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Melba C. Beloncio, an employee of Manila Mandarin Hotel since 1976 and at the time of her dismissal,
assistant head waitress at the hotel's coffee shop, was expelled from Manila Mandarin Employees Union for
acts allegedly inimical to the interests of the union. The charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from her
emotional remark to a waitress who happened to be a union steward, "Wala akong tiwala sa Union ninyo."
The remark was made in the course of a heated discussion regarding Beloncio's efforts to make a lazy and
recalcitrant waiter adopt a better attitude towards his work.

The union demanded the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of the union security clause
of their collective bargaining agreement and the Hotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave effective
August 10, 1984. Consequently, Beloncio filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal
against the Union and Manila Mandarin Hotel Inc. before the NLRC, Arbitration Branch.


1. Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case?

2. Whether the union is guilty of unfair labor practice?


1. Yes. The dispute is not purely intra-union but involves an interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) provisions and whether or not there was an illegal dismissal. Article 217 of the Labor Code
also provides: (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide ...
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural; (1) Unfair labor practice
cases. In this case, the Labor Arbiter explained correctly that "(I)f the only question is the legality of the
expulsion of Beloncio from the Union undoubtedly, the question is one cognizable by the BLR (Bureau of
Labor Relations). But, the question extended to the dismissal of Beloncio or steps leading thereto.
Necessarily, when the hotel decides the recommended dismissal, its acts would be subject to scrutiny.
Particularly, it will be asked whether it violates or not the existing CBA. Certainly, violations of the CBA would
be unfair labor practice."

2. Yes. The Court held that union security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an employer,
much less their own members, except with a high sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence, and
judiciousness. A union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her job, for
personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement and in a manner
characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality. This is particularly true in this case where Ms. Beloncio was
trying her best to make a hotel bus boy do his work promptly and courteously so as to serve hotel customers
in the coffee shop expeditiously and cheerfully. Union membership does not entitle waiters, janitors, and
other workers to be sloppy in their work, inattentive to customers, and disrespectful to supervisors. The Union
should have disciplined its erring and troublesome members instead of causing so much hardship to a
member who was only doing her work for the best interests of the employer, all its employees, and the general
public whom they serve. Thus, the case was dismissed. The Union was guilty of unfair labor practice. ordered
to pay all the wages and fringe benefits due to Beloncio from the time she was on forced leave until actual
reinstatement, and to pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.


When some employees of Manila Cordage Company formed the Manila Cordage Workers Union Some
employees who were members of the Manco Labor Union resigned from said union and joined the former
union. At the instance of the Manco Labor Union, the Manila Cordage Company dismissed those who
resigned from the Manco Labor Union, among them, Silvino Rabago, Vicente Untalan, Ruperto Balsamo,
Natalio Nisperos, Ricardo Traiano, Roque Ruby and Salvador de Leon. It is alleged that the Manco Labor
Union held meetings wherein the members were informed that under the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), continued membership in the Manco Labor Union was a condition precedent to employment in the
Manila Cordage Company. The CBA states:


Both parties agree that all employees of the COMPANY who are already members of the
UNION at the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall continue to remain members of
the UNION for the duration- of this AGREEMENT"

As a consequence, some of those who resigned from the Manco Labor Union withdrew their resignations
and were re-employed by the Manila Cordage Company. At the behest of the Manila Cordage Workers Union,
an acting prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a complaint dated March 28, 1961 for unfair
labor practice against Manila Cordage Company and the Manco Labor Union.


Whether the Manco Labor Union and Manila Cordage Company were guilty of unfair labor practice?


Yes. To construe the stipulations above-quoted as imposing as a condition to continued employment in the
Manila Cordage Company the maintenance of membership in the Manco Labor Union is to violate the natural
and constitutional right of the laborer to organize freely. Such interpretation would be inconsistent with the
constitutional mandate that the State shall afford protection to labor. In order that the Manila Cordage
Company may be deemed bound to dismiss employees who do not maintain their membership in the Manco
Labor Union, the stipulation to this effect must be so clear as to leave no room for doubt thereon. The Court
of Industrial Relations correctly found that the disputed "maintenance-of-membership" clause in question did
not give the Manila Cordage Company the right to dismiss just because they resigned as members of the
Manco Labor Union. Thus, the Company and the Union are ordered to reinstate the complainants to their
former positions and with all the rights and privileges formerly appertaining thereto and to pay jointly and
severally their backwages fixed at the equivalent of two years pay without deduction or qualification computed
on the basis of their wages at the time of the private complainants’ respective dismissals.


PSSLU had an existing CBA with union security clause with Sanyo Philippines Inc. when the former informed
the latter that some of its employees were notified that their membership with PSSLU were cancelled for anti-
union, activities, economic sabotage, threats, coercion and intimidation, disloyalty and for joining another
union. Many of these employees were not members of PSSLU but of another union, KAMAO. Accordingly,
such KAMAO officers including Yap, Salvo, Baybon, Solibel, Valencia, Misterio and Ricohermoso executed
a pledge of cooperation with PSSLU. Despite this, PSSLU wrote another letter to Sanyo recommending the
dismissal of the aforesaid KAMAO officers, allegedly because: 1) they were engaged and were still engaging
in anti-union activities; 2) they willfully violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU; and 3) they threatened
and were still threatening with bodily harm and even death the officers of the union. The Company hence
dismissed said employees. Consequently, the dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for
illegal dismissal. On the other hand, PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor
Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case as the same should be disposed of by referring it to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.


Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case?


Yes, the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear
and decide the complaints of the private respondents. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitrator states that “(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein
provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies”. Only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance
machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the
dismissal of private respondents. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance
machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one
hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has to
be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and
the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands
that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been
an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.


The ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union represented by respondent Union Officers, and ABSCBN
Broadcasting Corporation signed and concluded a Collective Bargaining Agreement with a check-off
provision. The Union members filed a complaint against Union Officers and the Company praying that (1) the
special assessment of ten percent (10%) of the sum total of all salary increases and signing bonuses granted
by respondent Company to the members of the Union be declared illegal for failure to comply with the Labor
Code, as amended, particularly Article 241, paragraphs (g), (n), and (o); and in utter violation of the
Constitution and ByLaws of the ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union; (2) respondent Company be
ordered to suspend further deductions from petitioners’ salaries for their shares thereof. Both the Med-Arbiter
and DOLE affirmed the validity of the check-off provision.


Whether the check-off is valid?


Yes, the check-off is valid. Article 241 speaks of three (3) requisites that must be complied with in order that
the special assessment for Union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses, as
stipulated in Article XII of the CBA, be valid and upheld namely: (1) authorization by a written resolution of
the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (2) secretary’s
record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the
employee concerned. In the case at bar, the ABS-CBN Supervisors Employee Union held its general meeting
on July 14, 1989, whereat it was agreed that a ten percent (10%) special assessment from the total economic
package due to every member would be checked-off to cover expenses for negotiation, other miscellaneous
expenses and attorney’s fees. The minutes of the said meeting were recorded by the Union’s Secretary, Ma.
Carminda M. Munoz, and noted by its President, Herbert Rivera. On May 24, 1991, said Union held its
General Membership Meeting, wherein majority of the members agreed that “in as much as the Union had
already paid Atty. P. Pascual the amount of P500,000.00, the same must be shared by all the members until
this is fully liquidated.” Eighty-five (85) members of the same Union executed individual written authorizations
for check-off. Considering that the three requisites aforesaid for the validity of a special assessment were
observed or met, the Court upheld the validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment authorized in the

Article XIII. Section 3. PH Constitution.

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its
just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth.

Article III. Section 4. PH Constitution.

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Article 263(b). Labor Code.

Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for
their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of
employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected.
However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union
and intra-union disputes.

BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY vs NLRC, G.R. No. 101858 , August 21, 1992


Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTBCo NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-NAFLU), an affiliate of the National

Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the BLTBCo on the grounds of unfair
labor practice and violation of the CBA. Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary
Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC. A copy of the certification order was served upon the union on
August 30, 1988. On August 31, 1988, the officers and members of the union went on strike and maintained
picket lines blocking the premises of BLTBCo's terminals.

On September 6, 1988, the NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking employees to lift their
picket and to remove all obstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as of May 23, 1988
were required to return to work. BLTBCo, on the other hand, was directed to accept them back to work within
5 days under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo
employees who went on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted.
Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than
the strike, filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were refused
admission when they reported back for work.

On July 19, 1991, the NLRC issued a resolution declaring the strike illegal but directing the reinstatement of
all striking employees who have not committed illegal acts. On September 16, 1991, the NLRC issued the
other challenged resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of BLTBCo and Complainant Pepito
Abratique for lack of merit. BLTBCo was likewise directed to reinstate the union members specifically named
in the questioned resolution and all those striking employees who have not committed illegal acts. BLTB then
filed this special civil action for certiorari, claiming that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of


W/N the union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have been reinstated on the ground
that they defied the return-to-work order of the NLRC and thus abandoned their position

No. As correctly stated by NLRC, it was "not inclined to declare a wholesale forfeiture of employment status
of all those who participated in the strike" because, there was inadequate service of the certification order on
the union as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing that the striking members had
been apprised of such order by the NAFLU. The circumstances of time and place of employment and the
residences of the employees as well as the lack of individual notice to them are reasons enough to justify
their failure to beat the deadline. Some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to
return during the period given by the petitioner, which was only five days.

An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned
his work. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly
established. As we stressed in a recent case, mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by
overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. In the
case at bar, the affidavit of Eduardo Azucena, BLTBCo operations manager, besides being hearsay, lacks
credibility in light of the subsequent acts of the private respondents in complaining about their separation. A
worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his employment.
If his purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike.

Moreover, Only the officers of the union deserved to be penalized with the loss of their employment status,
under the principle of vicarious liability. The leaders of the union are the moving force in the declaration of
the strike and the rank-and-file employees merely followed. While the general membership of the union may
have joined the strike at its inception, the Court was convinced that they returned to work on September 19,
1988 or, immediately thereafter.

The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to substantiate the
commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation. He who asserts the commission of illegal
acts, must prove the same, and it is on the basis of substantiated evidence that this Commission declares
the loss of employment status of specific union members who have committed illegal acts.


The petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 19, 1991, and September 16, 1991, are AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order dated November 6, 1991, is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioner.

Discussion on the right to strike:

The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of
labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to
press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat
to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the
working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it
blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation
among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to
reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-
to-work order in industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the
very workers it is supposed to protect.

Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit
of all concerned.
MARCH 25, 1999


Densing, et al were casual EEs of CENAPRO Chemicals (CENAPRO). In CENAPRO, the CBA
representative of all rank-and-file EEs was CENAPRO Employee’s Association (CCEA), with which
CENAPRO had a CBA. This CBA excluded casual EEs from membership in the union. The casual EEs who
have rendered at least 1-6 years of service sought regularization of their employment with CENAPRO. When
this was denied, they formed themselves into an organization and affiliated with AIUP. Afterwards, AIUP filed
a petition for certification election, which was opposed by CENAPRO and CCEA, on the basis of the contract
bar rule.

On May 4 and July 3, 1990, the AIUP-sponsored union (Union) filed a notice of strike and other necessary
documentation with the DOLE, citing as grounds the acts of CENAPRO as constituting ULP, specifically the
coercion of EEs and systematic union-busting. The Union proceeded to stage a strike on July 23, 1990, in
the course of which, the Union perpetrated illegal acts such as padlocking the company gates, as well as
preventing/coercing other non-striking EEs from reporting for work. Because of the illegal acts, CENAPRO
filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC, which then granted a TRO to enjoin the Union from conducting
further illegal acts. On July 24, 1990, the Union filed a complaint for ULP and illegal lockout and in response,
CENAPRO filed an illegal strike complaint the day after.

The LA consolidated the complaints and decided that the strike conducted by the Union was illegal, and
dismissed the charge for illegal lockout and ULP. 5 Union officers were declared to have lost their
employment status, while 15 union members were not reinstated because of execution of quitclaims in favor
of CENAPRO. 6 workers, some of which composed the group of Densing et al, were ordered reinstated, but
on a later order, 2 EEs were excluded from reinstatement and backwage payment.

Both parties appealed to the LA decision, and pending resolution of the appeals, AIUP moved for execution
of the LA’s decision regarding reinstatement of some of its members. This was granted by an issued order,
with CENAPRO later moving that they pay separation pay on the premise of strained relations between the
parties. This opposition was overruled by the LA, which issued a 2nd writ of execution directing actual, if not
payroll, reinstatement.

Upon appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the LA in toto and reiterated the LA’s Order for
reinstatement of the Densing group. Upon an MR from CENAPRO, the NLRC later modified its decision,
ordering payment of separation pay (1 mo/year of service) without backwages. Meanwhile, Densing was
declared to have lost his employment status. Therefore, AIUP filed a petition for review on certiorari to
reinstate the LA decision ordering reinstatement and payment of backwages.


W/N the AIUP-sponsored Union committed an illegal strike.


YES, it is an illegal strike. From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered that the strike staged by
the petitioner union was illegal for the reasons, that: 1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of
the strike. They formed human barricades to block the road, prevented the passage of the respondent
company's truck, padlocked the company's gate, and prevented co-workers from entering the company
premises. 2) And violated the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the union and/or its members from
obstructing the company premises, and ordering the removal therefrom of all the barricades.

It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal
as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Article 264 (a) of the Labor
Code: " x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any x x union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status. x x" Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead
of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their
dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers' responsibility is
greater than that of the members.


The petition is GRANTED; the Resolution of NLRC, dated February 21, 1995, is SET ASIDE, and the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter of October 8, 1993 REINSTATED, with the modification that the petitioners,
Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, be paid full backwages
computed from October 15, 1993 until full payment of their separation pay. The payment of separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement, is hereby authorized.

Discussion on the right to strike:

A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. It is considered as the most effective
weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment.
But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment
of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.
Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph
(e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or
intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares. Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike
may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was considered
illegal as the "strikers formed a human cordon along the side of the Sta. Ana wharf and blocked all the ways
and approaches to the launches and vessels of Petitioners"



105090, SEPTEMBER 16, 1993


The labor conflict between the parties (BIMCAI and Concrete Aggregates Corp) broke out in the open when
the petitioner union struck on April 6, 1992 protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices and union
busting allegedly committed by the private respondent. The union picketed the premises of the private
respondent. On April 8, 1992, Concrete Aggregates filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction (with a prayer
for TRO) to stop the strike which it denounced as illegal. It alleged that: The strike is a wild-cat strike, which
did not comply with the procedural requirements for a valid strike.

During the strike, the union impeded the ingress and egress of persons who have lawful business with private
respondent. The petition was set for hearing on April 13, 1992 at 3 p.m. The union, however, claimed that it
was not furnished a copy of the petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented its address.
On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the evidence of the company alone. The ex parte hearing started at 2:30
p.m. where testimonial and documentary evidence were presented. Some 30 minutes later, an Ocular
Inspection Report was submitted by an unnamed NLRC representative which states that: The passage was
obstructed. The business operation was completely paralyzed as no person was noticed inside the company
compound. No persons and/or vehicles were seen entering and leaving the premises. Ingress to and engress
from the company is presumed to be not free. Before the day was over, the respondent NLRC (First Division)
issued a temporary restraining order against the union. No copy of this Order was furnished the union. The
union learned of the Order only when it was posted on April 15, 1992 at the premises of the company. On
April 21, 1992, it filed its Opposition/Answer to the petition for Injunction, which alleged: Public officers
charged with the duty to protect the Concrete Aggregates’ property are able and willing to furnish adequate
protection, as shown by the fact that when the TRO was served, the police came immediately to respond.
On April 24, 1992, the union also filed its own Petition for Injunction to enjoin the company “from asking the
aid of the police and the military officer in escorting scabs to enter the struck establishment.” The records
show that the case was heard on April 24 and 30, May 4 and 5, 1992 by respondent Labor Arbiter Enrilo

On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction wherein
it alleged that union is still committing illegal acts. It submitted the affidavits of non-striking employees, its
personnel managers, among others. The union got wind of the motion only on May 4, 1992. The next day,
May 5, 1992, it opposed the motion, alleging that they were never furnished with a copy of the original petition
for injunction because of the erroneous address indicated in the petition. The same day, however, the
respondent NLRC issued its disputed Order granting the company’s motion for preliminary injunction on the
ground the union was still committing illegal acts despite the TRO issued earlier. The NLRC based its ruling
on the affidavits submitted by Concrete Aggregates. The union then filed the instant petition for certiorari and


W/N the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction against the union was proper


NO. It violated their right to strike, and it did not comply with the LC’s requirements for the issuance of an
injunction. NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218(e) of the Labor Code, which provides
both the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary
or permanent injunction can issue in a labor dispute, in issuing its order.

Affidavits used by the company in proving the continued strike despite the TRO was controverted
upon presentation to the labor abiter. No less than the company’s operations manager, Mr.Mercado, further
testified that after the issuance of the TRO, the barricades were removed. Mr. Mercado and Atty.
Jolo(personnel manager) also testified that public authorities charged to protect the company’s properties
were neither unwilling nor unable to furnish adequate protection. As a matter of fact, police assistance was
never requested. Records reveal continuing misuse of unfair strategies by the company to secure the ex-
parte TRO. The union was never furnished a copy of the petition for injunction. They were denied the right to
attend the 13Apr hearing where the TRO was issued. Issuance of ex-parte TRO is not per se prohibited BUT
it must be clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity. Because imprudently issues TRO’s can
break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike. The deleterious effects of such a TRO on the rights
of striking employees can no longer be repaired for they defy simple monetization. As such it behooves
officers receiving evidence to support ex-parte evidence to take a more active stance seeing to it that the
right to social justice is in no way violated. Nor does the court find baseless the allegation by the union that
NLRC had neglected to resolves their injunction. The company’s prayer for ex-parte TRO was heard and
granted on the same day. The company’s petition for preliminary injunction was filed april 30 and was granted
less than a week after May5. On the other hand, the union’s petition has not yet been heard nor decided.
The disparate treatment is inexplicable considering the subject matters of their petition are of similar
importance to the parties and to the public.


The petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted. The Order of the NLRC is annulled and set aside. The
public respondents are likewise ordered to hear and resolve, with deliberate speed petitioner’s petition for
injunction filed on April 30, 1992.

Discussion on the right to strike:

Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of employees to
improve the terms and conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly developed countries, the
significance of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in view of the preference for more peaceful modes of
settling labor disputes. In underdeveloped countries, however, where the economic crunch continues to
enfeeble the already marginalized working class, the importance of the right to strike remains undiminished
as indeed it has proved many a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. It
remains as the great equalizer. In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a rhetoric than
a reality, labor has vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity of the right to strike. Its struggle to gain the right
to strike has not been easy and effortless. Labor's early exercise of the right to strike collided with the laws
on rebellion and sedition and sent its leaders languishing in prisons. The spectre of incarceration did not spur
its leaders to sloth; on the contrary it spiked labor to work for its legitimization. This effort was enhanced by
the flowering of liberal ideas in the United States which inevitably crossed our shores. It was enormously
boosted by the American occupation of our country. Hence, on June 17, 1953, Congress gave statutory
recognition to the right to strike when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. For
nearly two (2) decades, labor enjoyed the right to strike until it was prohibited on September 12, 1972 upon
the declaration of martial law in the country. The 14-year battle to end martial rule produced many martyrs
and foremost among them were the radicals of the labor movement. It was not a mere happenstance,
therefore, that after the final battle against martial rule was fought at EDSA in 1986, the new government
treated labor with a favored eye. Among those chosen by then President Corazon C. Aquino to draft the 1987
Constitution were recognized labor leaders like Eulogio Lerum, Jose D. Calderon, Blas D. Ople and Jaime
S.L. Tadeo. These delegates helped craft into the 1987 Constitution its Article XIII entitled Social Justice and
Human Rights. For the first time in our constitutional history, the fundamental law of our land mandated the
State to ". . . guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." This constitutional
imprimatur given to the right to strike constitutes signal victory for labor. Our Constitutions of 1935 and 1973
did not accord constitutional status to the right to strike. Even the liberal US Federal Constitution did not
elevate the right to strike to a constitutional level. With a constitutional matrix, enactment of a law
implementing the right to strike was an inevitability. RA 6715 came into being on March 21, 1989, an
intentional replication of RA 875. In light of the genesis of the right to strike, it ought to be obvious that the
right should be read with a libertarian latitude in favor of labor. In the wise words of Father Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., a distinguished commissioner of the 1987 Constitutional Commission " . . . the constitutional recognition
of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that injunctions, should be reduced to the barest minimum".
126717, FEBRUARY 11, 1999


Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the Parties submitted their respective proposals for its projected renewal.
However, it ended in a deadlock. Thus, the Union proceeded to stage a strike employing some violence and
blocking all points of ingress and egress of the Company’s premises. In view thereof, the GREPALIFE
directed the Union to explain why no disciplinary action, including possible dismissal from employment,
should be taken against them for committing illegal acts against the company in the course of the strike. In
response, the Union asserted that they were just exercising their right to strike, while the other striking
employees ignored the same. The GREPALIFE found Union’s explanations unacceptable, thus terminating
its officers and employees.

