GABI, HERSHEY

PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

1. Flores VS Drilon - GR No. 104732
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) reads —
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the
Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is constitutional.
RULING:
The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the
Constitution itself.
The appointment of Gordon as Chairman of the SBMA is null. However, despite his
appointment to the said office, Gordon did not automatically forfeit his seat as Mayor of
Olongapo City.
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution.
On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position,
his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack
of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution
where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office
or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The
difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another
government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before
they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being
appointed to the other post.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the
position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment
thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily
null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer who may retain the benefits he may
received from the position he may have assumed.

In the case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
proscription seeks to prevent, there is not doubt to conclude that the proviso contravenes
Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in
the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the
second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

2. Balacuit VS CFI -GR NO. L-38429
FACTS
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969,
penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of
selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances to require children between 7 and 12 years of age to pay full payment for
tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.
Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a
Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed
as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30, 1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment
declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.
they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay
away.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes
the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public
policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No.
640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.

ISSUE
Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is
valid and constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

HELD

It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places
of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police
power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature
may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance
being a valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is
equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID
3. Tan VS COMELEC - GR NO. 73155
Alampay, J:
FACTS:
-Petitioners, who are residents of Province of Negros Occidental, filed a petition for prohibition
to stop the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the ratification of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
which provides for the creation of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite was scheduled for January
3, 1986. The petition was filed on December 3, 1985.
-Petitioners contend that BP 885 is unconstitutional because Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution
provides that no local government unit may be created, divided, merged or abolished or its
boundary substantially altered unless it is in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and subject to the approval by a majority of votes in the unit or units
thus affected.
Sec. 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions for the creation of a new
local government unit and one of them is that:
“its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or
provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under
this section.”
-However, due to Christmas holiday, the Supreme Court was only able to act with the petition
after the plebiscite was already held.
-The petitioners thus filed a supplemental pleading assailing the plebiscite on the ground that
only the inhabitants of Negros del Norte were allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Voters from
the rest of Negros Occidental were excluded from the plebiscite.
-Respondents argued that the remaining cities and municipalities of Province of Negros
Occidental not included in Negros del Norte do not fall within the meaning and scope of terms
“unit or units thus affected” referred to in Sec. 3, Art. XI. Of the Constitution.
-Respondents also argued that the issue is already moot because the majority of residents of
Negros del Norte already ratified BP 885 in a plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.
ISSUES AND RULING:
ISSUE NO. 1: ON MOOTNESS
-The case is not moot because it involves an issue that is capable of repetition but can evade
review. Non-resolution of this case might tempt those who have selfish motives to create,
divide, merge or abolish local government units knowing that that Supreme Court will not
entertain challenges to their acts if they manage to finalize those acts before the Court is able
to respond.
ON MERITS
ISSUE NO. 2: WON “unit or units affected” include the mother province
Yes. In the case at bar, the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would
necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that
there can be created the new province of Negros del Norte. Hence, both the parent province
of Negros Occidental and the new province of Negros del Norte are “political units affected”.
-The respondents cited Gov. Paredes v. Hon. Executive Secretary to the President to defend
its argument but that case only involves a division of a barangay which is the smallest unit in
the Local Government Code. In the case at bar, what is involved is a division of a province,
the largest political unit contemplated in Art. XI of the Constitution. Moreover, the Supreme
Court said that Gov. Paredes v. Executive Secretary is “one of those cases the discretion of
the Court is allowed considerable leeway”.
-The Supreme Court adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad in Lopez, Jr. v.
COMELEC which declared unconstitutional a referendum which did not include all people of
Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum were intended to ascertain if the people of said
provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila.
- It is a well-accepted rule that to ascertain the meaning of a particular provision, it can be
gleaned from a provision in pari materia. Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, which was the draft bill
of BP 885, provides that “the plebiscite shall be conducted in areas affected within a period
of 120 days from the approval of the Act”. The proponents could have anticipated the strong
challenge against the legality of BP 885 that is why they deliberately added that phrase that
states that the territory covered by Negros del Norte constitutes the unit affected.
ISSUE NO. 3: WON BP 885 is Constitutional
No. Sec. 97 of the Local Government Code states that no province can be created unless if
it has at least 3,500 km2. Negros del Norte only has at most 2,865 square kilometres
considering the statistics relating to the land
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

4. Padilla VS COMELEC - GR. NO. 103328

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines
Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod,
Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo,
same province.

