People v Lacson (Provisional Dismissal) steps by which one who has committed a crime is to either fro insufficiency of funds
ro insufficiency of funds or closure of account.
FACTS:
Respondent and his co-accused were charged with
multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
persons who were claimed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The said cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the respondent as he
himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he
filed his motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and for examination of witnesses.
Respondent asserts that the new rule under Section
8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is
no substantive right of the State that may be impaired
by its application to the criminal cases in question.
According to the respondent, penal laws, either
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively
applied so long as they favor the accused. He asserts
that the two-year period commenced to run on March
29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more
than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly
indict him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural laws may be applied
retroactively.
RULING:
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural
laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the
be punished.
In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect
the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been
held that a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure.
*****Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1)
year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
Panaguiton vs DOJ (BP 22)
1992 - Cawili with is business partner borrowed
money from petitioner and issued 3 checks in
payment of said loans. Checks were dishonoured,
Fomal demands for payment made but to no avail.
BP 22 filed before QC Prosec. Only partner filed a
counter affidavit claiming he did not sign the checks
only Cawili did. City Prosec found probable cause
against cawili but dismissed against Tongson.
Petitioner filed appeal before DOJ and chief prosec
ordered city prosec to refer the matter to the NBI to
review the signatures.
Tongson filed an MR but denied.
1999 – Asst. City Prosec dismissed the complaint
against Tongson because it has prescribed na daw.
4years from dishonour. Because the filing of the
complaint did not stop the prescriptive period because
what comtemplated is judicial not administrative
proceedings.
Petitioner appealed again to the DOJ but Sec.
Teehankee also dismissed it. MR – granted during the
time of Sec. Gutierrez.
MR by Tongson – ruled in favour naman niya.
Nebeyen. Precribed na daw.
Certiorari CA hanggand dumating sa SC.
RULING:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with
the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation,
the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act
No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was
approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the
function of conducting the preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the
peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown
in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v.
Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is
tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the
peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the
filing of the complaint signifies theinstitution of the
criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These
cases were followed by our declaration in People v.
Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the
investigation or examination of offenses partakes the
nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People
v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in
the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes
of preliminary examination or investigation, should,
and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on
the merits. In addition, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent
the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender,48and hence, the prescriptive period should
be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company
Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and
the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which
are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of
the Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted
by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
People vs. Dumlao
G.R. No. 168918
March 2, 2009
Doctrine
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of
the material averments of an information is whether
the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essentials elements of
the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde, or
matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be
considered.
Facts
An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan
charging respondents Dumlao, La’o and others with
violation of the Section 3(g) of R.A. no. 3019 or Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information
alleged that the respondent-members of the Board of
Trustees of GSIS entered into a contract of lease-
purchase with respondent La’o, a private person
whereby GSIS agreed to sell to La’o, a GSIS-acquired
property consisting of a land and building known as
the Government Counsel Centre for P2 Million on an
instalment basis with annual interest and amortization
and grant La’o the right to sub-lease the ground floor
during the period of lease, from which he collected
yearly rentals in excess of the yearly amortization
causing gross disadvantage to the government.
During arraignment, Dumlao pleaded not guilty, and
as agreed by prosecution and respondents, a Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was
submitted to the court. The Joint Stipulation admitted
additional facts: (1) 3 members of the Board, Dumlao
being one of them, signed the Minutes; (2) 7
members of the Board were present during the board
meeting; and (3) the documentary evidence of was
authentic and duly executed. It was further decided
for the pre-trial to be terminated limiting the course of
the subsequent trial to “matters not disposed of...
unless modified by the court.”
Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. He stated that the prosecution’s main thrust
against him was the alleged approval by the GSIS
Board of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. He argued
that the Resolution was not in fact approved by the
GSIS Board. Since the signatures of fellow
respondents did not appear in the minutes of the
meeting, these people did not participate in the
Lease-Purchase Agreement. There was no quorum of
the board; thus no resolution approving the
Agreement. Since the resolution was not approved,
he was innocent. He added that the person liable was
Atty. Javellana who actually executed the contract.
Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Dumlao. It found that
the minutes shows that the Board failed to approve
the Lease-Purchase Agreement in question. As
evidenced by the Joint Stipulation, of the 7 members,
only 3 signed. It did not validly pass a resolution
because at least a majority of 4 votes were required.
Therefore prosecution had no cause of action against
Dumlao.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45, Rules
of Court.
Issue
1. WON court erred in dismissing case after
pre-trial and before prosecution could
formally present its evidence
a. WON facts charged in the information
actually constitute an offense
b. WON insufficiency of evidence is a
ground for Motion to Dismiss
Held
1. Yes. The petition is granted. Resolution of
Sandiganbayan is reversed and set aside.
Sandiganbayan is ordered for reception of
evidence of prosecution.
a. Yes. Facts in the information
contained elements of the crime
charged.
b. No. Grounds for Motion to
Dismiss/Quash are limited to those
enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the
RRCP

Ratio
The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the
accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government;
and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The ground raised by Dumlao in his Motion to
Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. And after examining the
information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of
Section 3(g) as against respondent Dumlao.
Therefore, the motion to quash should not have been
granted.
It can also be gathered from the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan that it did not consider the ground
invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied
respondent Dumlao’s motion. From the reasoning
given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it
dismissed the case because of insufficiency of
evidence.
According to Sec. 3, Rule 117 of RRCP, insufficiency
of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to
Quash. It is only a ground for dismissal of an action
only after the prosecution rests its case as provided
in Sec. 23, Rule 119 of RRCP on demurrer to
evidence.
In the case at bar, Sandiganbayan dismissed the
case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence,
even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to
present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the
prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case
and to prove the accused’s culpability.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it
not consider the ground invoked by respondent
Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not
raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The
dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
Soriano v. People
FACTS:
The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the BSP
transmitted a letter to the DOJ, which was attached
with five affidavits, which would allegedly serve as
bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to
PD No. 1689, and for Violation of Section 83 of RA
337, as amended by PD 1795, against, inter
alia, petitioner Hilario P. Soriano. These five affidavits,
along with other documents, stated that spouses
Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an
outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural Bank of
San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for
nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who was
then president of RBSM who had ordered, facilitated,
and received the proceeds of the loan; and that
the P8 million loan had never been authorized by
RBSM’s Board of Directors and no report thereof had
ever been submitted to the Department of Rural
Banks, Supervision and Examination Sector of the
BSP.
Two separate informations against petitioner.
Petitioner moved to quash these information.
Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the
characterization of possession is different in the two
offenses. If petitioner acquired the loan as DOSRI, he
owned the loaned money and therefore, cannot
misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the
offense of estafa. Conversely, if petitioner committed
estafa, then he merely held the money in trust for
someone else and therefore, did not acquire a loan in
violation of DOSRI rules.
The trial court denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash for
lack of merit. The MR was denied as well.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA which was also denied.
Hence, this petition.
1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, for the letter transmitted
by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the
complaint and was defective for failure to
comply with the mandatory requirements of
Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
such as statment of address of the
petitioner and oath of subscription and the
signatories were not authorized persons to
file the complaint; and
2. that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, for the commission of estafa uner
par. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the RPC is inherently
incompatible with the violation of DORSI
law (Sec. 83 or RA 337 as amended by PD
1795), and therefore a person cannot be
charged of both offenses.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the
mandatory requirements of law.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
is the proper remedy in an order denying a Motion to
Quash.
Ruling:
We have examined the two informations against
petitioner and we find that they contain allegations
which, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime of DOSRI violation
and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be
the complaint but merely transmitted for preliminary
investigation. The affidavits and not the letter
transmitting them initiated the preliminary
investigation and therefore is the complaint which
substantially complied with the manadory
requirements of law.