Eventually, the Parties entered into a MOA, where GREPALIFE requested, among others, for the voluntary
resignation of President and Vice-President of the Union, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Dela Rosa, respectively, in
exchange for the reinstatement of all other strikers. Mr. Dela Rosa then filed a complaint against GREPALIFE
for illegal dismissal and ULP. The Labor Arbiter sided with the Union’s Officers, then the NLRC reversed,
contending that a just cause for dismissal had been sufficiently established. However, it agreed that
GREPALIFE failed to comply strictly with the requirements of due process prior to termination, thus awarding
the Union‘s Officers its monetary benefits. Hence, Mr. Dela Rosa’s Petition.


(1) W/N the dismissal of the union officers is discriminatory constituting ULP

(2) W/N the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion


(1) NO. The decision of respondent GREPALIFE to consider the union officers as unfit for reinstatement is
not essentially discriminatory and constitutive of an ULP. Discriminating involves either encouraging
membership in any labor organization or is made on account of the employee's having given or being about
to give testimony under the Labor Code. These have not been proved in this case. To elucidate further, there
can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. A union officer has larger
and heavier responsibilities than a union member. Union officers are duty bound to respect the law and to
exhort and guide their members to do the same; their position mandates them to lead by example. By
committing prohibited activities during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice President of petitioner UNION
demonstrated a high degree of imprudence and irresponsibility. Verily, this justifies his dismissal from
employment. Since the objective of the Labor Code is to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial
peace, the dismissal of undesirable labor leaders should be upheld.

(2) NO. The NLRC did not err and GREPALIFE is not guilty of the acts charged. GREPALIFE submitted
before the Labor Arbiter several affidavits of its employees which de la Rosa did not refute. With these
documents, two (2) specifically described the incidents that transpired during the strike that the Union’s
Officers and Employees had participated and employed such illegal acts. Thus, declaring the staged strike
illegal and from that will not constitute ULP.

The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. The Labor Code is
emphatic against the use of violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits the
obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. The sanction provided
in par. (a) of Art. 264 thereof is so severe that "any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status."


The petition is DISMISSED. The decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated 14 May
1996 (a) finding that petitioner Rodel P. de la Rosa was legally dismissed, and, (b) ordering respondent Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation to pay petitioner his one (1) month salary for its failure to comply strictly
with due process prior to the latter’s termination and his one (1) month salary per year of service based on
the new CBA rates as separation pay, as well as its Resolution dated 16 August 1996 denying
reconsideration, is AFFIRMED.

Strike Activity

Labor Code. Article 212 (o) "Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

Regulation Use:

Our laws regulate the exercise of strikes within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management
together with the overarching public interest. Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are
provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They provide for
the procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike—filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and
reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment. These steps are mandatory.


142824, DECEMBER 19, 2001


Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Respondent. They
had a CBA. Prior to the expiration of the CBA, respondent company was approached by the petitioner,
through its officers. The Union inquired about the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA
which was set to expire in a few months. Salazar told the union officers that the matter could be best
discussed during the formal negotiations which would start soon. All the rank-and-file employees of the
company refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule. The employees stopped working and left
their workplace without sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on. To
minimize the damage the overtime boycott was causing the company, Salazar immediately asked for a
meeting with the union officers. In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the
employees would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as
to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the matter could be
better discussed during the formal renegotiations of the CBA. Since the union was apparently unsatisfied
with the answer of the company, the overtime boycott continued. In addition, the employees started to engage
in a work slowdown campaign during the time they were working, thus substantially delaying the production
of the company. Respondent company filed with the National NLRC a petition to declare illegal petitioner
union’s “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” which, according to respondent company, amounted to
illegal strike. It also filed with Office Secretary of Labor a petition for assumption of jurisdiction. Secretary of
Labor Nieves Confesor issued an assumption order over the labor dispute. Labor Arbiter Caday submitted
his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. Then Secretary Quisumbing
approved and adopted the report in his Order, finding illegal strike on the part of petitioner Union.

(1) W/N the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike

(2) W/N the overtime boycott or work slowdown” by the employees constitutes a violation of the CBA
which prohibits the union to stage a strike or engage in slowdown or interruption of work


(1) YES. the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 of the labor Code the authority to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause or lockout in an industry. Necessarily, this authority
to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies
including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident
from the opening proviso therein reading ‘(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code x x x.’ Plainly,
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors)
and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be
able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the
absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically
opposed rulings. As we have said, ‘it is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would
breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of
the Secretary as authorized by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code,
taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.

(2) YES. Because there is a contractual commitment “that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or
slowdown of work, boycotts or secondary boycotts x x x or any interference with any of the operations of the
company during CBA. The workers’ refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force is a slowdown and it is
inherently illegal activity essentially illegal even in the absence of a no-strike clause in a CBA. The court also
agrees that such slowdown is generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable because while the
employees “continue to work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to them. They select
what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform.


The petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and the 29 December 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals is



Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas while peitioner Union is the
duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondents. Union has a collective
bargaining agreement with private respondents. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private
respondents initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.

First, respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security
services for their business premises. Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of
private respondents’ officers, employees and guests within company premises. The Union branded the
security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents’ “goons” and “special forces.” It
also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members. Second, respondents conducted
seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their managerial and supervisory
employees and, later, the rank-and-filers, to promote their social education and economic growth. Among the
topics discussed in the seminar were the mission statement of the company, corporate values, and the
Philippine political spectrum. The Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped
the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations
such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups. Union directed its members not to attend the
seminars scheduled. Union, led by petitioners Bacolod and Arao, picketed the premises of the Philippine
Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards. Worse still, the Union filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor
practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting.

While issues were being discussed before NCMB, Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union,
was gunned down in his house. The gunman was later identified as an alleged member of the new security
forces of private respondents. The day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report
for work. They returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the “quota system” adopted
by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their
production to 30%. Respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.
Respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice
and damages, with prayer for injunction. Petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to Martinez. Again,
petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they proceeded to private respondents’ office at Lanang, carrying
placards and posters which called for the removal of the security guards, the ouster of certain management
officials, and the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not succeed.

A strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won
overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB. Two
days later, the Union struck.


W/N the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal


YES, as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the
Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and
Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members.

The result of the strike (or lockout voting) should be reported to the NCMB at least 7 days before the intended
strike or lockout, subject to the cooling off period. This means that after the strike vote is taken and the result
reported to NCMB, seven days must pass before the union can actually commence the strike. This seven-
day reporting period is intended to give the Dept. of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether
the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.


The petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent.
Costs against the petitioners.


Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines filed a notice of strike due to deadlock with the NCMB-NCR after
the renegotiation for the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Sulpicio Lines remained a stalemate.
In response, the respondent company filed with the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), a petition
praying that the Secretary assumes jurisdiction over the conflict. SOLE issued an order assuming jurisdiction
over the labor dispute. The Union on the other hand filed a second notice of strike alleging that Sulpicio
Lines committed Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), tantamount to union busting. The Union immediately
conducted a Strike vote on the same day resulting to the non-reporting for work of the vast number of rank
and file employees, officers and members of the Union. They instead gathered in front of the Pier 12 in North

The SOLE issued another order directing the employees to return to work. The labor dispute was certified
by the Secretary for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC. Sulpicio Lines on the other hand, filed a complaint
with the NLRC for illegal strike against the Union members and officers and asked for clearance for the
termination of employment of the Union Officers for staging an illegal strike.


(1) Whether or Not there was a strike

(2) Whether or Not the Strike was Illegal

(3) Whether or Not the Union Officers should be terminated


On whether or not there was a strike, the Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The Labor
Code as amended, defined Strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees
as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. It shall mean also, slowdowns, mass leaves, sit downs, attempt
to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities. In the present case, all
the basic elements of strike are noticeable. First, there was work stoppage, by not reporting to work of the
union members and officers, in a concerted manner. Second, the 167 members and officers of the union
gathered in front of the respondent’s office at Pier 12, North Harbor in Manila for the strike voting conducted
by the petitioner. And lastly, this activity was an offshoot of the petitioners second notice of strike for the
alleged ULP, which clearly is a labor dispute.

The Supreme Court averred that indeed the strike was illegal. The Union did not observe the 7- day
waiting period and failed to submit to the DOLE the results of the strike vote at least 7 days before the strike.
This requirement is mandatory, as such the union’s failure to observe the cooling off period and the 7 days
ban before the strike works against the petitioner. The union cannot invoke good faith to justify its holding of
a strike as their allegation of acts constituting Unfair Labor Practice amounting to union busting lacks
sufficient proof. As they are burdened to prove such allegation, no substantial evidence was presented by
the union to convince the court of such act by the respondent. Relying on sincere belief that the respondent
company committed such acts when the circumstances points otherwise is futile.

On the issue of whether or not the union officers who participated shall be terminated, the Supreme
Court said, Yes under Article 264 of the Labor Code. “Any union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that the mere participation of
a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER INC. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 147080, APRIL 26, 2005.


Capitol Medical Center Inc.’s refusal to negotiate for a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) led
to a union-led strike which prompted the SOLE to direct the management of the Capitol Medical Center Inc.
to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association- Alliance of Filipino Workers, the
certified bargaining agent of the rank- and- file employees. In relation with this, the Union requested a
meeting to discuss matters in connection with CBA Negotiations but the company refused.

However, instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the directive, the Union
filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The union alleged that
the grounds for their projected strike was the managements refusal to bargain, coercion of employees and
the restrain to self-organization.

The Capitol Medical Center on the other hand asserted its position that the strike conducted by the
union was illegal. The Petitioner maintained that no strike voting among union members and officers took
place and apparently, no notice of such voting was submitted to the NCMB at least twenty four hours prior to
the scheduled holding of the strike vote.


Whether or Not the strike was valid.


No. The strike was not valid. A notice of strike is an indispensable requirement which should be
submitted to the NCMB. With this, the NCMB through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a
conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possible alternatives
and avenues for an amicable settlement. In the instances that amicable settlement should fail, the parties
should submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. In the event the parties refuse, the union may hold a
strike vote, if the required majority vote is obtained, a strike will follow. The strike vote ensure that the decision
to conduct a strike was a majority decision of the union members and not upon mere minority. This also
discourages wildcat strikes, union bossism and corruption. A strike vote submitted to the NCMB at least
seven days prior to the intended strike ensures that indeed a strike vote was actually taken. The 15-30 days
cooling off period, provides an opportunity to correct any misgivings and come up with remedy before it is
too late.

The indispensable requirement of giving notice to the conduct of strike vote with the NCMB at least
24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to give NCMB ample time to decide if there is
a need to supervise the conduct of the vote or if additional personnel will be needed to safeguard the peaceful
conduct. The notice will also serves as the unions way of informing the NCMB of their purpose and intention
in holding such. NCMB on the other hand, will ensure that the conduct will be peaceful and reflective of the
union member’s decision. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the
NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike by the
union illegal.