Pursuant to said law, the COMELEC issued a resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite. The
said resolution provides that the plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units affected, namely
the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas
of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, majority of the votes cast were
against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.

Thus, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted
throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken. It is the
contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained
were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC, should have been
conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the
new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,
Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses
that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In support of his stand, petitioner argues that where
a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segregated
should be included in the plebiscite.

Was the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo valid?

Yes.
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated
by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what
is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units
which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas
are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was
concluded that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating the resolution.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

5. Tatel VS VIRAC - GR. NO. L-29159  These principles require that a municipal ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the (2) must not be unfair or oppressive
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatel’s
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring
Tatel’s warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable
place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal officials (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion (6) must not be unreasonable.
or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Tatel contends that said
ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of
the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
 In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where
such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses
Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the
loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation
of the government.
 Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of
 The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have
its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are
not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound
agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to
government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to
engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the
people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be
 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative
no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.
Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make
such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.

 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

6. Magtajas VS Pryce - GR. NO. 111097 residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it
leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and
equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed
the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the
mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an
affront to the welfare of the city.
The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation
of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those
of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to
help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for
review.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid

Held: No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested
with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

8. Dela Cruz VS ParaS - Gr. No. L-42571-72 ISSUE

Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
Doctrine/Topic: operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles of Bills; Subject shall be expressed hostesses
in the title
HELD
Facts of the Case: A. Decision:
1. Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and cabarets in Bulacan.  The SC held that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as a prohibition and closure ordinance which  The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15,
was based on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (but was originally enacted on June 20, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullified.
1953).
 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
3. The said RA is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND unconstitutional.
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
B. Rationale:
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS."
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue,
4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall the operation of a night club was prohibited.
have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation
 A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be
of night clubs, cabarets… and other similar places of amusement within its territorial
subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
jurisdiction.”
operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations.
5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely the power
 It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were
to regulate, but likewise "prohibit."
considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs.
6. The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. Additionally,
the title was not in any way altered, as the exact wording was followed. The power
7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no
authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling; (2) Ordinance No. 84 is  There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act
violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one
hearing; and (3)That under Presidential Decree No. 189 (as amended, by Presidential subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Decree No. 259 the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including
night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.
8. The respondent Judge issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975. Then came
on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence, this petition for certiorari by way
of appeal.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

9. Quezon City VS Ericta - GR. No. L-34915

FACTS:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides for the appropriation of 6% of memorial
parks for charity burial of the paupers. Himlayang Pilipino, Inc (HPI), did not appropriate the
6% requirement. Seven years after, the Quezon City council issued a resolution to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space.

ISSUE: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

RULING:
No. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries. (Thus, even if it is an eminent domain, it would not have been the proper measure
to promote general welfare in this case)
Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of
liberty or property for the promotion of general health, morals, safety of the people and more
so, the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID
10. Ortigas VS FEATI - GR. No. L-24670
Facts:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto Padilla y
Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the
Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the vendees transferred their rights and interests
over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in
favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements and the
deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of land subject of
the deeds of sale “shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes”. The
restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the said lots
issued in the name of Chavez.
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building restrictions also
annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly from Chavez “free from
all liens and encumbrances” while Lot No.6 was acquired through a “Deed of Exchange” from
Republic Flour Mills.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme
designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms
part of its big landed estate where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or
established.
Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to
the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No.27 of
the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff “completely sold and transferred
to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA” and the subject lots thereunder were
acquired by it “only on June 23, 1962 or more than 2 years after the area xxx had been
declared a commercial and industrial zone”.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a building devoted to
banking purposes but which it claims could also be used exclusively for residential purposes.
The following day, the plaintiff demanded in writing that the construction of the commercial
building be stopped but the defendant refused to comply contending that the construction
was in accordance with the zoning regulations.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.
2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed
by defendant-appellee.
Held:
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was impliedly
admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. Having
admitted the validity of the subject resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its
position on appeal.
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the said resolution,
the posture is unsustainable.
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) to to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. The law does not
restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that
Resolution No.27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the
intendment of the word “regulation” under the provision.
An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of a municipality
should be “liberally construed in its favor” and that “any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be
presumed to exist.” An exception to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities
is when the exercise of its powers will conflict with vested rights arising from contracts. The
exception does not apply to the case at bar.
2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute
since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Invariably described
as the “most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers” and the “greatest and most
powerful attribute of government”, the exercise of police power may be judicially inquired
into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the
Pasig River as an industrial or commercial zone was passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to safeguard/promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of
the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution which are
hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The Municipality
of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified under the circumstances in passing the subject
resolution.
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of
restraint and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state, and to this fundamental aim of the Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

