TRANS LA TOR S P REFA C E

’
.

G E NE RA L D U FOUR th e C hief o f the G eneral Staff

,

o f the A rmy o f Switzerland is a gra duate o f the

,

P olytechnic S chool o f F rance — the in stitution styled

,

by the great Napol eon Th e li en w h i ch la g/ 8 m e

,

g olde n e
gg s G
.
’
ener a l D ufo ur is a distinguished
C ivil and Military E ngineer besides being a prae,
~

tical soldier I n all military matters h e is recog

.

n iz e d as o n e of the first authorities i n Europe .

The work o n Strategy G uard Tactics & c of

, ,
.
,

which a translation i s n ow o ffered to the public ,

was prepared for the instruction o f the officers of

the Swiss army It is written in a plain an d si m
.

ple style The author does n ot dea l in vague gener

.

a lit ie s,
but gives simple practical directions which
, ,

are ill u strated by actual examples left by N ap o l e o n

and o t her great generals o f ancient and modern
ti m es It will be observed that the work contains
.

n um erous excellent plates embodying principl e s in

themselves .
iv P RE FA C E .

That portion o f the original which had a special

application to the Swiss army has b een omitted in
t he translation S ome modifications an d slight a d
.

dit io n s have been ventured upo n with a View o f ,

making th e book more acceptable to A merican

readers .

U S M I ARY A C ADE MY
. . IL T ,

“7081?P oint, N Y
. .
 P AG E
.

FIG . 1 . Re la tio n o f di sta n ce s a nd tim s e of two a r mie s from a

co mmo n po int
A dv t g e f o bl iq b s f op r tio s
an a o ue a e o e a n

C o ca v e b s
n f op r tio s a e o e a n

Do bl l i s f o p r t io s
u e ne o e a n

Li e f o p r t io s to w rds fl
n o e a k of my s fro t
n a an e ne
’
n

A dv c d g an e rd fl k &ua , an e rs , c .

P r p r tory ord r fo b ttl

e a a f di vi s io n e r a e o a

A fl k m rch
an a .

A fl k m rch f l g body f tr00ps

an a o a ar e o

M th d o f m rch i g f Fr d ri c k th G re t
"
e o a n o e e e a

M rch f
a rmy co t i i g fiv corps
o an a n a n n e .

M rch f R ss i
a o rmy to A s t rl itz
u an a u e

N p ol o s m rch po Ulm i 1 805

a e n
’
a u n n

E h lo ord r
c
e n e

O rd r f b ttl
e ow ith rt ill ry i fro t f t h i f try
a e. a e n n o e n an

E mpl sho w i g r l t iv i fl
xa e, c f str t g ic l d
n e a e n uen e o a e a an

t ct ical co s id r tio s i choos i g po i t of tt c k

a n e a n n n n a a .

S e co d e mp l
n xa e

P o i t f tt c k w he
n o a wi g
a f h army i o th
,
n a n o e ac s n e

sa m r g f h ig h g ro
e an d e o 99 un .

C a se i w hich n t s iv t r i g move me t is pro p r 2 02

an e x e n e u n n n e

A m thod e f m ki g o p ed tt ck poa n an unex a a u n a

An tt ck upo th ce tr
a a n e n e

A ttac k b y corps of fo r divisio s

a u n

D fe ce b y corps of fo r d ivi s i o s
e n a u n

D f s iv e p s iti o
e en h ig h g ro do n on un

Di spos itio s f rmy i l i s rpris ed

n o an a n n e, u on th e l e ft

De fe n c f p os ti o i mo t i o s co try
e o a i n n a un a n u un

Topog r ph ic l s k tch
a a e

It i r ry
ne a

P ro fil f fi l d w ork f d f ce f
e o c mp g ard
e -
or e en o a a u .
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEG Y .

C H A P TER I .

A r t. l — D e nn i t l o n s
. .

Ir by the aid o f the histori es , o ften very incomplete ,

o f the a rmi es o f ancient tim e s we examine their
,

operations we shall find some o f them more or less

,

si milar to those o f modern armi es , and others essen

t ia lly di fferent
. The fi rst class which relate t o,

gran d movements , are withi n the domai n of S tr a teg y .

The sec on d class belong to Tactics : such are th e

di sposit ions fo r m arches for battles o f camps & c
, , ,
.

Fo r e xample , the fam ous expeditions of Hannibal

and Napoleon across the A lps presented m ore than
o n e point o f res emblance i n their gen eral outlin e ,

but the subsequent combats an d battles were entirely

di ssimilar The general arrangements o f campaigns
.

depend upon the topography o f the theatre of the

war which is almost u nchanging ; but special arrange
,

m ents evolutions , or i n a word Tactics, vary with

, , ,

the ar ms in use at di fferent periods Much valuabl e .

8 P R IN C IP LE S or S TR A TE GY .

instru ction in s tr a teg y may therefore b e derived from

the study of history : but very grave errors would
result if we attempt to apply in the armies o f the
present day the ta cti cs o f the ancients This fau l t .

has been committed by more than one m an o f merit ,

for want of reflection upon the great di fferences b e

tween ou r missile weapons an d those o f the an cients
-
,

and upon the resulting di fferences i n the arrangement

o f troops for combat .

It is evident from the preceding remarks , that strat

e
gy is in a special manner tiac s ci en ce
qf g en er a ls
; but
i n tactics in its various ramifications from th e school ,

o f the platoon to the orders o f battl e from the b i v o u a e ,

of an outpost to the campi n g o f an ar my o fficers of ,

all grades are concerned It wou l d however be ped

.
, ,

a n t ry to desire to fix invariable li m its for these two

branches o f the military art for there are many cases,

where these separating limits disappear .

Ta cti cs if we design ate by that term simply the

,

evolutions of the battle fi el d m ay so to speak be

-

, , ,

taught by mathematical figures because for each of ,

these movements there is a rule ; and this remark is

the more applicable as we descend the scale of mili
tary k nowledge But the case is not the same with
.

strategy because in its calculations account must be

,

taken of time o f the n ature of roads of ob stacles of

, ,

every kind of the q u ality o f troops of the mobility of

, ,

the enemy and m any other things whi ch can not b e

,

m easured by mathematical instruments F or exampl e .

,
 F
D E IN ITI N S O .
9

an
y one would b e greatly deceived who should b e
lieve the point A (fig 1 ) su ffi ciently protected by the
.

army M again s t an e n
emy placed at N a lit ,

tle outside the circle de

scribed with A as a cen
tre and A M as a radius .

A th o ug h upon the s u P
,

position that the gro u n d s es;

c a

is perfectly level the ar

,
F ig 1

m y M m ay reach A before th e ar my N which is at a ,

greater distance still the poi n t A is insecure because ,

t h e enemy taking th e initiative before the army M is

,

infor m ed o f its m ovement m ay have so much the

,

start as t o reach some point as P before M is ready

, ,

to m arch ; the distan ce P A being then less than M A ,

N could arrive at A before M It is quite evident .

from this illustration th at other things b esides dis

,

tances are to be taken into a c ount in calculating the

c

relative ad vant ag es o f the positions of two armies

having a common obj ect in view : the time must be
con sidered which is n ecessary for one army to be i n
formed o f the movement o f the other ; and this ele
m ent o f tim e is the on e which i n war gives so many
advantages to the general who takes the initiative ,

and moves with activity If moreover the quality

.
, ,

of the roads is v a ri a bl e ; if rivers are to be crossed an d

fil
de e s to be passed — as the two armies will seldom be
upon equal terms in these particulars the p roble m—

a
l
10 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

of the relative advantages of positions becomes still

more complicated and less capable of solution by the
,

use o f geometrical figures ; genius alone can grasp

an d solve it .

Having now S xplained what is to be understood by

the terms s tr a teg y an d ta cti cs to the definition o f
,

which too much importance has perhaps been lately

given we shall proceed with o u r subj ect
,
.

In every operation in war there are three principal

things to be considered : the point o f departure the ,

point to be attained and the direction to be followed

,

i n reaching it The line u pon which an arm y rests

.
,

an d fro m which it proceeds to act against the enemy ,

i s called the ba s e of op er a ti on s Thus the Rhin e .

, ,

with its fortified cities is the base o f operations for

,

the F rench in waging a war in G erm any The A lps .

and P yrenees with their forts an d de fil e s are the

, ,

bases for o p erations in Italy an d Spain .

If the army remains mpon its base of Operations ,

and limits itself to di sputing its possession with the

enemy it takes the name o f li n e of def en ce In fol
, .

lowing the course o f the D anube we fin d in succes ,

sion the lines of defence o f the Black F orest ; o f the

Iller which has Ul m o n the right o f the L ech pass
, ,

ing by A ugsburg ; o f the Iser having Munich an d ,

L andshut near it ; of the Inn which empties into the

,

D anube at P assau & c A hundred combats have

,
.

taken place on these di fferent lines .

The points whi ch it is desirable to attain whose ,

 BA S E S OF O PE RATI ON S . 11

capture is important for the success o f a campaign ,

are call e d objecti ve p oi n ts or o bj ecti ves (f op er a ti on s
, .

The route pursued by an army in reaching an ob

ec ti ve is the l i n e
j of p
o e r a ti on s which takes the name
,

o f li n e o
f r etr ea t when passed over by an army reti

ring before a victorious enemy in order to gain som e ,

line of defence where a stand m ay be made .

A r t . I L— B a s c s o f Op era tio n s.

The base o f Operations should be formed of secure

poi n ts where every thing is collected that is necessary
,

for the wants o f the army and from whi ch proceed ,

roads suitable for pu r poses o f transportation If these .

points are j oined by a n atural obstacle such as a river, ,

a chain o f mountains a great m arsh extensive forests

, , ,

th e l in e is s o much the better o n account o f the diffi

,

c u l ti e s presented to an enemy who attempts to break

through it .

A b as e o f operations which has some extent is bet

ter than a contracted o n e because there is more room
,

fo r m anoeuvres and there is less danger o f being cut

,

o ff from it . If fo r example a single city forms the

, ,

bas e an d an en emy gets possession of the principal

,

road leading to it the army m ay be greatly embar

,

r a ss e d as it will be c u t o ff from all supplies and r e

,

enforcements .

The form o f the b ase is not a m atter of i n differ

ence : if it is concave to the front or has its e x tr em i ,

ties resting upon the sea a great lak e or some other

, ,
12 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

prominent obstacle the army has its wings m uch

,

more secure than if the base be convex, or presents a

point towards the en emy .

When an army moves forward a long distance it is ,

obliged to assume a n ew b a se in advance o f the first ,

in order to have dép Ot s at han d from which its sup
plies may be drawn This n ew line is called the
.

s econ da r
y b f p
a se o o er a ti on s
; it is usually a river
crossi n g the line o f operations and the towns upon it ,

are fortified if they are not already so i n order to the

, ,

security of the military supplies & c collected in them ,

.
,
.

If it is prudent to occupy successive bases of opera

tions as the army advances into an enemy s country ’
,

still it is not to be understood to be necessary for it to

,

halt in the midst o f a seri es of successes for the pur

pose Of making these establishments Troops are left .

behind or others are brou ght up to occupy and fortify

, ,

the points to be held an d establi sh dep Ot s o f supplies

, ,

while the army continues to advance and profit by

the s uccesses already gained .

When the secondary base is not parallel to the

ori ginal base the more distant extremity must b e
,

specially strengthened by art because it is more ex ,

posed to the attacks o f the enemy The other ex .

t rem ity from its retired position is more secure but

, , ,

a ffords less protection to the army .

A n oblique base gives an army the opportunity Of

’
threatening th e en emy s communications an d base ,

without exposing its own Thus the army M (fig . .

 A
B S E S OF O P E R ATIO N S .

whose original base w as a fi

g
R S parallel to P Q the
, ,

b a s e o f the en emy and ,

which has as its n atural

line o f operations A B ,
v
perpendi cular to these
two lines could not m ak e
,

an attempt upon the left

flank o f the army N with
o u t runni n g the ris k o f A

5‘
having its o w n communi mg 2 , ,

ca t ions intercepted unless it h a d taken a secondary,

base XY oblique t o A B for the pos itions would be

, ,

reciprocal If you cut the line of communica t ions of

.

the enemy he m ay take possession o f yours which is

, ,

l e ft Open to hi m Bu t with th e n ew base the lateral

.
,

m ovement is n ot impr ude n t because M always h as a ,

direct and safe retreat upon the point Y, which is

*
near en ough to give support .

A ttention has already been called to the advantages

o f a base o f operations which is concave towards th e

enemy an d embraces with its wings the theatre of the

,

war When it is decidedl y o f this form it gives

.
,

an opportunity o f changing the line o f operations if ,

necessary, without the loss o f the support o f a secure

b ase Suppose f or example that the base o f opera
.
, ,

tions has the form R S T (fig th e army M basing .

,

o ts lik e th
P in e on e st o w h ich
in q u e i n, a re r d
ma k e in th e fig u e rs
by s m ll c ircl s
a e ,
ar e fort d c t s or posts
ifi e i ie .
14 P RINC IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

itself o n R S may at ,

first adopt the lin e A B

in its operations agai n st
the army N whose base ,

is P Q and afterwards , ,

if circumstances render
T
it necessary or a dv an t a
geons the line B C may
,

be taken up which h a s ,

S T for a base In th is .
O
A .

F ig 3
. . way the K ing o f P ru ssia ,

before the battle of P rague passed from the left to the

,

right bank o f the Moldau The passage having taken

.

place he had a new base upon the fron tier o f S ilesia

, ,

a n d abandon ed the o n e he had at first in the de fil e s

separating Bohemia from S axony His first line o f .

operations was from Dresden to P rague by the le ft

bank of the M oldau ; the second was directed towards
N eiss a strong position in S ilesi a the two b ases
,

made an angle with its opening towards the enemy .

In the same way in 1 809 Napoleon had the D anub e

, ,

for his base an d a line of operations directed towards

,

Ingolstadt but foun d it prudent to change both pre

, ,

v i ou s to the combat o f L andshut an d the celebrated

battle o f Eckmuhl : he w rote to his generals that b e

w a s n o l on g er con cer n ed a bou t th e D a n u be that he had
chosen a new base on the L ech an d that th ey should
,

fall back to Augsburg in the eve nt of a fai lure (See .

 LIN E S OF O P ER ATION S . 15

When the change i n the lin e o f operations is made

j ust before a battle great advant a g es may b e gained
, ,

because it deranges all the plans of t he enemy Non e .

but great generals however know when to m ake such

, ,

a change .

The army N (fig which has but a single base ,

.

P Q must remain upon the line B D as it otherwise

, ,

run s the ris k o f having its retreat cut Off in th e event ,

o f a reverse It i s laid down as a principle that in

.
,

such a case even if the forces were superior the

, ,

aban donm ent o f the li n e 13 D which is virtually th e ,

abandonm en t o f the bas e P Q would be wro n g ,

.

Whe n o n e party controls the sea a portion of the ,

coast where a good harbor m ay be held and furnished

,
‘

with supplies is a su fficien t bas e for an invasion

,
.

The English o n di fferent occas ion s have taken C o

r unn a L isbon and D un k irk as bases o f Operations
, , ,

th ey used every possible exertion t o retain th e last

n amed place as a foothold upon the coast of F rance ;
they still hold G ibraltar when ce they are ready to ,

pen etrate in to Spain when ever it is necessary or

*
pol itic .

Art . [ IL — L i n es o f Op e ra tio n s.

A ll routes are n ot equally good for moving against

an enemy Some lead more directly and safely than
.

o t hers to the obj ect aim ed at ; some are more or less

Ve ra C r u z w as t h e bs a e for th e op r tio e a n of G e ne r l S cott s

a
’

c mp
a a ig n in Me x ico , in 1 847, as a lso f th t or a of th e Fr ch i en ,
n

1 86 2
16 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

favorable according to the relative inferi ori ty in e av

,

alr
y or infantry ; some abound more in resources are ,

’
more convenient for turning the enemy s positions ;
some are more completely protected by the base o f
operations & c O n e o f the most v alu able talents of
,
.

a general is that which en ables him to estimate p r o

perly the relative advantages o f li n es o f operations ,
an d to choose the best .

The line of operations is s imp le when the army p ro

c e e ds in a single direction and remains united ; o r at ,

any rate the corps composing it are not so distant

,

fro m each other that they cannot afford mutual sup

port It is therefore the case of roads being used
.
, ,

nearly parallel not distant from each other and

, ,

separated by no great obstacles .

The line of operations is dou ble when the army is

divided an d although procee ding from a single base
, , ,

the different corps move along lines so distant from

each other that they could not be concentrated the
same day upon a common field o f battle When .

Marshal Wu rm s er issuing from the passes o f the

,

Tyrol to succor Mantua which was besieged by ,

B onaparte divided his army into t w o parts with a

, ,

vie w of advancing simultan eously along the valleys

o f the A dige and C hiese on both sides of L ake G arda , ,

he had a double line o f operations In the same year .

,

1 79 6 J ourdan and Moreau basing themselves on the

, ,

Rhine bet ween Basle an d Mayence man oeuvred upon

, ,

the Mai n an d Danube separately : they had a double

 L INES OF O P ER ATIO

line of operations ; o r what is n ea,

each had his o wn line .

Except in the case o f being as strong as the enemy ,

both m orall y an d physically or stronger upon each ,

.

li ne it is disadvantageous to use a double line o f

,

operation s especially if it is divergent ; because the

,

enemy m ay take a position between the fraction s o f

the army beat each separately an d fin d h i ms elf
, ,

favorably situated for cutti n g their communications .

The greater the progress m ade upon divergent lines

o f operations the greater does the disadvant age b e
,

come be cause the two arm ies are constantly in c r e a s

ing their distance fro m each other as well as the dif ,

fi c u l ty o f a ffording m utual ass istance The enemy .

between them m ay suddenly m ove ag ainst on e o f the

two corps an d beat it before the other can come up ;
he m ay then return to the latter with a fair prospect ,

o f overwhelmi n g it i n the sam e way In the first o f .

the two examples cited above Marshal VVu r ms e r was ,

beaten by his young oppon ent who took a position ,

between hi s two corps and destroyed them in succes

sion . In t h e secon d ex ample the F rench gen erals ,

were forced to retreat by the A rchduke C harles who ,

m an oeuvred upon a S in gle interior line and had th e ,

skill t o profit by his position It is evident from this.

explan ation that al though there is da n ger o f bei n g

,

enveloped o n a battle fi e l d the case changes when

-

the di stances increase and the e n veloping corps are

,

t oo far separate d t o be able to combine the i r attacks .

18 P R INC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

Then the central position is the best provi ded there ,

is a display o f the energy requisite in such circum

stances Thus the rules o f strategy m ay di ffer essen
.
,

t ially from those o f tactics ; they may even b e di

r e c tl in opposition and this is o n e o f the causes
y
which often render the application o f these rules so
diffi cult .

The only case in which even with forces nearly

,

equal , and when powerful motives urge to such a

course it is proper to take a double line in presence
,

o f a respectable enemy is that where h e moves upon

,

two diverging or widely separated lines But then .

the lines should be i n ter i or in order that the two

,

corps M an d M (fig 4) ’
.

m ay if n ecessary kee p
, ,

1 up an i nter commu ni -

cation give mutual as ,

X
sist e nce in case of at
fig
‘ n :

tack or con centrate sud,

de n l y against one o f th e
hostile c orp e N N which '

m an cr u vrm
0

are upon o
n é — a s
D

Fi g 4. . ex te r i or l i nes and can ,

n o t possibly take part i n the same action The prin .

c ip l e o f interior l ines especially when they are con

,

verging is really nothin g but a modification of that

,

o f the simple lin e of operations This principle con

.

sists in always kee ping your corps between those of

th e enemy, more nearly together than hi s and better ,
 LIN E S OF O P E R A TION S .

prepared to afford mu t u al support It is however al .

, ,

ways sa fer to man oeuvre upon a single l in e than upon

two even if they are interior especially so when
,

the country is entirely open an d there is no obstacle ,

between you an d the enemy which would permit hi m

to attack o n e o f your corps by s u rpri s e before the ,

other could rej oin it .

We must n o t confound with double o r m ultiple lin es

o f operations the di fferen t roads tak en by the corps

composing a single army for the pur p ose o f reachin g,

a com m on place o f con centration in this case there

i s a common obj ect to be attained and the corps are ,

separated only temporarily to e n able the m to move ,

m ore rapidly to gai n a thorough knowledge o f th e

,

country and to subsist m ore easily This separation

, .

is ind e ed the perfection o f art when it is arranged i n

, , ,

such a m anner as t o cease at the moment the decisive

stru ggle begin s It is o n e o f th e best mean s o f keep
.

ing the enemy a long time uncertain as to the point

where he will be attacked To know how altern ately .

t o separate the corps in order to embrace a great ex

,

tent o f country when circumstances permit o r requi re

it and t o concentrate them rapidly to strik e decisive
,

blows is o n e o f the most evident marks of mili

,

tary genius N 0 gen eral of m od ern times h as gi v en

.

stronger proofs of poss essing this faculty than N a

p e le e n .

When a comm ander i s forced by th e events o f the

war to change the original line of Operations and to ,
20 P R IN C IP LE S OF S TR A TE G Y .

take a n ew o n e the latter is called an a cci den ta l line

,

o f operations But it would be improper to apply

.

this term to a lin e take n voluntarily for th e purpose ,

of marching upon a po int that the enemy may have

left unprotected because he imagin es himself th r eat
,

en ed in another direction The change o f the lin e .

,

far from being an accident i n t his case is the resul t ,

o f a wise combination and the probable cause o f i m ,

portant successes Th e primit ive lin e would then be .

,

to some extent a prete n ded o n e and the secon dary

, ,

line the real o n e ; it should n o t therefore be called

, , ,

accidental : it would be simply a new line of opera

*
tions .

It is sometimes proper i n a retrograde movement , ,

to abandon the n atural line O f retreat and adopt a n ew

o n e for the purpose o f drawing the enemy into a part
,

o f the country where his supe r iority m ay be diminished

and himself removed from hi s principal obj ect Th e .

re t reat is then m ade paral lel to the frontier instead o f

along the origin al l in e which is usually perpendicular ,

to it This line of retreat cannot be s tyled accidental

.
,

because it is made through choice and has an a dva n

tage over th e natural line It has received the n ame .

of
p a r a l le l r etr ea t which i s very appropriate F red , .

erick o f P r u ssia having been obliged by t he loss of

, ,

W a sh in g ton made l f op r t io s ft r th
a ch an g e in h is in e o e a n a e e ac

ti o f Pri c to i N w J rs y w hich i
n o n e n, n f th fi st i milit ry
e e e ,
s on e o e ne n a

hi story N pol o h d proj ct d ch g i h i l i f op r tio s i

. a e n a e e a an e n s ne o e a n ,
n

c s h lost th b ttl f A st rlitz b t v ictory r d r d i t

a e e e a e o c tiou e ,
u en e e s ex e u n

un ne cess ry — H ll k M l t y A t d S
a . a ec
’
s i i ar r an c i e nce.
 L INE S OF O P E R ATIO N S .

a l arge c o n v e y to raise the siege o f O lmutz adopted

, ,

a line o f retreat through Bohemia i n preference to

re entering S ilesi a by his n at u ral line from O lmutz
-
,

to Neiss : by pursuing thi s cours e he continued ,

though retreating to wage th e war on his enemy s

,
’

s oil and to relieve his o w n provinces from its burdens

, .

The lin e was really accidental only for his ad versary .

S uccess i n such a case requires in the first p l ac e

, , , ,

that the force be not t o o much infe rior t o that o f the

pursuing en emy ; and secondly tha t the retiring army
, ,

b e n ot so fa r from its ow n te rritory as to run the ris k

o f being entirely cut o ff The n at ure o f th e surround
.

ing country must be considered i n coming to a con

elusion in this matter ; if it i s di fficul t the movement ,

will be the less d angerous ; if the country is o n the ,

contrary free from obstacles the Safest road wil l

, ,

u sually b e the shortest .

If th e retreat i s effected behin d a lin e of defence

which the enemy h as forced it m ay still b e parallel
,

rather than perpendicul ar t o that line because h e is ,

thus withdrawn from his obj ect o f penetrating i nto

the interior an d m arching o n the capi t al ; there is
thus a gai n o f time and al though the cou ntry is not
,

relieved by it of the burdens of th e war it has all the ,

other advantages of the parallel retreat The re t reat .

o f Marshal S oult in 1 81 4 be f ore th e English army

, , ,
’
may be classed under this head Wellington s m ain .

obj ect was to cross the G aronn e an d march upon P aris ;

Soult moved along the P yren ees forci n g Wellington ,
22 P RIN C IP LE S or STR ATE GY .

to follo w h im as far as Toulouse where h e detained ,

the English gen eral several days

When a choice is to be made between several lin es
o f Operations that should be preferred which o ffers
,

—
the greatest facili t ies fo subsisten ce where the army
r

will be safest and have the greatest advantages If .

it i s superior in cavalry the level country wil l be

,

better for its operation s ; in the contrary case broke n ,

o r mountainou s cou ntry will probably be m ore suitable .

A line o f operation s parallel and n ear to a water

course is very favorable because the army has at once
,

a support for o n e o f its w ings an d great a dditional ,

facilities for transportation The position o f th e ene

.

m y has also a great influence u pon the choice of a lin e

of Operations . If he is spread o u t in cantonments
over a large extent o f country that route will b e the ,

best which leads into the m idst of his isolated corps ,

and gives an assailant the opportunity of separating

them still more If in t hese circumstances the line
.
, ,

o f operation s were direct e d towards o n e of th e e x tr e m i

ties o f the hostile army its co r ps woul d be pressed

,

back to w ards each other and their concentration ,

would be rather exp dited than hindered If how

e .
,

ever the en emy is concentrated a direction should be

, ,

chosen by which o n e of his flanks m ay b e threatened ,

provided your o w n line run s no risk o f bei n g cut ;

the first principle is n ever to u ncover the base or the
line o f operatio n s The plan to be adopted depends
.

also upon the character and capacity o f the opposing

 L IN E S OF O PERATIONS .

gen erals the quality o f the tr00ps their state o f dis

, ,

c ip lin e ,
&c Turenn e when h e h a d to contend
.
,

against th e great C ondé by n o means undertook what,

w ould h ave been simple and easy i n presence of in fe

rior m en Upon o n e occ a sion i n the campaign o f
.
,

1 6 54 he lost several men by pa s sing before the Span

,

i sh lines within range which gave ri se t o som e r e

,

m arks from severa l o fficers who were wi t h him ; he

replied It is true , this mo vement would be imp ru
dent if m ade i n presence o f C ondé ; but I desire to
examine this position closely and I k no w the cu stom s ,

o f the Sp a nish service are such th at before the arch ,

duk e i s inform ed of o u r proceedings h as given n otice ,

o f t hem to P rince de C ondé and received his advice ,

”
I shall be back to my camp There spoke a m an .

w h o was capable Of ju dging i n those matters which

b el ong to th e divine part Of th e art It is i n these .

delicate distinctions that i s manifested a true genius

for war .

It h as been stated th at the line o f operations should

be directed u pon the flank o f the ene m y when he
keeps united if it can be done without exposing your
,

own . It almost al w ays happens th at the tu rn er i s

tu r n ed; an d this i s strictly tru e i n a coun try free
from obstac les when the b ases o f the t w o armies are
,

n early parallel an d equ al In fact th e army M

.
,

om m u
(fig )
. 5 cannot m ake an attempt upon the c

n i c a t i o n s o f the army N except by following a lin e

,

o f Operations S B which is oblique to the base R S , ,

, ,
24 P R IN C IP LE S OE S TR A TE GY .

r
—
o
B
supported
a
by I t at
an d

i t s extremity ; but then

t he cen tral lin e A B
a n d the communication

o n the left are u ncovered ,

and the advantages o f

t h e extended base are lost ,

S ince the only line of r e

t r eat left is upon th e

point S It is then only .

in the case where n atural

!
Fi g 5 “
obst a cles en able a fe w
troops to defen d th e commu n ications B R an d B A , ,

agai n st attack from the enemy that the principal line ,

o f operations may probably be directed towa r ds the

flank of the enemy because by throwing forward the

,

small corps m and m upon the other lines the base R S

,
'

, , , ,

i s covered while at t he same t ime the enemy is thre a t

,

ened upon several poi nts I t may be s t ated g enerally

.
,

that it i s only when favored by n atural Obs t acles i n

t his manner movements may w i thout v e ry great risk
, , .

b e made against t he flanks o f an ene my Th e influence .

o f t h e features o f gro u nd i s always m anifested in the

resolutions arrived at in war ; the study of topography

i s the refore o f the hig h est i mportance for o fficers of
, ,

all g rades b u t especially fo r those who are intrusted

,

w ith important commands .

A li ne o f operations which is too extended rela ,

.

ti v ely to its base l oses a portion o f the advantages it

,
 S TRA TE GIC P OINTS . 25

m ay p ossess , o n account of
the opportunity afforded
an enemy of cutting it It is this consideration whi ch
.

i nduces a general as he advances from his primi t ive

,

base t o adopt secondary ones To desire to establish

,
.

a fixed relation between t he length o f a lin e o f Opera

tions and the extent o f a base would be ridicul ous
pedan try The triangle form ed by connecting the p 0
.
<

S itiou o f the army with the extremi t ies o f the base may

vary infinitely Its form an d dimen sion s gener al ly

.

do n o t depend upon o u r will It i s s u ffi cient to say

.
,

that the greater the extent o f th e base the m ore dis ,

tan t may be the Operatio n s of the army without having

its communications endangered ; nearly i n the sam e
way that a pyramid m ay wi t h equal stability , have
,

a gre ater height as its base is broader .

A r t . l V .— S t r a t e g i c P o i n ts.

Objec ti ve p are also called s tr a teg i cp o in ts ; and

o i n ts

we include under this denomin ation not only those

w hich m ay b e consid ered as the principal obj ects t o
be attained , but also those whose occupation is of
manifest advantage t o th e army .

A capital city is a strategic point o f great impor

tance because i t regul ates o r greatly influences the
,

public opinion o f the n ation contains abundant r e .

sources of every kind t he loss of which m ay greatly

,

paralyze the enemy ; and to the minds of a large por

tion o f the people all hope o f successfu l defence is
2
26 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRATE GY .

lost when an invadi n g army has reached the heart of

the state If by seizing the capital no other than th e
.

moral effect is produced of discouraging the peopl e ,

it is still a worthy obj ect o f the e ffo r ts o f an invading

*
army .

A point is strategic when it is the key o f several

important communications when it controls the n avi ,

gati e n of a river o r defends som e importan t passage .

F or i n stance Ratisbon on the Danube which is the , , ,

centre o f important com m unications on both banks

o f th e river has always been shown in the wars i n
, ,

G erman y to be a strategic point for th e p o sSe ss ion

,

o f which the belligerents have made great e fforts .

S molensk on the Borys th e n es is another ; this city is

in t h e interval between the Bo ry s th e n e s and the M ej a ,

the key o f the Russian empire on the side of Moscow .

Hence in 1 81 2 the Russian s were as anxious to hold

, ,

this point as the F rench to seize it The city of L an .

gres situat ed n ear the sources o f several o f the

,

oss ss io of G o T ri Al
Th e p e dri Mil & i 1 79 6
n en a, u n, e x an a, an , c .
,
n ,

both from t h ir pol itic l d milit ry import c h d d cid d i fl

e a an a an e, a a. e e n u

c po th r s lts f th w i th s s v r l st t s I th s me
en e u n e e u o e ar n e e e e a a e . n e a

w y V i c Ro m
a en d N pl s i 1 79 7; Vi
e, i 1 805
e , an d 1 809 a e n e nn a, n an
; ,

B rl i i 1 806 ; M drid i 1 808

e n, n dP r is i 1 8 1 4 a d 1 8 1 5 If H
,
n i an a ,
n an . ann

b l h d c pt r d t h c pit l imm di t ly ft r th b ttl

a a a u e e fC
a th
a e a e a e e a e o a n n es , e

Rom pow r w o ld h v b d stroy d Th t k i g f W shi g

an e u a e ee n e e . e a n o a n

ton , i 1 81 4 h d l ittl or o i fl
n , c a th w f the pl c w s n n uen e on e a r, or e a e a

th f i mport c i its l f d w
en o no mer l y omi l c pit l It
an e n e an as a e n na a a .
,

how v r g r tly i fl c d
e e ,
ea r p t tio bro d d r q ir d m y
n uen e o ur e u a n a a ,
an e u e an

b rill i t s cc ss s to w sh t h
an u blot from
e e tio l sc tch o a e our na na e u e n.

Th poss ss io
e f th e c pit l i
e f pr im i mpor t c i
n o civil w s
a a s o e an e n a a r, a

r e ce t e vn ts in A me ric h ve prov d H ALLEOK

en a a e -
.
 STRA TEG IC P OINTS .

streams which water F ran ce is another strategic point , .

A lexand ria i n P ied mont as a fort ress beyond the Alps

, , ,

i s equally so ; its possession is indispen sa ble fo r holding

the plai ns o f the P O Soria u p on the plateau of O ld .
,

C astile is also a strategic point al though that city

, ,

h as n o thing in it s el f to m a ke i ts conqu est desirable ;

i t is rath er the position which is important b ec aus e , ,

l ike La ngres it is near th e source of seve ral rivers

,
*
.

In level countries there are few points that are strate

gic from th eir po s itio n s ; they b e come so o n a cc ount
o f the fo rtification s which su rround them as well as ,

the suppli es an d reso urces they furn ish Many of .

th ese points ar e found in wooded undulating coun ,

tries cut up by r i vers and lake s S uch countri es are

,
.

us ual ly thickly settled .

In mountainous regi ons like th e Alps and the ,

P yrenees the n umber of strategic points is some

,

what limi ted b u t th e y a re very distinc tly m arked

,

they are found at the entrances Of de fi les at the ,

points whence se v eral valleys branch o u t at t h e jun c ,

'

tions of roads Th e high ground at the point where

.

s everal ridges m eet is al so strategic for the troo ps o c ,

c up y in g it m ay select the route by which t o descend

their movements are from a central point outwards ,

while those o f the enemy can only be accompl ished

ro t th e j ctio f th Ohio a d Miss iss ippi Riv rs i s a

C ai ,
a un n o e n e ,

str t g ic po i t f g r t import
a e n o P d c h ea t th mo t h f t h e a n ce . a u a ,
a e u o

T ss i lso import t N w Y ork N w Orl s Fortr ss Mon

e nn e e e, s a an . e ,
e e an ,
e

roe S t Lo i s
,
. d C h tt n og a are str t g i c po ints
u ,
an a a o a e .
28 P RIN C IP L ES OF S TRA TE GY .

by long circuits made to pass around the mountain s

which it may be impossible to cross If he has once .

fairly started in a valley he is i n a measure forced to

,

remain i n it as it i s extremely difficult for him to

,

pass from o n e to another ; but the troops sta t ioned at

the head of the valleys may use the m at p leasure a n d
in turn if necessary .

A r t. V. —P la n o f a C a mp a i g n.

Before undertaking a war o r any Operation a cer ,

tain obj ect to be attained m u st be decided upon ; the

direction o f the necessary movement must b e fixed
‘

in advance an d as accurately as possible ; there must

b e a thorough understandi n g of th e real obj ect aimed
at i n order that every thing m ay be prearranged and
,

nothing left to chance This is called m a ki n g th e

.

h e ca m a i g n :
p l an o
f t p the definitio n itself implies

that the war is to be O ffensi ve .

It is evident that this plan shoul d be limited to the

grand strategic Operations and be only an outline o f
them leaving as much latitude as possible for choice
,

o f movements o f detail and execution It would b e .

absurd to pretend to dictate to a general what he

ought to do from day to day for after the first , ,

m arches and he has reached the theatre o f the ene

,
’
my s operation s he n o longer does what h e likes but
,

what he can : m arches m an oeuvres combats depend

, ,

upon imper i ous circ u m stances th e determinations to

m ak e them are usuall y sudden and res ul t from the posi
 P L AN OF A C ALIP AIG N .

tion resources forces and condition of the enemy The

, , , .

general should be perfectly untrammelled in carrying

o u t a plan o f campaign even if it has been m arked ,

o u t for him by higher authori ty ; but it is still better

,

a fte r selecting a co m pe t ent m an to let him m ake his ,

o w n plan and attend als o t o its execution as he b e

, ,

i ng more i nterested in its succes s than any o n e else ,

will strive to make i t su ccee d .

In m aking a p lan o f ca m pa ign m aps are n ecessary , ,

an d fo r this pu rpose those upon a small scale are th e ,

b est as they show a whole country together It is

,
.

enough for the m to indicate ex actly the position o f

fortified places water courses t he m ain roads moun
,
-
, ,

tain ran ges frontie rs Th e s e maps are best which

,
.

are most distinctly m arked becau se they are more ,

eas ily consulte d Maps on a large scale or topo

.
,

graphi c al m aps a r e useful i n determinin g questions

,

o f detail but t he n umber o f sheets such maps u sual

,

ly consist o f rende rs them inconvenient for use in

m aking t he gener a l arrangements o f a plan of a cam
ai n
p g The . topographical maps will be con sulted
when a camp is to be establish ed , a position taken
up an order o f battl e agreed upon
,
.

The plan o f the campaig n indicates the places of

con centration o f troops the base and line of opera ,

tion s the strategic points to be attaine d

,
.

The choic e of t he points o f concentra t ion of troops

is regulated n o t only by the consideration of subsi st
en ce although this is always very important but by
, ,
30 PR INC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

the desire to occupy s u ch positions as will ke ep the

en emy uncertain where he is to be attacked an d ,

which p ermit the ini t iative to be taken promptly an d

in strong force The distance o f the d ifferent points
.

o f assembly should be so calculated that all the corps

m ay arri ve at the same time at the general rendez

v ous in order to pass t he frontier toge t he r Thus i n .
,

1 81 5 N apoleon having determ i ned to attack the a l

,

lied ar mies directed his forc es towards Belgium which

, ,

was occupied by the English and P russians They .

were covering all t he space betwee n L iege M o n s , ,

and Brussel s for a distance of six t y o r se ven ty miles

,

along t he S ambre and t he Meuse being p rincipally ,

established between Mons an d Na m ur N apoleon .

assembled his forces at Maubeuge Beau m o nt and , ,

P hilippeville thus threat ening Mons Brussels and

, , ,

Na mur an d forcing the ene m y to remain separated

,
.

He resolved to pass the fr on t ier at C harleroi with a ,

View of assailing the centre of the hos t ile can t on

m ents C alculating t he distan ce he caused the s e v
.
,

e r al corps to set o u t at hours which enabled them to

ar r ive simultaneously at C ha r leroi The p l ace was .

readily taken They passed the S ambre an d on the

.
,

same day J un e 1 5 th camped i n the enemy s coun

, ,
’

try This is a n interesting example : it demonstrates

.

the influ ence of a good choice of places of assembly

upon t he first successes the moral effect of which i s,

so great The same gen eral two years previously

.
, ,

Operating u pon a vastly g reater scale obtained the ,

 P L AN or A C A M P AI N . G 31

same precision in th e results o f his arrangements .

