Ideological Language and Social Movement Mobilization

Ideological Language and Social Movement Mobilization: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of
Segregationists' Ideologies
Author(s): Gerald M. Platt and Rhys H. Williams
Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Nov., 2002), pp. 328-359
Published by: American Sociological Association
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Ideological Language and Social Movement Mobilization:
A Sociolinguistic Analysis of Segregationists' Ideologies*
GERALD M. PLATT
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
RHYS H. WILLIAMS
Universitv of Cincinnati
The current "culturalturn" in the studyof social movementshas produceda numberof

conceptsformulating the cultural-symbolicdimension of collective actions. This pro-
liferation, however,has resultedin some confusion about which cultural-symboliccon-
cept is best applied to understandingculturalprocesses involved in social movements.
Wearticulate a new definitionof ideology that makes it an empiricallyuseful concept to
the study of social-movement mobilization. It is also formulated as autonomous of
concepts such as culture and hegemony and of other cultural-symbolic concepts pres-
entlv used in the movement literature to explain participant mobilization. We demon-
strate the usefulness of our ideology concept by analyzing letters written to Martin
Luther King, Jr. from segregationists opposed to the integration of American society.
The analysis indicates that the letter writers particularized segregationist culture, cre-
ating ideologies that fit their structural, cultural, and immediate circumstances, and
that the ideologies they constructed thereby acted to mobilize their countermovement
participation. The particularizing resulted in four differentiated ideological versions of
segregationist culture. The empirically acquired variety of ideological versions is incon-
sistent with the role attributed to cultural-symbolic concepts in the social-movement
literature and requires theoretical clarification. We conclude with a discussion of the
theoretical implications for social-movement theory of the variety of segregationist
ideologies.
Considerthe following statementstakenfrom correspondencewrittenby four white Amer-

icans to MartinLutherKing, Jr. in the mid-1960s:'
The move of the Negro race towardequality with, or even supremacyover, the white
race is immoral. I quote the law against desegregation, as it stands in Galatians 5:
19-21 ... so the attempt ... is immoral and is punishable by death, unless those
involvedask God'sforgivenessfor this sin andcease pushingfor equalityor supremacy.
*We want to thankthe MartinLutherKing, Jr.Centerfor Nonviolent Social Change for permissionto quote the
correspondenceto Dr. King. Special appreciationfor their help is extended to the former director of the King
Libraryand Archive, Dr. BroadusN. Butler,and to Mrs. CorettaScott King. We also wish to thankGene Fisher,
Bill Gamson, Bennetta Jules-Rosette, Gary Marx, Neil Smelser, Marc Steinberg, and Fred Weinstein for their
comments on the earlier version of the essay. Addresscorrespondenceto: GeraldPlatt, Departmentof Sociology,
University of Massachusetts,Amherst, MA 01003; e-mail: platt@soc.umass.edu.
An earlier version of this essay entitled, "Ideological Discourse, Segregationist Ideology, and Social Move-
ments:A Sociolinguistic Analysis," was presentedat the annual meeting of the American Sociological Associa-
tion, August 9, 1999, Chicago, IL.
1For this article, we have edited the letters for spelling and typographicalerrors;however, we have preserved
the punctuation,capitalization,and phrasing as faithfully as is possible in order to convey the 'feeling" of the
message without distractingattentionto the form in which it was expressed.
Sociological Theory 20:3 November 2002

? American Sociological Association. 1307 New YorkAvenue NW, Washington, DC 20005-4701
IDEOLOGICALLANGUAGEAND SOCIAL MOVEMENTMOBILIZATION 329
After all, this is a whitemans'country,and if the Negro, who was broughtin here by
the English, is not satisfied with our way of life, why don't they go back to Africa, to
educate and civilize their own people.
It is said that ... the group NAACP[National Association for the Advancement of
ColoredPeople] gets paid well-by Communists,to violate laws, provokeviolence-
anything for publicity.... you and your un-Americanemployees-are mercenary
... violate all decency for money, largely supplied by enemies of USA.
If you really want to do something for the Negro race, teach them to live like human
beings, pull themselves out of the filthy low down lives they are living.... Then you
would have a race of people that would be acceptable.
These claims are familiarto anyone who has studied the Americancivil rights movement.
They are statementsmade in letters sent to Dr. King by opponents of integrationand are
examples of "segregationist ideology." But examine the assertions more closely. Each
rests upon a different ground as to why segregation should be preserved. The first is
religious, claiming that segregation is God's will. The second is based in a segregationist
interpretationof Americanhistory.The thirdnegates integrationby associating it with the
great symbolic demon of mid-20thcenturyAmerica,communism.The fourthholds out the
potentialfor equality at some unspecified futuredate but claims that, as yet, AfricanAmer-
icans are not ready for that condition.
This variety of ideological versions of segregation suggests the need to rethink our
views of social-movement culture and ideology. Almost every sociological approachto
social movements takes the cultural-symboliccomponent of collective action to be unify-
ing, producing solidarity.Whetherthe term is "frame,""identity,""cognitive liberation,"
or "ideology," sociologists have formulatedthe culturalcomponent as reducing and uni-
fying the meanings membersof a social movementhold aboutthe movement and the social
world.2 However, while each ideological statement above opposes integrationand sup-
ports a segregationist order,each also representsa distinct adversarialvision that makes
sense of a variety of cultural and structural crises confronting the correspondent-
interpretersand Jim Crow society (Platt and Williams 1988; Platt and Fraser 1998). In the
1950s and 1960s, Jim Crow society and the cultural worldview that legitimated it were
threatenedwith the collapse of their ability to justify and recapitulatethat order.The four
ideological versions are examples of the "practicalconsciousness" (Giddens 1984:xxiii) or
"operativeideology" (Williams and Blackburn 1996:170) that these segregationistadher-
ents producedto meet these crises.
The cultural-symbolicdimensions of social-movementtheorizingare much in debate in
the currentsociological literature.Concepts such as "frame,""identity,""cognitive liber-
ation," and "ideology" are profferedas most appropriatefor the requiredtheoreticaltasks
(Snow, Cress, Downey, andJones 1998; Goodwin andJasper1999; Polletta 1998; McAdam
1999; Oliver and Johnston2000; Snow and Benford 2000; Benford and Snow 2000; Wil-
liams and Benford 2000). We wish to avoid engaging in "concept wars,"while still enter-
ing this debate by offering a theoretically autonomousand empirically useful conception
of ideology as a cultural-symbolicconcept designed to explain social-movement mobili-
2We realize this contention may be controversial,and will returnto the issue in the conclusion. Suffice to say
here that examples from such varied authorsas Snow and colleagues (1986), McAdam (1982), Melucci (1995),
and Klandermans(1984, 1988) all view the power of culture as residing in its unifying the meaning-systems of
movement adherents. We are arguing for the importance of ideology, but for the opposite reason-precisely
because it offers diverse and particularizedmeanings.
330 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
zation. The power of ideology, we contend, is achieved through its diverse and often
contradictoryappeals, not through its unifying functions. We illustrate the usefulness of
this conception by examining letters from countermovementsupporterssent to Dr. King
and the SouthernChristianLeadershipConference (SCLC).
THE CONCEPTOF IDEOLOGY

Our formulationof ideology narrowsits traditionalmeanings while developing a compre-
hensive cultural concept for social-movement mobilization. Our formulationis also dis-
tinctfromthe broadernotionsof cultureandhegemony.It suggeststhatmovementadherents'
ideologies are experientiallydesigned versions of the past, present, and futuresocial order
and that these ideologies organize adherents'cognitive, moral, and emotional practices
(see Goodwin, Jasper,and Polletta 2001). This conceptualizationintegratesstructuraland
cultural factors, describing how they combine to establish and differentiate ideological
perspectives. Ideology is often inflated by theorizing that equates it with the whole sym-
bolic world. It is also often deflated by reducing it to a pejorative charge hurled against
those who speak for objective truth.3While ideology is not empirically independent of
culture, without its conceptual autonomy from other symbolic concepts its analytic use-
fulness is hindered.
We draw upon the theorizing of Antonio Gramsci (1971), Clifford Geertz (1973), and
Raymond Williams (1977, 1981) to establish our conception. We begin our inquiry with
a provisional formulationof ideology as an assemblage of ideas providing conceptions of
past, present, and future social conditions.4 We use the phrases "assemblage of ideas"
and "conceptionsof past, present, and future social conditions"because we wish to por-
tray ideology as lacking any necessary logical coherence. Further,we conceive of ideol-
ogy as constructions of the social world arising from a variety of influences, such as
cultural and structuralcircumstances and idealizations about the social world used to
interpretthem.
Ideology is expressed in a number of symbolic forms, but mostly it is delivered in
spoken and written language. Therefore, we offer a sociolinguistic analysis of how it is
formed,operates,anddifferentiatesin language'suse (Hymes 1974;Gumperz1982).Because
of ideological language's malleability, it provides movement participants, in Giddens'
sense, with both agency and organizationalstructuring(Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). For
this reason, we formulate ideology as a cultural resource for its adherents. It is in the
language of ideology that activistsjustify theirparticipation,constructtheirconceptions of
past, present, and future social worlds, and orient their moral, cognitive, and emotional
practices (Platt 1980; Williams 1995). In ideological language, adherentsmobilize and
orient their movement activities.
3Geertz (1973) attemptedto reformulatethe concept of ideology so as to protectit from becoming, as he put it,
"ideologized."His attemptis more elegant but less systematic than our effort. He provides less of a handle on
how the concept might be empirically used. Additionally, his essay focuses upon producersof ideology. Our
essay focuses on the interpretivelanguage that groups of individuals use to transforma culturalworldview into
a resonantmobilizing ideology.
4In this definition of ideology, and in two subsequentelaborationsof it, we privilege neither ideas nor condi-
tions, neitherculture nor structure;rather,both are involved in determiningthe substanceof an ideology (Fields
1990). Ourposition is thatideologies express some coherence, but they are not systematic, nor are they addressed
solely to ideational-cognitiveconceptions of the social world. Ideologies are symbolic, to be sure, but they also
provide orientationsto and conceptions of the moral, cognitive, and expressive ordersof the social world (Jasper
1998). The word "assemblage"implies ideas, symbols, and meanings about a variety of dimensions, from mate-
rial to cultural,from cognitive to expressive and moral, and from myth to science. Our conception of ideology is
influenced by its earlierformulationsin the symbolic Interactionisttraditionof Turnerand Killian (1987), and it
resonates with the recent formulationof ideology found in Oliver and Johnston(2000). See also footnotes 4 and
5 below.
Some Troublesfor an AutonomousConception of Ideology
Ideology has often been conceptualizedas false-consciousness thinking (Dant 1991:5-6).