In the present case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement
to NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote. Hence, no strike vote meeting took place and the strike
by the Union was illegal.



Petitioner Anacleto G. Pimentel started work as a lay-out man assigned at AG & P San Roque,
Bauan, Batangas, while petitioner Gaudencio A. Aldovino was hired as an electrician at the AG & P Batangas
Marine and Fabrication Yard (BMFY) in Bauan, Batangas. Pimentel and Aldovino acquired the status of
regular employees and became members in good standing of the employees' union, herein petitioner United
Rank and File Association (URFA), then the recognized and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all
regular rank-and-file employees of AG & P.

Luis I. Villanueva, president of AG & P, issued Presidential Directive No. 0191 enumerating
emergency measures to be implemented by the company "to stave off the devastating impact" of its severe
losses. Among these plans was the temporary layoff of forty percent (40%) of the existing complement in all
its corporate and divisional support units.

By the following month, respondent company began to lay off seven hundred five (705) rank-and-file
employees and eighty-four (84) staff and managerial personnel. This forced URFA to file a notice of strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment

At a conciliatory conference held before the NCMB, AG & P and URFA agreed to submit for voluntary
arbitration the issue of the temporary layoffs.
Meanwhile, the AG & P Supervisors' Union, an unrecognized union seeking recognition as the
bargaining agent for supervisory personnel, waged a strike in all operating divisions of respondent company
in Metro Manila to protest the layoffs. This union was later on joined by the Lakas ng Manggagawa sa AG &
P - National Federation of Labor Chapter (LAKAS-NFL), another unrecognized union for workers, particularly
the company's project employees
On 7 September 1991, an agreement ending the strike was reached by AG & P and the three unions of
AG & P, namely, petitioner URFA, the Supervisors' Union and LAKAS-NFL. The covenant outlined the
financial assistance to be extended by AG & P to all laid-off employees during the 6-month layoff period. The
employees were given the option to request payment of separation pay and/or other cash benefits in case
they would not be recalled, or to extend their temporary layoff status until the company could hire them.
Ten (10) days later, or on 17 September 1991, petitioners Aldovino and Pimentel were served separate
notices of temporary layoff. Both received temporary financial assistance equivalent to two (2) months basic
pay in accordance with the 7 September 1991 agreement.
Voluntary Arbitrator Romeo B. Batino upheld the right of respondent company to temporarily lay off its
employees upon his finding that AG & P's claim of severe financial losses due to adverse business conditions
was duly substantiated.
After applying anew for work at the AG & P, Pimentel was rehired at a reduced salary as a project or
contractual employee assigned at the company's Flour Daniel-Enron Project.
In 1994 Aldovino and Pimentel instituted separate but similar complaints against AG & P for unfair labor
practice, illegal layoff, illegal dismissal and non-payment of CBA increases and benefits. They prayed for
reinstatement with back wages, interests, CBA wage increases, benefits and attorney's fees. The two (2)
cases were thereafter consolidated.
On 12 August 1994, finding that the complainants were illegally dismissed, Labor Arbiter Ernesto S.
Dinopol rendered a decision in the two (2) cases ordering AG & P to reinstate Aldovino and Pimentel as
regular employees and to pay back wages and attorney's fees. He explained that the financial situation of
AG & P was not bleak as was pictured in its position paper, which was why the extended temporary layoff
status of Aldovino and Pimentel was unjustified and "akin to illegal dismissal." The Labor Arbiter however
rejected the charge of unfair labor practice and the claims for damages and other monetary benefits for lack
of evidence.
AG & P appealed to the NLRC protesting that the issue of the validity of the temporary layoff had already
been decided in its favor by a voluntary arbitrator, hence, was res judicata. Aldovino and Pimentel also
appealed, although partially, questioning the Labor Arbiter's computation of their back wages and the denial
of their claim for CBA increases and benefits
Resolving the appeal on 18 February 1995, the NLRC set aside the 12 August 1994 decision of the
Labor Arbiter and agreed with AG & P that the principle of res judicata was applicable in petitioners' case,
citing the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator Batino which upheld the validity of the 17 September 1991
temporary layoffs. It also alluded to its decision in Revidad v. AG & P of Manila promulgated on 14 July 1993
which already established the law of the case. In its resolution of 30 March 1995, the NLRC denied
Hence this recourse.


Whether or not Aldovino and Pimentel were illegally dismissed.

It must be noted that in the instant case no appeal was taken from the 7 January 1992 decision of
Voluntary Arbitrator Batino who on the validity of the temporary layoffs found for management. It is a matter
of fact that even prior to this arbitral decision an agreement had already been signed on 7 September 1991
between AG & P and its three (3) unions, which included URFA to which petitioners belonged, under which
financial assistance for each laid-off employee was provided. Both Aldovino and Pimentel availed themselves
of this assistance after their respective layoffs. This certainly shows that the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator
Batino was not confined only to the initial layoff effected in August 1991 but to all the layoffs subsequently
made. Thus, when his decision attained finality, as there was no appeal, it became the "law of the case."
Subsequently, in Zebra Security Agency and Allied Services v. NLRC we explained -
More specifically, [law of the case] means that whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be
the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court x x x x
Petitioners are now barred by prior judgment from raising in this case the same issue of the legality of
their layoffs. The test to determine whether there is identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the
same evidence necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in
the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different.
For NLRC to allow Aldovino and Pimentel to prove that they were illegally dismissed as a result of the
extended layoff period would be to relitigate the validity and reasonableness of the retrenchment program of
AG & P, a matter already resolved by Voluntary Arbitrator Batino and likewise settled in Revidad. It is to the
interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a
subject once fully and fairly adjudicated.
There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC in its application of the
principle of res judicata, all the other arguments of petitioners have become academic, hence, need no longer
be resolved.



Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-registered banking institution
with principal office in Cebu City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI Association of
Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union (APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor
organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).

On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate of Registration No.
R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter referred to as the union.

On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory employees
of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor organization duly-registered with
the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these
employees supported the petition: (4) there was no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between
any union and SRBI; and (5) no certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months prior
to the petition.

On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The pre-certification election
conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.

On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union’s petition. It sought to prevent the
holding of a certification election on two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact
managerial or confidential employees.


(1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or highly-placed
confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations and engaging in union

(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon the filing of a
petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the petitioner’s appeal pending before the
DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the union’s registration.

(1) Petitioner’s explanation does not state who among the employees has access to information specifically
relating to its labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves as the secretary of the
bank’s Board of Directors may not be so classified.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons
who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the field of labor relations].9
The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential
employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer;
and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities.
However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally
applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential
employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating
to labor relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to confidential
labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming,
assisting, or joining a union.

(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to
be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes
of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent
union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification election shall
automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization.16 Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification election if the
management appeals on the issue of the validity of the union’s registration. On this score, petitioner’s appeal
was correctly dismissed.



Petitioner MSMS, (local union) is an affiliate of ULGWP (federation). A local union election was held
under the action of the federation. The defeated candidates filed a petition for impeachment. The local union
held a general membership meeting. Several union members failed to attend the meeting. The local union
requested the company to deduct the union fines from the wage of those union members who failed to attend
the general membership meeting. The Secretary General of the federation disapproved the resolution
imposing the Php50 fine. The company then sent a reply to petitioner’s request stating it cannot deduct fines
without going against certain laws. The imposition of the fine became the subject of a bitter disagreement
between the Federation and the local union culminating to the latter’s declaration of general autonomy from
the former. The federation asked the company to stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the
education funds. The company led a complaint of interpleader with the DOLE. The federation called a
meeting placing the local union under trusteeship and appointing an administrator. Petitioner union officers
received letters from the administrator requiring them to explain why they should not be removed from the
office and expelled from union membership. The officers were expelled from the federation. The federation
advised the company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation pursuant to
the Union Security Clause in the CBA. The Federation filed a notice of strike with the NCMB to compel the
company to effect the immediate termination of the expelled union officers. Under the pressure of a strike,
the company terminated the 30 union officers from employment. The petitioners filed a notice of strike on the
grounds of discrimination; interference; mass dismissal of union officers and shop stewards; threats, coercion
and intimidation, and union busting. The petitioners prayed for the suspension of the effects of their
termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it was an intra-union matter. Later, 78 union shop
stewards were placed under preventive suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and officially
declared a strike that afternoon. The strike was attended by violence.

1. Whether or not the company was illegal dismissal.

2. Whether or not the strike was illegal.
3. Whether or not petitioners can be deemed to have abandoned their work.


1. Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeds from one main issue – the termination of
several employees upon the demand of the federation pursuant to the union security clause. Although the
union security clause may be validly enforced, such must comply with due process. In this case, petitioner
union officers were expelled for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty to the federation. The company did
not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and merely relied upon the federation’s allegations. The issue is
not a purely intra-union matter as it was later on converted into a termination dispute when the company
dismissed the petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. Although it started
as an intra-union dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BLR, to remand the same to the BLR would
intolerably delay the case and the Labor Arbiter could rule upon it. As to the act of disaffiliation by the local
union; it is settled that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union in the absence of
specific provisions in the federation’s constitution prohibiting such. There was no such provision in
federation ULGWP’s constitution.

2. No. As to the legally of the strike; it was based on the termination dispute and petitioners believed in
good faith in dismissing them, the company was guilty of ULP. A no-strike, no lockout provision in the CBA
can only be invoked when the strike is economic. As to the violence, the parties agreed that the violence
was not attributed to the striking employees alone as the company itself hired men to pacify the strikers.
Such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike illegal.

3. As to the dismissal of the petitioners; respondents failed to prove that there was abandonment absent
any proof of petitioner’s intention to sever the employee-employer relationship.



On July 1990, the supervisory, administrative personnel, production, accounting and confidential
employees of Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc.(ALSI) affiliated with Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino, a
national labor organization.

These supervisory employees’ name as they have adopted, ALSI-SAPPACEA-KAMPIL (Atlas

Lithographic Services, Inc. Supervisory, Administrative,Personnel, Production, Accounting and Confidential
Employees Association).

Thereafter, KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN filed a certification election so that it can be the sole bargaining
agent of the supervisory employees. However, Atlas Lithographic Services Inc. opposed the certification
election and ATLAS LITHOGRAPIC SERVICES’s contention: that under the law (art.245 of LC) KAMPIL-
KATIPUNAN cannot represent the supervisory for collective bargaining purposes because they (KAMPIL)
also represents the rank-and-file employees.- A CONFLICT OF INTEREST MAY ARISE in Collective
bargaining and strike, and discipline.