He h a d assembled his corps o n th e Ni em en ; he sent

them by di fferen t roads and at di fferen t times to
wards O s tr o w n o where they a rrived aft er long march
, ,

es a t the momen t when the t w o armies were about to

,

com e to blows G eneral B arclay wi t h F abian pru

.
,

dence avoided th e e ffect o f this for m id able c o n c e n

,

t r a t io n by ab andoning the position to his ad versary

,
.

In a plan o f campaign the base o f operations can ,

only be a subj ect of discussion when there i s a choice

between t wo frontiers and there is a hesi t ation which t o
,

take F or example if a w a r were impending bet w ee n

.
,

F rance and A ustria and F rance as she usually does

, , ,

wished to take th e o ffensive there would be occasion ,

for discussi n g the relati ve advantages o f the Rhine

frontier or that o f the A lps This is the tim e whe n .

th e general form o f the base must be considered and ,

its influence upon the obj ect in view If it i s concave .

,

the army a fter ad vancing will h ave a secure support

for its wings and rear If it form s a salient angle as
.
,

does S ile ia i n the A ust rian S tates there is the a dv an

s
,

tage o f being en abled with a single body o f troops to

, ,

keep the ene my uncertain as to the qua rter t o be at

tacked ; and he is thus obliged to spread his forces
along the whole circuit to b e guarded which is very ,

unfortun a t e for him But even if he remains united

.
,

there is every facility for attracting his attention i n

o n e direction suddenly striking a blow in the other by
,

the short est route an d taking h i m unawares This

,
.
32 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

salient form is therefore advantageous for opening a

campaign ; but th e army run s the risk in case o f a ,

defeat of being separated from its base The case is

,
.

reversed with a concave base .

The importance of the b ase of operation s increases

with its extent its defensive proper t ies its resources
, ,

o f every kind its vicinity to d ep ots the facilities for

, ,

reaching it from th e interior & c If it i s p e rp e n dic u ,

.

lar to the p roposed line of operations and extends b e ,

yon d it o n b oth sides it i s better than if it were oblique

, ,

an d only supported the line on o n e side .

When t herefore in a plan of campaign there is an

, , ,

Opportunity to compare the rel ative advantages of two

b ases of operations not only should the characte r of
,

the base be considered as a more or less solid support

,

for th e army a greater or less obstacle to the en emy

, ,

but also its form and relative position .

O f two frontiers o n e necessarily has preponderating

,

advantages ; it should t herefore be selected as the base

o f operations and all the disposable means o f attack
,

should be collected upon it A faul t is committed i n .

proceeding fro m two bases at th e same time It is .

much better to stand on t he defensive on one frontier ,

i n order to collect more troops o n the other and secure ,

more chances o f success S uccess seldom follows a .

division o f forces and the same reason s which make

double li n es o f Operations dangerous are equally power ,

ful against attempts to act o ffen si vely fro m two distinct

bases There should o n the contrary always be the
.
. ,
 P L AN OF A C A M P A IGN . 33

greatest possible concentration o f e ffort i n order that ,

successes which are gain ed m ay be decisive and

they will alway s be more so upon the important fron
tier than upon the other ; all proper means o f strength
c uing the one without to o much weakening th e power
,

o f de fen ce o f the other should b e adopted ; in the ,

same manner upon a battl e field troops ar e wi t hdrawn ,

from the wing that is less th reatened i n order t o re e n ,

-

force that one which is to d e cide th e fate of the conflict .

The discussion o f the di fferent lines o f operation s

that may be followed is an essential par t o f the pla n
,

o f a ca m paign In fact it is n o t with these lines as

.
,

with the ba s e which o ftentimes gives no ground for

,

di s cussion for the reas o n that it is determin ed before

,

hand by the geo graphic al posi t ion o f the coun t ry where

the war i s to be w aged L ines o f Operations o n the .
,

contrary may be very di fferent b ecause there are al

, ,
~

mos t always seve ral routes leading to the same obj ect .

There are so many things to be considered that the ,

choice of the b e st line is always a very delicate matter .

In this the general shows his true conception o f the

,

principles of the art It is scarcely poss ible to lay

.

down other rules o n this subj ect th an those stated in

A rticle III It m ay be added that in discu ssing these
.
,

lines e ffec t i ve distances are to be calculated that is to

, ,

say the times actually necessary for passing over

,

them and not the dis tan ces on the map ; all things
,

else b eing equal the shortest rou t e should be adopted ;

,

the best ro ad will b e used when there are no s trong

x
2
34 PRIN CIP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

reasons for leaving it for troops march much more

,

rapidly along a broad and con venient road th an ,

th r o u g h n a rr o w and di fficult paths

'

The cha r acter of .

the ci t ies to be passed de fi l e s obs t acles may oblige

, , ,

the use Of indirect and bad roads ; for the mere difli ‘

c u l ti e s o f a march a r e not usually so g r eat as those of

capturing cities and forcin g de file s When th e army .

,

in advancing is enabled to rest on e o f its w ings upon

,

a natural obstacle the best lin e o f operations wil l be

,

the o n e which is near est to that obstacle because ,

during the m arch it will be better covered by the

army whose front is almost a lways several miles i n
,

extent ; at any rate while a battle is not imminent

,
.

When the two wings of the army are u n s u p p o r te d t h e ,

lin e o f operations should proceed fr om the middle of the

front in order to be as far as possible in this u nfavor
, ,

able case equally covered on both s ides A s a gene

,
.

ral rule in a march as in a b attle t he lin e of Opera

,
.

tions must not be unco vered ; all the arra n gemen t s

should on the contrary te n d to cover and defe n d it
, ,

as much as possible .

Th e choice o f obj ective points also requires much

sagacity as th e possessi on of o n e may g ive grea t mili
,

tary advantages such as the co n trol of the navi gation

,

o f a river or t he passage across it o r the con t rol of ,

several roads o r valleys having a com mon point or an ,

ess ential lin e of retreat & c ; another may have a d

,
. ~

vantages of a di fferent kind but n o less important such, ,

as provisions , munitions , arms , clothing equipments , ,

 P L AN OF F
D E EN C E .
35

—
tools money all indispensable artic les which must be
, , ,

carried wit h the army if t hey cannot be obtained ,

along the way The capital large cities abounding

.
,

i n resources o f every kind are the principal points to ,

b e occupied and are those which in a plan o f c am

, ,

a i n should fig ure as objective poin t s o f t he first i m

p g ,

portance Bu t th is subj ect has been already treated

.

t o s ome ex tent in th e prec eding article .

A r t . V L —P l a n o f D e fe n ce.

The plan o f a defensi ve campaign m ay b e bette r

ter med p le a def en ce It consists in the first place
.
, ,

i n de termin in g the character of the war to be u nder

taken whic h depend s o u n ational ch aracter the r e
, ,

sources o f the country its topography and clima te , , .

The F rench defend themsel ves by attacking ; the G er

m ans patiently wage a methodical war behind their
frontiers ; t he S paniards strive to exterminate their
adversaries in detail the Russians in 1 81 2 were seen , ,

to d evastate their country an d burn their capi t al to ,

deprive the i nvader o f n ec essary res ources P eopl e .

w h o are courageous but unaccustomed to pri vations

, ,

will not protract a war but strive to end it by bril ,

liant a ction s ; they will strike heavy blows preferring ,

a single great b at t le where d efeat even will be glor i

,

o u s to a series of partial engagemen ts which exhaust

, ,

the coun try and lead to n o decisive res u lt .

To carry the war into the territory of the in vader or

o f h is a llies i s a s ure m ea n s of throwing part of th e
,
36 PRIN C IP L E S OF S TRA T E GY .

burden upo n their shoul ders and thwar ting their

plan s The m or a le of troops is raised by a pro ceeding
.

o f this kin d and the chances o f success are increased

,
.

But to reap success from such a plan the forces must ,

not b e too inferior and the conform ation o f the fron

,

tiers must be favorable The army mu st not go too .

far from its own territory in order to avoid being com ,

promised The zone o f country b etween the ar my

.

an d its fron tiers will supply its wants and should be ,

defended to the last ex t remity by bold attacks wi t h , ,

the entire disposable force upon th at corps o f the ,

en emy which is most con veniently situated for the

pu rpose If the stroke is successful the army m ay
.
,

pass to the o ffensive givi n g an entirely new phase to

,

the war If i t i s unsuccessful there should be still

.
,

grea t er concentration strong positions for camps ,

should be selected or the army should retire u nder

,

shelter of some fortified city or cover itself by mean s ,

o f a river & c Y o u t hus oblige the enemy to follo w

,
.

o u an d to move in a zon e o f which the devastation

y ,

is entirely at his expense Mo n t e c u c u li in his Me .

,

moirs strongly recommends this kind of a war for the

,

defensive He says : O n the territory o f an a dv er

.
“

sary malcontents are enlisted in your favor ; there is

,

no n eed for concern abo u t supplies of men money , ,

and other n ecessaries as t hese only become exhausted

,

in the theatre o f war which is upo n your adversary s

,
’

”
so il
.

A n army fighting upon its own territory causes ,

 P LAN OF DE FE N C E .

n ecessarily m uch inj u ry to the people b ut there are

, ,

less risks t o be run the po pulation is favorable and ,

gi ves assi stance of e v e r v kind ; every individual is a

spy upon the enemy and gives inform ation o f his
,

opera t ion s ; the battl es are fought o n positions ex

a m in e d and sometimes prepare d in advance where
, , ,

the enemy i s obliged to co m e after the army it may

move in any dir ection becau se e very space n o t oce n
,

pied by the en emy may s erve for a base o f operations ;

there is every facility for threatening hi s c o m mu n ic a
ti on s ; h e is forced t o m ake detachments for the
purpose o f guarding the cities h e has taken and to ,

secu re his subsequent movements These detachments .

are fair game — they may be s eparately attacked and

beaten o r surrounde d When fo rtun e crown s wi t h
,
.

s uccess the e fforts o f the defenders their victories a re,

m uch more decisive if obtained wi thin their o w n

territories than beyond the m because the v an quished
,

enemy has defi les t o repass and a retreat to e ffec t

, ,

in the midst of a population which is hostile and ready

to fall upon him But i n order that su ch a method
.
,

o f actin g defensively b e successful there must be ,

unity o f inte ntion and e ffo rt i n the n a tion — no civil ,

—
discords to divide it into two hostile parties and the ,

dread o f foreign domination m u st exist in every hear t .

What can a divided people do in presence o f an

enterprising enemy ? What can the army do even ,

when most faithfu l to its flag its ow n honor and , ,

organized in the most perfect m an rie r if it is not

’

,
38 PRIN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

secon ded by the population —if it meets n othing but ,

inertness and luke w armness o r hostility where it , ,

should receive assistance support c o operation ? This

, ,
-

essen t ial condition without which defence is i mp o s

,

sible should therefore b e assumed as satisfied in

, , ,

treating a question of this kind .

A frontier which has its convexity turned to the

enemy is favorable for a defence m ade within its limits
at the opening of the campaign and may lead to th e ,

adoption o f that method In fact from a c e n tral

.
,

point which is strongly held the whole circuit o f ,

v ulnerable frontier may be observed an d the army ,

m ay stand ready to move by the shortest route t o the

p oin t threatened Thus the P iedmontese by occupy
.
, ,

i n g a position n ear Turin m ay reply to any attack

,

m ade upon them from the surrounding Alps .

The character o f the war being decided upon the ,

details are n ext to be considered and these properly ,

compose the p la n of def en ce The determination of .

the places where a suitable resistance m ay be made

o f those to which the forces shall retreat in case o f

reverse and the routes to be pursued ; th e disposition

,

’
o f the troops while expecting the enemy s approach

the m ann er o f anticipating him wherever he m ay ,

come ; the indication of points for concentratio n

b ehind the frontier as soon as his proj ects are
,
.

developed ; the method of supporting the advanced

corps and those in observation by central reserves ;
, ,

finally th e desig nation o f points to be fortified by th e

,
 P L AN OF DE E NC E F .

appliances o f art bridges to be destroyed road s to be

, ,

m ended &c : the s e are t he obj ec ts to be attended to

,
.

i n making a plan o f defence .

The local topography will i ndicate the appropriat e

military disposi t ions t o b e a dopted I t i s scarcely .

possible t o lay down rules o n this point ; all that can

be said is that a to o great scattering o f the troops
,

is always dangero us con s eq u en t ly far from thinking ,

o f gu arding all the pas s ages som e m ust be abandoned

, ,

that oth e rs the m os t important and the most

,

threatened m ay b e better defend ed If the en emy

, ,
.

leaves these to go to the former his proj ects must be ,

counteracted by simil ar means an effo r t b eing al way s ,

made to Oppo se t o hi s ad vance by whatever route h e ,

m av come as m any troo p s as p o ssi b le

,
Hence we .

see how g reatly the defence o f a State is influenced by

the for m of the fron t iers the direction and character
,

o f t he roads If you are en abled to follow by straigh t

.
,

i nterior lines the mo vemen ts of the enemy m a n oe u

,

v r in on the circum fe r en ce o f the circle you have all

g ,

the advan tages of po sition an d m ay always anticipate

,

h i m at any t hreatene d point E ven in the contrary .

cas e you cannot possibly close all th eavenues ; that

,

would oblige yo u to form a long cordon of troops very ,

w eak at every point through which an enemy m ay

,

penetrate wherever he pleases Y o u should ra t her .

place the main b ody o f the troops b ehind t he frontier ,

in a well selec ted position for t he promptes t movement

-

upo n the several roads open to the e nemy In advan ce .

40 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

of this corps and upon its flanks you should sen d o u t

, ,

simple detachments to occupy the passes temporarily ,

an d give notice of an attack They will d i spute the .

gro u nd while falling back t hus retarding the m arch ,

o f the enemy an d gi ving time for troops to approach

,

and meet him In this way all the surrounding

.

country will b e e fficiently watched t o avoid sur prises ,

and the troops are also readily concentrated to fight

, ,
.

Such are the general arrangements t o be adopted i n

a plan o f defence ; evidently great latitude is give n
them and they should conform to the requirem en ts of
,

localities .If however they are b ased upon the

, ,

principle o f con cen tr a ti on they will b e always prefer ,

able to an insecure cordon whose detached bodies ,

a fford no reciprocal support are withdrawn from the ,

immediate command of the general who cannot be ,

omnipresent and o n account of their distance apart

, , ,

they cannot be concentrated when the lin e is broken

anywhere F euqui eres blames M arshal C atinat for
.

n eglecting th ese p r in ciples C atinat being i n trusted

wi t h the defence of the passes of the A lps against
Monsieur de S avoy adopt ed a cordon system , ,

scattering h i s forces along the whole circuit of the

mountains and thus gave the en emy an o p p or t u
,

n i ty o f taking the o ffensive although much inferior ,

i n infantry which is the important arm for moun

,

tain warfare D e Savoy by con centrating his

.
,

force s was superior to C atinat wherever he chose

,

to attack especially as he o ccupied the centre of the

,
 P L AN OF D EF EN C E .

circle an d could threaten several points at once ,

and choose fo r the real attack that which seemed
”
best .

To give prompt notice o f the enemy s movemen ts ’

a syste m o f sign als m u s t b e used or the m agnetic ,

telegraph .

It is not always by takin g position in the direct

pat h of an en emy that his a d vance i s opposed but ,

sometimes poin ts m ay be o ccu pi ed o n the flan k with

m uch ad van t ag e so as to threa ten his line o f opera
,

tions if he v entures to pass If thes e flank positions .

can be held in force , th e enemy must leave his direc t

route to attack them fo r unless h e carries them h e
, , ,

runs the risk of being cut o ff from his base He .

is t hus compelled to fight o n ground selected b y his

adve rsary and prepared for his reception by fo rt ific a
,

tion and any o t her m eans circumstances m ay per m it .

In this way th e Turks by concentrat ing at S h uml a

, ,

completely arrested the Ru s sian in vasion of 1 81 0 and ,

by pursuing the same course i n the war of 1 82 8 they ,

prolonged their de fence during a whole ca mpaign .

If in 1 81 2 K u t os o w instead o f covering Mosco w

, , ,

and taking position upon the plateau o f M oja isc h had ,

retired towards Riow he would as Napoleon himself

, ,

admits h ave drawn th e F rench army in that direction

, ,

an d the immense sacrifice o f Moscow would have been

avoided .

Next come the successive lines of defence presented

by a country whi ch are n aturally indicated by the
,
42 P RIN C I P E SL OF S TRATE GY .

water courses and the c hains o f m ountains or hill s

-
.

The advantages and disadvantages of these are to be

carefully discus sed The best l ines are those whose
.

wings are supported by natural obstacles such as the ,

Se a ,
a great lake a broad and rapid river ; which
,

have a controll ing i n fluence over the surroundi ng

country ; are onl y p a ssable by a small number of
roads easily gu arded ; whose general form is convex
to the front an d behind are good roads facilitating
,

rapid m ovements and by Short marches to any point

, ,

attacked The famous l ines o f Torres Vedr as con

.
,

structed by Wellington in 1 809 to cover L isbon ‘

, , ,

satisfied the most o f these con di ti ons ; they form ed a

great curve several leagues long on e of its ex tr em i
, ,

ties resting on the Tagus an d the other on the sea ;

there was a chai n o f h ills most of them crown ed by ,

fortifications behin d which the E nglish army could

,

man oeuvre unseen an d move to di fferent points o f

,

the curve by roads whi ch had been put in good con

dition an d som e newly constructed Th e F rench
,
.

co m d not force these li nes although they were n ot ,

cover e d by a river in front o f them C ontinuous arti .

fi c i al li nes erected by the labor o f m e n deserve but

, ,

little confidence , on account of the d ifficulty n o t to say ,

i mpossibility of defending these inert masses when

,

unprotected ; o r but feebly defended by n atural ob

s t a cl e s .The lines of VVi s s em b ou rg although covered ,

by the L auter did not prevent the F ren ch from bei n g

,

driven ou t o f them by th e A ustrians under Marshal ,

 P L AN OF DE F EN C E .

Wu rm ser . Resting at the le ft upon the Vo sg e s m oun

tains and at the right u pon the Rhine they were ten
, ,

o r twelve miles long ; it was impossible for an army

o f less than men to make an en ergetic resist

ance in them But a few hou rs were n ec essary to see
.

the m entered at s evera l points an d the defenders ,

dri ven off Th e m o st celebra ted artificial lines are

.

the C hin es e walls and th es e n ever arre ste d the inva

,

sions o f the Tartars .

The advantages to be dra w n fro m fortified cities

should be considered either for prot e cting against the,

attempts o f the enemy all the s upplies that must be

collected for the troops o r for the de fence o f certa in ,

points which should b e held as long as possible A .

city surrounded by a simple wall an d di tch which ,

secures it fro m danger o f being taken by surprise or

open assault m ay if favorably locat ed be o f the
, , ,

greatest value A city which will withstan d att a ck

.

but twen ty four hou rs m ay be ve ry useful as in this

-
, ,

sp ace o f time even t s m ay transpire that will entirely

chan g e the appearance o f a ffairs an d save a S tate ,

—
from th e greatest o f all misfortunes the loss o f its
independence If in 1 81 4 the city o f Soissons had
.
, ,

cl osed its gates and m ade but a semblance of resist

an ce Blucher could n ot have escaped N apoleon s a o
,
’

ti ve pu r suit and perh aps F rance might have been

,

saved In 1 809 the A ustrian G overnment rebuilt

.
,

the w all s of C omorn which had been destroyed thirty

,

years b efore through J oseph s want of foresight

,
’
.
44 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRATE GY .

In a special man ner cities upon rivers m ay b e very

valuable to the defence although they m ay not be in
,

a condition to repel an attack in force By giving ,

poss es sion o f the bridges they facili tate m anoeuvres

,

from on e bank to another enable an army to cover it

,

self by the ri ver or to pass it in the event either of its

,

being too weak to m arch against the enemy or o f a ,

-

good opportunity being presented to take advantage

o f some false movement u pon his part If the army .

passes the river these cities are so many tétes de p on t

,
- -

s ecuri n g its retreat an d covering its operations after

repassing ; they are so many points by which the

army may debouche at any instant and the enemy is ,

thus kept o n the watch and obliged to divi de his

forces In a word fortified cities give much value to
.
,

the lines o f defence formed by rivers they m ay even

make a river which is perpendicular to the frontier
, ,

a dangerous obj ect for an invading army by the ,

facilities afforded the defenders for occupying the

side opposi t e the enemy and threatening his com
m u n i c atio n s
. He m ust then halt and gain possession
o f the cities which control the river But this is a .

very di fficult operation in presence o f an adversary

who is determined to make a vigorous defen ce If .

the attacking party advance along both banks his ,

army is divided The defensive party holding the

.
,

bridges m ay assemble in force and operate against

,

either subdivision of the hostile army His success .

is altogether prob able The i nvader must therefore

.
 P LA N OF F
D E EN C E .

remain united and turn hi s attention to the ri ver whose

té tcs dc p on t are s o thr eatening t o him j ust as would
- -

be n ec e ssary for any flank p o sition strongly occupied ,

that co ul d not be passed by without great dan ger If .

such a river had upon it n o fortifi e d places it might , ,

i n stead o f being an obs tacle form a support for o n e of ,

the wings o f the i nv a ding army an d facilitate its ,

transportation .

It is therefore tr ue that citie s co mm an ding the

wa ter cou r s es are o f g reat i m portance an d deserve
-
,

careful attention upo n th e part o f those engaged in

preparing a plan o f defen c e ; even when they are
i m perfectly fortified their advantages should n o t b e
,

n eglected but o n the contr ar y e fforts s hould be made

, , ,

t o increase their powers o f defence .

P os i tio n s properly so called that is the places

, , ,

where an army m ay advantageously fight should b e ,

i ndica ted in a pl an o f defence The relative a dv an .

tages and di s advantages of the several pos iti ons should

b e carefully exa m in ed i n order that the for m er m ay
,

b e profited by an d the latter avoided as far as the

,

circ u m stances permit C alculation should be made

.

o f the e fforts necess ary to a u g m ent the defe n sive

power o f the several p os iti ons by the means p resented

by the en g ineer s art an d to remove the obsta cles o f
’
,

fer e d t o the free m ovement o f troops ; an enumera

tion should be made of the troops of each arm of the
servi ce necessary or useful in the defence and the ,

plac es for th em t o b e cam pe d or quartered should be

46 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

i ndi cated , as al so the resour ces in the neighborhood

o f each A S a measure o f prudence in anticipation
i

.
,

o f a reverse the question o f the best lin e of retreat

-

for the army sho uld be discuss ed w hat are the best
places for rallying ; what parts of the line ar e to b e
disputed foot by foot an d what parts are to be ,

rapidly passed over &c The condi tions o f a good

,
.

m ilitary position wi ll be mentioned under the subj ect

o f ba t tles .

The roads are to b e design ated that should be

broken up to make the m impassable by the enemy ;
also those to be improved in order to facilitate the ,

defence Too much attention cannot be bestowed

.

upon these obj ects which at first sight seem o f sec

,

o n da r
y importance but have so much
,
influen ce upon
the rate of movemen t o f the two parties an d couse ,

quently upon the execution o f any proj ect A well .

organized government will always take care in the ,

establi shment o f can als and roads that the a dv an ,

tages procured by them to commerce are not very

dearly paid for in war The best r e a d may be se .

cured from danger by constructing a work for i t s

defence at the most suitable point Roads m ay .

undoubtedly and especially in mountai ns be cut and

, ,

rendered temporarily i mpassable by the destruction ,

o f bridges &c ; ; but independently o f the greater or

, ,

less facil ity with which an enemy may repair these

i njuri es there is always a feeli ng o f repugnance t o
,

t aki ng steps for the destructi on of th e commu ni ca

 S TRATE GIC A L O P ERATION S . 47

tions o f the country ; it is delaye d t o the las t m o

m ent and Often until t oo late The sa fest plan is to
,
.

build the forts o f which m ention h as been made , and

,

for thi s rea so n a plan o f defen c e S ho u ld in di c a te the

positions for them Wh ile marking th e points where
.

a defence m ay be m ade the method of obstructing ,

the ro ads in front sho u ld be in dicated , as well as the

m eans of improvi ng the parts t o the rear with the ,

double view of retarding the approach o f the enemy,

and fac ilitating the arrival o f suc c or .

A ll the roads conn ecting t wo positions or which , ,

b eing behind a li ne of defence run parallel to it , ,

s ho u ld be repaired ; for thes e road s are the routes to

be passe d over to succor th reatened points o r to fall ,

i n force upon detachm en ts o f the enemy Th e pla n .

o f defenc e s h ould treat these operation s in detail .

These are the e sse ntial obj ects to be mentioned i n

a plan o f defence There are others no less i m
.
,

p ortant ,
which rela te t o the administrative depart ~

m ent , such as hos pitals equipment acco m modating

, ,

troops at the poin ts o f concentration their subsist ,

ence foraging the po stal service an d other means o f

, ,

co rresponden ce &c Th ese obj ects should all be c on

,
.

S i de r e d in a plan o f defence but it is i m possible t o o

, g
i nto all their details here .

A r t . V IL — S t r a t e g i c a l O p era tio n s.

P reparato ry movements m arches skilfully m ade , ,

with a view o f taking position upon vulnerable points

o f the enem
’
y s lin e ; i n a word s tr a tegic al operations ,,
48 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

proc u re those immense results which sometimes fol

l o w a single victory A ba t tle gain ed is an excellent
.

thing but its consequences will va r y acco r ding as the

,

victor is so situated as to be able to profit by it an d ,

’
cut the enemy s communicatio n s separate him fro m ,

his base disperse his army & c or is un able to inter

, ,
.
,

rupt his retreat In the firs t case th e vic t ory is deci

.
,

sive if th e pursuit of the defeated en emy i s vigorous

,

ly prosecuted ; in the second h e may be expected ,

soon to m ake another stand , an d fig h t again When .

Napoleon moved his army from Boulogne in 1 805 by , ,

forced marches to attack the A u strian army that had

, ,

already invaded Bavaria and was advancing betwee n ,

the D anube an d L ake C onstance he directed th e dif ,

ferent corps upon the flank and rear of the enemy ,

assuming as a base the Rhine below S trasbourg an d

the Main o f which h e was master ; he turned the
,

mountains o f the Black F orest in whose de fi l e s he ,

showed several heads of column s to cause M ack to ,

think h e was going to meet h i m by the way of the

valley of t h e D anube When Mack perceived his
.

error it was too late ; the blow had b een struck He

,
.

was c u t o ff from his commun i ca t ions beaten in seve ,

ral encounte rs an d obliged to take shelter in Ulm

, ,

where he capitulated with his whole army The wise .

and rapid marches which preceded the combats o f

G u nz b o u r g Elchingen & c were the causes of the
, ,
.
,

successes of Napoleon m u ch more than those c om

,

b ats brilliant as they were The A ustri ans w ere

,
. .
 STRA TE GIC AL A O
OP E R TI N S .

completely cut o ff from retreat ; they were envelope d ,

an d forced t o lay do wn th eir arms before th e arrival

*
o f the s uccor they expected Ma rshal S axe was con .

v in c ed tha t m arches contributed t o the successful

issu e of a campaign more than b attles and he laid ,

down th e axiom that succes s i n wa r is due to tli e

,
”
l egs of the soldiers History j ustifies his assertion
. .

We sh all now lay down the p rinciples relating to

m a rc h es o r rather t o strategic movements
,
.

F or wa r d M ovem ts — A n ume r ous army is always

‘
en .

divided into several co rps which move along di fferent ,

roads either t o procure sub sisten ce more easily o r to

, ,

facili t ate their deployments and preparati on s fo r bat

tle These column s should be the nearer to each other
.
,
’
as th e enemy s ente rprises are the more to be a p
prehended If he may attack the Col u mns should b e
.
,

n ear enough to afford mutual support ; there sho uld

be no obstacle between them which will prevent their ,

j un ction and con centration on the field o f bat t le But .

the re is n o n ecessity for the column s to move exactly

side by side and alo ng parallel roads which hav e
,

bee n o p e n ed with the axe an d the pick Such a .

cou r se would m a k e rapid move m ents impossible and ,

would gi ve all the advantag es t o the antagonist wh o

w as not so precise S ince the time o f Turenn e L ux
.
,

e mbourg an d Villars rapid marches had been forgot

, ,

ten ; a weak army was divid ed up int o numerou s

column s which with great labor m ade roads th rough
, , ,

For th e d e ta i ls of th se m rch s
e a e ,
s ee C h pt r III
a e .
, cl
Ar t i e IIL

3
50 P RINC IP L E S OF S TRATE GY .

forests and across ravines without losing sight of each

,

other so to speak The result wa s great confu sio n

,
.
,

and inconceivable slowness The F rench Revolution .

put an end to that folly and a return w a s m ade to

,

the free rapid b old marches o f the Roman s S o

, ,
.

’
long as the man oeuvr e is out o f range of the enemy s
cannon , the intervals between the columns executing
preparatory movements may be greater o r less accord ,

ing to circumstan ces ; the only limit to b e laid down

is to keep the intervals such that the c orps may be
able to concentrate the same day upon the same field
of b attl e .

Each column S hould take proper precautions to

prevent being surprised and its march should be pre
,

ceded by an advanced guard Negligence i n this

'
.

particular may lead to disaster as history proves con ,

elusively The defeat of F laminin s at Th ra sy m en e

.

(now P erugia) is a celebrated

,
example i n point .

This gen eral imprudently ventured into the defil e

between the lake and the mou n t ains without sending
o u t an advanced guard and without examination of
,

the heights He was hurrying to attack Hannibal

.
,

who was laying the country under contribution ; hi s

haste was so great that he would not wait for his col
le ag u e who was coming up fro m Rimini with an
,

army In the midst of the defile the wily C ar th ag

.

ian had taken a stand to b ar the way The ac t ion .

begins and the Romans see descending from t he sur

,

roundi n g heights numerous troops to take them in ,

 flank at the sam e time the cavalry which they had ,

pass ed by un seen attack s them in the rear The Ro

, .
~

m ans being obliged to fight on all sides are obli ged

, ,

t o y ield an d the C arth a g inians made terri b le slaugh

,

ter amon g them .

To m ake a m arch safe against the attacks of the

enemy it should as far as possible and in the m an
, , ,

n er previously exp lain e d be along a ri ver whi ch will

,

cover t he flank o f the column bu t even i n this case , ,

the aven ues must always be occupied by which the

enemy might approach F or t his purpose troops are
.

detached t o take posi t ion and cover the m ar ch u ntil

th e colum n h as p a ss ed so far that there is no longer
danger The de tachment wil l then rejoin t he army
.

as s oon as prac ticable .

Those m arch es which are concealed fro m th e en e

my lead to the mos t important results By such .

m arches a gene ra l succe eds in placing his army upon

the flank o f his ad vers ary threatens his base or sur
, ,

pri s es h im in his cantonmen t s The most di fficult

.

co u ntries are the most favorable for conce aled

marches as t here are greater facilities for hiding
,

the m and the enemy tr usting to the n atural obs t a

,

cles neglects ordinary precaution s and omits to seek

, ,

for i nformation Wi t h patience l abor and p re s e v e

.
, ,

ran ce m ateri al obstacles m ay b e always overcome by

,

an army that is n o t disturbe d by the presence o f an

enemy It may be stated that in this par t icular noth
.

i ng i s impossible A s an exam p le , take t he ex tra or

.
52 P R IN C IP L E S OF . S TR ATE GY .

din a ry march of Hannibal across the m arsh of C l u ‘

S ium .He had two roads by which to advance on

Rome o n e through the defiles o f the A pennines easy ,

but long and held by the Roman army ; the other

,

shor t er but across vast m arshes suppos e d to b e i m

, ,

passable Having ascertained t h e depth o f the

.

m arshes and being convinced that th e di fficulties

,

they presented though great were n ot i n s u r m o u n t a

, ,

ble Hannibal chose that road K nowi ng he was not

,
.

expected in that direction he saw that he would have ,

to overcome only local di fficulties and he w a s su r e of ,

success as far as they were concerned By taking . .

that road he avoided the de fil e s where hi s cavalry , ,

which was superior to th at of the Romans would ,

have been useless and where the individual valor of

,

the Roman soldiers would h ave compensated for

the incapacity of their co nsul He had moreover .
, ,

goo d grounds for hoping th at having once e ffected ,

the passage he coul d inveigle the imprudent F lam i

,

nius into a b attle before the arrival of his colleagu e ,

as infact happened The s u ccess of that bold m ove

.

ment was perfect because it was so secret an d prompt

,

that the Roman s had no time to offer any opposition .

Rapidity is o n e of the first conditions o f success in

m arches of strategical m ovements as o f simple m a
, ,

n oeuvres By celerity of m ovement a general pre

.

serves the advantages gained by a fortun ate initiativ e ,

and h e follows up and completes the success a vic

tory has begun It i s only by rapid marchin g th at
.
wa r ca n be ma de to By r e m ainin g b u t
s up p or t wa r .

a Short ti me in o n e place an army does n o t exhaust

,

the provinces through which it passes ; their resources ,

un certa in a s they may be will always b e su fficien t,

for the te mpo rary w a nts o f armies By adopting such .

a system there i s n o longe r a n eed o f the immens e

,

wagon trains used to trans p ort provisions nothing is

-

carried but wh at i s indi spensa bly necessa ry the sol

diers m ay be required to take a few ration s of bread ,

and are followed by droves o f animals to furn ish meat .

The troops being thus un encu m bered can undertak e

, ,

an d execute the grandest proj ects It is impossible .

to gain any su cc ess i n w ar wi t hout rapid marches .

P roceed at a snail s pace and yo u wil l accomplish

’
,

n o th in misfortun e will attend you continu ally and

o'
3
b ,

the elements will seem to conspire against you .

If the en emy approaches spreading out his corps ,

over a large space wi t h t he in tention of en veloping

,

o u move at once against him and strike at the centre

y , ,

o f his lin e Endeavor to attack o n e o f the isolated

.

parts o f hi s army and d efeat it before the others c a n

,

arrive ; mo ve rapidly against another and treat it i n ,

the same way : you will thu s oblige t hem all to re

t reat to take di vergent roads and to en coun t er a
, ,

thousand di fficulties i n e ffecting a j unction if indeed ,

it be possibl e for them to do so at all .

In this way Napoleon i n th e beginning of his ,

career rushed from the m ari t ime A lps and fell like a
, ,

m ountain torrent upon the A ustro S ardinian army -

,
54 P RIN C IP L E S OF STR A TE GY .

commanded by Beaulieu and C olli who had commit ,

ted the fault o f spreading o u t their forces i n a long

line with the expectation of e n veloping their youn g
,

adversary C olli was fi rst bea t en at se veral points ;

.

Beaulieu s turn came next and fro m that time the two
’
,

armies were so entirely separated that o n e o f the gen ,

e ra l s desiring to cover Turin retreated towards that

, ,

city whilst the other fell back upon Milan wi t h out

,

attempting to rej oin hi s colleague C olli was forced .

to accept such terms as the victor chose to gi ve ; Beau

lieu could only s te p his retrograde move m ent under
the walls o f Mantua .

Bu t if the hostile army is concentrated an attempt ,

m ay b e m ade to ad vance upon him along two line s

towards his flanks which will induce him t o div id e
,

his forces in order to meet this double attack Then .

the t wo corps which have be en separated onl y t em

,

p o r a ril
y with a view
,
of immediately e ffecting a re

union will move towards each other and make a com

, ,

b in e d attack against the nearest of the two portion s

o f the opposing army It readily appears that such
.

m ovements m ay be a t tempted only when the t o p og r a

phy o f t he country favors an d to some extent suggests ,

them F o r example : a gen eral having his army

.
,

covered by a river need have n o alarm at seeing hi s

,

adversary appear opposite in the interval between his

two corps when he can m ak e a rapid flank movem en t
,

by m eans o f roads alo n g t he ri v er In this case he .

m ay wit h no great danger pass to the right and left

, , ,
 S TR ATE GIC AL O P ER ATIONS .

in order to cause une asiness to the enemy at two dis

tant po ints If the enemy weakens his centre to r e e n
.
-

force the win gs the general m ay m ake a rapid and

,

c onceal ed night m arch hurry b ack a n d pass the river

, ,

u sing temporary bridges for the pur p ose for whic h ,

the m aterials should all have bee n prepared in a d

va n ce and as secretly as possible The river on ce
,
.

c ross ed he h as the inte rior position activity and

,

braver y must accomplish what rem ains to prevent the

sep ara t ed corps o f the enemy fro m e ffecting a junction ,

an d they are thus forced to o p e rate o n exterior lines .

Here we see the importance o f making a g oo d u se o f

time in order to concent rate pass the river and b eat
, , ,

in success io n the fractions of t he army between which

we have fortunately succeeded in interposing o u r o w n .

Time is all impo rtant in war ; often an hour lost can

-

n o t be regained in o n e hour we may be anticipated

u pon the de c is i ve o in t ; i n o n e hour we m ay be over
p
'

whel med by superior forces suddenly a ss e m b l e d o r we , ,

m ay let slip ad vantages which fortune grants only to

ac tivity and b oldness .

The preced ing remarks prove that if a frontier i s

attack ed o n se veral p oints the d efensive army should
,

n o t be divided in t o the sa m e n umber o f equ al corps ,

because the resistance will be feeble at every point ;

but the di fferent attacks should be m et by small corps ,

placed in observation chiefly while the principal mass

,

is kept at some con venient point in order to fall upon

,

a singl e o n e o f the attacking armies when separated

56 P RINC IP LE S or S TR A TE GY .

from the others Suppose we take the case of

.

men being called upon to resist divided i nto

three equal m asses o f each ; if the defensive
army is divided into three eq u al corps each will con ,

tain about men and con sequently there will be

,

an i n feriority Of force at every point I f in stead o f ,

that arran gem en t each o f the advancing armies is met

,

by a simple corps o f observation of to

’
men they will be able t o delay the enemy s march
, ,

an d t here will remain a central mass o f 3 5 000 t o ,

men which b ci n g united to o n e of the corps of observa

, ,

tion will form an army o f abou t

,
m en a n d this ,

may defeat the en emy all other thi n gs being equ al

,
.

When the disparity o f force i s still greater every ,

e ffort must b e exerted to be superior in numbers upon

some point ; but if that c annot be don e an d it is some ,

tim es impracticable t he rule must s t ill b e followed o f

,

co n centrating as l arge a force as possible to meet the

enemy Then the struggle is to be prolonged by the
.

devel opmen t of th e g reatest attain able vigor and a c

t iv i ty and by skilfu lly using all t he topographical
,

a dva n tages o f the country N apoleon i n th e war i n

.
,

F r a n c e g a ve a striking example o f the effectiveness

y

o f ce n tral manoeuvres he fought tripl e his forces for

four months He moved his reserves from point t o
.

point with marvellous rapidity O n e day he fought a .

battle in o n e place an d the n ext he was twenty fi v e

,
-

o r thirty miles distant marching to attack ,

another
enemy , who m he astonished by the exhibition o f so
 STRA TE GIC A L O P E R ATION S .

much resol ution an d cele rity o f m ovement C aesar .

