1.) G.R. No.
152131 April 29, 2009 1673(3) of the Civil Code; and that since the demolition and construction of the new house was without the consent of the
FLORAIDA TERAÑA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO DE SAGUN, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XIV, NASUGBU,
BATANGAS AND ANTONIO B. SIMUANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petitioner Floraida Terana (petitioner) asks us to reverse and set aside, through this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 the
September 7, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its subsequent Resolution 3 denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
THE FACTS
The respondent Antonio Simuangco (respondent) owned a house and lot at 138 J.P. Laurel St., Nasugbu, Batangas, which he
leased to the petitioner.4 Sometime in 1996, the petitioner demolished the leased house and erected a new one in its place. 5 The
respondent alleged that this was done without his consent. 6 The Contract of Lease 7 defining the respective rights and obligations
of the parties contained the following provisions, which the petitioner allegedly violated:
3. That the lessee obligated herself with the Lessor by virtue of this Lease, to do the following, to wit:
a) xxx
b) To keep the leased property in such repair and condition as it was in the commencement of the Lease with the
exception of portions or parts which may be impaired due to reasonable wear and tear;
c) xxx
d) Not to make any alterations in the Leased property without the knowledge and consent of the Lessor; x x x
The petitioner allegedly also gave the materials from the demolished house to her sister, who built a house adjacent to the
respondent’s property.8 When the respondent discovered what the petitioner did, he immediately confronted her and advised her
to vacate the premises.9 She refused. On February 3, 1997, the respondent sent a letter demanding the petitioner to vacate the
leased property.10 Despite this letter of demand, which the petitioner received on February 10, 11 she still refused to vacate the said
property.
The respondent thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer12 against the petitioner on April 16, 1997 on the ground of the
petitioner’s violation of the terms of the Contract of Lease. 13 The respondent prayed for the petitioner’s ejectment of the leased
property, and for the award of ₱70,000.00, representing the cost of the materials from the demolished house, attorney’s fees, and
costs.14
The presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Hon. Herminia Lucas, inhibited from the case
on the ground that she is related to the respondent.15
The petitioner denied allegations of the complaint in her "Sagot."16 She claimed that she demolished the old building and built a
new one with the knowledge and consent of the respondent; that the original house was old and was on the verge of collapsing; 17
that without the timely repairs made by the petitioner, the house’s collapse would have caused the death of the petitioner and her
family. The petitioner prayed for the court to: 1) dismiss the ejectment case against her; and 2) award in her favor: a)
₱100,000.00 as moral damages, b) ₱200,000.00 as reimbursement for the expenses incurred in building the new house, c)
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and d) ₱10,000.00 as costs incurred in relation to the suit.18
The trial court called for a preliminary conference under Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure (RSP) and
Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and required the parties to file their position papers and affidavits of their witnesses
after they failed to reach an amicable settlement. 19 Instead of filing their position papers, both parties moved for an extension of
time to file the necessary pleadings. The trial court denied both motions on the ground that the RSP and the Rules of Court,
particularly Rule 70, Section 13(5), prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time.20
The MTC framed the issues in the case as follows:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the contract of lease when the old house was demolished and a new house
was constructed by the defendant; and
2. Whether or not defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for her expenses in the construction of the new house. 21
THE MTC’S DECISION22
The MTC rendered its decision on November 5, 199723 despite the parties’ failure to timely file their respective position papers. 24
The decision stated that: according to the parties’ Contract of Lease, the consent of the respondent must be obtained before any
alteration or repair could be done on the leased property; that the petitioner failed to produce any evidence that the respondent
had given her prior permission to demolish the leased house and construct a new one; that even in her answer, she failed to give
specific details about the consent given to her; that in demolishing the old structure and constructing the new one, the petitioner
violated the Contract of Lease; that this violation of the terms of the lease was a ground for judicial ejectment under Article
respondent, there was no basis to order the respondent to reimburse the petitioner.
The MTC thus ruled:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Antonio B. Simuangco and against the
defendant Aida Terana as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Aida Terana and all persons claiming right under her to vacate and surrender possession of
the subject house to the plaintiff;
2. Ordering the said defendant to pay the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as Attorney’s fees; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.25
Unaware that a decision had already been rendered, the petitioner filed a letter entitled Kahilingan,26 to which she attached her
position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses.27 The submission was essentially a motion for reconsideration of the denial of
motion for extension of time. On November 6, 1977, the MTC denied the petitioner’s Kahilingan as follows:
Defendant Aida Terania’s "KAHILINGAN" dated November 5, 1997 is DENIED for being moot and academic on account of the
decision on the merits rendered by this court dated November 4, 1997 relative to the instant case.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on November 12, 1997. 29 The records of the case were ordered elevated to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 439.
THE RTC’S DECISION30
The RTC rendered judgment affirming the decision of the MTC on February 26, 1998. The RTC ruled that: 1) the ruling of the
MTC was supported by the facts on record; 2) although the respondent failed to submit his position paper and the affidavits of
his witnesses, the MTC correctly rendered its decision on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties, as well as the
evidence on record; 3) the petitioner failed to show enough reason to reverse the MTC’s decision. The court further declared that
its decision was immediately executory, without prejudice to any appeal the parties may take.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial on March 3, 1998. 31 The petitioner argued that the
appealed MTC decision was not supported by any evidence, and that the respondent failed to substantiate the allegations of his
complaint and to discharge the burden of proving these allegations after the petitioner denied them in her Sagot. In effect, the
petitioner argued that the allegations of the complaint should not have been the sole basis for the judgment since she filed an
answer and denied the allegations in the complaint; the RTC should have also appreciated her position paper and the affidavit of
her witnesses that, although filed late, were nevertheless not expunged from the records.
In her motion for a new trial, the petitioner argued that her failure to submit her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses
within the 10-day period was due to excusable negligence. She explained that she incurred delay because of the distance of some
of her witnesses’ residence. The petitioner alleged that she had a good and meritorious claim against the respondent, and that
aside from her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses, she would adduce receipts and other pieces of documentary
evidence to establish the costs incurred in the demolition of the old house and the construction of the new one.
On April 28, 1998, the RTC granted the motion for reconsideration, and thus reversed its February 26, 1998 judgment, as well as
the November 5, 1997 decision of the MTC. It noted that: 1) the MTC rendered its decision before the petitioner was able to file
her position paper and the affidavit of her witnesses; 2) the rule on the timeliness of filing pleadings may be relaxed on equitable
considerations; and 3) the denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and/or new trial will result to a miscarriage of
justice. Thus, believing that it was equitable to relax the rules on the timeliness of the filing of pleadings, the RTC remanded the
case to the MTC for further proceedings, after giving the respondent the opportunity to submit his position paper and the
affidavits of his witnesses. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, on considerations of equity and substantial justice, and in the light of Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court, the judgment of this Court dated February 26, 1998, as well as the Decision dated November 4, 1997 of the Lower Court
in Civil Case No. 1305, are hereby both set aside. The lower court to which the records were heretofore remanded is hereby
ordered to conduct further proceedings in this case, after giving the plaintiff-appellee an opportunity to file his position paper
and affidavits of witnesses as required by Section 10, Rule 70, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [Underscoring supplied.]
SO ORDERED.
On May 9, 1998, the petitioner challenged the order of remand through another motion for reconsideration. 32 The petitioner
argued that since the original action for unlawful detainer had already been elevated from the MTC to the RTC, the RSP no
longer governed the disposal of the case. Before the RTC, the applicable rule is the Rules of Court, particularly Section 6 of Rule
37, which reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. – If a new trial is granted in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the
original judgment or final order shall be vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded evidence taken
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upon the former trial, in so far as the same is material and competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without
retaking the same.
Thus, the RTC should have conducted a trial de novo instead of remanding the case to the MTC. The petitioner further argued
that a remand to the court a quo may only be ordered under Section 8, Rule 4033 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC denied the motion noting that the petitioner missed the whole point of the reversal of the decision. First, the reversal
was made in the interest of substantial justice and the RTC hewed more to the "spirit that vivifieth than to the letter that
killeth,"34 and that "a lawsuit is best resolved on its full merits, unfettered by the stringent technicalities of procedure." The RTC
further emphasized that a remand is not prohibited under the Rules of Court and that Section 6 of Rule 135 allows it:
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect – When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer, and if the procedure
to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
Second, Rule 40 governs appeals from the MTC to the RTC. Nowhere in Rule 40 is there a provision similar to Section 6 of Rule
37.
Third, Section 6 of Rule 37 contemplates a motion for new trial and for reconsideration filed before a trial court a quo. The RTC
in this case was acting as an appellate court; the petitioner’s motion for new trial and reconsideration was directed against the
appellate judgment of the RTC, not the original judgment of the trial court.
Fourth, after Republic Act No. 6031 mandated municipal trial courts to record their proceedings, a trial de novo at the appellate
level may no longer be conducted. The appellate courts may instead review the evidence and records transmitted to it by the trial
court. Since the petitioner is asking the court to review the records of the MTC, inclusive of her position paper and the affidavits
of her witnesses, it is also important to give the respondent an opportunity to file his position paper and the affidavits of his
witnesses before the MTC renders a judgment. It is the MTC or the trial court that has the jurisdiction to do that.
THE CA’S DECISION
The CA affirmed the RTC in a decision promulgated on September 7, 2001. 35 The CA noted that the RTC’s order of remand was
not just based on equity and substantial justice, but was also based on law, specifically Section 6 of Rule 135. Thus, the CA ruled
that the RTC did not err in remanding the case to the MTC and ordering the conduct of further proceedings after giving the
respondent an opportunity to present his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses. This ruling did not satisfy petitioner,
giving way to the present petition.
THE PETITION
Before this Court, the petitioner alleges: 1) that the respondent made a request for the petitioner to vacate the subject property
because his nearest of kin needed it; 2) that she was only going to vacate the premises if she were reimbursed the actual cost
incurred in building the said house;36 3) that the case be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in the court
of origin, including memoranda and briefs submitted by the parties, instead of being remanded to the MTC.
In his Comment37 and Memorandum,38 the respondent joins the petitioner’s prayer for a ruling based on the records instead of
remanding the case to the MTC. He prays that, as the MTC ruled, the petitioner be ordered to vacate the leased property, and that
the petitioner’s claim for reimbursement be denied. The respondent argues that the MTC correctly ruled on the basis of the
parties’ pleadings, the stipulation of facts during the preliminary conference, and the records of the proceedings.
ISSUES
The petitioner submits the following as the issue to be decided:
[W]hether under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the Regional Trial Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, may order the case
remanded to the MTC after the plaintiff, herein respondent, failed to submit evidence in support of his complaint because his
Position Paper, affidavit of witnesses and evidence, were not submitted on time and the extension of time to file the same was
denied because it is prohibited under the Rules on Summary Procedure.39
which we break down into the following sub-issues: 1) whether a remand is proper; 2) whether the Court should appreciate the
petitioner’s position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses; and 3) whether the complaint for unlawful detainer should be
dismissed.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition is partly meritorious.
Remand Not Necessary
We find that a remand of the case to the lower courts is no longer necessary, given the pleadings and submissions filed, and the
records of the proceedings below. A remand would delay the overdue resolution of this case (originally filed with the MTC on
April 16, 1997), and would run counter to the spirit and intent of the RSP.40
Petitioner’s Position Paper and the Affidavits of Her Witnesses Cannot Be Admitted
Should the Court admit the petitioner’s position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses attached to her Kahilingan?
The intent and terms of the RSP both speak against the liberality that the petitioner sees. By its express terms, the purpose of the
RSP is to "achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination" of the cases they cover, among them, forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases.41 To achieve this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit certain motions and pleadings that could cause
delay, among them, a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper. If the extension for the filing
of these submissions cannot be allowed, we believe it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed late.
Effectively, we would then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty
Development Corporation v. Florentino, 42 albeit on the issue of late filing of an answer in a summary proceeding, we stated that
"[t]o admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures, the very mischief that the rules seek to redress."
The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is due to the essence and purpose of these rules. The law
looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency presented by this
situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious and inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful possessor to the enjoyment of the
subject property.43 This fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment case quickly. Thus, we cannot reward the petitioner’s late filing
of her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses by admitting them now.
The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from issuing a judgment on the ejectment
complaint. Section 10 of the RSP states:
Section 10. Rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. [Underscoring supplied.]
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order
specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten
(10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or
the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment.
Thus, the situation obtaining in the present case has been duly provided for by the Rules; it was correct to render a judgment, as
the MTC did, after one party failed to file their position paper and supporting affidavits.
That a position paper is not indispensable to the court’s authority to render judgment is further evident from what the RSP
provides regarding a preliminary conference: "on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the
parties, judgment may be rendered without the need for further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered
within 30 days from the issuance of the order." 44 Thus, the proceedings may stop at that point, without need for the submission of
position papers. In such a case, what would be extant in the record and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint,
answer, and the record of the preliminary conference.
Unlawful detainer
The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the following essential requisites:
1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;
2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;
3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to
possess;
4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and
5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.45
Requisites 1, 4, and 5 have been duly established. The presence of the Contract of Lease is undisputed; the letter of demand was
sent on February 3, 1997, and received by the petitioner on February 10, 1997; and the action was filed on April 16, 1997, well
within the one-year period from the letter of demand. For our determination is whether the petitioner’s right to possess the
subject property may be terminated by virtue of her violation of the terms of the contract. If we answer in the affirmative, her
continued detention of the property is illegal.
Section 1673(3) of the Civil Code answers this question by providing that the lessor may terminate the lease contract for
violation of any of the conditions or terms agreed upon, 46 and may judicially eject the lessee.47 One of the stipulated terms of the
parties’ Contract of Lease, as narrated above, is that no alterations may be made on the leased property without the knowledge
and consent of the lessor. The issue in this case is beyond the fact of alteration since it is not disputed that the petitioner
demolished the house under lease and built a new one. The crucial issue is whether the demolition was with or without the
knowledge and consent of the respondent.
The petitioner contends that the Court should not give credence to the respondent’s claim that he neither had knowledge of nor
gave his consent to her acts. She argued that the respondent had the burden of proving this allegation with positive evidence after
she frontally denied it in her answer. Since the respondent failed to discharge this burden, she argues that she no longer needed to
prove her defense that the demolition and construction were done with the respondent’s knowledge and consent. 48
The petitioner’s contention is misplaced.
Page 2 of 46
First, the material allegations in a complaint must be specifically denied by the defendant in his answer. Section 10, Rule 8 of the
1997 Rules of Court, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall
set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of
an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so
state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that material allegations in the complaint which are not specifically
denied, other than the amount of unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted. A denial made without setting forth the substance
of the matters relied upon in support of the denial, even when to do so is practicable, does not amount to a specific denial. 49
The petitioner’s denial in her answer consists of the following:
1. Maliban sa personal na katangian at tirahan ng nasasakdal, ay walang katotuhanan ang mga isinasakdal ng
nagsasakdal;
2. Na hindi lumabag sa kasunduan ng upahan ang nasasakdal;
3. Na, ang pagpapagawa ng bahay na inuupahan ng nasasakdal ay sa kaalaman at kapahintulutan ng nagsasakdal
at higit na gumanda at tumibay ang bahay ng nagsasakdal sa pamamagitan ng pagpapagawa ng nasasakdal; xxx50
We do not find this denial to be specific as the petitioner failed to set forth the substance of the matters in which she relied upon
to support her denial. The petitioner merely alleged that consent was given; how and why, she did not say. If indeed consent were
given, it would have been easy to fill in the details. She could have stated in her pleadings that she verbally informed the
respondent of the need for the repairs, or wrote him a letter. She could have stated his response, and how it was conveyed,
whether verbally or in writing. She could have stated when the consent was solicited and procured. These, she failed to do. Ergo,
the petitioner is deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint.
Second, both parties failed to present evidence other than the allegations in their pleadings. Thus, the court may weigh the
parties’ allegations against each other. The petitioner presented a general denial, while the respondent set forth an affirmative
assertion. This Court has time and again said that a general denial cannot be given more weight than an affirmative assertion. 51
Damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer action are limited to rentals or reasonable compensation for the use of the property
This Court has no jurisdiction to award the reimbursement prayed for by both parties. Both parties seek damages other than
rentals or reasonable compensation for the use of the property, which are the only forms of damages that may be recovered in an
unlawful detainer case.52 Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to order the award of an amount
representing arrears of rent or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises if it finds that the allegations
of the complaint are true.531avvphil.zw+
The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer case was explained in Araos v. Court of
Appeals,54 wherein the Court held that:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value
or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the
only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which
the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and
not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is
an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires
a summary procedure. The joinder of the two actions is specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder
may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said
court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction. [Underscoring supplied.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-48534 is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner FLORAIDA TERANA and all persons claiming right under her are ordered to
vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent ANTONIO SIMUANGCO. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2.) G.R. No. 166714 February 9, 2007
AMELIA S. ROBERTS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARTIN B. PAPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 69034 which
reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 01-431. The
RTC ruling had affirmed with modification the Decision 3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, Makati City in
Civil Case No. 66847. The petition likewise assails the Resolution of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration of its
decision.
The Antecedents
The spouses Martin and Lucina Papio were the owners of a 274-square-meter residential lot located in Makati (now Makati City)
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-44980. 4 In order to secure a ₱59,000.00 loan from the Amparo
Investments Corporation, they executed a real estate mortgage on the property. Upon Papio’s failure to pay the loan, the
corporation filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Since the couple needed money to redeem the property and to prevent the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, they executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property on April 13, 1982 in favor of Martin Papio’s cousin, Amelia Roberts. Of the
₱85,000.00 purchase price, ₱59,000.00 was paid to the Amparo Investments Corporation, while the ₱26,000.00 difference was
retained by the spouses.5 As soon as the spouses had settled their obligation, the corporation returned the owner’s duplicate of
TCT No. S-44980, which was then delivered to Amelia Roberts.
Thereafter, the parties (Amelia Roberts as lessor and Martin Papio as lessee) executed a two-year contract of lease dated April
15, 1982, effective May 1, 1982. The contract was subject to renewal or extension for a like period at the option of the lessor, the
lessee waiving thereby the benefits of an implied new lease. The lessee was obliged to pay monthly rentals of ₱800.00 to be
deposited in the lessor’s account at the Bank of America, Makati City branch.6
On July 6, 1982, TCT No. S-44980 was cancelled, and TCT No. 114478 was issued in the name of Amelia Roberts as owner. 7
Martin Papio paid the rentals from May 1, 1982 to May 1, 1984, and thereafter, for another year. 8 He then failed to pay rentals,
but he and his family nevertheless remained in possession of the property for a period of almost thirteen (13) years.
In a letter dated June 3, 1998, Amelia Roberts, through counsel, reminded Papio that he failed to pay the monthly rental of
₱2,500.00 from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1997, and ₱10,000.00 from January 1, 1998 to May 31, 1998; thus, his total
liability was ₱410,000.00. She demanded that Papio vacate the property within 15 days from receipt of the letter in case he failed
to settle the amount.9 Because he refused to pay, Papio received another letter from Roberts on April 22, 1999, demanding, for
the last time, that he and his family vacate the property.10 Again, Papio refused to leave the premises.
On June 28, 1999, Amelia Roberts, through her attorney-in-fact, Matilde Aguilar, filed a Complaint 11 for unlawful detainer and
damages against Martin Papio before the MeTC, Branch 64, Makati City. She alleged the following in her complaint:
Sometime in 1982 she purchased from defendant a 274-sq-m residential house and lot situated at No. 1046 Teresa St., Brgy.
Valenzuela, Makati City.12 Upon Papio’s pleas to continue staying in the property, they executed a two-year lease contract 13
which commenced on May 1, 1982. The monthly rental was ₱800.00. Thereafter, TCT No. 114478 14 was issued in her favor and
she paid all the realty taxes due on the property. When the term of the lease expired, she still allowed Papio and his family to
continue leasing the property. However, he took advantage of her absence and stopped payment beginning January 1986, and
refused to pay despite repeated demands. In June 1998, she sent a demand letter 15 through counsel requiring Papio to pay rentals
from January 1986 up to May 1998 and to vacate the leased property. The accumulated arrears in rental are as follows: (a)
₱360,000.00 from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1997 at ₱2,500.00 per month; and (b) ₱50,000.00, from January 1, 1998 to
May 31, 1998 at ₱10,000.00 per month. 16 She came to the Philippines but all efforts at an amicable settlement proved futile.
Thus, in April 1999, she sent the final demand letter to defendant directing him and his family to pay and immediately vacate the
leased premises.17
Roberts appended to her complaint copies of the April 13, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale, the April 15, 1982 Contract of Lease, and
TCT No. 114478.
In his Answer with counterclaim, Papio alleged the following:
He executed the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale and the contract of lease. Roberts, his cousin who is a resident of
California, United States of America (USA), arrived in the Philippines and offered to redeem the property. Believing that she had
made the offer for the purpose of retaining his ownership over the property, he accepted. She then remitted ₱59,000.00 to the
mortgagor for his account, after which the mortgagee cancelled the real estate mortgage. However, he was alarmed when the
plaintiff had a deed of absolute sale over the property prepared (for ₱83,000.00 as consideration) and asked him to sign the same.
Page 3 of 46
She also demanded that the defendant turn over the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. S-44980. The defendant was in a quandary. He
then believed that if he signed the deed of absolute sale, Roberts would acquire ownership over the property. He asked her to
allow him to redeem or reacquire the property at any time for a reasonable amount. 18 When Roberts agreed, Papio signed the
deed of absolute sale.
Pursuant to the right to redeem/repurchase given him by Roberts, Papio purchased the property for ₱250,000.00. In July 1985,
since Roberts was by then already in the USA, he remitted to her authorized representative, Perlita Ventura, the amount of
₱150,000.00 as partial payment for the property. 19 On June 16, 1986, she again remitted ₱100,000.00, through Ventura. Both
payments were evidenced by receipts signed by Ventura. 20 Roberts then declared that she would execute a deed of absolute sale
and surrender the title to the property. However, Ventura had apparently misappropriated ₱39,000.00 out of the ₱250,000.00 that
she had received; Roberts then demanded that she pay the amount misappropriated before executing the deed of absolute sale.
Thus, the sole reason why Roberts refused to abide by her promise was the failure of her authorized representative to remit the
full amount of ₱250,000.00. Despite Papio’s demands, Roberts refused to execute a deed of absolute sale. Accordingly,
defendant posited that plaintiff had no cause of action to demand payment of rental and eject him from the property.
Papio appended to his Answer the following: (1) the letter dated July 18, 1986 of Perlita Ventura to the plaintiff wherein the
former admitted having used the money of the plaintiff to defray the plane fares of Perlita’s parents to the USA, and pleaded that
she be allowed to repay the amount within one year; (b) the letter of Eugene Roberts (plaintiff’s husband) to Perlita Ventura
dated July 25, 1986 where he accused Ventura of stealing the money of plaintiff Amelia (thus preventing the latter from paying
her loan on her house and effect the cancellation of the mortgage), and demanded that she deposit the balance; 21 and (c)
plaintiff’s letter to defendant Papio dated July 25, 1986 requesting the latter to convince Ventura to remit the balance of
₱39,000.00 so that the plaintiff could transfer the title of the property to the defendant.22
Papio asserted that the letters of Roberts and her husband are in themselves admissions or declarations against interest, hence,
admissible to prove that he had reacquired the property although the title was still in her possession.
In her Affidavit and Position Paper, 23 Roberts averred that she had paid the real estate taxes on the property after she had
purchased it; Papio’s initial right to occupy the property was terminated when the original lease period expired; and his
continued possession was only by mere tolerance. She further alleged that the Deed of Sale states on its face that the conveyance
of the property was absolute and unconditional. She also claimed that any right to repurchase the property must appear in a
public document pursuant to Article 1358, Paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of the Phililppines. 24 Since no such document exists,
defendant’s supposed real interest over the property could not be enforced without violating the Statute of Frauds. 25 She stressed
that her Torrens title to the property was an "absolute and indefeasible evidence of her ownership of the property which is
binding and conclusive upon the whole world."
Roberts admitted that she demanded ₱39,000.00 from the defendant in her letter dated July 25, 1986. However, she averred that
the amount represented his back rentals on the property. 26 She declared that she neither authorized Ventura to sell the property
nor to receive the purchase price therefor. She merely authorized her to receive the rentals from defendant and to deposit them in
her account. She did not know that Ventura had received ₱250,000.00 from Papio in July 1985 and on June 16, 1986, and had
signed receipts therefor. It was only on February 11, 1998 that she became aware of the receipts when she received defendant
Papio’s letter to which were appended the said receipts. She and her husband offered to sell the property to the defendant in 1984
for US$15,000.00 on a "take it or leave it" basis when they arrived in the Philippines in May 1984. 27 However, defendant refused
to accept the offer. The spouses then offered to sell the property anew on December 20, 1997, for ₱670,000.00 inclusive of back
rentals.28 However, defendant offered to settle his account with the spouses. 29 Again, the offer came on January 11, 1998, but it
was rejected. The defendant insisted that he had already purchased the property in July 1985 for ₱250,000.00.
Roberts insisted that Papio’s claim of the right to repurchase the property, as well as his claim of payment therefor, is belied by
his own letter in which he offered to settle plaintiff’s claim for back rentals. Even assuming that the purchase price of the
property had been paid through Ventura, Papio did not adduce any proof to show that Ventura had been authorized to sell the
property or to accept any payment thereon. Any payment to Ventura could have no binding effect on her since she was not privy
to the transaction; if at all, such agreement would be binding only on Papio and Ventura.
She further alleged that defendant’s own inaction belies his claim of ownership over the property: first, he failed to cause any
notice or annotation to be made on the Register of Deed’s copy of TCT No. 114478 in order to protect his supposed adverse
claim; second, he did not institute any action against Roberts to compel the execution of the necessary deed of transfer of title in
his favor; and third, the defense of ownership over the property was raised only after Roberts demanded him to vacate the
property.
Based solely on the parties’ pleadings, the MeTC rendered its January 18, 2001 Decision 30 in favor of Roberts. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding this case for the plaintiff, the defendant is hereby ordered to:
1. Vacate the leased premises known as 1046 Teresa St., Valenzuela, Makati City;
2. Pay plaintiff the reasonable rentals accrual for the period January 1, 1996 to December 13, 1997 at the rate
equivalent to Php2,500.00 per month and thereafter, Php10,000.00 from January 1998 until he actually vacates the
premises;
3. Pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees as Php20,000.00; and
4. Pay the costs
SO ORDERED.31
The MeTC held that Roberts merely tolerated the stay of Papio in the property after the expiration of the contract of lease on
May 1, 1984; hence, she had a cause of action against him since the only elements in an unlawful detainer action are the fact of
lease and the expiration of its term. The defendant as tenant cannot controvert the title of the plaintiff or assert any right adverse
thereto or set up any inconsistent right to change the existing relation between them. The plaintiff need not prove her ownership
over the property inasmuch as evidence of ownership can be admitted only for the purpose of determining the character and
extent of possession, and the amount of damages arising from the detention.
The court further ruled that Papio made no denials as to the existence and authenticity of Roberts’ title to the property. It declared
that "the certificate of title is indefeasible in favor of the person whose name appears therein and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of the one-year period from the date of issue," and that a Torrens title, "which enjoys a strong presumption of
regularity and validity, is generally a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein."
As to Papio’s claim that the transfer of the property was one with right of repurchase, the MeTC held it to be bereft of merit
since the Deed of Sale is termed as "absolute and unconditional." The court ruled that the right to repurchase is not a right
granted to the seller by the buyer in a subsequent instrument but rather, a right reserved in the same contract of sale. Once the
deed of absolute sale is executed, the seller can no longer reserve the right to repurchase; any right thereafter granted in a
separate document cannot be a right of repurchase but some other right.
As to the receipts of payment signed by Ventura, the court gave credence to Roberts’s declaration in her Affidavit that she
authorized Ventura only to collect rentals from Papio, and not to receive the repurchase price. Papio’s letter of January 31, 1998,
which called her attention to the fact that she had been sending people without written authority to collect money since 1985,
bolstered the court’s finding that the payment, if at all intended for the supposed repurchase, never redounded to the benefit of
the spouses Roberts.
Papio appealed the decision to the RTC, alleging the following:
I.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT OUTRIGHT ON THE
GROUND OF LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
II.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHICH ESTABLISHED THAT A REPURCHASE TRANSACTION EXISTED BETWEEN THE
PARTIES ONLY THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WITHHELD THE EXECUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE
AND THE TRANSFER OF TITLE OF THE SAME IN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S NAME.
III.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE LETTERS OF PLAINTIFF-[APPELLEE]
AND OF HER HUSBAND ADDRESSED TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND HIS WIFE ARE IN THEMSELVES
ADMISSION AND/OR DECLARATION OF THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD DULY PAID PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE OF THE PURCHASE AMOUNT COVERING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT OUTRIGHT
CONSIDERING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WHO IS [AN] AMERICAN CITIZEN AND RESIDENT THEREIN HAD
NOT APPEARED IN COURT ONCE, NEITHER WAS HER ALLEGED ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MATILDE AGUILAR NOR
[DID] THE LATTER EVER [FURNISH] THE LOWER COURT A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY AUTHORIZING HER
TO APPEAR IN COURT IN BEHALF OF HER PRINCIPAL.32
Papio maintained that Roberts had no cause of action for eviction because she had already ceded her right thereto when she
allowed him to redeem and reacquire the property upon payment of ₱250,000.00 to Ventura, her duly authorized representative.
He also contended that Roberts’s claim that the authority of Ventura is limited only to the collection of the rentals and not of the
purchase price was a mere afterthought, since her appended Affidavit was executed sometime in October 1999 when the
proceedings in the MeTC had already started.
On March 26, 2001, Roberts filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. 33 The court granted the motion in an Order 34 dated
June 19, 2001. Subsequently, a Writ of Execution 35 pending appeal was issued on September 28, 2001. On October 29, 2001,
Sheriff Melvin M. Alidon enforced the writ and placed Roberts in possession of the property.
Page 4 of 46
Meanwhile, Papio filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati City, for specific performance with damages against Roberts. Papio,
as plaintiff, claimed that he entered into a contract of sale with pacto de retro with Roberts, and prayed that the latter be ordered
to execute a Deed of Sale over `the property in his favor and transfer the title over the property to and in his name. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851.
On October 24, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision of the MeTC. The fallo of the decision
reads:36
Being in accordance with law and the circumstances attendant to the instant case, the court finds merit in plaintiff-appellee’s
claim. Wherefore, the challenged decision dated January 18, 2001 is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.37
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. 38 In an Order39 dated February 26, 2002, the court denied the
motion of Papio but modified its decision declaring that the computation of the accrued rentals should commence from January
1986, not January 1996. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
Wherefore, the challenged decision dated January 18, 2001 is hereby affirmed with modification that defendant pay plaintiff the
reasonable rentals accrued for the period January 1, 1986 to December [31, 1997] per month and thereafter and ₱10,000.00 [per
month] from January 1998 to October 28, 2001 when defendant-appellant actually vacated the subject leased premises.
SO ORDERED.40
On February 28, 2002, Papio filed a petition for review 41 in the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in not finding that he had
reacquired the property from Roberts for ₱250,000.00, but the latter refused to execute a deed of absolute sale and transfer the
title in his favor. He insisted that the MeTC and the RTC erred in giving credence to petitioner’s claim that she did not authorize
Ventura to receive his payments for the purchase price of the property, citing Roberts’ letter dated July 25, 1986 and the letter of
Eugene Roberts to Ventura of even date. He also averred that the MeTC and the RTC erred in not considering his documentary
evidence in deciding the case.
On August 31, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition. The appellate court set aside the decision of the RTC and
ordered the RTC to dismiss the complaint. The decretal portion of the Decision42 reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered: (1) rendering an
initial determination that the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated April 13, 1982 is in fact an equitable mortgage under Article 1603 of
the New Civil Code; and (2) resolving therefore that petitioner Martin B. Papio is entitled to possession of the property subject
of this action; (3) But such determination of ownership and equitable mortgage are not clothed with finality and will not
constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership and such judgment shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in the
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession. All other counterclaims for damages are
hereby dismissed. Cost against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.43
According to the appellate court, although the MeTC and RTC were correct in holding that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint for unlawful detainer, they erred in ignoring Papio’s defense of equitable mortgage, and in not finding that the
transaction covered by the deed of absolute sale by and between the parties was one of equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of
the New Civil Code. The appellate court ruled that Papio retained the ownership of the property and its peaceful possession;
hence, the MeTC should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case No. 01-851 relative to his
claim of ownership over the property.
Roberts filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the following grounds:
I. Petitioner did not allege in his Answer the defense of equitable mortgage; hence, the lower courts [should] not have
discussed the same;
II. Even assuming that Petitioner alleged the defense of equitable mortgage, the MeTC could not have ruled upon the
said defense,
III. The M[e]TC and the RTC were not remiss in the exercise of their jurisdiction. 44
The CA denied the motion.
In this petition for review, Amelia Salvador-Roberts, as petitioner, avers that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
M[e]TC AN(D) THE RTC WERE REMISS IN THE EXERCISE OF THAT JURISDICTION ACQUIRED
BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL PETITIONER’S DEFENSE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN REQUIRING THE M[e]TC
AND RTC TO RULE ON A DEFENSE WHICH WAS NEVER AVAILED OF BY RESPONDENT. 45
Petitioner argues that respondent is barred from raising the issue of equitable mortgage because his defense in the MeTC and
RTC was that he had repurchased the property from the petitioner; by such representation, he had impliedly admitted the
existence and validity of the deed of absolute sale whereby ownership of the property was transferred to petitioner but reverted
to him upon the exercise of said right. The respondent even filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, which is
now pending in the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851 entitled "Martin B. Papio vs. Amelia Salvador-
Roberts." In that case, respondent claimed that his transaction with the petitioner was a sale with pacto de retro. Petitioner posits
that Article 1602 of the Civil Code applies only when the defendant specifically alleges this defense. Consequently, the appellate
court was proscribed from finding that petitioner and respondent had entered into an equitable mortgage under the deed of
absolute sale.
Petitioner further avers that respondent was ably represented by counsel and was aware of the difference between a pacto de
retro sale and an equitable mortgage; thus, he could not have been mistaken in declaring that he repurchased the property from
her.
As to whether a sale is in fact an equitable mortgage, petitioner claims that the issue should be properly addressed and resolved
by the RTC in an action to enforce ownership, not in an ejectment case before the MeTC where the main issue involved is
possession de facto. According to her, the obvious import of the CA Decision is that, in resolving an ejectment case, the lower
court must pass upon the issue of ownership (in this case, by applying the presumptions under Art. 1602) which, in effect, would
use the same yardstick as though it is the main action. The procedure will not only promote multiplicity of suits but also place
the new owner in the absurd position of having to first seek the declaration of ownership before filing an ejectment suit.
Respondent counters that the defense of equitable mortgage need not be particularly stated to apprise petitioner of the nature and
character of the repurchase agreement. He contends that he had amply discussed in his pleadings before the trial and appellate
courts all the surrounding circumstances of the case, such as the relative situation of the parties at the time; their attitude, acts,
conduct, and declarations; and the negotiations between them that led to the repurchase agreement. Thus, he argues that the CA
correctly ruled that the contract was one of equitable mortgage. He insists that petitioner allowed him to redeem and reacquire
the property, and accepted his full payment of the property through Ventura, the authorized representative, as shown by the
signed receipts.
The threshold issues are the following: (1) whether the MeTC had jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer to resolve the
issue of who between petitioner and respondent is the owner of the property and entitled to the de facto possession thereof; (2)
whether the transaction entered into between the parties under the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Contract of Lease is an
equitable mortgage over the property; and (3) whether the petitioner is entitled to the material or de facto possession of the
property.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, the CA ruling (which upheld the jurisdiction of the MeTC to resolve the issue of who between petitioner or
respondent is the lawful owner of the property, and is thus entitled to the material or de facto possession thereof) is correct.
Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession. The judgment rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with
respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment
would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. 46
The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership of the property of the defendant. 47 The MeTC is not
divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action simply because the defendant asserts ownership over the property.
The sole issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is material or de facto possession of the property. Even if the
defendant claims juridical possession or ownership over the property based on a claim that his transaction with the plaintiff
relative to the property is merely an equitable mortgage, or that he had repurchased the property from the plaintiff, the MeTC
may still delve into and take cognizance of the case and make an initial or provisional determination of who between the plaintiff
and the defendant is the owner and, in the process, resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession. The MeTC, in unlawful
detainer case, decides the question of ownership only if it is intertwined with and necessary to resolve the issue of possession. 48
The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely provisional or interlocutory. Any question involving the
issue of ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action brought specifically to settle the question with finality, in
this case, Civil Case No. 01-851 which respondent filed before the RTC.
The ruling of the CA, that the contract between petitioner and respondent was an equitable mortgage, is incorrect. The fact of the
matter is that the respondent intransigently alleged in his answer, and even in his affidavit and position paper, that petitioner had
granted him the right to redeem or repurchase the property at any time and for a reasonable amount; and that, he had, in fact,
repurchased the property in July 1985 for ₱250,000.00 which he remitted to petitioner through an authorized representative who
signed receipts therefor; he had reacquired ownership and juridical possession of the property after his repurchase thereof in
1985; and consequently, petitioner was obliged to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in his favor.
Notably, respondent alleged that, as stated in his letter to petitioner, he was given the right to reacquire the property in 1982
within two years upon the payment of ₱53,000.00, plus petitioner’s airfare for her trip to the Philippines from the USA and back;
petitioner promised to sign the deed
Page 5 of 46
of absolute sale. He even filed a complaint against the petitioner in the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851, for specific
performance with damages to compel petitioner to execute the said deed of absolute sale over the property presumably on the
strength of Articles 1357 and 1358 of the New Civil Code. Certainly then, his claim that petitioner had given him the right to
repurchase the property is antithetical to an equitable mortgage.
An equitable mortgage is one that, although lacking in some formality, form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to change a real property as security for a debt and contain nothing impossible or
contrary to law.49 A contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage if the following requisites are present: (a) the parties
entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and (b) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of
mortgage.50 The decisive factor is the intention of the parties.
In an equitable mortgage, the mortgagor retains ownership over the property but subject to foreclosure and sale at public auction
upon failure of the mortgagor to pay his obligation. 51 In contrast, in a pacto de retro sale, ownership of the property sold is
immediately transferred to the vendee a retro subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase the property upon
compliance with legal requirements for the repurchase. The failure of the vendor a retro to exercise the right to repurchase within
the agreed time vests upon the vendee a retro, by operation of law, absolute title over the property. 52
One repurchases only what one has previously sold. The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the
same parties.53 By insisting that he had repurchased the property, respondent thereby admitted that the deed of absolute sale
executed by him and petitioner on April 13, 1982 was, in fact and in law, a deed of absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage;
hence, he had acquired ownership over the property based on said deed. Respondent is, thus, estopped from asserting that the
contract under the deed of absolute sale is an equitable mortgage unless there is allegation and evidence of palpable mistake on
the part of respondent;54 or a fraud on the part of petitioner. Respondent made no such allegation in his pleadings and affidavit.
On the contrary, he maintained that petitioner had sold the property to him in July 1985 and acknowledged receipt of the
purchase price thereof except the amount of ₱39,000.00 retained by Perlita Ventura. Respondent is thus bound by his admission
of petitioner’s ownership of the property and is barred from claiming otherwise.55
Respondent’s admission that petitioner acquired ownership over the property under the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale is
buttressed by his admission in the Contract of Lease dated April 15, 1982 that petitioner was the owner of the property, and that
he had paid the rentals for the duration of the contract of lease and even until 1985 upon its extension. Respondent was obliged
to prove his defense that petitioner had given him the right to repurchase, and that petitioner obliged herself to resell the property
for ₱250,000.00 when they executed the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale.
We have carefully reviewed the case and find that respondent failed to adduce competent and credible evidence to prove his
claim.
As gleaned from the April 13, 1982 deed, the right of respondent to repurchase the property is not incorporated therein. The
contract is one of absolute sale and not one with right to repurchase. The law states that if the terms of a contract are clear and
leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. 56 When the
language of the contract is explicit, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters, the courts may not read into it any other
intention that would contradict its plain import. 57 The clear terms of the contract should never be the subject matter of
interpretation. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal interpretation justifies the creation of a contract for the parties which
they did not make themselves, or the imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation to assume simply or merely to avoid
seeming hardships.58 Their true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be presumed that the contracting parties know their scope
and effects.59 As the Court held in Villarica, et al. v. Court of Appeals:60
The right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but is a right reserved by the
vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. Once the instrument of absolute sale is executed,
the vendor can no longer reserve the right to repurchase, and any right thereafter granted the vendor by the vendee in a separate
instrument cannot be a right of repurchase but some other right like the option to buy in the instant case.61
In Ramos v. Icasiano,62 we also held that an agreement to repurchase becomes a promise to sell when made after the sale because
when the sale is made without such agreement the purchaser acquires the thing sold absolutely; and, if he afterwards grants the
vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered into by the purchaser as absolute owner. An option to buy or a
promise to sell is different and distinct from the right of repurchase that must be reserved by means of stipulations to that effect
in the contract of sale.63
There is no evidence on record that, on or before July 1985, petitioner agreed to sell her property to the respondent for
₱250,000.00. Neither is there any documentary evidence showing that Ventura was authorized to offer for sale or sell the
property for and in behalf of petitioner for ₱250,000.00, or to receive the said amount from respondent as purchase price of the
property. The rule is that when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall
be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void 64 and cannot produce any legal effect as to transfer the property from its lawful
owner.65 Being inexistent and void from the very beginning, said contract cannot be ratified. 66 Any contract entered into by
Ventura for and in behalf of petitioner relative to the sale of the property is void and cannot be ratified by the latter. A void
contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone.67
Respondent also failed to prove that the negotiations between him and petitioner has culminated in his offer to buy the property
for ₱250,000.00, and that they later on agreed to the sale of the property for the same amount. He likewise failed to prove that he
purchased and reacquired the property in July 1985. The evidence on record shows that petitioner had offered to sell the property
for US$15,000 on a "take it or leave it" basis in May 1984 upon the expiration of the Contract of Lease 68 —an offer that was
rejected by respondent—which is why on December 30, 1997, petitioner and her husband offered again to sell the property to
respondent for ₱670,000.00 inclusive of back rentals and the purchase price of the property under the April 13, 1982 Deed of
absolute Sale.69 The offer was again rejected by respondent. The final offer appears to have been made on January 11, 1998 70 but
again, like the previous negotiations, no contract was perfected between the parties.
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or
to render some service.71 Under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, there is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Contracts are perfected by mere consent manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause
which are to constitute the contract.72 Once perfected, they bind the contracting parties and the obligations arising therefrom have
the form of law between the parties which must be complied with in good faith. The parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but also to the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good
faith, usage and law.73
There was no contract of sale entered into by the parties based on the Receipts dated July 1985 and June 16, 1986, signed by
Perlita Ventura and the letter of petitioner to respondent dated July 25, 1986.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate
thing and the other, to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. 74 The absence of any of the essential elements will
negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. As the Court ruled in Boston Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo: 75
A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal or real property because it
seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties. Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and
enforceable contract of sale. The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a price
fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale. 76
A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. When there is merely an offer by one
party without acceptance of the other, there is no contract. 77 When the contract of sale is not perfected, it cannot, as an
independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation between the parties.78
Respondent’s reliance on petitioner’s letter to him dated July 25, 1986 is misplaced. The letter reads in full:
7-25-86
Dear Martin & Ising,
Enclosed for your information is the letter written by my husband to Perlita. I hope that you will be able to convince your cousin
that it’s to her best interest to deposit the balance of your payment to me of ₱39,000.00 in my bank acct. per our agreement and
send me my bank book right away so that we can transfer the title of the property.
Regards,
Amie 79
We have carefully considered the letter of Perlita Ventura, dated July 18, 1986, and the letter of Eugene Roberts, dated July 25,
1986, where Ventura admitted having used the money of petitioner amounting to ₱39,000.00 without the latter’s knowledge for
the plane fare of Ventura’s parents. Ventura promised to refund the amount of ₱39,000.00, inclusive of interests, within one
year.80 Eugene Roberts berated Ventura and called her a thief for stealing his and petitioner’s money and that of respondent’s
wife, Ising, who allegedly told petitioner that she, Ising, loaned the money to her parents for their plane fare to the USA. Neither
Ventura nor Eugene Roberts declared in their letters that Ventura had used the ₱250,000.00 which respondent gave to her.
Petitioner in her letter to respondent did not admit, either expressly or impliedly, having received ₱211,000.00 from Ventura.
Moreover, in her letter to petitioner, only a week earlier, or on July 18, 1986, Ventura admitted having spent the ₱39,000.00 and
pleaded that she be allowed to refund the amount within one (1) year, including interests.
Naririto ang total ng pera mo sa bankbook mo, ₱55,000.00 pati na yong deposit na sarili mo at bale ang nagalaw ko diyan ay
₱39,000.00. Huwag kang mag-alala ibabalik ko rin sa iyo sa loob ng isang taon pati interest.
Ate Per81 1awphi1.net
It is incredible that Ventura was able to remit to petitioner ₱211,000.00 before July 25, 1986 when only a week earlier, she was
pleading to petitioner for a period of one year within which to refund the ₱39,000.00 to petitioner.
Page 6 of 46
It would have bolstered his cause if respondent had submitted an affidavit of Ventura stating that she had remitted ₱211,000.00
out of the ₱250,000.00 she received from respondent in July 1985 and June 20, 1986.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69034 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, affirmed with modification by the
Regional Trial Court, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 7 of 46