No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the
accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice
on his part to present special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
CEREZO V PEOPLE (DOUBLE JEO)
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel
against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda,
Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as
Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo). Finding probable cause to
indict respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information
against them before the RTC. Respondents thereafter
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to
Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-
QC. In its resolution, the OP-QC reversed its earlier
finding and recommended the withdrawal of the
Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on
December 3, 2003. During the intervening period,
specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were
arraigned. All of them entered a not guilty plea. In
deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC
ordered the criminal case dismissed in its Order.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
said Order, arguing that the OP-QC resolution has not
yet attained finality, considering that the same was
the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred
action on the said motion to await the resolution of the
DOJ. The Secretary of Justice promulgated his
resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QCs
resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier
Information for libel. The RTC issued its first assailed
Order granting petitioners motion for reconsideration,
conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary
and setting aside its last Order granting the dismissal
of the case against the respondents and order the
reinstatement of the case.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied in the RTC.
The respondents elevated their predicament to the
CA arguing that the RTC Orders violated their
constitutional right against double jeopardy. The CA
found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion
in ordering the reinstatement of the case. The CA
annulled the impugned RTC Orders, ruling that all the
elements of double jeopardy exist. There was a valid
Information sufficient in form and substance filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction to which
respondents had pleaded, and that the termination of
the case was not expressly consented to by
respondents; hence, the same could not be revived or
refiled without transgressing respondents right against
double jeopardy. The CA further found that the DOJ
Secretary improperly took cognizance of the Petition
for Review because DOJ Department Order No. 223
mandates that no appeal shall be entertained if the
accused has already been arraigned or, if the
arraignment took place during the pendency of the
appeal, the same shall be dismissed.
Petitioner interposed the instant appeal when his
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was
denied.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid termination of the case so
as to usher in the impregnable wall of double
jeopardy.
Ruling:
The Court held that in resolving a motion to dismiss a
case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court
should not rely solely and merely on the findings of
the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is
the courts bounden duty to assess independently the
merits of the motion, and this assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor
or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive,
it is not binding on courts.
The Court noticed that it is obvious from the Order of
the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC
judge failed to make his own determination of whether
or not there was a prima facie case to hold
respondents for trial. He failed to make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits
of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the
manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor
when he should have been more circumspect and
judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information especially so when the
prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and
irresolute on whether to indict respondents. The same
holds true with respect to the Order, which reinstated
the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate
evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the
DOJ Secretary.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public
prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary,
the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said
Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of
discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due
process. They were void, had no legal standing, and
produced no effect whatsoever.
The Court remanded the case to the RTC, so that the
latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if
a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve
the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw
Information anew.
The Court also held that double jeopardy did not set
in. Double jeopardy exists when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
Since the Court have held Order granting the motion
to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor
was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of
the case. The fifth requisite which requires the
conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the
dismissal of the case without the approval of the
accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not
set in. The petition was granted and the Supreme
Court remanded the case to QC-RTC for evaluation
on whether probable cause exists to hold respondents
for trial.
CO V NEW PROSPERITY
Facts:
● Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products,
represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaint for
violation of B. P. 22 against petitioner William Co.
● In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the
cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003
in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of criminal Procedure. Uy received a
copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while
her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On
July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted.
● Co filed a petition challenging the revival of the
criminal cases. He argues that the June 9, 2003 order
provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be
considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his
right to speedy trial was denied. Assuming that the
criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co
further posits that such dismissal became permanent
one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 order,
not after notice to the offended party. He also insists
that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial
court's issuance of the order granting the revival must
bewithin the one-year period. Even assuming that the
one-year period torevive the criminal cases started on
July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003
order, Co asserts that the motion was f f iled one day
late since year 2004 was a leap year.
Issue: WON the provisional dismissal of the criminal
case has become permanent. (No)
Ruling:
● Essential requisites of the first paragraph of Sec
18, Rule 117 of the ROC, which are conditions sine
qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph thereof are :
1) The prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case
2) The offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
3) The court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally ;
4) The public prosecutor is served with a copy ofthe
order of provisional dismissal of the case.
● In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was
served on the private complainant at least 3 days
before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule
15 of the Rules.
● Furthermore, the second paragraph of Rule 117,
Sec 8 should be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived.
● When a party is represented by a counsel, notices
of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent
to the latter at his/her given address pursuant to Sec
2, Rule 13 of ROC. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is
served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
● Also, the contention that both the filing of the
motion to revive the case and the court order reviving
it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year
period is not found in the Rules.
● Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s
motion to revive the criminal cases. Even if the Court
will consider that 2004 is a leap year and that the one-
year period to revive the case should be reckoned
from the date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal by Uy. Disposition: Petition is denied and
resolutions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
People vs De Leon, 754 SCRA 147
FACTS
The accused-appellants were charged with Robbery
with Homicide under an Information which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 2002, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence and/or intimidation against [sic] person, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob
one EMILIO A. PRASMO, in the following manner, to
wit: on the date and place aforementioned, while
victim/deceased Emilio A. Prasmo was walking along
A. Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches,
this City, together with his wife and daughter in-law,
accused pursuant to their conspiracy armed with
sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal. revolver rob
EMILIO A. PRASMO and took and carried away
P7,000.00, Philippine currency, and by reason or on
the occasion thereof, with evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and treachery, accused
with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon EMILIOA. PRASMO by then
and there shooting and hacking the victim with the
use of said weapons, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and grave wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said Emilio A. Prasmo.
When arraigned, all the accused-appellants entered a
plea of not guilty except accused Antonio. Thus, the
RTC ordered a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is
concerned.
The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime
of robbery with homicide as charged in the
Information, but found all the accused guilty of the
crime of murder. According to the RTC, contrary to
the charge of robbery with homicide, the accused is
guilty of the crime of murder because the prosecution
failed to establish the crime of robbery. The RTC,
citing People v. Nimo,23 ratiocinated that in order to
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing
itself.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modifications the ruling of the RTC and found all of
the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However,
contrary to the findings of the RTC with regard to the
crime of robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of
the separate crime of robbery.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the accused appellant can
be convicted for crime of murder which is
different from the crime filed in the
information which is robbery with Homicide.
–Yes
2. Whether or not theaccused appellant Danilo
De Leon was placed in double jeopardy
when the appellate court also found him
guilty of robbery based on the same
information filed where he was already
found guilty of murder. –Yes
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. With regard to the crime charged, accused-
appellants are guilty of the crime of Murder
instead of Robbery with Homicide. As borne
by the records, the only intent of the
accused-appellants was to kill Emilio. The
"accused-appellants had an axe to grind
against Emilio x xx. The means used by the
accused-appellants as well as the nature
and number of wounds - debilitating, fatal
and multiple – inflicted by appellants on the
deceased manifestly revealed their design
to kill him. The robbery committed by
appellant Danilo [was on] the spur of the
moment or [was] a mere afterthought."
As we already held, the nature and location
of wounds are considered important
indicators which disprove a plea of self-
defense. A perusal of the evidence would
depict the presence of a deliberate
onslaught against Emilio. The means used
by accused-appellants as shown by the
nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by Emilio are so much more than
sufficient to repel or prevent any alleged
attack of Emilio against accused-appellant
Antonio. Evidently, the accused-appellants’
intent to kill was clearly established by the
nature and number of wounds sustained by
Emilio. The wounds sustained by Emilio
indubitably reveal that the assault was no
longer an act of self-defense but a
homicidal aggression on the part of
accused-appellants.
2. We find that the appellate court erred for
violating the constitutional right of Danilo
against double jeopardy as enshrined in
Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.1âwphi1 If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.24
Double jeopardy attaches if the following
elements are present: (1) a valid complaint
or information; (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded
to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.25
In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence
of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a
valid Information for robbery with homicide
was filed; (2) the Information was filed in
the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge;
and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the
crime of robbery for lack of sufficient
evidence, which amounted to an acquittal
from which no appeal can be had. Indeed
the conviction for murder was premised on
the fact that robbery was not proven. The
RTC Decision which found accused guilty
of the crime of murder and not of robbery
with homicide on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to
the crime of robbery alone.
As the first jeopardy already attached, the
appellate court is precluded from ruling on
the innocence or guilt of Danilo of the crime
of robbery. To once again rule on the
innocence or guilt of the accused of the
same crime transgresses the Constitutional
prohibition not to put any person "twice x xx
in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense."26 As it stands, the acquittal on the
crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient
evidence is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy.27 A judgment of acquittal is final
and unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot,
even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence, review the
verdict of acquittal of the trial court28 due to
the constitutional proscription, the purpose
of which is to afford the defendant, who has
been acquitted, final repose and safeguard
from government oppression through the
abuse of criminal processes.29 The crime
of robbery was not proven during the trial.