,

when surro u nded i n t h e middle of G aul by n ations i n

insurrection extricated hi mself from his critical posi
,

tion by S imilar movements He was at every point .

where dan g er called h e g av e the G auls neither time

n o r m ean s o f uni tin g ; he fought them succ essively ,

and beat them i n detail A fe w w ee ks su fficed to

.

finish that rem arkable campaign .

The study o f the C omm entaries of this great cap

tai n is o n e o f the m ost in structive that can b e re c o m
me nd ed to young o fficer s A lmos t every pa g e e x e m
.
’

l ifi es the applica t ion o f strategical principles which

p , ,

as has b een remar k ed are the sa m e at all t imes an d

,

in all places .

R etrea ts — In retrograd e as in forwa rd movem ents

, ,

the simple lin e is the bes t as by using it the m ass of

,

th e force is always i n h an d t o Oppose th e en emy .

Wha t are called diverg en t o r eccen tr i c ret rea ts which ,

are e ffected at the same time by se veral routes with ,

the view o f m isleading the victor and making h im ,

un certain as to the course to pursue are ex t remely ,

d angerou s A force which is divided up to follo w

.

these di fferent directions is weak at every point ; the

isolated corps affording n o m utual support are ex
, ,

posed to th e risk o f being envelope d thrust upon o h ,

s t a c l e s dispersed d estroyed as was the case wi t h t he

, , ,

P russian s after the battle o f J ena Th e victor n o t .

,

allo wing hi s attention t o be diverted should follo w ,

closely o n e of these corps and o verwhel m it ; he need

x
3
58 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

give himself n o present concern about the others well ,

knowing that he will have n o di fficulty i n attendi n g

to them separately at a con venien t time .

A n army should never be divided up except ju st

after a brilliant victory ; i t is then in presence of a
disorganized enemy who h as lost his communication s
,

an d is i n a state o f demoralization It m ay rush into .

the midst o f the scattered corps ; it n eed only show

itself and the enemy flies In such a case no attempt
.

i s t oo rash ; any thing is good except what is t o o slow

an d methodical Bu t this is an exceptional case pro
.
,

du c e d by the circumstances of the d efeat o f the enemy .

Remain united therefore in a retreat still m ore

, , ,

than i n an o ffensive movement even if your m otion s ,

are thereb y retarded for the first con sideration i s

,

safety March in as good order as circumsta nces per

.

mit o r at least keep toge t her ; still present an i mp o s

,

i ng front to th e enemy and if he pursues too rashly

, , ,

make h im pay the penal t y for so doing ; have th e

boldness to turn upon him if he gives a fair o p p o r tu
n it o r marches n egligently More honor i s some
y .

'

times derived from a well conducted r e tre a t th a n in a

s-

battle gaine d where chance often enters so largely

, .

M arsh a l Massen a s retreat in P o rtugal i n 1 809 is

i

’
, , ,

an excellent mode l for imitation He k new how to .

take advantage o f all the accidents of the ground to

retard the p ursuit of th e Engli sh He never gave up .

a positio n u ntil it was just about bei n g turn ed an d .

then he fell back to another at s o m e dis ta n ce furth e r

 S TR A TE GIC A L O P ER ATION S .

on. His columns retired S lowly afforded mutual sup

,

port and kept o u t o f each other s way deploy i ng and

,
’
,

fi ghting whenever the enemy pressed them too closely ,

o r where the ground w as favorable for defence .

A gain they fell back movi ng towards a common

,

po int in the re ar keeping always near enough for m u

,

tual ass istance Nothing said an eye witness could

.
,
-
,

exce e d the S kill there displa y ed by Massena .

It is very advantageo us to retreat in a direction

parallel to the frontier if possible becau se then an
, ,

en emy gains n othing by his pursuit This subject .

w as touched upon at the same time wi t h accidental

lines o f Operation s If the p a r a llel r etr ea t i s executed
.

’
i n an enemy s count ry th e army lives at his expense ;
,

t h e b u rde n s of the war weigh upon him

. h e is almost
as ba dly o ff as if he were th e beaten party If the .

retre at is made behind the frontier the victorious ,

army i s drawn alon g after t he other ; it is forced to

p ass over much ground without advancing an inch
towards the interior ; only the borders of the country
are given up t o th e pursuing enemy which is also in ,

a position where th e flank i s exposed to forces coming

fro m t he interior But the retiri ng army should
.

take care not to expose i ts elf by undertaki ng such a

m ovemen t in a country where there are n o obstacles ,

for th e enemy would then be able to cu t it o ff from

i t s b ase The parallel re t reat should therefore not be
.

u ndertaken unless some respectable obstacle as a ,

river or mountain range favors it ,

.
60 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

Ifthe parallel retreat is covered by a river all th e ,

b ridges Should be b l ok e n for security against attack

,

o n the flank . F or the sam e reason if it is made under

,

cover o f a ch ain of m ou n tain s the lateral passes shoul d

,

be occupied until the a r my h a s gone by an d such dis ,

position should be adopted as will permit an atta c k

in force upon t hose hostile bodies which n otwith ,

standing th e precaution taken m ay succeed i n break

,
?

ing through o r turni n g th e passages , and m ay attempt

to stop the progress o f the retrea t ing army A wea k .

corps presenting itself i n this way should occasion no

alarm for the danger is really o n its side
,
.

Evidently a parallel retreat can only be effectively

carried o u t on a frontier o f considerable extent If .

such a fron tier is guarded w ith di fficulty o n acc ount ,

o f its le n gth it presents the advantage which has j ust

,

been indicated an d this i s not the only one if th e

, ,

gen eral knows how to a de p t t he active defensive sys

tem F or what cannot be u ndertaken in the defence
.

o f a n arrow frontier wi t hout risk of being cut o ff fro m

it o r being thrown back upon the obstacles which

,

contract it while g IVIn g support to the wings m a y be ,

at tempted with su ccess upon an extensive fron t ier

that presents long b ases o f operations Th e s e o ffen .

sive returns m ay then be m ade which for t u ne often

crown s with success an d those brilliant enterprises
,

undertaken that are i n spi r ed by courage and daring .

D iver s i on s
.
— C o mbi n e d a r c s
m h e — What has been .

thus far said to demo n stra t e the necessity o f coneen

 S TR A TE G IC A L O P E R ATIO N S .

t r a ti o n of
forces and o f keeping u nited proves a l so ,

that diversions combi n ed movemen ts detachm ents

, , ,

are operations that generally cannot be approved .

A diver si on is effected when a corps is sen t to a

distance to operate independ ently o f the army A .

co mbi ned ma r ch is made when the movements o f this

corps and o f th e army have a m utu al relation and the ,

s am e general obj ect in view In each c as e the sepa

.

r ate corps forms a detach ment .

Divers ions are dan gerou s because the army is weak

,

ened by j ust s o many men as are employed t hat way ;

they withdraw the attention o f the commander in -

chief from the m ain obj ect ; they i ncre ase t he chances
o f accidents ; they complicate events m ultiply juris ,

diction s which m ay lead to clashi n g o f or ders and ,

they are al most always a source o f disaster Th e .

army if victorious can only gain a partial success

, , ,

an d can wi t h di fficulty profit by it ; if on the con ,

t rary it is defeated i t is exposed to t he d anger of total

, ,

ruin since it can receive n o support from the corps so

,

un fortun ately detached However there is nothing

.
,

absolutely fixed in the difficult science of war ; there

i s no rule without n umerous excep t ion s C ases arise .
,

therefore i n which di versions are not only j ustifia ble

, ,

but n ecessary F o r example a formidable position is

.
,

t o be carried by force and it can o n ly be don e by a t

,

tracti n g the enemy s attention in another direction ;

’

i t then becomes n eces sary t o detach a body o f tro ops ,

more or les s nu merous according to circumstances,

,
62 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

who may make a Circuit for the purpose of occupying

’
commanding heights o r threateni n g the en emy s line
,

o f retreat . These cases frequently occur i n moun

t a in o us countries ; a detachment then becomes a n e ‘

c e s s ity the only altern ative being the failure to aeco m

,

l is h the obj ect in view ; but it should be so r egu l ated

p
that its absence should be as short as possible and as , ,

soon as circumstances permit there must be a retur n

,

to the observan ce of the principle which requires u nity

o f action and concentration o f forces C ombined .

m ar ches and diversions are much less dangerous i n

m ountai nous countries than elsewh ere because it IS ,

di fficult for the enemy to interpose himself betwee n

th e columns The separate corps find in every valley
.

contracted spaces where the i r w m g s are s u pported ,

and they are in no danger o f being envelo p ed and

sometimes it would b e even more dangerous than use
ful for large bodies to be held together In such a .

case each of th e separate corps should b e strong

,

e n ough to de fen d the valley i n which it is operating ,

and to keep open i t s communication s to the rear The .

rule is here violated only In form and not in reality ,

since there is n o m ore subdi v ision th an th e groun d

requires ; the di fferent co rps are not exposed to be
forced from th eir positio n s and there is ample O p p o r
,

t u n i ty for reunion by th e roads in rear G eneral Le .

comte gave a fi n e example of such march es when he

attacked the S aint G othard i n 1 79 9 Upo n that o c
,
.

casion in all the valleys occupied by th e F rench they

, ,
were in su ffi cien t force to defend them even against
a sudden attack o f very su p erior nu mbers That is .

the whole secret .

A di version i s allowable wh en the forces in hand

are greatly supe rior to the en emy s and there is diffi
’
,

culty experienced in subsisting them together Skill .

i s then shown i n m aking such a division of the

tr oops as will permit a corps to be moved against the
flanks o r the communications of the enemy while a
force equal to his is p resen t ed in front ; dive rsion s
m ay then b e m ade in the provinces which are poorly
g uarded o r lukewarm in their allegiance o r where
, ,

insurrection m ay b e excited ; troops may b e u n ex

e c te dl sent to the capital r the richest cities to
p y o ,

levy contribution s & c The detached corps should

,
.

then act vigorously m ak e forced marches in order to

,

m ul t iply itself in the eyes o f t he en emy cause him ,

very great u n easiness or inflict a real blow In de c i .

sion o r vacillation o n the par t of t he commander of

th e hostile army m ay induce a dive rsion Except in .

these cases i t is much better to resist the temptation

,

o f diversions ; it is al ways safest .

When diversions are conde mne d it is to b e under

,

stood that those are n o t referred to which m ay change

’
the whol e face o f the war o r consist in an army s
,

abandonment o f its o w n country to the enemy in

order to carry the war into his They are altoge t her
.

di fferent from other diversion s ; the army remains

united and m oves as a whole t o the attainment o f a
,
64 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

single well determin ed obj ect Such r esolution s bear

-
.

the tr u e impress o f genius and far from bei n g blam a

, ,

ble are worthy o f prai s e no m atter h o w they may

, ,

result ; fo r a m an o f S pirit c an attempt nothing more

h onorable for the sal vation o f his co untry after h av
ing tried in vain all ordinary means Agathocles .
,

king of S yracu se was besieged by th e C a r th ag in

,

ians ; a ft er exhausting all his resources in the defence

o f the place being upon the point o f surrender ing
, ,

he determin es boldly t o pass over into A frica He .

leaves i n Syracuse only the garrison strictly n ecessary

for its defence takes with h im his best troops burn s
, ,

his fleet o n the coast of A frica so as to make v ictory ,

a necessi ty and advances towards C arthage He

,
.

overwhelms the opposing army succeeds in contract ,

ing certain alliances an d brings the capital to the

,

brink of ruin S yracuse was saved C ertainly this

.
~
.

was a diversion which produced a very great result ;

it would be a misuse of words to con demn an operation
having t he same n ame though di ffering so essenti al ly
,

i n character from those already referred to .

D iversions of this kind although on a small scale , ,

m ay be Successful when they are well conducted and

localities favor It is al ways advantageous to do
.

what the enemy i s not prepared to expect because in ,

this way his combinations are thwarted and he 1 8

.

obliged to stan d on the defensive ins t ead of taking

th e o ffensive Turenne in his last campaign gi ves a
.
, ,

fin e example o f such a course He was not intimi .

 S TR ATE IC A G L O P E R ATIONS .

d ated by the at ta ck o f his ad versary the celebrated ,

M o n te c u e uli who had cros sed the Rhine ; b ut tak

, ,

ing n o noti c e o f his initia t ive he cros sed t h e ri ver at

,

another point and obliged hi s Oppon ent t o leave th e

,

F rench territory in order t o follow h i m and defend

his own .

We ordin arily unde rst and combi n ed ma r e/Les to be

those ar ranged with th e intention of arriving fro m
two or more directions upo n a position occ upi ed by
the enemy ; o r taking i n front and r ear an army
which i s to be attacked ; or plac ing i t to use the ordi , ,

n ary express ion between two fires But there is

, .

nothing more influenced by chance than these cecen

tric movements ; independently o f t he tem porary
weakening they occas ion the smallest accident is suf
,

fi c ie n t to lead t o their failure and upset plans appa

,

re n tl
y perfect : a b ody o f troop s is led astray by t he
guide bad roads retard the m arch a storm a ri ses a
, , ,

s wollen stream stops the column the enemy i s en

,

countered where h e was n o t expe c ted ; finally a ,

thousand accidents happen which cause t he operation

t o be un successful O n the other han d the army
.
,

may i n the mean time have been at t acked o r forced to

retreat ; i t m ay n o t be at the place o f rendez vous ;
then the isolated corps is ver y much compromised ; i t
i s in danger o f being enveloped a n d obliged to lay
down its arms The greater the extent of these
.

eccentric m ovements th e more t hey are exposed to

,

chance and cons equently the more care is to be taken

,
66 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

to avoid them Thus o n a field of battle it is a fault

.
, ,

to sen d a corps to the rear of an enemy to attack him

there o r to cut his communications b e cause the army
, ,

may be defeated while this corps is m aking its dé

tour ; but the fault is still g reater when the detached
corps is to make a m arch o f several days in order to ,

reach a point o f rende z vou s already occupied b y the

enemy for success then d epends on circumstances
,

that cannot be controlled .

Detachments m ade to e ffect a diversion o r a com

b in e d march o r fo r any othe r motive are condemned
, ,

by all writers o n the art o f war Many examples .

may be cited to prove their danger The G reat F red .

eric usually so wise and skilful had to repent having

, ,

m ade n ear Dresden a large detach ment of

, ,

m en with the i n t ention o f cutting the c o m m un ic a

,

tions o f the A ustrian army with Bohemia The d e .

t a ch m e n t was surrounded and fell into the enemy s

’
,

hands aft er having fought bravely against t r iple its

numbers consta ntl y ho ning that the army would come
,

u
p t o its delivery This a ffair took
. place at Maxen ,

i n the month of O ctober 1 75 9 it shows at once bo t h,

the danger o f detachments and that of wishing to

c u t the line o f retreat o f an army which although , ,

beaten is still not entirely disorganized The detach

, .

m ent com m anded by G eneral Fink succeed ed it i s

, , ,

true in tak ing a position in rear of t he A ustrian ar

,

m y an d closing the way but it was not strong enough

,

to hold it This general was certainly deservi n g

.
 STR AT E G IC A L O P E RATIO NS . 67

blame for having permit t ed himself to b e en veloped ,

fo r a force o f that m agnitude ought always to be able

to penetrate thro u gh the envelopi n g circle at some
po int F ink should have made th e attempt and he
.
,

would have saved a par t o r th e whole o f his detach

m ent .

Nearly upon the sam e ground th e corps o f V an ,

damme debouching from P irna a fter the b attle of

,

Dresden in 1 81 3 had ad vanced to TOp lit z i n B0

, ,

b emia while the m as s of the F rench army was still

,

i n the vicini t y o f Dresden This d e t achment e x p e r i

.

e n c e d at C ulm th e same fate as that o f F rederic .

However V andamme attemp t ed to break t hrough

,

t he enemy s line and a part o f his corps escaped in

’
,

tha t way Napoleon in sending o u t t his detachment

.
, ,

deprived hi mself of a part o f his troops for the bat

tle o r at least for the O p erations subsequent to th e
,

victory and having the object of completing it ; he lost

or excellent troops ; a n d w h at was worse , ,

the mor a le of the army was sensibly a ffec t ed by this

check If all t he detachments referred to in history
.

were as disastrous as these th e temptation to make ,

them i n presence o f an enemy unless he is enti re ly ,

defeated would b e overcome ; but others which are

,

mentioned were entirely successful an d hence arises ,

an attraction fo r t hem which it is di ffi cult to resist In .

fact t here is no more brillia n t operation than cutting

,

the line o f retreat of the enemy If howe ver this c a n .

, ,

only be done by a division of force it ought to be ,

68 P RINC IP L ES OE STR ATE GY .

e n ough for a general o f prudence to know the dan

ger to which he exposes himself to cause h i m to r e ,

e c t the idea of a diversion o r of any separation o f

j
‘

the di fferent parts of his army .

P u r s u i t — A fter a victory the beaten corps which

, ,

are separated and disorganized by defeat should be ,

vigorously foll o w e d u p ; every effor t should be p u t

‘

fort h to preven t their rallying and to take advantage ,

of their te m porary weakness and discouragement .

There is no danger in dividi n g the army in order to

give greater m obility to the columns intrusted wi th
t h e pursuit provided h owever they keep o n inte r i or
, , ,

lines and push the e n emy on dive r gi n g lin es C are .

must be taken not to drive towards a common point

corps alre ady separated becau se this would b e play
,

ing directly into their hands and facilitating their ral

lying A faul t o f this kind lost the battle of “Tater
.

loo to the F rench Marshal G r ouchy who had been

.
,

directed to pursue the P russians aft er t h eir defea t at

L igny should have gained their right in order t o
, ,

separate them from the bridges of the Dyle which ,

w ere their communications with th e English army ;

ins t ead o f that h e pushed them towards Wavre
, ,

where they crossed the river an d came up at the de,

o isive moment to the aid of their allies on t he field

of Waterloo G rouchy who should at all hazar ds

.
,

h ave barred the way to them or at least have r eached ,

th e fi eld of battle s n n ul ta n e ou s ly with them only ,

followed the m up an d did not make his appearance

,
 S TR AT E G IC AL O P E R ATION S .

u ntil th e battle was over Moreover the terrible .

,

cannonade said in tones o f thunder that the g r eat

q ues t ion at i ssue w as bei n g d ecided at Waterl o o a n d ,

that he sho uld has ten there wi t h his whole corps In .

this memorable instan ce G rouchy exhibited a wan t

o f skill o r o f resolution ; he did n o t know how to

k eep the P rus sians at a distance and after permitting , ,

th em to pass he took n o s te p s t o n eutralize the mate

,

rial and m oral effect n ec es sarily p roduced by their

arrival upon the F rench army which had been fig ht ,

i n g since noon against s uperior force s .

When th e enemy reti re s in tolera ble order his cor p s ,

remaining united and no t p r es enting their flanks to

,

partial attacks th e pu rsuit is mad e by the arm y en

,

m asse . It is n e cessary h owever to do some t hing

, ,

m ore than simply follow him alo n g the same roa d be ,

cause as s oon a s he finds a d efile o r other favora ble

,

position he will check the purs uer and com p el th e

, ,

use of means to dislodge him precious time will thus

b e con sumed which m ay enable his re enforcements to
,
-

arrive It is therefore j udicious to m a n ce u vr e to gain

.
, ,

the flan k o f the en emy while a pa rt o f the army

,

presses clo s ely in rear In this way he is unabl e to

.

take any positi on that cannot be turned at once and ,

he wil l be forced to fall back im media t ely a ft c r estab ‘

li s h in g him self The march o f the pursuing army will

.

thus b e n o t percepti b ly retarded an d th e beaten party ,

will experienc e the greatest di fficulty in e ffec t ing a

reorgani z ation o f h is force G eneral K u tu s o f in th e
.
,
70 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

disast rous campaign o f 1 81 2 took advantage o f this,

m ethod called the p a r a llel p ur s u i t Instead of fol

,
.
“

lowing the sam e road as the F rench army where h e ,

would have suffered much from want o f provisions ,

an d would have had continued co m bats wi t h strong

rearguards he moved alo n gside the long column of the
,

enemy attacking whenever he could throwin g his for

, ,

ces into the gaps occasioned by the length of the road ,

by the cold , and by th esufferings of the F rench This .

wise conduct on the part o f the Russian general greatly

increased the losses and demoralization o f his enemy .

When the pursuing army has o u ts t rip p e d th e e n

emy there are two courses which may be taken ; either
,

to close the way if it is s u fli c ie n tly strong to brave his

,

despair or to take a posi t ion on the flank leaving

, ,

the road open The latter is the better course b e

.
,

cause it is always dangerous to i mpose upon any body '

o f men weak as it may b e the necessity o f con quer

, ,

ing o r dying U n der s uch ci r cums t ances men o f

.
,

s pirit surpass themselves and sell their lives or liber

,

ties very dearly ; nothing is to be gained by placing

the m i n such a si t uation It is the n better to attack
.

such a body of troops by the flank than to bar their

retreat ; for they will seek rather to escap e than to
fight a determination however which will cost the m
, ,

dearly A general expecting t o occupy w ith i m p u

.
,

mity the path of an army or a strong detachment ,

must have forces con siderably superior t o prevent its ,

breaking through ; otherwise he should make a bridge ,

of gold rather than expose himself to great loss or ,

even to entire defeat as w as t he lot of the Bavarians

,

at H a n a n when in 1 81 3 they at tempted to close the

,
’
way to France to Napol eon s army whic h was retiring
,

aft er the dis aster of L eipsic .

The p a ssage of a ri ver is always a delicate operation

for an army which is reti ring ; the general engaged i n
th e pursuit should know how to pro fi t by this circu m
s tance to make an opportune attack The advantages
,
.

are eviden t ly on his side ; he a t tacks with his united

forces an army divided by the river in t o two portions ,

which can not a ssist each other ; he surrounds the por

t i o n o n t h e same side of the ri ver wi t h himself and ,

presses it u p o n an obstac le which should cause its de '

s truction . Now o r n ever he should act with the great

est promptness to take poss ess ion o f the bridge the ,

only m ean s of es c a p e A ny hesitation under such

.

circums t ances would be a fault .

G ua r di n g a con q u er ed cou n tr y — It is not su fficient

to ov ercome the enemy at every point but a rrange ,

ments should be made for holding the conquered

country F or thi s pur p ose detachments are m ade of
.
,

su fficient strengt h to occupy the fortified places and

other military posts to collect th e taxes imposed an d
, ,

to keep the people in subj ection These detachments

.

weaken the army in proportion as it penetrates fur

ther into the country ; whilst th e defenders co n een ,

t r at ing in t he inte rior are getting stro n ger

,
A point
.

must therefore be reached where an e quality will again

72 P R IN C IP LES or S TR ATE GY .
'

exist and there th e struggle will recommence the in

, ,

vaders h avin g against them a l l the chances which m ay

“

result fro m a defeat at a distance from th e base of ope

ration s and in the midst o f a pop ulation ready to rise
,

in ar m s at the reverse of their enemies as was done in

‘

the S panish war of Napoleon .

These inconveni ences may be avoide d by having the

a c ti ve a r my fo ll o w e d u p by corps whose only d u ty it i s
'
“

to guard the country They will for m an a r my of .

r es er v e which will remai n at the distance of several

,
!

d ays march, and -will act according to special princi

’

ples Ins tead o f remaining c oncentra t ed it will ex

.
,

tend itself as much a s p o s s ib l e ; in order to enlarge the

'

base o f opera t ion s t O p r oc u re abundant supplies an d

,
'

to keep t he coun t ry in subj ection The army of r e .

serve being weaker th an the active army and formed

, ,
*

ch iefly of new soldiers will be entirely secondary to ,

the latter and will receive orders from t he same chief ;

,

properly speaking it is but a por t ion o f the main

,

army which will be added to i t when circumstances

,

require .

The army o f rese rve will follow the active army i n v

all its movements keeping at a certain distance fro m

,

it ; will secure its rear wil l g uard the dé p o ts and pre

, ,

serve free communication s with the sources o f supply ;

w ill b e s i e g e o r blockade the fortifie dplaces , w h i ch t h e
'
i '

active army may th u s n e g l e c t an d pass by ; it will

'

guard an d secure the line o f retreat in c ase of disaster

will c on str fié t n ec es sary works of fortification t o i m
‘

'
 ST R ATE G IC A L O P E RATIONS .

prove the lines o f defence to cover the bridges and

,

secure th e d ep ots ; in a word will do every thing the

,

acti ve army could not do without scattering t o o much

,

a n d delaying its march .

It is e vident that such arrangements can only be

m ade whe n there is great superiority on the part of
the invade r s in material and moral force In the re .

v ers e case far from thinking of forming an army o r

,

corps of reserv e in rear o f the active army al l the ,

available forces should be assembled for b attles ; for

the essential thing is t o h ave decisive victories When .

these are obtained the coun try i s held in subj ection

, ,

either by re enforcements passing through it to the

-

m ain army or by detachments o f the strictly minimum

,

s trength consistent with safety which under the n ame , ,

o f m ova ble col u m ns pass through th e country and

, ,

multiply themselves in th e eye s o f the inhabitants by ,

continual marc hes and counter marches -

.

When an army after long fa t igues should take

, ,

some res t it should be spread out for accommoda t ion

,

in the villages and with a view to embrace such an

,

ex tent o f country as will furnish subsistence for men

and horses This is called going into ca n ton men ts
. .

Evidently this s tep is only taken when the en e m v is so

I distant that there is n o danger o f attack fro m him .

However t he con t ingen cy of his advancing against

,

the cantonments should always b e provided for by ,

making arrangements for meeting him wi t h a s u ffi ~

cien t force A point of assembly is designated for the

.

4
74 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

troops in the event o f an attack and care is taken to ,

have it so far to the rear that the en emy may not be

,

able to reach i t before them The more ad vanced .

corps retires o n this point those o n the r ight and left

,

move towards it by flank m arches a n d those in rear ,

come up like re enforcements by forward movements

-
.

Thus the concentration IS effected by the shortest

routes To facilitate the movements and when the
.
,

cantonments are to b e occupied some time the roads ,

are repaired n ew ones even are m ade through forests

,

and marshes bridges are thrown over Intervening

,

strea m s dikes are formed across ravines & c no

, , .

trou b l e or labor s hould be spared which contributes to

the safety o f the army .

The cantonments occupied during winter are calle d

wi n ter q u a r ter s Th ey di ffer from those j ust referred
.

to only in being of greater extent N atural obstacles .

S hould be taken advantage of to cover and secure them

from incursions of the ene m y They are ordin arily .

established behind a river which may serve as a line,

o f defence .

We here conclude what we h ave to say o n the sub

j c et o f stra t egy with the remark that if the principles ,

o f this elevated branch o f the art o f war are so simple

that a n y o n e may n o t only understand but discuss ,

them th eir application in practice i s very di fficult

, ,

and requires much sagacity and tact The proble m .

to b e solved is an indeterminate o n e admit t ing of ,

m any solutions ; a thousand circumstances complicate

.
 S TR ATEG IC AL O P E R A TIO NS .

it ; the data are oft en indeed always more o r less , ,

uncertain ; and in many c a ses actio n mu st be taken

u pon no other basis than conj ecture There are many
-

exception s to the guiding rules Even t s succeeding .

each o t her rapidly ; unforeseen occurrences ; difli c u l ties

in procuring information motives unperceived by the
m ass o f people but imperiously influencing a com
,

m ander oblige him to modify plans perfectly arranged

, .

If we add t hat t i m e a most essen t ial element almost

,

always fails i t will be understood tha t n one but

,

supe rior m en are capabl e o f putting i n prac t ice t his

science whose principles are con t ained i n so small a
,

compass Le t us t herefore abstain from j udging

.
, ,

unfortun ate generals wi t h too mu c h severi ty L e t us .

recollect that at t he m oment w hen they were obliged

to act they were not accurately informed e ith e r of
, ,

t h e force or the position o f the enemy tha t havi n g ,

n o certain informa t ion o n this subj ect they were ,

n ecessarily reduced to a weighing o f probabilities ;

that o f many things which became perfectly well

known after the even t they were entirely and n ec e s ,

sarily ignorant ; that if they had known them they , ,

would doub tless have seen as well as we what was

, ,

best to be don e ; th at perhaps again the force of , , ,

circumstances whic h is irresis t i b le in war has

, ,

obliged t hem t o act otherwise L et us therefo r e be .

, ,

moderate in j udging others L et us be indulgent or .

,

rather just to wards those who are in all proba b ility

, , ,

compete n t to be o u r teachers ; let us not forget that

76 P RIN C IP L ES OF STRATE GY .

circumstances beyond their control may have induced

those acts which seem to u s faults an d that good
,

fortune is often at bottom of the most glorious

resul ts
.
 C H A P TE R II .

O RGA NIZ A TIO N ,

E TC .

A rt . L — C mn p o s i ti o n o f a n Arm y ,

To for m an army something more is requisite tha n

,

a mere assemblage of men with arms in their hands

those men m ust be obedi ent t o the orders o f a c o m
m ander who directs their movements and causes the m
, ,

all to act for the attain m e nt of a common obj ect .

Without this an army i s little more than a tumultuous

,

m ob where confusion and disorder reign supreme

, .

If the n um erous individuals composing it do not obey

a single will and do not act for a common object no
, ,

plan can b e certainly undertaken or carried o u t .

Discipline is therefore o f prime im p ortance to an

, ,

army ; an essential indis p ensable condition for i ts

,

existence Thus those t roops which have been brought

.

to the highest state o f discipline have at all periods ,

and among all races had the undoubted superiority

,
.

By their admirable discipline the Romans tri umphed

,

over all nations and gained the m astery o f the world

,
.

Honor i s the m ost certain promoter o f discipline ,

especially in the militia P unishm ents which are too

’

severe irritate the soldier without reforming ; they

S hould be reserved for rare cases where to arres t , ,

m utinous disorder , it beco mes nec e ssary to use th e

78 P R IN C IP LES or S TR A TE GY .

m ost powerfu l repressive m easures It i s by using .

persuasive m eans with soldiers incli n ed to be regard

less o f duty by treating them humanely even when ,

punishing ; by carefully avoiding humiliating them by ,

contemptuous and o ffensive lan guage ; by seeking on ,

the contrary to inspire them with sentiments of patriot

,

i s m an d honor that a chief can expect to form cohorts

,

which will b e magnanimous in victory and unshake n

i n the midst of reverses These are the only means
.

which can b e relied upon to produce soldiers who may

b e trusted in critical moments If they are insu ffi cient
.

to m ake heroes ; if enthusiasm a l o n e is the m ainspring

o f prodigies o f valor like that at Th e r m o p y l m we
, ,

m ay be at l eas t sure o f obtaining every thing that

'

c a n be expected fro m veteran and well organized -

troops .

A commander should therefore n ever use h arsh

, ,

a n d contemptuous language ; he should particularly

avoid violent reproofs of those subordinates who have
failed in their dut ies ; he is not excusable for giving
way to passionate expression s he will always c o n g r a t
u l a t e himself for restraining his to n gue ; the soldiers ,

who are perfectly able to appreci ate t he o ffence will ,

give h i m cred it for hi s moderation an d will pass

.
,

their o w n j u dgment o n th e guilty parties a n d will ,

be themselves more disposed to obedience .

But there is another extreme into which o fficers o f

m ilitia easily fall and it m ust be carefully avoided
,
.

It is th a t e x cessive familiar ity which lowers and

 C OMP O SITIO N OF AN A R MY .

throws discredit upon the individual who resorts to it ,

and renders him contemptible i n th e eyes of the very

pe rs ons whose favor he seeks to gain It is this .

culpable weakness which is the means o f filling the

ears o f com manders with the talk of bad soldiers who ,

are always indulging in grievances and complai nts .

It is destructive of all disciplin e as it seals the eyes o f

,

the o ffi cers to the faults an d disorders which should

b e rigidly punished or repressed A com m ander wh o
.

i s to o familia r with his soldiers loses all control o ver

,

th em he is exposed to vulgarities and want o f res pect

from those who m he has accustomed to regard hi m as
an ordinary companion an d to speak to h i m as such
,
.

Th e man to whom the charge o f a body of soldi e rs

is intrusted should avoid t w o ex t re m es the severity
,

which alienates an d the excessive familiarity whic h

,

breeds contempt He will preserve a proper mean

.
,

if he kn ows how to be j ust while not severe and to ,

b e kind to individuals while requiring rig i d perform

a n ce o f duty If n o fault goes unpunished if general
.

good conduct and gallant deed s receive praise and

worthy rewards the chief will be at once feared and
,

loved by hi s subordinates ; his o rder will be punctually

e xecuted an d eve ry e ffort will b e made to merit his
,
.

approbation F in ally discipline will be perfect

.
,
.

If i t were possible to select the men o f whom to

m ake up an army great stature should not b e the
,

only thing to be sought after The Remans were not

.

a tall r a ce , an d yet what nation has equalled the m in

80 P RIN C IP LE S OE S TR ATE GY .

m ilitary exploits ? They accomplished such g reat

results by joining to military qualiti es th e civil virtues .

Strength of body great height courage are doubtless

, , ,

v al u able things b u t to make the real soldier these

, ,

should b e accompanied by other qualities no less

precious such as sobriety patience u nder privations
, , ,

honor and above all a pure and ardent S pirit of

, , ,

patriotism Those virtues alone are su fficien t to

ennoble the m
.

ilitary profession which is too often ,

disgraced by excesses of every kind as hurtfu l to th e ,

n ation it should protect as to the enemy who i s th e

cause or the pretext o f them Therefore the republics
.
,

of a n cient times exercised the greatest precautions In

the selection o f the soldiers to whom their destinie s

were committed No o n e was admitted to the honor
.

o f bearing arms in the service of the country who was

not directly interested in i ts defence O u r m odern .

institution s do n ot permit us to h ope for so excellent

a composition of o u r armies but something similar ,

might be attempted in the service o f militia ; and i n ,

the regular army the custom o f recr uit ing its ranks
,
.

from the scum of cities might b e abandoned a n d ,

replaced by a military conscriptio n against which it , ,

i s true there has always been a grea t outcry ; but

,

still it presents the only means o f havi n g an army

filled with men whose interests a re the same as those
of other classes o f citizens .

A fter these p relim i nary rem arks which it is , ,

hoped may n o t b e useless I enter u pon m y subject

, , .
 C O MP O SITION OF AN AR MY .

A great arm y under the orders o f a general i n

,
-

chief i s composed o f corps commanded by s ub or di

,

n ate generals each corps containing all arms of the

,

service that is to say infantry artillery and caval r y

, , , , ,

in t h e proportions de t ermined b y experience It wil l .

be evident t h at the division o f a large army into seve

ral co rps is absolutely n ecessary i n order to render ,

that huge m achine capable of obedience to the various

impulsion s it is to receive and o f assumi n g the various ,

forms circumstances require .

A n a rm y corp s rarely contain s m ore than

men an d oft en lower even among n ations who have
, ,

the g reatest n umbers o f troops S uch a command is .

a great burden an d few m en are capable o f managing

,

it creditably .

A n a r my corp s is divided into a certai n number o f

di visions o f infant ry and cavalry each o f which is ,

usually in F rance commanded by a general o f divi s

, ,

ion the army corps itself being under the orders of

,

a m arshal of t he empire In the United S t ates army .

a division is the command of a m ajor gen eral The -

.

number o f divisions in a n army corps is vari able de ,

pending o n the strength o f the di visions and the corps .

The other arm s engineers and artillery enter usually

, ,

by companies in the composition o f an army corps .

If however there are several companies o f the sa m e

, ,

arms as is u sually the case for artillery they may be

, ,

j oi n ed under th e orders o f o n e comman der .

A division is composed o f sever al brigades usuall y ,

*
4
82 P RIN C IP LE S OE S TR A TE GY .

from two to four ; in the United S tates service each

is commanded by a b rigadier gen eral .

Brigades are divided into regiments each contain ,

i n g two or more ; regiments into two or more batta

lions o r squadrons according as they are composed
,

o f infantry o r cavalry We hence see that for these

.

two arms the denominations are the sam e except the ,

last subdivision which m ay therefore be reg arded as

,

the unit in the composition o f armies and is oft en ,

,

u sed in expressing the strength o f a corps the n u m ,

ber o f batta lions and squadrons i t contains being

stated In the U nited States army the artillery has
.

a n ominal regimental organization .

O n e m a n could not attend to all the duties imposed

by the command o f an army He has as assistants
’

.
, ,

a c e rt a i n number o f o fficers who compose his sta ff

'

They transmit hi s orders verbally o r in writing they

arrange marches and encampments they m ake ex
a m i n a t io n s of ground an d collect all possibl e i n fo r
,

m ation with referen ce to the position and movements

o f the en emy ; they receive and communicate with

fl ags o f truce an d attend t o procuri n g spies & c ;

, ,
.

they m ake condensed reports o f the state o f the com

m and from the reports of its several su d VIS Io n s
,

they make detail ed inspectio n s o f troops quarters , ,

hospitals & c to be certain that every thing i s in

, .
,

good order ; they preserve th e corresponden ce and

records ; they give description s o f the parts o f the
campaign , m ak e m aps of fields o f battle supervise the ,
 C O M P O SITIO N OF AN A R MY .

di fferen t services and see to the execution o f regula

,

tion s and orders ; in a word they are the intermedia ,

ries the general makes use o f in setting in motion the

huge mac hin e called an army and causing its various ,

movements to be m ade in an orderly and suitable

m anner without interference between the several
,

parts The great variety o f details composing the

.

duties o f the sta ff m akes it necessary to divide them

i nto bureaus and to as sign special duties to each
,

bureau The superior officer placed at their head

.

should posse ss the confidence o f the commander ; he

m ust be made acqu ainted with his plans in order to ,

c o operate fully in carrying them o u t ; it is his duty

-

t o gi ve his Opinion s freely o n the plan s proposed ,

even to o ffer n e w ones if he thinks fit to do so b u t it

i s equally incumbent u p on him to throw aside his
o w n ideas when they have n o t been adopted in order ,

that he may i mbibe so to spe ak those of the general

, , ,

as the least misunderstanding between these two men

m ay lead t o the gravest mishaps Unity o f ideas .

and action is the best requisite for success .

Each army corps division brigade and regi m ent

, , ,

h as its ow n s ta ff whose duties are similar to those of

,

the staff o f an army altho u gh o f course more con

, , ,

tracted and less important proportionally to the body

, ,

o f troops i n question Th e artillery and engineers

.
,

when foun d in su ffi cient numbers are assimilated t o ,

t h e divisions o f infantry an d cavalry They have .

the ir s p ecial s taffs for directin g t heir troops and ,

84 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

every thing relati n g to their special an d appropriat e

duties .

The adm i n i strative serv i ce o f an army is usu ally

divided into several distinct departments as : ,

P a y depar t men t .

S ubsis t ence depa rt men t .

M edical
j
Th e s e t wo In U ni t ed Stat es
H ospi t al s e r vice u ni t ed .

Recrui t in g
C l o t h ing
Bar r a ck Th e s e fo ur In Uni t e d S t at es
ar my combine d in one c alled ,
F u el qua rt e r m as t e r s depar t men t
’
.

T r anspor t a t ion
Mili t a ry jus tice .

These all have their employés S well the nu m ,

wh o ~

b ers of an army although they do not enter the lin e

,

of battle .