3.) G.R. No. 155343 September 2, 2005
BENGUET CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CORDILLERA CARABALLO MISSION, INC., herein represented by its Chairman, Greg Bernabe, Jr., TEOFILO
"BOY" DICANG and GREG BERNABE, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Resolution1 dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 72150 and the Decision2 dated June 14, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch VIII, in
Civil Case No. 2K-CV-1698, and thus reinstate the Decision3 dated December 21, 2001 of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon,
Benguet in Civil Case No. 314.
Petitioner Benguet Corporation owns Pilo mineral claim covering several hectares of land in Virac, Itogon, Benguet. It planted
pine trees in compliance with the directive of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and built roads,
buildings and security gates in the covered area. Sometime in September 1997, petitioner discovered that representatives of
respondent Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc. (CCMI) bulldozed and leveled the grounds within its Pilo mineral claim in
preparation for the construction of a school. Despite petitioner’s demands to cease, respondents continued with the construction
activities.
Petitioner filed a complaint4 for forcible entry against respondents in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Itogon, Benguet. The
MTC ruled in favor of petitioner’s prior possession of the land since August 10, 1964, vis-à-vis CCMI’s possession which began
only in 1994. The court ordered respondents to vacate the premises, restore complete possession to the petitioner, and pay the
cost. 5
On appeal, the RTC reversed the judgment of the MTC and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It found
that the complaint did not state the means of dispossession and did not constitute an action for forcible entry.6
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition for failure to attach (a) the board
resolution authorizing the affiant to file the complaint, and (b) the certified copies of other pleadings and documents pertinent
and relevant thereto.7
Petitioner now comes before us alleging that
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error –
a) in denying due course the petition (sic);
b) in not considering the issues raised in the petition which are actually based on facts not controverted but even stipulated by the
parties;
c) in not disposing the issues which are not even factual but legal issues based on duly established facts at the trial court. 8
Simply stated, we are asked to resolve the following issues: (1) Is petitioner’s failure to attach the board resolution and the
copies of other pleadings an excusable mistake? (2) Does the complaint state a cause of action? and (3) If it does, who should
have possession?
On the first issue, petitioner claims to have substantially complied with the rules, and pleads for the liberal construction, as a
matter of substantive justice. It averred that affiant Marcelo A. Bolaño was authorized by the board but copies of the board
resolution were in its Makati Office while its counsel was based in Baguio City. It maintains that the attached complaint and
decisions of the MTC and RTC were sufficient since the petition before the Court of Appeals was limited to pure questions of
law. It posits that the complaint itself is the best evidence to determine whether the allegations therein sufficiently state a cause
of action.
This Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. 9 Such
requirement is a condition affecting the form of the pleading; non-compliance with this requirement does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. 10
Further, the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping. 11 Considering that later
on Mr. Bolaño’s authority to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping was ratified 12 by the board, there is no
circumvention of these objectives.
On the necessity of other pleadings and documents, Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires attachments if these
would support the allegations of the petition. We note that the facts alleged in the petition filed before the Court of Appeals were
the same facts found in the decisions of the MTC and RTC. Accordingly, we find no compelling need to attach other portions of
the records. Besides, the appellate court can always refer to the records transmitted 13 by the clerk of the trial court if it wanted to
verify the allegations.
The Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied with reason and liberality 14 to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are used to help secure and not override
substantial justice. Thus, the dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in
unfairness.15 No such result happened here.
Anent the second issue, which goes to the merits of the instant controversy, petitioner asserts that it specifically alleged the acts
constituting forcible entry and it points to paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint as well as to the annexed photographs. For its
part, the respondent defends the ruling of the RTC that petitioner failed to state sufficiently a cause of action in the complaint
before the MTC.
The pertinent portion of the complaint reads:
...
3. The plaintiff is the owner as well as lawful and peaceful possessor of a parcel of land covered by PILO Mineral Claim shown
in the approved plan hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
4. Sometime in the later part of September 1997, plaintiff’s caretaker noticed an ongoing bulldozing and ground leveling
activities within Pilo Mineral Claim. His investigation revealed that the illegal activity was being undertaken by individual
defendants who were supervising the heavy equipment owned by one Pio Wasit. When confronted, said defendant represented
themselves to be representatives of defendant Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc. To this effect, hereto attached….
5. The defendants were warned of their unlawful entry in the above-described property of the plaintiff but defendants refused to
stop to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff herein. In fact, in the process of forcible entry in the property, the defendants
destroyed young and full grown pine trees alike which your plaintiff had been protecting and spending considerable amount
therefor.
6. The unlawful activities by the defendants and their refusal to stop despite demand prompted plaintiff to send them demand
letter dated October 1, 1997, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "G", but in spite of the receipt of said letter, the
defendants ignored it and continued in their activities dispossessing plaintiff of its peaceful possession over the property. In fact,
the defendants even proceeded in laying the foundation of the construction of a building as shown in the photographs hereto
attached as Annex "H".16
In actions for forcible entry, it may be stressed, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction.
First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of
his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, and stealth.17 If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these means, the proper recourse is to file not an
action for forcible entry but a plenary action to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court.18
Nothing in the complaint before the MTC would show how the entry was effected nor how dispossession took place. The
complaint merely stated that petitioner’s caretaker noticed an ongoing bulldozing and leveling activities. The allegations that
these activities were illegal and that respondents’ entry was unlawful are not statements of bare facts but conclusions of law. The
complaint should have specified what made the activities illegal and the entry unlawful. 19 Without these ultimate facts, the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. In view of the foregoing, the RTC properly reversed the MTC’s decision and then
dismissed the complaint of petitioner for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court would not and did not commit a
reversible error in sustaining in effect the RTC’s decision of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72150 and the Decision dated June 14, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch VIII,
in Civil Case No. 2K-CV-1698 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 8 of 46