It has been conflated with cultureand hegemony in the Marxiantradition(Althusser 1971;
Williams 1977). And traditionalsociology also suggests thatideology is value-boundthink-
ing (Shils 1968).5These approachesproducetwo troublingissues for an empiricallyuseful
and autonomousconcept of ideology: (1) the belief that ideology consists of ideas imbued
in the masses, creating in them a false consciousness that obscures the reality of their
circumstances(Williams 1977:55); and (2) the incapacityto conceptually distinguish ide-
ology from other symbolic processes that orient social practices (Williams 1981:26-30).
From its outset, the ontological status of "reality"has been central to the concept of
ideology. Marxand Engels (1939), the theoristswho broughtthe concept into social analy-
sis, conceived of ideology as masking reality, thereby creating an appearanceof reality
serving the interestsof the dominantclass. In this tradition,the standardfor obtainingtrue
knowledge of the social world resides in the analysis of the material conditions of exis-
tence, set against the ideological conception of them. However, the Marxisttraditionsoon
moved away from a conceptual dichotomy of appearance and reality to the creation of
reality by interweaving ideas with material circumstances. Starting with Engels in 1893
(1959) and his concession to ideas and continuing among left theorists for more than a
century, the significance of ideas in social formationhas provided a revision of this con-
ception of reality. In contemporary Marxism, ideas and the material operate simulta-
neously to create the realities in which persons exist. These realities reflect class-based in-
terests,butmayalso incorporatebourgeoisbeliefs (Hall 1986a, 1986b;Steinberg1994, 1999).
Writingin the Marxist tradition,Purvis and Hunt (1993) provide a theoretical solution
to the problem of ideological distortion versus objective reality. They resolve this dichot-
omy by removingtheirconceptionof ideology from the domainof ontologicaltruth.Instead,
they note that"Ideologyis concernedwith the realmof the lived, or the experienced,rather
than 'thinking.'... . [It] implies the existence of some line between 'interests'and 'forms of
consciousness'" (Purvis and Hunt 1993:479, 476). Ideology so formulatedis a conscious-
ness that expresses, among other things, the interests of a particularlysituated class and
thus constitutes a subjectively constructedtruth. Purvis and Hunt conceive of this ideo-
logical consciousness as a form of truth,but with a small "t".It is the truththat reflects a
class's interpreted,lived experiences and interests but does not provide for ontological
truthin the sense of depicting a reality separatefrom its social construction.They refer to
ontological truthas truthwith a capital "T", but consider it beyond reach.
Thinkingof ideology as interest-based,constructedversions of reality informs our con-
ception of ideology as a mobilizing resource. However, the interestsupon which ideology
is constructedare those designated by classes of persons as important.There are no fun-
damental"rational"intereststhattrumppeople's constructionsof theirown circumstances.
Further,we add to our conception of ideology a dimension of the emotion of hoped-for
realities. Thus, ideology incorporates idealized beliefs also derived from lived experi-
ences. These idealizations orient thinking as they mobilize courses of action aimed at
promoting or resisting change. We ask, how do ideologies that incorporateinterest-based
5Oliver and Johnston refer to their conception of ideology as a "nonpejorative"formulation,contrastingit to
pejorative conceptions of ideology that emphasize its reality distorting function. They note that there is a core
body of work that "provides a solid basis for investigating ideology in its nonpejorativesense as a system of
meaning undergirdinga social movement" (Oliver and Johnston 2000:42). We concur, and have relied upon
similar sources to develop our conception of ideology as meaning constructing.However, we conceive of ide-
ology as a less coherent assemblage of ideas than do Oliver and Johnston (see 2000:44-45), and we also focus
more on its constructedand differentiatedcharacter.We do agree that ideology is a more comprehensivecultural
conception than frames or framing.And, insofar as "culturalwars"are forms of struggle over culturalresources,
we also accept Oliver and Johnston's idea that ideology carries with it a political connotation (Williams 1997).
truths and idealized visions for change and resistance come about? And how do they
operate and differentiatein social processes?
The second issue that stands in the way of a useful formulation of ideology is the
confusion between ideology and other symbolic concepts. Ideology as a symbolic process
has been equated with culture and hegemony, because all three have been conceptualized
as dominating and orienting both consciousness and social practices. Ideology is distin-
guishable from culture and hegemony in its capacity to act as a mobilizing resource for
change and resistance.
Michael Billig and colleagues argue that ideology and culture are often conceptually
indistinguishable.To this point, they write:
[T]he concepts of cultureand lived ideology are similarbecause both seek to describe
the social patterningof everyday thinking. It might be said that ordinary people
living in a particularsociety partakeof the general culturalpatternsof that society,
and their thinking is shaped by these patterns.The word "culture"could easily be
substitutedby "ideology" in the previous sentence. (Billig et al. 1988:28)
RaymondWilliams(1977:108-14) also struggledto provideconceptualdistinctionamong

hegemony,culture,and ideology. To this point he writes, "Wehave then to note that,unless
we make these extensions and qualifications, 'ideology,' even and perhaps especially in
some powerful contemporarytendencies in Marxist analysis, is in effect repeating the
history of 'culture' as a concept" (Williams 1981:28). His solution was that, among the
three, hegemony is the most comprehensive;he referredto hegemony as the "whole social
process."Having createdthis distinction,however, an essential featureof the threeremains
similar in Williams's formulations:for him, hegemony, culture, and ideology are all sym-
bolic systems of social control that shape consciousness and orient social practices. To be
sure, the concept of hegemony implies a dominating metanarrative,but the traditional
ideology concept also implies domination, and culture is often formulatedas a society's
dominatingand controlling metanarrative.Insofar as the concepts' capacities for domina-
tion and social control remain at their hearts, it is impossible to conceive of them as
conceptually autonomousof one another.Although we agree with Williams that concep-
tualizing cultureand ideology requirestheir distinction and thatboth cultureand ideology
are createdby real practices, we do not agree with him regardingwhat these practices are
and what they accomplish.As with our criticism of Geertz (see footnote 2), we believe that
Williams does not provide an empiricallyuseful or precise conception of ideological prac-
tices, or of their consequences.
Put anotherway, the concepts "ideology,""culture,"and "hegemony"have consistently
been employed to explain dominationand the reproductionof existing social forms. How-
ever, within both the Marxist and the traditionalsociology traditionsthere are dissenting
voices. Gramsci (1971) and Geertz (1973) suggest that ideology is derived from immedi-
ate circumstances.Gramscinotes that counterhegemonicideologies arise from those who
exist in conditions of oppression and would challenge the powerful. Geertz remarksthat
ideologies derive from conditions that prohibit the interpretationof immediate circum-
stances accordingto establishedculture,resultingin ideological forms as alternatesto, and
in conflict with, established conventions. For Gramsci and Geertz, ideology arises from
immediate circumstances;it is structuredby these conditions, even as it interpretsthem.
Our theorizing draws upon both approaches.We conceive of ideologies as organic inter-
pretationsarising out of the experiences of the immediatecircumstancesfacing a segment
of society and acting for them as a mobilizing resource for change or resistance. If we are
to develop a concept of ideology that is distinguishablefrom culture and hegemony, we
IDEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION 333
suggest that it be hinged to interest-based assemblages of ideas proselytizing for hoped-for

or idealized social conditions that do not exist, or interest-based assemblages of ideas
advocating for the perpetuation of social forms experienced as failing. Ideology can be
formulated as independent of culture and hegemony if it is confined to ideas advocating
interest-based social processes oriented to bringing about or resisting change.
We may refine our definition of ideology, then, as a symbolic perspective regarding
desired social conditions; it is an assemblage of ideas about the construction of activities
and circumstances oriented to achieve interests and life experiences as visualized in an
idealized past, present, and future.
SPECIFYING IDEOLOGY FURTHER

We do not intend to relativize the concept of ideology. We propose a concept of ideology
formulated as experience-driven, interest-based idealized conceptions of society. This for-
mulation ties ideology's construction to its immediate circumstances. Therefore, ideology
is a circumstantially restricted conception of reality, and it is hardly relative (Seliger 1977;
Brandist 1996).
Ideology comes into play when cultural meanings and the structuring of the social
world run into trouble. Gary Marx and Doug McAdam suggest that ideologies arise when
cultural meanings and practices become "inadequate, indifferent, or in dispute" (Marx and
McAdam 1994:18). These troubling conditions create subjective experiences of disruption
and undermine people's capacities to employ conventional cultural symbols and routine
social practices to construct their social worlds. Experiences of cultural and structural
disruption have been termed "sense-making crises" (Platt 1980:82) and described as "dis-
rupting the 'quotidian"' (Snow et al. 1998:1; also see Useem 1998).6 They have been
theorized as cultural and structural conditions that mobilize movement participation.
For persons so affected, it becomes problematic to fit practices to the moral conceptions
that provide authority for one's own and others' activities. Individuals seek explanations in
ideologies not so much when events in the world cannot be interpreted as when events
seem-and are experienced as-"uninterpretable" (Williams 1996). Such situations encour-
age the search for ideological interpretations of these settings. Individuals in these settings
struggle to make moral, cognitive, and emotional sense of their experiences by describing
them, finding their causes, and offering solutions in ideological doctrine (Weinstein and
Platt 1973; Weinstein 1990:83-121). In these situations, persons actively construct the
meanings of their experiences and the direction of their courses of actions. They use their
ideological interpretations as cultural resources or as "normative tools" to make sense of
their circumstances and to guide their activities (Swidler 1986; Platt 1980; Williams 1995).
6Snow and colleagues (1998) suggest four conditions that create breakdownsand strainsthat foster movement
mobilization. They do not claim that this is an exhaustive list of the disruptive conditions that cause strain.
Instead,these conditions exemplify the circumstancesthatunderminethe "quotidian,"the latterformulatedin the
Schutzian and Durkheimian traditions as the routine practices and the normative characterof everyday life.
Within that context, Snow and colleagues single out loss as the primarystrainthat causes movement mobiliza-
tion. They formulate "loss" as the loss of economic or utility resources, ratherthan as generalized cultural and
social psychological experiences within which economic or utility resources are a subcategory.However, it is
theoretically appropriatein the Durkheimian and Schutzian traditions to assume that "loss" would not give
priority to a utilitarian formulation. Instead, loss should be conceived of in terms of the cultural and social
psychological experiences of it. Not only would such a formulationbe consistent with social-movement theoriz-
ing derived from Durkheimand Schutz, but-more significantly-it could also provide a conceptual framework
within which the authors might develop theoretical cohesion among the myriad potential forms of disruption-
breakdown-strain-lossconditions. A sizable culturaland social psychological literaturein the Durkheimianand
Schutziantraditionsfocuses upon a generalized conception of breakdown,strain,loss, and movement mobiliza-
tion (e.g., Geertz 1973; Weinstein and Platt 1973; Weinstein 1990; Emirbayer1996; Useem 1998). Althusser's
classical Durkheimian-Freudianinfluenced structuralstatementon "overdetermination"would also be helpful in
clarifying these issues (Althusser 1979:87-128).
The disruptionof everyday life and the incapacity to make sense of immediate condi-
tions occur in two forms: (1) the experience of the failure of extant culturaldoctrine and
practices to cope with and make meaningful sense of immediate situations; and (2) the
experience of the absence of appropriateculturaldoctrine and practices to provide for the
changing circumstances that are developing in society (Platt 1987). Geertz (1973) and
Snow andcolleagues (1998) emphasizethe failureof interpretivecapacities,butthe absence
of culturaldoctrine and social practices is also influential, as for example, when cultural
ideals do not exist or the culture is "indifferent"or "in dispute" about recognizing and
rewardingthe changing-and often rising-performance capacities among a category or
class of persons (Marx and McAdam 1994:18).
Both forms of interpretationwere exhibited in the counterreactionsto the integrationof
African Americans into the mainstreamof American institutionallife. Two of the segre-
gationist ideological constructionsdescribedbelow attemptto repairand reasserta segre-
gationist cultureand its practicesthat were experiencedas failing. Two others supplement
segregationistdoctrinewith principlesnot usually associated with it, advocatingideas and
practices not usually associated with the conventional southernsegregationistworldview.
While these principleswere absentfrom traditionalsegregationistculture,they were expe-
rienced as relevantto the historical circumstancesin which integrationoccurredand were
included in constructingtwo particularizedsegregationistideologies.
Neil McMillen (1971) documents the fact that the circumstancesnoted above fostered
the rise of the countermovementsegregationist organizationthe White Citizens' Council
(WCC). He emphasizes that
[w]hile the most fertile soil for the Council's germinationwas to be found in black-
belt counties, the most salubriousclimate for its growth was that created by racial
crisis. The story of Council expansion, then, was not one of steady progress. Repre-
sented graphically,its growth in Mississippi and elsewhere in the South resembleda
fever chart with peaks occurringin periods of racial unrest when the white popula-
tion's perceptionsof the imminenceof desegregationwas greatest,andslumpscoincid-
ing with periods of relative calm. The first such growth-producingcrisis came with
the Brown decision in May 1954. (McMillen 1971:28)
Rhoda Blumberg,in her influentialanalysis, agrees that the WCC formed in reactionto
the changing circumstancessignaled by the Brown decision. The "first Citizens' Council
... formed in Indianola,Mississippi, in July, 1954 ... determinedto resist and nullify the
school desegregation decision" (Blumberg 1991:203). These accounts suggest that the
southern countermovementwas constructedfrom several relevant circumstances:apart-
heid southerncultureformed during slavery and Jim Crow society; reactionsto the crises
created for it by the immediate events of Supreme Court decisions and the executive
branch'senforcementof them; and local circumstantialcrises createdas reactions to legal
and activists' efforts to integrateAfrican Americans fully into southernsociety.
Ideological discourses are interest- and experience-based idealizations offering alter-
nate courses of action; they provide solutions to circumstancesthat are perceived as hav-
ing created the uninterpretablemoral, cognitive, and emotional troubling experiences.
They constitute challenges and substitutes to conventional cultural interpretations;they
also constitute symbolic ways of bolsteringand supplementingfalteringconventionalcul-
turalinterpretations.Ideologies emerge among those who would change society and those
who would resist change, those who are advocates of the extant but failing conventional
interpretiveorder and its practices. The result is two types of ideological doctrine: emer-
gent ideologies orientedto change and counterideologiesopposed to the emergingschemes,