Thu s t o recapitulate a gran d arm y is composed of

, ,

several corps which are sometimes designated as the

,

w i n g s , th e ce n tr e , th e g en er a l a dva n ced
g u ar d
,
th e
en er a l d,
E ach army
r es er ve corp s , cfic .
g g r ea r - uar

corps is formed o f several di v ision s each di vision of ,

several brigades each brigade of several regiments

, ,

an d each regi ment o f several battalions o r squadrons .

The artillery attached to differen t corps is u sually ,

form ed into companies which serve batteries They .

a re kept together as much as possible Sappers .

,

miners an d pontoniers serve in companies

, .

A n army is accompanied by a great number o f car

 C O MP O S ITIO N OF AN A RMY .

ri a
g the
e s, for
transportation o f m unitions an d war
lik e equipments , provi sion s m oney hospital stores , , ,

& c tools pontoons & c baggage and a variety of

.
, , ,
.
, ,

other thin gs A ll these accompaniments were aptly

.

styl e d by the Rom an s i mp edi men ta for n othing em ,

b arrass es the movements o f an army so m uch as the

lo n g tr a in s o f wagons it is forced to carry with it ; in
order to supply its various wants It is almost super .

fl u o u s to say that these should be kept down to the

smallest possible number an d the strictest care shou l d ,

be taken to prevent offi cers and employés from carry

in g with them carri ages u nauthorized by regulations .

Th e three arms in fantry , cavalry an d artillery

, , ,

enter in different preportions in armi es according to ,

th e n atur e o f the country where t he war is to be car

ri ed o n In a mountainous cou ntry less cavalry is
.

n ecess ary for there is but little ground suitable for its
,

action ; less artillery is admissible especially o f hea v y ,

cali bres becau se of the di ffic ul ty o f transporting it

,
.

In countri es full o f plains the artillery and cavalry ,

should be co nsiderably increased The usual propor .

tion i n the great armies o f Europe is for the cavalry

, ,

t o be on e fift h an d three pieces o f artillery t o every

-
,

m en Thus an army o f . m en would

,

contain horses for caval ry an d 300 cannon ,

.

The three ar m s are still us ually distingu ished as

troops o f the lin e an d light troops : the first are
specially designed to fight in order with closed ranks ,

the others to s cour the country, harass the enemy ,

86 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

pursu e him after vi ctory m ake pri soners &c It, ,

.

would however be an error to suppose that these

, ,
‘

l ight troops are n ever drawn up in any kind o f order

and n ever fight except as s kirm
,

ishers S uch troops .

would be a great embarrassment It seem s still ques .

t i on ab l e whether two distinct classes o f infantry doing ,

di ffere n t duties ar e n ecessary ; an in fantry of the lin e

,

to fight in the ranks an d light infantry to act indi

,

vi dually Will it not be better to inst ruct all in

.

fan try soldi ers In these double duties ? A great sim

p l i c it y would be the result every body o f troops

woul d then be able to do its own scouting and s im

il a r duties ; t o spread out in broken gr ound , an d to act
i n m ass o n level ground The troops of the line would
.

n o longer b e heard complaining o f the absence o f the

light troops nor the latter sometimes giving way on

,

account o f their separation from the infantry o f the

line There would no longer be a pretext for the dif
.

fe r e n t corps accusing each other o f want of success .

The infantry would then u n der all circumstan ces be

, ,

self sustaining ; being composed o f S imilar elements

-

it would be able to form line of battle at pleasure or ,

to act in dispersed order .

When the duties are divided on e class o f infantry

,

cann ot dispense with the ser vices o f the other ; an d if

by accid ent they are temporarily separ ated there is ,

danger o f loss of confidence ; because the o n e is n u

able to disperse among woods and rocks or th e other , ,

bei ng in a level positi on is unaccustomed t o figh t ing

,
 C O MP O S ITION OF AN AR MY . 87

in lin e It has moreover been observed that troops

.
, ,

o f the li ne deteri orate in a long campaign whi lst the

,

contrary is the case with light troops all the infantry

should therefore be required to perform in turn duties
as light tr oops an d i n the lin e o f battle Detached
, .

troops engage in what is call ed la p eti te g u er r e an

“” -

excellent school fo r o fficers w h o in such expeditions ,

, ,

must make use o f all the ir faculties Light infantry .

,

s ee m ing m ore sui t ed to these duties are prefe r red for ,

them ; so that the o fli c ers o f the line perpetually at ,

t a ch e d t o their battalions can learn noth ing except

,

the less elevati n g p art o f their profession Thi s is a .

very grave in conveni ence that would b e avoided by

,

gi ving all th e i n fan try the sam e instruction A n d .

certainly thi s wou ld n o t be exacting t oo much o f

soldiers w h o commonly pass a li fe of idl eness in
,

garrison m uch more calculated t o rui n their health

,

than excite military virtues .

C ertain military o fficers of great m erit insist not ,

w ithstandi ng these consideration s upon the propriety ,

o f having t w o kin ds o f i nfantry in order that each ,

m ay perform more perfectly the duty required o f it ,

an d h ave m ore c onfidence in itsel f The principal .

s trength o f s oldiers consist in g in their o w n opin ion o f

themselves the soldi er o f the lin e wi ll behave better

,

in the closed ranks o f a battalion and the light in ,

fa n t ry m an in an Open ord e r which allows him full

freedo m of m ovem ent , where he can profit by his
s k il l an d tak e advanta ge of the leas t obstacle offering
,
88 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

a shelter In fact this question can not b e treated

.
,

in a rigorous manner as its solution depends upon ,

n ational characteristics and varying c ircumstances .

A s to the cavalry it is best to have several kinds ,

,

in order to use profitably horses of all siz es an d to ,

take advantage of their different degrees o f strength

and speed C avalry o f the line or heavy cavalry ar e
.
, ,

usually mounted on the strongest horses ; light cav

al r , composed o f huss ars chasseurs an d lancers
y , , ,

m ake use o f the sm allest and most active horses the

dragoons are a kind o f i ntermediate cavalry m a ,

n oeu vr in in line with the first o r skirmi shing with

g ,

the second .

The artillery o f th e lin e is served by men on foot ,

an d the gait usu ally is the walk or the trot of th e
, ,

horses, in order that the men m ay follow But the .

system i s n ow adopted o f mounting the gun ners

u pon the limbers and caissons which permits much ,

more rapid movements L ight artillery i s served by .

mounted gu nners the usual gait being the gallop ; it

,

m anoeuvres with the cavalry being able to move ,

with equal rapidity and b e supported by it The

,
.

artillery o f the li n e regulates its movements by those

of the infantry an d should be always supported by it
, .

Besides there is the heavy or siege artillery which is

, ,

n ecessary for the attack and defence o f fortified

pl aces : it only follows the armies at a distance or ,

remai ns in the parks ; it is only brought on the

grou nd when neede d
’

.
 FORM ATION OF TR OO P S .

A rt. I L— F o r ma tio n o f T ro o p s.

S i nce the introducti on o f the musket t o the exclu ,

s ion o f the rifle in all ,

the armi es o f the civilized
world infantry is form e d in n ot more than thr ee
,

ranks an d o ften in t w o With thi s form ation all

,
.
,

th ree rank s ca n u se their arm s at once ; with four

ra n ks it would be im practicable because the arm is ,

t o o short . The men o f the four th ran k would kill or

wound those o f the firs t E ven in the three rank for
.
-

m ation there is dan g e r of th is especially with new

,

troops O pinion i n E urope is divi ded as to the rela

.

tive advantage o f th e formation i n t wo or three ran ks ,

and practice i n European armies is also variable The .

E nglish and Swiss adopt the form er A mon g some o f .

the people who use the three rank formation th e -

third is specially intended for duty as S ki rmishers s o ,

that there are really but t wo ranks firing in line .

The advant ages and di sadvantages o f the two

m ethods b alan ce each other examples o f success at
tending th e use o f both may b e ci t ed The E n glish .

are cert ai nly fi rm notwiths tanding their Shallo w

,

order ; the F rench deemed it exp edient to form i n

t w o r a n k s at the battle o f Le ipsic where they were ,

oblig ed to occupy a ve ry great extent o f ground in

order to fight against vastly superior numbers N a .

ol e o n in his Memoirs seems to favor this form ation

p , , ,

but propo s es to i ncrease greatly the n u m be r of file

90 P R IN C IP LES OE S TR A TE GY .

closers, really making a third rank whose duty it is ,

not to use their arms but to preserve order in the ranks

, .

To use the third rank in firing, the first must kneel ,

and this movement requires a comm an d for its e x e cu

tion F iring at the word o f com m and is rarely prae
.

t i c ab l e when the action is i n progress for the voices ,

o f the commanders are drowned in the noise o f can

n on , drums cries o f the woun ded & c the excite

, ,
.

ment of the combat makes it impossible for soldiers

to give that cool an d continued attention without ,

which a large number cannot discharge and reload

their pieces together The firing necessarily becomes
.

”
by jlle which can only be executed by the first two
,

ranks The third rank thus becomes useless iii firing

.
,

while one more man in each file is exposed to each bullet

o f the enemy A n attempt has been m ade in the
.
,

F rench serv ice to make the men of the th ird rank load
,

their muskets and pass them t o those in the second who ,

may thus fire twice in rapid succession and the firi ng ,

is in theory more actively kept up than i n the two

rank formation Experience has demonstrated the
.

f allacy o f this expectation as confu sion is produced i n

,

exchanging arms between the secon d an d third ran k s ,

loss of time takes place an d there is moreover a re

, , ,

u n an ce on the part of the soldier to part with his o wn

p g
an d t o use the musket of another This repugnance is .

praiseworthy for the soldier should cli n g to his mus

,

k et as did the Spartan to hi s shield He S hould

,
.

n e ver be permi tt ed to lo s e it ; an d if he cannot brin g

 FO R M ATIO N OF TR OO P S . 91

the whole of it from the field of b attle he should be ,

ob liged to exhibit pieces o f it .

The l o sses o f troops drawn up in two ranks whe th er ,

in line o r colum n are less when exposed to artillery ;

,

they occupy wi t h equal numbe rs a greater extent of

grou n d which is very ad vantageous for o u tfl a n k ing
,

the wings o f the enemy o r for resting their o w n on

,

ob stacles which would necessarily be bey ond the line

if formed in three r anks The first bei n g able to o c c u
.

py the same ground with fewer m en than the secon d ,

stronger res erves may be held in hand i n order to ac t ,

at the d ecisive point an d gain the victory F inally .

,

troops form ed in two ranks m arch with greater ease ,

a n d, for the sam e reas on are m ore qui ck ly instructed

,

a n d formed .

If there is a shock to be received a charge of cav ,

al r
y to be repelled t h
,
e formation o f three ranks has

u ndoubted advantage beca use the third rank supports

,

the other two and gives them c onfidence ; its fire m ay

be very e ffective against the horsemen in the l ater
m oments o f the charge when the men o f the first two
,

ranks ha v ing co me to the posi t ion o f cha r g e ba g

“

o n ets
,
are bracing th emselves to recei ve the shock .

A t this m ovement they n aturally lower the head and

lean forward a little which diminish e s their height
,

s omewhat so th at those w h o are behind are able to

,

discharge their pi eces without injury to those in front ,

particularly as it is n ecessary to ai m high in order to

s trike men o n horseback .
92 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

C avalry ,all other thi n gs being equal have a much ,

better chance o f success against a battalion which i s

v ery shallow and extended greatly than against o n e ,

drawn up with a n arrow front and with deep files .

F or thi s reason a s m all s q u a re is much safer than a

'

large o n e : a little body o f a few infantry often r e

s ists all the e fforts o f a nu merous cavalry because ,

combined attacks are impossible against so small an

obj ect which can be only assailed by a few horsemen
,

at once and these m ay be always driven o ff if the

, ,

i nfantry are cool and m anage their fi re skilfully ,

.

When an action is prolonged and losses

are formed in the lin e o f battle which being con , ,

s t a n tly increased may even tu ally compromise th e

,

safety o f the troops unless measures are taken to fill

,

them ; this e ffect is specially to b e apprehended i n

t w o rank squares o n account o f the diminution o f fire
-
,
.

The third rank m ay be ve ry usefully employed in

closing these gaps It i s really t he first reserve o f the
.

combatants and v iewing it in this light a commander

, , ,

would be wise who when the fight is n ot at close ,

quarters should place h is third rank behind an und u

,

lation of ground either standing or sitting or lyi n g

, , ,

down to preven t useless exposure Th e third rank

,
.

may be used in carrying o ff the wounded whose suf ,

ferin g s and cries produce a demoralizing effect which ,

sh o u ld b e avoided if
possible F inally if during the
‘

.
, ,

contest it is necessary to r e enforce the ski rm ishers o r

,
-
,

to s end suddenly a detachment upon the flank of t he

 FO RMATION OF TR OO PS . 93

en emy o r t o some point importan t t o b e occupied it

, ,

m ay be don e wi t hout disarranging the plan o f battle

, ,

by employing the men of the th ird rank Marshal .

S axe condemn ed battalion s too much extended o n ,

the ground that th ey were not firm and were good ,

for nothi ng but firing which he said was never de

, , ,

c i s iv e .

If the battalion is con side red b y itself it is evident ,

that where it exceeds certain limits it m arc h es and .

m an oeuvres badly either o n account o f the difli c ul ty

,

o f moving its parts toge t her o r o f the impossibility of

,

h earing the voice o f its chief from o n e end to the o ther .

A long lin e al w ays wavers and is more o r less dis

,

j ointed when m archi n g in line o f battle which of all , ,

t he methods o f gaining ground towards the enemy is ,

the most n atural and simple A battalion of moderate

.

extent can march more easily an d for a lo n ger time

in good order The same number o f o ffi cers is
.

n ecessary for a weak battalion as a strong one and ,

they are more expensive for th e state than soldiers .

Two armies on e of ,
men formed in three ranks , ,

and the other of m en in t w o ranks would r e

, ,

quire the same number o f commissioned and non com -

missioned officers G rade w ould be more valuable

.
,

and the subordin ate o ffi ce rs would have greater i m

portance i n the first case th an in t he second because
, ,

they would be proportionably less numerous A ny .

thing depreci ates in val u e as i t becomes common .

In a very mountaino us co untry like Switzerland , ,

94 P RIN C IP L E S OF STRA TE GY .

for example there are special reason s for preferring

,

the formation in three ranks which are drawn fro m ,

the n ature of the country itself This country even .

,

i n th e most open portions i s cut u p by woods hills

, , ,

rivulet s ; t h ere i s seldom foun d su fficient space for

'

deploying several battalion s ; there is no level ground

not flanked by woods o r other natural obstacles .

Hence it is better for the battalions to have less extent

and more solidity in order to be less disordered in a
, .

broken country and to close the open spaces better

,
.

These are in fact the only places where the enemy

can pen etrate— the only points where attacks of
cavalry are to be met The woods and broken groun d
.

m ay always be su ffi ciently defended b y rifl e m e n and

‘

skirmishers F iring should not be the only depend

.

ence of the battalion ; every thing else should not b e

sac r ificed to facility of firing ; care should also b e
taken to have the lines firm and to provide means of
,

givi n g the men th at self reliance without wh ich they

-

cannot be expected to o ffer a prolonged resistance to

the attacks of troops that may be better disciplined
an d more numerou s .

It has been proposed to retain all the ad v antages

o f th e b attalion formation in two ranks for firing an d ,

executing certai n m ovements with convenience and ,

to gi ve also in part at least and under certain cir

, ,

c u m s t a n c e s the advantages of three ranks

,
Thi s is .

to be e ffected by keepi n g two or more companies of

a b attalion specially for skirmishers and when not ,
 F O R M A TION OF TR OO P S .

th u s eng aged to place them in rear o f the flank c om

pan ics in order to streng then these points of the line
, ,

and protect them from attack by the rear o r flank .

If th e battalion has a powerful attack to resist these ,

companies may form a third rank In a simple square .

,

they m ay also furnish a third ran k to the fo u r fron ts ,

o r form a reserve t o be moved to any point the en emy

,

m a y threaten In mo ving against t he en emy i n

.

columns o f companies o r d ivisions these companies ,

m ay for m sm all col umn s o n the fl a nks o f the m ai n

column keeping abreas t wi t h th e l ast division o r a
,

li t tle in rear o f it ; t hey will thus serve to enlarge the

breach which m ay h ave been m ade These auxiliary .

colu m n s m ay then turn to the ri g ht and le ft taking ,

'

i n flank the adj acent pa rts of the enemy s line if it ,

s til l remain s firm next the breach finally they may ,

pu rsue in open order .

A formation i n an even number o f division s i s

ad van t ageous as it permits a battalion to be divided
,

into two equal half battalions and each part to be,

m a n mu v re d separately if necessary,
The proper .

extent o f front to give a battalion in lin e is deter

m ined by the condition that the voice o f its chief
at o n e end m ay b e easily heard at the other This .

will fix the proper num b er o f men for a battalio n A . .

suitable front i s found to b e about o n e hundred and

fifty yards and if in t w o ranks the ba t talio n will
, , ,

contain about six hundred men It i s an excellent .

plan t o have each division formed of a single co m

96 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR TE A GY .

pany b ecause i n actual engage ments the b attalion i s

, , ,

m an oe uvred in column o f division s much often er

than in company a nd at such times it is very a dv a n
,

t ag e ou s to have the men under the immediate orders

o f their o wn captains When a di vision is formed of
.

two companies on e captain is in the ranks and a whole

, ,

company under the orders o f a m an with whose voice

th e men are n o t familiar Thi s is a frequent cause o f
.

co n fu sion at m oments when it i s most to be avoided .

C avalry is dra w n up i n two rank s which are quit e ,

as many as are n ecessary and even the n the men o f ,

the rear rank cannot use their arms e ffectivel y C on .

s i de rin g this point alone it would seem that cavalry

,

S hould be drawn up in but o n e rank b ut the men o f

the secon d rank are by n o means useless ; for they
support press forward and excite t o greater e ffort
, ,

those o f the front rank G aps in a line o f cavalry are

.

even more dan gerous than in a line o f infantry an d ,

the men o f the rear rank are at h and to fill such ope n
ings If we could expect t o determine the effect o f
.

t h e S hock o f a body o f cavalry as in a proble m o f m e ,

c h an i cs by multiplying the mass by the velocity we

, ,

would conclude that the formation o f cavalry ough t

to be deeper than it is actually since the mass would ,

b e increased by making the number o f ran ks greater ,

th e front remaining unchanged But such a hop e .

would not b e realized for no cavalry however well

'

i t m ay b e drilled will form a compact mass at the en d

,

o f a charge The boldest m en and the faster horses

.
 FORM ATION OF TR OO P S . 97

get in advance and the wounded timid , and badly

, ,

mounted m en fall behind s o that the s ho ck if a col

, ,

li s io n tak e s place is ra t her th at o f successive an d sepa

,

rate individuals th an o f the whole body It appears .

,

the re fore that two ranks a re enough The squadron

,
.

cannot h ave so grea t a front as a battalion because it ,

would be les s eas ily m ana g ed an d the voice of its ,

commander would be drowned by the rattling of arms

and the noi se o f horses Experi ence has shown th at
.

i t S hould have about h alf the length of t he battalion ,

o r about seventy fi v e yards -
Allowing as is usual a
.
, ,

yard to a man t he squadron wil l consist o f on e hun

,

dred and fifty men and ho rses and if the rol l contains
m ore men it will be with a vie w of keeping the ranks
,

filled to the proper number and m aking allowance ,

for absentees who are generally n umerous since a

, ,

hor s eman is a compound animal con sisting of horse ,

an d rider and rendered unserviceable by acciden t to

,

ei th er of its parts m oreover horsemen are more used ,

f r duties o u t o f t heir ranks t han infan t ry

o .

F or artillery the unit is t h e battery consisting usually ,

o f four or six pieces It is bes t to have the pieces in

.

each b attery o f the same kind and calibre as there is ,

always liability to confusion an d del ay fro m mixing

di fferent sorts o f amm u ni t ion A s a general rule it is.
,

best to have the cor r espon ding part s alike in any mili
tary body and this applies to the p e r s o n n el as well as
,

to the ma ter i el Replacements of disabled parts i s

.

thus fa ilitated In l ine o f battle each piece of artil

c
.

5
98 P R IN C I r L E s OF S TR A TE GY .

lery o f larg e calibre should be allowed about fifteen

yards and twelve for smaller These distances are
,
.

necessary for the free passage of limb ers a n d caiss on s .

E ach piece should have i t s o w n caisson The lin e o f ;

caissons is about fifty yards behind t he pieces This .

distance m ay be varied and advant age should be taken

,

o f inequalities o f the ground to cover the caissons .

 L
R U ES TO BE O BS E R V E D IN M ARC H E S .

C H APTE R III .

M ARC H E S A ND A
M N (E U E RS V .

TH business o f an army is to m arch and to fight

E .

By rapid and wisely directed m arches a skilful gen e

ral prepares th e way for a s ucces sful campaign reaps ,

the fruits o f victory o r escapes fro m pursuing and

,

s uperior forces The subj ect of marches forms there

.
,

fore a very important p art of the a r t of war

, .

A rt i c l e L— R u le s to b e o b se rv e d in M a rch e s.

Marches are o f t w o classes — those m ade n ear an

en emy and those made at a dis t ance from him I n
,
.

the latter con venience and comfort are greatly con

,

s ide r ed each m an may have ample room so as not to ,

be crowded by his n eighbors ; the road may b e gi ve n

up to the ca rriages o f different kinds so as to allow ,

free p ass age ; and the soldie rs m ay march on the sides .

C are should be taken not to move very large bodies

together i n order that the troops arriving in a town
,

m ay be more eas ily lodged and fed When too many .

men are accumulated in a town it is some t imes very ,

di fficult t o provid e promptly for their wants ; those

w h o a re obliged to wai t have j ust ca u se for complaint
. ,
] 00 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

an d disturbances m ay take pl ace It i s som etimes i m .

possible to a v oid these delays an d discomforts a n d ,

soldiers should therefore learn to bear them patiently

This is the touchsto n e which proves the good soldier .

There is more merit in patiently enduring the i n c o n

v e n i e n ces necessarily attending the painful trade o f

war than in braving death in battle .

When the body o f troops to be moved to any p oint

is v ery large it should be divided up i nto deta ch
,

m ents and th ese started successively a t intervals o f a

,

day o r m ore th at t hey m ay be di s t ributed along the

,

road If two roads lead to th e sam e point part o f the

.
,

troops will be sent by each th e tim e bei n g so r egu ,

lated that they will arri ve s uccessively at the poin t of

j unction The colum n s Sh ould never cross each othe r
.
,

because a tiresom e delay will always be caused to th at

o n e which must wait for t he other to pass D an gerous .

contests m ay even result from such m eetings if th e ,

sta ff o fficers who regulate th e m arch are not very

careful to arrange the m ann er i n which the column s
shall pass e ach other Unless specially ordered to do.

so n o column will halt to allow another to pass it

,
.

Soldiers cannot make an entire m a rch without hal t

ing especially when the distance is con siderable A
,
.

halt at mid day i s n ecessary an d should be l ong

-
,

enou gh to give m en time to rest themsel ves and tak e

some food It . right to halt a few min
utes i n each hour and t o allow no leaving of ranks at
,

o ther times A few t rus ty m en should always b e in

‘ ‘

.
 L
R U ES TO BE O BS E R V E D

rear to gather up stragglers a n d prevent maraudin g

, .

A n early hour in the morn ing should be taken for

starting, e sp ecially in summer ; b u t men sho u ld n ot
be depri v ed o f n ec ess ary sleep that between midn igh t
’
and t h ree or four o clock is found to be best and most
refres h ing Night marches are b a d for the health o f
.

troops as h as been ascertained by direct experiment ;

,

they are very fatig u ing to mind and body and th ere ,

is more straggling t han in d aylight .

F o r m arch es m ade in an enemy s country oth er ar

’

range ments are n ecessary In such cases comfort and

.

convenience mu st b e sacrificed to security n ecessary

res tricti on s and labors must b e born e in orde r to avoid
all d an ge r o f surprise an d to be always ready to
,

receive an attack N egligence i n this respect is i n e x

.

c u s a b l e ; for the enemy m ay at an y time m ak e his

appearance when least expected .

The first rul e is to march in column and with as ,

wide a front as possible in order to have the colu mn

,

as shor t as po ss ible so that in cas e of attack it may

,

b e most speedily concentrated If the obj ect o f the .

movement is a si m ple change o f position to e ffect an

.
,

as semblage or concentration o f troops b efore coming

to blows ; if in a word the m arch is n o t within the
‘

, ,

limi t s o f the enemy s operations s ome freedom may

’
,

be allowed in the ranks and the col u mn may march

,

at
f u ll dis ta n ce .It should however be closed
,
to ,

half distan ce when th e march is a m a n oeu vr e that is ,

to sa y , o n e o f those movements which precede a battle ,

1 02 P R INC IP LE S OF STR A TE GY .

an d are intended to con centrate the troops upon th e

i mportant point to secure the communications t o
, ,

cover weak points to deceive the enemy to distract

, ,

his attention to divide his forces to threat en his lin e

, ,

o f retreat to make him uneasy about his d ep ots 65 0

, ,
.

These m an oeu vr e m a r c h es are so called because they

-

are m an oeuvres made o n a large scale out o f range of ,

canno n and have n ot for their obj ect a simple gai n

,

o f ground as is the case with an ordinary m arch , but

,

to reac h a suitable position o n the field where a b attle

m ay fo llow They are executed i n the immediate
.

n eighborhood of the enemy and really under his o b ,

servation Th ey S hould therefore b e characterized by

.

perfect order and great celerity .

When the battle is imminent the troops should b e ,

prepared for rapid deployment and formed in close ,

column by divisions on the road o r at the S ide of it

, , ,
.

This m ay be called the o r der p r ep a r a tor y to ba ttle .

There is but a si n gle case where fu ll distances should

be kept in a man oeuvre m arch an d this is when th e-
,

flank is exposed t o th e ene my A column at full .

distance m ay for m line o f battl e by a simple wheel o f

its subdivision s These flank m ovements are always
.

dangerous and should be avoided as much as possible

, .

G enerally th e head of the column reache s the battle

,

field fi rst and the propriety o f closing it up is mani

,

fest wi t h a view of facilitating an d hasteni n g the

,

deploy m ents
A column o n the march will always be prec eded b y
 R U LE S TO BE O BS E R VE D IN M ARC H E S . 1 03

an advan ced guard which searches and explores the

,

ground o p ens or r epai rs t h e roa ds if n ecessary defeats

, , ,

the attempts o f th e enemy to surprise the column or ,

draw it into ambuscades, & c I t gives warning of .

the ap proach o f the enemy receives the first attack , ,

and thus secures the m ain body time to prepare for

battle The ad v anced guard i s preceded by sm all
.

detachments O t her small bodies called fi a n k e rs are

.
, ,

s ent o ff to the right and le ft to pass around v illages ,

and clumps of t rees whe r e the enemy might be con

c e a l e d around hills bordering the roa d behind he dges
, , ,

through ravines field s o f g rain & c The colu m n has

, ,
.
,

i n addition its o w n fl a nk e rs especially when it is

, ,

isolated for something may escape the advanced party

,
.

It is far better to take too many precautions than too ,

few .

The D uke o f V end ome w as more fortunate than

prudent when at Lu z ara in 1 702 h e came near
, , , ,

pitching his camp in pre sen ce of P rince E u g e u e s ’

w hole army which was in battle array concealed

, ,

behi nd a dike His presence was not at all susp ected

.
,

so that the advanced guard h aving reached the ,

ground did n o t move further to examine the neigh

,

b orh oo d and the pi t ching of t he tents wi t h its a t

, ,

tending co n fusion w as about to begin when an , ,

accident saved Ve n dom e s army A n aide de camp ’

.
- -
,

whose d u ty it was to establish the camp g u ard -

,

thought it ad v isable to place a sentinel on the dike ,

whi c h was very near Re a ching that point , he di s.

1 04 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

covered the infantry of Eugene lying con cealed b ehind

the dike waiting the signal fo r the attack y w h ile the
,

cavalry was i n line o f batt le at a greater dis t an ce .

He immediately gave t he alarm and the troops , ,

w h o h a d not broken their ra nks were able to repulse ,

th e attack Ten minutes later V end ome would have

.
,

lost his army an d his reputati on .

In th e wars o f the F rench Revolutio n an in e x ,

er ie n c e d republican general had under his comman d

p
a long column o f infantry which was moving o n a ,

road bord ered by h edges There were n o advanced .

guard no fl a n k e rs and m u ch n egligence in the

, ,

column whic h was much elongated

,
S uddenly th e .

V endean chief C harette fell upon the flank o f the

, ,

column cut it through and dispersed it i n a moment

, ,
.

Bravery was of no avail i n such circumstan ces an d ,

there was no thing to be don e but to escape by fl ight .

S uch was the result of ignorance or imprudence upon

the part of a comm anding o fli c e r A rear guard is .
-

also necessary to close th e march prevent the dis ,

or derly conduct o f stragglers and guard against ,

u nexpected attack i n the rear The main body i s thus .

surrounded by detachments which look to its security .

Wagons should not be mixed with th e troops ,

because in a n accidental engagemen t they wo u ld

,
.
,

s eriously interfere with the prompt assembling of the

difl e r e n t e orp s ; and in all cases they make the

'

.
, ,

column u nn ecessarily long The vehicles therefore .

, ,

s houl d m ove in a compact and orderly man ner behind ,

 RULE S TO BE OBS E R VE D IN M A RC HE S .

th e troops in two files if the roads are su fficiently

, ,

wide in order to reduce by half th e space they

, , ,

occupy which i s always con siderable The b aggage

,
.

S hould have an escor t to protect it from the part i sans ,

who may slip in upon the rear of an army .

Working men should be distribu t ed at t he h ead o f

-

every colum n to level obstacles fill up ditches and

, ,

ru t s repair bridges o r streng t hen the m when they are

, ,

weak &c By pursuing this course the march of a

,
.

column may someti m es be made less rapid but n ever ,

entirely stopped These workmen should have with .

them several wagons loaded wit h tools timbers ropes , , ,

and oth er n e ces sary articles .

A nother th ing seemingly o f lit tle but really o f

, ,

great importance which demands attention is the , ,

regula t ion o f the pace at the h ead o f the column t o ,

avoid i t s becoming elongated too much Th e poorest .

marche rs or the heaviest troo p s may b e pl aced

, ,

in front and for th e sam e reas on c x teams m ay b e

, , ,
-

put b efore the other vehicles When the en emy is .

s t ill distant an i nterval may be left between the

,

variou s co rps o f which the col u mn is composed by

this means the fluctu ations of o n e are not tran smitted
to t he others and each moves with almost as much
,

comfort as if alone O therwise every man in rear is .

,

obliged to hal t when for any cause those in fron t o f , ,

h im do so an d t hen he must quicke n his pace to re

,

gai n his proper distance This irregularity of pace i s .

found to b e very fatiguing It may be gre atly avoide d . ,

a
5
1 06 P RIN C IP LE S CE S TR A TE GY .

by a do pti n g th e pl an indicated bu t in man oeu vre ,

m arch es and whenever there iS da n g e r of an attack ,

,
'

distan ces m ust be carefully preserved .

O rdinary marches are fro m fift een to t wen ty miles .

The latter distan ce is a lo n g march but sometimes ,

circumstances require a col u mn to get o ver twenty

fi v e miles and even more at the risk o f l e a v m g m any
, ,

m en an d animals behind .

S e veral d ays rest S hould always follow forced

’

m arches else the army will m elt away i n a little while

, ,

fo r the human body is not m ade o f iron A t a deci .

sive momen t a n d to obtain importan t res ults a

, ,

general m ay a n d should de m a n d of his troops an

, ,

extraordinary effort ; but it Should be of S hort du

ration Tw o o r three forced m arches in succession
.

are all that S hould b e expected from troops inured

to fatigue ; but raw troops ca n not stand even so m uch .

Infantry m arches about two and a half miles an

hour n o t counting halts ; so th at t ak in g every thing
, ,

into consideratio n ten hours are necessary for passing

,

over twenty miles the m arch being in col um n

,
.

C avalry makes about three miles an hour at a walk

'

and fi ve miles at a moderate trot ; as this gait

may b e held for several hours it m ay if necessary , , ,

pass over the S pace of an ordinary d ay s march i n ’

three or four hours ; but forced marches a r e even

more hurtful to cavalry than to infantry
In m arches near th e enemy the hal t at mi d day is ,

ta k en advantage o f to cook When men and horses .

 R U ES L TO BE O BS E RV ED IN M AR C H ES . 1 07

have eaten something they can with more ease get ,

over the remaining pa rt of th e march and h ave s u ffi ,

ci ent stren gth to fight if an eng a gement occurs i n th e

,

aft ern o on Unless there are orders to the cont r ary

.
,

o r special c ircumstances inte rfere this halt should be ,

long enough to give time for coo king .

The commissaries should be careful to have provi

s io n s ready at the e n d o f each m arch and with this , ,

end i n vie w S hould have the colu mn followed by

,

an imal s and wagons loaded with provisions procured ,

by purchase an d by requisitions o n the inhabitants if

, ,

n eces s ary Th ese re s ources m ay sometimes fail and

.
,

it is a good plan to require e ach soldier to carry pro

v ision s su fficient to l as t him several d ays prohibiting ,

th em as far as possible from eating unless when it is

, ,

really necessary In the Russian campaign Marshal

.
,

Davoust had arranged the kn apsacks of his m en so

that they could carry in them four biscuits o f a pound
weight and under each a li t tle bag of flour weighing
,

ten pounds besides a clo t h bag Suspended from the

,

shoulder and containing two loaves o f three po u nds

, ,

weight The entire load was n e arl v S ixty pounds

.

but little less than that habitually carried by the

Rom an soldier Whether the troops are in quarters
.

o r bivouacs they should n ever break ranks until the

,

detachments whose duty it is have examined the

, ,

neighborhood and the outposts are established around

,

the quarte rs o r bivouacs S ecurity is the fruit o f .

v igilance . Every body of troops however numerous ,

1 08 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

it may be , should take these precautionary m easures ,

not on ly at night, but at all halts .

i i
S co u t n g P a r t se — No march should be m ade in
an en em y s co u ntry without a careful ex amin ation o f
’ ‘

the ground In an unobstructed country this duty

.

will be performed gen erally by mounted sol diers b u t ,

in a broken country by footmen The scouting par .

'

ties move in front and o n t he flanks It i s u s el e s s to .

have them composed o f m any persons as their duty ,

is n ot to fight but to learn every thing they can T h e

,
.

duty IS m oreover a very fati guing o n e and should

,
‘

, ,

not recur too freq u ently.

The scou t ing parties precede t h e advanced guard .

The parties o n the flanks are called fl a n k er s They .

move at two er three hundred paces fro m th e a d

v a n c e d guard o f which and o f each other they neve r
,

lose S i ght F or this purpose the leading detachment

.

sends o u t three small groups o n e i n front on th e road , ,

and two others o n the right and left Each group .

keeps together o r at least the members of it Should

,

always be i n sight and heari n g of each other The .

fl an k er s are sometimes obliged to move at a consider

able dis t an ce from the road in order to examin e the ,

c ountry well Each detachment would in such a

.
,

case , surroun d itself with small groups on e in front , ,

‘

and the others towards the enemy When the coun .

try is much covered by forests & e the number o f

'

.
, ,

sc o utin g p arties must be increased .

Three men are enough for a group the senior com ,

 L
RU E S TO BE OBS ER V E D IN A
M RC H E S .

manding th e remaining two They do n ot use their .

arms unless they fall into an ambuscade o r they are ,

o n t h e point of being t ak en and then they must give

,
’
n otice o f the en emy s presence in the o n ly w a which
y
re m ains We may here call t o mind t he noble devo
.

ti on o f the C hevalier d A ss a s wh o having fallen into

’
, ,

the hands of a hostile patrol and being threatened ,

with death if he uttered a sound cried o u t a t the top ,

o f his voice This way A uvergne ; he re are the en e

,
“
,
”
my ! He fell co vered with wounds but he gave
, ,

the alarm and saved his comrades .

The scouting parties endeavor to cover themselves

under h edges woods thickets o r heigh ts alon g the
, , ,

road to see as much as possible without being seen

, .

A S soon as they discover a body o f the enemy they ,

halt and con ceal th emselves while one o f the number ,

g ives the information to th e com m an ding o fficer of

the detachment to which they belong They wil l .

keep him informed o f every thing more they learn ,

and a l l without nois e .

The scouting parties explore ravines an d woods with

great care an d will n e v er pass a dike a hedge a
, , ,

wall o r a field o f tall grain without seeing whe ther

, ,

there is any thing concealed They should v isit .

houses in which the enemy might be con cealed on e ,

o f th e scouts entering alone while the others remain ,

outside to give the alarm if necessary In like man,

.

ner every spot should b e examined where an enemy

m ight be hid .
110 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

Before entering a village th e ad vanced guard halt s ,

to give the scouts time t o e x a m in e it and procure .

i nformation about parties o f the en emy that m ay be

n ear The scouts pass through th e streets en ter yards
.
,

and gardens enclosed by walls cause several h ouses ,

to be open ed to their inspection and visit th e church ,

es and other public b u ildings To take as little t ime .

as possible the business of examin ation should be

,

divided up and ought to take b ut a few minutes If

, .

the enemy is quite near and there is any thing s u s p i

,

cions about the village the scouts should take a ,

longer tim e and make a more thorough inspection

, .

Moreover however small th e number o f the advanced

,

guard may be it should be also preceded by an a d

,

v a n c e d guard so that only the advanced detachment

,

S hall be delayed ; and thi s body will retak e its place

by a rapid movem ent after passi n g the v illage In

, .

this case the ad vanced gu ard o f the advanced guard

would furnish the scouts and th e fl an ke rs would ,

come fro m the advan ced guard itself .

A S the fl a n k e r s are sometimes out o f sight conn ec ,

tion is kept up with them by patrols or small detach

m ents The leadi n g group on the road S hould consist
.

o f about five men of whom two are sent in front o f

,

the remaining three .

F igure 6 gives the idea o f these arrangemen ts .

A represents th e advanced guard B the detachmen t .

,

that furnishes the three groups o f scouts which pre

cede i t O and O the detachments which move
.
,
 L
R U E S TO RE O BS ER V E D nv M AR C H E S . 111

p aral lel to the road ,

and furnish flanke rs ,

who are supposed

als o to be i n thre e
groups the o n e i n
,

front o f the detach

m ent communicatin g
wi t h the scouts and ,

the other two group s

on the outer flank .

D and D a re patrol s ,

t o keep up communi

cation with t he fl a n k
M O .

ers,
an d a ffording
th em pro mp t aid if attacked .

In a n ight m arch all these det a chmen ts should be

drawn in much n earer to the advanced guard and ,

generally the fl an k e rs must be dispen sed wi t h S i .

lence m us t be kept a n d every c a r ready to catch the

.
,

least sound Xenophon says that at night ea rs m ust

.

do the duty of eye s .

