I.

DISTINGUISH AND ILLUSTRATE PROHIBITION, INJUNCTION AND

QUO WARRANTO THROUGH PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE.

PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE PROVIDES:

(a) Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right

binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo
warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's
successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same
source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is
never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person — to
determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform
any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the
case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely
against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was
the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against
respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals
did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision. (Mendoza vs
Allas, 1999)

(b) This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude
officers appointed by the legislative branch of the government. Although this
Court has no control over either branch of the Congress, it does have the
power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be its officer is
holding his office according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as
a bar to jurisdiction can only be raised by the supreme power, by the
legislature, and not by one of its creatures. (Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How.
1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of the Senate appointed
by different faction thereof and contesting each other's right to the office, it
would not be the Senate by the Court which would be called upon to decide
the controversy. There is more reason for the Court to intervene when the
office of the President of the Senate is at stake. The interest of the public are
being greatly imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy determination
of the same is imperatively demanded, in the interest of good government
and public order. (Avelino vs Cuenco, 1949)
(c) Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights
and interests.6 Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the
following requisites be present: 1) there must be aright in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is
to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right
 violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the
existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected
through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has
attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the
existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The
controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is
that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation. (Idolor vs Court of Appeals,
2001)

(d) Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following
requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a
right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is
a violation of such right. 11 The onus probandi is on movant to show that there
exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to
be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is
material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent a serious damage. (Gustilo vs Real, 2001)

(e) The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition
is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the
petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals
was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run
and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the
material dates were not stated. (Lapid vs Laurea, 2002)

(f) Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition),

147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they
are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify
their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition,
since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a
preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he
may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest
proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody
and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within
the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the
arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained
persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested
can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without
prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other
remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for
prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65,
Rules of Court). (Lacson vs Secretary Perez, 2001)