supportingan extant or past but failing culture.
Conflict involving the challenges among ideological interpretationscreates circum-
stances in which many differentpersonal and collective rationalesfor commitmentsarise.
These struggles among ideological camps are often couched as conflicts between truthand
falsity, scientific and biased perspectives, or God-given naturalorders and misguided hu-
man formulations.We contend that the struggles are none of these. Instead,they are inter-
pretive conflicts among versions of morally appropriatesocial worlds, their change or
perpetuation(Luker1984).These conflicts amonginterpretativeschemesaremoralandstruc-
turalstrugglesover culturalandsocial resources,not over truths-no matterhow manygenu-
flections to scientific or God-given trutharemadeon all sides of the conflict (Smelser 1963).
Ideology is local because it arises in relation to the cultural and structuralconditions
immediately facing groups. However, not all groups experience and interpretthe same
circumstancessimilarly.The resultis thatthereis never a single ideology expressed among
movement and countermovementgroups.Instead,varying ideological versions arise out of
the different ways in which local circumstancesare made relevantto groups' interests and
their experiences (Schegloff 1991; Platt and Fraser 1998).
Ideologies serve cognitive functions because they involve the creation of meaningful
conceptions and practices appropriateto the immediate conditions. Also embedded in
ideology's cognitive meanings are principles regardingemotional expression and control.
Ideology links cognitive expressions to emotive ones by interpretingand containingemo-
tions about local circumstances while providing hope for instituting an idealized past,
present, and future. Ideology provides for its adherentsdefinitions of "appropriate"emo-
tions regardingthe crisis circumstances,courses of action pursued,and futurestates (Platt
1980). Ideology also offers its adherentsmoral legitimacy for courses of action, insisting
they will achieve greatercommon or public good in the ideal state (Williams 1995).
Within the distinction provided by Jorge Larrain(1996:53-54), our conception of ide-
ology incorporatesboth "neutral"(particularized)and "critical"(evaluative) definitions of
ideology's functions. We adopt a "neutral"conception in that we recognize the mobilizing
capacities of the particularperspectives of all ideological symbolic formulations,thereby
rejecting any division between truthfuland ideologically distorted understandingsof the
social world. We offer a "critical" definition by calling attention to the interest-based
natureof ideology by examining its role in criticizing social arrangementsand justifying
social movements for change and resistance.
We conclude that ideology is a symbolic perspective regarding desired social condi-
tions; it is an assemblage of ideas about the constructionof activities and circumstances
oriented to achieve interests and life experiences as these are visualized in an idealized
past, present, and future. Ideology is a structurally grounded local construction. It is
expressed in language discourse that orients moral, cognitive, and emotive processes
responding to and interpretingthe experiences of failures and absences of cultural doc-
trine and structural circumstances. It mobilizes adherents to resolve these failures and
absences, therebysetting them in motion to establish or reestablish idealized conceptions
of past, present, andfuture social conditions.
IDEOLOGYAS A SOCIOLINGUISTICPROCESS
Ideology is expressed primarily in spoken and written language. We employ a sociolin-
guistic analysis to investigate how its meanings are signified in language use (Gumperz
1982). We also investigate how ideological language differentiates-that is, how it is
particularizedto adherents'circumstances(Gamson 1992).
A society's culture may be conceived of as its total symbol discourse regarding the
constitution of meanings (Williams 1977). Cultureso understoodis the symbolic context
within which ideologies are constructed. The ideologies we examine were constructed
within the contexts of local circumstances,including the southernsegregationist culture.
Racial segregation is a salient element of American society generally, and it was an espe-
cially coherent southernsubculture.It was a significant cultural-symboliccontext during
the civil rights era.
The ideological expressions we discovered were constructedwithin this cultural con-
text. In these conditions, conducive to the development of social movements, a variety of
ideological interpretationsarose (Hunt 1991). Ideological language influenced by the his-
tory, experiences, interests, and structuraland cultural circumstances of segregationist
adherentsresulted in varying ideological conceptions (Schutz 1962; Platt and Williams
1988). A sociolinguistic analysis of the interpretativeprocesses involved in creatingmobi-
lizing ideologies provides insights into the ways in which alternatesegregationistideolog-
ical expressions were constructed.
Ideological sentences used to make immediate circumstancesmeaningful are referred
to as "indexical"expressions. Referringto an expression as "indexical"calls attentionto
the inherent ambiguity existing in everyday language, requiring, in speech, the use of
discourse strategiesto express and acquirethe intended meaning of these sentences (Bar-
Hillel 1954; Peirce 1931; Wittgenstein 1958). As is the case in all everyday language
conversations, the meanings of ideological sentences are achieved by using discourse
strategies.
Discourse strategies are conversationalinterpretivepractices. There are two forms of
discourse strategies. One form is grammatical,semantic, and syntactic interpretivestrat-
egies: thatis, interpretivestrategiesembeddedin the sentences themselves that are used by
speakersto express and by hearersto comprehendsentences' meanings.These are referred
to as linguistic interpretivestrategies because they are expressed in and restrictedto the
sentences. They reveal their meanings in textual analyses of spoken and writtensentences.
The second interpretiveform that speakersemploy to assist them in providing meaning to
everyday language sentences is referredto as extralinguisticor pragmatic discourse strat-
egies. These are interpretationsdrawn from the interactionalfeatures that exist between
speakers, such as facial and tonal expressions, shared historical and experiential back-
grounds,and sharedculturaland structuralcircumstancesin which conversationsare con-
ducted.These are revealed in contextualanalyses of languageuse. Sociolinguistic analysis
relates everyday language use to the circumstancesof its production.Language compre-
hension and the capacity to share meanings requirethe use of both linguistic and extralin-
guistic discourse strategies. In interpersonalinteractive settings, the comprehension of
language is especially influenced by the use of extralinguistic,pragmaticdiscourse strat-
egies (Gumperz 1982).
Sociolinguistic analysis assumes that shared communication is accomplished among
interacting speakers within the context of their settings. Background experiences plus
context are the local extralinguisticfeaturesthat are used as pragmaticdiscourse strategies
to achieve sharedmeanings.The communicantsmust know the purpose,occasion, partici-
pants, and what is relevant to each other in order to achieve meaningful communication.
Language in and of itself cannot convey sharedmeanings; it must be placed in context to
be interpretedcorrectly. Sharedmeanings in ideological language, as in all language dis-
courses, are context-dependent.
Meaningfully shared communication can be achieved using everyday language sen-
tences when speakers use similar linguistic and extralinguisticdiscourse strategies. Even
jargon, idiomatic, or particularlyambiguous sentences can be understoodwhen they are
used among persons who share similarhistories, cultures,and situations.However, despite

the capacity to achieve shared meanings in spoken or written language, ideological dis-
course is particularly susceptible to particularizing influences because of the circum-
stances in which it occurs. Ideological discourse occurs under structurallyand culturally
disruptedconditions-that is, when cultureprinciplesare failing or absent, or as Marx and
McAdamput it, when cultureis "inadequate,indifferentor in dispute"(Marx and McAdam
1994:18). Sense-making crises underminethe use of shared discourse strategies, making
commonly interpretedideological meanings difficult. It must be emphasized, however,
that the use of extralinguisticpragmaticdiscourse strategiesto develop sharedideological
interpretationsunder these conditions does not merely become difficult; they are often
intentionally made difficult.
Movement leadersattemptto foment crises, therebymobilizing participation.They also
knowingly assert divergentinformationto differentgroups to encouragethem to construct
alternatebut circumstantiallyrelevant ideologies in orderto mobilize them. We argue that
leaders employ linguistic and pragmaticdiscourse strategiesin their efforts to characterize
crisis circumstances as relevant to different groups who may share a cultural worldview
(Childers 1990).
The degree to which the interpretiveuses of discourse strategiesenhance or differenti-
ate sharedideological meanings between leaders and participantsis, of course, an empir-
ical question. We examine the constructionof both shared and differentiatedideological
meanings. We emphasize the latter because it is the alternate ideological versions that
illustrate our contention that ideology's power resides in its capacity to mobilize diverse
groups with diverse ideological outlooks into a single movement.
Ourdatawill emphasize the particularizingeffects of linguistic and extralinguisticstrat-
egies as these are used to highlight differentfeaturesof the segregationistworldview.They
will also be used to illustratethe inclusion of exogamous principles and ideas in particu-
larizing ideological versions. Features from the segregationist worldview and other cul-
turaldoctrinewere used as the groundsfor constructingideological interpretationsamong
variously situated segregationistcorrespondents.
Alternate,and sometimes contending,ideological perspectivesappearbecause different
groups are encouragedto perceive crisis circumstancesin distinct ways. Adherents'inter-
pretationsvaried because of the differences in their conceptions of the culturaland struc-
tural circumstances they confronted, their distinct knowledge of the crisis circumstance
and its potential impact upon their interests, their formulationsregardingopportunitiesor
obstacles to act, and so forth (McAdam, McCarthy,and Zald 1996). On the bases of such
varied local knowledge and circumstances,different groups calculate and derive distinct
ideologies and courses of action.
The processes of particularizingideological constructions may be further specified.
Ideological constructions are accomplished in two ways. First, groups in different social
circumstances with distinct backgroundsmnayinterpretthe same cultural worldview dif-
ferently (as, e.g., the class- and status-influEncedideological differences expressed among
movement adherents in Robert White's 1989 study of the IRA). Activists with varying
backgroundknowledge, experiences, and circumstances may employ different extralin-
guistic discourse strategies to make sense of the crisis and a shared cultural worldview.
These result in particularizedideological discourses with a variety of ideological lan-
guages. This occurs-and can be historicallydemonstratedto have occurred-even among
people who express solidarity with one another. Ideological interpretationsmay share
some perspectives and may overlap in substance but nevertheless be distinct versions of
the same cultural worldview adheredto by variously structurallysituated groups partici-
pating in a single movement organization(Kertzer 1988; Platt and Fraser 1998).
Second, different groups of people contextualize different substantive aspects of a

worldview-those aspects relevant to their interests and experiences. In response to his-
torical and structuralcircumstances,they may also "go afield" to find relevantexogamous
ideas and principles in cultural doctrine other than that which is expressed in a cultural
worldview. Historical and structuralcircumstancesmay encourage them to generate new
ideas that they annex to their ideological constructions.In these instances, they assimilate
the "foreign" or newly created ideas, integrating them into an ideological construction
derived from a cultural worldview. This second form of ideological constructioncenters
different substantiveaspects of a worldview and ideas previously not associated with it.
This process, too, creates alternateideological versions. However, this form of ideological
particularizingoften results in conflict and schisms among groups who share similar out-
looks. It has a tendencyto splinterorganizationsexisting within a "social-movementindus-
try" (SMI; see McCarthyand Zald 1977; Benford 1993).
The first form of ideological variationoccurs because differentmeanings are attributed
to similar worldview substance. The second form of variation occurs because groups of
persons are creating innovative ideological discourses in relation to historical-structural
circumstances.Both forms of ideological variationwere found among the segregationists'
correspondencewe analyzed.
Both forms of interpretivevariationare legitimatedon the bases of interestsas these are
drawn from perceived relevant social, structural,cultural, and immediate circumstances.
Each of the differentideological constructionsis deemed "rational,"in thatactivists impute
that the ideological discourse suggests reasonablysuccessful courses of action in the pur-
suit of change or resistance.Such ideological formulationsare made resonantby providing
ideological adherentswith moral, cognitive, and emotive expressions appropriateto their
locally experienced circumstances.
Ideology language may mobilize different segments of activists to participatein differ-
ent organizations,creatinga varietyof mobilized groupswithin a single SMI. Ideology can
also be used to interpretstructuralconditions similarly for different groups of persons
(e.g., those of differentraces, classes, genders), binding them in solidaritywithin the same
movementorganization.Put otherwise, it is importantto recognize thatideology can mobi-
lize different segments of society with varying structuralinterests, each group with over-
lappingyet distinctideological outlooks, to participatein a single organization.This occurs
not because ideology unifies meanings, but ratherbecause ideology can differentiateto
create mobilizing justifications for a variety of groups.
Ideology's flexible capacity to achieve these ends is essential to the creation of mass
movements. Mobilizing a variety of groups with diverse backgrounds and interests to
engage in the same mass movement depends upon shared, yet varying, interpretivecon-
structionsof ideological language (Childers 1990).
A DATASET FOR A SOCIOLINGUISTICANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY

The civil rights movement createda crisis for the southernsegregationistworldview. Mar-
tin LutherKing, Jr. received letters from segregationists interpretingtheir failing world-
view and wishing to educate him about segregation's value for such things as "law and
order"and "Black and White relations."These correspondentswere attemptingto open a
dialogue with King to convince him of the incorrectnessof his doctrinalpositions and the
correctnessof theirs, hoping to convince him to end his integrationcampaigns. Although
King did respondto many who wrote to him, he did not respondto segregationists'letters.
We analyze these letters to demonstratethe empirical value of our conception of ideol-
ogy. The letters share many commonly held beliefs, yet at the same time the correspon-
dents constructeddistinct ideologies. The substance of the letters exhibits segregationist

ideological conceptionsandthe discoursestrategiesthe authorsused to interpretandthereby
to constructparticularizedideological formulations.The discourse strategiesin the letters
are found in the authors'uses of language and in the structural,cultural,and circumstantial
features upon which they remark.From the discourse strategies in their letters, we derive
their interpretationsof King and the civil rights movement and the structural,cultural,and
circumstantialinfluences they used to create their ideological conceptions.
The letterswere discovered in the libraryand archiveof the MartinLutherKing, Jr.Cen-
ter for Nonviolent Social Change in Atlanta,Georgia.The archive contains a large deposi-
tory of letters sent to Dr. King and the SCLC duringthe years of the civil rights movement.
The correspondenceincludes letters from movement supportersand opponents.The segre-
gationistletterswere frequentlymarkedby SCLC staff as "adverse"letters.The intentof the
staff was to signify a broadrange of antimovementsentiment.However, not all the disap-
proving letters in the King archive were so marked.We used the SCLC's reference to "ad-
verse" as our initial conception of ideological resistance to the civil rights movement. The
King archiveof documentsandlettersis divided into two series, "primary"and"secondary."
The primaryseries contain letters writtenby well-known people such as PresidentLyndon
JohnsonorAndrewYoung;the secondaryseries containcorrespondencefromordinarypeo-
ple. For our analysis, letters found in the secondaryseries were most appropriate.
The secondaryseries contains a wide varietyof letters.We did an initial, cursoryreading
of all the letters held in this series. After selecting and photocopying,two samples were de-
veloped: antimovementletters (i.e., letters marked"adverse"or expressing similar senti-
ments)andsupportiveletters(lettersmarkedby the SCLCstaffas "kind"orexpressingsupport
andparticipationin the movement).7Thereare900 adverseletters.The samplefor this analy-
sis is drawnfromthese. In additionto requiringthatanalyzedlettersexpressresistanceto in-
tegration,we used the following criteriato select lettersfor analysis. First, we requiredthat
the letters be legible. Second, we selected letters that contained informationaboutthe cor-
respondents'background,such as theirrace, gender,place of residence,andreasonsfor writ-
ing Dr.King;while some adversecorrespondentspresentedthisinformationaboutthemselves,
a great many did not. Third,letters in the sample had to provide detailed informationabout
the correspondents'attitudestowardand descriptionsof the movement and its doctrine,in-
tegration,AfricanAmericans,Dr. King, Americansociety, its values, and much more.
These criteriaresulted in a sample composed of letters with considerable information
about the writers' ideological stances but unsystematic information about their back-
grounds.Approximately5 percentof the adverseletters were fromAfricanAmericans.For
this analysis we selected letters exclusively from white correspondents.
Our analysis stresses the authors'purposes for writing and the cultural, structural,and
circumstantiallegitimations they used to justify the continued separationof the races. The
letters revealed the practical circumstances of the letter writers, their threatenedreality,
and their ideological realities. The correspondentswere telling King which of their cul-
tural, structural,and immediate experientialcircumstanceswere salient to them. These in
turn shaped their ideological formulations.The contents of these letters conform to our
definition of ideology.
Applying a Sociolinguistic Analysis of Ideology

We begin this analysis by discerning what is commonly shared in the segregationists'
cultural outlook. We derive this by drawing upon two sources: the total sample of segre-
7A more detailed description of the archive and the acquisition of the letters is presented in Platt and Fraser
(1998).
gationists' letters to Dr. King, and the segregationistculturaltraditionas it is expressed in

publishedliteraturefrom the Jim Crow period, including the WCC's responses to activities
of the civil rights movement.We pursuethis analysis by examining how the segregationist
culture is particularizedin the correspondents'ideological accounts. We discovered that
the correspondents'formulationsof their structural,cultural, and immediate experiential
circumstanceswere used as discourse strategiesto constructand differentiatetheir partic-
ularized versions of the segregationistculturalworldview.8
We use writinglettersto King and SCLC as the operationaldefinitionof supportfor and
participation in the countermovement against civil rights. Given the images of sign-
carrying picketers, lunch-counter sit-ins, and vigilante violence against demonstrators,
letter-writingseems a generousdefinitionof supportandparticipation.However,we believe
it is justified. First, we are interestedin the spoken and writtenlanguage of ideology, and
the letterscomprisea gold mine of these forms of informationaboutsegregationists'beliefs.
Second, we are theoretically guided by the importance of participants'formulations of
movement ideology, and the letters provide an entirely different source of articulations
from the pronouncementsof organizational leaders and spokespersons, the distinction
referredto as "formal"in contrast to "operational"ideologies (Williams and Blackburn
1996). We note, too, that the numberof citizens who engage in any kind of political action
other than voting is small (Neuman [1986] estimates 5 percent of the adult population).
Letter-writingitself is a motivated action that is relatively uncommon. Further,because
these letters were cognitive, emotive, and moralizing attempts to educate and persuade
King aboutthe values of segregation,we consider them a significant source of information
on the ideological stances of countermovementparticipantsand supporters.Finally, what
is absolutely apparentis that the letter writers were formulatingideologies in reaction to
the crisis circumstancesfacing segregationist society.
In face-to-face conversationalsettings, meanings are achieved by interpretinga variety
of linguistic and extralinguistic-auditory, tonal, and visual-cues. In written language,
these extralinguisticcues are unavailable.Thus, interpretingwritten language requires a
modified form of sociolinguistic analysis. Our approachmakes several assumptionsabout
creating and acquiringmeanings in written language. First, the segregationistcorrespon-
dents were engaged in constructingand conveying to King their circumstantiallyinformed
conceptions of a southern cultural worldview. Second, the meanings they conveyed are
explicitly and implicitly embedded in the substance of their correspondence.Third, the
linguistic and extralinguisticdiscourse strategiesthey employed reveal the meanings they
intendedto convey. Fourth,because this is an analysis of writtenlanguage, extralinguistic
discourse strategiesplay a significant role in shaping the correspondents'ideological for-
mulations. Fifth, the extralinguistic strategies were derived from aspects of correspon-
dents' lives-that is, theirinterestsand the relevantfeaturesof theircircumstances.Finally,
the interests and relevant features used as extralinguisticdiscourse strategies to construct
ideological versions of the southern cultural worldview made the versions authentically
meaningful and resonant to correspondents'structural,cultural, and immediate circum-
stances. We insist that the circumstances the correspondentsuse as extralinguistic strat-
8A "culturalworldview"is a subcultureof a
society's culture.We think of a worldview as applied to a domain-
specific set of symbolic meanings, such as ethnic, racial, gender, and geographic worldviews. The segregationist
worldview evolved and was elaboratedfrom assumptionsderived from "the naturalorderof segregation."It was
and is a subculturethat has much to say about blacks and whites and their relations with one another.It is not
mute but has much less to say about,for example, the value of capitalism,democracy,and other such institutional
activities. By contrast,a society's culture is a metanarrative,providing for all mannerof meaning constructions
and practicalcourses of action pursuedwithin a society. Our point is that the segregationist cultural worldview
must be differentiatedand translatedby movement participantsinto their "operative ideology" (Williams and
Blackburn 1996).
egies cannotbe assumeda prioributinsteadmustbe discoveredin the letters'texts (Schegloff

1991:49-57). In our analyses, we ask what these features are, how and in what ways they
act as extralinguisticdiscourse strategies, and how they influence the constructionof the
authors'ideological conceptions of the southernculturalworldview.
The Natural Orderof Segregation:A SouthernSegregationist Cultural Worldview

McMillenpointsoutthattheWCC,thepremiercountermovementorganization,neverachieved
ideological consensus. However, he claims there existed "a common body of assumptions
generally acceptableto the entire movement."He indicates that "Primarilythe ideology of
the Citizens' Council was the ideology of white supremacy."Further,supremacists
rested their case for white dominance on the postulate that Negroes were inherently
different from Caucasians and that this difference, this hereditaryinferiority, ren-
dered them unsuitablefor free association with white society. In the Council's view
the black man's presence could be tolerated only so long as the range of his eco-
nomic, political, and social interactionwith the white man's world could be system-
atically defined. In the Council's syllogism of white supremacy,then, segregation
was the conclusion that necessarily followed the premise that human worth is cal-
culable in terms of apparentphysical characteristics.(McMillen 1971:161)
The segregationist cultural worldview created the moral and practicalreality insisting
upon the separationof races, the sharedcultural"bedrock"from which differentiatedide-
ologies were constructed.This doctrine, described in the literature(Myrdal with Sterner
and Rose 1944; Dailey 1962; Kilpatrick1962; Newby 1968; McMillen 1971) andexpressed
in the adverse letters, suggests a formulationthat may be referredto as "thenatural order
of segregation."
Over the years of Jim Crow, and during the period of the civil rights movement, the
features of the naturalorder of segregation evolved, and yet the center of its formulation
was buttressedby the same foundationalassumptions.Both anti-andprosegregationauthors
suggest that for American society generally,and for southernwhites in particular,race is a
transcendentfact of social life requiring special norms of conduct. Assumed hereditary
inferiorityof blacks-ordained by God or validatedby "science"-initially justified slav-
ery, and subsequentto Reconstructionit underwrotethe moral and practicalseparationof
the races as these were instituted in the myriad forms of legal and informal Jim Crow
structures.Fixed as it was in inheritance,blacks' inferioritywas immune to environmental
influences. This created permanentcircumstancesof incompatibilitybetween blacks and
whites, justifying racial separationand allocating blacks to lesser status and second-class
citizenship. It is also assumed that these conditions serve the interests of both whites and
blacks, as each race is distributedto societal roles consistent with its inheritedintelligence,
personal attributes, and ordained destiny. Thus, the prohibitions against intermarriage,
physical contact, socializing, and political and economic equalityare consistentwith hered-
ity, serving both races' interests. Having found their appropriateplaces in society, both
races should be content in this division of labor. There is also a not-too-subtle subtext,
encapsulated in Mary Douglas's (1970) formulation of pollution taboos. Segregationist
cultureproposes the idealized-mythologicalbelief that whites are the repositoriesof purity
while blacks are objects of danger, and that the natural order of segregation prohibits
contact preventingracial pollution.9
90f course, this was a normativetaboo serving white male interests-for example, in the sexual exploitationof
black women.
Below, we describe four distinct ideological versions of the naturalorder of segrega-