A vd a n ced G u a r —
d If the only duties o f an a d
v a n c e d guard were those o f examin ation and Ski rmish

i ng n one b u t light troops S hould be employed ; but

,

it has sometimes to seize and hold importan t points

again st a superior force u n til th e main body can co m e
up It h as to force de file s take possession of villages
.
, ,

and i s at every moment exposed to serious attacks .

The advanced guard of a corps o f considerable i m

11 2 P R IN C IP L ES oE STR A TE GY .

portance ought therefore to have in addition to th e ,

light troops some infant ry of the line heavy caval ry

, , ,

an d some artillery in such proportions that the di ffer

,

ent arms m ay afford each other mutual assistance .

The ba t talions a n d squ adrons o f the army S hould

all be detailed in turn for advanced guard d u ty since ,

this i s the b es t school for soldiers o f all grades to

learn their trade and a l l S hould receive its i n s tru c
,

tion s, To f or m the advanced guard of detachments

take n from the several corps is a bad plan as it com ,

plicates the det ails o f that service an d destroys the ,

spirit of honorable rivalry whic h Should subsist b e

tween the corps ” D iscipline su ffers also becaus e the ,

m e n do not serve u nder the chief to whom they are

accustomed F or these reason s it should be laid dow n
.

as a rule that the battalions and squadrons shoul d

'

serve in succession o n advanced guard duty If the .

advanced guard does not contain a battalion o r a

squad r on whole companies Should be detailed an d
, ,

never frac t ions .

The commander of th e advanced guard ought t o

h ave the best maps that can b e obtained and to be ,

attended by several of the inhabitants o f the country ,

to ser ve as guides and gi ve him such information as

,

h e m ay need A t each statio n h e takes n ew guides

.
,

who are carried along under a stro n g escort to preven t ,

th eir escape K nowledge o f the la n guage o f t he

.

country is of great importance and if the comman der, ,

himself does not po s sess i t , he should have on his s taff

 L
R U E S TO BE O BS ER VE D IN M A RC H E S .

some o fficers who do preferri n g those who have

,

tra v elled through t he country before .

Travelle rs deser t ers and p r isoners should be sep a

, , ,

ra te l y questioned as to the pos i t ion and force s o f t he

enemy and wi t h reference to what is known or pre

,

sum ed about his plan s the m or a le of his troops the

, ,

characte r of the commanders & c F rom each indi , .

vidual som e information will h e obtained oft en indeed ,

v ery incomple t e and un sa t isfactory but by comparing ,

a l l t heir sta tement s a qui te accurate idea m ay be

formed o f the com p o si t ion o f the hos tile forces their ,

numbers position s prior movements &c A ll a n

, , ,
.

sw ors should be exactly written out and transmi tt ed

to the com m andi n g general whenever they furnish,

an
y interes t ing information as to the plan s o f the

en emy .

A S soon as the command er o f the advanced gua rd

arri ves at the place where h e i s to halt he ques t ion s ,

the magistra tes and other intelligent persons i n orde r ,

to obtain all the information they p o sse ss about t he

ro ads bridges fords fo res ts de fi le s m arshes & c If
, , , , , ,
.

t hey k n ow an y thing o f the pos ition and des igns o f the

enemy th ey can generally be prevailed upon by polite

, ,

m anagemen t rather than b y threa t s to communi ,

ca te it What they say with regard to t he reso urces

.

o f th e country is to b e recei ved wi t h caution for i t is ,

gen erally th eir i nterest t o depreciate them This .

,

h owever is a point about which reliable info rmation

,

s hould be required While the commander is attend

.
1 1 4: P RINC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

ing to these details which demand much act ivity and ,

tact he send s some of his subordinates to examin e the

,

neighborhood an d speci ally in the direction o f th e

,

road to be passed over the next day The coun try .

should b e explored to a con siderable distance by

patrols which will move along all th e roads and
, ,

inspect every spot where an enemy might b e con

c e al e d The troops should not lay down their arms
.
,

nor enter quarters nor bivo u ac until the patrols r e

, ,

turn and th e guards are established and there is n o ,

longer any thing like attack to be apprehended .

A very important duty of the commander o f a n

advanced guard is to obtai n provision s in order to ,

preven t his m en from wandering o ff i n search of

them A s th e advanced guard is generally n o t very
.

s trong in n umbers and m ay have to engage very su

,

p erior forces it is the more important for it to keep

,

united A S provisions are n eeded to d ay so they wil l

.
,

be to morro w an d they S houl d be loaded into some

-
,

o f the vehicles o f the country S uch foresight is .

n ever hurtful Montluc says : A lways have a good

.
“

s tock o f p r o v rs mn s and especially bread and wine in

, ,

order to a fford th e soldier som e refreshment for the ,

”
human body is n o t m ade of iron .

When the advanced g u ard comes to a village o n

the road it p asses round it if possible rather than
, , ,

thro u gh it especially if it is quite lo n g because de

, ,

files where an attack m ay b e m ade are gen erally to

, ,

b e avoided So m eti m es , more over it m ay happen

.
 L
RU E S TO BE C RS E Rv E D IN M AR C H E S . 115

that the scouts have not m ade a su fficiently clos e

examin ation of a village ; the en emy m ay be con
c e a l e d in the houses and under t heir cover m ay do
, , ,

much mischief before they c a n be dislodged A l though .

this event is not very probable yet it is possible and

, ,

the precaution i s therefore justifiable and pruden t .

A t crossings o f roads the ad vanced guard marks

o u t with bran ch es o f trees o r with straw the one it

h a s taken so that the main body which is at some

, ,

distance in rea r and generally o u t o f sight may n ot

, ,

m istake th e road A few horseme n m ay b e left at

.

such a pl ace to S how the way but th at will depend

,

u pon th e time required for the m ain body to come up .

If a bridge is found broken o r un safe o r ditches dug ,

acro ss the road or there are miry places o r other obsta

,

cles which might stop the m arch of the column the ,

workmen imme diately commence the n ecessary repair

with all possible diligence and rej oin the advan ced
,

gu ard at th e first halt .

When the coun t ry i s m uch covered with forests ,

th e advanced gu ard send s out som e scouts who keep

U p com mun ication with the leading detachment and

the fl a n k e rs This is to provide for th e case of the lead

.

ing scouts h aving left some portion o f the ground with

o u t su ffi cient exploration and the enemy not havi n g
, ,

been discovered might unexpectedly fall upon the

,

advan ced guard The second set of scou t s will see

.

him approach and give warning of it The same pre .

caution may be used for the main body especially ,

116 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TEGY .

when it i s co n sid erably distant from the advan ced

guard We repeat that in war it is impossible to
.
,
'

take too m any precautio ns to prevent surprise as ,

wel l o n the march as in quarters .

In passing defi le s tha t cannot be avoided the lead ,

ing de t achmen t of the advanced guard s h o ul d a ft e r , _

passing through examine with minute care the neigh

,

boring ground because i t is in such posi t ions th at an

,

enemy would secrete himself with a view of attack ,

ing the column before it had time to deploy The .

leading detachment should therefore halt after pass

ing the defile for m lin e of battle and send fl a n k e rs
, ,

o u t as far as possible at the same time t hat the scouts

,

examine all the grou n d in the front Its march will .

only be resumed whe n t he head of th e ad va nced .

g u ard is at hand and then its proper distance will be

,

regained by in creasing the pace It i s evi dent that .

this duty is very fatiguing and consequently all the ,

light troops of t he ad vanced guard should take their

t u rns they alon e being employed to form th e leading
detach m en t of the advanced guar d .

There IS no good reason for dispensing with any o f

these p r e c a u tio n s i n an open country for however
.
,

level it m ay appear , there a r e a l w a ys undulation s,

.

under whose cover troops may lie hid in conside rable

n umbers a nd an a m buscade in such a country would
,

prob ably b e the more effectual b ecause t he less ex

e c t ed T h e only advantage presented by a level
p . I,

and open country is , t hat a few horsemen may gallop

 L
RU E S To BE OBS ERVE D IN M ARC H E S . 1 17

over it rapidly giving it a su fficient examin ation , an d

,

t hus the column be not long delayed .

If the ad vance d guard meets th e enemy it forms ,

line o f battle and tri e s to hold its p osition ; if this

can not be done it falls back upon t he main body
, ,

taking advantage o f all favorable points for delaying

the enemy and giving ti m e to the main bo dy to make
,

such preparations as may suit the occasion The .

commander should l os e n o tim e i n se n ding an express

m e s se n g er to the main body If it is night the a d
.
,

v a n c e d gu ard sh ould charge with impetuosity what ,

ever m ay be its force i n order t o thro w the enem y

,

into confusion o r to intimidate him at all events to ,

check him In s uch a case the darkness is favorable

.

t o th e attacking party because the enemy being

, ,

unable t o see what force b e is en gaging must be ,

careful The main body can thus h ave ti me to c o me

.

to th e support o f the advanced guard Bu t as has .

,

been already observed night m arches are to be avoid

,

e d S ince they are very fati uing give rise to dis o r

, g ,

de rly conduct which the o ffi ce rs cannot repress and ,

d uring the darkness most unfortun ate mistakes often

occur O n e example will be given of the m any tha t
.

h ave occurred o f frien dly troops firing into each other

at night A F rench army in two column s was ma r ch
.

ing at night toward s L and au when a partisan chief

,

wi t h fift y men S lip p ed bet w ee n the two c o lumn s ,

which were separated by a ravine He fired from his .

central position upon both columns at the same time .

118 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

E ach supposing itself suddenly attacked returned the

, ,

fire and so th ey continued butchering each o t her

,

until daylight revealed the fatal error .

Th e advanced guard S hould choose some favorable

spot for the principal halt o f the m arch —o n e con
c e al e d as m uch a s practicable from obser v ation as , ,

for instance the reverse S lope o f a hill S entin els

,
.

should be placed at th e to p to have an extended Vie w ,

and upon the roads by which an enemy might a p

proach If there are ro ads n ear they should b e ex
.
,
'

a m i n e d by scouting parties and a few m en left there ,

who m ay conceal themselves in the undergrowth and ,

b e enabled to see the exterior groun d without being

s een .If an attack is imminent o n e half o f the ,
-

troops will rem ain in line o f battle ready to fight ,

u ntil the remaining half take their m eal The h alves .

will then change places .

When a wood of considerable extent is to b e crossed ,

the advan ced guard should be hal ted before ente ri n g

it and the leading detachment streng thened in order
, ,

th at the n umber o f scouts m ay be in creased .

The drums o f th e advanced guard should not be beat ,

as they give warnin g o f its approach ; and generally

the dru m shoul d b e little used on the march except ,

in passing through a town in comi n g into camp o r

, ,

entering the field o f b attle .

What should be the strength of the advanced

guard and at what distance S hould it march from the
,

T u ai n body ? These questions cannot b e answered

 L
RU E S T O BE O BS E RV ED IN MA R C H E S .

with pre cision The strength o f the advanced guard

.

an d i ts composition vary wi t h circumstances and de ,

pend u p o n the m eans at the disposal o f the co rn

m ander in chief Th e ad vanced guard may b e tem
- -
.

o ra r i l r e enforced whe n it m ay have to receive an

p y
attack o r carry and hold a posi tion ; but in general
,

its strength wil l not exceed o n e fi fth o f the mai n -

body and oftener will be l es s The advanced guard

,
.

will contain in the m ajority o f cases between one

, ,

tenth an d o n e fi fth o f the mai n b o dy To make i t

-
.

stronger would be to fatigue the men by a severe

du ty r e curring t o o frequently ; o n the other h and to ,

make it t o o weak would be to expose it to capture o r

destruction A consciousness o f weak ness might pre
.

v ent risking a vigorous e ffort when imperatively r e

quired and such a failure might be highly disastrous

,

to the army .

T he dis t ance of the advanced guard fro m the main

body m ay e v idently be greater for a large than a small
body of t roops and it depends also very much o n the
,

length of t he column A s it is the d uty of t he a d

.

v a n c e d guard t o gi v e notice o f the approach of the

enemy and to delay his m arch it should be at such a ,

distance that the main body m ay h ave t ime enough to

prepare for an attack F or example if the column is
.
,

three miles long more than an hour is needed for t he

,

rea r to come up to a line wi t h the head and the a d ,

v a n c e d guard should therefore be at least the same

, ,

distance in front ; for if it is true that it delays the

C
1 20 P R INC IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

e n emy s arri v al it i s equally tru e that so m e time is

’
,

consumed in ascertaining the real state of a ffairs an d

sending a m e s s en g e r to t he rear It would seem t hen
'

a good rule that the advanced guard Should precede

,

the main column by a distance a t least equ al to the

length of the latter F requently the distan ce is mu c h
.

increased .

The r ea r g u a r d is arranged nearly in the same way

-

as the advanced guard but is n aturally m ade weaker, ,

as there is less danger o f attack in rear than in front .

It is the escort for the baggage when the m arch is

in advan ce The rear guard proper has its o w n rear
.
-

detachment and fl an k ers These detachm ents send .

o u t groups o f two o r thr ee men who should fr e ,

q uently turn b a c k to see whether the enemy is fol

lowing the column They w ill arrest deserters an d
.

m arauders and drive along stragglers A rear guard .

-

should have a detachment o f cavalry to move about

rapidly in every direction when necessary and to ,

k eep up communication with the m ain body .

In a retreat the rear gu ard be co m es the most im

,
-

portant body an d S hould b e com posed o f the b est

,

troops or those which have su ffered least There can

,
.

b e but little rotation in su ch duties Necessity gen .

e ra ll y requires the sam e body to act some time as the

rear guard often for several successive week s No

-

,
. -

other service can give more fame to a body o f troops

than in such a case as this where it exposes itself ,

to danger pri vation , an d toil less for itself than for

, ,
 L
RU E S TO BE O BS ER V E D IN M A RC H E S .

th e rem ainder of the army More tha n on e c om .

m ander of a rear gu ar d h as made his n am e celebrated

-

In a retreat the baggage wagon s are n ot placed b e

,

tween the main body and the rear gu ard but ar e -

m ov e d as far towards the head of the column as p os

s ible t o se cure them against attack an d n ot to e m
,
~
,

ba rrass the defen sive arran gements .

S te en g t/b of a co lu m n on th e m a r ch — It h as been
‘

s ta t ed in a prece ding chapter that an arm y o f con

, ,

si de r a b le siz e is always di vided up into se veral c orps ,

whi ch o n a m arch form separate columns and m ov e

, , ,

a long parallel roa ds The arm y has thus n o t only

.

m ore m obility but also threatens the ene m y si m

,

u l ta n e ou sl
y i n s e v eral d irections keeps hi m in a ,

s tate o f uncert ainty as t o the real point t o b e a t

t acked o u tfl a n k s him if he m akes a stand at any par

,

ti c u l a r o n e and can be subsisted with much gr eater

,

eas e The number o f column s will depen d o n the

.

m agni tude o f the army and the character o f the coun

t ry. G en erally th e number will be in creased near
the battl e fiel d to fac il itate the necessary deploy
-
,

m ents Th ere is however a l imi t , below whi ch it is

.
, ,

bes t to k eep the str en gth o f a marching column .

Suppos e for e x am ple a large corps m archi n g along

, ,

a single road It will be composed o f troops of all

.
-

arms in the proper propo rt ion There will be an

,
.

advan ced guard fro m seven t o ten m iles or a half ,

m arch in front o f the m ain body C ouri ers will take

,
.

about an ho u r t o p ass ov er thi s di stan ce , an d the

6
1 22 P R INC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

c ommander o f the m ain body wi ll hence h ave about

two hours in which to give his orders an d to deploy
his colu m ns upon the supposition that the enemy is
,

greatly superi or t o the a dvanced guard an d drives it ,

b ack upon the main body Hence the total length .

,

o f the column should not b e more than six or seven

m iles in order that the rear battal ions may have time
,

t o arrive at th e head o f the column to participate in

the engagement Experience an d calcul ation demon
.

s trate that an army Of men in cluding artillery ,

an d caval ry and with infantry in three ranks is about

, ,

as large as can be properly marched alo n g a S ingle

r e ad T hi s fixes the m agnitude of the a r my corp s as
.
,

i t i s termed If the infantry is in two ranks th e

.
,

c orps S hould n o t contain more than m en .

A rt . IL — F o rw a r d M o v e m e n t s, an d th e C o mb a ts

th ey lea d to .

Or de r f moa r ch
of D i vi s i o n
order to apply
a — In
the r ul es l aid down ,
an d to have definite ideas as to
the details o f a forward m ovement we wi ll take an ,

ex a mple o f a divi sion o f four brigades sub di vi ded a s ,

16 b a ttal i o n s of i nfa ntry O f 700 men ea ch

1 0 co mp an ie s o f sh a rpshoot e rs
2 c a v alry .

2 4 p i e c e s o f a rt ill e r y i n 4 b a tt e r ie s
,

1 co mp an y of s app e rs
1 po n to n iers
 FORW A RD M OV E ME N TS ,
E TC .

This tot al does n o t compri se th e di v ision and

b rigade staffs o r persons employed in the medical
, ,

quarterm aster and commissary departmen ts These

, .

troops in l ine o f battle will occupy about two and a

half miles if deployed i n a single line and th e in ,

fa n t ry is in t w o ranks Th e column if the infantry

.
,

m arch by sections an d each piece o f artillery be f ol

,

lowed by its caisson wi ll be also about two an d a

,

h alf miles in length not withstanding th e absence of

,

the advanced gu ard an d fl a n k e rs The advanced .

guard will be two and a half o r three miles in a d

v ance o f t h e column .

The rear guard which escorts the b a ggage will be

-
, ,

about o n e mile and a half to the rear If the division .

’
carries four days provision s i n wagons as is usual ,

when concentrating before the enemy 400 wagons ,

will be required an d th e train will be more th an a

,

m ile lon g .

The infantry is divided into four brigades each of ,

four battalion s ; an d as the marksm en are to be Spread

along the fr ont in c as e o f an enga g ement t w o com
'

a n ies will be attached to e a ch bri gade an d two to the

p
artillery The in fantry brigades will m arch in turn
.

at the h ead o f the colum n and that one which is in

,

front will furn ish the battalions an d sh arpshooters of

the advanced guard In like mann er each battery
.
,

m arches in turn with the advanced guard unless ,

there are special reasons t o the contrary .

The advanc e d guard will consist of the company

1 24 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

of sappers , on e comp a ny o f cavalry two of sharp ,

shooters o n e battery and t w o battalion s of infantry

, ,
.

Th e proportion will thus be on e eighth for the in -

fa n t ry o n e fi fth for th e s h arpshooters o n e fourth for

,
-
,
-

the artillery and o n e half for the cavalry I t is t o o

,
-
.

large for the art illery and cavalry , but the entire a d
v a n ce d guard will be about in the proper proportion

to the whole command Som e cavalry soldiers are .

necessary with an advanced gua rd even i n a very ,

broken cou ntry to serve as couriers between it an d

,

the m ain body Not less than one company S hould

.

be with the advanced guard in this case O n e plat .

o o n will pass to the front an d furnish scouts for the ,

main an d parallel roads while the other will remain ,

at the head of the advanced guard form i ng the ,

escort o f its co m m an der The sappers will follow .

the cavalry having with th em wagons of tools and

, ,

other things necessary for the repair o f roads an d

bridges The battalion s will throw ou t flank detach
.

ments who will also keep up a communication with

,

the cavalry scouting parties ~

.

Th e remainder of the troops w ill march alo n g th e

r oa d as well closed up as possible an d in such order
, ,

that the column m ay readily form li ne of battle t o

the front G enerally the artillery should be in the
.

centre, so as to b e better protected by the infantry ,

and the sharpshooters will be on the flan k s The

. .

order o f march of the advanced g uard wil l therefore

 FORWARD M OV E M E NTS ,
E TC .

l st .A platoon o f cavalry in front of the advanced

u ard prope r an d furn is hing the scouts
g ,

2 d A nother platoon o f ca v alry at the head of the

.

a d vanced gu a rd ;

3d The company o f sap p ers with thei r wagons ;

.

4th A company o f sharpshooters ;

.

5 t h A battal ion o f in fantry sendi ng ou t on e co m

.
,

any as fl a nk ers o n the right ;

p
6 th A batte ry o f artillery ;
.

7th A battalion o f infantry sen ding ou t o n e co m

.
,

p any as fl a n k e rs on the le ft ;

8th A company o f sh arpshooters

. .

If this column deploys t o receive the enemy, the

t wo platoon s o f cavalry an d the company of sappers
will fall t o the rear to be employed as may be n e c e s
,

s ary an d the fl a n k e rs will gather in upon the w ings

,

t o support the shar pshooters .

The m ain body will m arch (two o r three miles in

rear) in the following order
l s t Tw o remaining battalions o f the brigade which
.

has fu r n ished the advanc e d gu ard A company of the

.

leading battalion will march three o r four hundred

paces in advan ce like a secon d advanced guard which
, ,

will throw t o the several groups fron t an d flanks ;

2 d Th e entire secon d brigade with sharpshooters
.
,

leading ;
3d Three batteries o f artillery together each piece
.
,

followed im mediately by its caisson an d the whole ,

preceded by their two companies of sharpshooters ;

1 26 P RIN C IP LES OE S TR A TE GY .

4th . The th ird brigade with sharpshooters lead ,

in g ;
5 th The fourth brigade preceded by its Sharp
.
,

Shooters having detached o n e battalion to the rear as

,

rear guard ;
-

6 th A ll the baggage reserve am m unition forges ,

.
, ,

ambulances bridge train ;

,

7th The b attalion which forms at on ce the baggage

.

escort and the rear guard the company of pontoniers

-
,

an d the remaini ng company o f caval ry c losing the

column .

It would seem at first glance that the pont oniers

ought to be i n front to prepare for passing rivers ,

whose bri dges m ay be broken but their train would

clog the advan ced guard whose movements S hould be ,

prompt and unembarrassed A t the first reverse the .

train would be lost an d the army deprived o f a most

,

important accessory to successful operati ons The .

pontoniers will only be employed in p a s sm g r 1 v er s o f

some import ance an d i n such cases their train is
,

easily m oved to the front while the army is halti n g ,

as it must do The sappers of the advan ced gua r d can

.

make all necessary arrangements for crossing brooks

and small streams .

The division will m arch as indicated i n advan cing ,

toward s th e enemy There will b e de file s to pass

.
,

bridges to force rivers to cross a n d at last prepara

, , , ,

tio n s made for battle whe n t he enemy takes up a ,

po sition to hol d it Thes e cases wi ll be treated i n a

.
 O
F R W AR D M OV E M E NTS ,
ET C . 1 27

general way without particular reference to the div 1

,

sion whose order o f march has been described

, .

P a s s a g e of D efil es A grave disaster m ay result

.
-

from rashly entering a long defile when the enemy i s

near even if he is retrea t ing after a de feat It i s
, .

much wiser to attempt to turn a defile held by th e

en emy th an to trust to the chances of forcing it by
,

direct attack at the expense o f much blood How .

ever there are case s when the necessity is urgent and

, , ,

c ost what it m ay the passage m ust be forced

,
U nder .

s uch circumstances the first thing to do is to take

,

possession o f the lateral heights a n ecessary p r e lim i ,

n ary to succes s The heights m ust be assailed with

.

infantry columns Whose strength will be proportion al

,

to the resistance and di fficulties to be m e t and over

come The enemy will be driven from the heights
.
,

an d h is position in the defile turned The army will

'

n o t attempt to penetrate the defile u n til t he column s

o n the flanks have taken possession of the heights If .

the defile is Very n arrow there will b e a single ,

column in it ; and in su ch a case there should be con

s ide r a b l e intervals between th e several parts o f the

colu m n in order that if the leading portion is dri ven

,

back the confusion will not be transmitte d to those

,

behin d Whe n th e valley is broad an d i ts sides

.
,

gently sloping other column s may mo v e parallel to

,

t h e m ai n one at levels between the botto m and top

,
.

These side column s should keep som ewhat in advanc e

o f the main column o n the lowest ground This .
 1 28 P R INC IP L E S OF S TRATE GY .

arran g ement is based upon the supposition that the

s t re am b f water u su al ly f o u n d i n such locations m ay

be readily cross ed so that the communication between

,

the several colum n s m ay b e easily kept up It is .

always unsafe to separate the parts of an army by 1 m

p assable obstacles in presence of an en emy who m ay
, ,

attack and crush o n e whi le the other is little else

than an idle spectator If the strea m i n the defile i s
.

n o t easily crossed bridges must be thrown over it at

,

several points or the whole force must rem ain on o n e

,

side .

If the defile i s short and not occupied in forc e the ,

ad van ced guard S hould take possession of it the ligh t ,

infantry clearing the heights and the heavy infantry

,

passing through the defile wi t h the artillery a n d

cav al ry The artillery t a kes the l ead th at it m ay
.
,

n o t be m asked if it b e c o m es n e c e s s ary to ope nfire

‘

The cavalry falls to the rear as it can be o f littl e use

,

in such a situation The sha rpshooters if there are

.
,

any form small column s on the flanks of the artillery

, ,

o r they may b e replaced by companies o f regular

infantry .

When the defile i s quite long an d stro n gly held , ,

the advan ced guard halts at th e entran ce and waits

for the main body When all the troops h ave com e
.

u
p,
arrangements will b e made as previously indi

c a t e d.

The rules to b e followed are the sam e for a large

or s m all body o f troops The heights must first be
.
~
 FORW AR D M OV E M E NTS ,
E TC .

carried an d the enemy driven from them b efore a

, ,

m ovement i s m ade into t he defile This principle .

cannot b e v iolated wi t h impuni t y as more than on e ,

example h as demon strated .

In high mountains , defi le s are s o e as ily defended

against direct attack th at it is preferable to turn
,

them which is generally possible as paths more or

, ,

l e ss circuitous alm o st always exist by which a force

m ay b e thrown upon the flank o r rear o f the as sailed .

Th e sense o f security on account o f the stren gth o f a

o sition sometimes puts vigilance t o sleep an d t h
p e ,

plac e is taken .

S ometimes the enemy occupies b ut on e S ide o f the

valley If th e heights cannot be carried i n such a
.

case t he attempt may be made to slip alo n g the other

,

side some skirmishers and even artillery so as to tak e

, ,

the enemy i n flank while the r e mainder o f the troops

,

at ta ck in front It w as thus the F rench forced the

.

de fi le o f C alliano .

The defence is n o t always made i n the defile itself .

Som e t imes an attempt i s m ade to en velope an d over

whelm the column as it debouch es The comm ander .

i n chief having been infor med o f such a state o f

-
,

affairs hastens to j oin the advanced guard and as

, , ,

c e n di n
g som e eminence when ce he can see the cue

my s posi t ion he m akes his arrangements and send s

’
,

h is ord e rs to th e troops in rear

G enerally t he only course i s t o scatter the troops
,

j ust in front o f the defile by a fire o f artillery and ,

1 30 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

immediately to throw forward and deploy a por t ion

of the troops o n the ground thus cleare d These .

troops under C over of the artillery crossi n g its fire in

,

fr ont o f t hem endeavor to gain ground to the fron t to

,

m ake room for t hose behind them The skirmishers .

,

and especially the sharpshooters push for ward on the ,

right and left alon g the heights wi t h a View o f a n ,

n oying the batteries of the enemy w hose converging ,

fi r e o n the debouching co lumns m ay be very de s tr u c

’

tive In the m ean time n ew battalion s closed i n

.
, ,

m ass in the defile but at some distance from each

,

oth er d ebouch and deploy rapidl y to th e right and

,

left S everal squadrons gallop up and deploy o n the

.

wings When troops enough are o n the ground they

.
,

at t ack wi th the b ayon et and drive the enemy o ff .

In the deployments subsequent to passing de file s ,

and i n other cases which might be m entione d much ,

time is Oft en g ained i n m anoeuvring by i n ver s i on .

Many instances have occurred o f troops being repulsed

because they did not know how to m anoeuvre in this
way .

Whatever b e the circumstances o f the passage o f a

defile and whatever plan be adopted the baggage
, ,

should n ever be permitted to enter un til the outer ex

t r e m ity is clear o f the enemy and t here is ample ,

S pace for the troops t o m an oe uvre I t i s n o t di fficul t

.

t o conceive of the horrible confusion of a column

dri ve n back from th e front harassed in flank and, ,

finding t h e defile filled with wagon s whose d rivers ,

 FO R W A RD M OV E M E NTS ,
E TC .

have cut their harn ess an d es caped o n the horses .

The baggage should t herefore never b e permitted to

en ter the defile until it is perfectly safe .

The passage o f a defile of some importance requires ,

o n the part o f the advanced guard redoubled v i i

g ,

lance and preca u tion even when the enemy is sup

,

po sed to b e absent for h e m a y return by a cross road

,
-

a n d attack unexpectedly The defile S hould there

.
,

fore b e examined by a detachment of cavalry some

,

distan c e In fr ont of the advanced guard and th e ,

woods o n th e right and left carefully explored by

fl a n k e rs. The advanced guard sho uld pass through
by detachments so that if any accident h appen to the
,

leading o n e the remainder m ay escape the same fate

, ,

and m ay render it as sistance A ll the detachments .

S hould unite at the débouché and remain there unti l,

scouting parties h ave thoroughly exa min ed the neigh

boring ground S O that they m ay feel secure against
,

a ll danger of at t ack .

P a s s ag e of B r i dg es — Bridges are short defiles but ,

their passage requires some precautions to be taken

by any body o f troops They prese n t seriou s difli c u l
.

ties when they are defended an d the p a ssage m ust b e ,

forced When there i s n o enemy visible the same

.
,

precautions are n ecessary as for any other S hort defile .

T he leading detachmen t of the advanced guard s t e p s

at th e river ban k taking advantage of all cover afford
-
,

ed by the locality u n til the scouts have made an

,

examination of the ground o n the other S ide Th e .

 P RIN C IP LE S OF S TRA TE GY .

horsemen wh o perform this duty cross the bridge at

, ,

a rapid trot a n d then divide in t o three groups ; o n e

,

o f which moves carefu lly along the road making the

,

circuit o f ho u ses gardens and clumps o f trees while

, , ,

the other two groups go to the right a n d left e x p l or ,

ing as they go When after a few minutes no enemy

.
, ,

is discov ere d the l e ading detachment crosses the

,

b ri dge and rapidly rej oins the groups which belong to

,

it In the mean time the advanced guard has h alted

.
,

a t some distance from the bridge ; the fl a n k e rs having ,

r eached the ri ver ban k mov e down towards the

-
,

bridge examinin g as they go They cros s the bri dge

,
.

and move to the right and left resu ming their duties ,

as fl a n k e rs The a dvanced guard then crosses t h e

.

bridge but always a t a rapid pace and in close order

, ,
.

It is a good plan to leave an interval between the

artillery and the troo ps before an d after and to pas s ,
‘

that over at a trot .

A S soon as the advanced guard is safely over t h e ,

comm ander makes a repor t of the facts o f the case

to the commander in chief When th e m ain body
- -
.

comes up it m ay pass without delay only givi n g a

, ,

l ittle time fo r its fl an k e rs an d scou t s to pass before ,

an d take their appropri ate places o n the other S ide .

If the communication established by the bridge i s

an important o n e the advan ced guard S ho u ld n o t
,

move forward until the m ain body has come up ,

because the enemy might permit the passage by the

adv an ced guard and dispute that o f th e m ain body
,
.
 FORWAR D M OV E M E NTS ,
ETC .

In such a case it should prepare t o resist any attack

,

th e enemy might make before the arrival o f the m ain

body tak ing advantage o f the features of t he ground
, .

to str engthen i t s position .

When th e enemy holds the bridge it is very difli ,

cult to dislodge t hem especially if t he bridge is long

, ,

and the Opposite bank the highest and the en emy ,

provided with a rtillery Th e famous pas sage of the

.

b ridge o f Lodi by Napoleon in the presence o f

, ,

A ustrians is well known ,

.

A rtillery pla y s an important part in the attack o f a

bridge b ec ause it is n ecessary to drive the enemy fro m
,

the o ther side before sending troops upon the bridge .

’
If the direct attack fails the enemy s at tention m ust
,

be engaged while the m ain body pass es at another

point.

If the bridge is sho rt a n d is held by a small force

, ,

th e advanced guard m ay b e able to carry i t If .

n ot i t will h alt the staff o fficers will examin e the

,

ground loo k for fords &c while the main body is

, ,
.
,

coming up .

The artillery will be put in position to cross their

fire o n th e ground near the other end o f the bridge ,

a n d m arksmen may do excellent service also in killi n g

th e men and horses i f the river is not too W ide

,
.

While this firing is in progress the infant ry who are ,

to force the p a ssage are m aking the n ecessary pre

p a r a t io n s covering
,
themselves as well as possible
b ehi nd inequalities o f the ground houses woods , ,
1 34 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

or thickets near the bank Eac h battalion will for m .

a closed column w ith as wide a front as the b r idge

,

Will p ermit The fir s t b a tt a lion advances past the

.
'

lin e o f marksmen rushes upon the bridge and , ,

crosses i t at a run ; drives away the few m en remain

ing at the other end and deploys near the bridge ,
.

If this is s uccessful a secon d ba t talion crosses in lik e

,

m anner deploys alo n gside the first and the two gain
, ,

ground to the front A third battalion is thrown .

over and finally the whole army is gotten across

,
.

But it may happen that the firs t battalion is repulsed .

If so the o fli c e rs ral ly it and again rush upon th e

, ,

enemy If there is any hesitation in the m ovement

.
,

it Is a fit time for a person al effort The chief seizes .

a flag takes his place in front t he men are inspired

,

with fresh courage ; the bravest rally aroun d their

leader ; the rest follow and the passage is forced ,
.

E vidently there mus t be som e powerful mo t ive to

j ustify so dangerous and bloody an opera t io n else it
“

would b e preferable to take more ti m e and secure an ,

easier passage at some other point .

A s soon as the infantry has taken up a position on the

opposite S ide the artillery continues its fire as lo n g as
,

it can without endangering the infantry which has

crossed It th en ceases fire forms column passes the
.
, ,

bridge as rapidly as possible an d takes position on ,

the other S ide at some suitable point where it may

,

continue to fire upon the retiring enemy The cavalry .

will have crossed as soon as th e infantry was in s u ffi

 FOR WARD M OVE M EN TS ,
E TC . 1 35

cient force to give it support and is threaten i n g the ,

flanks o f the en emy O r else taking ad v antage of .

,

some for d i t m ay have turned t he posi t ion while t he

,

i nfantry were attacking i n front The rem aining .

troops who during t he engagement have kept ou t of

, , ,

fire and m ade such disposi t ions as would be a dv a nt a

,

geons in ca s e of a repulse n o w form column and cross ,

the bridge .

P a s s ag e of Woods — When a column is to pass

through a large forest th e attempt should not be ,

m ade until it h as been thoroughly explored both in ,

front a n d on the S ides to such a distance as to remove ,

all apprehen sion o f unexpected attack by a large force

o f t h e enemy In this case t he infantry must do the
.
,

scou ting as the cav alry can make but little progress
,

in a d ense forest The fl a n k e rs shoul d be supported

.

by se v eral pa t rol s which wi ll keep u p their connec

,

tion with t he column If the wood is of small extent .

,

the advanced guard does n ot pass through unti l th e

scouts have reach ed the other S ide but if of consider
abl e extent th e del ay would be t o o great and in this
, , ,

case a halt of half o r quarte r o f an hour is made

, ,

while detachments follow each other to the front and ,

serve as success ive re enforcements to the leading -

de t ach ment if it is obliged to fall back

,
.

If the wood is occupied by the enemy skirmishers ,

are s e n t forward who gradually cree p up on t he

,

flanks under such cover as th ey can find to the o u t

, ,

skir ts The artillery follows a t a s u itable distan ce

. ,
1 36 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

takes a central positio n fires obliquely and forces th e, ,

defenders to t ake refuge in the denser par ts T h u s .

,

the skirmishers are enabled t O g e t co ver b ehind the ‘

outer fri n ge of t rees When t his i s accomplished and

.
,

the advanced guard is in possession o f the skirts of

the wood the enemy c a n not hold hi s position long
, ,

unles s abatis have been made This species of .

obstacle cannot b e o f very great extent and m ay b e ,

the more e as ily t urn e d as the wood itself conceals the

'

movement Th e enemy once set i n motion Should be

.
, ,

vigorously pressed by the skirmishers s u pported if , ,

practicable by small columns

,
If the entire wood .
-

c a n be turned the cavalry which can b e o f n o use i n

, ,

t he interior m ay m ake a circuit to threate n th e com

,

m u n ic a tio n s of the enemy and h as t e n h i s retreat

‘

.
,

When the forest h as been well swept by th e fire ,

several squadrons m ay b e sent along the road at a
gallop to dash upon the retiring enemy as he debouche s
,

i nto the open ground an d thus change his retreat ,

into a rout .

P s s g e of R i v r a
a a e — The most serious obstacle that
can be e ncountered o n m arches i s an unfordable
,

river with its bridges broken down an d th e enemy in

, ,

possessio n o f the opposite bank To pass such an .

obstacle al w ays o cc a sion s loss o f time which will b e ,

proportion al to the difficul t ies attending t h e attempt .

If t h e colu mn has a bridge train it wil l an swer for ,

the passage of streams of moderate S ize ; but when the

river is very broad i t may b ecome n ecessary to col l ect
,
 FO RWAR D M OVEM E NTS ,
E TC . 1 37

the boats o f the country and other m aterials fo r build

'

ing the bridge .

A pas sage is m ade either by a stratagem o r by

force o r oftener still by both togeth er Th e attempt
, .

should n ot be m ade until th e sta ff officers have made

an examin ation o f the river to discover the most ,

favorable po int This point will usually b e o n e where

.

the bank is higher than o n the other sid e and at the ,

same time envelopes it o n account o f a bend in th e

,

river The n eighborhood o f an afflue n t is convenient

.
,

as it o fl e rs facilities fo r collecting in safety and fl o a t

’

i n g down t he bridge m aterials A thickly wooded .

b ank and a wooded isl and enable the preparations for

p ass age to be made o u t o f sight of the enemy .

E ffo rts are made to keep the plans secret an d to ,

d e ceive the enemy P reparat ions are sometimes made

.

at a place where n o passage is intended and whe n , ,

every thing is ready a sudden move is made to th e

,

real point A t d awn batteries ad vantageo u sly pos ted

.
, ,

u pon commanding points o n the right and left cross

, ,

their fire o n the opposi t e shore an d dri ve o ff or un der ,

co ver all who may be there Marksmen m ay also b e .

very useful i n assisting the artillery if the strea m is ,

n o t t o o wide A t the same time the boats descend

.
,

the affluent where they have been concealed They .

are filled with soldiers and rapidly moved across the

,

river where the men disembar k as fast as possible

, ,

and secure the best cover they can to enable them to ,

hold their ground The artillery gives a ll the aid it

.
“

1 38 .P RINC IP L E S OF STR A TE GY .

can render while the b oats are carrying o ver other

loads o f infantry There is a dou ble advantage i n
.

these successive trips o f the boats the first soldiers ,

thro w n over being incited t o strenuous efforts by

havi ng their retreat temporarily cut o ff and sti l l ,

h aving the hope o f speedy re—enforcement The posi .

tion of the attacking force gets cons tantly be t ter until

they feel stron g enough to charge upon the enemy ,

and drive h i m from the river .