4.) G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA FABELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M.
Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision 1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private
respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these
material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at
Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc.
Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex
"A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B";
3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said lot
thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them,
but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former
to surrender the lot peacefully;
6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay Captain
was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the
necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex
"C";
7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the
premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus
incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise
ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";
8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in question,
plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x2
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior physical possession of
the property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land
on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an
ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They also stressed that the complaint
failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the
property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January
1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the
decision of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners
failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful
detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners’ complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires
an allegation of prior material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:
An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an action for ejectment are
conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the
complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the
private respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to occupy the premises, which right has now
[been] extinguished.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before which the action for ejectment was
filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered
by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint
in Civil Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction. 3
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.4
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration5:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER.
B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE
IT.
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer having alleged that
private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to
establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available
to the owner if another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance or permission without any contract between the two as the
latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion
interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer
(desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy,
threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right
to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. 8 The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while
in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.9
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial
court.10 Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and
from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. 13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be,
not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action
to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present
right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. 15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the
start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. 16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to
vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to
vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons:
First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy
redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed,
then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court.
Page 9 of 46
Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. 27 It is in this light that this Court
that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in No pronouncement as to costs.
pursuance of the summary nature of the action.18 (Underlining supplied) SO ORDERED.
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is
legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.20
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. 21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land
through intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased
mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled 23:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that
possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that
they had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required
to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present
right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The
appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her
death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the
complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and
consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely,
without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As
explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right
from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible
entry x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, 24 petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer merely
contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in
finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession.
xxx
xxxx
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of
petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by
petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these
arguments advance the view that respondent’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the
essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right
from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.25
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim
that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that
"respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of

Page 10 of 46

5.) G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall decide the appeal of the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer or forcible entry cases on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had
in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be required by the RTC. There is no trial de nova of the case.
The Case
The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68419,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, Branch 49, in Guagua, Pampanga, and reinstated the judgment rendered on
August 31, 2000 by the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga dismissing their complaint for unlawful detainer and the respondents’
counterclaim. They also hereby assail the resolution promulgated on January 24, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.2
Antecedents
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis
Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No 4236 with an area of 914 square meters of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by approved survey plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to
Lot 4236 was the respondents’ Lot No. 4235 covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-216701. In 1997, the
petitioners caused the relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the
respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted by
the Lands Management Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) confirmed the result on the
encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof
despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua (Civil
Case No. 3309), and the casewas assigned to Branch 2 of that court.3
On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of jurisdiction based onits finding that the
action involved an essentially boundary dispute that should be properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. 4 It stated that the
complaint did not aver any contract, whether express or implied, between the petitioners and the respondents that qualified the
case as one for unlawful detainer; and that there was also no showing that the respondents were in possession of the disputed
area by the mere tolerance of the petitioners due to the latter having become aware of the encroachment only after the relocation
survey held in 1997.
On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for further proceedings, 5 holding that
because there was an apparent withholding of possession of the property and the action was brought within one year from such
withholding of possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the case was
not a boundary dispute that could be resolved in an accion reinvidicatoria, considering that it involved a sizeable area of property
and not a mere transferring of boundary.6
Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1,7 ultimately dismissed the complaint and counterclaim for lack ofmerit through the decision
rendered on August 31, 2000,8 ruling that the petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence showing that the
respondents had encroached on their property and had been occupying and possessing property outside the metes and bounds
described in Bienvenido Bacani’s OCT No. N-216701; that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the respondents’ right
of possession; and that the respondent’s counterclaim for damages should also be dismissed, there being no showing that the
complaint had been filed in gross and evident bad faith.9
Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.
At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment, and
also heard the testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel Limpin, then Acting Chief of the Survey Section of the CENR-
DENR.
On September 19, 2001,10 the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set aside the MTC’s decision of August 31,
2000, observing that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners’ property based on the court-ordered relocation survey,
the reports by Engr. Limpin, and his testimony;11 that the respondents could not rely on their OCT No. N-216701, considering
that although their title covered only 481 squaremeters, the relocation survey revealed that they had occupied also 560 square
meters of the petitioners’ Lot No. 4236;12 that the petitioners did not substantiate their claims for reasonable compensation,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and that, nevertheless, after it had been established that the respondents had encroached
upon and used a portion of the petitioners’ property, the latter were entitled to ₱1,000.00/month as reasonable compensation from
the filing of the complaint up to time that the respondents actually vacated the encroached property, plus ₱20,000.00 attorney’s
fees.13
The respondents moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for its lack of merit.14
The respondents appealed.
On October 18, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,15 viz:
WHEREFORE, the appealed RTC decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decisions of the MTC of Guagua,
Pampanga, Branches 1 and 2, are REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA concluded that the RTC,by ordering the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" upon
motion of the petitioners and over the objection of the respondents, and making a determination of whether there was an
encroachment based on such survey and testimony of the surveyor, had acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the second
paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it amounted
to the reopening of the trial, which was not allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It observed that the
relocation and verification survey was inconclusive inasmuch as the surveyor had himself admitted that he could not determine
which of the three survey plans he had used was correct without a full-blown trial.
The CA held that considering that the petitioners’ complaint for unlawful detainer did not set forth when and how the
respondents had entered the land in question and constructed their houses thereon, jurisdiction did not vest in the MTC totry and
decide the case; that the complaint, if at all, made out a case for either accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana, either of
which fell within the original jurisdiction of the RTC; and that the RTC’s reliance on Benitez v. Court of Appeals16 and
Calubayan v. Ferrer17 was misplaced, because the controlling ruling was that in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 18 in which the
complaint was markedly similar to that filed in the case.
The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion for its lack of merit in the resolution of January 24,
2003.19
Issues
Hence, this appeal.
The petitioners contend that the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in anejectment case because it was
not absolutely confined to the records of the trial in resolving the appeal; that the respondents were estopped from assailing the
relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC because they had actively participated in the survey and had even cross-
examined Engr. Limpin, the surveyor tasked to conduct the survey;20 that Engr. Limpin’s testimony must be given credence,
honoring the well-entrenched principle of regularity in the performance of official functions;21 that the RTC did not conduct a
trial de novoby ordering the relocation and verification surveyand hearing the testimony of the surveyor; that the desirability of
the relocation and verification survey had always been part of the proceedings even before the case was appealed to the RTC; 22
that, in any case, the peculiar events that transpired justified the RTC’s order to conduct a relocation and verification survey; 23
that the case, because it involved encroachment into another’s property, qualified as an ejectment case that was within the
jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the respondents were barred by laches for never questioning the RTC’s February 11, 1999
ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.24
In contrast, the respondents assail the relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC as immaterial, because (a) it could
not vest a right of possession or ownership; (b) the petitioners were mere claimants, not the owners of the property; (c) the
petitioner had never been in possession of the area in question; and (d) cadastral surveys were not reliable. Hence, they maintain
that whether or not the relocation and verification survey was considered would not alter the outcome of the case.25
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. 26 In this
connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides:
Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. — x x x.
xxxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis
of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de
novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s
testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin. Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309
Page 11 of 46
was an ejectment case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the complaint. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents' "illegal use and occupation" of the property. As such, the action was not
Accordingly, the pertinent allegations of the petitioners’ complaint follow: unlawful detainer.
2. Plaintiffs are co-owners ofland known as Lot no. 4236 of the Guagua cadastre. Plaintiffs inherited the said parcel Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the respondents had
of residential land from Tomasa B. Garcia-Manalang who is the absolute owner of the said property and the same is encroached on the petitioners' property was also warranted. In contrast, the only basis for the RTC's decision was the result of the
declared for taxation purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No. 07014906, a copy of which is hereto attached relocation and verification survey as attested to by the surveyor, but that basis should be disallowed for the reasons earlier
as Annex "A"; mentioned. Under the circumstances, the reinstatement of the ruling of the MTC by the CA was in accord with the evidence.
3. Lot No. 4236 is covered by an approved plan, Plan Ap-03-004154 (a copy made Annex ‘B") and it consists of 914 WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
square meters; costs of suit.
4. Adjacent to plaintiff’s [p]roperty is Lot No. 4235 of the Guagua Cadastre and covered by approved plan As-03- SO ORDERED.
00533 (copy made Annex "C") which is being claimed by defendants and is the subject matter of Cadastral Case No.
N-229 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Branch 53 where a decision (copy made Annex "D") was rendered by
said court on August 28, 1996 confirming the title over said lot in favor of defendant Bienvenido Bacani. The said
decision is now final and executory …
5. On February 23, 1997, plaintiffs caused the relocation and verification survey of cadastral Not No. 4236 of the
Guagua Cadastre belonging to plaintiff and the adjoining lots, particularly Lot No. 4235 being claimed by defendants;
6. The relocation and verification survey conducted by Engr. Rufo R. Rivera, a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer per
plan (copy made Annex "F") revealed that defendants had encroached an area of 405 square meters of the parcel of
land belonging to plaintiffs. In fact, the whole or part of the houses of the said defendants have been erected in said
encroached portion;
7. Sometime in June of 1997, plaintiffs through plaintiff Concepcion Gonzales lodged a complaint before the
Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga against defendants regarding the encroached portion. A
preliminary relocation survey was conducted by the Lands Management Sector of the DENR and it was found that
indeed, defendants encroached into the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs. This finding was confirmed by the
approved plan Ap-03-004154;
8. Since defendants refused to vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff, the
Barangay Captain of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga issued a certification to file action (copy made Annex "G’) dated
March 4, 1997 to enable the plaintiff to file the appropriate action in court;
9. On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs senta formal demand letter (copy made Annex ‘H") to defendants to vacate the
premises and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the said encroached portion;
10. Despite receipt of said demand letter per registry return cards attached to the letter, defendants failed and refused
to vacate the encroached portion and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs;
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable compensation in the amount of P 3,000.00 from defendants for the illegal use
and occupation of their property by defendants;
12. By reason of the unjust refusal of defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable compensation to
plaintiffs, the latter were constrained to engage the services of counsel for ₱30,00.00 plus ₱1,000.00 per appearance
and incur litigation expenses in the amount of ₱10,000.00.27
Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary action like accion
reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion
reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the
property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to
hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming
unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
possession de facto.
Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was correct. It is
fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of
the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the action.28 To be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.29 To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction
to effect the ejectment from the land of the respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful detainer.30 However, the allegations of the
petitioners' complaint did not show that they had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the
respondents; or how the respondents' entry had been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents had started.