tion. Each version shares some of the featuresof "naturalorderof segregation"culturebut
simultaneouslyfashions for its own intereststhe assumptionsof the southernsegregation-
ist culturalworldview. The four versions reflect correspondents'uses of their own relevant
cultures,structures,and circumstances,expressed in the letters as extralinguisticdiscourse
strategies, shaping the authors' ideological version of the worldview. Among the four
segregationistideologies we describe, the first two envision the worldview as underattack
and failing in its capacity to organize social arrangements.When adjusted to the corre-
spondents' situations, these two versions closely advocate the traditionalfeatures of the
southern cultural worldview; thus, they are more or less "restorationist."The other two
ideological forms assume that the segregationistworldview is missing prescriptionsnec-
essary to bring about social orderwithin the context of post-World WarII America;these
versions innovate upon the segregationistworldview.
However, it is axiomatic for all four versions-and within the assumptionof the natural
orderof segregation-that the social world is appropriatelyordered.Segregationis simply
a part of that order.Taken-for-grantedroutines and culturallylegitimated social practices
are seen as operatingin everyone's interest by ensuring order.Concomitantly,overt vio-
lence is disruptive and presumablycontraryto order.However, given that segregation is
part and parcel of the extant order,violence associated with the civil rights movement is
easily assigned to those who are calling for change. Compliance with law implies fidelity
both to God's and human law; such obedience is less a definition of order than it is con-
sidered integralto the maintenanceof order.Whetherthe maintenanceof orderemerges as
an end in itself is differentiatedamong the various ideological versions. The more funda-
mental point is that the basic naturalnessof order is the result of coherence among a
transcendent(eitherreligiously or "scientifically"legitimated) design, the organizationof
Americansociety in both its history and present,and the naturalworld. These things share
a "createdness"in which each realm reinforces the other.
This formulation resonates with Geertz's (1973) description of the meaning-creating
functions of culture, in which a worldview unites a cosmology with human society and
each borrowsauthorityfrom the otherto normalizeand integratethatworldview.This does
not require, of course, logically consistent argumentswithin the articulateddefenses of
segregation.Much of this is unexaminedand often unarticulated;it representsan assump-
tion of orderin which the sub-rosaquality itself lends it its power.In similarterms, Larrain
(1979) understandsideology as playing the "naturalizing"function of aligning a moral
vision of what the world ideally should be with an empirical vision of how the world is.
The rough edges of the latterare assimilated to the former,thereby creating in the believ-
er's mind a satisfying correspondencebetween the two. When believers cannot accomplish
this correspondence,this is anotherway of referringto a sense-making crisis, the social
ordering of crisis and cultural failure, and the failure and absence of organizing cultural
principles.
The four ideological versions derivedfrom the naturalnessof the segregationistcultural
worldview are alternatives struggling to accomplish the alignment while attempting to
reinstate and/or reconfigure a segregationist order.Each differentiatesthe source of the
naturalnessand justifies the continuing separationof the races on the basis of the corre-
spondents'circumstancesand interests,which they themselves understandas relevant.The
four ideological alternativesare: (1) a religiously based constructionemphasizing as an
extralinguisticdiscourse strategythe divine source and religious justification for segrega-
tion; (2) an historical-"scientific"-groundedconstructionthat highlights relevantimputed
traditionalarrangementsin Americansocial life and an alleged biologically groundednat-
ural orderof inequalities;(3) a secular-political constructionthatemploys as extralinguis-
tic discourse strategies the free enterprise system, national security, and the dangers of
communism; and (4) a symbolic constructionderived from the culturalvalues of equality
and individualism acting as discourse strategies and disclaiming African Americans' pre-
paredness in terms of these to achieve these circumstances.10
Religious Constructionof Segregation: Segregation as God's Will

In the religious ideological constructionof the segregationistworldview, separationof the
races is a markof God's plan for humankind-importantly, a directreflection of the sacred
orderin the naturalworld. The extralinguisticdiscourse strategyused to create this version
is found in the knowledge, sometimes accurateand sometimes paraphrased,of the Scrip-
tures. This emphasis on Scriptureis consistent with the thrust of Evangelical Protestant
culture, in which religious authority is uniquely grounded in the Bible. The language,
therefore, locates the justification for segregation in a divine will that created separate
species and races and a religious doctrine that insists upon their continued separation.A
typical example:
Turn to Genesis 1st Chapter in the King James Holy Bible and you will see God
created the fish, the birds, animals, also man ... after their own kind.... You don't
see a black bird integrating with a Robin, etc.... God was displeased with the
children of Israel when they intermarried,Even with other nations and tribes, see
Exodus 34, 10 to 17 The Covenant or Law of Segregation.
Or again:
Do you ever tell your people you are a cursed people not by the man in the South but
your EarthlyFatherBro. Noah, who cursed you and do you tell your people thatthey
are also born in Bondage for as long as the world stands?... as for segregation,you
rememberback in the Bible where Nimrod who was a blackmanand he was having
the tower of Babel built... Now at the tower of Babel God separatedall nations. ..
Here the writer is depending upon the assumed sharedbackgroundknowledge of the bib-
lical story in which Noah's son Ham sees his father naked and is cursed. A common
understandingamong many American Christianswas that the "curse of Ham" was dark
skin. The letter writeris pointing out to King that God's will (and direct intervention),not
southern whites' racism, is the source of segregation practices. Another letter makes the
connection specific:
I Don't Think You Would WantTo TraceYourAncestry Back to Cane Do You, then
afterthe Flood Because Ham Made Lite of His FatherHis Son Had a CursePut up on
Him You Can Learn about the Flood in Genesis Six Chapter...
Many of the adverse letters are replete with references to God, the church, religion,
"Christian"conduct, and the like, but are not necessarily included in this ideological ver-
sion. What makes this construction distinct is its reliance on theological doctrine as the
pragmaticstrategyfor extractingfrom the culturalworldview the justification of segrega-
tion in a divine plan. For these correspondents,the ordering of the segregated world is
l?In this instance, we use the term "symbolic"as it is derived from Kinderand Sear's (1981) idea of "symbolic
racism."
easily apparent;a number of their letters refer to "black birds not mating with white
birds."'
One must only be attentiveto God's truth,as revealed in Scripture,in orderto recognize
the rightness and universality of segregation. For example, although the following letter
makes references to communism, it is understoodas sin; divine justification is at issue
here:
[P]rove to me that God teaches Race mixing, any where in the Bible... If you will
stop and think a few moments you will be able to see the great sin of Communism
and race Agitation in this country.... [Those] trying to force race mixing will never
enter Heaven-if you want Bible proof for that statement,I have it.
A writer sums up the religious constructionof segregation succinctly: "SEGREGATION

IS GOD'S PLAN. INTEGRATIONIS MAN'S PLAN. And we realize we should OBEY
GOD RATHER THA[N] MAN." In the religious construction, we specifically do not
include statementsthat criticized King for not acting like a Christian,or that encouraged
him to pay attentionto his preachingand saving souls. References to religion as culturalor
social practices are found in the second ideological discourse, the historical-"scientific"
ideology.
Historical Practices, TraditionalSocial Arrangements, "Scientifically"Based Inequality

The historical constructionemploys knowledge of traditionas the extralinguisticbase to
interpretand align the segregationistworldview. Segregationis justified as a naturalorder
because it was traditionallyinstituted. Letters in this constructioncriticize King for dis-
ruptingwell-established,historically legitimatedpractices.This ideological version is also
justified in terms of an essential inegalitarianismbased in the alleged biological incom-
patibility of blacks and whites. The source of inequality is made explicit by referringto
establishedpractices,or by referenceto the past as justification for futurepractices.Racial
differences and racial separationare partof a natural,established,historical,cosmological
ordergroundedin the alleged biological inferiorityof blacks. Correspondentspoint to the
benefits to AfricanAmericans of this naturallysegregatedorder (althoughthe benefits are
alleged ratherthan specified). The bedrock of these practices exists in the sexual segrega-
tion of blacks and whites, the transgressionof which results in miscegenationand presum-
ably in the polluting of the races. Although God and religion may be mentioned in the
letters, this ideological version is shornof theologicaljustification. For example, one letter
writer says:
God and white men and women made America, its cultureand traditionswith brains
and courage, with valor and patriotismby fighting, suffering and dying and every-
thing in it was conceived developed over the centuries by WHITEpeople-negroes
had nothing to do with its evolution, its progress or its greatness, yet you negroes
think you can step in and claim "rights"which do not exist ...
Withinthis circularreasoning,biological differences arejustified by social practicesor by

"scientific facts" that legitimate this ideological interpretation,but not by a divinely man-
dated plan:
1 Unsurprisingly,this constructionis expressed in the published literaturein Reverend Louis E. Dailey's The
Sin or Evils of Integration(1962:15-23).
Biological differences do exist between the races. There are inborn racial antago-
nisms. It is not merely prejudice. Perhaps there should be a better name for it, or
perhaps there should be a distinction between emotional prejudice and intelligent
prejudice.Whateverit is, it cannotbe changed,andis only intensifiedby yourprogram.
That segregation is naturaland immutableis often combined with an implicit notion of

territorialityabout a historically justified white ownership of America (nowhere in this
formulationis there recognition of Native Americans' relation to the land prior to white
settlers). Not surprisingly,this results in a "returnto Africa"solution to racial antagonism.
Some of the correspondentsuse angry language that conflates Africa, the jungle, the pre-
sumed animal natureof black people, and a lack of civilization. This is common enough as
an epithet, and many of the references have a formulaic quality. But other interpretations
of this ideological version of segregation recognize an inevitability of separationof the
races and do not view the returnto Africa as punishment,but as a restorationof the natural
order.The correspondentnoted below uses linguistic as well as extralinguisticstrategiesto
proffer "a returnto Africa" policy. A semantic interpretationof the phrase "to buy out the
Negroes" requiresknowledge of slavery while more immediatelysuggesting an instrumen-
tal formulationof "to buy off" to restorethe traditionalgood orderof the separationof the
races benefiting both peoples.
The two races are not happy whenforced together.Never were & never will be. The
right way to correct the whole trouble is for this Nation to buy out the Negroes &
give them all free transportationback to Africa, the land that producedthem in the
first place. See to it thatthey have a nationof their own to operateto suit themselves.
Then both races will be happy.
Some letters cite AbrahamLincoln as an authorityfor a back-to-Africaplan. This sug-

gestion is occasionally punctuatedwith allusions to the inherited incompatibility of the
races. These correspondentsdispute King's use of Lincoln as a symbol for his struggle and
instead cite Lincoln's prepresidentialproposal for separatism.Lincoln's importance and
legitimate authorityare not questioned; in that regard, his image is part of the extralin-
guistic strategyused here. What is at issue is the properinterpretationof his thought.This
is expressed in the following:
[Neither] Mr. L. (nor I) believe in slavery,but neitherof us want close association of

white and black peoples. The negro race is far inferior to the white race.... Why
don't you quote Mr.Lincoln on the following partof a debate speech [followed by a
quote advocating separatism].
There is a common admonishmentfor King to "get back to preachingthe Gospel." One

letter begins, "You set yourself up as a minister of the Gospel, then why, I challenge you,
don't you live it???"Interestingly,the reason for the admonishmentvaries. For some letter
writers, it is the job of the clergy to preparebelievers for an other-worldlysalvation, and
thus the civil rights campaigns are out of King's institutionally legitimate jurisdiction.
Other writers doubt King's understandingof politics or economics, given his training in
theology. Yet others accuse him of hubrisand arrogancein criticizing society and call him
a "self-appointed"leaderunrepresentativeof the many "goodnegroes"in the United States.
Whatever the rationale, the naturalorder and history of segregation are taken as given.
This formulation,like the religious one, uses correspondents'backgroundknowledge and
social structuralcircumstancesin a segregated society to realign the segregationistideol-

ogy with the changing societal conditions.
Further,we note the "assembled"characterof the particularizedideological versions of
segregation by combining within this version both defenses of traditionalhistorical prac-
tices and "scientific"(thatis, pseudoscientific)justifications. For many scholarly analysts,
tradition, history, and culture are understood as human constructions, while science is
thought of as a legitimating discourse that transcendshuman creation. In that sense, sci-
ence is like religion in that it is an authoritybeyond human society (see Jasper 1992).
However, the religious version of segregation doctrine is clearly theological in its
orientation-that is, focused on the manifestationsof a conscious divine will-while the
historical-"scientific"constructionis predicatedon the idea that the culture and traditions
of segregation are part of a naturalorder that can also be understood through science.
Logical coherence is not the ideological glue; rather,it is the interpretivework that makes
the segregationist worldview resonantwith local circumstancesand the perceived histor-
ical relevance to the correspondents.
Secular-Political Constructionand the Threatof Communism