KAMPIL’s contention: despite affiliation with a national federation, the local union does not lose its
personality which is separate, and distinct fromthe national federation. It applies the 1984 Adamson Case –
that interprets the right of a supervisor’s union to affiliate under the Industrial Act.
On Sept. 1990, the Med Arbiter ordered the conduct of the certification election.


Whether under Article 245 of the Labor Code, a local union of supervisory employees may be
allowed to affiliate with a National federation of labor organizations of rank-and-file employees.


ALSI-SAPPACEA-KAMPIL prohibited from affiliating with a national labor union of rank-and-file

employees. Adamson case not applicable in this case. Because in Adamson the rank-and-file employees are
not under the supervisor’s union as in the case before us. Also, the national union in Adamson case did not
actively represent its local chapters, unlike in this case where KAMPIL even filed for certification election to
represent the supervisors.

PROHIBITION : a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national
federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in union activity in
the company. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national
federation the members of which include local unions of rank-and-file employees. The intent of the law is
clear especially where, as in the case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom
they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.

The interests of supervisors on the one hand, and the rank-and-file employees on the other, are
separate and distinct. The functions of supervisors, being recommendatory in nature, are more identified with
the interests of the employer. The performance of those functions may, thus, run counter to the interests of
the rank-and-file. Also, Members of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary measures
against their co-member rank-and-file employees. In the area of bargaining, their interests cannot be
considered identical. The needs of one are different from those of the other. Moreover, in the event of a
strike, the national federation might influence the supervisors' union to conduct a sympathy strike on the sole
basis of affiliation. The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while they are not managers, when they
recommend action implementing management policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of subordinates,
they identify with the interests of the employer and may act contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file.



Adamson and Adamson Inc. filed a petition to set aside the decision of the CIR holding that the
Adamson and Adamson Inc. Supervisory Union (FFW) can legally represent supervisors of the petitioner
corporation notwithstanding the affiliation of the rank-and-file union of the same company with the same
Labor Federation, the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).

The petitioner argues that the affiliation of the respondent union of supervisors, the salesmen's
association, and the rank and file personnel with the same national federation (FFW) violates Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act because — (1) it results in the indirect affiliation Of supervisors and rank-and-file
employees with one labor organization; (2) since respondent union and the unions of non-supervisors in the
same company are governed by the same constitution and by-laws of the national federation, in practical
effect, there is but one union; and (3) it would result in the respondent union's losing its independence
because it becomes the alter ego of the federation.

Whether or not a Supervisor’s Union may affiliate with a federation with which unions of rank and-
file employees of the same employer are also affiliated.


Yes, the Supervisor’s Union may affiliate with a federation that a rank and-file employees of the
same employer are also affiliated. Citing the case of Elisco-Elirol vs Noriel and Liberty Cottons, the court
ruled that the locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain the equality of
bargaining power between the employer and their employee-member in the economic struggle for the fruits
of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into the national union was
in the furtherance of the same end. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association; free to serve their
own and the common-interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-laws of the

In the case at bar, The Adamson and Adamson Supervisory Union and the Adamson and Adamson,
Inc., Salesmen Association (FFW), have their own respective constitutions and by-laws. They are separately
and independently registered of each other. Both sent their separate proposals for collective bar agreements
with their employer. There could be no employer influence on rank-and-file organizational activities nor there
could be any rank and file influence on the supervisory function of the supervisors because of the
representation sought to be proscribed.



Petitioner was once affiliated with the Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers (ALUMETAL for
short). both unions, using the name Volkschel Labor Union Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers, jointly
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with respondent companies. One of the subjects dealt with is
the the obligation of the respondent companies to deduct and remit dues to ALUMETAL.

After less than a year, a majority of petitioner’s members decided to disaffiliate from respondent
federation in order to operate on its own as an independent labor group pursuant to Article 241 (formerly
Article 240) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the pertinent portion of which reads: Incumbent affiliates
of existing federations or national unions may disaffiliate only for the purpose of joining a federation or
national union in the industry or region in which it properly belongs or for the purpose of operating as an
independent labor group.

On despite resolution revoking their check-off authorization, ALUMETAL wrote respondent

companies advising them to continue deducting union dues and remitting them to said federation.


(1) Whether or not petitioner union’s disaffiliation from respondent federation valid.
(2) Whether or not a federation is entitled to union dues payments from union’s members notwithstanding
their disaffiliation from said federation.

(1) Yes. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its
members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant.

(2) No. Under Section 3, Article I, of the CBA, the obligation of the respondent companies to deduct and remit
dues to ALUMETAL is conditioned on the individual check-off authorization of petitioner’s members, In other
words, ALUMETAL is entitled to receive the dues from respondent companies as long as petitioner union is
affiliated with it and respondent companies are authorized by their employees (members of petitioner union)
to deduct union dues. Without said affiliation, the employer has no link to the mother union. The obligation of
an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his affiliation or membership. “The employees’ check-off
authorization, even if declared irrevocable, is good only as long as they remain members of the union
concerned.” A contract between an employer and the parent organization as bargaining agent for the
employees is terminated by the disaffiliation of the local of which the employees are members. Respondent
companies therefore were wrong in continuing the check-off in favor of respondent federation since they
were duly notified of the disaffiliation and of petitioner’s members having already rescinded their check-off

A local union which has validly withdrawn from its affiliation with the parent association and which continues
to represent the employees of an employer is entitled to the check-off dues under a collective bargaining



This a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the Supreme Court in 1975 in the dispute between
the same parties. The petitioner-workers only ask for reconsideration of the awards given

The original decision held the defendants Liberty Cotton Mills and Philippine Association Free Labor Union
liable for dismissal and ordered that:

1. Liberty Cotton Mills reinstate the workers within 30 days, failing that shall make respondent company liable
to the workers for the payment of their wages from and after the expiration of that period.

2. PAFLU pay the workers the equivalent of three (3) years backwages without deduction or qualification

The reliefs sought in this MR by the workers are the following:

1. That Liberty Cotton Mills be made jointly if not solidarily liable for the payment of the 3 years
2. That when the workers are reinstated their wages should be at the same rates as those of their
contemporaries in 1964
3. That the backwages to be paid be increased from 3 years to 5.5 years


Whether or not Liberty Cotton Mills should be held liable with PAFLU for the backwages.

YES. Liberty Cotton Mills is solidarily liable. The other reliefs sought do not merit consideration.

Respondent company is equally liable for the payment of backwages for having acted in bad faith in
effecting the dismissal of the individual petitioners. Bad faith on the part of the respondent company may be
gleaned from the fact that the petitioner workers were dismissed hastily and summarily.

While respondent company, under the Maintenance of Membership provision of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, is bound to dismiss any employee expelled by PAFLU for disloyalty, upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily.

The company acted in bad faith in dismissing petitioner workers without giving them the benefit of a hearing.
It did not even bother to inquire from the workers concerned and from PAFLU itself about the cause of the
expulsion of the petitioner workers. Instead, the company immediately dismiss the workers on May 30, 1964
after its receipt of the request of PAFLU on May 29, 1964 — in a span of only one day — stating that it had
no alternative but to comply with its obligation under the Security Agreement in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, thereby disregarding the right of the workers to due process, self-organization and security of

February 28, 1962


The laborers of Elizalde Rope Factory went on strike which lasted from September 1957 to February
1958. Edilberto Tupas, a laborer, was one of the strikers. During the period of time the strike lasted, petitioner
did not pay to the Social Security Commission any premium for Edilberto Tupas. It only resumed to pay the
premium after the period of strike up until May 1958, when Tupas died. The Social Security Commission sent
Bill No. 138 to petitioner in the amount of P10.27 representing its contribution to the unpaid premium for
Edilberto Tupas. The rope factory averred in a letter to the commissioner that the amount of P9.45
representing employer’s 3-1/2% premium contribution for October to December 1957 should be for the
account of the late Edilberto Tupas for the reason that he was then on strike and consequently, unemployed
by the company. Mr. Tupas, during these months, received no wages. The Company, however, was willing
to pay the amount of P0.82 only, as underpaid premium for the month of May, 1958.
The Social Security Commission sent a letter to the rope factory, declaring the strike “not unlawful” and
reiterating its demand to pay
the amount of P10.27, pursuant to the Commission’s policies which states

that the employer will continue to remit his 3-1/2% contribution every month even without the employee's 2-
1/2%, where there are no earnings on the part of the employee. The 3-1/2% will be based on the month's
earnings of the employee immediately preceding the month where there is no earning. A memorandum was
also sent by the Commission, recommending Elizalde Rope Factory to pay its 3-1/2% contribution for the
account of all strikers corresponding to the months covered by the strike, to be based on the wages or
compensation each of them received in August, 1957, or the month prior to the strike. The rope factory
requested the Commission to reconsider its ruling requiring it to pay the 3-1/2% contribution in question,
contending that it is not required to pay such contribution corresponding to a period of strike, because during
such period a striker ceases to be an employee. Such request was denied by the Commissioner.

Whether or not the social security premium corresponding to a period when a covered worker is on strike be
paid by the employer?

YES. Although during a strike the worker renders no work or service and receives no compensation, yet his
relationship as an employee with his employer is not severed or dissolved. Strike is the workers' means of
expressing their grievances to employers and enforcing compliance with their demands made upon them.
And when laborers go on strike, it cannot be said that they intend to cut off or terminate their relationship with
their employer. On the contrary, a strike may improve the employer-employee relationship bringing about
better working conditions and more efficient services. Hence, the petitioner's contention that Edilberto Tupas
ceased to be an employee from 17 September 1957 to the middle of February 1958 when he was on strike,
cannot be sustained. The Social Security System provides that that after an employee is compulsorily
covered by the System he and his employer will contribute to pay the premium every month during his
employment. In the case at bar, Edilberto Tupas was compulsorily covered in September 1957 by the
System. When he was on strike from 17 September 1957 to the middle of February 1958, his employment
did not cease or end. For such period, his monthly premium accrued and the petitioner as his employer must
pay its 3-1/2% contribution in accordance with circular No. 21 of the System.


COMMISSION and PT&T EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU, G.R. No. 99858. June 19, 1995.


Herein private respondent PT&T Union-ALU initiated this case via a complaint, filed on 25
November 1986,charging petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation ("PT&T") with unfair
labor practice acts and underpayment of statutory and contractual benefits claimed to be due pursuant to
Wage Orders No. 3, 4, 5 and 6,and also under Sections 2 and 3, Article IX, of the 1984 Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") and Section 2, Article XII, of the 1986 CBA. Petitioner denied the charges.


Whether or not the PT&T be obligated to pay both the CBA and statutory, wage increases?