As we discussed, the acquittal of the
accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not
reversible.
PRE TRIAL
Estipona vs Lobrigo
FACTS:
Estipona was charged with an offense under RA
9165. He wants to enter into a plea bargaining
agreement but Judge Lobrigo did not allow him to do
so because Section 23 specifically prohibits plea
bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona argues that
Section 23 is unconstitutional.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or
procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as
a means of implementing an existing right then the
rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that
a procedural rule violates substantive rights. By the
same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining
was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining
is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the
administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined
as “a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval.”
There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that
both the prosecution and the defense
make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system –
speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the
court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of
advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested
right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement
an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for a disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea
bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty
to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the
offense charged. The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based
on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the
pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution
already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial
stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should
not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and
the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the
former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and
nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling
on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness
of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s
acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is
improper and irregular.
TRIAL
Salvanera vs People, 523 SCRA 147
FACTS
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996,
petitioner RimbertoSalvanera, together with Feliciano
Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is
charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, committed
as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality
of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, with treachery and
evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE Y
MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his body,
resulting to his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the
alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman;
Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried
Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime;
while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the
latter. All the accused have been arrested and
detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-
large.
Respondent LucitaParane is the spouse of victim
Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The
prosecution, on March 4, 1997, moved for the
discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo
Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the motion to discharge accused Abutin and
Tampelix to be state witnesses. -Yes
 2. Whether or not the cancellation of bail bond
of the petitioner is proper. -Yes
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Granted petitioner’s application for bail and
denied the prosecution’s motion for the discharge of
accused Abutin and Tampelix.
CA: Discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and
Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become
state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of
petitioner Salvanera.
SC: The decision of the CAis AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may
be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly
charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the
prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a
state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for
the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct
evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony
of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused
can be substantially corroborated
in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear
to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any
time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
The corroborative evidence required by the Rules
does not have to consist of the very same evidence
as will be testified on by the proposed state
witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more
readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by
any other method. If it is shown that the statements of
the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence,
then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the
confirmatory testimony only applies to some
particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has
told the truth in other respects."It is enough that the
testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some
other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are
satisfied from a reading of the records that the
testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated
on important points by each other’s testimonies and
the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies
of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such
extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can
testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where
a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of
the conspirators is essential because only they have
knowledge of the crime.8 The other prosecution
witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in
fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators
knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of
the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission
of the crime.
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution
forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It
is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution
of a person for government to achieve a higher
objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of
the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of
having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the
particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of
the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably
elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the
delicate power should be exercised, who should be
extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are
questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of
the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the
right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is
limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be
an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the
success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute.
Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the
selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for
neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should
correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness
demands that courts keep the scales of justice at
equipoise between and among all litigants. Due
process demands that courts should strive to maintain
the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually
level.
2. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court in
cancelling the bail bond of petitioner. The grant of
petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to
await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their
proper weight in determining whether the petitioner is
entitled to bail.
Vda.deManguerra vs Risos, 563 SCRA 471
FACTS
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged
with EstafaThrough Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a
criminal information dated October 27, 1999, which
was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999.
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-
52248,5 arose from the falsification of a deed of real
estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents
where they made it appear that Concepcion, the
owner of the mortgaged property known as the
Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the
document. Hence, the criminal case.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who
was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in
Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati
Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further
treatment.
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion
for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case
No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question.
They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which
was an action for declaration of nullity of the
mortgage, should first be resolved.8 On May 11,
2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion.
Concepcion’s motion for reconsideration was denied
on June 5, 2000.9
This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil
action for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders.
The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266
and remains pending before the appellate court to
date.10
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed
a motion to take the latter’s deposition. He explained
the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to
her weak physical condition and old age, which
limited her freedom of mobility.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a
defect in the respondents’ petition by not impleading
the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party.