The two previous constructionsof segregationistideology conceive of the southernseg-
regationist worldview as providing legitimate courses of action but failing to achieve its
intended purpose of producing and maintainingthe naturalorder of segregation. These
differentiatedideological forms offer repair,specification, and reaffirmationof the segre-
gationist worldview. The worldview was failing in the face of social change, and letter
writerswere producingidealized, if not mythologized, affirmationsof their versions of the
naturalorder.In contrast, the ideological versions discussed here and in the next section
consider the segregationistworldview as missing importantfactual and prescriptiveele-
ments in their constructionsof the naturalorder.
The first of these includes as extralinguisticdiscoursestrategiesthreatsof communismto
the United States and to the free-enterprisesystem formulatedas they are intertwinedwith
segregation.These threatswere not partof 19th-centuryJimCrowculture,but were relevant
to the postwar world and Cold Warculture.Although communism was immediately asso-
ciated with civil-rights-movementactivities, it did not have a prominentplace in the con-
structionof the religious or historical-"scientific"ideological versions of the segregationist
culturalworldview.Communismandfreeenterprisewere assimilatedto the natural-order for-
mulationby assumingthatsegregationwas integrallyinvolved with the historicalevolution
of Americansociety into a world-dominantpolitical andeconomic nation.Since integration
and communism are conflated in this ideological version, criticisms of segregationare as-
sociated with an attackupon America'spresentand futuregreatness. 2
The pragmaticbasis of interpretationin the secular-political ideological constructionis
a particularizedhistorical conception that intertwinesAmerica's greatness with the sepa-
ration of the races. However, implied in this ideological version is the belief that if inte-
gration doctrine were shorn of the communist attackupon America, equality between the
races might be possible.
The second version, which we discuss in the next section, also includes important
factual and prescriptiveelements that were not originally partof the southernsegregation-
ist worldview. We refer to it as the symbolic ideological constructionof racial separation.
'2It has been suggested that J. Edgar Hoover initiated the association of black activism with radicalism and
communism. Hoover was militantly antiblack and anticommunist.These animosities were conflated and first
directed at Marcus Garvey, whom he considered a dangerous black radical. By "1919, Hoover had already
defined political movements within the black community as a permanentfield of investigation for his Radical
Division" (Powers 1987:127-28).
This version involves the inclusion of the culturalvalues of equalityand individualachieve-

ment as the extralinguistic,pragmaticbases for interpretingthe perpetuationof the sepa-
ration of the races.
In the segregationistversions presentedhere and in the next section, the correspondents
attempt not only to adjust and reassert, but also to amend and embellish the southern
segregationistculturalworldview. Both ideological versions suggest thatchange be sought
"judiciously,"according to the correspondents'perspectives, but that it could result in
greaterjustice for African Americans.
Charges of communist influences in the SCLC and the NAACP abound in the corre-
spondence. These expressions range from folk wisdom to the columns of such establish-
ment commentatorsas Joseph Alsop (a photocopy of an Alsop article titled "Reds Worm
Into Rights Groups"was included in a letter from April 1964). Many of the remarksare
seemingly off-hand, or handy epithets easily drawn from the general vocabulary of the
early 1960s. For example, one letter claims "you are one of the biggest liars in the country
. . . calling your communistprogram 'Christian'."Another writerrefers to "yourCommu-
nist coalition," while yet another writer addresses King as the leader of the "Southern
CommunistLiars Conference."One letter begins:
A-The real VILLEN of the RACE PROBLEMare the REDS! They are in turn,
B-Using the N.A.A.C.P. as DUPES, to,
C-Destroy the freedom of both the Whites and Colored in the south.
Particularlyafter King's public condemnationof United States involvement in Vietnam,

many letter writersquestionedhis patriotismand accused him of being naive and of giving
aid and comfort to the enemy.
Interestingly,while the connections between civil rights organizationsand communism
were made easily, the condemnationsof communism in our sample overwhelmingly did
not include its putative atheism. Rather,the distinction exists in the advocacy of a natural
secular order of American segregation, in contrast to the misguided secular disorder of
communism. The most common charge against communists was their plans for intermar-
riage and "race-mixing"and thereforeconstitutinga threatto the good orderand continued
vitality of American society:
[Y]our "rabble-rousing"talks are creaters of hatreds and violence ... NAACP uses
big money ... to promote violence, race-mixing or any other un-Americanactivi-
ties.... Communistsare known to demand "race-mixing."
Even though socialism is frequentlycontrastedwith the "freeenterprisesystem,"no vision

of socialist economics emerges. Rather,socialism is typified as the symbolic counterto the
Americansystem, which is portrayedas a vehicle of opportunity,one that is as available to
AfricanAmericans as to anyone else. The idea thatAmerica remainsa land of opportunity
for all, and all must bear responsibility for their own circumstances, leads to the fourth
version.
Symbolic Segregationist Construction,the Open System, and Questions of Strategy

If the United States is a society of mobility, the responsibilityfor achieving equality rests
on individuals and their motivations. The fundamentalproblem of equality is one of per-
sonal effort and worthiness. One can potentially earn one's place as a full member of
society in an open system. In this accounting, segregationremainsa measureof the extent
to which black Americansare not yet ready for or entitled to equality.The path to equality
comes not from protests,demands,or disorder,but from education, self-improvement,and
patience, virtues the southern segregationist cultural worldview does not associate with
African Americans. Contrary to the principles guiding the religious and historical-
"scientific"constructions,the potential for equality is available, if African Americanscan
find within themselves the wherewithalto achieve it.
We find these values appendedto the symbolic segregationistconstruction(see Kinder
and Sears 1981). It often is associated with an idealized image of the immigrantworking
classes' upwardmobility and assimilation in the new world. The extralinguistic strategy
for this image is incorporatedin the overused adage, "We made it on our own [by impli-
cation, throughhard work, diligence, and civility]; you should do the same." Sometimes
these experiences are intertwinedwith expressions of religious doctrine counseling a vir-
tuous morality applied to secular achievements and law-abiding behavior.It is frequently
expressed in the correspondence:
We Denverites are sick & tired of the way you are leading your people to animosity
toward the White and Black ... Those Southernpeople will come aroundone day,
but no, you have to try to force and show them that you want the same now.
The religious underpinningsof this argumentexist in the naturalcondition of social order

as partof God's plan, and "agitation"or "militance"is not a "Christian"strategyfor social
change. Even less is there a religious justification for breakinghuman law:
[T]he Bible does NOT record a single instance where the church, as such or even a
group of "BELIEVERSIN CHRISTJESUS"engaged in any overt act of aggression
against "THE LAW OF THE LAND" . . . you had bettercheck your acts of aggres-
sion with what God's Word authorizesand instructs.... Breaking laws illegally as
you and the NAACP are doing, is against the teaching of the Holy Bible, and at the
same time being done with malice in your hearts to make trouble instead of peace.
The religious language used in this example does not recount a divine plan that sepa-
rates the races, nor does it define an essential inequalityas natural.Rather,the assumption
is that orderis natural,American society is ideally organized, and any people who follow
Christianprinciples would be pursuing a different course of temporal action (if not nec-
essarily different goals) from that being pursued by King and the SCLC. Although reli-
gious objections to King's campaigns are numerousin this ideological construction,they
are not identical to the theological justifications for continued segregation. Whether the
authors fully faced the implications, the religious references used within the symbolic
constructionleave open the possibility of change and equality, if pursuedcorrectly.
In the following example, the earned component of equality is articulated and con-
trastedwith the presumablydeserved quality of segregation:
Why don't you colored people get busy and do something worthwhile, so you will
deserve to be integratedwith the whites? ... Look at all the colored people who have
achievedworthwhilepositionsfor themselves... the white people acceptthembecause
they deserve to be accepted.
The symbolic version of the segregationistideology emphasizes the "landof opportunity"

and "earnyour equality" themes couched in the secular language of social and political
order:
[Respect] must be earned not demandedby a personof any race.... We have negroes
in our community who have earned the respect of the white people ... [and] retain
that respect by living useful and well-orderedlives.
With very best wishes,
A loyal American
E PLURIBUS UNUM
Interpretedas a linguistic strategy,the addition of the national motto "out of many, one"
may simply be a postscriptthat was meant to reinforce the writer's legitimacy as a "loyal
American."However, it may also be ironic in that the expression holds out the promise of
eventual integrationinto national life, but does so by summoning the images of the suc-
cessful assimilation experiences of Europeanimmigrantsand the qualities of their collec-
tive charactersthatpresumablymade thatpossible. Hence, in this view segregationremains
understoodas a naturalorder,but integrationachieved in an orderly manneris consistent
with national identity.
Several writers who employ the symbolic pragmaticstrategy feel it importantto pro-
vide a context for their opposition that distances them from the traditionalintransigent
racial hostility common among correspondentswho created the religious and historical-
"scientific" constructions. Such authors portray themselves as concerned with issues of
law andorder,the welfareof AfricanAmericans,andthe potentialconsequencesof backlash:
[G]o back to preaching the Gospel of Jesus ... to your race and try to win souls to
the Lord, and stop wasting your time in violating city ordinancesand stirringup your
race to get them into more trouble. ... I love the colored people, worked in the fields
with them, listen to them preach, sing and pray. My father gave the colored people
the land to build them a churchwhen I was just a child, and they had some glorious
meetings there and there was always good order.
I'm no enemy of the negro. I talk [to] and like them. But why agitate and build up
race hatred.Most southernnegroes try/want to get along.
[signed]
A Mississippian
(not a negro hater)
Ideological Versions:Agency, Structuring,and SituatedLanguage

These four particularizedideological versions offered language "repertoires"as potential
courses of action upon which opponents to integrationcould draw to apply to their cul-
tural, structural,and immediate circumstances (Tilly 1977, 1995; Williams 1995). These
repertoireswere createdsimultaneouslywithin the context of one historical moment, circa
1955-1968. That four differentiatedversions occurredsimultaneouslyis evidence of cul-
tural agency, as groups of persons fashioned particularizedideological "repertoires"to fit
their interests and relevant circumstances.
Language'sinterpretationenabled correspondentsto create the four distinct ideological
versions. We wish to delve deeper into a specific aspect of this sociolinguistic process. We
want to bring into bold relief a direct connection between an immediatelyrelevantcircum-
stance and its effects upon the structuringof a particularizedsegregationistlanguage. We

illustrate how King's efforts to integratehousing in the urbanNorth influenced the con-
structionof a particularizedideological version.
During the period of the SCLC's efforts to integrateChicago housing, correspondents
from the area wrote to King interpretingcampaign events occurring in that city. They
perceived King's appeal for open housing as a threat to their economic and cultural
interests-as a threatto both their propertyand their status. Interpretingthese crisis cir-
cumstances within a northernurbanenvironmentresulted in a particularizedideological
formulationfit to the cross-cutting pressures from the segregationist worldview, the cor-
respondents'interests,and a liberal-urbanculture.Ourexample from Chicago illustratesa
situationallygroundeduse of the fourth ideological version presentedabove, the symbolic
segregationistconstruction.
King in Chicago: Symbolic Segregationist Constructionand the Potentialfor Equality