No. Union members should be paid their salary differentials in accordance with Wage Orders No. 3
to 6; and Sections 2 and 3, Article IX of the 1984 CBA and Section 2, of Article XII of the 1986 CBA. The
common provisions of Wage Orders No. 3, 5, and 6, state that:

“All increases in wages and/or allowances granted or paid by employers . . . shall be credited as
compliance with the minimum wage and allowance adjustments prescribed herein, provided that where the
increases are less than the applicable amount provided in this Order, the employer shall pay the difference.
Such increases shall not include anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements
unless the agreements expressly provide otherwise…”

Petitioner company and private respondent union, in the 1984 and 1986 CBAs, in turn, have stipulated that:

“The parties agree that in the event of additional wage increases, bonuses or allowances which may during
the life of this agreement being made mandatory as a matter of law, such that the minimum wage including
bonuses and allowances shall be greater than the wage provided therein, then such wages shall ipso facto
become the total remunerations under such agreement in lieu of all other remunerations and increases herein

”The foregoing CBA provisions reveal quite sufficiently the parties' intention to consider salary increases
provided in the CBA to be creditable to wage increases that are or may be mandated within the applicable
period by law. Such agreements merely create an equivalence between legal and contractual imperatives,
rendering both obligations susceptible performance by compliance with either, subject only to the condition
that where the increases given under agreement fall short in amount of those fixed by law, the difference
must be made up by the employer.
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, G.R. No. L-28607. May 31, 1971


Respondent Shell Company of the Philippines (COMPANY) dissolved its security guard section
stationed at its Pandacan Installation, notwithstanding its (guard section) continuance and that such is
assured by an existing collective bargaining contract. The respondent company transferred 18 security
guards to its other department and consequently hired a private security agency to undertake the work of
said security guards. This resulted in a strike called by petitioner Shell Oil Workers’ Union (UNION), The
President certified it to respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). CIR declared the strike illegal on the
ground that such dissolution was a valid exercise of a management prerogative. Thus this appeal is taken.

Petitioner argued that the 18 security guards affected are part of the bargaining unit and covered
by the existing collective bargaining contract, as such, their transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal
being done in violation of the existing contract. The Company maintained that in contracting out the security
service and redeploying the 18 security guards affected, it was merely performing its legitimate prerogative
to adopt the most efficient and economical method of operation, that said action was motivated by business
consideration in line with past established practice and made after notice to and discussion with the Union,
that the 18 guards concerned were dismissed for wilfully refusing to obey the transfer order, and that the
strike staged by the Union is illegal.


Whether the existing collective bargaining contract on maintaining security guard section, among
others, constitute a bar to the decision of the management to contract out security guards.


YES. The strike was legal because there was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement by
Company. It was part of the CBA that the Security Guard Section will remain. Yet, the Company did not
comply with the stipulation in CBA. It was thus an assurance of security of tenure, at least, during the lifetime
of the agreement. .For what is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached, the terms of which should
be binding on both parties

The stand of Shell Company as to the scope of management prerogative is not devoid of plausibility,
management prerogative of the Company would have been valid if it were not bound by what was stipulated
in CBA. The freedom to manage the business remains with management. It cannot be denied the faculty of
promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation. To it
belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted
to outside agencies. However, while management has the final say on such matter, the labor union is not to
be completely left out.

An unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its refusal ‘to bargain collectively with
the employer’. Collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a continuous
process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such
a collective bargaining agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes
an unfair labor practice.

The right to self-organization guarded by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right “to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection.” The
employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined
by the CIR and after a dispute has been submitted thereto and pending award or decision by the court of
such dispute.

In the present case, the employees or laborers may strike before being ordered not to do so and before an
industrial dispute is submitted to the CIR, subject to the power of the latter, after hearing when public interest
so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, to order them to return
to work, with the consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work, when so ordered, the court may
authorize the employer to accept other employees or laborers.” Thus a strike may not be staged only when,
during the pendency of an industrial dispute, the CIR has issued the proper injunction against the laborers
(section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended).


It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if
such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. So it was
declared: “As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners
were wanted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners
were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the
same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as
employees of respondents herein.”

31, 1964


Marsman & Co, Inc had employees of around 320 persons, about 140 of whom where members of
Marsman & Company Employees and Laborers Association (MARCELA) and about 20 of the National Labor
Union. On December 23, 1953 the Industrial Court named Marsman & Company Employees and Laborers
Association (MARCELA) as the employees' bargaining agent in regard to rates of pay, terms and conditions
of employment. At that time, MARCELA was affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), a national
labor organization. On March 17, 1954 MARCELA-FFW submitted to the Company a set of proposals for
collective bargaining, which the Company answered on March 24, 1954. Despite negotiations held between
the Company and the Union, they failed to reach In agreement; so on April 8, 1954 th Union, failed a notice
of strike with the Department of Labor. Mediation by the Conciliation Service of that Department proved
fruitless. On June 4, 1954 the Union declared a strike and at the same time placed a "round-the-clock" picket
line around the Company's premises in Intramuros, Manila. On July 30, 1954, in a conference called by
Eleuterio Adevoso, then Secretary of Labor, the Union officials and members then present were prevailed
upon by Adevoso to accept the proposals of Antonio de las Alas, Company vice-president, that they stop the
strike and go back to work, and hat when they were already working the Company would discuss with them
their demands. Upon being informed to the Union's acceptance of the proposal the strikers returned to work.
The Company admitted back sixteen picketing strikers on August 9,1954 and later on, it also reemployed
non-union employees and a majority of the strikers. However, complainants herein were refused admittance
and were informed by Company officials that they would not be reinstated unless they ceased to be active
Union members and that in any case the Company already had enough men for its business operations. As
a result the strike and the picketing were resumed, because of which employees who had been admitted to
work since July 21, 1954 had to stay inside the Company premises, where the Company furnished them food
and quarters up to October 1954.Because of the Company's consistent refusal to reinstate the 69
complainants even after repeated requests, the Confederation of Labor Associations of the Philippines
(CLAP), to which the Union had affiliated after seceding from the FFW initiated the present charge for unfair
labor practice. Initially the strike staged by the Union was meant to compel the Company to grant it certain
economic benefits set forth in its proposal for collective bargaining. The strike was an economic one, But the
strike changed its character from the time the Company refused to reinstate complainants because of their
union activities after it had offered to admit all the strikers andin fact did readmit the others. It was then
converted into an unfair labor practice strike. The Court (Judge Jose S. Bautista), after hearing, found the
Company guilty of the charge and ordered it to reinstate 60 of the aforementioned 69 complainants to their
former positions or to similar ones with the same rate of pay, without back wages. Motions for reconsideration
were denied hence this petition.


Whether or not the strike was illegal?


The Company claims that the complainants applied for readmission only on June 7, 1955, more than a year
after the offer, when the CLAP, in their behalf, wrote the Company asking for their reinstatement. Prior to
said letter, however, complainants had, by various means, sought readmission. After Delas Alas' invitation
to return to work was accepted by the Union officers and members, they informed all the other strikers
accordingly. There upon the strikers terminated the strike and presented themselves for work at the
Company's premises. The Company alleges that it was economic reasons, i.e., its policy of retrenchment,
not labor discrimination, which prevented it from rehiring complainants. This is disproved, however, by the
fact that it not only readmitted the other strikers, but also hired new employees and even increased the
salaries of its personnel by almost 50%.The Union began the strike because it believed in good faith that
settlement of their demands was at an impasse and that further negotiations would only come to naught. It
stopped the strike upon the belief they could go back to work. Then it renewed the strike (or it started a new
strike) as a protest against the discrimination practiced by the Company. Both are valid grounds for going
on a strike.

CEMENT CO., INC., G.R. No. L-18442, November 30, 1962


 Petitioner Union sent to respondent company, a letter containing a set of proposals for the purpose of
entering into a collective bargaining contract with it.
 A reply was made stating that it could not entertain the proposals until after a certain case, which was
then pending with CIR, has been finally settled, since the demands in the proposals and those involved
in the pending case were the same.
 Union, responding to the reply, claimed in a letter that the proposals being submitted were distinct and
separate from those litigated in the above mentioned case.
 The Company answered the Union's letter and reiterated its previous stand regarding the proposals.
 The Union then filed with the DOLE a Notice of Strike.
 At a conference (held by the Conciliation Service of DOLE), the Union proposals were not discussed.
 Then, another Union, the Binangonan Labor Union (NWB), presented a set of proposals with the
respondent Rizal Cement Company, and after a series of conferences held by the Conciliation Service,
a collective bargaining contract was entered into between respondent company and the Binangonan
Labor Union.
 The petitioner union declared a strike against respondent company at its plant in Binangonan Rizal.
The dispute was certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations
(C.I.R.). (See Notes for what happened during the strike)
 Company: the notice of strike prescribed in Section 14, par. (d) of Republic Act No. 875, applies to the
strike in issue.
 CIR: Disagrees because the present case involved a strike against unfair labor practice acts, and not
an economic strike. The required 30-day notice which affords the parties cooling off period within which
to settle their difference through processes of collective bargaining applies to economic strike.
o Ordered the Company to reinstate all the striking members of petitioner union to their former
positions or substantially equivalent positions, without back wages.
 Petitioner Union sought a reconsideration of the CIR decision in so far as it did not award back wages
contending that same is contrary to law and the evidence on record.
 Rizal Cement Company moved for a reconsideration of the judgment, in so far as it considered the
strike justified.
 The CIR, en banc, denied both motions, with two Judges taking no part. Only the petitioner Union
appealed to this Court.


Whether or not the members of Rizal Cement Workers are entitled to backwages?