This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the
matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate
court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the
specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken
before the judge or the court where the case is
pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before
the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave play, and it provides:
abuse of discretion.
Section 15.Examination of witness for the
prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a
ISSUE/S of the CASE
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to
Whether or not the examination of prosecution
appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to
witnesses in the present case is governed by Section
leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. –
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in
Yes, Rule 119 applies
the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been
ACTIONS of the COURT
served on him, shall be conducted in the same
RTC: No. RTC granted the motion and directed that
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
Concepcion’s deposition be taken before the Clerk of
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
Court of Makati City.
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
CA: Yes. Set aside decision of RTC and any
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
deposition that may have been taken on the authority
accused.
of such void orders is similarly declared void.
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age
and health condition exempt her from the application
of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule
23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their
testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
The contention does not persuade.
the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases
in order that the accused may be afforded the
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once
to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
the ground which places her squarely within the
face to face.26 It also gives the parties and their
coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically
counsel the chance to propound such questions as
they deem material and necessary to support their
states that a witness may be conditionally examined:
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.27
1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines
Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the
with no definite date of returning. Thus, when
witnesses’ demeanor.28
Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had
she not been too sick at that time, her motion would
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions,
have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining
Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
her outside the trial court, she would have been
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to
compelled to appear before the court for examination
by a party to an action. These rules are adopted
during the trial proper.
either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as
modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a
12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December
deposition should be made before the court, or at
1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the
least before the judge, where the case is pending.
defense and prosecution witnesses.
Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a
relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the
prosecution witness, who, according to the
deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before
be able to attend, as when he is under detention.
More importantly, this requirement ensures that the
judge would be able to observe the witness’
deportment to enable him to properly assess his
credibility. This is especially true when the witness’
testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case.
While we recognize the prosecution’s right to
preserve its witness’ testimony to prove its case, we
cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for
the protection of the accused’s constitutional rights.
The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule.
The conditional examination of a witness outside of
the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a
strict construction of the rules.
JIMENEZ V PEOPLE
FACTS:
Witness si Montero. He confessed his participation to
the killing and dumping of rub rose barrameda’s body
to naming Jimenez and othe co – conspirators to the
killing. His statements led to the recovery of the steel
casing where her body was dumped. So nag file siya
ng motion to discharge as part of the accused which
was granted by Judge Zaldy stating that the
prosecution complied with the requisites in granting
the motion. Jimenez opposed this motion.
RTC denied the motion. MR was filed and was
granted by the new judge of the sala.
Petitioner for certiorari by Jimenez to the CA.
Granted. MR by People – reversed in favor of the
people.
WON MONTERO CAN BE A STATE WITNESS:
Ruling:
We agree with the CA that the prosecution has
complied with the requisites under Section 17,Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that:
In the discharge of an accused inorder that he may be
a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the
commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge isfiled by the prosecution
before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state
witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no
other directevidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not atany time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO
Facts: On November 28, 1991, an Information for
murder was filed with the RTC against Joven de
Grano(Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and
Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-
accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo
Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil
(Leonardo),who were at- large. Duly arraigned, Joven,
Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty” to the
crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides,
Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large.
Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong. RTC found the
accused guilty of the offenses charged. In 2004 an
order was issued that modified the previous decision,
from murder the case was downgraded to homicide.
However, Joven, Armando, and Domingo was not
present during promulgation. They maintained that
while they were not present during the promulgation
of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under
police custody, attended the promulgation. Thus
according to them, when they filed their Joint Motion
for Reconsideration, which included that of
Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its authority
to resolve the joint motion.
Issue:Whether or not RTC erred in taking cognizance
of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the
absence of the other accused during the promulgation
of judgment?
Held: Yes. Section 14(2),[59] Article III of
the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows
the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain
stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignmentand plea, whether of innocence or of guilt;
(b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification
purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case, the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his
presence is required and cannot be waived. When the
Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only
Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently
thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the
reasons for their absence, Joven,Armando, and
Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the
RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the
respondents who were at large, it also took
cognizance of the joint motion. The RTC clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint
Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the
respondents who were at large. It should have
considered the joint motion as a motion for
reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao.
Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained
their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court; and
unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of
the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.
ASISTIO V PEOPLE
FACTS:
Asistio was charged with violation of the Cooperative
Code. He had an exclusive dealership with Coke for
the school and audit reports found out that he had
defrauded the cooperative and its members for 3
years. Despite requests that she return the amounts
she failed to do so. Hence criminal cases were filed.
Asistio moved to dismiss by DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE with prior leave of court. She also moved
that RTC did not have jurisdiction for the violation of
the cooperative code does not carry with it sanction
for which she can be held criminally liable.
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON dismissal based on demurrer to evidence was
an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable.
RULING:
On whether the dismissal of the charge against
petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court
rules in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed
that demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one
of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient
in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to
sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is
merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained
the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to
evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final
and unappealable, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as
the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had
rested its case" and when the same is granted, it calls
"for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction
beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of
the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by
the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused
in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal,
the case ends there.23cralawlawlibrary
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer
to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not
decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the
issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the
case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal
does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be
subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.
CABADOR V PEOPLE
FACTS:
On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused
petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon
City of murder. On February 13, 2006, after
presenting only five witnesses over five years of
intermittent trial, the RTC required the prosecution to
make a written or formal offer of its documentary
evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public
prosecutor asked for three extensions of time. Still,
the prosecution did not make the required written
offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion
to dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention
in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial.
Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial
court could not consider any evidence against him
that had not been formally offered. He also pointed
out that the prosecution witnesses did not have
knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
On August 31, 2006, the RTC issued an Order
treating petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion
without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have
waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
The trial court deemed the case submitted for
decision. Cabador questioned the RTCs actions
before the CA. The latter denied his petition and
affirmed the lower courts actions. Petitioner seek the
help of Supreme Court via a petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss
before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to
evidence.
RULING
Supreme Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his
right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. In
criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on
the ground of denial of the accused’s right to speedy
trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable,
vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the
accused, or by unjustified postponements that
unreasonably prolonged the trial.
It can be said that petitioner Cabador took pains to
point out how trial in the case had painfully dragged
on for years. The gaps between proceedings were
long, with hearings often postponed because of the
prosecutors absence. This was further compounded,
Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions
for extension of time to file its formal offer and its
failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked
his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the CA
simply chose to ignore these extensive averments
and altogether treated Cabadors motion as a
demurrer to evidence.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do
what is so fundamental in any demurrer and the
prosecution was not yet deemed to have rested its
case on that date. He did not state what evidence the
prosecution had presented against him to show in
what respects such evidence failed to meet the
elements of the crime charged. His so-called
demurrer did not touch on any particular testimony of
even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit.
Thus, the petitioner’s motion to dismiss cannot be verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends
treated as a demurrer to evidence. there.

PEOPLE V TAN
Facts:
Two separate information were filed against
respondent Tan for violation of the Revised Securities
Act, when he failed to file with SEC the amount of all
BWRC (Best World Resources Corporation) shares of
which he is the beneficial owner within 10 days after
he became such beneficial owner.
During the trial, petitioner made its formal offer of
evidence. RTC admitted the pieces of evidence, but
denied admission of all other exhibits. Tan filed
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence.
Petitioner filed its Opposition to which Tan filed a
Reply. In the end, RTC issued an order granting Tan’s
Demurrer to Evidence.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, which is not present in this
case. RTC did not violate petitioner’s right to due
process as the petitioner was given more than ample
opportunity to present its case which led to grant of
Tan’s demurrer. RTC never prevented petitioner from
presenting its case. In fact, one of the main reasons
for the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the
absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares
that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks
were divided into, whether there are preferred shares
as well as common shares, or even which type of
shares respondent had acquired,

Petitioner filed a petition before the CA assailing the

order of RTC which granted Tan’s motion. CA denied,
ruling that the dismissal of a criminal action by the
grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits
and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the
prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place
the accused in double jeopardy.

Hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in granting Tan’s
Demurrer to Evidence.
Held:

No.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as
the one at bar, is “filed after the prosecution had
rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it
calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would
be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The