11. Heirs of Ardona VS Reyes - GR. No. L-60549 Also, the contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of police power
and likewise eminent domain.

Doctrine: As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of eminent domain comes into
play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use

FACTS:

The Phil. Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu for the expropriation of
282 ha of rolling land for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and
well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The PTA will construct a sports
complex, clubhouse, playground and picnic area on said land. AN electric power grid will also
be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary support
facilities (malls, coffee shops) will also be created.

The defendants alleged that the taking is not impressed with public use under the
Constitution, that the land was covered by the land reform program and therefore the Court
of Agrarian Reform and not the CFI of Cebu has jurisdiction over the case, and that the
expropriation would impair the obligations and contracts.

Nonetheless, upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, CFI
authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the land.

ISSUE: WON the public use requirement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been complied with

HELD:

Yes. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purpose for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that “public use” means “use by the public” has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of eminent domain comes
into play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.

The petitioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that
the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

12. Grego VS Comelec - GR No. 125955

FACTS: On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy
sheriff by the court upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran
for councilor in the second district of Manila and had won the race for 3 term. On his final
term, an election protest was filed against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him
on the ground that he was removed previously in an office as a result of an administrative
case. On May 14, 1995, COMELEC ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the
parties able to comply the directive, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly elected
councilor and took his oath of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should
have suspended the proclamation. Such act according to the petitioner violated the provision
of sec. 6 of R.A 6646, which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate by the
COMELEC pending final judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving
discretion to order the suspension of the proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it did
not suspend the proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending final
judgment of the case filed against it.

HELD: It did not. The use of the word “may” in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the
proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What
is merely mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest. The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy
between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic. Since section 6 of R.A 6646, the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may”, it is, therefore improper and
highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

13. Borja VS COmelec - G.R. No. 133495 not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom
they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as
Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate
of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja,
Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that
Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence,
he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared
Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible
to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was
not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service,
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the
mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his
service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people.
A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption
that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have
served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID
14. Subic Bay VS Comelec - GR No. 125416
FACTS:
 On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise
created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military
reservation into alternative productive uses.
 On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation
to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation
of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and
other installations left by the American navy.
 On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as
required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and
submitted such to the Office of the President.
 On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.
 The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for
Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met.
 The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
 Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
 On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
 On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes
and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
 On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848,
adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules
and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum
 On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local
initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law
ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
HELD:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a
"Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of
Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the
part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making
powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control
or change the substance or the content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the
proposal stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should
the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only
when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution
that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is
merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not
hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it
does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been
promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take
cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

1. Macasiano VS Diokno - GR No. 977464 Held:

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
Facts: patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to property for public use, Article 424 of Civil
Code provides that "property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists
On 13 June 1990, the Municipality of Paranaque passed Ordinance 86, s. 1990 which of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and
authorized the closure of J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other
Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MCC prejudice to the provisions of special laws." In the present case, thus, J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz,
Ordinance 2, s. 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal Bayanihan, Lt. Gacia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and
streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or are therefore considered public properties of the municipality. Properties of the local
vending areas, under certain terms and conditions. On 20 July 1990, the Metropolitan Manila government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the
Authority approved Ordinance 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council subject to conditions. On absolute control of Congress. Hence, local government have no authority whatsoever to
20 June 1990, the municipal council issued a resolution authorizing the Parañaque Mayor to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them
enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, by Congress.
maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. On 8 August 1990, the
municipality and Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the
latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market with the obligation to remit dues
to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were
put up by Palanyag on the said streets. On 13 September 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later
returned to Palanyag. On 16 October 1990, Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag giving the
latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.