 Company: the review has become academic and moot, since the decision sought to be reviewed has
already been implemented and/or executed, in that the strikers affiliated with the petitioner union, had
returned to work and respondent company has reinstated them to their former positions or substantially
equivalent positions, as ordered by respondent court; that under the circumstances, petitioner is now
estopped from or has waived the right to question the legality or validity of the decision.
 Petitioner principally based its claim for back wages on the theory that there was lock-out or "virtual
lock-out" which prevented them to work. The law (Act No. 875), provides —
o SEC. 15. Violation of Duty to Bargain Collectively. — It shall be unlawful for any employer to
refuge to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees, or to declare a lockout
without having first bargained collectively with the representatives of his employees, in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. Any employee whose work has stopped as a
consequence of such lockout shall be entitled to backpay. . . .
 It will thus be seen that under the above provision, the lockout referred to is that which is committed by
the employer, if it refused to give work to its workers.
 No finding was made by the CIR on the question of lockout. That there was no lockout is clear from the
observations of the respondent court, when it said; "the striking union decided on this question of strike
which was carried out and maintained by picketing the respondent's cement plant at Binangonan
 The offer to return to work made by the members of the petitioner, did not make the refusal to accept
the same, a lockout. This is so because the case on the legality or not of the strike was then pending
decision by the CIR and said Court did not issue any order in connection with said offer.
 The strike which was openly and publicly declared by the petitioner union on May 27, 1956, can not be
converted into a pure and simple lockout, by the mere obedient of filing before the trial court a notice of
offer to return to work, during the pendency of the labor dispute.
 Petitioner alleges that said refusal to accept them, constituted a "virtual lock-out".
 The law does not provide for a virtual lockout. But assuming, that the non-acceptance of the
unconditional offer to return to work was a virtual lockout, still the circumstances of the case would not
justify the demand that the strikers are entitled ipso jure to back wages.
 This is so because the respondent court found that the strike was attended by isolated acts of violence
committed by the strikers and stated, in the same breath, that certain degree of reason and fairness be
accorded the strikers. Thus CIRstated in its Answer :
o When this statement is preceded with an earlier statement made of the awareness of the Trial
Court of the fact that passions and emotions run high at the heat of the strike, it is then clear
that such judicial pronouncement is based on the broad powers of respondent to adjust the
parties in order to arrive into a happy solution of their dispute.
o If respondent Court has the power to adjust a strike legal, even as it is attended with violence,
personal injuries or damage to property, and this is not disputed in this case, then with equal
reason respondent Court could also declare that such striker may be reinstated without
o It could not be denied that the strikers failed to earn the wages they ought to have received
when they offered to return to work but not accepted; but it likewise could not be denied that
because of the strike and how it was carried out, the employer also suffered. The Decision and
the En Banc Resolution disputed, therefore, simply placed the parties in a situation where one
gained none for the fault of the other and vice-versa.
o This is in accordance with section 13, in relation to Section 20, of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
as amended, the effectivity of which is revived upon the certification of the labor dispute by the
President to CIR
 Inasmuch as the present case has been certified by the President of the Philippines to the CIR, said
Court is authorized to exercise its powers of arbitration under the provisions of Act No. 103, as
amended, including the fixing of the terms and conditions of employment which embrace reinstatement
of the strikers, with or without back wages.
 The evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases,
not only in the manner prescribed under said Act No. 103, but with the same broad powers and
jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution
in an industrial dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return back to work,
it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power or jurisdiction to
carry the solution into effect. And of what use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not
have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it had adopted.
 Lastly, if said court has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order
the return of the workers with or without backpay as a term or condition of employment.


June 27, 1991


1. IBM, representing 4500 employees of SMC, demanded for correction of the significant distortion in
the workers’ wages pursuant to Sec. 4 (d), RA 6727.

2. IBM alleged that SMC ignored the demand by offering a measly across-the-board wage increase
of P7/day as against the IBM’s proposal of P25/day, which was later reduced to P15/day by way of an
amicable settlement.

3. Because of SMC’s rejection, IBM members refused to render overtime services as their means of
compelling SMC to correct the wage distortion.

4. SMC claimed that the abandonment of the long-standing work schedule caused substantial losses
(P174,657,598 in sales and P48,904,311 in revenues), work disruption, and lower efficiency to the
prejudice of SMC. Hence, it filed a complaint before the NLRC to declare the strike or slowdown illegal.


Whether or not IBM’s concerted acts of reducing their work time, thereby causing financial losses
to SMC in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of wage distortions, are illegal.

YES. IBM’s concerted acts are illegal. It is prohibited under RA 6727 and the CBA.

SMC’s contention: The concerted acts are contrary to law and to the CBA between it and IBM.

SC ruling: CORRECT.

• Although Art. 263, LC gives the workers the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
CBA or for their mutual benefit and protection, these activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or

• Sec. 3, RA 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed, and comprehensive procedure for the correction of
wage distortion. And it implicitly excludes strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities as modes of
settlement of the issues.

• The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortion shall be sought by voluntary
negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or
management, is made clear in Sec. 16, Chapter I, RA 6727 IRR: “Any issue involving wage distortion shall
NOT be a ground for a strike/lockout”.
• Moreover, under the CBA, IBM was prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in
non-peaceful concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of wage

• IBM’s acts are in the nature of a “slowdown” which is a “strike on the installment plan”, a willful
reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the
employer, in relation to a labor dispute; an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work,
retard production or their performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their

• Thus, the partial strike or concerted refusal by the IBM to follow the 5-year-old work schedule is
tantamount to a slowdown which is forbidden by law and contract, hence, illegal.

Union Security


(G.R. no. 171618-19)


Due to the adverse effects of the Asian economic crisis on the construction industry beginning 1997,
petitioner decided to temporarily stop its business of producing concrete hollow blocks, compelling most of
its employees to go on leave for six months.

Respondent immediately protested the temporary shutdown. Because its collective bargaining
agreement with petitioner was expiring during the period of the shutdown, respondent claimed that petitioner
halted production to avoid its duty to bargain collectively. The shutdown was allegedly motivated by anti-
union sentiments. Respondent went on strike. Its officers and members picketed petitioner’s main gates and
deliberately prevented persons and vehicles from going into and out of the compound.

Petitioner filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO in the NLRC. It sought
to enjoin respondent from obstructing free entry to and exit from its production facility. NLRC issued a TRO
directing the respondents to refrain from preventing access to petitioner’s property.

Respondent union violated the said TRO. Union members, on various occasions, stopped and
inspected private vehicles entering and exiting petitioner’s production facility. NLRC ordered the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner sent individual memoranda to the officers and members of respondent who participated
in the strike ordering them to explain why they should not be dismissed for committing illegal acts in the
course of a strike. Respondent ignored petitioner’s memoranda despite the extensions granted. Petitioner
dismissed the concerned officers and members and barred them from entering its premises.

Respondent filed complaints for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages, ULP, illegal dismissal
and attorney’s fees, and refusal to bargain on behalf of its officers and members against petitioner and its
corporate officers. It argued that there was no basis for the temporary partial shutdown as it was undertaken
by petitioner to avoid its duty to bargain collectively.

Petitioner asserted that because respondent conducted a strike without observing the procedural
requirements the strike was illegal. Petitioner argued that it validly dismissed respondent’s officers and
employees for committing illegal acts in the course of a strike based on the NLRC decision.
LA dismissed the complaints for illegal lockout and unfair labor practice for lack of merit. However,
because petitioner did not file a petition to declare the strike illegal before terminating respondent’s officers
and employees, it was found guilty of illegal dismissal. NLRC, on appeal, modified the LA decision and held
that only petitioner should be liable for monetary awards granted to respondent’s officers and members.

Petitioner assailed the said NLRC decision via a petition for certiorari in the CA. It asserted that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding former decision wherein respondent’s officers
and employees were found to have committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. In view thereof and
pursuant to Article 264(a)(3), petitioner validly terminated respondent’s officers and employees.

CA dismissed the petition but modified the former NLRC decision. Because most of affected
employees were union members, the CA held that the temporary shutdown was moved by anti-union
sentiments. Petitioner was therefore guilty of ULP and was ordered to pay respondent’s officers and
employees backwages and separation pay of one month salary for every year of credited service.


W/N the filing of a petition with the LA to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua non for the valid
termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course of such strike.


No.Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing the
free ingress to and egress from the employer’s premises. Since respondent was found in the NLRC decision
to have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioner’s compound, respondent’s officers
and employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of the strike.

The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant
to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to
declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.

We uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondent’s officers and employees. Article 264 of the
Labor Code further provides that an employer may terminate employees found to have committed illegal acts
in the course of a strike. Petitioner clearly had the legal right to terminate respondent’s officers and

FEDERATION OF LABOR (NMF-NFL) G.R. No. 106316 May 5, 1997


Fil Transit Employees Union filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) because
of alleged unfair labor practice of Petitioner Company. Despite several conciliation conferences, the parties
failed to reach an agreement, the union went on strike, as a reason several workers were dismissed.

The union filed another notice of strike alleging ULP, massive dismissal of union officers and members,
coercion of employees and violation of workers' rights to self-organization. Conciliation conferences were
held but the union again went on strike. The then Minister of Labor and Employment (MOLE) ordered the
striking workers to return to work. Only 66 employees were accepted, conditioned on the submission
of certain requirements.
The Secretary of Labor ruled for the legality of the strike and awarded backwages and separation pay to the
strikers. Petitioner, however, alleged that no strike vote was obtained, the result thereof was not reported to
the MOLE, the strikers engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts, and it complied with the return to work


Whether or not the strike was illegal.


Yes. It was not shown in the pleadings that a strike vote was obtained before the declaration of
strike. The statement in the same order of the Labor Secretary that a notice of strike had been filed because
several conciliation conferences failed due to management's consistent refusal to appear is contrary to
evidence because management was duly represented during the conciliation proceedings prior to the strike.

Even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, the strike called by the Union was illegal because
of nonobservance by the Union of the mandatory seven-day strike ban counted from the date the strike vote
should have been reported to the Department of Labor and Employment up to the time the Union staged the
strike on June 17, 1986. I

The union was in bad faith when it conducted the strike because instead of attending the conciliation
meetings with petitioner, it went on strike. The strike was attended by pervasive and widespread violence
such as the hijacking of Fil-Transit buses, barricading of the terminal in Alabang, puncturing of tires, cutting
of electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts, use of Molotov bombs, and theft of expensive equipment such
as fuel injections. The commission of these illegal acts was neither isolated nor accidental but deliberately
employed to intimidate and harass the employer and the public.

However, only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts against
the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status in accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor

CLUB FILIPINO, INC. vs. Bautista July 13, 2009 G.R. No. 168406 July 3, 2018


Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. (the company) is a non-stock, non profit corporation duly formed,
organized and existing under Philippine laws.

Respondents on the other hand, were former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees
Association (the union).
The union and the company had a collective bargaining agreement. Prior to the expiration of the
CBA and within the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied
that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held.

The union submitted its formal CBA proposal to the company’s negotiating panel and repeatedly
asked for the start of negotiations. No negotiations, however, took place for various reasons proffered by the
company, among them the illness of the chairman of the management panel. In order to compel the company
to negotiate, respondents, as officers of the union, filed a request for preventive mediation with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). However, meeting concluded with a declaration by both parties
of a deadlock in their negotiations.

The union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure
to bargain. The company formally responded to the demands of the union when it submitted its economic
counter-proposal. Meanwhile, the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision of the DOLE.

In response to the company’s counter-proposal, the union sent the company its improved proposal,
but the company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on May 26, 2001
on the ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock.

The company filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare
the strike illegal, and prayed that all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered
separated from the service. The labor arbiter declared the strike procedurally [infirm] and therefore illegal.
The labor arbiter noted that the union failed to attach its written CBA proposal and the company’s counter-
proposal to the notice of strike and to provide proof of a request for a conference to settle the dispute.

Thus, the notice to strike was deemed not to have been filed and the strike illegal. All the officers of
the union were deemed terminated from service. However, they were entitled to separation pay equivalent
to that granted to employees affected by the retrenchment program which the company had earlier launched.