King moved his activities to the North in the mid-1960s, beginning protests for Chicago
open housing in January 1966 (Ralph 1993:60-65). Not surprisingly, the movement's
geographicchange from the South to the North was controversial.There had been support
from white northernersfor changing southernJim Crow laws and practices.There was less
support for charges of northerncomplicity in segregationist institutional arrangements,
particularlywhen these appearedto involve voluntarysocial arrangementsin civil society
ratherthan overt discriminatoryactions enforced by state and local segregationlaws.
The contents of adverse letters written to King during this period reflect the changing
situational context of their production. The Chicago demonstrationsfor open housing
promptedmanylettersfromlocal correspondents.In theirletters,the correspondentsempha-
sized the symbolic ideological construction.The discourse shifted from the argumentthat
segregation was an immutablepart of a changeless naturalorder,as was expressed in the
religious and historical constructions, to a rationale that implied a potential for greater
equality that was as yet unrealized.However, the source of the inequalitywas still located
in African Americans. It was alleged that blacks lacked the strengthor will to participate
fully in societal opportunities.Continuedsegregationitself became a measuringrod of the
degree to which black Americans were not yet ready for, or worthy of, equality and
integration.
The extralinguistic strategies imputed alleged motivational and circumstantialprob-
lems among AfricanAmericans.Black Americanspurportedlylacked the wherewithalfor
integration, and their neighborhoods were evidence of their motivational shortfall. The
letters sent to King during his Chicago campaign for open housing highlight the situated
characterof the productionof ideological language-that is, a symbolic constructionfit to
the multiple cross-pressures impinging upon the letter writers. An example of this
formulation:
So you are going to get rid of the slums, well let me tell you, in order to do it, you
would have to eliminate all the negroes, because they create slums; I lived in poor
neighborhoodsin my life, we did not call them slums, the houses were old and no
conveniences but we ... kept them clean and bought soap and paint instead of liquor
and dope . . . our mothers cleaned the house . . . our fathers cleaned and fixed the
premises....
A self-identified Jewish woman from Chicago described her relationshipwith a black

woman from her neighborhoodwho had taken care of her as a child when her father was
sick; the writer also provides examples of anti-Semitism she had experienced in her own
life, and asked why no one protested the Holocaust. She goes on:
May I ask why you [King] must clean the apartments,carry garbage, and ashes?
Why are not the tenants keeping clean their apartments.... But we also lived in
slums ... and I never saw a rat or roach-why because our jewish people kept the
premises CLEAN.... [Negroes need to be taught] CLEANLINESS,NUTRITION,
CARE OF THEIRCHILDRENand all the attributesthat contributeto a measureof,
true not gracious living, when ones funds are limited....
Other,more blatantlysegregationist, letters coming from Chicagoans are less nuanced

but still within the symbolic frame, attributingto blacks themselves the circumstancesin
which they live: "who turnsa nice neighborhoodinto a nigger slum. Of course, the niggers
themselves." Another letter asks King to pay attentionto Atlanta'scondition (presumably
before focusing on Chicago):
It [AuburnAve.] is a sad place to see now as far as business is concerned. From

Jackson St. up to Boulevard all that valuable land vacant not a coffee bar, sandwich
shop or caf6 to be seen.... While you arerunningall over the worldto partsunknown
and encouraging the negroes to go in and push the white man out of all the decent
places he has workedhardto establish for his people.... why don't you get together
and put up some nice places on the Avenue and give the negro girls and boys who
need jobs so bad something to do.
The circumstancesthat promptedthese letters, the region of origin of the writers, and
the writers'often-relatedpersonalexperiences with poverty or discriminationcombined to
produce a discourse not found in the first three versions of segregationist ideological
doctrine. A few of these adverse letter writers had an authentic commitment to an open
society and perhapseven a desire for AfricanAmericansto achieve an appropriateplace in
it. Among others professing this stance, there are two prominentundertonesthat express
the authors'continuing commitmentto segregationistworldview. The first is a "disingen-
uous commitment"to an open society. The commitmentis noted, but it is interlacedwith
beliefs thatAfricanAmericansdo not, and cannot,possess the motivationalwherewithalto
succeed. The commitmentto an open society is declared, but without potential cost to the
correspondent.The second theme thatemerges from these lettersis thatthe commitmentto
an open society provides the ideological adherentswith the time to maintaintheir advan-
tage no matterwhat may evolve for succeeding generations. Both of these stances origi-
nate in a commitment to the religious and historical ideological perspectives as these
beliefs are expressed at the heart of "the naturalorder of segregation."However, these
discourses resonatedwithin the northernurbanenvironmentfrom which they were derived
and situated.
Some of these letters include racist epithets; others, as noted, doubt that the conditions
African Americans face can be overcome. We are not trying to soften the extent to which
these, too, were adverse letters using segregationistlanguage to oppose King and the civil
rights movement and were in favor of continuing segregation. We suggest, however, that
conflating these various sources of ideological thinking overly simplifies potential under-
standingof the resistance specifically to the movement and underminesa general ability to
understandhow ideological language contributesto the accomplishment of locally situ-
ated social-movement activism.
CONCLUSION:IDEOLOGYAND SOCIAL-MOVEMENTTHEORY
Ouranalysisuses sociolinguisticconceptsdevelopedby Gumperz(1982) andHymes (1974)

to describe the meaning variation in culturally and structurallysituated communicative
processes; their sociolinguistic approachhas been termed "the ethnographyof communi-
cation" (Goddardand Wierzbicka 1997:232). We extended their lines of thought to the
communication of ideological language within social movements. In reading the corre-
spondence from countermovementactivists communicatingtheir ideologies to King, we
realized that while they shared aspects of what they intended to convey, significant por-
tions of their discourse divergedfrom one anotherin the meaningsthey were attemptingto
communicate.In that observation, we realized the importanceof the uses of situated lan-
guage in communicatingideology. Language is alive to its situated expressions; in being
so, it provides for the constructionof sharedbut situationallyvaried meaningful ideolog-
ical versions.
Thus, we conceived of ideology as a cultural resource for mobilizing movement par-
ticipation.We illustratedits mobilizing capacity by applying a sociolinguistic analysis we
fashioned to study language in correspondencesent to MartinLutherKing, Jr. by segre-
gationist countermovementopponents. We described how these letter writers particular-
ized their segregationist ideologies in order to make them meaningfully authenticto and
resonantwith their structural,cultural,and immediate experientialcircumstances.
In our analysis, we designed conceptions of linguistic and extralinguistic discourse
strategies,operationalizedas textual expressions of relevant structural,cultural,and expe-
riential circumstances,that correspondentsused in their letters to King. We demonstrated
how these discourse strategies appearedin the segregationists' correspondenceand how
they shapedthe correspondents'ideological versions of resistanceto the civil rights move-
ment. The analysis producedfour particularizedideologies, ratherthan a single "formal"
ideological discourse advocated and proselytized by movement organizations and their
activist leaders. We demonstratedhow a cultural worldview shared by different groups
may be differentiatedinto resonantparticularizedideologies, ratherthan trying to posit a
single, univocal ideology to which all members of a movement for change or resistance
adhere.
This differentiation into particularizedideologies is important because it illustrates
how activists integratecognitive, moral,and expressive understandingswith both practical
and normative courses of action. The ideologies they constructprovide them with ideal-
ized conceptions of past, present, and future conditions. The correspondentsused these
ideological versions in their efforts to restore and maintaintheir visions of an appropri-
ately orderedsocial world. In accomplishing these ideological constructions,the segrega-
tionists created for themselves an experientially grounded, interest-based "operative
ideology" that they used to mobilize and orient their participation.
This conception of ideological processes is more comprehensive than several other
cultural concepts that attempt to link movement organizations' formal ideologies with
participants'operative ideological stances. We believe, along with Weber, Gramsci, and
Geertz, "thathumansare suspendedin webs of significance which they have spun. .[C]ul-
ture is those webs and cultural analysis is a search for the interpretivemeanings of those
webs" (Geertz 1973:5). This formulationis a metaphor,more than a definition, and yet it
implies that a culture concept appropriatefor social-movement mobilization cannot be
confined to "framing,""cognitive liberation,""identity,"or even "ideology" when ideol-
ogy is expressed solely as ideational processes. Instead, Geertz suggests, culture requires
of individuals that they be immersed into meanings that are affixed to a collective past,
present,and future.This formulationof the concept also implies that culturerequiresof its
believers a dedication to its determiningmoral evaluations, its emotional expressions, and

its cognitive conceptions. All of this is implicit in Geertz's idea that culture is "webs of
significance":that is, culture is a discourse about multiple social and personaldimensions
of significant meanings.Thus, whetherhandeddown from above and unexaminedor inter-
preted and constructedby groups of persons, cultureis a discourse to which its adherents
are deeply committed because it is the narrativethat they use to organize and orient the
moral, cognitive, and emotional-expressivedimensions of their personal and social lives.
A lesser formulation of culture caricaturesthe human symbolic experience, and a lesser
formulationof ideology as culturewould not explainhow movementadherentsaremobilized.
Adherents to the segregationist worldview constructedparticularizedideological ver-
sions of that culture in the language they employed, cultures in which they could fully
immerse themselves. They aligned their ideological constructionsusing their interestsand
immediate experiences to particularizethe southernsegregationistworldview. Withinthis
formulation,we developed a comprehensiveconception of ideology as a locally produced,
interest-basedmobilizing culturethatacts as a resourceto mobilize movementparticipants
for change or resistance. We intentionally depicted ideology as "particularized,"eschew-
ing terms such as "privatized"or "individuated."We wanted to avoid the relative and
reductive connotationof those words, suggesting instead that movement ideologies can be
made particularto socially structuredgroups' interests,experiences, and circumstancesin
a manneranalogous to the way Gumperzdemonstratedthat ethnic and racial groups may
particularizetheir language use and comprehension (Gumperz 1982:153-203). To "par-
ticularize" is a structuringconception, not a form of "phenomenologicalindividualism"
(McAdam, Tarrow,and Tilly 1996:20). It refers to groups' uses of linguistic and extralin-
guistic discourse strategies to construct particularizedcultures as ideological languages
relevant to their interests, experiences, and circumstances.
In complex societies, groups of persons adheringto a cultural abstractionsuch as the
southernsegregationistworldview exist in differentsocial structures.This worldview may
be shared, but in order for it to be resonant and meaningfully authentic within specific
differentiated circumstances, each group must particularize it. By doing so, the group
constructs, in Gramsci's (1971) conceptual language, an "organic ideology"-what we
refer to as "operative ideology." Without particularizing,a cultural worldview contains
abstractideas that individuals may believe in, such as "the naturalorder of segregation,"
but such abstractthought is inherentlydifficult to apply to groups' socially situatedmean-
ings and interactivepractices.
Our illustrationof the Chicago resisters' reactions to King's efforts at open housing is
directly addressed to the linguistic process of constructing an "operativeideology" that
would provide a repertoireof socially situated norms and practices fit to the culture of a
northerncity. While this symbolic form of countermovementoperative ideology was dis-
tinct, it drew, in common with the religious and historical segregationistideologies, on an
assumptionof the innate inability of African Americans to integrateinto white American
society. The Chicago ideological language muted this assumption, suggesting that if this
inability were overcome it would be possible to integrate black Americans into white
society, although many of these correspondentsdoubted that this would or could ever
occur.
We recognize that we are suggesting a different epistemological conception of social
structuresthan is found in traditionalstructuralapproachesto social movements, whether
approving (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow,and Tilly 1996) or critical (e.g., Goodwin and Jasper
1999). The structureswe point to are real. They exist, but they affect groups' cultural
constructions when they are made relevant to a group's circumstances. Situated groups
make structuresrelevant through the manners in which they interpretthem. However, it
should be kept in mind that it is not possible to determinea priori what structureswill be
made relevant and what proportionof a group will do so within terms sanctioned by the
group.And while theremay be predictabletendencies of interpretationfor differentgroups,
even in these instances whole groups never conform to a priori interpretiveexpectations
drawnfrom specific structures.Measuredagainstpredictableexpectations,anomalouscul-
tural interpretationsand practices are always created within a single group.
Additionally, no exhaustive set of structurescan be listed a priori that will influence
ideological constructions. We discovered in our investigation that four very different-
some unusual and unexpected-structural and culturalcircumstances acted as pragmatic
discourse strategies (Steinbergforthcoming).'3The immediatecircumstancesthey used to
shape their particularizedideologies included religious scripturalbeliefs, historical tradi-
tions and pseudoscientific formulationsof race, the structuringof American society as a
great political and economic nation, and the values of equality and individualism as the
bases for full participationin American society.
To be sure, our approachto ideology and movement participationhas been influenced
by the cultural constructionist theoretical tradition, particularly that of symbolic inter-
actionism (Turnerand Killian 1987). However, it is also infused with theorizing from
EuropeanMarxiststructuralism,culturalanthropology,and the "languageturn"in cultural
studies. We also note, as we did earlier in the essay, that we have developed our formula-
tion in response to the lively debate in the social-movement literatureregardinga cultural
theory adequate to the task of explaining movement participation.Our remarks on the
comprehensivenessof our conception of ideology speak directly to this issue.
Withinthe social-movementliterature,the cultural-symbolicfeaturesof movements are
thoughtto producereduced, unified meanings among movement participants.We suggest
that they operate differently.For example, Snow and colleagues write, "By frame align-
ment, we refer to the linkage of individual and SMO interpretativeorientations,such that
some set of individualinterests,values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, andideology
are congruent and complementary.... By renderingevents or occurrences meaningful,
frames function to organize experiences and guide action"(Snow et al. 1986:464, empha-
sis in the original). If we carry forward this logic, we must conclude that if members'
interests, values, and beliefs and the SMO's activities, goals, and ideology are "congru-
ent," then all members'consciousness are congruentwith the organizationalleadership's
conception of the movement and in turnare congruentwith all other members'conscious-
ness (see also a similar critique in Hart [1996]).
McAdam offers a different theoretical approachto social movements-the "political
process model"-and yet he writes of his cultural-symbolicformulation,"cognitive liber-
ation," that
movement emergence implies a transformationof consciousness within a significant