On 23 October 1990, the municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition
for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction. On 17
December 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance 86 s. 1990
of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order
against Palanyag. Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by Macasiano thru
the OSG.

Issue:

Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque

authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is
valid?
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID
2. SolGen VS Manila - GR No. 102782
Facts:
On July 13, 1990, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles
for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro
Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid
down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also
observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted (Metropolitan Traffic
Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong).
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when
he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic
Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City. Likewise, several letter-complaints were received
regarding removal of front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-
Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel
of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
On May 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/
abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution stating that the authority to detach
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila by the MMA appears to be in conflict with the
decision of the Court in the case abovementioned where it was held that the license plates of
motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.
MMA defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers
conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its
governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide
application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination,
and exercise of its rule-making powers.
MMA argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because
the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision
itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or
ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. MMA sustains Ordinance No. 11,
Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, and while Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the
Local Government Code.
Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was
that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly
prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.
Issue: WON ORDINANCE #11 IS VALID?
Ruling: No. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These
requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence
of a sufficient standard. Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature
complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the
statute reaches it is to implement it. As a second requirement, the enforcement may be
effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running
riot."
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will
of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply
the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be
general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do
not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is
PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in
the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and
now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.
The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only
"in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree
itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides
that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These
restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political
subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose
such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this
effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains
effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except
under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations
in Metropolitan Manila.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

3. Binay VS DOmingo - GR No. 92389

Facts: On September 27, 1988 petitioner municipality through its council approved
Resolution No. 60 seeking to extend burial assistance to families whose income fall below
2000php a month, and upon fulfillment of certain requirements would receive 500php from
the municipality. The Metro Manila Commission approved said resolution and thereafter the
amount of 400,000php was certified for appropriation for the implementation of the Burial
Assistance Program. However, respondent Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution
upon initial findings. Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay sent two letters of reconsideration stating
to the effect that the program falls within the principle of police power and that the only
function of the COA was to allow the financial assistance. Although COA denied both letters,
on the grounds that the resolution bears no real substantial relation to the general welfare
and it should benefit the whole if not the majority of the inhabitants of the city, stressing that
government funds shall only be used for public purposes. Petitioner again through its council
passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming the earlier Resolution but the COA stayed the
program via its Decision No. 1159, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that police power is a governmental function, an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. Its fundamental
purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Municipal
governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause stating that it is clothed
with authority to enact ordinances and regulations necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience and promote the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants. Police power in a sense is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The SC said
that COA is should change with the times and that public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it benefits a limited number of people. The care for the poor is a public duty
and the support for the poor has been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion
of the common good. The loss of a family member is a painful experience and it is more
painful to be burdened financially by such. Petition granted. COA decision is ordered set
aside.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
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4. Torio VS Fontanilla - Gr. No. L-29993 powers, on the other hand, are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the
community. These include those which are ministerial, private and corporate.
Facts: This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality for
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 “to manage the the acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration…” The “1959 Malasiqui ‘Town Fiesta Executive If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty, no
Committee” was created, which, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter,
stage. nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or
A “zarzuela” troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
performance on January 22. During the “zarzuela”, the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be
pinned underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but died the following day. held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to suit upon
Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, contracts and its tort.
its Municipal Council and all the Council’s individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise
of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence
of any of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipality’s agents in carrying
out the municipal ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence
in implementing the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding that the Executive Committee had
exercised due diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the construction of the
stage, and the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of the committee.
Consequently, the defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered all the
defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of
P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages:P1200.00 its attorney’s fees; and the
costs.

Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.