Respondents appealed but the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter. The NLRC did not see fit to pass upon the
issues raised by respondents because, by the time they appealed, they had either resigned from the company
or were no longer part of the union because of the election of new set of officers.

The CA set aside the rulings of the NLRC and the labor arbiter.


Whether or not the strike was legal.


Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states:

In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved
issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-
proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair
labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to
resolve the dispute amicably.

Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be
deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the

In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached
the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such
counter-proposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike after several requests to start negotiations proved
futile. It was only after two weeks when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first
part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company another three weeks to complete it by submitting the
second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year after the expiration of the CBA sought to be

The Implementing Rules use the words as far as practicable. In this case, attaching the counter-
proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the
union to produce the companys counter-proposal which it did not have. One cannot give what one does not
have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the
time the union filed a notice of strike. The law does not exact compliance with the impossible. Nemo tenetur
ad impossibile.

Another error committed by the labor arbiter was his declaration that respondents, as union officers,
automatically severed their employment with the company due to the alleged illegal strike. In the first place,
there was no illegal strike. Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality of the strike
should not be automatically followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from employment.

The law is clear:

Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status.

Note that the verb participates is preceded by the adverb knowingly. This reflects the intent of the
legislature to require knowledge as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be dismissed from
employment for participating in an illegal strike.

The provision is worded in such a way as to make it very difficult for employers to circumvent the
law by arbitrarily dismissing employees in the guise of exercising management prerogative. This is but one
aspect of the States constitutional and statutory mandate to protect the rights of employees to self-

Nowhere in the ruling of the labor arbiter can we find any discussion of how respondents, as union
officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal strike. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the strike
was illegal, their automatic dismissal had no basis.


(CEEA), represented by Union President, TALAVERA G.R. No. 122136 July 19, 1999


Due to losses on production of the petitioner, it was constrained to cease operations. In the evening
of April 6, 1992, the machinery, equipment and materials being used for production at Complex were pulled-
out from the company premises and transferred to the premises of Ionics Circuit, Inc. (Ionics) at Cabuyao,
Laguna. The following day, a total closure of company operation was effected at Complex.

A complaint was, thereafter, filed with the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice,
illegal closure/illegal lockout, money claims for vacation leave, sick leave, unpaid wages, 13th month pay,
damages and attorney’s fees. The Union alleged that the pull-out of the machinery, equipment and materials
from the company premises, which resulted to the sudden closure of the company was in violation of Section
3 and 8, Rule XIII, Book V of the Labor Code of the Philippines and the existing CBA. Ionics was impleaded
as a party defendant because the officers and management personnel of Complex were also holding office
at Ionics with Lawrence Qua as the President of both companies.

The Union anchors its position on the fact that Lawrence Qua is both the president of Complex and Ionics
and that both companies have the same set of Board of Directors. It claims that business has not ceased at
Complex but was merely transferred to Ionics, a runaway shop. To prove that Ionics was just a runaway
shop, petitioner asserts that out of the 80,000 shares comprising the increased capital stock of Ionics, it was
Complex that owns majority of said shares with P1,200,000.00 as its capital subscription and P448,000.00
as its paid up investment, compared to P800,000.00 subscription andP324,560.00 paid-up owing to the other
stockholders, combined. Thus, according to the Union, there is a clear ground to pierce the veil of corporate


WON Ionics is merely a runaway shop


NO. A “runaway shop” is defined as an industrial plant moved by its owners from one location to
another to escape union labor regulations or state laws, but the term is also used to describe a plant removed
to a new location in order to discriminate against employees at the old plant because of their union activities.
It is one wherein the employer moves its business to another location or it temporarily closes its business for
anti-union purposes. A “runaway shop” in this sense, is a relocation motivated by anti-union animus rather
than for business reasons.

In this case, however, Ionics was not set up merely for the purpose of transferring the business of
Complex. At the time the labor dispute arose at Complex, Ionics was already existing as an independent
company. As earlier mentioned, it has been in existence since July 5, 1984 (8 years prior to the dispute). It
cannot, therefore, be said that the temporary closure in Complex and its subsequent transfer of business to
Ionics was for anti-union purposes. The Union failed to show that the primary reason for the closure of the
establishment was due to the union activities of the employees.

The mere fact that one or more corporations are owned or controlled by the same or single
stockholder is not a sufficient ground for disregarding separate corporate personalities. Mere ownership by
a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of
itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality.

At first glance after reading the decision a quo, it would seem that the closure of respondent’s
operation is not justified. However, a deeper examination of the records along with the evidence, would show
that the closure, although it was done abruptly as there was no compliance with the 30-day prior notice
requirement, said closure was not intended to circumvent the provisions of the Labor Code on termination of
employment. The closure of operation by Complex on April 7, 1992 was not without valid reasons.
Customers of respondent alarmed by the pending labor dispute and the imminent strike to be foisted by the
union, as shown by their strike vote, directed respondent Complex to pull-out its equipment, machinery and
materials to other safe bonded warehouse. Respondent being mere consignees of the equipment, machinery
and materials were without any recourse but to oblige the customers’ directive. The pull-out was effected on
April 6, 1992. We can see here that Complex’s action, standing alone, will not result in illegal closure that
would cause the illegal dismissal of the complainant workers. Hence, the Labor Arbiter’s conclusion that
since there were only 2 of respondent’s customers who have expressed pull-out of business from respondent
Complex while most of the customer’s have not and, therefore, it is not justified to close operation cannot be
upheld. The determination to cease operation is a prerogative of management that is usually not interfered
with by the State as no employer can be required to continue operating at a loss simply to maintain the
workers in employment. That would be taking of property without due process of law which the employer
has the right to resist.
SSS vs. SSS Supervisor’s Union G.R. No. L-31832


The instant case is an offshoot of a CIR case for compulsory arbitration of labor dispute between
the SSS and the PAFLU concerning the interpretation of certain provisions of their Collective Bargaining

The Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) had staged a strike in defiance of the CIR
Order of August 29, 1968 "enjoining the parties, for the sake of industrial peace . . . to maintain the status
quo-the Union not to declare any strike and the Management not to dismiss nor suspend any of its employees
nor to declare any lockout." On 3 September 1968, in that same case, the SSS filed an Urgent Petition to
declare the strike illegal.

Respondent Union (the SSS Supervisors' Union) filed a Motion for Intervention in the said case
averring, inter alia, that it had not participated in the strike: that its members wanted to report for work but
were prevented by the picketers from entering the work premises; that under the circumstances, they were
entitled to their salaries corresponding to the duration of the strike, which could be deducted from the accrued
leave credits of their members.

The SSS opposed the demand for the payment of salaries pertaining to the entire period of the
strike. The court ruled against SSS and ordered the payment of salaries of the members of respondent Union
during the strike period, but not to be chargeable to accrued leave credits.

Hence, this petition.


Whether or not petitioner Social Security System (SSS) may be held liable for the payment of wages of
members of respondent Union who admittedly did not work during the 17-day strike declared in 1968 by the
rank and file Union.


NO. The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or management and
employee is that of a 'fair day's wage for a fair day's labor.' If there is no work performed by the employee
there can be no wage or pay, unless of course the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
locked out, dismissed or suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate
against his employer on the employer's time.

In this case, the failure to work on the part of the members of respondent Union was due to
circumstances not attributable to themselves. But neither should the burden of the economic loss suffered
by them be shifted to their employer, the SSS, which was equally faultless, considering that the situation was
not a direct consequence of the employer's lockout or unfair labor practice. Under the circumstances, it is but
fair that each party must bear his own loss.

Considering, therefore, that the parties had no hand or participation in the situation they were in, and
that the stoppage of the work was not the direct consequence of the company's lockout or unfair labor
practice, 'the economic loss should not be shifted to the employer.' Justice and equity demand that each
must have to bear its own loss, thus placing the parties in equal footing where none should profit from the
other there being no fault of either.

DISPOSITIVE: Respondent Union WON.

DOCTRINE: The failure to work on the part of the members of respondent Union was due to circumstances
not attributable to themselves. But neither should the burden of the economic loss suffered by them be shifted
to their employer, the SSS, which was equally faultless, considering that the situation was not a direct
consequence of the employer's lockout or unfair labor practice. Under the circumstances, it is but fair that
each party must bear his own loss.

Philippines Inter-Fashion, Inc. vs National Labor Relations Commission


In January 1980, the Philippines Inter-Fashion, Inc. decided to retrench 40 employees due to alleged
lack of available work for employees. As a result, the labor union therein, the Philippine Inter-Fashion
Workers Union (affiliated with the National Federation of Labor Unions {NAFLU}), staged a strike.

Philippines Inter-Fashion then filed a case of illegal strike against said employees.

In February 1980, the employees obtained a return to work order from the Minister of Labor. But
instead of being accepted back to work, Philippines Inter-Fashion locked them out. As a result, the union
filed a case of illegal lockout against Philippines Inter-Fashion.

In October 1980, 150 employees offered to voluntarily leave the strike and return back to work. They
were admitted back by Philippines Inter-Fashion. This leaves 114 employees still on strike.

Consequently, Philippines Inter-Fashion dropped its case of illegal strike against the 150 employees
it re-admitted. However, it continued its case against the remaining 114 strikers.

Eventually, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that Philippines Inter-Fashion
should re-admit the 114 remaining strikers and pay them three-months worth of backwages. The NLRC ruled
that since Philippines Inter-Fashion re-admitted the 150 striking employees, it had, in effect, condoned the
illegal strike committed by the remaining strikers.


Whether or not the re-admission of some strikers in an illegal strike operates as a condonation of the illegal
strike as a whole.


No. There is only condonation insofar as the admitted employees are concerned or in this case, the
150 employees which were re-admitted by Philippines Inter-Fashion after said employees voluntarily offered
to leave the strike.

In this case, it was not disputed that the strike by the union was illegal (not clear in the facts as to
why it was illegal – it could be because there was no permit or that they continued to strike despite the return
to work order). The 150 employees offered to return to work and at the same time withdrew their case of
illegal lockout against their employer. On the other hand, Philippines Inter-Fashion unconditionally accepted
the offer of the employees, hence this operates as a condonation on its part of the illegal strike done by the
said 150 employees.

Such unconditional acceptance by Philippines Inter-Fashion does not include a condonation of the
illegal strike which the remaining 114 employees continued to take part in at that time.
However, since Philippines Inter-Fashion and the union are in pari delicto (both at fault), the status
quo prior to the illegal strike and illegal lockout must be sustained. Here, there was also a finding that
Philippines Inter-Fashion engaged in illegal lockout. Hence, the other 114 employees must be reinstated but
they are not entitled to backwages under the general rule that strikers are not entitled to their salary (save in
some instances not present in this case) and under the principle of “no work, no pay”.