Homework 9

PHIL 150

due December 5, 2018

1. Show the following using Fitch-style

proofs.

(a) ∀x(P(x) ∧ Q(x)) --f- (∀xP(x) ∧ ∀xQ(x))

(b) {∃xF(x),  ∃y∀xR(x,  y)} f- ¬∀x∀y(F(y) → ¬R(y,  x))

(c) {¬∀x(P(x) → Q(x))} f- ∃x(P(x) ∧ ¬Q(x))

(d) ∀x∃yR(x,  y) f- ∀x∃yR(g( f (x)),  y)

2.   Assess the following for truth or falsity. Justify your answer with a truth ta-
ble, or an argument about valuations.

(a) 1-­  ((A → (B ∨ C)) → (A ∧ C)) → ¬(¬A ∧ C)

(b) {¬(A → B),  C → (A ∨ B ∨ ¬D),  B → D} 1-­  ¬C
(c) {B ∨ C} 1-­  (A → B) ∨ ¬(B → C)

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 3.   Consider the following epistemic logic puzzle.

The bear enclosure at the zoo was left open all night. Zookeepers are afraid that the three bears,
Annabel, Blueberry, and Clover, have escaped.

Zookeeper 1 checks the dust outside the bear enclosure for footprints. She is an
expert tracker, and will be able to tell how many bears have escaped.

Zookeeper 2 scans the den where Annabel and Clover like to spend their mornings; if
they’re in the enclosure, they’ll be in the den.

Zookeeper 3 checks to see if Blueberry’s favorite toy is still in the enclosure. (There’s a
spot where Blueberry always keeps it when she’s in the enclosure, but if she left, she
would take it with her.)

After performing their checks and locking the gate to prevent further escape, the
zookeepers re-convene to discuss what they’ve learned. It is com- mon knowledge
that 1 knows how many bears have escaped (but not which bears), 2 knows whether
Annabel and Clover have escaped, (but not whether Blueberry has escaped), and 3
knows whether Blueberry has escaped (but not whether Annabel or Clover has
escaped). We can depict their situation in the diagram on the next page.

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 A,  B,  C
s1

A,  B A,  C B,  C
s2 s3 s4

A B C
s5 s6 s7

s8

In case the colors are difficult to make out, here is the diagram again, with
Zookeeper 1’s accessibility relation drawn in solid lines, Zookeeper 2’s ac-
accessibility relation drawn in dashed lines, and Zookeeper 3’s
accessibility drawn in dotted lines.
A,  B,  C
s1

A,  B A,  C B,  C
s2 s3 s4

A B C
s5 s6 s7

s8

Call the model M . Suppose that the actual state is s7 (depicted in the lower
right of the diagram): Clover has escaped, but Annabel and Blueberry have
not. Assess the following claims.

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 (a) M,  s7 1=  K1K3(A → (¬B ∨ ¬C))
(b) M,  s7 1=  K2(K1(B ∨ C) →K3(A ∨ B ∨ C))

Now suppose zookeeper 1 announces that exactly one bear has escaped,
which we can state in the object language as:
(A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C) ∨ (¬A ∧ B ∧ ¬C) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ C).
∗
Call the updated model M . Which of the following claims hold for M∗?
Mwere transitive, as
(Hint: don’t forget that the accessibility relations in
well as reflexive and symmetric.)

(c) M∗ ,  s7 1=    K 2 (C ∧ ¬B)

(d) M∗ ,  s7 1=    K 3 ¬A

4.   Use Fitch-style proofs to show the following. You may use only the
introduction and elimination rules in the course reader. Points will be
deducted for using introduction or elimination rules from other natural
deduction systems, or for using derived rules.

a.   {Fa ∨ Gb,  ∀x(H x → ∀y¬Gy),  (∃xH x ∧ ∃yFy) → ∀zGz} f-- ∃x¬H x

(b) {∃x(∀y(Fy ↔ y = x) ∧ Rxa),  ∀x∀y(Rxy → y = x)} f-- ∀x(F x ↔ x = a)
(c) f-- ∃x∃y(Ryx ∨ Rxy) ↔ ¬∀x¬∀y¬Rxy

5.   Build counter models to show the following. Explain, for each model you
construct, why it is a counter model.

(a) .II   ¬(¬∀x(¬F x ∨ Gx) ∧ ¬∀x(¬Gx ∨ F x))

(b)   ∀x∀y∀z((Rxy ∧ Rzy) → Rxz) .II   ∀x∀y∀z((Ryx ∧ Ryz) → Rzx)
(c)   {∀x∃y(¬Rxy → ¬F x),  ∀x(Gx → ∃yRyx),  ∃xGx} .II   ∃xF x

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6.   Below are attempts at arguments about metalogic. All of them begin from true
premises and end with false conclusions. Pinpoint the step where each of them
goes wrong. Explain the mistake in a way that your classmates could
understand if they were confused.
a.   Proof that First-Order Logic is decidable.
Every theorem of Boolean Logic is also a theorem of First-Order Logic.
Boolean Logic is decidable, so decidability must also follow from
First-Order Logic. Therefore, First-Order Logic is decidable.
b.   Proof that 0φ  → D0φ  is not valid on all Euclidean frames.
In modal logic, we can construct a modelM= (S ,  R,  V) such that for
some s ∈S , M,  s Jt  0φ        D0φ.
→ Therefore, 0φ          D0φ  is
→ not valid
on the class of all modal frames.
All Euclidan frames are modal frames, so every formula that is valid
on all Euclidean frames must be valid on all modal frames too. This
means that 0φ   → D0φ   cannot be valid on all Euclidean frames.
(Otherwise, it would be valid on all modal frames, and we showed in
the previous paragraph that it is not.)
c.   Proof that 1-­  ¬∀x∀y∃z(x <  y → (x <  z ∧ z <  y)).
Consider the model M = (N,  I), where N  is the set of natural num-
bers {0,  1,  2,  3 .  .  .} and x<I y iff x <  y. We can see that while for every
variable assignment g, M 1=   2 <   3[g], there is no variable
assignment g such that M 1=  2 <  z ∧ z <  3[g]. Therefore, there is no
variable as- signment g such that M 1=   2 <  3 → (2 <  z ∧ z <  
3)[g].
It follows (by the clause for existential quantification in definition
6.3.2) that for an arbitrary variable assignment g, we have M Jt  
∃z(2 <  3 → (2 <  z ∧ z <  3))[g]. Where g(y) = 3I , we have M Jt  
∃z(2 <  y → (2 <  z ∧ z <  y))[g].
By the clause for universal quantification in 6.3.2, for any variable
assignment g, M Jt  ∀y∃z(2 <  y → (2 <  z ∧ z <  y))[g]. Where g(x) =
2I, we also have M Jt  ∀y∃z(x <  y → (x <  z ∧ z <  y))[g].
Therefore, by the clause for universal quantification in 6.3.2, for any
assignment g, M Jt  ∀x∀y∃z(x <  y → (x <  z ∧ z <  y))[g].
Whenever M Jt  ∀x∀y∃z(x <  y → (x <  z ∧ z <  y))[g] it’s also the case
that M 1=   ¬∀x∀y∃z(x <  y → (x <  z ∧ z <  y))[g].
Thus, we have shown for an arbitrary model M and assignment g, M
1=  
¬∀x∀y∃z(x <  y → (x <  z ∧ z <  y))[g]. It follows by the definition of
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validity that 1-­  ¬∀x∀y∃z(x <  y → (x <  z ∧ z <  y)).