segment of the aggrieved population. Before collective protest can get under way,
people mustcollectively define theirsituationsas unjustand subjectto changethrough
group action.... Evidence of this optimistic "stateof mind"is again sketchy, but is
so consistent as to leave little doubt that it was sharedby large numbersof blacks in
the early 1960s.... If the generation of insurgency depends on the presence of
sharedcognitions within the movement's mass base, then just as surely the absence
of these same cognitions contributesto movement decline. (McAdam 1999:51, 161,
201)
13Steinberg makes the coherentpoint that structuresand cultures should be read semiotically and situationally
ratherthan providing them with a priori, invariantmeanings (Steinbergforthcoming:3-9).
McAdam's assertion that sharedcognitions makes insurgencypossible and the absence of

shared cognitions contributes to its decline makes clear the necessity, in his model, of
movement members' sharedculturalmeanings.
Alberto Melucci represents a third approach to social movements. The cultural-
symbolic component of movement members' subjectivity is formulatedin his concept of
"collective identity . .[:] this process of 'constructing'an action system. Collective iden-
tity is an interactiveand shareddefinition producedby several individuals (or groups at a
more complex level) and concerned with the orientationsof action and the field of oppor-
tunities and constraintsin which the action takes place" (Melucci 1995:44). Otherexam-
ples may be quoted here; for example, see Klandermans's notion of the "consensus
mobilization"(1984, 1988, italics ours) necessary for collective action.
However, we need not belaborthis point further.We simply note that the conception of
a movement's cultural-symbolic component-whether in the frame alignment, political
process, or new social-movementtheoreticalapproaches-is to formulatecultureas reduc-
ing and unifying meanings held among movement participants, rather than to provide
them with the agency to create distinct "operative ideologies" fashioned to the group's
situated cultures, structures,interests, and immediate circumstances.
We also should remark upon the recent synthetic effort at bringing into accord the
contributionsof structural,rational-choice,and constructionistapproachesto social move-
ments. We applaudthis ecumenical attempt. However, note that structuralfactors, tradi-
tionally conceived, still hold pride of place in this effort's sociological thinking about
social movements, as, for example: "Moreover, structuralistassumptions probably still
constitute the conceptual fulcrum on which most movement research rests" (McAdam,
Tarrow,and Tilly 1997:159; see also McAdam 1999:x and xii). In McAdam, Tarrow,and
Tilly's latest effort (2001), the authorsstrugglemightily to include an autonomouscultural-
symbolic conception, using the terms "identity,""collective identity," "identity shifts,"
"identity mechanisms," and so on. However, they have not yet achieved that conceptual
goal. They still use the identity concept to reduce and unify the consciousness among
movement participants.Further,identity is conceptualized and empirically illustratedas
determinedby structuresand structuralchanges that exist and occur within the environ-
mental contexts of contention.
In contrast, we formulate structuresas real, but interpretedfrom the perspectives of
groups relating to their circumstances.This formulationpermits groups to engage in con-
ventional cultural interpretationsof structures,objectifying and recapitulatingthem as
recognized in their conventionally encountered forms. However, it also permits groups
facing crisis situations regardingstructuresto attemptto restore or change conventional
structuralarrangements.Whetherconventionally objectified and strugglingto recapitulate
themselves or seeking to change, structuresare the products of human agency, the out-
comes of the practices in which humans engage, whatever those practices. To be sure,
practices have a solidity, and they may insist upon their recapitulation-but they may also
be changed.
In this regard, we have also entered into the debate over how to conceptualize social
movements' organizationalefforts to define the situation for participantsand in so doing
acquire, mobilize, and align participants'and movements' frames (Best 1987; Snow et al.
1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Benford 1993). Snow and Benford (1988:199, 1992) have
elaborated several factors that they suggest affect the mobilizing power of movement
organizations'frames. Among these, they point to the importanceof the ideology's rele-
vance to belief systems already extant among a targeted population, and to ideology's
relation to the life-world and experiences of potential participants (Snow and Benford
1988:205). They term these processes "frameresonance."Benford also remarksupon the
"variationacross a movementwith regardto its activists' networksand experiences";these

variations,he suggests, "can yield divergent views as ... types of framings will resonate
or stimulate participation"(Benford 1993:692).
We concur with the call to attendto the importanceof frame resonance (e.g., Williams
and Kubal 1999). However, to understandhow ideology authenticallyresonates across a
spectrum of potential users requires a theory, not of social-movement organizationsand
their leaders as spokespersons, but of the interpretivepractices of participants and how
these practices may act as a resource to mobilize them.
Joan Scott writes that by examining language, we may ascertain the ways in "which
people established,interpreted,andactedon theirplace in relationto others"(Scott 1988:59).
Scott is suggesting an analysis from the point of view of those who, in theircircumstances,
interpretideology, not one from the perspectiveof those who hold positions of authorityin
movement organizations.We followed Scott's suggestion by providing a sociolinguistic
analysis of the relationship between a worldview and the ways in which it is used in
practice to create ideologies according to movement participants'use of language. It is
within this analytic context suggested by Scott, we found, that ideological language has
the power to appeal to diverse populationscohering a variety of perspectives into a move-
ment ratherthan unifying perspectives in order to do so. Ideology's conceptual strength,
therefore,resides in its capacity to understandhow groups of persons expressing a variety
of ideas-sometimes contradictoryones-are mobilized into a single movement.
We discovered thatactivists are multivocal. Conceiving movementparticipantsas univ-
ocally expressing only the formal ideology of the movement organizationserves the ana-
lyst well, because it providesfor the unity of activists'beliefs and actions amongthemselves
and between participantactivists and the movement's organization.However, such a view
runs the risk of portrayingactivists as consensual and passive, limiting their agency to
accepting the organization'sformal ideology as its leaders express it, the elite bias often
found in the literature(e.g., Benford 1997; Williams and Blackburn 1996; Williams and
Kubal 1999). Despite the analytic difficulties participants'multivocality may create for
social-movement analyses, it is appropriateto envision participants'diverse ideological
constructionsas expressions in their own voices.
In our theoreticaland empirical analyses, we centeredcultural,structural,and immedi-
ate experiential circumstancesin relation to the constructionof ideological expressions.
We illustratedhow ideology is fashioned so that it resonates authenticallyfor its users. In
order to achieve these goals, we formulatedthe interpretivecharacterof social life as a
"double hermeneutic"(Giddens 1984:xxxv, 284) involving the simultaneous interpreta-
tion of language, interests, experiences, and structuraland culturalcircumstancesthat are
themselves interpretationsof a cultural worldview. This interpretivework creates reso-
nance between a larger cultural worldview and the practices of living in particularized
ideological versions of the social world. Throughout,we have attemptedto demonstrate
that language and verbal communicationare sociological processes, and that "meaningis
'socially situated'-deriving from the particularcircumstances of the interaction-and
individualcontributionsarenot meaningfulapartfromthatsituation"(Krauss2001:16164).
Thus, we have contributedto an understandingof the culturalprocesses of interpretation
generally, and to the mobilization of participationin social movements specifically.
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Ideological Language and Social Movement Mobilization: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The current "culturalturn" in the studyof social movementshas produceda numberof

Considerthe following statementstakenfrom correspondencewrittenby four white Amer-

Sociological Theory 20:3 November 2002

THE CONCEPTOF IDEOLOGY

Some Troublesfor an AutonomousConception of Ideology

Ideology has often been conceptualizedas false-consciousness thinking (Dant 1991:5-6).

RaymondWilliams(1977:108-14) also struggledto provideconceptualdistinctionamong

suggest that it be hinged to interest-based assemblages of ideas proselytizing for hoped-for

SPECIFYING IDEOLOGY FURTHER

gent ideologies orientedto change and counterideologiesopposed to the emergingschemes,

used among persons who share similarhistories, cultures,and situations.However, despite

Second, different groups of people contextualize different substantive aspects of a

A DATASET FOR A SOCIOLINGUISTICANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY

dents constructeddistinct ideologies. The substance of the letters exhibits segregationist

Applying a Sociolinguistic Analysis of Ideology

gationists' letters to Dr. King, and the segregationistculturaltraditionas it is expressed in

egies cannotbe assumeda prioributinsteadmustbe discoveredin the letters'texts (Schegloff

The Natural Orderof Segregation:A SouthernSegregationist Cultural Worldview

Below, we describe four distinct ideological versions of the naturalorder of segrega-

Religious Constructionof Segregation: Segregation as God's Will

A writer sums up the religious constructionof segregation succinctly: "SEGREGATION

Historical Practices, TraditionalSocial Arrangements, "Scientifically"Based Inequality

Withinthis circularreasoning,biological differences arejustified by social practicesor by

That segregation is naturaland immutableis often combined with an implicit notion of

Some letters cite AbrahamLincoln as an authorityfor a back-to-Africaplan. This sug-

[Neither] Mr. L. (nor I) believe in slavery,but neitherof us want close association of

There is a common admonishmentfor King to "get back to preachingthe Gospel." One

social structuralcircumstancesin a segregated society to realign the segregationistideol-

Secular-Political Constructionand the Threatof Communism

This version involves the inclusion of the culturalvalues of equalityand individualachieve-

B-Using the N.A.A.C.P. as DUPES, to,

Particularlyafter King's public condemnationof United States involvement in Vietnam,

Even though socialism is frequentlycontrastedwith the "freeenterprisesystem,"no vision

Symbolic Segregationist Construction,the Open System, and Questions of Strategy

The religious underpinningsof this argumentexist in the naturalcondition of social order

The symbolic version of the segregationistideology emphasizes the "landof opportunity"

Ideological Versions:Agency, Structuring,and SituatedLanguage

stance and its effects upon the structuringof a particularizedsegregationistlanguage. We

King in Chicago: Symbolic Segregationist Constructionand the Potentialfor Equality

A self-identified Jewish woman from Chicago described her relationshipwith a black

Other,more blatantlysegregationist, letters coming from Chicagoans are less nuanced

It [AuburnAve.] is a sad place to see now as far as business is concerned. From

Ouranalysisuses sociolinguisticconceptsdevelopedby Gumperz(1982) andHymes (1974)

believers a dedication to its determiningmoral evaluations, its emotional expressions, and

movement emergence implies a transformationof consciousness within a significant

McAdam's assertion that sharedcognitions makes insurgencypossible and the absence of

"variationacross a movementwith regardto its activists' networksand experiences";these

.1979. "Contractionand Overdetermination:Note for an Investigation."Pp. 87-128 in For Marx, trans-

1988. "TheFormationandMobilizationof Consensus."InternationalSocial MovementResearch1:173-96.

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