The artillery is silenced as soon as its fire might b e

dangerous to the troops o n the other S ide and will ,

s hift its position to another where it m ay still b e

,

e ffective .

Whe n things are in this condition the bri dge m ay

b e commenced but troops S hould continue to cross in
,

the boats F ield works are at once begun to cover

.
-
,

the bridge and secure its possessio n i n case a retreat

becomes n ecessary subsequently Th is is a pr uden .

tial measure which S hould never be omi t ted .

The bridge S hould b e built above the a ffluent so as ,

not to be exposed to da n gerous shocks from boats

which might get loose and float down the c urren t .

When the bridge is finished the artillery the cavalry ,

, ,

and the remainder o f the i n fantry pass over .

A r r i va l
f o til e colu mn i n p r es en ce
of l ive en emy .

A s soon as the general receives notice o f the presen ce

o f the enemy he hasten s to j oin the ad vance d guard
, ,

i n order to examine his forces and position as well as ,

the ground u pon which he must himself m an oeuvre

 FO RW A RD M OVE M E NTS ,
ETC . 1 39

an d fight He takes with h i m the chief of artillery,

.

and at le ast o n e of the higher o ffi cers of each of the

.

corps in the colu mn so th at aft er the reconnoissance

, , ,

when his plans are arran ged h e may give to these

o fficers in person instructions for their respective
, ,

corps .

In the m ean time th e troops composing the column

,

h alt in th e roa d after sending forward several battal

,

ions to r e enforce the advanced guard if necessary ;

-

and while waiting orde rs they close i n mas s to o c

, , ,

c u p y as little depth of g round as possible The bag .

gage under gu ard o f a fe w m en remain s in rear and

, , ,

the cavalry which had formed its escort files past

, ,

along the road and takes position beh ind the i nfantry .

The fi eld artillery is in the centre of the col u mn and ,

the reserve caissons draw n e ar to be at hand i n case ,

o f need .

In this order th e col umn will ad vance either along

t h e road or m o ving o ff o bliquely if required If the
, ,
.

engagemen t i s no t to take place the same day the ,

army upon reaching th e posi t io n selected w ill deploy

, , ,

light its fires and wait for the n ext day When t he
,
.

gener a l sends word to prepare at once for bat t le the ,

column will h alt and break up into several smaller

columns which wil l move to the right and left at dis
,

tances suitable for deployment opening roads if n e , ,

c e s s a ry wi t h the aid of the axe and S hovel

,
.

To h ave definite ideas o n this ma t ter let us recur ,

to the exa m ple o f the division o n the march m e n ,

1 40 P RIN C IP L E S OF STR ATE GY .

t io n e d above i n thi s chapter The two remaini ng bat

.

talion s o f th e leading brigade of the colum n will b e

rapidl y moved forward to support the advanced g u ar d .

There will remain three brigades o n the road in clos e

column the sharpshooters and eighteen pieces of ar
,

tillery being bet ween the second and third brigades .

The order assumed preparato ry for bat tle wil l b e that

sh own in F ig 7 where A B and C are the brigades

.
, , , ,

D th e artillery and C th e cavalry and the division

, ,

will move forward i n this order When it h as arrived.

o n the field the n ecessary deployments can be m ad e

,

in twenty m i nutes The subj ect o f battles will b e

.

treated in another chapter .

 FL AN K A
M RC HES .

Ar t . I I I . —F l a nk Ma r c h e s .

A s a rule a flank should n ot be exposed to the

,

enemy ; b u t there are c a ses where a flank m arch can

not b e avoided o r where it is the best thing to be
,

don e and the risk should be run for a short time in

,
.
,

order to gain some great ad vantage Take the case .

,

for ex a mple o f a corps whi c h could effect a j unction

,

w i t h the main body by exe c uting a flank m arch along

,

th e pos ition o f the enemy or by making a wide détour

,

at a dis tance fro m h im If it w as es s en tia l that th e

.

j u n ctio n should be e ffected in the least possible time ,

the risk should be taken and the fla n k m arch m ade ,

.

I n war there i s n o rule wi t hout exception s These flank .

m arch es are exception al cases which sometimes occur , ,

a n d it i s proper to mention the precaution ary measure s

to be ad o pted to avoid disaster o n such occasions .

A S t h e great est danger t o which the column is ex

posed is that O f being attacked in flank during the
m arch a strong detachment should be thrown ou t on
,

the S ide next the en emy to move along i n a direction

,

parallel wi t h the column and su fficiently n ear to keep

,
'

u
p a constant communication with it and avoid being ,

itself compromi s ed A mile would be about a proper

.

d istance between the column and the flank de t ach

m ent b u t this must depen d upon the ground and
,

other circumstan ces .

The a dvan ced guard u s ually becomes the flank de ~

1 42 P R IN C TPLE S OF S TR ATE GY .

t a c h m e nt a flank m arch but it wil l be well to in

on
,

crease its stre n gth as the ch auces o f attack are greater

, ,

and it should be able to hold its ground against a serious

e ffort o f the ene my The flanking detachment sho u ld
.

h ave its advanced guard rear guard and fl an k e rs each

,
-
, ,

o f these sending o u t groups an d S ingl e m en in every

direction to avoid surprise Th e m ai n body will n eed

,
.

but a small advanced guard to march a fe w hundred

yards i n its front the ordinary rear guard following
,
-

also but n earer than u sual

,
.

The b aggage becomes in a case like this more o f an

, ,

encumbrance tha n us u al It may b e sent to j oin th e

.

army by a circuitous route at a distance from th e ,

enemy o r m ay move o n that flank of its o wn colu mn

,

which is safest again st attack .

Such are the principal arrangem ents necessary i n a

flank m arch See F ig 8 where M indicates the e n
. .
,
 L
F AN E M ARC H E S . 1 43

emy in position ; A th e principal column w ith its ,

advanced guard a and rear guard a ,

B the flank -
'

de t achment with its advanced guard b rear guard

, ,
-

b , and detachm ent b o u i t s flank

'

The scouts ar e
, .

only pl a ced o n the side next the ene my The baggage .

,

D moves o n a road parallel to that occupied by t h e

,

principal column .

The principal col u mn and the flanking detachment

should eac h m arch with ful l distance between their sub
division s so that by simply wheeling to the right or
, ,

left as the case m ay be line of battle is at once formed

, , .

P e rfect order should be kept If the flank detachment .

discovers a lateral defile through which the enemy ,

might debouch such as a ridge o r a road through a

, ,

m arsh o r village that would not n eed a strong guard

, ,

a detachment should be left until the col um n has

p asse d and it will then j oin o r replace t he rear guard
,
-
.

This wo uld be a use l ess precaution in an open country ,

as small detachm ents would not then an swer for suc h

purposes and moreover there is not the same liability
, , ,

t o surpri se as i n a broken country .

It is ob vio u sly wise to conce al a flank march if ,

possible under cover o f a fog o r the darkness o f night

, ,

o r any feature o f the ground whic h would screen the

movement fro m the enemy Under no circ u m stances .

should the u se of the flank detach m ent be omitted .

If it encounters hostile patrols a bold appearance ,

m ust be put on so as to lead to the belief that the

,

whole army is at hand In the m ean time , the column .

1 44 P RIN C IP E S L OF STR ATE GY .

moves steadily forward and when it has passed s uffi , ,

c ie n tly fa r t he de t ach m e n t leaves the pos it ion it h a d

,

held an d re t ires rapidly tak i ng if necessa ry a dirc e

, , , ,

tion di fferent fro m that o f the m ai n column an d ,

s ubsequentl y rej oining it by a détour The enemy will .

n ot fo llow it very far as he exposes his o w n flank to

,

the troops whic h have already passed .

In flank marches it is particularly n ecessary to have

,

accurate infor m atio n as to the cha racte r of the road ,

and t he obstacles to be sur m ounted for the least del ay ,

might prove fatal if unexpected If a de file is t o b e

,
.

passed troops S ho uld be sent for w ard t o hold it

,
.

If t he flank march i s to b e executed by a large .

body of troops several column s should be formed if

, ,

the ground is of a n ature to allo w them to move

freely The col umn at the g re a te s t dis t a n c e fro m the
.

enemy should b e also far thes t to the front the o thers ,

being thrown back i n echel on so as to afford mutu al

support If the e n emy attacks the first column he is
.
,

liable to a flank attack from the others ; if he attacks

the last column those in front are in close supporting
,

distance for it .

In F igure 9 M M represents the ene my in posi

,

tion A i s the flanking de tachment ; B C and D th e , ,

three columns into which the mass to be mo ved is divi

ded The col umns are moving left i n front S O that by
.
,

sim p ly wheeling to the right lin e of battl e is form ed ,

in echelon towards the enemy The baggage E m ay .

follow th e s ame road as D , o r a s til l m ore distant o n e ,

 FLA NK

if ther e is s uch Th e columns m ay b e a tho usand

.

paces from each oth er The first column might be to o

.

s eriously compromised if the others were m ore dist ant

.

When several columns are t o ma rch in this way by

the flank it may be neces sary to make roads to enable
,

them to preserve the prope r distances It was for

.

merly a very com m on thing to make roads for the

numerous colu mn s o f an army as they approached
7
1 46 P RIN C IP LE S OF S TRA TE GY .

the field o f battle ; but in later years wh en armies ,

are moved with so much more rapidity and c a s e it i s ,

seldo m done However N apoleon had several roads

.
,

c ut out o f the rocky banks of the S aale in the night ,

preceding th e famous b attle of Jé n a It might be .

*
don e aga i n when n ecessary .

It was the habi t o f F rederick the G re a t when his ,

enemy was incapable of rapid m anoe u vres to fal l ,

upon him by a flank m arch He formed his o w n army .

o n s u ch occasions in two colu mns o f c o mpan i es so ,

that by wheeling to the right or left he at once formed

lin e o f b attle facing the enemy F or thi s pur .

pose h e changed the direction of his march when

,

n ear t h e ene m y under cover of some inequality of

,

ground and protected by the ad v anced guard These .

long col u m ns ran the risk of being attacked in fro nt ,

and often wo u ld ha v e been if the enemy had b een

m ore prompt b ut F rederick knew with who m he had
,

to do S o m eti m es to remedy this grave obj ection h e

.
, ,

mo ved forward in fo u r colu m ns and u pon changing ,

direction for m ed two which could wheel at once i nto

a double line constituting his line of ba ttle S e e F ig
,
.

ure 1 0 The two central columns A and A are com

.

posed entirely o f infantry ; one h alf o f each goes in -

to the front lin e and the other half into the secon d
,

line The columns B and C of cavalry are also

.
, ,

each divid ed equally b etween the front an d second

R o ds wer
a e cut at Ce rro G ordo b y t h e A me i rc s an un dr
e G en e a rl
tt
S co .
 F L A NK M ARC H E S .

415311521503
B x

flflfifl fififlfl

Fi g . 10 .

lin es o f the line of battle o f which they form the

,

wings A n ad vanced guard D covers the heads o f

.

the columns and masks their movements The rear .

guard E o f the columns becomes t he reserve o f the

,

line o f b attle .

A r t . I V .— M a rc h es in R e t rea t.

A retreat may be simply a retrograde moveme nt

o f o n e army b efore ano t her without an engagement
,

between them which demands n o t hing more than the

,

ordinary precautions for a march ; or it may b e after

a defeat and the general who conducts such an oper
,

ation will n eed all the fir m ness and experience of the
finished soldier Th e essential t hing in a ret r eat is to
.

get the start o f the purs u ing en e my and shake h i m

1 48 P R IN C IPL ES or S TRA TE GY .

o ff. F orced m arches b ecom e necessary and they must ,

often be made at night Nigh t m arches are n ot o b

.

j e c ti o n a b l e in such circumstances as there is lit tle or

,

no danger of t h e retreati n g army falling into an a m

b u s c a de. O n the other hand the pursuing army has ,

that danger to apprehen d and m u st b e proportionally

,

circumspect Th e n ecessary inconvenience s an d fa

.

tigue accompanying nig h t marc h es mus t b e expected

and end ured for safety has b eco m e th e para m o u n t
,

consideration Marshal T urenn e afte r his defeat at

.
,

Marienthal held his ground unti l night and then

, ,

took ad v antage of the darkness to m ove o ff c o m ,

l e te ly distancing the Imperial troops who d r e a ded

p ,

an ambuscade and preferred to wait for daylight .

Some t imes a m ovement to th e rear may b e conceale d

fro m the en emy by lighting the camp fi res as if to
spend the night and leaving a few m e n to keep the m
,

burn ing while the ar my pas ses off quietl y Th e de

,
.

t a c h m e n t s th us left behind m ay set o ff j ust before

day light and readily rej oin the mai n body .

When a start is gained i n this way it is important ,

to k eep it even at the sacrifice of so m e of the w agons

,

th at mov e too slowly In such ti m es the sa fety of the

.

troops is the important thing E very thing however , .

,

should be carried off th at can be and especially the ,

artillery should be saved .

A s soon as th e comm ander has determin ed to re

treat he sh ould order the o fii c er having charge of th e
,

tr ai n of w agon s to m ove off at on ce o n th e ro u t e in s

 A
M R C H E S IN R ETRE AT . 9

dic a te d t o h i m ,and t o push along as rapidly as p o s

sible The road may thu s be cleared to so me distance
.

to the rear .

It is a very di fficult t hin g for an army to commenc e

a retreat i n presence o f the enemy especially aft er a ,

severe battle It shoul d hold its o w n as well as it

.

can repulsing the attacks of th e victorious army an d

, ,

yielding ground only foot by foot until some positio n ,

is reached where a stan d m ay b e made during the

remainder o f the day The general should take a dv a n
.

tage o f t he fi rst oppor t unity to collect his scattered

troops cause them to take some food and rest while
, ,

h e ar ranges the ord er o f m arch and o rganizes a rear

gu ard Notwithstanding the darkness each corps
.
,

m ust take the place as signed it after procuring the ,

m eans for trans p ortin g t he wounded It will thus .

u sually be midnight before the retreat really begins .

If it is abso lutely necessary to abandon the wo u nded ,

they should be collected i n s u c h houses as m ay be at

h and with physicians and other attendants and le ft
, ,

to the generosity o f the victors .

T[w r ea r g u a r d should be form ed of th e b est

-

troops or o f those which have su ffered least It

,
.

should b e wel l provided with artillery as this wil l ,

keep the en emy a t a distance and force h i m to fre

,

quent deployments which del ay his mo v emen t for

ward and give t he retiring a rmy time to get a good
,

start an d occupy som e advantageous posi t ion for

,

c h ecking the p ursuit The rear guard is expected

.
-
150 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR ATE GY .

to m ake a bold front wherever the ground is fa v o ra

ble ; an d as the main body continues its m arches th e ,

interval between t hem must oft en be con siderable .

Th e composi t ion of the rear guard s hould therefore -

, ,

be such that it may take care of itself on all kinds of

ground It is i mpossible to say exactly wh at should
.

be its strength ; but as a gene ral rul e a rear gu ard in

, ,
-

retreat should be stronger tha n a n advanced gua r d in

an advan ce L ess than one fi fth the whole force
.
-

wo ul d be too little and som etimes on e qu ar t er would

,
-

n o t be too much for the rear guard for indepe n dently -

, ,

Of its daily combats its duties are ex t remely fatigu i ng

, ,

since the same troops o n acco u nt of the di fficulty of

,

changi n g th em are oft en obliged to con stitute the

,

rear guard d uring the who l e of a retreat

-
.

O n the march the rear guard is divided i nto three

,
-

parts : its main body which keeps t ogether as much

,

as possible ; the rear detachment which sends word of ,

the approach of the enemy and gives ti m e to m ak e ,

arrangements to recei v e h i m and an in t er m edia t e d e

t ac h m e n t to keep up com m unication wit h th e a r my
, ,

an d occupy defil e s which are to be passed In addi .

tion th ere are small detachm ents of fianker s

, .

P erfect order should be preserved in the rear guard -

.

T h at detachment which is i n the immediate p resence

o f the enemy should march by fire r e a r r a n k so as to ,

be with its p r oper front rank to the enemy if obliged ,

to halt and engage him .

In an open country the rear guard should m arch,

-
 M A RC H ES IN R E TR E AT .

in se veral column s In a defile o n the contrary the

.
, ,

whole must b e in a S ingle column except the fl an k er s , ,

who try to move along the heights S quares are .

formed in open ground if the cavalry of the enemy is ,

annoying These squares should a fford mutual pro

.

t ec t io n by flankin g each other with their fire

,
The .

rear detachment sho uld be o f light artillery and the ,

b est cavalry in the com mand If it becomes engaged .

with overwhelming forces it m u st retire at a gallop , ,

and tak e shelter wi t h th e colu m ns o f infantry or in ,

the intervals o f the squares .

In a very broken country in fantry will form the ,

rear de t achment as nei t her ca v alry nor artillery could

,

m a n muv re freely The cavalry and artillery would

.

th en b e mostly with the leading portions of the rear

gu ard .

The com mander o f t he rear gu ard should be con -

s t a n t ly o n th e g a s v ic e to avoid being surprised

-
,
On .

the m arch he will n ot only keep o u t his fl a n k e r s but

,

will send o u t detachmen t s to occupy any p oints where ,

the enemy might debouch upon the flank o f his lin e of

m arch These detachments will remain in position
.

unt i l th e whole rear guard has passed an d will then

-
,

j oi n the rear detachment A t halts the troops should .

,

be in order o f battle al l approaches being carefully

,

guarded The men will not be all allowed to eat at

.

once The m arch will only be resumed when all the

.

detachments h ave come in .

P as si n g a B r idg e i n Retr ea t — If there is a bridge on

1 52 P RIN C IP L E S or STRA TE GY .

th e road , the m ain body a fter p assing it will leav e

, ,

a s ufficien t forc e to hold it until t he arrival of the i n

t e r m e dia te detachm ent o f which mention h a s been
,

m ade When the rear guard is informed of t h e fa c ts

.
-
'

it halts at some distance from the bridge an d deploys ,

i n order to check the pursui t o f the en emy Wh en .

the resistance h as been s u fficiently prolonged the rear ,

guard retires in echelo n o r in the checkerorder an d ,

passes the bridge by the wings taking position o n the ,

other b ank where a part of t he artille ry has already

,

been ad vantageou sly placed The rear detach m ent .

o f the rear g u ard makes a final e ffort to defen d t he

-

entrance to the bridge while the sappers m ake prepa

.

rations for burning o r otherwise destroying it S everal .

pieces of artillery wi ll be placed i n posi t ion to e n fil a de

the bridge and others will cross their fire i n front of
,

the entrance The sharpshooters on t he bank endeavor

.

t o retard the es t ablishment o f the enemy s batteries ’

,

an d the battalion s tak e advantage of all cover affo rded

by the ground to protect themselves from the artillery
,

fire .

The di fficulties o f the passage are much increased ,

if the bridge from peculiarities o f the ground is

, ,

opposite o n e o f the extremities o f the line o f battle

instea d o f the centre as the rear guard must th en m a
,
-

n oeu v r e by but o n e wing and the other is n ecessarily

,

fixed in front o f the bridge until the remainder o f t h e

force h as passed .

If the bri dge is destroyed the enemy is necessarily ,

 M AR C H E S IN R E TR E AT . 1 53

checked for a greater or l ess time If it cannot be de .

stroyed the rear g uard aft er holding its position as

, ,

long as possible wi t ho u t compromising its safety wi ll ,

resume its m arch to the rear The commander will .

first send to the rear those battali on s that are farthest

from t he bridge ; then a part of the ar tillery will take
up som e positio n where i t m ay sweep the road and
the n eighboring ground and the cavalry will be o n ,

the flanks to charge th e fi rst troops engaging in t he

,

pursuit S kirmishers wil l cover th e re t reat taking

.
,

advan tage o f ditches hedges and other like obstacles , ,

.

They thus for m a scree n which prote cts and masks

th e columns .

It m ay h e s ometimes advisable to cross the bridge

at a r un but care should be taken to avoid confusion
,

in crossing and there should be prompt return to th e

,

r anks and order o n the other side of th e stream

,
.

P a s s i n
g o th er D efi es — The hints given above will
s ugges t the precautions t o be taken in passing other

de fil e s than bridges such as a road through a ma r sh, ,

a long n arrow mountain pass a village with n arrow

, ,

stree ts thickly built In such c a ses care must be

"

.
, ,

take n to get well the start of the pursuing enemy to ,

look for seize and hold u ntil all have passed any
, , , ,

l ateral roads by which he might attempt to attack in

flank and cut o ff a portion of th e column N arro w
,
.

de fi le s m ay be obstructed by the use of various si mple

devices and the enemy forced to great delay It m ust
,
.

not be forgotten that a defile is a favorable situation to

*
7
 P R IN C IP LE S OF S TR ATE GY .

form an ambuscade for part of the en emy s force A n ’

.

at tempt of this sort m ay oft en be ca r ried o u t wi t h

ease an d produce the effect of entirely s t e p p in g the
,

pursuit .

The comm ander of a rear guard is often placed in

-

the most trying posi t ions To acqui t himself wi t h

.

credit he S hould possess much firm ness and activity

, ,

and be acquainted with all the resources o f the t a c ti ‘

c ia n . He S hould possess the confidence o f his m en

and the r e spect of his enemies If the r e is n o post.

more dangerous t han that o f comm anding the rear I

g u ard t here is certainly none more hon orabl e M a r

,
.

shal N ey acquired an i m perishable fa m e by h i s con

d uct as chief of the rear guard of the F rench army i n
-

its sad and terrible retreat from Moscow F o r several .

weeks successively he was fighting the enemy every

day and m ore than once engaged i n hand to han d
,

conflicts like a simple grenadier S oldiers will n ever

,
.

forget the glo r ious deeds of that heroic spirit who was ,

th e last to leave the hostile soil after end u r ing with , ,

a few brave comrades all the dangers and priva tions

,

poured by cruel fortun e upon the heads of t hat fam

i sh e d and shattered army which entered Ru ssia in
,

s u ch imposing array b ut a S hort time b efore .

 M ULTAN E OU S M OV E M E NTS
SI ,
E TC .

A r t . V .— T h e si m u l ta n e o u s M o v e m e n t o f se v e r a l

C o lum n s.

Th us far we have considered but a s in g l e c ol umn or

'

army corps m arching along o n e road It remains to

, .

say s omething wi t h reference to t he movement of a

great arm y o f several corps upon the supposition that ,

the enemy is near .

A s eac h of these columns is liable t o attack sepa

r a te l an d may have to take care of itself for a time
y , ,

until supported the same precaution s for its safety

,

s hould be taken as if i t w e re isolated and alon e Thus

every thing contained in t he preceding articles is ap
plicable to each of these columns Each should h a ve .

i ts advanced guard rear guard and fl a n k c r s ; and

,
-

s hould break into as m any smaller columns as circum

stances may require and th e locality permit Each

,
.

should s elect i ts positions encampments or bivouacs

, , ,

o f course withi n the limits properly falling t o it But .

each sho uld deport itself as a part of the great mass ,

and all man oeu vre towards t he common e n d .

Independently o f t he S pecial advanced guards of the

several columns one of the corps should precede the
,

o thers and form a general ad vanced guard for the

,

army and another will form a general rear guard or

,
-

reserve The arrangement o f a great army of five

.
15 6 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR A TE GY .

corps m archi n g o n three road s is shown in fig 1 1

, , . .

Th e c entral road is occupied by three corps A B and , , ,

O the first forming the gen eral advanced gu a rd t h e

, ,

second the centre o f the army and the third the gene ,

ral rear guard more properly i n such a case called t h e

-
,

reserve The other two roads are followed by th e

.

corps D and E resp ecti vely which serve as fl a n k e rs to

,

the principal column .

The lateral extent of ground as D E embraced by , ,

the columns is called the front o f the m arch It is

,
.
‘

usually a distance o f several leagu es so that all kind s ,

o f ground may be found within its limits Th ere is .

o n e rule n ever to be disregarded : to avoid leaving

between any two columns obstacles such as rivers ,

lakes e xtensi ve m arshe s imp assable ranges o f hills

, , ,

which would prevent th e corps from communicati n g

with each other an d rendering aid in case o f n eed
,
.

If such an obstacle occ u r either the whole army ,

S hould make a détour to avoid it o r the column which ,

would be separated from the others if n ot m oved i n ,

the original direction S hould turn to the right o r left

,

and fall behind the nearest corps where it would remain ,

until en abled to regain its proper place Th e cor p s .

o n the flanks shoul d occupy any de file s through which

their communication is kept up wi t h the mai n col umn .

The distance between two of the parallel colum ns

should not be more than from five to six miles Th e .

general advanced guard being o n the principal road

, ,

along which it m ay fall b ack if n ecessary should b e, ,

 158 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

at a greater distance ; in fact it should be as far to ,

the front as possible consistently wi t h safety Twenty

,
.

o r twenty fi v e miles would oft en be not too great a

-

distance although a precise limit cannot be laid down

,

for it The general reserve m ay be from six to te n

.

m iles in rear o f the mai n body .

The reser ve a r tillery the great train and the mos t , ,

cumbrous b aggage wagons are collected as well as -

,

possible in the safest place as at F in t he figure E ach

, ,
.

column however is accompanied by whatever is

, ,

indispensable in the way of b aggage & c which follows ,

.
,

in its rear under charge of a guard The fewer the

,
" .

wagons & c attached to a colu m n t he better for it ;

,
.
, ,

but there are always too m any .

The commander in chie f gen erally stays with th e

- -

central corps because he is then i n the most con

,

veni s h t position for transmit t ing his orders to the

other corps and receiving reports from them He
,
.

m ay j oin the ad v anced guard when it is necessary to

examine th e ground before t h e army reaches it or to ,

see the disposition of the troops of th e en emy .

In order th at the march m ay be executed in the

best m ann er the chief of each corps ought to know
, Q

its general object ; to be told what co r ps are respect

i ve l
y before and behind him and o n his flanks
; fro m ,

what qua r ter he is to expect su pport in case o f n eed

in what direction he m us t move if assai led by very
superior forces There should moreover be a con
.
, ,

stant i nterchange of couriers orderly officers or aides , , ,

 S IM U TA N E L OU S M OV E M EN TS , E TC .

between the gen er al head quarters and the several -

corp s in order t ha t o n the o n e hand the chief of the

, , ,

staff who prepares th e orders of m arch may be con

, ,

s ta n tl y infor m ed how they are ca r ried o u t and may ,

com muni cate to the com m anding general the real

condition o f a ffairs at any moment and o n the other ,

hand that the comm anders o f corps m ay b e kept

,

ac q uainted with passing events and instructed as to ,

t h e necessary modifica t io n of details in carrying o u t

the main plan The orders sent to th e di fferent corps
.

o f th e F rench army by Berthier during the marches

, ,

which preceded N apoleon s great battles are worthy ’

,

o f careful study .

If an enemy is met in fron t by an army m arching ,

as i n fig 1 1 the advanced gu ard A falls back

.
,

n earer to th e m ain body at least until it reaches a ,

posi t i o n tha t may b e held when i t m akes an e ffort to ,

m ain t ain it The co r ps D and E oblique towards

.

the central column s t il l gaining ground towards the

,

front T he central corps B hasten s up to the suppor t

.

of A . D and E unite and form a second line The .

reserve C will come up a n d b e employed as the com

m ander i h ch ief may think fit
- -
.

These are the most n atural dispositions but they ,

m ay be modified i n many ways for example D and ,

E may j oin A and form a first line the o ther joining

, ,

B and forming a second li ne Three corps m ay be

,
.

put in the first line and two in the second ; or two

, ,

in the first and three in the second 85 0 This will ,

.
1 60 L
P RIN C I P E S or STR ATE GY .

depend o n the ulterior designs of th e general an d th e ,

relative facili t ies o ffered by distances and the g roun d

o f bringing up on e or the other corps to the suppor t

o f t he advanced guard he may be influen ce d by

; o r

some other o f the many circ umstances which are c o n

s ta n tl arising to interfere wit h what would b
y e

Invari able rules in war There i s o n e grea t a dv a n

.

tage in this for the enemy cannot know until the last
, ,

moment the disposition of th e troops he is to contend

,

against .

If the enemy shows himself i n force i n s u ch a posi

tion as to threaten the flank o f the army all the c orps ,

change direction towards that side and it will be see n ,

that the g eneral arrangemen t re m ains un changed .

There is still an advanced corps a reserve a central , ,

corps an d o n e on each fl ank Suppose for exa mple

, .
,

(fig . the army to have changed direction to the

right : D forms the ad vanced guard B remains in the ,

ce n tre A an d C are o n th e flanks and E is th e

, ,

reserve In retreat o r to attack an enemy who is i n

.
,

the rear the arrangement is the same

,
.

N 0 general ever understood better this mechanical

part o f the art o r applied i t more Skilfully t h an
, ,

Napoleon The history o f this wonderful man o ffers

.

to every student o f military a ffairs the most instr u cti ve

lessons It i s necessary to go back in histo r y as far
.

as Juli u s C aesar to fi n da general at all to be compared

with him .

The march of the Russian army before the b attle of

 SI M UL T ANE OU S M OV EM EN TS ,
E TC .

A usterlitz was made in a m an ner entirely similar to

t hat shown above This ar mv under the orders of
.
,

K u t o s o f w as moving alo n g the road from O lmutz to

,

Brunn (see fig i n order to engage the F rench

.

army whose advanced guard was at Wichau The

,
.

F rench main body was between Brunn and A usterlitz .

K u to s o f divided his army o f men into five

$
columns leaving b etwee n the m only space enough
,

for deployment The column s o n the flanks we r e but

.

subdivisions o f the co rps E and a afi g au

D being under th e same com

,
4
m ander . Three corps were
UC T E RL T A I Z
m arch i ng o n t he mam road A ,

commanded by Bagration being ,

the ad vanced gu ard ; B u nder ,

the immediate eye o f K u to so f é ww w , fl

but having its o w n commander ,

a lieutenant g e n e ra l fo rm in g the
-
,

centre ; 0 commanded by th e
,

G rand Duke C on s tan t ine as ,

the reserve Th e two column s

.

o n t h e right D composed a , ,

corps under G eneral Bu xh ow

den and the tw o left c ol u mn s E
, MU " , , “

also a single corps directed by ,

Fi g 1 2 . .

P rince L ichten s t ein S o far all was well . The ,

.

Ru s sians were de feated but it was because they com ,

m i t t e d the fault of m aking a long circular movement

aroun d A usterlitz wit h a portion of the army in order ,
1 62 P RIN C IP LES or S TR A TE GY .

to turn the right o f the F renc h army M The centre , ,

.

was too much weakened : Napoleon fell in force upo n

that point and the Russians were completely beaten
,
.

Aft er laying down the gene r al r u l e i t must b e ,

'

stated that circumstances m ay and often do render , ,

modifications o f it necessary The essential thing i s

.

to confor m to the principle that the di fferent corp s

, ,

into which an army is necessarily divided ought ,

always to have such relative posi t ions that th eir con

centration may be easily effected b efore t h e ene m y ,

can unite his forces against o n e of the corps In an .

ope n country the rule must be s t rictly adhered to ;

but whenever any natu ral obstacle delays the m arch of
the en emy a n d renders a concentrated attack upon his
,

part difficult while at the same ti m e protecting the

, , ,

m ovements of the other army there may be g reater ,

S pace between the columns o f the latter and a m ore ,

extended field m ay be e mbraced in the m an oeuvr e if ,

some important result may thereby be gai n ed o r ,

th e obj ect o f the campaign be more perfectly attained .

In 1 805 when Napoleon had concentrated h is ar m y

,

In the neigh b orh ood of S t u t tg a r d and L udwigsburg ,

intending t o cross the Danube and take i n the rear

th e A ustrian army which was established near U l m
,

see fig he di v ide d his ar my i n to four columns

( .
,

o f which t he first o n the righ t

,
co m m anded by ,

Marshal Ney was to move upon G ii n z b u rg n ear Ulm

, , ,

t o attract the attention of t he A ustrians i n tha t di r e c

tion The second column , composed of the corps
.
 L A N E OUS
S IMU T M OV E M E NTS ,
E TC .

of Soult Murat and , ,

La nnes o n the same,

road an d at a half day s

,
‘
’

march from each other ,

was to be directed u pon

Donauwerth twenty ,

fi vc miles lower down

t h e Danu b e than G ii n z

burg The third col

.

u mn ,
containing the
corps o f Davoust and
Marmon t passed th e ,

Danube at N e w b u rg ,

t en or twelve miles b e
l o w Donauwerth Fi . F g 13 l . .

n ally the fourth column under Bern ado t te was direct

, , ,

ed towards Ingolstadt eight o r ten miles lower sti ll ,

.

There were bri dges at all t he town s named in t he fi g

ure In t his m a n mu v re march there was a distance of
.
-

forty fi ve miles bet w een t he right and left column s

-
,

but t he fac t o f a great river like t he Danu b e being b e

tween the two armies the certain ty that the enemy ,

had no t collec t ed his entire forces m ade the probability ,

o f attack very s m all If the righ t corps had been a t

.

tacked i t would have fallen back upon the central col

,

u m n moving along the Danube which would ha v e

,

been a pro t ection to one o f i ts flanks The enemy hav .

,

ing his atten t ion drawn to this retrograde movemen t ,

would h ave abandon ed the right bank of the river ,

1 64 P RIN C IP LES or STRA TE GY .

w h ere was hi s lin e o f operation s and the gen eral m a ,

n oe u v r e would h ave equally succeeded There w as .

,

th erefore no real disadvant ag e in thus separating this

,

column fro m the o thers If o n the contrary the enemy

.
, ,

should make a flank movement towards Donauwerth ,

wit h a ll his disposable force h e would find there N a ,

p o l e o n himself and the principal F rench column ,

while h e was all the time o u tfl an k e d by the other two

column s the nearest o f which might b e brought u p
,

i n a day . The distances were so calculated that the

strongest col u mn the o n e by D on auwer th was to arrive
, ,

in advance of the others and they were echeloned in ,

such a mann er that the first having p assed th e Dan

,

ube during the 6 th and 7th o f O ctober the secon d ,

would arrive a t Newburg on the 8th and th e l ast a t ,

I n golstadt on the l oth So that really only the D onau

.

wer th colum n was attackabl e and as it was composed ,

o f t hree corp s n ear together it could dispute the ,

groun d until th e arrival of the othe rs ; o r else if ,

forced to retire it might move down th e right ban k

,

o f the Dan ube protected i n flank by t h e r i ver unti l

, ,

reinforced the n ext day by the column fro m New

burg an d still later b y the col u mn fro m I n golstadt
, ,

while in the mean time the G ii n z b u rg column was

, ,

t h r e a te n i n g th e flank a n d rear o f the enemy Th e .

more s t udy is given to this m an oeuvre m a r ch the wiser -

does it see m There is no supposition to which it

.

does not a dj ust itself and still the front of the m arch
,

was more than fifty miles This is another proof tha t .

 S IMU LTA N E O US M OV E M E NT S ,
ET C .

in war every thing depends o n the skill with whi c h

the arrangemen ts are made to suit the topography of
the field o f ac tion .

A ft er cross ing the ri ver all the cor p s changed

,

direction to the right in order by a m ovement of

, ,

considerabl e extent to envelope t he posi t ion of Ulm

, ,

and take poss essio n o f the bridges of the L ech by ,

which the A ustri an s might attempt to escape The .

whole army described a c ircle around G ii n zb u rg while

Ney held t hat poi nt his corps beco ming the pivot of
,

that grand move ment So ul t e corps which at fi rs t

.
’
,

formed the advanced guard became the left flank ; ,

Murat and L annes who were i n the centre became

, ,

the general ad vanced guard ; Davoust and M ar mon t

n ow formed the centre Ney was on the ri ght and
.
,

Be rn a de t te was the rese rve In this way the army ,

.

which had arrived u pon the Danube presenting the ,

right flank to th e en emy advanced upon him by a

,

front m arch a fter passing the river The res ults of

,
.

thi s skilful plan are well known Ulm capitul ated ; .

n early a whole army was captured only a small part

o f it escaped alo n g the l eft b ank o f the Danube while ,

the F rench were passing to the ri ght .

F ig 1 3 exhibits the features o f this combin ation

.
.

M M represents that part of the A ustrian army which

was assembl e d at U l m and G ii n zb u rg ; A is the corps
of Ne
y flanking t he other col u mns and moving upon ,

G ii n z b u rg where he was to hold the bri dges B C an d

,
. , ,

D , t h e c orps o f S o u l t M u rat and L annes , forming

, ,
1 66 P R INC IP LES or S TR A TE G Y .

the principal column are represented as arriving at

,

Don auwerth ; the first o f these having cros sed the river ,

the previous day is marching towards A ugsburg to

, ,

secure the bridge over th e L ech at that point ;

the other two after passing through Donauwerth
,

and seizing Rain turn to the right and form th e

,

n ew general ad van ced guard E and F commanded .

,

by D avoust and Victor wil l reach N e w b u r g the next

,

d ay and havi n g cross ed the Danube at that point

, , ,

will turn t o the right and move towards the bridge of

Rain to form the centre o f the army
,
Bernad e tte s .
’

corps G m aki n g the fourth column is directed upon

,
r
, ,

Ingolstadt and Munich being intended to be the gene

.

ral reserve for the army .

.
En ough has been said tr) explain the m erely m e
c h a n ic a l part of man oeuvre m arches made by several -

column s an d to Show the spirit of such combination s

, .

If the country is open and th e enemy near the , ,

columns keep together and m arch so as to be ready ,

to give prompt mu tual suppor t If on the contrar y .

, ,

the troops o f the enemy are scattered or at a distance ,

o r if large rive r s intersect the country and g ive secu

rity against sudden attack the column s may be sepa ,

rated by greater distances and may eve n present the m ,

-

selves obliquely provided their relative positions are

,

preserved so as to permit concentration i n case o f

, ,

need When S hal l t h e rule b e strictly observed ?

.

When and how far may a deviation fro m it b e permit

ted ? These questions ad mit o f no an swers C ircum .
 S IMU T L A N E O US M OV E M E NTS ,
E TC .

stan ces which are al w ays di fferent must d ecide i n ,

each particular case that arises He re is the place for

.

the general t o S ho w his ability Th e military art .

would no t be so di ffic ul t in practice and those who ,

h ave become so distinguished in i t would not have

acquired their renown had it been a thing of in varia
,

ble rules To be really a general a man must have

.
,

great tact and discern m ent in order t o adopt the best

,

plan i n each case as i t presents itself he must have a

rea dy coup (l aai l so as to do the right thing at the
’

right time and place for what is excel lent one day
,

m ay b e very inj udicious the next The plan s of a .

great captai n see m like inspirations so rapid are t he ,

Operations of the mind fro m which they proceed ; not

wi t hstanding this every thing is taken into accou n t
,

and weigh ed ; each circumstance is appreciated an d

properly estimated ; obj ects whic h escape entirely the
observat ion o f ord inary minds may to h i m seem so
,

important as to become the principal m eans o f ind u

cing him to pu rsue a par t icular course A s a necessary . .

con sequence a deliberative council is a poor d irector

,

o f the opera t ions o f a campaign A s a nother c o n s e

.

u e n c e no mere theorizer can be a great general

q ,
.
1 68 P R IN C IP L ES or S TR A TE GY .