Page 12 of 46

6.) G.R. No. 137013 May 6, 2005
RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998
in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution2 dated December 11, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3506-B-96.
In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondent spouses are the registered
owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building
which straddled both the lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents that the building
occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire
portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property
and turn over to him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even made
improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to file action was issued.
In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is
no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere
tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in
1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, their
successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the subject properties and
peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as dismantle/remove the structures found thereon.
Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached area in the
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequent months
thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorney's fees of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED."3
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25,
654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.4 The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents' occupation of the
contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court
action.
Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. In its Decision dated October 5, 1988
now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's proper remedy should have been an accion
publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus:
"In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time private respondent bought
three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a building being used by the
former as a bodega. Apart from private respondent's bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that petitioners'
possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-in-interest. The fact that respondent might have tolerated petitioners'
possession is not decisive. What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of
petitioners' possession from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the complaint itself merely alleges
that defendants-petitioners have been 'occupying a portion of the above properties of the plaintiff for the past several
years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.' Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated
petitioners' possession of the premises. x x x.
Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana and
not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED."5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON
THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.
II
THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE."
The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that petitioner's complaint is
within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.
Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned property before he could file an
action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents' occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it.
After his demand that they vacate, their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the
MTCC is proper.
Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property even before petitioner
purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were occupying the property by mere tolerance because
they were ahead in time in physical possession.
We sustain the petition.
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint
and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. 6 This rule is no
different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. 7 All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with
the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall
include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. 8 The said
courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the
litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. 9
Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, reads:
"Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs."
Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry,
which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning
as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an
action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract
(express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder.10
Petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the competence of the MTCC. His
pertinent allegations in the complaint read:
"4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as other structures and
have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the
tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the property;
5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the defendants to vacate
and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found inside the PROPERTIES of
plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES
occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.
6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City for
a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The barangay case reached the Pangkat but no
settlement was had. Thereafter, a 'Certification To File Action' dated March 27, 1996 was issued x x x;
x x x."11 (underscoring ours)
Page 13 of 46
Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error in the MTCC
assuming jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding
of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 12 Here, there is
an allegation in petitioner's complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance.
Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his
demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance
refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals 13 is applicable in this case: "A
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 14 of 46

7.) G.R. No. 173616 June 25, 2014
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) seeks the nullification of the Court of Appeals'
Resolution1 dated March 29, 2006 and Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. The Resolution dated
March 29, 2006 granted the application for temporary restraining order (TRO) of Bernie G. Miaque, while the Resolution dated
May 30, 2006 issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo despite Miaque's alleged continued failure and refusal to make current the supersedeas bond
and to pay to the A TO the rental and concession privilege fees.
The proceedings on the main case of ejectment
MTCC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 01 (38)
In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Iloilo City, Branch 3. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 01 (38). The ATO sought the following, among others:
(1) That Miaque be ordered to permanently vacate and peacefully return to the ATO possession of:
(a) the 800-square meter Refreshment Parlor fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport;
(b) the 310-square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Airport Terminal; and
(c) all areas occupied or otherwise utilized by Miaque incident to his operation of the Porterage Service
within the Iloilo Airport; and
(2) That Miaque be ordered to immediately pay the ATO the amount of not less than ₱1,296,103.10, representing
unpaid space rental and concessionaire privilege fees as of October 15, 2000 plus interest and additional rental and
fees which may be proven during the trial.3
The MTCC subsequently rendered a Decision4 dated May 27, 2002 the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding [Miaque] to be unlawfully detaining the following premises and orders [him], his
men and privies to:
a. vacate the 800[-]square meter Refreshment Parlor fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport. [Miaque] is
further ordered to pay [the ATO] the rental and concessionaire privilege fee[s] accruing from November 1986 to
October 2000, totaling ₱460,060.70, plus differential billings from January 1990 to July 1993 for ₱4,652.60 and
interest charges from January 2000 to October 2000 for ₱2,678.38 or a total amount of ₱467,397.68 as of October
2000, less the payments made by [Miaque] under Official Receipt No. 4317842 dated December 1998, and the
monthly current lease/concession privilege fee from November 2000 until [Miaque] shall have vacated the premises;
(b) vacate the 310[-]square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Terminal Building which was reduced to a
total of 183 square meters in 1998 (51.56 square meters inside the pre-departure area and 126.72 square meters
outside the pre-departure area). [Miaque] is also ordered to pay [the ATO] rentals/concessionaire’s privilege fee[s]
from January 16, 1992 to October 15, 2000 in the total amount of ₱719,708.43 and from October 16, 2000, to pay the
current monthly lease/concessionaire privilege fees until [Miaque] shall have vacated the premises; and
(c) vacate the area occupied or used by [Miaque] incident to his operation of the Porterage Service within the Iloilo
Airport. [Miaque] is further ordered to pay Tender Offer Fee due from March 1992 to October 2000 in the total
amount of ₱108,997.07. [Miaque] is further ordered to pay the current monthly concession privilege fee from October
2000 until such time that [Miaque] shall have vacated the premises.
Costs against [Miaque].5
RTC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 02-27292
Miaque appealed the MTCC Decision to the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 24. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27292. The
RTC, in its Decision6 dated June 7, 2003, affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety. Miaque’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.7 Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 Miaque questioned the RTC Decision in the Court of Appeals by filing a
petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, on September 25, 2003. In a Decision8 dated April 29, 2005, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC Decision. Miaque moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a
Resolution dated January 5, 2006.9
Supreme Court: G.R. No. 171099
Miaque brought the case to this Court in a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 171099. In a Resolution 10 dated February
22, 2006, the petition was denied as no reversible error in the Court of Appeals Decision was sufficiently shown. The motion for
reconsideration of Miaque was denied with finality.11
The proceedings on execution
As an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the Court of Appeals issued on February 27, 2004 a temporary restraining order
(TRO) effective for a period of 60 days and required Miaque to post a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00. 12 After the lapse of
the TRO, the ATO filed an urgent motion for the execution of the RTC Decision pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. This was opposed by Miaque.13
In an Order14 dated August 2, 2004, the RTC granted the ATO’s motion:
Wherefore, in view of the above consideration, the court finds merit [i]n the reasons given in the motion of [the ATO] and hereby
Grants the issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates that the judgment of this Court being
immediately executory in cases of this nature, let a writ of execution shall issue, ordering the sheriff of this Court to effect its
Decision dated June 7, 2003, affirming the Decision of the MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Furnish copies of this order to the Asst. Solicitor Almira Tomampos of the Office of the Solicitor General and Atty. Rex Rico,
counsel for [Miaque].15
Miaque sought reconsideration of the above Order but the RTC denied the motion in an Order16 dated August 13, 2004.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution dated August 16, 2004.17
However, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution18 dated August 18, 2004 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and enjoining the ATO and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the respective Decisions of the MTCC and
the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 is pending. Thus, after the dismissal of Miaque’s petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the ATO filed another urgent motion for execution of the RTC Decision. In its motion, the ATO pointed out that the
supersedeas bond filed by Miaque had lapsed and was not renewed and that the rental and concessionaire privilege fees have not
been paid at all in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.19 Miaque again opposed the ATO’s urgent motion for
execution,20 while the ATO filed a supplemental urgent motion for execution stating that Miaque’s appeal in the Court of
Appeals had been dismissed.21
In an Order22 dated June 1, 2005, the RTC granted the ATO’s urgent motion for execution and issued a Writ of Execution 23
dated June 2, 2005. On the basis of the said writ, a notice to vacate was given to Miaque.24 On June 3, 2005, Miaque filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 1, 2005, with prayer to set aside the writ of execution and notice to vacate. 25
At the same time, he filed a motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 praying that the Court of Appeals order the RTC judge and the
concerned sheriffs to desist from implementing the writ of execution.26 Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution27
dated June 14, 2005 ordering the sheriffs to desist from executing the Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP
No. 79439 is still pending. However, on June 15, 2005, before the concerned sheriffs received a copy of the Resolution dated
June 14, 2005, the said sheriffs implemented the writ of execution and delivered the possession of the following premises to the
ATO:
(a) the Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Terminal Building in the reduced area of 183 square meters; and
(b) the area which Miaque occupied or used incident to his operation of the Porterage Service within the Iloilo
Airport.
The sheriffs who implemented the writ then filed a return of service 28 and issued reports of partial delivery of possession.29
However, Miaque subsequently regained possession of the said premises on the strength of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution
dated June 14, 2005.30
On February 9, 2006, after the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution dated January 5, 2006 denying Miaque’s motion for
reconsideration of the Decision dated April 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO filed with the RTC a motion for the
revival of the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005.31 This was opposed by Miaque.32 After the RTC
heard the parties, it issued an Order33 dated March 20, 2006 granting the ATO’s motion and revived the writs of execution dated
August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005. Miaque filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it.34
A new case in the Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603
On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition35 for certiorari (with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction) in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, where he assailed the RTC’s Order dated March
20, 2006. He prayed, among others, that the implementation of the writs of execution be enjoined. It is here where the Court of
Appeals issued the Resolutions being challenged in this case, namely, the Resolution dated March 29, 2006 issuing a TRO
effective for 60 days, and Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation
of the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June2, 2005. In particular, the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 reads: Before
us for resolution is [Miaque]’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that would restrain the respondent
judge, Sheriffs Marcial B. Lambuso, Winston T. Eguia, Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and Eric George S. Luntao and all other
persons acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the orders issued by the respondent judge on March 20, 2006 and March
24, 2006, including the writ[s] of execution issued pursuant thereto, while the petition in the case at bench is still pending with
us.
Page 15 of 46
After examining judiciously the record in this case, together with the submissions and contentions of the parties, we have come
up with a finding and so hold that there is a sufficient showing by [Miaque] that the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enumerated in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court exist. We find that [Miaque] has a
right in esse to be protected and the acts against which the injunction is sought to be directed are violative of said right. To our
mind, [Miaque] appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time
when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo
City, which is the court of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 on April 29, 2005. Under
the attendant circumstances, it appears that the respondent judge orthe RTC in Iloilo City has no jurisdiction to order the issuance
of such writ of execution because we gave due course to the petition for review filed with us in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and, in
fact, rendered a decision on the merit in said case, thereby divesting the RTC in Iloilo City of jurisdiction over the case as
provided for in the third paragraph of Section 8(a) of Rule 42of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. In City of Manila vs. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, as cited in Mocles vs. Maravilla, 239 SCRA 188, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"The rule is that, if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the RTC and the decision of the latter itself is
elevated to the CA whose decision thereafter became final, the case should be remanded through the RTC to the metropolitan
trial court for execution."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby ordered or caused to
be issued by us enjoining the respondent judge, Sheriffs Marcial B. Lambuso, Winston T. Eguia, Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and
Eric George S. Luntao and all other persons acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the orders issued by the respondent
judge on March 20, 2006 and March 24, 2006, including the writ[s] of execution issued pursuant thereto, while the petition in the
case at bench is still pending with us.
This is subject to the petitioner’s putting up of a bond in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS(₱100,000.00) to the
effect that he will pay to the respondent ATO all damages which said office may sustain by reason of the injunctive writ if we
should finally decide that [Miaque] is not entitled thereto.36
The present petition
The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction through the Order dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution
dated May 30,2006, respectively. According to the ATO, the Court of Appeals ignored the government’s right under the law,
Rules of Court, jurisprudence and equity to the possession as well as to the payment of rental and concession privilege fees
which, at the time of the filing of this petition, already amounted to ₱2 Million. Such right had already been decided with finality
by this Court, which affirmed the Decision dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, but the Court
of Appeals has repeatedly thwarted it. The RTC acted properly and pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court when it
issued the writs of execution.37 Moreover, the ATO asserts that a TRO cannot restrain an accomplished fact, as the RTC’s writ of
execution dated June 1, 2005 had already been partially implemented.38
The ATO also argues that, by his admission that the issues in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 are
exactly the same, Miaque has committed forum shopping. In this connection, the ATO points out that, in his opposition to the
ATO’s motion for additional period of time to file its comment on Miaque’s petition in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, Miaque
pointed out the similarity of the core issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, to wit:
b) The legal issues raised by the petition [in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603] are very simple and not complicated. In
fact, the threshold issue, i.e., whether or not respondent court (RTC) has jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution
after the appeal over its decision had been perfected and the petition for review [in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439] given due
course, is exactly the same one earlier raised by [the ATO itself in its] "Motion for Reconsideration" of the Resolution
dated June 14, 2005, in CA G.R. No. 79439, entitled "Bernie G. Miaque vs. Hon. Danilo P. Galvez and Air
Transportation Office (ATO)", (same parties in this proceeding), then pending before the 20th Division, Court of
Appeals, Cebu City.
Hence, all that [the ATO has] to do is simply to reiterate [its] said arguments, the law and jurisprudence [it has] earlier invoked
and, if [it wishes], add some more arguments, laws or jurisprudence thereto. Such an exercise would definitely not require a sixty
(60) day period. A ten (10) day period is more than sufficient.39
The ATO further contends that the subject premises form part of a public utility infrastructure and, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1818, the issuance of a TRO against a public utility infrastructure is prohibited.40
The ATO adds that Miaque’s petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603 introduces a new matter which is the alleged
novation of the MTCC Decision when he deposited the amount of ₱319,900.00 to the Land Bank of the Philippines account of
the ATO in February 2006. At any rate, the ATO asserts that its tenacity in pursuing the execution of the judgment against
Miaque belies its consent to the alleged novation.41
For his part, Miaque argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to dismiss a petition still pending with the Court of Appeals. Thus,
the ATO cannot properly pray that this Court dismiss CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. According to Miaque, the jurisdiction of this
Court is limited only to the determination of whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing a TRO
and, subsequently, a preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. In this connection, Miaque insists that the Court of
Appeals acted well within its jurisdiction in the issuance of both the Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO and the
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. As this Court has
effectively affirmed the MTCC Decision, then it is the MTCC and not the RTC which should have directed the execution of the
MTCC Decision. Moreover, the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 1, 2005
because the said court already lost its jurisdiction when Miaque filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 25, 2003,
which appeal was given due course.42
Miaque also asserts that the ATO’s claim that the RTC’s writ of execution had been partially implemented is not true and that he
is in possession of the entire subject premises when the Court of Appeals issued the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
being challenged in this case.
Finally, Miaque alleges that no writ may be issued to enforce the MTCC Decision as the said decision had already been novated
by his deposit of ₱319,000.00 to the ATO’s account with the Land Bank of the Philippines in February 2006.43
This Court, in a Resolution44 dated August 14, 2006, issued a TRO enjoining the Court of Appeals, Miaque, and his agents and
representatives from implementing the Resolution dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603.
The Court’s ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the challenge to the Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO, effective for 60 days, is
moot as its effectivity had already lapsed.
Cutting through the tangled web of issues presented by the contending parties, the basic question in this petition is whether or
not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 which granted petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that question: Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.)
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the
same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases
governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
which respectively provide:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such
other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition
and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the
appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership,
accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection
of the rights of the adverse party.
xxxx
Sec. 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.–
(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the appeal
is deemed perfected as to the petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties.
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and
allow withdrawal of the appeal.
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the appeal shall stay the judgment or final order unless
the Court of Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall provide otherwise. (Emphases supplied.)
Page 16 of 46
The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case
appealed to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory, without prejudice to a further
appeal that may be taken therefrom; and
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in
the appellate court’s discretion, suspended or modified.
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory -- is emphasized by the fact that no resolutory
condition has been imposed that will prevent or stay the execution of the RTC’s judgment.45 The significance of this may be
better appreciated by comparing Section 21 of Rule 70 with its precursor, Section 10, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
provided:
Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – Where defendant appeals from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance, execution of said judgment, with respect to the restoration of possession, shall not be stayed unless the
appellant deposits the same amounts and within the periods referred to in section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same
manner as therein provided.
Under the old provision, the procedure on appeal from the RTC’s judgment to the Court of Appeals was, with the exception of
the need for a supersedeas bond which was not applicable, virtually the same as the procedure on appeal of the MTC’s judgment
to the RTC. Thus, in the contemplated recourse to the Court of Appeals, the defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could also
prevent the immediate execution of the judgment by making the periodic deposit of rentals during the pendency of the appeal
and thereby correspondingly prevent restitution of the premises to the plaintiff who had already twice vindicated his claim to the
property in the two lower courts. On the other hand, under the amendatory procedure introduced by the present Section 21 of
Rule 70, the judgment of the RTC shall be immediately executory and can accordingly be enforced forthwith. It shall not be
stayed by the mere continuing deposit of monthly rentals by the dispossess or during the pendency of the case in the Court of
Appeals or this Court, although such execution of the judgment shall be without prejudice to that appeal taking its due course.
This reiterates Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which replaced the appellate procedure in, and repealed,
the former Section 10, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court.46 Teresa T. Gonzales La’O & Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Hatab47 states:
Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court where the defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could prevent the immediate
execution of the judgment by taking an appeal and making a periodic deposit of monthly rentals during the pendency of the
appeal thereby preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of the premises in the meantime, the present wording of Section
21, Rule 70 explicitly provides that the judgment of the regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be immediately
executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher court.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus. 49
Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the RTC’s
judgment and appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the
appeal taking its due course.50 The rationale of immediate execution of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice to a
lawful possessor.51 Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the appellate court may stay the writ of execution should
circumstances so require.52
The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom – reinforces the first. 1âwphi1
The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon its rendition and, upon motion, immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom. The execution of the RTC’s judgment is not discretionary execution under Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 2. Discretionary execution. –
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party
filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on
appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a
judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. – A several, separate or partial judgment may be executed under the same
terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.
Discretionary execution is authorized while the trial court, which rendered the judgment sought to be executed, still has
jurisdiction over the case as the period to appeal has not yet lapsed and is in possession of either the original record or the record
on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of the motion for execution. It is part of the trial court’s residual powers,
or those powers which it retains after losing jurisdiction over the case as a result of the perfection of the appeal.53 As a rule, the
judgment of the RTC, rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, being sought to be executed in a discretionary
execution is stayed by the appeal to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On the other
hand, execution of the RTC’s judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution but a ministerial duty of the
RTC.54 It is not governed by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court but by Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on
judgments not stayed by appeal. In this connection, it is not covered by the general rule, that the judgment of the RTC is stayed
by appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, but constitutes an exception to the said rule.
In connection with the second characteristic of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it, the consequence of the
above distinctions between discretionary execution and the execution of the RTC’s judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals is that the former may be availed of in the RTC only before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the
appeal while the latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again, in the
latter case, the Court of Appeals may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC should circumstances so require. 55 City of
Naga v. Hon. Asuncion56 explains:
This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is without recourse to avoid immediate execution of the RTC
decision. The defendant may x x x appeal said judgment to the Court of Appeals and therein apply for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Thus, as held in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately
executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. (Citation omitted.)
To reiterate, despite the immediately executory nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, which judgment is not
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a writ of preliminary injunction that will restrain or enjoin
the execution of the RTC’s judgment. In the exercise of such authority, the Court of Appeals should constantly be aware that the
grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with
great caution.57
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing
substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine
whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In the absence of the same, and
where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillarywrit must be struck
down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.58
In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of the RTC in Civil Case No. 02-27292, and of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the property and the
corresponding obligation of Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that the MTCC, the RTC, and the
Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to continue in possession of the said premises. It is therefore
puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction with the sweeping statement that
Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he
shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which
is the court of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439." Unfortunately, in its Resolution dated
May 30, 2006 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in Miaque’s favor, the Court of Appeals did not state the source or basis
of Miaque’s "clear legal right to hold on to the [said] premises." This is fatal.
In Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.,59 this Court stated that, in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the court must state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the
appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury
sustained by one who seeks an injunctive writ, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified.
Thus, where the right of one who seeks an in junctive writ is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.
The sole basis of the Court of Appeals in issuing its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 is its view that the RTC "has no jurisdiction
to order the issuance of [the] writ of execution" because, when it gave due course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the RTC was already divested of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 8(a), Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals is mistaken. It disregards both (1) the immediately executory nature of the judgment of the
RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken there from. It ignores
the nature of the RTC’s function to issue a writ of execution of its judgment in an ejectment case as ministerial and not
discretionary.
The RTC was validly exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court when it issued the writs of
execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2,2005. While the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 enjoined the execution
of the RTC’s judgment during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the RTC revived the writs of execution dated August 16,
2004 and June 1, 2005 in its Order dated March 20, 2006, after the Court of Appeals denied Miaque’s motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439. Indeed, the said writs of execution need not even be revived because
they continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion, that is within five years from
entry of judgment, pursuant to Section 14,60 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 661 of the same Rule.
Page 17 of 46
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.62 In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting Miaque’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction contrary to Section 21, Rule 70 and
other relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as well as this Court’s pronouncements in Teresa T. Gonzales La’O & Co., Inc.63
and Nisce.64 Thus, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Resolution dated May 30, 2006
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
This Court notes that the controversy between the parties in this case has been unduly protracted, considering that the decisions
of the MTCC, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court in favor of the ATO and against Miaque on the ejectment case are
already final and executory. The Court of Appeals should therefore proceed expeditiously in resolving CA-G.R. CEBSP No.
01603.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603 is ANNULLED for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals is directed to
conduct its proceedings in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 expeditiously and without delay.
SO ORDERED.