Held:
Yes.
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter
alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character: public, governmental or political on
the one hand; and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are
those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting
the public welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal
GABI, HERSHEY
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MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court
243 SCRA 538 opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the
case.
Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate
of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance
fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his
arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account
of his alleged “flight” from that country.

Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent’s

certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidate’s disqualification
was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition.

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner

instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the
COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a
foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive
from justice.”

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

“Article 73. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be disqualified from

running for any elective local position:

“(a) xxxx

“(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.

Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment.”

It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons
who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not
make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive
GABI, HERSHEY
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FRANCIS MARQUEZ v COMELEC; GR 127318 and MeTCs. Moreover, quo warranto proceedings involving
elective barangayofficials are cognizable by the MTC, MCTC or MeTC. To
contend that quo warranto proceedings involving SK Chairman should be
SYNOPSIS brought in the Regional Trial Court would, in effect, make the SK Chairman
more important than the chairman and elective barangay officials.
Private respondent filed an election protest before the Metropolitan Furthermore, if election protests involving SK officers are cognizable by the
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City impugning the election of petitioner as SK MTCs, there is no reason why quo warranto proceedings involving the same
Chairman of Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City, on the ground that the officers should not be cognizable by the same courts.
latter is disqualified by age to the office of SK Chairman. Thereafter, the MeTC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding petitioner to refrain from
taking his oath of office. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the election protest
on ground of lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the trial court's
jurisdiction is confined only to frauds, irregularities and anomalies in the
conduct of the SK elections and that the determination of eligibility or
qualification of a candidate for SK elections is vested with the election officer
concerned under Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. The MeTC
ordered the dismissal of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and set the hearing of
the case. Hence, petitioner filed a petition before the respondent
Commission imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC
when it assumed jurisdiction over the disqualification proceedings. On
November 19, 1996, the COMELEC issued a Resolution upholding the
jurisdiction of the MeTC, ruling that the disqualification case having been
filed after the election and proclamation of the winning candidate, the
governing law, therefore, is the second paragraph of Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which confers upon the trial court the jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the present disqualification case. Hence, this
petition. SCEDaT

In affirming the resolution of the COMELEC, the Supreme Court held

that Sections 252 and 253 of the Omnibus Election Code shall govern the
elections of theSangguniang Kabataan. Thus, any contest relating to the
election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (including the
chairman) — whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their
election — is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 applies only to proceedings before the election. Before
proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are
cognizable by the Election Officer. But after the election and proclamation,
the same cases became quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID
MERCADO v MANZANO; GR 135083
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates
for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results
of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it
appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission on
Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998. Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the Philippines
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and
R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on
the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec.
5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that
he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the

Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions
for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

GABI, HERSHEY
PUBLIC CORPORATION
ATTY. RODOLFO LAPID

ANDAYA v RTC CEBU mayor’s protégé in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by the Regional
Police Director to the mayor.
Facts: Petitioner Andaya, Regional Director, Regional Police Command No.
7, submitted to the City Mayor of Cebu a list of 5 eligibles for the mayor to
choose one to be appointed as the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor
did not choose anyone from the list because the name of his protégé was
not included therein.
The City of Cebu filed a complaint against the petitioner to require him to
include the mayor’s protégé in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by
the Regional Police Director to the mayor.

Petitioner refuses stating that aside from the fact that said protégé is not
qualified; the power to designate the chief of police of Cebu City is vested
with the Regional Director. However, the mayor is authorized to choose the
chief of police from a list of 5 eligibles submitted by the Regional Director.

Under RA 6975, Sec 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be deputized as
representative of the National Police Commission in his territorial jurisdiction
and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of police
from a list of 5 eligibles recommended by the Police Regional Director. Then
the Regional Director, RPC No.7, appoints the officer selected by the mayor
as the Chief of Police, Cebu City.

Issue: WON the mayor has the authority to appoint the Chief of Police.
Held: No. As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very
limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited
power of selecting one from among the list of 5 eligibles to be named the
chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu
City is vested in the Regional Director.
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the 5
eligibles from a pool of eligible officers without interference from local
executives. Hence, the mayor cannot require the petitioner to include the