C H AP TE R IV .

L
BA TT E S .

are th e mos t conspicuou s features o f a cam

ai n
p g . A general may often put o ff a battle if he

is not wil l ing to fight ; but a prolonged delay m ay

become more dam aging th an a ba t tle on account o f ,

the m any smal l combats and daily skirmishes which

lead to no dec isive result and in the en d occasion
,

considerable losses ; besides , the country around fro m ,

which the armies draw their supplies m ay become ,

exhaus t ed It i s so metimes impossible to pursue a

.

temporizing policy because th e country m ay n ot b e

,

o f a s u itable character o r th e en emy may press so

,

vigorously as to compel either a battle or a retreat .

A gain a co m mander may fight a b attle when i m

, ,

e l le d thereto not by any necessity but by the hope

p ,

o f great results from a victory This h e m ay do if

.
,

decidedly superior in th e numbers an d q u ality o f his

troops when th e ene my is expecting considerable r e
,

enfo rcem ents o r his di fferent corps are too distant and
,

disunited for m utual support or his generals are o n,

bad terms o r give evidence of irresolution and inca

,

p a c it
y ,
830 A.lth ough success is always doubtful as ,

for tune h as q uit e as m u ch to do in decidin g battles as

th e talents an d foresight o f the com m ander i n chief
- -
,

there are other motives than those already men tioned

which may i nd u ce him to figh t a decisive e n gage
men t ; such as the wish to relieve a besieged city to
extricate himself from a position where supplies are
failing ; to Open a campaig n by a brilliant stroke ,

which will de m oralize the opposing army and anim ate

his o wn If it were possible to avoid b attles and ruin
.

the enemy by other means less influenced by fortu n e ,

the most ordinary pr udence should lead to the adop

tion o f t he latter But a battle is generally the only
.

m ean s o f putting an end to th e many other ills of a

protracted war and gives the wisest and speediest path
,

to lasting pe a ce ; for after a great victory the con

, ,

u e ro r m ay dictate terms and even th e defeated party

q ;
goes from a severely contested field without disgrace ,

and may reas onably expect the consideration always

due to cour a ge and d evotion to duty .

N 0 general should determin e to bring about so

s olemn an d momentous a transaction as a great battle

without having upon his sid e as m any elements of

success as poss ible Therefore all troops within a
.
,

reasonable distance o f his a rmy which are not a b s o

,

l u tely n ecessary to g uard other important p oints ,

S hould be called to him fo ro n e battalion m ore or less

,

m ay decide the fate of the day If he has a grea t

.

number o f troops only en ough to engage the enemy

,

thoroughly should be at firs t brought into action the ,

remainder being m an oeuvred against the flan ks or ,

8
1 70 P R IN C IP LE S OE S TR ATE GY .

held in reserve for use as occasion m ay require The

,
.

army Should if possible b e placed in such a p osition

, ,

b efore the b attle is beg un as to make the victory if

, ,

gained lead to g reat results ; as for example to the

, , ,

separation o f the en emy from his d ep ots and re en -

forcements ; to his be i ng forced b ack after defeat upon , ,

some ob stacle lik e a lake o r river o r d efile where

, , , ,

his forces m ay be wholly o r in part captured o r dis

er s e d When the features o f the country are u n fa
p .

v o r ab l e to either army it should fight with so muc h

,

the greater order an d obs tin acy t hat it m ay wrest ,

from the enemy the advantages he h as When v ie .

tory is essential for the preservation of life or liberty ,

m en will perform prodigies of valor A skilful com .

m ander knows how to bring success o u t of wh at i n

spires ordin ary minds with despair C orte z after .
,

landing o n the sea shore the small force which was to

-

co nquer Mexico b urn ed his ships and thus compelled

, ,

his m en to rely entirely on their swords as there was ,

n o way left for retreat .

A r t . I .— D efin i t i o n s .— o r d e r s o f B a t tl e .

If an army were always drawn up in the same

m anner it would be certainly beaten by another
,

whose dispositions were changed to suit varying cir

c u m s t a n c es
. There is n o invariable order o f b attle .

It will always depend upon t he locality In a c on .

tracted space an army will b e drawn u p i n several

,

successive li nes ; if, o n the contrary the front to be ,

 DE F INIT ION S .
—ORD E R S OF A L
B TT E .

occupied is great but a single line m ay b e used

, .

This use o f one o r more lines will depend on the topo

graphy of th e battle fi e l d th e ci rcums t ances of the
.
-

m oment the forces and posi t ion of the enemy th e

, ,

kind Of troops f orming th e m ass of his army the char ,

acter o f his commanders ,

As a rule troops in battle should be drawn up in

,

several lines as far as possi ble to prevent the whole

, ,

from being exposed to the first shock and to enable ,

o n e portion to be used to relieve or support another

when necessary .

Usually an army is formed in two lines affording

, ,

m utual support The infantry an d cavalry are dis

.

t ri buted in these two lines as the commander m ay ,

d eem expedient ; but the artille ry is always in the

firs t li ne an d even i n front of it i n order to h ave a
, ,

wide field o f view and to take the masses of the enemy

,

obliquely as they advance to the attack The line of .

caissons is in rear of their pieces b u t near enough to ,

supply them re a dil v The first line of the order of

.

battle i s disposed in such a way as to be able to come

into action as soon as the contending forces are within
range o f the small arm s Up to that moment the .

tim e is occupied in man oe u vres the formation of lines ,

and column s movemen ts to the front and rear &c

, ,
.

The second lin e keeps o ut o f fire taking advantage of ,

undulations o f ground until its support becomes n e c es

,

sary.

Besides these two lines a reserve i s organ ized of all

,
1 72 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

arms o f the service which is held at som e suitable

,

point in rear until called upon to move to some point

,

where it is n eeded Th is reserve composed chiefly of

.
,

cavalry and ar t illery i s under the im mediate orders

,

o f the commander i n chief who uses i t at oppo rt un e

- -

mome n ts With this reserve and especially with the

.
,

artillery he r e enforces certai n parts of h is order o f

,
-

b attle during the action ; with the reserve cavalry ,

enveloping movements of the enemy a re repelled by

co u nter attacks in flank ; wi t h the entire fo rce of the
-

reserve he strikes the blow which will decide the vic

tory or else repairs a disaster and r e esta b lishes his
,
-

line This is of great importance for there is danger

.
,

in t hese move m ents o f the origin al lin es which are ,

m ade under fire and b eing not understood by the

, ,

men give them unnecessary alarm More tha n o n e

, .

battle has been lost by an attempt to make a cha n ge

i n the order of b at tle during the actual progress o f the
eng agement A s the movemen t of any part of the
.

original line i s therefore to b e avoided and a change

, , ,

o f front is sometimes n ecessary for this purpose if for , ,

no other a reserve is indispensable Th e Roman s

,
.

adopted the rule of multiplying reserve corps behind

the main army rather than prolong the wings even if ,

th e ir fo r c e was much superior This is a good rul e .

still In case o f decided inferiority o f n umbers th e

.
,

reserve must o f necessity be small comparatively

, , ,

because an army must not allow itself to b e o u tfl an k e d

bu t ther e m u s t be a r es er ve Upon the proper u se of .
 F
D E IN ITIO N S .
— O R DE RS OF L
BATT E .

this reserve su c c ess is dependent no less than upon ,

p reliminary arrangements and the courage of the

t roops G enerally that army whose reserve comes
.
,

last into action will be successfu l A general shows .

his s k ill in compelling his adversary to employ his

whole force while there is still unused o n his own ,

side the weight which is at last to turn the scal es i n

,

his favor .

The battalion s o f the first lin e should be deployed ,

in order that the artillery m ay inj ure the m as little as

possible an d th at they may deliver their own fire if
,

Opportunity o ffers ; those o f the second line are held

in compact columns s o as to be readily moved to the
,

front throug h the intervals of t he first line and against ,

the enemy o r t o execute any other necessary move

,

m ent ; o r fin ally to leave o penings through which

, ,

the battalion s o f the first line m ay pass if driven back .

The b at t alions o f the second line will therefore be , ,

drawn up i n close col umns , as a rule ; but this sup

o s e s t h e ground to be of su ch a character as to a f
f ord
p
cover to these m asses otherwise t h e artillery would ,

be very destructive unless the line were held so far

,

to the rear as to be beyond good supportin g distance

o f the first In that c a s e the second line would be
.
,

deployed like the first and at a distance of 300 yards ,

o r m ore . If the gro u nd favors it should be brought ,

up n earer The topography o f the field has there

.
,

fore a ve ry decided influence upon this first element

,

o f the order of battle .

1 74 P RIN C IP L E S OF STR ATE GY .

The troops of an army corps Should be divided b e

t ween the two lines For example a corps o f four
.
,

division s would usu ally have two in each lin e The .

t w o lines bei n g under the order s of the same chief

, ,

have a co m mon i n terest and will a fford m utual sup

,

p ort and assistance If o n the contrary entire

.
, ,

corps are formed in each line it sometimes happens ,

that the co mmanders are j ealous of each other an d ,

do not act in concert ; or the tro ops of the second line

may give a cold supp ort to the first ; and the latter ,

expecting such a state of a ffairs lose confidence an d ,

fight feebly This arrange ment is however quite

.
, ,

frequently resorte d to an d really has its advantages ,

,

for the com m an der has not his attention divided b e

tween two lines ; and the second being not so inti i ,
-

mately connected with the first is m ore disposable ,

for such move ments as may b e n eces sary In a .

broken country the first is undoubtedly the best ar

,

range m ent in as m uch as it reduces the front b y h alf

, ,

and lends itself better to varying ground .

The reser v e Should be composed o f in dependent

and entire bodies in order to have independence and
,

capability of rapid movement wherever its presence

m ay b e required .

A corps of sixteen battalions divided into four ,

brigades two in the first line an d two in the secon d

, ,

and with twenty four pieces of artillery would r e

-
,

quire about or yards front or about o n e ,

mile This would be increased or diminished accord

.
,
 F
D E IN IT I N S O .
-
ORD E R S OF A L
B TT E .

i ng the character o f th e ground If in on e line

to .

the extent o f front requir e d would be about two miles ,

— a grea t er space than o n e man can readily keep wel
l
under his eye especially i n a wooded or rolling
,

country .

Tacticians gi ve different n am es to the order o f bat

tle according t o th e manner o f arranging it It may
, .

be the con ti n u ou s order o r t h e order w i th i n ter va ls .

With respect to the hostile ar my it may be p a r a l lel ,

o r obl iq u e These di fferent varieties are usually all

.

found in th e same army when engaged some parts o f ,

the li ne being con tinuou s and others with inte r vals ,

s ome p arts parallel an d others oblique i n some places ,

single and in others double But each o f the se .

disp osition s must be examined s eparately in order to

appreciate its properties .

The parallel order as its name impo rts is that in

, ,

which the two armies are drawn i n front of each

other so as to beco m e e n aged S im ultaneously along
,
g

the whole line S u ch m u st have been the style of the

.

earli e st battles where no science was required a n d

, ,

succe s s depended upon little else than indivi dual

strength and upon the co u rage and obstinacy of the
,

combatants In this order an equal e ffort is m ade

.
,

along the whole front If a vi ctory is obtained it is

.
,

doubtless a complete success ; but on the other hand , ,

a defeat i s alike decisive Wit h equal bravery o n .

each side the vi ctory belongs in advance to the

,

more n u merous party .

1 76 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

Th e oblique order o n the contrary is a disposition

, ,

by which a portion o f the troops are carried against

the enemy s li ne while the re m ai n der are kept di s en
’
,

gaged .To use th e technical terms o n e wi ng is ,

thr o wn f or w a r d while the other is r ef u s ed The first

,
.

is strengthened in every possible way while the other ,

is reduced as m uch as it can be without c o mp r om i ,

sing its safety A n attempt is thus made to o u tfl an k

.

a wi ng of the opposing army to cr u sh the li ne at o n e ,

point while attentio n is dra w n to others If the

,
.

enemy can be kept in a state of uncertainty up to ,

the last moment by false attacks and by a ski l ful

, ,

direction given to the column s o f attack ; if they are

promptly deployed an d only at the m oment when
,

the action is about to begin the enemy will have n o ,

time for counter m an oeuvres or sending su fficient sup

-
,

ports to the wing attacked an d will probably be de ,

feated A rt m ay thus supply the want o f n umbers ;

.

and a small army well commanded m ay defeat a

, ,

large o n e whose chief has not known how or has not

, ,

been able to m ass his forces at the decisive point

,
.

This art is in our day much more important than

wi th the ancients because ou r lines are much more
,

exte nded The troops drawn fro m parts n ot attacked

.
,

to support those that are sometimes cannot come up ,

s e en enough to check the confusion ; and the bat

tal ions are overthro w n o n e after another by the a t ,

t a cking wi ng of the army adopting the oblique order ,

which becomes more threatening by each successive

 F
D E INITI N S O — O R D E RS O F B TT A LE .

step and by the deploy m ent o f its whole strength At .

L euthe n this was the result where F rederick after , ,

threateni n g for some ti m e the right wing of the A us

tri e n s in order to i n duce the m to dra w a large part of
,

their forces to that poi n t attacked their le ft with his ,

best troops took it in fla n k drove it back upon the

, ,

ce n tre and follo w ed up so closely that the di fferent

,

c orps which came up fro m the opposite extremity to

,

ar re st his prog re ss w e re be a ten i n s u ccession

, .

A mong the ge n erals of antiq u ity Epa mi n ondas ,

se ems to h a ve sp ecially ap p rehe n ded the advantages

o f the obliq u e order and to it he o wed the fa m ous
,

victories of Le v e t ia an d Mantinea .

By refu sing o n e wi n g n ot only is the advantage ,

secured of strengthening the other for the att a ck but ,

at the same time means are held in hand for recover

ing fro m the e ffect of a check if one occ u rs or for , ,

protecting the retreat if necessary In fact the fur ,

.
,

ther th e repulse d wing falls back the more strongly ,

it is s u stained by th e troops left to the rear whi ch ,

co m e now s u c c es sively into action The front i n .

crease s and becomes more for midable ; a fresh attempt

m ay b e m ade or if the battle is certai n ly lost , a r e
, ,

t reat m ay be commenced u nder the protection of the

tro ops that have bee n b u t slightly engaged and hav e ,

not su ffered When the obliq u e order is properly

.

employed it gives m any chances of success as h as

, ,

been explained and provides as far as possible against

, , ,

m ishaps .

96
8
1 78 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

YVh en a wi ng is refused artillery o f the heaviest ,

calibre Should b e placed upon it in order to keep the ,

opposite wing of the enemy at a respectful distance ,

and to prevent the order from becomi n g parallel .

The retired wing Should also as far as practicable be , ,

i n a good position for defence whi ch m ay i n case of , ,

n eed be a set off to its want o f numbers A ll natural

,
-
.

features should b e taken advantage o f such as woods , ,

ravines hills & c to afford support or cover to this

, ,
.
,

wing .

The oblique order properly so called is un doubt , ,

e dl
y preferable t o the parallel order ; but the l atter

has also its advantages especially when it is r e enforced ,

-

o n one of its wings It is very suitable for an army

.

havi ng a numerical superiority that can present equal ,

forces to the ene my s along the whole front while at ’

,

the same time it doubles its li n es an d e ffects a con

centration o f stre ngth on on e w ing In thus at tack .

ing the enemy in front the victory wi ll b e more de ,

o isive because the battle will have raged seriously at

,

every point This method called the p ar a llel or der

.
,

r e en o r ced conforms to principles because a princi

-
f , ,

pal m ass is brought against o n e point o f the hostile

line while at other points the opposing forces are
,

equal Thus i n fa c t the par allel order re enforced is

.
, ,
-

analogous to the oblique order an d possesses the same ,

properties though n ot in so great a degree In both

,
.

there is a decisive effort at o n e w ing an d simple dem ,

o n s tra ti on s o r a less serious en agement at the other

, g ,
.
 DE FIN ITIO N S — O RDE R S OF B ATT LE .

If n o w we compare the continued order with that

, ,

having i nterv al s either obl ique o r parallel we will

, ,

see that the first can only be used in large plains free
from obstacles where cavalry may always be placed
,

o n the wings The other may be us ed in all cases of

.

groun d and permi ts the use o f the ca valr y wherever

,

i t c an act whether at the centre o r o n the wi ngs

,
If .
,

in the contin ued order the cavalry is put in the ,

centre it loses all its advantages ; being kept down

,

to the pace o f the infantry with whi ch it is in l ine it

‘

los es its mobil ity its chief or m ore accurately its sole
, , , ,

sour c e o f success ; exposed without possibility of r e ,

ply to the fire o f the artillery, it m ust either stand

,

still and be cut to pieces o r retire to a pl ace of safety

,

and leave a large gap in the li n e o f battle The chief .

o f the cavalry would doubtless prefer to move forward ,

being supposed to be a man of spirit ; but in charging

infa n try which is i n good order hi s force will b e
, ,

ove rwhel med by the fire and probably dispers e d ; ,

either way the gap still remains in the lin e o f battle

,
.

This took place at the battle o f H o ck s t a e dt which ,

was gai ned in 1 704 by Eugene an d Marlborough

, ,
.

A t the battle of Minden D uke F erdi n and seeing , ,

Marshal de C on t a de s place h is cavalry in the centre ,

where the ground was favorable to its action directed ,

a portion o f his infantry against it giving orders that ,

when the infantry had dispersed the caval ry it should ,

turn to the right and left an d fall upon the flanks of

the enemy s line wh ile an attack was made in front by
’
,
1 80 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

the rem ain der of the army This manoeuvre imitated .

,

from that at H ock s t a e dt was equally successfu l In the,

.

continued order the cavalry must always be placed on

,

the w i n g s that it m ay have independe n ce an d mo

,

b il ity ; an d if the ground there is unfavorable for i t s

action it is nearly useless Such are the grave in con
,
.

v e n i e n c e s o f the con tinued order .

If o n the co n trary the d ifferen t bodies of infantry

'

, ,

l eave intervals betwee n the m the cavalry and art il ,

lery may easily a c t at opportune moments a n d w her

ever n ecessary But in order that thes e intervals m ay
.

not have the disad v antage pointed o u t above of leav , ,

ing gaps through which the en emy m ay penetrate ,

the line should be formed in echelons as shown in ,

fig 1 4 By thi s arrangement the caval ry m ay b e

. .

h eld behin d the echelons ready to charge thro u gh th e ,

intervals as shown by the direction of the dotted line

,

A B But this is n o t the sole advantage The differ

.
.

ent b odies not b eing attached to each other can be

, ,

more readily placed to suit the ground ; h ave greater

mobility in following up a s u ccess o r w ith dr a w m g In
case of reverse ; t h e defeat of on e does n ot n e c e s s a
rily i n volve those adj acent ; o n e m ay rally under the
protection of anothe r Notwithsta n ding the i nter .

vals the entire lin e occupies the same front paralle l

,

to the enemy as if drawn up in the continued order ,

while permitting a s till greater extensio n if circ u m

stan ces require i t E ach echelon flanks and supports
.

the preceding o n e so that if the enemy attem pts to

,
 DE F INITI N SO — O RD ER S OF L
B ATT E .

pas s through an interval h e is taken in flank by th e

,

next echelon to the re ar while at the same t ime he is

,

charged in front by t he cavalry Thu s the order in .

echelons facilitates th e application of th e principle ,

that the di fferent a r ms should be made to act on the

ground best suited to their manoe u vres ; but a t the
s am e time the danger is avoided o f l e a v i

the line o f battle .

The first echelon C D m ay , ,

be called the p oi n t The second

.

lin e and the reserv es support th e

echelon s o f th e firs t line by ,

adopting a similar fo rmation o r

by accumulating near the p o i n t ,

o r in a n y other way c ir c u m s t a n

ces m ay demand o r the general

commanding may desire .

The checker order is the par

allel order with inter vals t he ,

several subdivi sions being drawn

in two lin es so that those of
u
p ,

th e second lin e are opposite th e

intervals o f t he first This o r .

de r i s wanting in solidity b e ,

cause the subdivisions o f the fr on t Fi g M .

lin e are t o o far apart ; o n the sam e front it gi ves but

h alf as much fire as a full line ; with equal forces i t o c ,

c u ie s double as much groun d which is almost always

p ,

an incon venience rather than an ad vantage especially ,

1 82 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

if prod u ci n g diminished solidity The artillery cannot .

be placed in the intervals o f th e first line because i t ,

would attract towards the battalions o f th e second

all the m i ssiles o f the enemy ; for it is an established
fact that artillery replies to artillery ; this being th e
cas e troops should not be in position behin d batter
,

ies as thereby a doubl e mark i s o ffered to t he en e m y

, .

The intervals i n the checker order o r the quincun x

order are the more dangerous in pre portio n to the
proximity of the enemy for he may through such , ,

openings penetrate in mass overthrow the simple line

, ,

which resists him and dri ve it back upon the second

,

line where the sam e confusion m ay be produced

,
.

G enerally there should be no other intervals in a line

,

o f battle than tho s e strictly necessary for th e move

ments of the bodies o f troops composing it .

This order however will be less vicious if th e sec

, ,

o n d lin e is form ed of cavalry because these troops ,

may then charge through the openings befo r e them .

Thus the checke r order somewhat m odified might be

, ,

partially adopted in an order of ba ttle ; for e x ample ,

i n a retired wing that must b e extended to make a

grea t er Sho w In a retreat this order is employed
.
, ,

but rather as a m an oe uvre than an ord er o f battle ; it

i s then used to withdraw successively the differen t
bodies of troops e n gaged with t he ene my When in .

a line of b attle several of the su bdivisions a re drawn

back in order to g uard again st flan k attack there is ,

ford wh at i s c alled a cr ochet to the r ea r If th e

'

. ,
 F
D E INITI N S O —O RD E RS OF A L
B TT E .

same subdivi sion s are thrown forward in advance of

th e lin e of ba tt le b ut s o that t hey are a t tached to it
, ,

m aking an angle t here is for m ed the cr o ch et to th e

,

f r on t
. The for m er may b ecome the wedge a n d the

la t ter the inverted wedge when the two branches of ,

the lin e are about of equ al length The wedge is e s .

s e n t ia l ly o ffensive as an army wo uld only adopt thi s

'

formation with the intention of making a n a t tack to

pierce th e opposing lin e whilst t he croche t to the rear
,

would b e adopted as a d e fence against an enveloping

atta ck The same m ay b e said of th e crochet to the
.

fron t and the inverted wedge but i n a contrary sense ; ,

as the i nverted wedge would be used when the obj ect

w as to yield in the ce n tre to the en emy adv ancing o n
that p oint wh ile en velo p ing his wings it is a de fe n
, ,

sive formation the crochet to t he front being o ffen

,

sive History describes a famous example where two

.

armies were formed one like the wedge and the other
,

like t he in verted wedge It was the bat tle of Oa s il in

.
,

fought in 5 3 3 between the F ranks and Romans n ear ,

C apu a . The F ranks were drawn up between t wo

woods ; they re enforced their centre forming a real
-
,

wedge Th e Romans were less n u merous and adopt

.
,

ed a n order h aving less depth but more extent for m ,

in g an in verted wedge They gave gro u nd in t h e .

centre and m ade their principal e fforts against the

wi ngs of the F ranks the cavalry i n the mean time a t
, , ,

t acking them in the rear after passing around on e of

the woods The front o f the Fran k w edge co nti n u
, ,
1 84 P R INC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

ing to press forward reached the Roman camp the

, ,

confusion o f the pillage leading to their own defeat .

The victo r y of t he Rom an s was complete .

A r t . I I . —E m p l o y m e n t o f th e D i ffe re n t Ar m s.

When th e colu mns hav e reach ed th e field of battle

and each is in the place marked o u t for it th e com ,

m anding general g ives the sign al for the action to b e

gin and each of his subordinate commanders prepares
,

t o execute the gen eral instructions h e has received

“

retaining a great latitude in the m eans o f carrying

the m o ut They kn o w for example that the right is
.
, ,

to m ake the great effort ; that the left will b e but

feebly engaged an d in a manner only to give the
,

enemy uneasiness and to retai n him in his position ;

they regulate themsel ves accordingly directing all ,

th eir movements and m an oeuvres towards the c o m

m on end It is a sacred duty fer each o f them to
.

give any support hi s colleagues may require A s th e .

general in chief cann ot be eve rywhere it is for the m

- -

to supply his absence an d m ake every arrangem ent

,

that criti cal circumstances may require They w ill .

do well if in n othing they act in opposition to h is

gen eral plan The greater their responsibility the
.
,

greater will b e t heir part of the glory if succes s

cro w ns their e fforts o r even if deserted b y f o rtu n e
,

they fail pro v ided they have borne themselves brave

,

ly and honorably .

The bat t l e is begun by skirmishers who a r e thrown ,

 EhrIP LO Y M E NT O F TH E DI FFER E NT A RM S .

ou t to the front sometimes a thousand or fi ft een hun

,

dred paces S upported at suitable intervals by more

.

compact bodies o f troops and by light batteries they ,

attempt to ch eck the enemy until t he columns have

h ad t ime to deploy ; o r else when an attack i s to ,

b e m ade they cover the advancing columns mask th e

, ,

dispositions for the o ffensive repel the Opposing skir

,

m i sh e rs observe the latest positions of the enemy

, ,

discove r the vulnerable parts of his line at the same ,

’

time k e eping h i m uncertai n o f the real p o in t of a t

tack which S h ould n o t be disclosed until the complete
,

deployment o f the columns and the onset is j ust about

to b e m ade .

No w th e skirmishers should retire either to permit ,

the columns to become engaged o r because t hey can ,

n o longer resist th e enemy and are obliged to gi v e

way disputing the grou nd foot by foot When with
,
.

i n a short distance of the line of battle deployed b e

hind th em they fall back rapidly through the inter
,

vals of the battalions and j oin their respective corps

o r rally in rear .

A s soon as the front of the army i s un masked th e ,

firing of the first lin e begins the artillery first and , ,

then the infantry when the armies are sufficiently near

,

for small arm s to be e ffective The firing is continued

.

un t i l som e disorder is observed in the opposing ranks .

This i s the moment for forming columns of a t tack and

charging If the ene my retires before this o ffensive
.

m ovement the pursuit must not be headlong or dis o r

,
1 86 . P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

de rly ,but th e column s should be halted perfect order ,

restored as rapidly as possible and then the onward ,

m ovement resumed agai nst the second line which is ,

u sually disordered by the confusion of the first ; care

m ust also be taken that no part o f the line of battle
be advanced far beyond the remainder It is only .

when the v ictory is c ertain that the enemy may b e ,

rapidly foll owed up and then with the obj ect Of

,

m aking his retreat a rout .

When o n the other h and it b ecomes necessary to

, ,

fall back the ground should be disputed foot by foot or

, ,
“
der being preserved in the ranks as far as p o ss ib l e t h a t ,

advantage may b e take n of the least fault committed by

the enemy In every case the second line will move u p
.
,

t o support the first an d take its place making if p o s sr

, , ,

ble a counter attack upon the advancing enemy This

,
-
.

will restore confidence to the troops and prevent their ,

thoughts dwelling upon retreat ; and will moreover , ,

arrest the enemy or drive him back The same ground .

is thus oft en taken and retaken several times by brave

troops .

The cavalry may charge at any favorable time and ,

should never let slip any o pportunity of r u shing upo n

,

disordered infantry or a n exposed flank o r a badly

, ,

supported battery o r of m aki n g a counter moveme n t

,
-

against cavalry in motion F or this reason i t is n e c e s

.

sary to have convenient intervals which will permi t ,

the cavalry to pass through and to seize proper mo ,

m ents for falling with lightning speed upon the ranks

 E MP LO YM E NT OF TH E DI FFE RE NT A R M S .

of the enemy G enerally it is advantageous n o t to

.

employ cav alry un til a la t e period in the bat t le as its ,

e ffect is better t hen and i t is also in be tter condition

,

to pursue the ene my in case of success or to check ,

his ad vance in cas e of reverse .

t

The artil lery continues firing during the whole e n

a e men t The cannon are often heard during the
g g .

firs t skirmishing a n d al so give the ene my a par ting

,

salu t e when the victory is gained The caissons should .

,

there fore be abundantly supplied with ammuni t ion

, .

The artille ry is distributed in strong batteries so as t o ,

produ c e l arge gaps at certain points of the line in fro n t ,

in t o which the caval ry may rush Without pe rhaps , .

,

doing more hb s o l ute inj u ry i n this way tha n if dis

t r ibuted u n iformly along the fron t t h e mo r a l e ffect is ,

m uch g re a te rf The soldier is filled wi t h horro r when

he sees hi s comrades fal l rapidly a round him and ,

whole battal ions swept away i n an ins t a n t ; he loses

his presence of mind he recoils ; and if t he cavalry
,

presents itself at this m omen t he is not in a condit io n ,

for resis t ance A ll the artillery should not be accu

.

m u l a te d at one point even if it were possible

,
It is .

easier to cover by und u lations of the ground se v eral

, ,

separate batteries than a single one containing all t he ,

p ieces
. The fire should as far as possible be
,
co n ve r
,

gent upon t he important points of the line of t he

enemy as for example a wing t hat is to be crushed
, , , ,

a salient angle that is to be enveloped or a battery ,

that is to be dismounted & c ,

.
 P R INC IP LE S OF S TR ATE GY .

The light artillery moves to the front to begin th e

action following oblique directions as far as practica
, ,

ble both to un m ask the other t roops and to get slan t

,

ing fires upon the enemy s lines This kind of artil ’

.

lery should be bold as its lightness en ables it to e scape

,

w ith ease U sual ly accompanied by supports of cav

.

a lr
y it
,
falls suddenly upon the flan k o f the e n emy ,

advances retires halts i n o rder to avoid th e attempts

, , ,

m ade against it t akes ad vantage o f every favorable

,

posi t ion to fire a few rounds A s soon as th e victory .

is gai n ed the light a rtillery moves rapidly to the front

,

wi t h t h e cava l ry in order to break u p the arran ge

,

men t s for re treat followi n g closely upon the heels of

,

t he en emy giving hi m no rest and in every way i n

, ,

creasing the confusion i n his ranks It i s o f the first .

import ance th at light artillery h Ors e S b e o f the best for

-

strength an d swift ness and the cannoneers should b e

,

picked men .

_ The heavy artillery is collected in several strong

b atteries either in the line i n advance of t he intervals
,

b etween the division s o r upon the wings ; anywhere

, ,

in fact where it interferes least wi t h the infantry an d

, ,

where the ground suits it Th e smallest undula t ion s .

are taken advantage of to cover the pieces and give ,

them elevation A hill thirty o r for ty feet high gives

.

an excellent position for artillery as the fire 1 s grazi n g ,

and n o t too plunging and the infantry supports can ,

be kept near at hand a nd out of sight and fire .

S alient points of the order o f battle are good posi

 EMP LOY M E NT OF TH E DI FF ER EN T A R M S .

tion s for th e artillery Batteri es thu s placed give a

.

concav e formation to the first line which is very fa ,

v o r a b l e as the enemy is en veloped an d liable to a

,

converging fire In order however th at a battery

.
, ,

m ay b e es t ablished o n a salient point in this manner ,

it should b e protected by some obs t a

cle either n atural or artificial from
, ,

the flank fire it might o t herwise b e

exposed to Take for example the
.
, ,

case shown in figure 1 5 where in , ,

th e cen tre t w o batteries are pro

,

t e c t e d from e n fila ding fire by the

hi ll between them ; o n the left an ,

other battery is masked by a village ;

and o n the right s t ill another b y a ,

wood The infan t ry is formed in line

.

o f battle between the ba t teries and ,

the light troops occupy th e village ,

wood and hill If no obstacle exists

.

t o cover the artillery and permit i t

to fire obliquely as in the example ,

s hown it is placed in the line

,
or , ,

more exactly a little in front o f i t

,

fires directly to the front an d ordi ,

n a r ily in reply to th e artillery of the

enemy If t he art illery is silen ced

.
,

it fires upon t he infantry to break ,

the ranks cut up the column s pre

, ,

vent their deploy me nts and to keep Fi g 15 . .

1 90 P R INC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

th e m at a distan ce ; sh ells are thrown among t h e

cavalry which cause both dest r uc t ion an d ala r m
, .

F iring at too long range should be avoided for ,

it wastes ammunition The s mall e ffect it p r o du

.

ces is discouraging to o n e p arty a n d t ends t o em ,

bolden the other The ravages of artillery are

.
‘

greatest withi n the range of grape It would how .

,

e ver b e foolish to permi t an enemy to approac h So

,

n ear undisturbed because the e ffects of artillery are

,

very considerable at fift een hundred paces or more .

The guns of smallest calibre are most ad v anced while ,

the pieces o f heavy metal are placed at greater dis

tances as with a retired wing upon heights & c
, , ,
.

A r t . l l l .— o ff e n s i v e B a ttl e s .

The Recon n o i s s a n ce The general arrangements for

.

an attack can only b e made after a n examin ation of

th e position and force of the enemy This exami n a .

tion is made by the commander i n chief himself an d - -

,

if the ba t tle i s put o ff to the next day he m ust t hen , ,

b efore giving his final orders be certai n that n o change

,

has been m ade by the enemy in his position Wit h .

o u t this precaution the measures adopted might prove

,

very uns uitable to the n e w sta te of a ffairs Whilst .

he is on some elevated point glass i n hand glancing , ,

rapidly over the field and the positio n of the enemy ,

the commanders of corp s will be around him b e co m

m u n i c a t es his intentions an d gives notice of any mod i
,

fi ca tio n s of previous orders or reiterates the m

,
.
 OFF EN S IV E B A TT L E S .

But if the b attle is to be fough t the same da y the ,

skirmishers o f the enemy must be driven i n before the

general can approach near enough to get a good idea
of t he ad vantages an d in conveniences of the ground ,

o n which th e two armies are a b out to e n gage He .

must at any cost reach some high point where he can ,

see at least to a considerable extent the surrounding

, ,

groun d as well as the forces and dispositions of the

,

enemy While h e is m aking his examination an d set

.
,

tling his plan o f attack i n accordance with what he

h as s een he tran smits to the di fferent columns the
,

ord ers relatin g to t h em ; he sends the o fli c e rs of his ,

s ta ff to guide them and goes in person to that corps

,

w hi ch will be fi rst engaged o r i s to take the principal

,

part in the action he ascertains from a brief con ver

sation with the commander of this colu m n whether
his orders h ave been understood ; h e gives whatever
explanations m ay be n ecessary and hastens to o t her
,

points It i s evident from what has been said that

.
, ,

if the general is n ot with th e adva n ced gu ard when

the enemy is reported in presence he should join it as
,

rapi dly as possible in order to have time for the r e

,

connoi ssance and to make his dispositions for battle

,
.

It is from this rapid examin ation that he determines

the point upon which the strongest attack should be
m ade and w h ose possession will decide the fate o f the
,

b a t tle
.

D eter m i n a tion of th e p oi n t of a tta c h — If the topo

graphy of the field is alon e considered it may be said , ,
1 92 P R IN C IP L E S OF STR A TE GY .

that gen erally a height a village a wood occupied

, , ,

by th e enemy are so m any points to b e ta ken from

,

him In fact a height is oft en the key o f th e battle

.
,

fi eld an d should b e the point upon which the first

,

an d great attack S houl d be made b ecause such a point ,

m ay give a com m anding view and fire o ver a l l th e

surrounding ground A t the same time it serv es as a
.

screen behin d which new dispositions for a t tack may

,

b e arranged an d from the high ground a rus h m ay

,

at any moment be m ade upon th e enemy b elo w .

F rederick said : A lways attack the mountain or

“

highest groun d occupied by the en emy for if you ,

force that position al l o ther poin t s wil l fal l into your

,

possession ; troops are always more vigorous and

ord erly in the first stages of an engage m ent D o not .
,

therefore waste time and blood upon points of minor

,

importance and afterwa r ds proceed with disordered

,

and decima t ed battalion s t o attack the pri ncipal points

’
of the ene m y s position where the greater part of his
,

force wil l by this tim e be m assed by the course of

”
events if not by design .

Th e possession of a large village with store houses ,

-
,

is always a great advantage o u the field of ba ttle b e .

cause i t may be very easily put in a defen si ve state ,

an d is a kin d of for t ifica t ion S uch a village oft en .

b ecomes the scen e o f the most severe fighting as for , ,

example G ross A spern and Essling at the battle of

,
-
,

Essling and C astel C eriolo at Ma rengo

' '

.
,

A wood presents simil ar advantages It covers and .

 OFFE N S IV E B TTA L ES .

m asks th e ar tillery ; it is eas ily held by skirmishers

cavalry cannot appro ach it A wood protects the
.

flank of a line which rests o n it and the position o f

,

the latter cannot be held until the former is carried .

But th e topography of the field o f battle is by n o

m ean s th e only thi n g to be taken into account in de
t erm in in g the point o f attack There are considera
.

tions o f another kind m uch more extensive in their

,

relations The commander must first observe the d is

.
_

tan ces separating th e various hostile corps for it will ,

b e proper to direct his principal e fforts against the

ce ntre o r o n e extremity according as they are too
,

m uch S pread o u t or are well connected with each

,

other He ought then to examine what is the posi

.

tion o f the Oppo si n g army with reference to its line

o f operations o r any obstacles the country m ay pre
,

se nt i n order to try to throw it back upon tho s e obsta

,

cles o r t o cut its line o f communications The various .

reasons influencing to a movement in o n e or the other

direction are often quite in opposition and m ake the ,

determination of the point o f attack a problem o f

great difli c u l ty frequ ently adm itting o f a correct so
,

luti e n only from considerations o f a character likely

to escape common m ind s and appreciated solely by
,

those of v ast powers .

It i s impossibl e to lay down ru les upon a subj ect

like this which is a matter o f inspiration and genius
,

b ut we may group under three h eads the considera

tion s to b e taken into account i n determining the
9
1 94 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

point o f attack first those o f a s tr a teg i ca l character

, ,

relating t o combin ations o f the h ighest order ; seco n d ,

th e g r a n d ta cti ca l determining the p rincipal m an oeu

,

v r e o f the battle ; third th e ta c ti ca l which resulting

, , ,

from the n ature of th e ground where the troops are to

a c t m ay influence the details and ex ecu tion of the
,

gen eral movements It wil l b e profitable t o develop

.

these ideas a little and to cite some examples to ex

,

plain more definitely wh at is meant .

If for example the opposing army has its right n earer

, ,

the frontier of its own country than the left and the lin e ,

o f Operations is exposed th e attack should be made o n

,

the righ t because there is a prospect in this way o f

,

cutting its communications and separating i t from i ts ,

base ; if a vic tory is Obtained the results m ay b e very ,

great Thi s is th e s tr a teg i ca l con s ider a tion If the

. .

enemy is n ear a lake a river a great marsh a thick

, , ,

forest or a di fficult defile the g r a n d ta cti ca l considera

, ,

tio n whi ch is dependent u pon t he locality and t he

,

con figuration o f the battle fi el d and its environs would

-

lead to an attack on the side fro m the obstacle i n ,

order to drive th e enemy back upon it If there is a .

height o n th e field o f battle attack that first b e , ,

cause success there wil l lead to decisive results If a .

salient point is presented i n the order o f bat t le of the

enemy direct the first efforts u pon thi s because it
, ,

m ay be enveloped and cru shed If hi s lin e is too dis? .

j ointed and extended strike at the centre pierce i t

, , ,

and then beat in detail the separated wings The re .