Page 18 of 46

8.) G.R. No. 138377 February 28, 2000
CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, JOSEFINA V. AMAGAN and DINA V. AMAGAN, petitioners,
vs.
TEODORICO T. MARAYAG, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of
another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be
suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from the
enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 9, 1999 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50472,1 which disposed as follows:
It is plain to see that this Court, under its Decision, merely nullified the Order of the Respondent, dated November 26,
1996 granting Private Respondent's "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal" and denying Petitioners "Motion for
Reconsideration" [of] its said Order. This Court did not enjoin the Respondent Court from resolving Petitioners"
appeal from the Decision of the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court, on its merits.
Petitioners' complaint for "Quieting of Title and Reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1632" filed [at] the Regional Trial
Court does not abate the proceeding in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG) before the Respondent Court (Asset Privatization
Trust v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 627; Felicidad Javier, et al., versus Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, II, et al., 237
SCRA 565).
In sum, then, the [im]pugned Orders of the Respondent Court are in accord with case law and issued in the exercise
of its sound discretion.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is hereby dismissed. No cost.
SO ORDERED.2
Also challenged by petitioners is the April 22, 1999 CA Resolution3 denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
. . . . On June 3, 1996, the private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioners for "unlawful detainer" with the
Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court in Silang, Cavite. On September 27, 1996, the trial court promulgated a Decision in
favor of the private respondent and against the petitioners, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court for the plaintiff and against the defendants finds ordering the
latter as follows:
1. To vacate the property of plaintiff located at San Vicente, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 420
square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 13023 and remove their house constructed thereon;
2. To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P10,000.00 starting from June 1, 1996 until the
subject premises are fully vacated, as reasonable compensation for their continued unlawful use and
occupation of the same and another amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses; and
3. To pay the cost of suit.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cavite from said Decision, which appeal was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1671. On November 26, 1996, the private respondent filed a "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal"
with the Respondent Court which, on November 26, 1996, issued an Order granting said motion, the decretal portion
of which reads as follows:
As prayed for by the plaintiff(s), through (their) counsel, and finding the grounds alleged in their "Motion
for Immediate Exec(u)tion" to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, let a writ of execution pending appeal be issued in this case.
"The Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration" [of] said Order, was denied by the Respondent Court per its Order
dated February 21, 1997.
In the interim, the petitioners filed, on December 10, 19[96], a complaint against private respondent in the Regional
Trial Court for "Quieting of Title, Reconveyance and Damages," entitled "Concepcion v. Amagan, et al. versus
Teodorico Marayag, Civil Case No. 1682 (TG).
The petitioners filed, a "Petition for Certiorari," in the Court of Appeals, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated
April 28, 1997, against the respondents for the nullification of the aforesaid Orders of the Respondent Court, dated
November 26, 1996 and February 21, 1997, in Civil Case No. 1671, granting private respondent's "Motion for
Reconsideration" respectively, which Petition was entitled "Concepcion v. Amagan, et al., versus Regional Trial
Court, et al., CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611]." This Court issued a Resolution granting petitioners' plea for a temporary
restraining order which expired on June 25, 1997.
On July 7, 1997, the private respondent filed, with the Respondent Court, in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG), an "Ex-Parte
Omnibus Motion to Direct Sheriff To Make a Report And/Or Implement Writ of Execution and Declare the Case
Submitted for Decision" with the parties submitting to the Respondent Court their respective "Memorandum on
Appeal." The next day, July 18, 1997, this Court promulgated, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], a Decision in favor of the
petitioners and against the respondents therein the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated February
21, 1997, allowing execution pending appeal is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
On July 11, 1997, the Respondent Court issued an Order granting private respondent's Omnibus Motion,' supra. The
private respondent likewise filed a Petition for Review' with the Supreme Court, from the Decision of this Court in
CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611] and its Resolution denying private respondent's "Motion for Reconsideration" but the
Supreme Court, per its Resolution dated November 12, 1997, issued a Resolution denying private respondents[']
"Petition for Review." The Resolution of the Supreme Court became final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, the private respondent filed with the Respondent Court, in Civil Case No. TG-1671, a
"Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion" praying that the Respondent Court resolve the case and promulgate its Decision
on the merits. However, the petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondent's motion, contending that the
proceedings before the Respondent Court, in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG), be suspended pending decision, on the
merits, of the Regional Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 1682 (Quieting of Title, Reconveyance with Damages). On
April 3, 1998, the Respondent Court issued its Order granting private respondent's motion, declaring that the Court,
under its Decision, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], merely nullified its Order granting execution pending appeal but did
not enjoin the Respondent Court from hearing and resolving Civil Case No. 16[7]1 on the merits. The petitioners
filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court but the latter issued an Order
dated December 14, 1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, in this language.
Anent the Motion for Reconsideration, movants anchored their arguments that this Court should restrain
itself from further proceeding with the appealed case because of the decision, resolution of the Court of
Appeals, and resolution of the Supreme Court. It is worthy to note that [what] was brought up with the
higher Courts was the Order of the Court allowing the execution pending appeal, the said Order was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals[;] however, there was no permanent injunction that has
been issued for this Court to stop from further proceeding with the case. The said motion is, therefore,
DENIED for lack of merit.
The facts of this case may be simply summarized as follows. The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the ejectment suit filed by
respondent against herein petitioners. While an appeal was pending before the RTC, respondent filed a Motion for immediate
execution of the MCTC judgment, which was granted. However, the Court of Appeals 4 later reversed the RTC Order granting the
execution pending appeal, a reversal that was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, petitioners also filed
before the RTC a new action for quieting of title involving the same property.
Petitioners thence claimed that the proceedings in the ejectment appeal should be suspended pending final judgment in the
quieting of title case. The RTC ruled in the negative.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In sustaining the RTC, the CA held in two short paragraphs that its earlier Decision in CA-GR SP No. 43611 enjoined only the
execution of the judgment pending appeal. Without discussing petitioners' plea for an exception, it curtly applied the
jurisprudential principle that an action for quieting of title would not abate an ejectment suit.
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted for the consideration of the Court the following issues:
I. Whether or not the 8 July 1997 Decision and 23 September 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43911 (Annex I), as affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court, called off and restrained the proceedings in this case;
II. Whether or not the dispositive portion of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 should be referred to its body and
text.
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals' Decision having been based on Vda. de Legaspi vs. Avendano . . ., is now
final and executory as it was upheld by the Supreme Court in toto.
IV. Whether or not Lao vs. Court of Appeals [. . .] is applicable to the present case, and
Page 19 of 46
 V. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to consider and pass judgment on the exceptional nature of the present THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal of the
case.6 petitioners' house [from] the lot in question.
In the main, the issue is whether the peculiar circumstances of this case justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners' house prior to the
appeal before the RTC, pending the resolution of the action for quieting of title. determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands. 11
The Court's Ruling Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment
The Petition is meritorious. suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like
Main Issue: Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of
Suspension of the Ejectment Suit petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.
or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision 12 would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it
claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is
public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession." 7 In these claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time
cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust
nature. and probably irreparable.1âwphi1.nêt
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but
ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.
to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as The Suspension of Proceedings
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."8 Even During Appeal
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi, the Court held that "if circumstances should so require, the proceedings in the ejectment
Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared: case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found." This statement is unequivocally clear; it includes even the appellate
. . . . Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of stage.
the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant of Cavite is DIRECTED to suspend further action in Civil Case No. 1671 until Civil Case No. 1682 is concluded. No costs.
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or SO ORDERED.
not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or
decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving
legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right
to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the
other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any
attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.9
From the foregoing, it is clear that the mere existence of a judicial proceeding putting at issue the right of the plaintiff to recover
the premises is not enough reason to justify an exception to the general rule. In Salinas v. Navarro,10 the Court explained that
"the exception to the rule in . . . Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present petition. The right
of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from
the imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the ejectment case would also have
meant demolition of the premises, a factor not present in this petition."
After a close reading of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, however, we hold that equitable considerations impel an
exception to the general rule. In its earlier July 8, 1997 Decision in CA-GR No. 43611-SP which has long become final, the
Court of Appeals, through Justice Artemio G. Toquero, arrived upon the following factual findings which are binding on herein
parties:
Admittedly, petitioners who appealed the judgment in the ejectment case did not file a supersedeas bond. Neither
have they been depositing the compensation for their use and occupation of the property in question as determined by
the trial court. Ordinarily, these circumstances would justify an execution pending appeal. However, there are
circumstances attendant to this case which would render immediate execution injudicious and inequitable.
ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory that petitioners'
possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13,
1996 (Annex "D"), petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that
they are "owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J. P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite." In other
words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.
TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, quieting
of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this
issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.

Page 20 of 46

9.) G.R. No. 157604 October 19, 2005
GEORGE V. BENEDICTO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. CHUA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul the Resolution,1 dated March 21, 2003, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 736 square meters located in Carlos Hilado
Highway, Bacolod City. He entered into a contract of lease with private respondent Romeo G. Chua on October 15, 2000. Under
the contract, the lease was to start on November 15, 2000. The contract also stipulated that the rent would be ₱7,000 monthly.
Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence, conformably with paragraph 6 of their contract, to wit:
6. … the Lessee may introduce any improvements and additions on the land, and at the termination of the lease, he may remove
the same, except the fence surrounding and enclosing the property, the cost of which shall be equally divided into twenty-four
(24) months and the amount thereof be deducted from the rent until the same shall have been completely set-off.… 2
On November 13, 2000, Chua paid Benedicto ₱28,000 representing deposit for one month and advance rent for three months.
Thereafter, Chua failed to pay the rent prompting Benedicto to send a demand letter after a fruitless amicable settlement at the
Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Chua did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against Chua for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
26881, with the Municipal Trial Court in Bacolod City, Branch 3. In turn, Chua filed with the same court a petition for
consignation docketed as Civil Case No. 26911.
The MTCC dismissed the consignation case for lack of jurisdiction as the said case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The
MTCC found merit in the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. It ordered Romeo G. Chua and all persons acting for
and under him or on his behalf, (1) to immediately vacate or surrender possession of the leased premises to therein plaintiff; (2)
to pay plaintiff ₱19,500, covering the period from March 15, 2001 to August 14, 2001, and thereafter, the additional or further
amount of ₱4,500 only per month until said premises was vacated and until the ₱2,500 monthly credit in favor of the defendant
was exhausted reckoned from February 15, 2001 to January 14, 2003 whichever comes first; and (3) to pay the plaintiff the sum
of ₱10,000 as attorney’s fee and ₱5,000 for costs and other expenses.3
Chua appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43. In its Decision, 4 dated August 30, 2002, the RTC
modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the case for consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice; ordered
Chua to immediately vacate or peacefully surrender possession to Benedicto; ordered the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial
Court in the City of Bacolod to turn over to Benedicto ₱46,500 and ₱18,000 upon presentation of the original receipts; ordered
Benedicto to pay Chua ₱6,136.39 representing the remaining value of the improvement constructed by the former, which is the
perimeter hollow block fence, and deliver to Chua ₱4,672.64 deposited by the latter with the aforementioned judicial authorities
in the excess of the rental of the property as computed by the Court; and ordered Chua to pay Benedicto the ₱10,000, attorney’s
fees and ₱5,000 for cost and other expenses. The RTC also denied all other claims and counterclaims of the parties. 5
On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-11643, the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43 issued a Writ of
Execution.6
However, in view of the aforesaid petition for review, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order on December
23, 2002, enjoining the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43, from enforcing its Decision in Civil Case No. 02-11643.
Upon receipt of the said TRO, Presiding Judge Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador replied in a letter dated January 2, 2003 as
follows:
Pertinent to your telegram dated December 23, 2002 received by the undersigned on the same date, please be informed that
returns were made by Mr. Leoncio Yongque, Jr., Deputy Sheriff of this branch, on the partial execution of the Court’s Decision
dated August 30, 2002 in the aforementioned case. Attached for your ready reference are the following annexes:
A – Sheriff’s return dated December 5, 2002;
B – Sheriff’s return dated December 16, 2002;
C – Sheriff’s return dated December 23, 2002.
Also attached is the undersigned’s Memorandum to the branch sheriff enjoining him from fully implementing the Writ of
Execution dated November 22, 2002.
[Concomitant] to your resolution granting defendant’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order, there being no complete
execution of the assailed decision, undersigned undertakes that no further execution shall be implemented until further order
from your court.7
On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash Temporary
Restraining Order8 on the ground that the TRO had already become moot and academic.
In his Comment9 to the said Manifestation and Motion, Chua replied that the writ of execution issued by the RTC had not been
fully implemented because his properties and the improvements were still within the subject premises.
The Court of Appeals ruled on the said Manifestation and Motion, in its assailed Resolution of March 21, 2003, as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, let the writ of preliminary injunction be issued in this case upon the posting of a
₱100,000.00 injunction bond restraining the respondents from prohibiting the petitioner from entering the subject premises
and/or from conducting business thereon just like before the controversy between the parties had arisen. For this purpose,
respondent is hereby ordered to remove anything that was placed to block the display room of the petitioner and to remove the
padlock and to open the gate so that petitioner may resume his usual business in the premises, all pending resolution of the
instant petition for review.
...
SO ORDERED.10
Clearly, the sole issue in this case is: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary injunction, despite the immediately executory character of RTC
judgments in ejectment cases?
Herein petitioner Benedicto contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a preliminary
injunction even if it was not prayed for. Granting arguendo that said provisional remedy was prayed for, Benedicto insists
preliminary injunction does not lie as judgments of the RTC against the defendant in ejectment suits are immediately executory
even pending appeal. Benedicto also argues that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, in effect, disposed of the main
case without trial. Benedicto further points out that the act sought to be enjoined by the preliminary injunction was already fait
accompli.
For his part, Chua counters that the present petition cannot be resorted to without a prior motion for reconsideration to allow
public respondent Court of Appeals to correct the error imputed to it. He also maintains that there was only partial delivery of
possession to Benedicto; hence, the acts sought to be enjoined had not yet become fait accompli. Finally, Chua stresses that
despite the executory character of the RTC judgment against the defendant in ejectment cases, injunctive relief may still be
granted.
We find petitioner’s arguments without sufficient basis.
First, a preliminary injunction may be granted even if not prayed for as long as the requisites therefor are present. More so if it is
prayed for. Second, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main
case without trial. The writ merely suspended the execution of the RTC judgment pending appeal. It bears stressing that the main
case, subject of the petition for review, is still yet to be resolved by the Court of Appeals. Lastly, it is evident from Judge
Pagapong-Agraviador’s letter11 that the impugned judgment is not yet fully executed. Thus, the acts sought to be enjoined by the
assailed writ of preliminary injunction are not yet fait accompli.
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer states:
Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
This section presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution
without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. 12 It is our opinion that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ
should circumstances so require.
In the case of Amagan v. Marayag,13 we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño14 that the proceedings in
an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, thus:
Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to
recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive
of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in
which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary
injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment
in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession
Page 21 of 46
regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to
discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.15
Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be
granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed violate said right.16
In this case, we note that the petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals raises substantial issues meriting serious
consideration. Chua’s putative right to continued possession of the premises stands to be violated if the adverse judgment of the
RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ of
preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution, dated March 21, 2003, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73919 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Page 22 of 46

10.) G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed
HILARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,
respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged
therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot
No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father,
Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[’] father’s co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs’ father
without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he have ( sic) asked the
prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail,
evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation,
wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.3
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the defendant to vacate
and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
a. actual damages, as follows:
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case amounting to ₱1,500.00 and for the
subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case at ₱1,500.00 each schedule;
a.2. attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00 and ₱500.00 for every court appearance;
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to determine; and
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.4
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action,
citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. 5 He averred
that –
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case, however,
the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief
prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Court’s jurisdiction as provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed value of the land
in question cannot exceed ₱20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and
should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. …6
The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since the court can take
judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was ₱200.00 per square meter and considering that the
property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof is ₱3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners,
the motion to dismiss was premature and "the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the
land is of such value."
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim. 9 Traversing the material
allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute
was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention10 making common cause with the private
respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.11
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed
value of ₱5,950.00.12
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property; and
Dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.13
Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered
judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of
the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its
refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction
over the action, conformably to Section 3315 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied. 16 Hence, they filed the
instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE
REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED
ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.17
The Ruling of the Court
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC,
against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said
court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, they made mention of the
increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount of ₱3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their
action is also one for damages exceeding ₱20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined
by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is
filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. 18 The caption of the
complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the
defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was
an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the
recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the
recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said
ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also
referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.19
Page 23 of 46
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant, the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:
so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law …
provides: (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
… (₱200,000.00).
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title to, or possession of real property in
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the court’s jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.26
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.27
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
… SO ORDERED.
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the
said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property
multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.20 The fair market value is the price at which a property
may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property
subject of the complaint.21 The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. 22 Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of
the property in 1991 was ₱5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration
containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of
the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners
since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00.23
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA’s disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the
property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds ₱20,000, and the
MTC, if the value is ₱20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the
property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and
presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos,
not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is
the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is
₱5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has
jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.24
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it
has been issued by the proper government agency.25
Unavailing also is the petitioners’ argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding
₱20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier,
explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs." This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the
implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that –
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a

Page 24 of 46

11.) G.R. NO. 155179 August 24, 2007
VICTORINO QUINAGORAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution 2 dated August 28, 2002, which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual antecedents.
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz (respondents), filed on October 27, 1994 a Complaint for Recovery
of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran (petitioner) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch XI of Tuao, Cagayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 240-T. 3 They alleged that they are the co-owners of
a a parcel of land containing 13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz; 4
that in the mid-70s, petitioner started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by
tolerance of respondents; that in 1993, they asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial
building on the property; that petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they suffered damages for their failure
to use the same.5 Respondents prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed 400 sq m, more or less, and to be paid
the amount of ₱5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated, attorney's fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00, costs of suit and
other reliefs and remedies just and equitable.6
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,
which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed ₱20,000.00. He argued that since the 346 sq
m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of ₱1,730.00, the assessed value of the lot under
controversy would not be more than the said amount.7
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 11, 1999, thus:
The Court finds the said motion to be without merit. The present action on the basis of the allegation of the complaint partakes of
the nature of action publicciana (sic) and jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial Court, regardless of the value
of the property. This is so because in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff demanded from the defendant
the removal of the house occupied by the defendant and the possession of which is "Only due to Tolerance (sic) of herein
plaintiffs".
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.8
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the RTC. 9
Petitioner then went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of the Orders of the RTC.10
On May 27, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing petitioner's action and affirming in toto the RTC.11
Pertinent portions of said Decision, read:
At the onset, we find that the complaint filed by the Heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz adequately set forth
the jurisdictional requirements for a case to be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. The Complaint is captioned "recovery of
portion of registered land" and it contains the following allegations:
7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors, the latter being the admitted owner of the adjoining lot, the
former's occupancy of said house by defendant was only due to the tolerance of herein plaintiffs;
8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then demanded the removal of the subject house for the purpose of
constructing a commercial building and which herein defendant refused and in fact now claims ownership of the
portion in which said house stands;
9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the subject house were hence made but which landed on deaf
ears;
10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein plaintiffs clearly establishes that the subject house is occupying
Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at the north-west portion thereof, as per the approved survey plan in the
records of the Bureau of Lands.
xxxx
It is settled that when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an
accion reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. In the latter instances, jurisdiction pertains to the Regional Trial Court.
As another legal recourse from a simple ejectment case governed by the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, an accion
publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession has lasted more than one year or when
dispossession was effected by means other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Where there is no allegation
that there was denial of possession through any of the methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, or where there
is no lease contract between the parties, the proper remedy is the plenary action of recovery of possession. Necessarily, the action
falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, we find that the private respondents [heirs of dela Cruz] availed of
the proper remedy when they filed the action before the court a quo.
Undoubtedly, the respondent court therefore did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction
in denying Quinagoran's Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration, thereof, because it has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the instant case.
xxxx
It would not be amiss to point out that the nature of the action and jurisdiction of courts are determined by the allegations in the
complaint. As correctly held by the Regional Trial Court, "the present action on the basis of the allegation of the complaint
partakes of the nature of action publiciana and jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial Court regardless of the
value of the property. Therefore, we completely agree with the court a quo's conclusion that the complaint filed by the Heirs of
Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz, is in the nature of an accion publiciana and hence it is the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the action, regardless of the assessed value of the property subject of present controversy. 12
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on August 28, 2002 for lack of merit. 13
Petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review claiming that under R.A. No. 7691 the jurisdiction of the MTC,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) was expanded to include exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions when the assessed value of the property does not exceed ₱20,000.00 outside Metro Manila and
₱50,000.00 within Metro Manila.14 He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the
assessed value of the property involved.15 In this case, the complaint does not allege that the assessed value of the land in
question is more than ₱20,000.00. There was also no tax declaration attached to the complaint to show the assessed value of the
property. Respondents therefore failed to allege that the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. 16 The tax declaration covering
Lot No. 1807 owned by respondents and where the herein disputed property is purportedly part -- a copy of which petitioner
submitted to the CA -- also shows that the value of the property is only ₱551.00. 17 Petitioner then prays that the CA Decision and
Resolution be annulled and set aside and that the complaint of herein respondents before the trial court be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.18
Respondents contend that: the petition is without factual and legal bases, and the contested decision of the CA is entirely in
accordance with law;19 nowhere in the body of their complaint before the RTC does it state that the assessed value of the
property is below ₱20,000.00;20 the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the RTC that the assessed value of
the disputed lot is below ₱20,000.00 is based on the assessed value of an adjacent property and no documentary proof was
shown to support the said allegation; 21 the tax declaration which petitioner presented, together with his Supplemental Reply
before the CA, and on the basis of which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is only ₱551.00, should also not
be given credence as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of ₱56,100.00 for the entire property. 22
The question posed in the present petition is not complicated, i.e., does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of
possession regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA --
that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of
which is below ₱20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and ₱50,000.00, if within.
Republic Act No. 769123 which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 12924 and which was already in effect25 when respondents filed
their complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994,26 expressly provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
--- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
Page 25 of 46
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of , real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages or whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than
₱20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.27
In Atuel v. Valdez28 the Court likewise expressly stated that:
Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property." However, if the assessed
value of the real property involved does not exceed ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and ₱20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila,
the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.29
That settled, the next point of contention is whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property involved.
Petitioner maintains that there should be such an allegation, while respondents claim the opposite.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of
the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. 30 This is because the nature of the
action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. 31
In this case, the complaint denominated as "Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages," reads:
1. That plaintiffs are the only direct and legitimate heirs of the late Juan dela Cruz, who died intestate on February 3,
1977, and are all residents of Centro, Piat, Cagayan;
xxxx
4. That plaintiffs inherited from x x x Juan dela Cruz x x x a certain parcel of land x x x containing an area of 13,111
square meters.
5. That sometime in the mid-1960's, a house was erected on the north-west portion of the aforedescribed lot x x x.
xxxx
7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors, the latter being the admitted owner of the adjoining lot, the
former's occupancy of said house by defendant was only due to the tolerance of herein plaintiffs;
8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then demanded the removal of the subject house for the purpose of
constructing a commercial building and which herein defendant refused and in fact now claims ownership of the
portion in which said house stands;
9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the subject house were hence made but which landed on deaf
ears;
10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein plaintiffs clearly establishes that the subject house is occupying
Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at the north-west portion thereof, as per the approved survey plan in the
records of the Bureau of Lands.32
Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the
face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. 33 Indeed, absent any allegation
in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. 34 The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the
land.351avvphi1
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of
the parties.36 Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant.37
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously
erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, 38 and the CA erred in
affirming the RTC.39
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals's Decision in CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27, 2002 and
its Resolution dated August 28, 2002, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court’s Orders dated November
11, 1999 and May 11, 2000, and all proceedings therein are declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 240-T is
dismissed without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
12.) G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY: ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD
TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, ALL SURNAMED SUPAPO, AND SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-
SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, AND THOSE
PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo and Romeo Supapo2 (Spouses Supapo) to
assail the February 25, 2011 decision3 and August 25, 2011 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario
Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot
40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416 registered and titled
under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos
(39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of
Caloocan.7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least
twice a year.8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without
their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the
other one.9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before
the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action)
for failure of the parties to settle amicably.10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-
Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and
MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is
hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No.
8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal
case.15
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final. 16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the
latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. The
respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and
the respondent's motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting
Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June
5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-45610 are
Page 26 of 46
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from further executing or implementing its
decision dated March 18, 1996. The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that
the period to file the action had prescribed.
SO ORDERED.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now have unbridled license WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and Order dated October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate
landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper SO ORDERED
action for recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they came to us through the
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20 present petition.
The Petition
After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1)
there is another action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:
limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment. (1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the assessed value of the property
The MeTC Ruling23 does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila; and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the Torrens system.
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments advanced by the
respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the The Respondents' Case33
respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by prescription; and
From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.24 (3) barred by res judicata.
The RTC Ruling25 Issues

The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls The issues for resolution are:
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the complaint for
recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC. Our Ruling

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: The petition is meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. barred by res judicata.

The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction. Accion Publiciana and
the Jurisdiction of the
SO ORDERED.26 MeTC

In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court's jurisdiction over an action involving title to Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It
or possession of land is determined by its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls within MeTC's jurisdiction. withholding of possession of the realty.34

The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of
action had already prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the
Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to vacate was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by
which the ejectment suit should have been filed is counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate
to file action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or
more than ten (10) years thereafter.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA.29
The CA Ruling30
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based their better
right of possession on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property.35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication,
in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.36

Page 27 of 46

Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject property, we will only do so to determine
if they or the respondents should have the right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court has the
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
plenary.38
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of
the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is
located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its
assessed value.40 The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous
to taxable value.41
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA —
that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property — no longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed
value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.43 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action and the court with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief
prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some
or all of the claims asserted therein.44
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00.
This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the
genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
The cause of action
has not prescribed
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being filed out of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
xxxx
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one
year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten
(10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo
may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property, and assuming a Torrens
title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right to recover possession because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more than ten (10) years after the
certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible since the subject property
is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on
the subject lot in 1979.46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the
Supapo's TCT.47
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The respondents contend that they built
their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they
can no longer be disturbed in their possession.48
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions have no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land
because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as
the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. 52
The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is the
right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible. 54
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons'
occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.56
Page 28 of 46
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we still rule in favor of the
holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title
proving the alleged transfer or sale.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater probative weight to the plaintiffs TCT vis-a-vis the contested
unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents did not adduce a single
evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore that we uphold the indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court merely recognizes the value of
the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece
of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and
will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.
The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent.58
With respect to the respondents' defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings.60 In other words, the party alleging laches must adduce in court evidence
proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not
pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's petition. 61 On the contrary,
the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise their right over and recover
possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint
for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the action publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover possession of the subject lot is not barred
by prescription.
The action is not barred
by prior judgment
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They contend that the decision of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the action publiciana.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to challenge the RTC's issuance of the
writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law.
The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the respondents' conviction because their criminal
liability had been extinguished by the repeal of the law under which they were tried and convicted. It follows that their civil
liability arising from the crime had also been erased.
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).62
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the merits and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.63
The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of
action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject
property.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the
name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses
Supapo.
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting
Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve
governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to
protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still no basis.
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of action provided that there is
identity of issue and identity of parties.65
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose,
or subject matter of the two actions is the same.66
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil
action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "collusiveness of judgment" does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply
because there is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents (accused therein) committed the
crime alleged in the information, while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right
than the respondents to possess and occupy the subject property.
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the parties has a
better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is
not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.
Page 29 of 46
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February
25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.

SO ORDERED.

Page 30 of 46
 The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review19 filed before the CA.
13.) G.R. No. 187944 The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades. Carmencita,
VARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated
vs. on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’
MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR, Respondents. institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20 the respondents
DECISION emphasized that "even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been
REYES, J.: in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment."21 The
For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action anchored on the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true
Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court in the case at bar where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of
(RTC), Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.
Civil Case No. CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to the complaint for unlawful
in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the respondents instead referred to a
respondents. deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the
Antecedents 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision among the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered
plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued the following year after its supposed execution.
in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically
the following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion):9 occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’ possession of the subject lot was
Lot No. TCT No. Heirs by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in an old wooden chest in their
1907-A-1 T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an "Agreement,"23 dated February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and
his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan
1907-A-2 T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely: (1) Azucena Padilla, married from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the
to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla (Remedios), married to Oscar waiver must have been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no
Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla (Veronica);10 and (4) Moreno Padilla longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
(Moreno), married to Teresita Curso (Teresita) The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of action. The certification to file an action was issued
by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who had no real rights or interests
1907-A-3 T-543461 Cresencio Padilla
over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April
1907-A-4 T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that date. The absence of such demand rendered the
complaint fatally defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit
1907-A-5 T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia) can be filed.
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother, In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their loss would be irreparable.
Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had Moreover, the resolution of the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita
thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the event that the latter’s complaint for unlawful detainer
parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11 would be granted and the former’s ancestral house demolished.
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to The Ruling of the CA
transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing
inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.12 Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita had already purchased on Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
City a complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
Lot No. 1907-A.14 possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
origin of the instant petition.1âwphi1 She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and damages and costs.
Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,:
As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In]
respondents to vacate the same.16 forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The respondents were ordered to vacate stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise made solidarily possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17 inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling.18 unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such

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action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to
continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date
of the last demand.
A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer
but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the
respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents] entered the
land and constructed a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the respondents’] possession became legal before
[Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot
[the respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded [for the
respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the
land for several decades already. There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the
respondents’] possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied, between [the
respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of
the land as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that
[the respondents’] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest did not
yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely
stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one
constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession
which he later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana
or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry.
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:
For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for
more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. Although admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim
ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual
possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party
in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if
he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the case of Sarmiento cited by the
respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the subject of an
accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera 26 finds more relevance
in the case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each other’s relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer
case, prior physical possession by the complainant is not necessary.27 Instead, what is required is a better right of possession.
Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
I In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for
unlawful detainer.
II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of
new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.
Carmencita’s Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the
registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty.
Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand
turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose
recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot
be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of ownership of a piece of real property will
not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs.29
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA30 that the registered owner of a property is
entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation of a property not by its registered owner
but by others depends on the former’s tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand,
failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper.32
The Respondents’Arguments
In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer was
fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the
respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents possessed "the property by mere
tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon
demand by the owners’."34 In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.
In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership are inseparably linked in the case
at bar. Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is already the subject of the
respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.
Our Disquisition
The instant petition lacks merit.
Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in the case at bar.
"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper
judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper."37
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property,
viz:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer
(desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession
while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial
court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from
the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be,
not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.39 (Citations omitted)
(1)initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2)eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s
right of possession;
(3)thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.40
Page 32 of 46
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and "TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, quieting of title
when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it. 41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of
about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.["]
occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became "THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal of the petitioners’
deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had house [from] the lot in question.["]
demanded for the former to vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more "To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners’ house prior to the determination of
importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof. the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands."46 (Citation omitted)
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for reasons discussed hereunder.
necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have been in possession of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject
short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44 respondents’ house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing
As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can abate circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.
Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer. All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer. As
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that: discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her
ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy having their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where
to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved." IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared: 03489 are AFFIRMED.
"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the SO ORDERED.
plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less
productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the
Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final
judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that
as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession
regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to
discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts."
xxxx
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment
suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like
Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of
petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences
and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by
physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming
ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort
by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and
probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but
allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious
under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.45 (Citations omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio
G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:
"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory that petitioners’
possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x
x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the
premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely physical
possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.["]

Page 33 of 46

14.) A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126 January 20, 2009
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2896-RTJ]
ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III (complainant), by Complaint-Affidavit1 dated June 8, 2006 which was sworn to on June 9, 2006 and
received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on June 13, 2006, charged Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala
(respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, with gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, graft and corruption, knowingly rendering
an unjust order, and culpable violation of the Constitution.
Complainant was a party to the following cases which were originally raffled to different branches but which were ordered
consolidated and assigned to Branch 86 presided by Judge Teodoro Bay (Judge Bay), they having involved the same parties
(complainant and his wife), related issues and reliefs prayed for: (1) Civil Case No. Q-06-57760, 2 for Violation of Republic Act
No. 9262 or the "Violence Against Women and Their Children Act," filed by complainant’s wife against him praying for, among
others, the issuance of Temporary Protection Order (TPO), (2) Civil Case No. 06-57857, 3 filed by complainant against his wife
for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (3) Civil Case No. Q-06-57984, 4 petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
complainant’s wife against him involving their son Carlos Iñigo R. Tabujara (habeas corpus case).
The habeas corpus case was raffled to Branch 102 which issued on May 23, 2006 a Writ 5 directing Deputy Sheriff Victor
Amarillas to "take and have the body of …. CARLOS IÑIGO R. TABUJARA before this Court on 25 May 2006, at 10:00 A.M.
and [to] summon the respondent-[herein complainant] to appear then and there to show cause why he should not be dealt with in
accordance with law."6 (Capitalization and underscoring in the original)
During the hearing on May 25, 2006 of the habeas corpus case before Branch 102, on complainant’s information that there were
two pending cases before Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay, Branch 102 directed the consolidation of said habeas corpus case
with the other cases pending before Branch 86.
After hearing was conducted on the habeas corpus case, Branch 86 Presiding Judge Bay issued on May 31, 2006 an Order 7
reading:
After considering the records of the three (3) cases consolidated before this Court, this Court resolves as follows:
1. the child Carlos Iñigo R. Tabujara shall continue to be under the custody of the respondent Ernesto Tabujara III
until the Court shall have resolved the issue of custody of said child. This is necessary to protect the child from
emotional and psychological violence due to the misunderstanding now existing between his parents.
2. the Motion to Admit Amended Petition with Prayer for Temporary Protection Order is GRANTED. The Temporary
Protection Order dated April 19, 2006 is hereby extended until the prayer for Permanent Protection is resolved.
3. The respondent Ernesto Tabujara III is hereby ordered to bring the child Carlos Iñigo Tabujara to this Court during
the hearing of these cases on July 14, 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.
x x x x8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the same date (May 31, 2006) of the issuance by Judge Bay of the above-quoted Order, complainant’s wife filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial
Reconsideration (Of the Order dated May 31, 2006).9 The motion contained no notice of hearing and no copy was furnished
herein complainant, albeit a copy was sent to his counsel via registered mail. Also on May 31, 2006, respondent Presiding Judge
of Branch 87, the pairing Judge of Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay who had filed a Leave of Absence effective the following
day or on June 1, 2006, acted on the motion of complainant’s wife and amended Judge Bay’s May 31, 2006 order by advancing
the production of the parties’ child from July 14, 2006 to June 1, 2006. 10 The decretal portion of respondent’s May 31, 2006
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, Ernesto A. Tabujara III or any person or persons acting for and in his behalf and under his direction is hereby
directed to produce the person of minor Carlos I[ñ]igo R. Tabujara before the Session Hall, Branch 87, located at 114, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City on June 1, 2006 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning. Failing which, the more coercive process of a Bench
Warrant will be issued against said respondent, without prejudice to a declaration of contempt which may be due under the
obtaining circumstances.11 (Underscoring supplied)
Alleging that respondent’s May 31, 2006 Order was issued with undue haste and without notice to complainant, and that
respondent violated the rule against interference with courts of co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction, complainant filed on June 1,
2006 a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Court
of Appeals.12
On June 1, 2006, complainant having failed to appear at the rescheduled date (by respondent) for him to produce the minor child,
declared him
. . . in contempt of Court for defying the order directing the production of the minor, in which case, a bench warrant is hereby
ordered against respondent, who is likewise ordered imprisoned until such time that he is willing to appear and comply with the
order of this Court directing the production of the minor. Until further notice.13 (Underscoring supplied)
On June 2, 2006, the appellate court issued a Resolution 14 in complainant’s petition for Certiorari granting a Temporary
Restraining Order and ordering complainant’s wife to submit a Comment on the petition. On even date, in view of the contempt
order and bench warrant issued by respondent on June 1, 2006, complainant filed before the appellate court an urgent ex-parte
motion to set aside respondent’s June 1, 2006 Order and bench warrant. 15 The appellate court granted the motion by June 7, 2006
Resolution.16
Hence, arose the present complaint, complainant contending that when respondent issued her May 31, 2006 Order, Judge Bay
was not yet on official leave as it was yet to start the following day, June 1, 2006; that as a judge of a co-equal and concurrent
jurisdiction, respondent could not amend, revise, modify or disturb the orders of the other courts; 17 and that respondent violated
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court 18 on litigated motions which Rule calls for the setting of such motions for hearing and
the service of copy thereof upon the opposing party at least three days before the scheduled hearing.
Complainant adds that respondent’s May 31, 2006 Order was issued after the opposing counsel personally met and conferred
with respondent in her chambers without the presence of his (complainant’s) counsel; and that after issuing the Order, respondent
personally summoned via telephone complainant’s counsel to her chambers where she personally furnished him a copy of the
Order in the presence of opposing counsel.19
Then Court Administrator Christopher Lock, by Ist Indorsement dated July 3, 2006, 20 directed respondent to comment on the
Complaint-Affidavit within ten days from notice.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) synthesized respondent’s 22-page Comment dated August 2, 2006, 21 the salient
portions of which follow:
xxxx
In acting on the subject cases as pairing judge of Branch 86, respondent judge argued that she did not violate the basic rule
against interference between courts of concurrent or co-equal jurisdiction. When respondent judge ordered the production of the
minor child during the hearing set on 01 June 2006, the regular presiding judge of Branch 86 was no longer in his office as he
already left the building as per information of Branch Clerk of Court Buenaluz. Hence, as pairing judge, she has the authority to
act on the said urgent motion and to issue the bench warrant.
xxxx
Respondent denied her alleged close personal relationship with Atty. Carmina Abbas, counsel of record of complainant’s wife.
When Atty. Abbas appeared during the hearing on 01 June 2006, it was the second time that she saw her; the first time was
sometime two years ago during the IBP meeting in Makati City. She claimed that she did not know either Atty. Abas or the
complainant’s wife. She only came to know them when the case was referred to her for action.
With respect to her alleged failure to require complainant to show cause and answer the contempt charge against him, respondent
explained that the record of the habeas corpus case shows that complainant was given several opportunities to comply with the
Writ to bring the minor child. Per record, the 1st refusal to comply was during the hearing on 25 May 2006 when complainant
claimed lack of material time to fetch the child from Tagaytay highlands. Then, the 2nd and 3 rd refusal[s] to comply were during
the hearings on 26 May 2006 and 01 June 2006, respectively.
Respondent likewise denied personally calling complainant’s counsel and informing her about the motion and the hearing on 01
June 2006. As to the reason for Atty. Ambrosio’s unexpected arrival at the respondent’s sala and as to how she learned about the
motion is unknown to her. She claimed that the sending of notice to party litigants and/or their counsel is not her concern or duty
but that of the Branch Clerk of Court.
Respondent noted that the Petition for Certiorari which complainant filed in the Court of Appeals impleaded her in the capacity
of Presiding Judge of Branch 87. Hence, complainant misled the Court of Appeals in making it appear that she issued the
questioned order in her capacity as the regular judge of Branch 87.
Respondent only came to know of the TRO when the bench warrant was already disseminated to the proper government
authorities. It was thus incumbent upon the complainant to submit himself to the court and ask that the bench warrant be set
aside or recalled because of the TRO.
. . . . Complainant’s detention at the office of the Executive Judge Natividad was of his own making.
x x x x22 (Underscoring supplied)
After noting the following record of administrative charges against respondent:23
Docket No. Complainant Charge/ Penalty Date of
Violation Decision/
Page 34 of 46
 Resolution 1, 2006, when Judge Bay’s leave of absence started; Nor did respondent’s opinion on the urgency of the case justify her
sacrificing law and settled jurisprudence for the sake of expediency.27
Gross Insubordination And Dismissal from the Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty of indirect contempt and not direct contempt. 28
1. RTJ-06-1974 Edano, Carmen P. 26 July 2007 Indirect or constructive contempt is committed "outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of
Gross Misconduct Service without prejudice
the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
2. 05-10-618 Undue Delay in The Fine of P11,000.00 Pesos process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful
OCA’s Report 11 July 2006
RTC Disposition of Cases with Warning interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."29
Manansala, Fine of P40,000.00 Pesos
3. RTC-05-1916 Gross Misconduct 10 May 2005 For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule
Melencio III P. with stern Warning
71 of the
4. RTJ-00-1546 Bownman, James 06 March Rules of Court.30 In Lim v. Domagas31 where the therein judge declared the therein complainant guilty of contempt and ordered
Grave Abuse of Discretion Fine of P2,000.00 Pesos his arrest for failure to bring three minors before the court without the benefit of a hearing, the Court faulted the therein judge
(98-628-RTJ) et al., 2000
not only for grave abuse of discretion but also for gross ignorance of the law.
Dumlao, 08 February Because, again as reflected above, respondent was, in Edaño v. Asdala, dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all salaries,
5. RTJ-99-1428 Partiality Admonished
Florentino, Jr., 1999 benefits and leave credits to which she may be entitled, 32 she should, as recommended by the OCA, be fined in the amount of
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied), Forty Thousand Pesos, the highest amount of fine imposable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, a serious charge under
the OCA came up with the following evaluation of the Complaint: Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.33
As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent Judge had indeed acted on the three (3) consolidated cases: (1) without the WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of gross ignorance of law and procedure. She having been earlier
legal authority as pairing judge of Branch 86 considering that the regular presiding judge thereat was still sitting as such when dismissed from the service, she is FINED the amount of Forty Thousand (₱40,000) Pesos to be deducted from the Eighty
she issued the order of 31 May 2006; (2) in violation of the basic rule on procedural due process when she resolved ex-parte the Thousand (₱80,000) Pesos which this Court withheld pursuant to its January 15, 2008 Resolution in Edaño v. Asdala.
motion of the complainant’s wife; and . . . in citing complainant in contempt of court and issuing the bench warrant without SO ORDERED.
requiring the complainant to file his comment on said ex-parte motion and explain the reason for his failure to appear and bring
the minor child during the hearing on 01 June 2006.
xxxx
It must be noted that the motion of complainant’s wife was an ordinary motion which required the application of ordinary rules
and was not itself the application of writ under Rule 102.
xxxx
Clear it is from the foregoing that respondent’s basis in disregarding the rule under Section 4 of Rule 15 is not valid. While
respondent may be justified in immediately setting the hearing of the said urgent ex-parte motion, she should not have resolved it
without first requiring the complainant to file his comment. Although the appearance of the complainant during the hearing may
be waived, he has the right to be heard insofar as the said motion is concerned through the filing of his comment thereon.
Respondent Judge’s blunder was compounded when she immediately cited complainant in contempt of court and issued the
bench warrant without requiring the latter to explain the reason for his non-appearance and non-compliance with a standing
order. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, complainant’s alleged disobedience is an indirect contempt the punishment for which
requires that a respondent should be first asked to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
There is one more act equally serious in nature. As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent indeed took cognizance of
the consolidated cases without proper authority. Respondent cannot reason out that she acted in her capacity as pairing judge. It
is clear from the records that her authority as pairing judge of Branch 86 started only on 01 June 2006 when Judge Bay’s leave of
absence commenced. Judge Bay was still sitting as the regular judge of Branch 86 as evidenced by the issuance of his order on
31 May 2006. Respondent’s explanation that Judge Bay was no longer in the premises in the afternoon of 31 May 2006, so that
she could act on the subject ex-parte motion is clearly unacceptable. x x x
Under Section 8 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10, the penalty of gross ignorance of the
procedure and gross misconduct is dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which
she may be entitled and with disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporation…
x x x x 24 (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As reflected above, respondent having been earlier dismissed from the service, the OCA recommended that "respondent should
be fined in the sum of ₱40,000.00 pesos, the maximum penalty of fine under Section 11(3) under Rule 140, as amended."
By Resolution of June 30, 2008,25 this Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter.
The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA well-taken.
As found by the Court of Appeals, respondent gravely abused her discretion when she acted on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration (Of the Order
dated May 31, 2006).26 That Judge Bay may have left the court premises in the afternoon of May 31, 2006 did not justify her
acting on even date on motion of complainant’s wife, as her authority as pairing judge commenced only the following day, June

Page 35 of 46

15.) G.R. No. 150107 January 28, 2008
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED, ALMA PEÑALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA,
SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and ANTONIO B. LAPID, petitioners,
vs.
JORGE VALDEZ, respondent.
x ------------------------------------------ x
G.R. No. 150108 January 28, 2008
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED and TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO,
petitioners,
vs.
JORGE VALDEZ, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 13, 2001 in the consolidated
cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579.
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated (Tokio Marine), petitioner in these cases, is a domestic corporation
engaged in the insurance business. The individual petitioners are its corporate officers, except Antonio B. Lapid, one of Tokio
Marine's consultants.
Jorge Valdez, respondent in these cases, was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine pursuant to a Unit Management Contract
entered into between them on August 16, 1977.
On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila a complaint for damages against
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91356. He alleged therein that petitioners violated the terms of the Unit Management
Contract by refusing to pay him, among others, his "commissions," and bonuses. Respondent prayed for the following reliefs: a)
actual damages in the total amount of P71,866,205.67 and the corresponding interests; b) moral damages of P10,000,000.00; c)
exemplary damages amounting to P10,000,000.00; d) attorney's fees corresponding to 30% of the said amounts; and e) costs of
the suit.
Eventually, respondent filed with the trial court an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion For Authority To Litigate As Indigent Plaintiff."
On October 28, 1998, the trial court issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:
The Court hereby allows the plaintiff to litigate as pauper there being sufficient showing that he is an indigent. He
does not own any real property in the City of Manila or elsewhere.
The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to accept the complaint for filing without payment of filing fees
computed as SIX HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO AND EIGHTY-THREE
CENTAVOS (P615,672.83) which amount, however, shall constitute a lien upon any judgment to be rendered in favor
of the plaintiff.
On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint.
On December 17, 1998, respondent manifested before the trial court that he filed various criminal complaints against petitioners
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
On January 20, 1999, the trial court issued an Order 2 denying petitioners' motions to dismiss. They then filed motions for
reconsideration, but they were likewise denied.
On March 12, 1999, petitioners filed their "Answer Ad Cautelam" in Civil Case No. 98-91356.
On May 24, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1999 denying their motions to
dismiss, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.
On October 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the trial court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356 during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP
No. 52914.
Then on December 7, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals an "Urgent Notice of Taking of Deposition Upon Oral
Examination of Private Respondent Jorge Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending Case And For Such Other Legal
Purposes As May Be Warranted By Existing Law and Jurisprudence." It appears that respondent was already 75 years old and
sickly.
On December 13, 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to cite respondent in contempt of court, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 56579. Petitioners alleged therein that in filing with the appellate court an urgent notice of taking his
deposition, respondent violated the preliminary injunction issued by the said court.
Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.
On December 14, 1999, the deposition of respondent was taken by Atty. Alberto A. Aguja, a Notary Public for Manila. On the
same date, he filed with the Court of Appeals respondent's deposition.
On September 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 56579 dismissing the petitions and lifting and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the consolidated petitions filed by the petitioners are hereby DISMISSED. The writ
of preliminary injunction dated October 18, 1999 issued by this Court enjoining further proceedings in Civil Case No.
98-91356, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in denying their motion to dismiss respondent's complaint in Civil Case
No. 98-91356 for nonpayment of docket fees; (2) for not finding that respondent engaged in forum shopping; and (3) in not
declaring that he is guilty of contempt of court.
On the first issue, it is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket
fee.3 As we held in Magaspi v. Ramolete,4 the correct docket fees must be paid before courts can act on a petition or complaint.
The exception to the rule on payment of docket fees is provided in Section 21, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, thus:
SEC. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court,
upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees
which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court.
If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient
income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
The guidelines for determining whether a party qualifies as an indigent litigant are provided for in Section 19, Rule 141, 5 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - INDIGENT LITIGANT (A) WHOSE GROSS
INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE
MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A
FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent unless the court
otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate
family do not earn a gross income abovementioned nor they own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or
action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been
incurred.
For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is not really a pauper, but is properly a person who is an indigent
although not a public charge, meaning that he has no property or income sufficient for his support aside from his labor, even if he
is self-supporting when able to work and in employment. 6 The term "immediate family" includes those members of the same
household who are bound together by ties of relationship but does not include those who are living apart from the particular
household of which the individual is a member.7
In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondent's ex parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective since it was not
accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate members of his family. The argument lacks merit.
Section 19 clearly states that it is the litigant alone who shall execute the affidavit. The Rule does not require that all
members of the litigant's immediate family must likewise execute sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
Page 36 of 46
Petitioners next argue that respondent's ex parte motion is not supported by sufficient evidence to show his indigent status. 8
Suffice it to state that this Court is, first and foremost, a court of law. It is not its function to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence or premises supportive of factual determination.9 Thus, petitioners cannot now ask us to review the evidence anew.
Anent the second issue, petitioners insist that respondent committed forum shopping when he failed to report to the trial court
that he filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals 10 describes forum shopping as the act of a litigant who "repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by
some other court…to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another." Differently put,
it is "the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."11
The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different
courts as it constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.12
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirement shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall
be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
Respondent's Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 reads:
FURTHER, that he has not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, except the criminal case for SWINDLING
(ESTAFA) under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b) and for FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS under Art. 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor's
Office, criminal case for violation of the Insurance Code of the Philippines to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor's
Office, and the administrative case for violation of the Insurance Code Commission; that to the best of his knowledge
no such other action is pending in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing certification is a substantial compliance with Section 5 of Rule 7.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent manifested before the trial court on December 16, 1998 that he actually filed
criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
On the final issue, petitioners claim that the deposition of respondent taken on December 14, 1999 violated the injunction issued
by the Court of Appeals on October 15, 1999. Such act, petitioners assert, is tantamount to indirect contempt of court.
Contempt of court is "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court: such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation." 13
Succinctly, it is the despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court. 14 Rule 71 provides for two forms of
contumacious acts - direct and indirect.
Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an
officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful
interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.15 It is governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - After a charge in writing has been filed and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or rejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged
to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceeding of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court,
or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be compliance with the following requisites: (a) a charge in
writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court; and
(c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel.16 Records show that these requirements were complied with.
The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56579, dismissed the charge for indirect contempt, holding that respondent's
deposition was done in good faith, thus:
It should be emphasized that what triggered the holding of private respondent's deposition last December 14, 1999
was the use by the petitioners of the June 09 and 28, 1999 depositions when at that time no orders were issued by Us
enjoining any proceedings below. The use of the petitioners of June 09 and 28 depositions have been vigorously
objected to by the private respondent, contending that there was a misunderstanding created when the private
respondent was cross-examined by the counsel for the petitioners, and in his honest belief to clarify such
misunderstanding in the previous depositions, the December 14, 1999 deposition was taken.
We see no reason to depart from the foregoing findings by the appellate court. Moreover, the taking of respondent's deposition is
not a part of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not covered by the writ of injunction issued by the Court
of Appeals. Let it be stressed at this point that we have always abided by the dogma that courts must exercise their contempt
powers sparingly.
In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No.
56579.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 56579 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Page 37 of 46

16.) G.R. No. 150949 June 21, 2007
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 12, 2001 and Resolution dated
November 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.
The facts are:
On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land consisting
of 33,130 square meters in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
278479 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of
Sharcons. However, when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker
of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified
the status of the title and found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13,
1979.
On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a complaint for
quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and
the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Español, petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito See
and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have
used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title.
Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days
in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Petitioner’s Order is partly reproduced as follows:
From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds that the instant case is a callous and blatant
imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations, through the extensive use of falsified
documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C.
Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who connived with this private group on one hand, and some officials and
employees of the government agencies responsible for the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on
the other. Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the mercy of
these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v.
Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges be filed against Benito See and
Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau
of Investigation and the Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let
a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidant’s Office, Supreme Court. Manila.
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty.
Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in contempt for foisting
falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents in the pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the
instant case filed before this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid
respondents who should serve ten (10) days of detention at the Dasmariñas Municipal Jail, Cavite.
Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT No. T-511462 allegedly issued on
November 11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from another spurious title with TCT
No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property
No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Registry of
Deeds for its implementation with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the Assessor’s Office of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious instruments.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas, the private
defendant’s counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are likewise dismissed. However, the said private
defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No.
623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N.
Tagle.2 Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judge’s Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents
are falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor.
On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They were confined in the municipal jail of
Dasmariñas, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were
denied outright by petitioner.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On
July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent judge’s July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein petitioners in direct contempt and
ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the Warrant of Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of
Commitment, dated July 13, 2001, which the respondent judge issued against the persons of the herein petitioners, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Español erred in taking cognizance of the Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil
Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct
contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether
respondents are guilty as charged.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of November 15, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using
falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.
The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the
court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way
tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has
also been described as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during
litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court.5
The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia
Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign. 6 This concept was adopted by
the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the
inherent power to punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of the
judicial institution.7 Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very administration of justice.8
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or
a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not exceeding
one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to
obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished summarily without
hearing.10 In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the
commission of the act of contumely.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
Page 38 of 46
 jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to
be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent
into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an
officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful
interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.11
We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect
contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper conduct which degrades the
administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI,12 we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified
document, more so where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as
such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a
contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be
heard by himself and counsel.13 Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate
proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction. 14 Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of
evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. 15 Perforce,
petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She
should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took judicial notice of the Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92,
assigned to another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government, and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines,
the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even
when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the
Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified documents (such
as land title and tax declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling
that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of
respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting the required bail as ordered by the Court of
Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person
discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.17
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page 39 of 46

17.) G.R. No. 180200 November 25, 2013
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JESSIE E. CANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is of the utmost importance x x x that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as
possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the
operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the July 24, 2007 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
29009 which affirmed the July 7, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XI, Balayan, Batangas in Civil
Case No. 4051 dismissing petitioner Digital Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc.’s (petitioner) Petition for Indirect
Contempt/Prohibition against respondent Jessie E. Cantos (respondent) as Provincial Treasurer of Batangas. Also assailed is the
October 11, 2007 CA Resolution5 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
By virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. 7678,6 petitioner was granted a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain
telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines on February 17, 1994.
Upon seeking the renewal of its Mayor’s Permit to operate and provide telecommunications service in Balayan, Batangas,
petitioner was informed by then Mayor Benjamin E. Martinez, Jr. that its business operation would be restrained should it fail to
pay the assessed real property taxes on or before October 5, 1998. And as petitioner failed to pay, the Chief of the Permit and
License Division of Balayan, Batangas, Mr. Francisco P. Martinez, issued on October 6, 1998 a Cease and Desist Order
enjoining petitioner from further operating its business.
Petitioner thus promptly filed a case for Annulment of the Cease and Desist Order before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas against
the Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License Division. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3514 and raffled to
Branch IX of said court.
In a Decision7 dated July 15, 1999, Branch IX ruled in favor of petitioner and declared that the issuance of the Cease and Desist
Order was without legal basis. It held that the enjoinment of petitioner’s business operation is not one of the remedies available
to enforce collection of real property taxes under existing laws. The RTC also ruled that petitioner is only liable to pay real
property taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise. In arriving at such conclusion, the RTC
relied on Section 5 of RA 7678, which provides that:
Sec. 5. Tax Provisions. - The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings, and personal property
exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition
thereto, the grantee shall pay to the Bureau of Internal Revenue each year, within thirty (30) days after the audit and approval of
the accounts, a franchise tax as may be prescribed by law of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications
businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee; provided, that the grantee shall continue to be liable for income taxes
payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 72 unless the latter
enactment is amended or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto.
The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due thereon to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall be subject to audit by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
and construed the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" in the first sentence as limiting petitioner’s exemption from paying real
property tax only to properties used in furtherance of its legislative franchise to provide telecommunications services.
The dispositive portion of Branch IX’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Cease and Desist Order dated October 6, 1998 is hereby declared null and void for lack of legal basis. The
Court further declares that real properties of plaintiff [Digital] Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (DIGITEL) which are used
in the operation of its franchise are exempt from the payment of real property taxes, but those not used in connection thereto are
subject to aforesaid taxes.
SO ORDERED.8
The then Mayor attempted to set aside the above Decision by filing a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. But his efforts were
in vain as the CA outrightly dismissed the Petition.9 The dismissal became final and executory as shown in an Entry of
Judgment dated February 2, 2000.10
In June 2002, respondent, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas, issued seven Warrants of Levy 11
certifying that several real properties of petitioner situated in the Municipalities of Ibaan, San Juan, Sto. Tomas, Cuenca,
Nasugbu, Balayan, and Lemery, all in the Province of Batangas, are delinquent in the payment of real property taxes. Hence, the
properties would be advertised and sold at public auction within 30 days from petitioner’s receipt of the warrants.
On July 1, 2002, petitioner wrote respondent to request the lifting of the Warrants of Levy and to refrain from proceeding with
the public sale of its property located in Balayan, Batangas.12 It invoked the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 decreeing
petitioner’s exemption from the payment of real property tax which it claimed to be binding upon respondent. But since the
warrants remained unlifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)13 on July 5, 2002. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4051.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
For his defense, respondent averred that he cannot be held liable for contempt or for having disobeyed the Decision in Civil Case
No. 3514 since the same relates to an action in personam and, therefore, binds only the parties impleaded therein and their
successors in interest.14 He also asserted that petitioner’s claim for tax exemption could not be collaterally presented and
resolved in a contempt proceeding and that petitioner should have resorted instead to the remedies provided under the Local
Government Code (LGC) in order to prevent the public sale of its delinquent properties.
On July 25, 2002, the RTC granted15 petitioner’s prayer for TRO. Respondent, however, manifested that when said TRO was
served upon him, he had already effected the public auction of petitioner’s real properties.16 Thus, petitioner filed a Very Urgent
Manifestation and Motion17 to recall and nullify the auction sale and to order respondent and his counsel to explain why they
should not be held in contempt for their blatant defiance of the TRO. It also thereafter asserted that respondent is bound by the
final Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514 under the principle of res judicata.18 It maintained that respondent has a shared
interest with the defendants in Civil Case No. 3514 in that they are all interested in the levy, imposition and collection of real
property tax and that the Province of Batangas, including respondent, is estopped from denying privity because of the Province’s
active participation in both proceedings by virtue of the representation of the same counsel. Petitioner likewise contended that
the declaration in Civil Case No. 3514 that it is exempt from real property tax for properties used in the operation of its franchise
is considered in rem and binds the property itself.
On August 14, 2002, the RTC issued an Order19 denying petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
It held that the issuance of the writ prayed for had already become moot and academic since the public auction sale sought to be
enjoined was already consummated. It further noted that the writ as a provisional remedy is unavailing to petitioner’s case as it
should have availed of the remedy provided under Section 260 of the LGC in order to stop the scheduled auction sale, that is, to
pay the delinquent tax and interest due thereon under protest.
Petitioner filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Null and Void the Sale Conducted on July 25, 2002 20
which was, however, denied in an Order21 dated September 3, 2002. When petitioner elevated the denial to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari,22 the same was dismissed in a Resolution23 dated November 18, 2002.
Meanwhile, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,24 the RTC rendered its Decision25 dated July 7, 2003
dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition against respondent (Civil Case No. 4051). The RTC ruled
that since respondent was not a party in Civil Case No. 3514, he had no duty to render obedience to the Decision therein.
Furthermore, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 3514 and Civil Case No. 4051, the former being
an action in personam, the Decision in said case binds only the parties impleaded therein and their successors in interest, which
do not include the respondent. The said court refused to rule on petitioner’s claim for exemption from payment of realty taxes
ratiocinating that any case pertaining thereto should be filed directly with the local government unit concerned.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.26
As petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration27 was denied by the RTC in a Resolution28 dated September 17, 2004, it appealed to
the CA.29
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
In a Decision30 dated July 24, 2007, the CA found no merit in the appeal. First, it noted that the dismissal of the case for indirect
contempt by the RTC amounted to an acquittal from which an appeal is not allowed. In any case, respondent’s act of issuing the
warrants of levy did not constitute indirect contempt in Civil Case No. 3514 since the final Decision issued in said case was not
directed against him but to the Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License Division of Balayan, Batangas. The CA also
concurred with the trial court’s ruling that petitioner’s claim for tax exemption could not be presented and resolved in an indirect
contempt case and opined that the correct remedy is for petitioner to file an independent action for annulment of sale against the
Province of Batangas and there invoke its exemption from real property taxes.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated July 7, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 17, 2004,
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Balayan, Batangas in Civil Case No. 4051 are AFFIRMED.
Page 40 of 46
SO ORDERED.31
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration32 was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated October 11, 2007.
Issues
Petitioner, thence, filed this Petition on the following grounds:
(a) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Civil Case No. 4051 is simply a case for indirect contempt so much [so]
that its dismissal by the lower court would amount to acquittal from which an appeal would not lie;
(b) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent, not being a party to Civil Case No. 3514, cannot be held in
contempt for refusing to abide by the decision there[in];
(c) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of Digitel for real property tax exemption cannot be presented
and resolved in the indirect contempt case; and
(d) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the "proper remedy is for Digitel to file an independent action for
annulment of sale against the Province of Batangas, invoking its exemption from payment of real property taxes.34
Petitioner takes exception to the CA’s ruling that an appeal will not lie since the RTC Decision essentially amounts to
respondent’s acquittal. It posits that the CA can still take cognizance of the appeal since the same is also a Petition for
Prohibition. It is well within the authority of the said court to rule on the claim for tax exemption like in the case of The City
Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.35 wherein the claim for realty tax exemption of another
telecommunications company, Bayantel, was resolved through a Petition for Prohibition. Petitioner likewise insists that
respondent cannot defy the final ruling in Civil Case No. 3514 and also the pronouncement of this Court in Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan36 that petitioner is exempted from paying real property tax.
Also, in consonance with said rulings, the sale by public auction of petitioner’s properties is void ab initio, the same having been
made under a mistaken premise that petitioner’s properties are not exempt from realty taxes. Thus, an independent action to
annul the sale of the properties, contrary to the CA’s intimation, is not the proper remedy. Petitioner therefore prays for the
nullification and setting aside of the auction sale conducted by respondent against its real properties.
Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.
At the outset, the Court shall address the issue on double jeopardy as discussed by petitioner in its Memorandum.
In his Comment, respondent reiterated the CA’s ruling that the RTC Decision amounts to an acquittal, hence, an appeal does not
lie. Arguing against it, petitioner contends that the rule on double jeopardy will not bar it from pursuing its appeal because this is
not a criminal case and respondent is not tried as an accused.
The Court is not persuaded. Indeed, contempt is not a criminal offense.37 However, a charge for contempt of court partakes of
the nature of a criminal action.38 Rules that govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a prosecution for contempt.39 In fact,
Section 11 of Rule 7140 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal in indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as in
criminal cases. This Court has held that an alleged contemner should be accorded the same rights as that of an accused. 41 Thus,
the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to an acquittal, which effectively bars a second
prosecution.42
Be that as it may, respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s
order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends
to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their
witnesses during litigation."43
In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of petitioner’s real
properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of
Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform under Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160,44
viz:
Section 176. Levy on Real Property. - After the expiration of the time required to pay the delinquent tax, fee, or charge, real
property may be levied on before, simultaneously, or after the distraint of personal property belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.
To this end, the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, shall prepare a duly authenticated certificate showing
the name of the taxpayer and the amount of the tax, fee, or charge, and penalty due from him. Said certificate shall operate with
the force of a legal execution throughout the Philippines. Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate the description
of the property upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or served upon the
assessor and the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is located who shall annotate the levy on the tax
declaration and certificate of title of the property, respectively, and the delinquent taxpayer or, if he be absent from the
Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant
of the property in question.
In case the levy on real property is not issued before or simultaneously with the warrant of distraint on personal property, and the
personal property of the taxpayer is not sufficient to satisfy his delinquency, the provincial, city or municipal treasurer, as the
case may be, shall within thirty (30) days after execution of the distraint, proceed with the levy on the taxpayer's real property. .
A report on any levy shall, within ten (10) days after receipt of the warrant, be submitted by the levying officer to the sanggunian
concerned.
Section 177. Penalty for Failure to Issue and Execute Warrant. - Without prejudice to criminal prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code and other applicable laws, any local treasurer who fails to issue or execute the warrant of distraint or levy after the
expiration of the time prescribed, or who is found guilty of abusing the exercise thereof by competent authority shall be
automatically dismissed from the service after due notice and hearing.
Noteworthy at this point is that there is nothing in the records which would show that petitioner availed of the tax exemption or
submitted the requirements to establish that it is exempted from paying real property taxes. Section 206 of RA 7160 outlines the
requirements for real property tax exemption, viz.:
Sec. 206. Proof of Exemption of Real Property from Taxation. - Every person by or for whom real property is declared, who
shall claim tax exemption for such property under this Title shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor within thirty
(30) days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient documentary evidence in support of such claim including
corporate charters, title of ownership, articles of incorporation, by-laws, contracts, affidavits, certifications and mortgage deeds,
and similar documents.
If the required evidence is not submitted within the period herein prescribed, the property shall be listed as taxable in the
assessment roll. However, if the property shall be proven to be tax exempt, the same shall be dropped from the assessment roll.
Neither did petitioner avail of the remedy of paying the assessed real property tax under protest as prescribed in Section 25245 of
RA 7160. Suffice it to say that the availment of these remedies could have prevented respondent’s issuance of the Warrants of
Levy and the conduct of the subsequent public auction sale of petitioner’s properties. Due to petitioner’s non-availment of these
remedies, respondent therefore remained duty bound to perform such acts, otherwise, he may be subjected to the penalties
prescribed for non-performance of his ministerial duties as provincial treasurer.
Respondent is not bound by the Decision in Civil Case No. 3514.
Petitioner avers that respondent blatantly defied a final and binding Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514 declaring it
exempt from paying taxes on its real properties. It argues that there is a shared identity of interest between the defendants in
Civil Case No. 3514 and respondent. Therefore, respondent is barred by the Decision in the said case under the principle of res
judicata.
The contention is specious. "Res judicata means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.’"46 For res judicata to apply there must among others be, between the first and the second actions, identity
of the parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. 47 Here, there is no identity of parties between Civil
Case No. 3514 and the instant case. "Identity of parties exists ‘where the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity
between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.’"48 In Civil Case No. 3514, the action was directed against Benjamin E.
Martinez, Jr. and Francisco P. Martinez in their capacities as Mayor and Chief of the Permit and License Division of the
Municipality of Balayan, Batangas, respectively. On the other hand, respondent, in the instant case, is being sued in his capacity
as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas. While the defendants in both cases similarly sought to enforce the tax
obligation of petitioner, they were sued under different capacities. Moreover, there is no identity in the causes of action between
the two cases. In Civil Case No. 3514, the propriety of the municipal officials’ closure/stoppage of petitioner’s business
operation in Balayan, Batangas was the one in question while what is involved in this case is respondent’s act of issuing
Warrants of Levy and proceeding with the auction sale of the real properties of petitioner. Clearly, the principle of res judicata
does not apply. The RTC and the CA are therefore correct in ruling that respondent, not being a party thereto, is not bound by the
Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514.
Petitioner’s reliance on the rulings in Civil Case No. 3514 and Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of
Pangasinan is misplaced.
In support of its prayer to annul the auction sale of its real properties, petitioner heavily relies on the Decision rendered in Civil
Case No. 3514 declaring that it is exempt from paying real property tax. In addition, it invokes Digital Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan49 wherein it was ruled that petitioner’s real properties located within the territorial
jurisdiction of Pangasinan that are actually, directly and exclusively used in its franchise are exempt from realty tax.
As in Civil Case No. 3514, this Court’s Third Division in Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of
Pangasinan50 has interpreted the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" in the first sentence of Section 5 of RA 7678 as limiting
petitioner’s exemption from realty tax to real properties used in the pursuit of its legislative franchise. 1âwphi1 It was then held
Page 41 of 46
that RA 7678 exempted petitioner’s properties that are actually, directly, and exclusively used in the conduct and operation of its
franchise from real property tax.
But this ruling has already been abandoned.
In the later case of Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. City Government of Batangas,51 the Court en banc speaking
thru Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio pronounced:
Nowhere in the language of the first sentence of Section 5 of RA 7678 does it expressly or even impliedly provide that
petitioner’s real properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in its telecommunications business are exempt from
payment of realty tax. On the contrary the first sentence of Section 5 specifically states that the petitioner, as the franchisee shall
pay the ‘same taxes on its real estate, buildings, and personal property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or
corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay.’
The heading of Section 5 is ‘Tax Provisions,’ not Tax Exemptions. To reiterate, the phrase ‘exemption from real estate tax’ or
other words conveying exemption from realty tax do not appear in the first sentence of Section 5. The phrase ‘exclusive of this
franchise’ in the first sentence of Section 5 merely qualifies the phrase personal property to exclude petitioner’s legislative
franchise, which is an intangible personal property. Petitioner’s franchise is subject to tax in the second sentence of Section 5
which imposes the ‘franchise tax.’ Thus, there is no grant of tax exemption in the first sentence of Section 5.
The interpretation of the phrase exclusive of this franchise in the Bayantel and Digitel cases goes against the basic principle in
construing tax exemptions. In PLDT v. City of Davao the Court held that ‘tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and
unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be mistaken. They cannot be extended by mere implication or
inference.’
Tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal. A taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must point to a specific provision of law
conferring on the taxpayer in clear and plain terms, exemption from a common burden. Any doubt whether a tax exemption
exists is resolved against the taxpayer.52
As things now stand, petitioner s real properties, whether used in the furtherance of its franchise or not, are subject to real
property tax. Hence, its reliance on the rulings in Civil Case No. 3514 and Digital Telecommunications Philippines Inc. v.
Province of Pangasinan53 becomes unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 11, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR No. 29009 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Page 42 of 46

18.) G.R. No. 186592 October 10, 2012
GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, and RODOLFO
H. DE MESA, Petitioners,
vs.
LEO RUBEN C. MANRIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court filed against respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique
(Manrique) for allegedly publishing statements which tend to directly impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
Factual Antecedents
The instant case stemmed. from an article in Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation wherein respondent Manrique is
the publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements against the Supreme Court.
The petitioners, namely: Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Gov. Garcia), Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Angeles), Emerlinda S. Talento
(Talento) and Rodolfo H. De Mesa (De Mesa) alleged that the subject article undermines the people’s faith in the Supreme Court
due to blunt allusion that they employed bribery in order to obtain relief from the Court, particularly in obtaining a temporary
restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No. 185132. The pertinent portions of the article which was entitled, "TRO ng Korte Suprema
binayaran ng ₱ 20-M?" and published in the January 14 to 20, 2009 issue of the Luzon Tribune, are reproduced as follows:1
Bukod sa mga kontrobersiya na bumabalot ngayon sa Korte Suprema dahil sa isyu ng umano’y pagpapatalsik kay Chief Justice
Renato Puno, hindi maalis sa isip ng ilang Bataeño ang pagtatanong kung totoo nga kayang binayaran ng kampo ni Bataan
Governor Enrique Garcia, Jr. ang isa o ilang Mahestrado ng Korte upang mag-isyu ng Temporary Restraining Order ang Korte
na humarang sa implementasyon ng anim na buwang suspensyon ng Punong Lalawigan.
Marami umano ang nagdududa kung papaano nakakuha ng TRO si Garcia gayung malinaw na ang kaso ay kasalukuyang
dinidinig noon ng Court of Appeals. Ito umano ay paglabag sa tinatawag na Forum Shopping.
xxxx
Dalawang Division ng Court of Appeals ang tumanggi na dinggin ang petisyon ni Garcia para sa TRO hanggang sa dininig ito
ng isang division. Nagpadala ng liham ang Court of Appeals sa mga magkakatunggaling partido upang simulang dinggin ang
kaso. Nakapagtataka umano kung bakit hindi ito binigyang galang ng Korte Suprema.
Nang inilabas ng Korte ang TRO, malinaw na naihain na ang suspension order kay Garcia ng DILG kaya’t opisyal ng epektibo
ang suspensyon. Ano pa ba kaya ng na-TRO gayung sinisimulan na ni Garcia ang kanyang suspensyon.
May mga nagsasabing binayaran umano ng hanggang sa ₱20-Milyon ang isang mahestrado ng Korte upang pagbigyan ang
kahilingan ni Garcia.
Madiin naman itong itinanggi ni Garcia at nagsabing hindi dapat bahiran ng dumi ang Korte Suprema at dapat igalang ang
desisyon nito.
Gayunpaman, marami ang nagtataka at laging nakakakuha ng TRO sa Korte Suprema si Garcia lalu na sa mga mahahalagang
kasong kanyang hinaharap.
xxxx
Ang kompiyansa ni Garcia umano ay kitang-kita sa mga miting kung saan siya ay nagsasalita na kayang-kaya niyang lusutan
ang lahat ng mga kaso niya at maging kung mayroon pang kasunod na mga kaso na isasampa sa kanya.
Kaya naman hindi maalis ng ilan ang magduda na ang taong gipit sa kaso ay maaaring magbayad ng milyung-milyon piso
upang upuan ng Korte Suprema ang kaso at manatiling habang buhay ang TRO.
Prior to the publication of the foregoing article, two (2) interrelated petitions were filed before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos.
185132 and 181311, entitled Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al. and Province of Bataan v. Hon. Remigio
M. Escalada, respectively.
In G.R. No. 185132, the Provincial Government of Bataan ordered for the conduct of a tax delinquency sale of all the properties
of Sunrise Paper Products Industries, Inc. (Sunrise) situated in Orani, Bataan. When no public bidder participated in the
delinquency sale, the provincial government acquired all the properties of Sunrise which consisted of machineries and
equipment, including the parcel of land where the factory stood. Subsequently, Sunrise filed a petition for injunction which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 8164, to annul the auction sale and prevent the provincial government from consolidating its title
over the properties. Two (2) other creditors of Sunrise intervened in the proceedings. The provincial government entered into a
compromise agreement with Sunrise and the intervening creditors and thereafter filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 8164.
However, the trial court refused to dismiss the case and proceeded to hear the same on the merits. Subsequently, it rendered a
Decision dated June 15, 2007, which was thereafter challenged in another petition docketed as G.R. No. 181311.
Meanwhile, former workers of Sunrise, namely: Josechito B. Gonzaga (Gonzaga), Ruel A. Magsino (Magsino) and Alfredo B.
Santos (Santos), filed criminal and administrative charges against petitioners Gov. Garcia, Angeles, Talento and De Mesa, among
others, before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-L-A-08-0039-A. Subsequently, Deputy Ombudsman Orlando S.
Casimiro (Ombudsman Casimiro) issued an Order dated October 28, 2008, preventively suspending the petitioners.
Unyielding, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the Order dated October 28,
2008 of Ombudsman Casimiro, with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA,
however, deferred the resolution of the prayer for the issuance of TRO and instead issued Resolution dated November 14, 2008,
requiring Gonzaga, Magsino and Santos to file a comment. Dissatisfied with the action of the CA, the petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with
this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 185132. On November 19, 2008, this Court issued a TRO enjoining the public
respondents in OMB-L-A-08-0039-A from implementing the Order dated October 28, 2008 of Ombudsman Casimiro,
specifically the order for the petitioners’ preventive suspension, until further orders of the Court. The issuance of this TRO is the
incident mentioned in Manrique’s article.
In his Comment,2 Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or defamatory in his article since he only stated the facts or
circumstances which attended the issuance of the TRO. He likewise denied that he made any degrading remarks against the
Supreme Court and claimed that the article simply posed academic questions. If the article ever had a critical undertone, it was
directed against the actions of the petitioners, who are public officers, and never against the Supreme Court. At any rate, he
asseverated that whatever was stated in his article is protected by the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press1âwphi1.
The subject article falls under the
second type of contemptuous
publication.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the contents of Manrique’s article would constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which reads:
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as it is indispensable to their right of self-preservation, to the
execution of their powers, and to the maintenance of their authority; and consequently to the due administration of justice. 3 It
must however be exercised on the preservative not vindictive principle, and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.
The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.4
The power to punish for contempt does not, however, render the courts impenetrable to public scrutiny nor does it place them
beyond the scope of legitimate criticism. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers and such right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial authority. 5 It is the cardinal condition
of all such criticisms however that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand; and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect courts6 and therefore warrants the wielding of the power to punish
for contempt.
In his erudite dissenting opinion in People v. Alarcon,7 which was impliedly adopted in subsequent cases dealing with
contempt,8 Justice Manuel V. Moran noted the two kinds of publication which are punishable with contempt, to wit:
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication which tends to
impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the language of the majority,
what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of
justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any
way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. x x x Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.9 (Italics ours)
Succinctly, there are two kinds of publications relating to court and to court proceedings which can warrant the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt: (1) that which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice
in a pending suit or proceeding; and (2) that which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute.
We find the subject article illustrative of the second kind of contemptuous publication for insinuating that this Court’s issuance
of TRO in G.R. No. 185132 was founded on an illegal cause. The glaring innuendos of illegality in the article is denigrating to
the dignity of this Court and the ideals of fairness and justice that it represents. It is demonstrative of disrespect not only for this
Page 43 of 46
Court, but also for the judicial system as a whole, tends to promote distrust and undermines public confidence in the judiciary by guaranties of the Constitution than the fullest protection of their legitimate exercise. As important as is the maintenance of a
creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially.10 judiciary unhampered in its administration of justice and secure in its continuous enjoyment of public confidence. x x x.16
This Court has always exercised utmost restraint and tolerance against criticisms on its decisions and issuances, bearing in mind Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public
that official actions are subject to public opinion as a means of ensuring accountability. Manrique’s article, however, has interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.17 For the
transgressed the ambit of fair criticism and depicted a legitimate action of this Court as a reciprocated accommodation of the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly
petitioners’ interest. Contrary to Manrique’s claim of objectivity, his article contained nothing but baseless suspicion and system of dispensing justice, within the context, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by
aspersion on the integrity of this Court, calculated to incite doubt on the mind of its readers on the legality of the issuance. It did the general community.18
not simply dwell on the propriety of the issuance on the basis of some sound legal criteria nor did it simply blame this Court of Certainly, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an
an irregularity in the discharge of duties but of committing the crime of bribery. The article insinuated that processes from this abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said
Court may be obtained for reasons other than that their issuance is necessary to the administration of justice. Judging from the right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein.19
title alone, "TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng ₱ 20M?" the article does not aim for an academic discussion of the propriety Therefore; Manrique's article, lacking in social value and aimed solely at besmirching the reputation of the Court, is undeserving
of the issuance of the TRO but seeks to sow mistrust in the dispositions of this Court. To suggest that the processes of this Court of the protection of the guaranties of free speech and press.
can be obtained through underhand means or that their issuance is subject to negotiation and that members of this Court are The critical role of the Supreme Court as the court of last resort renders it imperative that it maintains the ideals of neutrality,
easily swayed by money is a serious affront to the integrity of the highest court of the land. Such imputation smacks of utter integrity and independence:) the characteristics in which the people's trust and confidence are built, alive and unscathed. Thus,
disrespect to this Court and such temerity is deserving of contempt. justices and judges alike are constantly reminded to live up to the stringent standards of the profession or else suffer the
Manrique claims that he was only being critical of the actions of the petitioners as public officers and that no disrespect was consequences. In return, the people are expected to respect and abide by the rulings of this Court and must not be instrumental to
meant to the Court. While he claims good faith, the contents of his article bespeak otherwise. A person’s intent, however good it its disrepute.
maybe, cannot prevail over the plain import of his speech or writing. It is gathered from what is apparent, not on supposed or WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique is hereby adjudged GUILTY of
veiled objectives. INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱ 20,000.00).
The truth is we consider public scrutiny of our decisions and official acts as a healthy component of democracy. However, such SO ORDERED.
must not transcend the wall of tolerable criticism and its end must always be to uphold the dignity and integrity of the justice
system and not to destroy public confidence in them. In People v. Godoy,11 we stressed:
Generally, criticism of a court’s rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not be restricted after a case has been finally
disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions of the
court, they commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but when they pass beyond that line and charge that
judicial conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected by political prejudice
or interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in their courts.12
There is thus a need to distinguish between adverse criticism of the court’s decision after the case has ended and scandalizing the
court itself. The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as
a case for contempt.13
A reading of the subject article shows that Manrique was not simply passing judgment on an official act of the Court. He was
actually intimating that the petitioners were able to obtain a TRO through illicit means, with the complicity of this Court. As he
hurls accusation of corruption against petitioners, he also unfairly smeared the reputation of this Court by stirring the idea that
one or some members of this Court yield to said illegal act. By no means can such an imputation be justified by mere curiosity or
suspicion. That he was only mulling on the thought that such an illegal act transpired does not make his insinuation any less
contemptuous. Manrique’s article no longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an indecent attempt to malign
the petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to the reputation of this Court.
It bears stressing that the Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. 14
Thus, the inflexible demand to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct is imposed upon all members of the judiciary.
They are required to keep their private as well as official conduct at all times free from all appearances of impropriety and be
beyond reproach.15
Malicious publications cannot seek
the protection of the constitutional
guaranties of free speech and press.
Manrique tries to invoke the protection of the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press, albeit unpersuasively, to
extricate himself from liability. However, said constitutional protection is not a shield against scurrilous publications, which are
heaved against the courts with no apparent reason but to trigger doubt on their integrity based on some imagined possibilities.
Contrary to nourishing democracy and strengthening judicial independence, which are the expected products of the guaranties of
free speech and press, the irresponsible exercise of these rights wounds democracy and leads to division.
In Alarcon, we emphasized:
It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the press. But license or abuse of that freedom should not
be confused with freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing vigilance against abuse of the sacred

Page 44 of 46

19.) G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001, 1 which
annulled the Orders dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.2
Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 246.0561 hectares, located in Inlagadian,
Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the
government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), 3 under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however
rejected by the respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced
summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by the Land Bank of
the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY
SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the
acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the
landowner in the manner provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.4
Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the
aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law.5
On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to
comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18, 1999. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ
of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the
CARL.6
On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as
Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he
complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order, 8 which was however denied by the PARAD
on September 20, 2000.9 Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the
decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure. 10
On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the determination of just compensation filed by
petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated October 25, 2000. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise
denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and ordered the
issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. 11 On January
3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.12
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. 13 The case was
raffled to Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its
stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the
final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.
SO ORDERED.14
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order, which was denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001. 15
Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,16 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. On
December 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN ENTERTAINING THE RESPONDENT’S SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE
FINAL ORDER OF THE RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RTC FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION,
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY MERE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND NOT BY VERIFIED
PETITION, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2, RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
OF RULE 71 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL AND EXECUTORY, BECAUSE THE
PARAD ITSELF DISALLOWED THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL TO THE DARAB CENTRAL OFFICE, IN
DISREGARD OF THE BASIC RULE THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES THE MERITS OF
THE APPEAL.
C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX LORAYES WAS IN GROSS AND
PATENT VIOLATION OF HIS PERSONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST
ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS, UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONLY JUDGES CAN
ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST CITIZENS, AND THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT
PROCEEDING WAS THE PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP MANAGER, AND YET THE CONTEMPT
ORDER WAS AGAINST THE LBP MANAGER.
D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS IT ATTEMPTED TO
ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND
EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT
WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.17
As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of
Appeals to nullify the injunction issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal. 18
Petitioner’s submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s substantive right
or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus, it has been held
that an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. As distinguished from a final order which
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.19
Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory order, hence, unappealable. Therefore,
respondent’s special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the correct remedy under the circumstances.
Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 20
The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of
an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous
and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.21
On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioner’s manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid,
Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in pertinent part:
Section 2. Indirect Contempt. – The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any
person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals with the commencement of indirect
contempt proceedings, provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
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 to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
xxx xxx xxx
The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the Rules of
Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explains this requirement:
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings.
While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous
practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees
therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second
paragraph of this amended section.
xxx xxx xxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the
offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements
therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.22
Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and
(2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial
entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. — Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to
contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have
suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for
contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction
over such charges as may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-
judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior
courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless
said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of
Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the situation where a person, without
lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to do so by the official
or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of
contempt of court, upon application of the official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding
sanctions.23 (emphasis in the original)
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case,
the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited
Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the
PARAD were invalid for the following reasons:24 First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the
Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio;
rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the
contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the
DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent’s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of
the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone
acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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