 OFFE N S IV E A L
B TT E S .

are other grand tactical considerations F inally when .

,

the country is more open and practicable on one wing

than the other the desi re to ha v e unity and p ro m p ti
,

tud e o f movement which is the ta cti ca l con s i der a t io n

, ,

i nvi t es to an attack upon that wing This last is the

.

least important consideration because vigo r ous efforts

,

will enable troops to surmount almost any di fficulties

th e ground may present and often these obstacles o n ce
,

passed are a guarantee o f further success because the ,

enemy supposed himself secure in that direction and

was less o n his guard The tactical consideration
.

s hould yield to the other two when there is antagonis m

among them in fixing upon the point of at t ack When .

they are all in accord there can be no doubt about

,

the true point o f attac k and n one but the most n u

,

skilful commander would fail to detect it S uppose .

an ar my A B (fig
,
. drawn up in such a line as to
 1 96 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

m ake an obtuse angle with its line of operations A C , ,

which is towards its right and rear ; let the left of the
army rest o n a ri ver and the right h e established on
,

th e high ground A ; let the ground in front of the

,

le ft wing be a marshy wood and that on the right ,

open and unob structed Every consideration then .

leads to m aking the principal attack at A for th at is ,

undoubtedly the key of the battl e field and m u st be ,

attacked whatever may b e the enemy s means o f r e

,
’

s is t a n c e there If this height is carried the l i n e o f

.
, ‘

Operations A C is cut and the enemy drive n back

, , ,

u pon the river The army A B instead of taking

.
, ,

the position supposed should h av e formed t he lin e ,

A D r e enforced on the wing D In this position the

,
-
.

as sailant is very much e mbarrassed as to the choice

o f a point of attack
. In the first pl ace he cann ot
.
,

attack the left which i s on the strong ground a n d

, ,

threaten the line o f communication s o f the other army ,

without running the risk o f being take n i n flank or ,

turned by the r e enforced wing D which m ay force

-
,

h i m back upon the river O r else to avoid such .

,

a mishap he will attack the right D at the same

, , ,

tim e holding the left in check ; but th en even a

'

success can have no decisive result inasm u ch as it ,

does not lead to the possession of the commanding

ground .

Suppose in the next p l a ce th at the army A B (fig u re

, , ,

rests upon a lake in an open country and that its ,

l ine of operations , C D is directed towards the banks ,

,
 OFFE N S IV E BATT ES .L

an d to the rear o f the

lake . The strategical
con sideration s would
lead to an attack upon
the l eft wing B with a L
,
= ,
.

view o f cutting the lin e

C D but the grand t a c ti
,

cal consideration s would F ig 1 1 . .

induce to attack the right wing with the intention of ,

dri ving the whole army back upon the lake Here .

strategy and grand tactics advise op p osite plan s and , ,

in such a cas e a battle should only be fought when the

,

victory is from other causes almost certain It would

, , .

b e much better to attempt by man oeuvres to pre v ail

u pon the army A B to leave its posi t ion In fact
, ,
.
,

an indecisive su cce s s o n the ri ght wing A does not , ,

drive the en emy u pon the lake nor cut his line of ,

communications O n the o ther hand it will n o t do to

.
,

violate the law o f grand tactics and attack at B for , ,

if the attempt failed the en emy might take the initia

,

tive and dri ve the attacking army into the lake If .

a battle must be fought the strategical consideration s

,

would in this case be deemed less important than the

, ,

tactical although th e gen eral rule is otherwise In

,
.

fighting a battle we mu st always take into ac count

,

the contingency of a defeat and not place a n ,

army in such a posi t ion that defeat would be destru o

tion.

If an army is posted between two rivers covering ,

1 98 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

its flanks a n d the lin e o f operatio n s is perpen dicular

,

to the line it occupies a t the middle poin t there is ,

nothin g special to be gained by attacking o n one side

rather than the other— i t is entirely a tactical question .

When the p oint o f attack is o n C e chosen it S hould ,

b e pressed vigorously all the arm s o f the ser v ice c o

,

operating and as many troops being employed there

,

as can be without confusion The enemy should be

.

kept In a state o f u ncertainty up to the last moment .

If the first attempt fails renew it again and again if

, ,

necessary S uch pertin acity often leads to victo ry

. .

If t he first effor t is successful the e n e m v should b e

,

vigorously followed up an d no time o r opport u nity

,

a fforded h i m to recover himself .

A tta ck of h eig h ts — A lthough it is a rule to attack

h eights in open ing an engagement i t should only b e ,

done when they are attainable and the troops upon, ,

reaching the high ground will have room to extend

,

themselves ; for if such positions can only be a p

'

r o a ch e d through n arro w de fi l e s a nd un der fire and

p ,

the troops mu st advance wi t h a very small front there ,

is lit t le prospect of s uccess S uc h a position must be

.

turned Bu t it must be recollected that in seeking

.
,

to turn a posi t ion the turning party run s t he risk of

,

being taken in flank a n d seeing his own c o m m u n ic a

tions cut S uch a movement sho uld t he r efore o n l v
.
, ,

be attempted when there i s n o opportuni ty for t he

enemy to debouch on the flank .

High ground m ay n o t always present its front but ,

 OFF E N S IVE BATT E S L .

m ay be a chain of hills perpendicular t o the general

,

line of the two armi e s both resting on e wing upo n

,

th em In such a case the attack should proceed from

.
,

the higher to the lower portions Thus the t wo .

,

armies A B and C D (figure 1 8) having each one wing

, ,

in the plain an d the

other o n the high
ground the general
,

direction o f which is
p e rpendicular t o their
front the army A B
,

sh ould att ack by its

right in ord e r t o dis
, F ig 1 8 . .

lodge the l e ft o f the enemy D be fore b ringing B , ,

i nto action The cen tre E follows the right and

.
, , ,

serves as a con nection bet w een t he wings The attack .

is thus progres sive from right to left and becomes ,

genera l only when the right and centre have repulsed

the left an d centre o f the enemy The order of battl e .
,

fro m being at first parallel becomes oblique and in,

echelon .

l
The en ve op i ng a tta ch — If the attacking army is
su fficiently n um erous the ene my may be enveloped
,

upon a single wing o r upon both If the attempt is

,
.

successful victory is nearly certain as the long shallow

, ,

lines of a modern army are almost defenceless against

such an attack on th e flank A too ex t ended move .

ment must however be guarded agains t in such a n

, ,

operation for a line wit h great development becomes

,
 2 00 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

proportionately w eaker an d may easily b e pierced a s

, ,

the Russian s discovered at A usterli t z It is better to .

kee p the army concentrated an d to fight i n front tha n ,

t o attack a flank i n th e manner referred to The .

enveloping attack req u ires therefore superior n u m

, ,

b ers and precautions should b e taken to keep the

,

enemy occupied throughout his front while the

enveloping mass assails the flank b u t by no very ,

extended m ovement Fo r still stronger reasons a r e

.

those very great circuits to b e avoided by which a ,

body o f troops i s sent to attack the ene my in re a r .

They are i n oppositio n to a fundamental rule i n war,

which requires the con centration o f all the disposabl e
forces when an e n gagement is to tak e place .

The fla n k a tta ck properly so called di ffers fro m

, ,

that j ust referred to since in this cas e the flank o f

, , ,

the en emy i s assailed not only by a single corps whil e

the others h o ld him in check along the fron t but the ,

whole army is drawn up in a lin e crossing that of the

enemy at a greater o r less angle It is certainly to
,
.

h ave gained an important advantage to have bee n

en abled to take up such a position sin ce only a par t ,

o f the troops of the enemy can be b rought into action

,

and as the oth er portions come up they m ay be suc

c es s i v el y o verthrown
. The advantages o f the oblique
order are here see n in all their force Bu t i s it prob .

able the enemy wil l stand still and s u ffe r hi m self to

be thus taken in flank , if his atten t ion is not drawn in
s ome other direct ion ? Is it not easy for him by a
,
 OFF E NS IV E A L
B TT E S .

similar operation to counteract a circular movement

,

such as must precede an attack of this kind ? May

he n ot even attack at some favorable moment while the ,

army is filing before h im and in taking position prepar

a to r
y to battle ? A l l this m ay happen and hence t he ,

flan k attack is extrem ely haz ardo us If the great .

F rederick owed m o st of his v ictories to this kind of

an attack it was b e cause the Opposing ar my manos u
,

vr ed with excess ive slowness and heaviness and because ,

he knew how to conceal hi s preparatory march by a

demonstratio n in another direction A S a rule the .
,

turning party i s also turned if he threatens t h e line

o f com m unications o f t he en e my he ex oses his o w n
p ,

at th e same time so that a man oe u v re march made ,

-
,

wit h the vie w o f m assing the army o n the fla nk o r

rear o f the enemy can only be justified by a favorable
,

locality and the possibility o f its accomplishmen t

,

without exposing the line of operations F or example .

,

fig 1 9 the army M m a y wit h out much risk and wi th

.
, , ,

considerable prospect o f success m anoe u vre agains t ,

t h e fl a n k of the army N if the line of operations P Q

’

, , ,

whi ch it is obliged to leave temporarily 1 8 protected ,

by a river and by di fficult ground o n i t s flanks A .

weak corps m statio n ed o n this lin e behin d a stream

,
’

, ,

with a deep bed m aking a strong defensive point, ,

may hold t he ene my i n check long enough to allo w

the mai n body M to move around along the dotted

, ,

line from m to M E v e n in this c a s e a body of

’
. ,
.

troops m should b e placed i n such a position as to

, ,
9s
9
2 02 P R IN C IP L ES OF S TR A T E GY .

Fig . 19 .

have a comm an ding view o f the enemy an d gi v e ,

warnin g of any attempt o n his part to strike at M i n

flank while o n the m arch Although the corps M m
.
, ,

and m are somewhat separated from each other the

’

connection i s su fficient as the in tervals cann o t b e

,

p enetrated by the enemy Napoleon practised a .

m an oeuvre almost identi cal with this d uring which ,

the famous battle o f A rcola was fought .

I t see m s therefore e vident that if an attack i n

, , ,

m ass by the flank is sometimes practicable it is only ,

so under the cover o f nat u ral obstacles an d with cer ,

tain precau t ion s ; such as concealing the movement ,

occupying in su fficient force all points which if in ,

possession o f the ene my would enable him to fal l on

,

the flank o f the moving mass G e n erally on the .

,

b attle fi el d th e ene my must be fairly attacked without

-
, ,

consuming time in movements to turn him which ,

 OFF E N SIVE B TT A LE S .

often prove da n gerous and frequently useless because

, ,

easily avoided .

A body o f tr oops m ay som etimes by a simple de ,

ployment t o th e right o r left gain ground in that ,

direction so as to o u t fl a n k o n e wing o f the enemy .

Suppose fo r example it is desired to attack with five

, , ,

bat t alions an enemy in equal force and to take him

, ,

i n fl an k Tw o c olumns A and B ( will b e

.
fig
, .

Fi g . 20
.

moved forward towards the centre of the hostile lin e .

The first A will consist o f two battalions at half dis

, ,
-

tance by divisions the secon d B of three battalions , ,

cl os ed in m ass and with on e color concealed The

,
.

column s will seem to the en emy to be of equal size ,

and he will not know where the principal attack is to

be made He will think it is to be in front an d
.
204 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR ATE GY .

parallel until the deployments under cover o f th e

, ,

skirmishers S how him a fifth b att a lion on the extrem

,

ity of his left win g Th e skirmishers that should b e

displayed against his right will contribute to th e suc
cess of this manoeu vre If the attack is vigorou sly
.

m ade before the enemy h as recovered fro m his a ston

i sh m en t it will be almost certain o f su ccess
,
What a .

small corp s o f fi ve b attalions h as don e in this case a ,

large army with numerous column s may repeat Eve ry .

head o f a column Sh own to the enemy increases his

uncertainty and this i s a reason for push i n g the m
,

forward equally as if the intention was to a de p t the

,

parallel order o f ba t tle Being in this state o f u n c e r

.

tainty until the last moment he c anno t prepare well ,

for the blow which is to fal l upon him .

If the ground o n o n e o f th e wings presents any fea

ture under cover o f which a body of troops m ay slip
,

alo n g unperceived advantage S hould be tak en of it

, .

E ven a small body appearing at an un expected place

,

and time will astonish the enemy , an d if the attack

is pressed at this mo m
,

en t it will c ertainly succeed .

w
A tta ck p on th e C en tr e — Although the centre is
.

the stronges t part o f an order of b attle there m ay b e ,

circumstances m aking it advisable to direct t h e main

attack against that point S uppose for exam p l e, that
.
,

a h eight the key o f the field is i n the centre o f th e

, ,

line In such a case the bul l must be taken by the

.

horns if a decisive result Is desired an d cons equentl y

m
,

th e meet v1 g oro us efforts sho uld be a de to C arry th e

 Fi g . 2 1.

high ground the possession of which is equivalent to

,

a control of th e field A n advantage obtained on on e

.

wing would amount to nothing so long as the enemy

held th e high g round an d it would be always u s ees
,
'

sary t o drive h im away from that part at last o r else ,

retire from the contest Therefore however perilous

.
,

this attack m ay be th ere i s no time for hesi tation the

,
2 06 P RINC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

attempt mu st be made as the only possible chance for

success u n less indeed the position can b e turned in
, , , ,

which case it would be better to man oeuvre than to

fight If th e attack is m ade the best troops should
.
,

b e selected for that purpose an d every possi ble p ains ,

taken to insure success The n atural order in such a .

case is the obliqu e order i n echelon by both wings ,

presenting a figure somewhat si m ilar to the wedge of

the an cients The point A B of this wedge (fig
.
, ,
.

intended to pierce the centre o f the ar my M is , ,

re enforced by doubling its line an d by drawing nearer

-

the reserve 0 O n the other hand the echelons A and

.
, ,
’

B o f the two wings are formed in a si n gle line as

’
, ,

they are to be but S lightly engaged only indeed to a , , ,

sufficient extent to hold the Oppos ing wings i n check .

The artillery being non effective against the hig h

,
-

ground is put i n position to fire obliquely o n those

,

parts o f the line adj acent to th e centre and thus in a ,

m easure to separate t he centre an d wings In short .

,

e v ery e ffort must b e made to have this attack success

ful If not th e b attle is lost and it is time to think
.
, ,

o f retreati n g The figure showing the army M sup ‘

.
,

ported o n the flanks by n atural obstacles that can not

be turn ed explains s ufli c ie n tly why it has been n ec e s
,

sary to attempt to carry the centre .

There is still another case whe n it is proper to attack

the centre even when the opposing a r m v is well con
,
-

c en t r a t e d It is when the latter i s i n front o f a defile

.
,

which o ffers b ut fe w advantages for a retreat ; because

 OFF EN S IV E B TT A LE S .

if the centre is pierced and the mouth of th e d efile

,

seized th e enemy i s lost being obliged to fly in con

, ,

fusion abandon his baggage an d lose many prison ers

, , .

The entrance o f t he defi le is in such a case the key of

the field o f battle A t Waterloo Napoleon directed
.
,

his main attack agains t the centre of the Englis h

army because t he latter had the great forest of
,

Soignes beh in d it and t he only line of retreat for the

,

cavalry and the baggage was along the road to Br u s

sels This attack failed only because the defenders of
.

the position were as brave as the as sailants were more ,

numerou s and to w ards the end o f the battle received

,

considerable re e nforce m ents whi ch decided the vic ,

tory i n their favor .

The attac k o n the centre which i s but an e x cep

,

t io n a l case when the Opposing army is wel l c o n c e n

t r a t e d b ecomes the rule whe n the army is much

,

S p read o u t and the different corps i n it are too far

,

apart By making simple demonstrations upon the

.

extre mities o f this long line and pressing vigorously

,

U pon t he centre it will al m ost surely be pierced and

, ,

the two wings wil l never su cceed i n re u niting It .

will b e practicable under such circumstances if time ,

is used to good advantage to envelope and destroy ,

the wi n gs i n succession o r else oblige them to retreat

,

upon divergent l ines In 1 808 the S panish army o f

.
,

men took up a position in front of Tudela ;

b ut t he general C asta nos instead of assembling the m
, ,

o n a front o f two miles as he should have don e ,

,
2 08 P RIN C IP LE S OE S TR A TE GY .

exte nded the m over three an d a h al f Marshal .

L annes who commanded the F rench army perce i ved

, ,

th e weakn ess o f such a disposition o f troops and ,

attacked i n the centre O n e division of infantry

.

promptly broke the line and the cavalry passing, ,

through the gap and turning to the left enveloped the

, ,

Spanish right wing an d completely routed it Th e

,
.

left win g could make n o further resistance although ,

composed of the best troops a n d retired with pr e c ip i

,

tati e n .

Co n c en i
tr a t on — In whatever direction the attack be
m ade whether upon one o f the wings or the centre
, ,

whether the order of battle be parallel or obliqu e the ,

m ass intended for th e attack should be composed of

all arms and should contain as m any battalion s
, ,

squadrons , and batteries as can b e brought together

and can act witho u t confu sion No e ffort S hould b e .

Sp ared to m ake the blow a decisive one T he lines .

should b e doubled and the reserves brought n ear .

S uccess depends upon the simultan eous cordial an d , ,

vigorous action of a ll the individual parts .

To g ive an idea o f the method of e ffecting such a

concentration o f force and action as is n ecessary we ,

will take the case o f an army o f four divisions r e ,

quired to act in an open field with th e in te n t ion o f

'

making a powe rf u l attack fro m its right aft er e n g a g ,

ing the centre The army may con sist of the follow
.

ing troops
 OFF E N S IV E A L
B TT E S .

30 o m p a n ie s of rifl e me n o r s h a r p shoot e rs
c

1 2 s q u a dr o
1 6 b a tt e r i e s e a ch o f 6 pi e c e s,

4 c o mp a n i e s o f eng in e e rs 400

m en .

It will be observed that the proportion of c avalry

an d ar illery in this army is small
t *
It is supposed .

that t he advanced guard has rejoined the m ai n army

and that all the troops are with their respective divi
sions The entire force o f cavalry is j oined to the
.

division whi ch is to for m the reserve A ll the dispo .

sable artillery and rifl emen are also held with the
r eserve .

The principal attack i s to be made by the right a n d ,

the rig li division is consequently strengthened by the

p
a ddi tio rl o f fi v e companies of r ifl e m e n giving i t ten
, ,

each of the two other di visions fi ve and the reserve ,

ten Three divisions are to form the line of battle

.
,

each presenting a fr ont of four b attalions and the r e ,

m aining six to be disposed of in the best m anner to

carry o u t the plan of battle .

This arran gement is agreed upon the evening pre

ceding the battle but is only definitely settled the next ,

o
J min i s y s A a g n r l r l it m y b st t d t h t
a : s e e a u e, a e a e a an a rmy i n

an op co t ry sho ld co t i c v lry to th mo t f
en un u n a n a a e a un o one- s i th it
x s

whol s t r g th ; i m q co tri s t t h w ill

”
e en t i n un a n o u s un e on e - en s u fific e .

O f rtill ry th s m thority s y s Th pr portio s o f a tir ll ry

“
a e e a e au a : e e n e
,

h v v r i d i diff r t w rs U s lly t hr pi c s t
a e a e n e en a . ua ee e e o a tho s d
u an

co mb t ts
a an ll o w d b t this ll o w c will d p d
a re a e ,
u a an e e en on circ m u

st c s TRANS LATOR ”
an e -
. .
 '

210 P RIN C IP LE S OE S TRA TE GY .

m orning when an ex amination of the fiel d has shown

,

t hat the en emy has m ade n o changes i n his disposi

tions The following order is the n sent to the division
.

comman de rs
“
The pri nc i pal at t ack will b e from the right the ,

left being ret ire d .

The army will adv a nce in three columns at su fli ,

ci ent intervals for deployment They will reg ulate .

their motions by the right and neit h er will get in a d

,

vance The reserve will follow the central column

. .

E ach colum n will b e preceded by an advanced guard ,

composed of its rifl e me n the flank companies of the

,

leading brigade and a battery ,

.

The deployment wil l be e ffected i n th e usual

order each brigade forming on e line the artillery o n
, ,

the right the rifl e me n in the intervals o f the battalion s

, ,

and the flank co mpanies o n the wings If at any ti m e .

during the battle the artillery moves to the front at

any point the battalions will form columns to m ake
, ,
”
room for its passage .

Under this order the divisions are moved to the

front preserving their proper intervals an d preceded
, ,

by their advan ced guards som e 1 2 00 or 1 5 00 paces .

They commence to deploy at a signal o f three guns

fired by the reser v e When the ad v anced guards are
.

s u fli c i e n t ly near the enemy the r ifl e m e n are deployed

,

as Skirmishers to engage th e skirmishers of the enemy .

Th e flank companies already referred to for m their

, ,

supports eac h keeping near th e battalio n to which it

,
 OFF E N S IVE A L
B TT E S .

b elong s The artillery will in the mean ti me have

.

, ,

opened upon the en emy whenever his masses have

been disco vered .

The combat of th e skirmishers i s continued until

they are dri ven in or called i n nearer to t h e line of
battle which is form e d by this time The b at t eries
, .

m ove up at a trot to j oin the troops already in posi

,

tion The supports relieve th e r ifl e m e n who rally

.
,

behind them O n e half forms the line of skir mishers

.
-

and the other the supports and in this order they fall
,

back grad ually towards the interval s of th e battalions .

The batteries are first unmasked and immediately

c o mmen ce firing The rifl e m e n take position in the
.

i ntervals o f the battalions and the flank co m panies ,

w hich have form e d thei r supports doubling on the ,

W i ngs .

The two right divisions n ow become en gaged open ,

ing fire if the enemy is in good range or cha r ging with

,

the bayonet The left division cannonades the right

.

o f the enemy an d m akes a display of troops ; the

only obj ect there being to hold that part of the o p
posing lin e in posi t ion .

F ig ure 2 2 shows these arrangements and the man ,

ner in which the generals of d ivisio n have co n for m ed

to the S pi r i t of their instructions Th e gene r al of the
.

right d ivision has wi thdrawn one ba tt alion fr o m eac h

line to for m a small reserve which he has placed b e
,

hind th e centre He wil l engage in the parallel order

.
.

The general o f th e ce n tral division has formed his

212 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

"
DL’ZIK I UUUEB
'

l i
if
i
F ig . 22 .

first lin e in t wo echelo n s but has doubled th e right

,

battalion and placed all the r ifl e m e n with the first

lin e Th e secon d line has n o thing peculiar abou t it
.
,

except that the three right battalions are nea rer t o

ge t her than th e two on the left This is in conformity
.

with the prim ary idea o f m aking the m ain attac k

 OFF E N S IV E B A TTL E S .

towards the right and refusing the left The gener al .

o f the le ft division i n order to retire the le ft has

, ,

formed his firs t line in echelon s by battalions deployed

at 1 00 yards distance fro m each other O n e of his .

batteries has been thro w n to the left and front i n order ,

t o cover his echelons and lead the enemy to expect an

att a ck on that side Th e fi ve companies of r ifl e m e n

.

form a support for that b atte ry and the flank compa ,

nies of the battalion form the lin e o f skirmishers .

The second brigade rem ains i n colu m n to the rear .

Th e general in chief having placed his reserve b e

- -
,

hind the centre of the right division and seeing the

engagement commenced j udges that the moment has ,

arrived for the development of his plan He de t aches .

o n e brigade o f the reserve wit h four com p anies of

,

r ifl e m e n six batteries and half t he cavalry

, ,
He sends .

verbally the following orde r s : The artillery to move “

u p t o the right an d le ft o f the b atteries of the right

division an d to take the line o f the en emy by as slant

,

a fire as possible ; the infantry to be m assed o n the

right of the artillery as supports guarding against a t
, ,

tacks of cavalry (the smoke of the cann on will facili

tate this movement) ; the cavalry to follow the i n ~

fa n t ry keeping to the right and rear and being pre

, ,

pared to take in flank the cavalry o f the enemy should ,

it at tempt to attack ”
Two o f the reserve ba t teries
.

are also sent to r e enforce those of the central d i vision

- .

The figure (2 2) S hows these movem en t s execu t ed .

The r ight and left battalions of the right divi s ion

2 14 P RIN C IP LES or S TR ATEGY .

form column to make roo m for the artillery ; and those

,

of the second line close in towards the centre to avoid ,

being behind the batteries The infantry brigade .

gains gro u nd to the right preceded by th e rifl e m e n

, ,

who are ready for deployment as S kirmishers This .

brigade may either charge in mass deploy th e leading ,

battalions o r form squares to close the front line Th e

,
.

cavalry is deployed to appear more n umerous two

, ,

squadrons being always kept in column .

The order of battle at first parallel thus becomes

, ,

oblique and the ene my will be turned if he does n ot

,

hasten to withdraw his left wing In the fi g ure (22 ) .

the two armies are four hundred or four hundred an d

fifty yards apart which supposes that the enemy has
,

brought into action as yet only S kirmishers and artil

lery or has already fallen back to avoid the flank a t
,

tack with which he is threatened But that has n oth .

ing to do w ith the move men t s j u s t describ ed whic h ,

a r e so much the more decisive if the armies are i n

close musket range .

The reserve being weakened by these move m ents ,

the general sends orders to the second brigade of th e

third division to draw near the centre to act as a sec ,

o n d reserve in case of need Whe n the first division

.

i s about to move to the front its two deployed bat ,

talions will first advance i n order to give a good v olum e

,

o f fire within e ffective range when the ti m e for

;
charging has arrived these b att al ions form column
, ,

those of the s e cond li ne take their plac e s in the i n ter

 OFFE N S IV E B ATT L E S . 215

vals and all advance together The muskets will not

,
.

”
be brought to the position o f charge bayonets un til “

the columns are within te n o r twenty p aces of the

enemy It is a bad plan to bring the m do w n soon er
.
,

as the m arching is more awk w ard and the align

m ent lost The enemy seldo m waits to receive such
.

an onset If a second deploy m ent is n ecessary it will

.
,

be done by the battal ions of the s econd line those o f ,

the firs t taking the places of the latter D uring these .

m an oeuvres the r ifl e me n and flank co mpanies placed

, ,

i n the intervals of t he columns will h ave opportuni ,

ties o f using their fi re arms e ffectively -

.

In the general movement the centre will be regu ,

la t ed by the ri g ht con stantly endeavoring to gain

,

g round If any gap oc curs in t he line on accoun t o f

.

t he manoeuvres it should be filled by the battalions

,

o f the secon d line The o ffice rs S hould use every ex

.

e rt io n t o have the engage m en t prog r ess from right to

l eft all d isconnected m ovements being carefully

,

avoided F in ally th e left which h as been retired in

.
, ,

the begin ning becomes engaged and the action i s

, ,

general Th e troops along the entire line are engaged

.

wi t h the enemy who being o u tfl a n k e d o n his left and

, ,

assailed i n front by doubled battalions ough t to b e ,

defeated unless he is very superior in artillery for this

, ,

arm in its present state of improvement h as very

, ,

m uch to do in the decision o f battles especially i n ,

open ground .

Enough has bee n said to give an idea of the method

216 PRIN C IP L E S OF STR ATE GY .

of
conce n trating upon a given point a large m ass of
troops and of handling them in action It wil l b e
,
.

observed that upon the right now become really th e

,

centre by reason o f t h e offensive movement whic h has

been explained the troops are really drawn up i n
,

three lines This arran gement might have b een made

.

still stronger by forming a greater nu mber of battal

ions i n col umn and closing the m more but they would ,

thus have afforded a better mark for the artillery of

the enemy and there would have b een the additi onal
,

inconvenience of having a portion of th e troops r e

du c e d to a state of inac t ion With modern weapons
.
,

the proble m to be resol ved is to cover as much fr ont

and to obtai n as long a line o f troops firing as possi
ble without having too much weakn ess in the l ine of
,

b attle.

In the example selected the groun d is supposed to

, ,

be level and open so that the artillery would be the

,

most important arm That is by no means the gen

.

eral case The dispositions must always be m ade to

.

conform to the ground Where it is more broken the

.
,

troops will remain more in colu m ns which will move ,

over t he practicable parts of the fiel d ; the combat o f

sk irmishers will be continued longer and as th e artil , ,

lery o f the enemy is less effective they may advance

,

n earer ; the bayonet wil l be more frequently used ; the

artillery will regul ate its movements by those of th e
infantry and will not be so much massed on account
, ,

of t he want o f suitab l e gro u nd ; finally the caval ry

,
 OFFEN S IV E B ATTL E S . 21 7

will b e li ttle els e th an spectators until the pu rsuit

b egins.

E v en i n an Ope n country m an oe u vres cannot b e

,

conduc te d wi th such m ethodi cal regularity and exact

distance s as have been seen in the example given if ,

the enemy is met o n the m arch an d a battle ensu es

the same day It m ay begi n when but tw o divisions
.

are at hand Someti m es a si n gl e division with the

.
,

advanced guar d will be obliged to receive the first a t

,

tack o f the enemy while the other di vision s are co m

,

ing u p in successio n i nto line A n oblique line i n .

e chelons will nece ssarily res ult under s uch circu m

s ta nces an d the commanding general having made

, ,

pro v ision for first emergen cies should give suitable ,

orders to the di fferent corps as th ey successively ar

ri ve o u the field Upon such occas ion s a skilful
.

comm ande r demonstrates his ability ; h e has n o tim e

fo r protracted reflection ; his a rrangements m ust b e
m ade upon the spur o f th e moment His co mbina .

tions should b e si m ple his orders brief and he must

, ,

b e c oo l when every o n e aro u nd him is in motion an d

excitement A ny man of ord inary capacity and som e
.

experience in moving troops m ay after reflection , ,

m ake suitable disposition s o f an army for b attle b u t ,

he must be born a general wh o can improvise them

under fire .

P u r s u i ts — It m ay h appen that while a decisive

attack is made on o n e wing the enemy may be doing
,

the sam e thing o n the other and the two ar mies may
,

10
21 8 P RIN C IP LE S OF STRATE GY .

each b e victorious on o n e wing and defeated at th e

other It is therefore impor t ant to modify the ardor
.
, ,

o f the troops and ,

instead of ind u lging in a headlong
pursuit to keep them well in hand and move the m
, ,

all or in part upon the flank o r rear o f the other wing

of the enemy It will b e su fficient to follow up fugi
.

t iv e s with the light cavalry supported by light artil

,
lery
and a few battalion s of infantry In the mean time .
,

the wing o f the en emy which has been v ictorious

may b e enveloped and its defeat made so much th e
,

more complete as it had advanced beyond its origin al

line A t the battle o f Naseby fought in 1 6 45 b e
.
, ,

tween C harles I and the parliamentary forces P rince

.
,

Rupert defeated the troops in his front an d purs u ed

them vigorously But C romwell who had defeate d
.
,

the royalists immediately in his front did n o t pursu e , ,

but turned on those that were still fighting took the m ,

i n flank and entirely routed them

,
If P rin ce Rupert .

had pursued this course he would probably have ,

s aved C harles his crown .

After a first success therefore the pursuit of the

, ,

enemy should be made with circumspection ; the ranks

should b e reformed and order preserved in anticipa
,

tion o f further attacks When i t appears safe to .

m ove forward the pursuit may be recomm enced in

,

such direction as to separate the corps of th e enemy

and prevent their reunion While the b attalion s are .

preparing for this pursuit the light troops will har ,

ass the retiring enemy the artillery will follow up

;
 OFFEN SIV E BATTLES . 219

an d gi ve him n o rest ; th e cavalry will charge vigor

o u s ly those corps which seem to be recovering thei r

order and will cut t hem to pi e ces o r oblige t h em to

,

lay down their arm s .

In following o u t th e rule o f reforming the ranks b e

fore pursuing actively th e enemy when he is thrown
into con fusion at any p oint care must be taken not to ,

lose too much time in m aking the necessary r e c t ific a

tion s o f alignments P e rfect alignment is not so im
.

portant to t he preservation o f order as th e touch o f

m an to m an K eep the troops well closed and push
.

forward ; n othing more is necessary t o o verthrow ,

completely an enemy w h o h as on ce yielded ground .

If o n the contrary tim e is lo st in align ing the ranks

, ,

as upon a drill grou n d the enemy will be enabled to

-
,

reform and o ffer bat t le a second tim e .

It appears therefore that t w o extremes are to b e

, ,

avoided when the en emy is falli n g back Too much .

circumspection m ay prevent a fi rst success from lead

ing to d ecisive resul t s and too much rash ness may ,

cause tota l ruin A union of p rudence an d boldn ess

.

is n ecessary A comman der must look n o t only b e

.

fore him but often to the sides and sometimes behind

, .

He must know what is pas sing i n the n eighboring

corps ; mu st obse r ve whether he i s supported ; if the '

line of which he forms a par t is m aintaining its posi

tion ; if the reserves are e n gaged ; if h e must depend
upon his own means & c ,
.

The com m ander in chief will direct th e movements

- -
220 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

of the whole ar my in such a way as to render his vic

tory decisive by gaining as much ground as possible in
,

the direction of the line of retreat of the enemy in o r ,

der to cut him o ff ; the last reserves will be disposed i n

such a manner as to overthrow any r emaining resist
ance While the di fferent corps are pressing the defeat
.

ed enemy turning them driving them upon obstacles

, , ,

making prisoners and capturing material the general ,

should take some rest dictate orders for a bivouac of

,

the army and for moving the next day ; he should

,

give atten tion to the wounded and should signify his ,

satisfa ction to the troops in an order of t h e lda y i n ,

which he will recount wha t each corps did i n gaining

the victory F inally he Should take measures to re
.
,

place expended munition s fill u p the ranks o f his ,

army and draw from the country such supplies as h e

,

needs and it can furnish .

A r t . l V .— D e f e n s i v e B a tt le s .

The weaker army is usually obliged to receive an

attack fro m the stronger It chooses as fa v orab l e a
.

S ite as possible and awaits the enemy there endeavor

,

ing thus to supply its numerical inferiority by superi

o r i ty of posi t ion .

P os i ti on s — A good position is o n e which n o t too

,

high still overlooks the surrounding ground and a f

,

fords space enough for deploying the troops The .

ground should be su fli cie n tly smooth and unbroken

 F V A L
D E E N S I E B TT E S . 221

to facilitate th e m anoeuvres o f all the arm s o f the ser

vi ce but especially the artillery and cavalry Its ex
, .

tent should b e propor ti oned to the strength of the

arm y ; an d i t may here be remarked that in a good ,

position the same troops m ay occupy a greater front

than i n a pl ain as there is n o t th e sam e n ecessity for
,

doubling the line throughout It will be su ffi cient if .

t w o lines are drawn up on the m ost easily accessible

p arts o f the field ; o n e lin e will an swer a t other points ,

and moreover consid erable spaces m ay be left b e

tween difl e ren t corps which will be occupied by S kir
'

,
'

m i sh e rs Some localities p e r m i t s u ch deviation fro m

.

gen eral rules A ll salient points being held by th e

.

artillery o r even by sharpshooters and infant ry t he

, ,

enemy can n ot with a prudent regard for his o w n

,

s afety expose his flanks by penetrating between them

,

and finding the reserves i n his front at the same time .

A divisio n of sixteen battalions four bat teries a bat , ,

talion o f sharpshoote rs and four squadrons may con ,

v e n ie n tl occupy a front f two tho san d yards

y o u .

Th e wings o f the position should res t upo n strong

natural Obstacles such as large m arshes a lake a
, , ,

deep ri ver a wood impassable rocks which secure

, , ,

the army a ai n st attack in flank o r oblige the ene my

g
,

to make wide détours to t u rn t he flank In front the .

groun d should fall away gently so that i t may be ,

thoroughly swept by the artillery and i t also permits

forward movements against the enemy whe n a dv is a
ble There should also be at intervals along the front
.
22 2 P RINC IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

cl umps of trees villages farm houses or en closure s

,
-
, ,

which being occup ied i n a proper man ner b ecom e

, ,

fo rmidable salient points that furnish cross fi r es an d

,
-

must be carried by the enemy befo re attacking the

real line .

A position whose front is covered by a river o r by ,

very steep and d iffi cul t grou n d is only suitable for ,

an ar my whic h is too weak to venture a for ward m ove

ment against the enemy but must be content to
,

remai n strictly on the de fensive E ve n i n such cases .

there S hould al w ays be e fforts m ade t o facilitate o fl e n

'

sive retur n s upo n the enemy at oppor t u n e m o ments ,

as these have a powerful effect i n arresting an attack .

In rear the roads s h ould be good i n orde r to facili ,

tate a retreat in case of reve rse A singl e road is not

.

eno ugh for the easy and prompt evacuation of a battle

field Moreover if the enemy should seize that sin
.
,

gle roa d to th e rea r the army is lost this is especially

,

dangerous if the road leads fro m o n e of the wings ,

and not fro m t h e cen t re The most favorable case is

.

that where there are several good roads through a

wooded and broken country where the army m ay ,

find good positions for checking the enemy A n open .

count ry is dangerous as nothing is more to be dreaded

,

than charges of cavalry upon a retreating army whic h

is in more o r less confusion .

B esides t he roads leading to the rear whose gen

,

eral direction is perpendic ular to t he line o f bat t le it ,

is well to hav e in rear o f the line a cross road fro m -

 DE F EN SIV E A LES
B TT . 22 3

right t o left s o that th e arti llery may m ove freely

,

from point to point The best place for this road is

.

behin d the second line Besides the foregoing a dv a n

.

tages which the position S hould o ffer to the defending

army the l o w ground that is l eft to the enemy should
,

b e cut up and obstructed by ditches pon ds hedges , , ,

w a lls & c — ob stacl es that are not impassable b u t

,
.
,

g reatly tend to delay and confuse the ad v ancing

troops es pecially if under fire
,
.

The ge neral form o f the position S hould b e concav e

toward s th e front if its exte n t is l imited but con vex
, ,

if there is considerable development In the first cas e .

the army oc cupies the entire extent o f the position ,

and h a s its wings strongly posted so as to be in n o ,

danger o f being enveloped ; it has only to stand and

deliver a close converging fire upon the enemy In
, .

the second case however as it will generally be

, ,

n ecessary to move troops from o n e part of t h e fi e ld to

another to repel the various attacks of the enemy

,

upon the extended front it is best to have the position

,

convex towards the front as the troops m ay then ,

m ove o n the chords o f the arcs passed over by th e

enemy Bu t properly S peaking such a position as
.
, ,

th e last is not a good field for a defensive battle ,

which should always b e in strict proportion to the

army holding it ; it S hould rather be deemed a piece
o f gro u nd o ffering facilities for manoeuvre marches
-
,

and giving opportunities fo r prompt movements upon

threatened points , o r for effecting a concentration of
22 4 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

’
tro ops at vulnerable parts of the enemy s position .

Th e advantages of such ground are rather strategical

than tactical .

P ositions actually Occupied seldom possess all the

,

advantageous conditions that have been m entioned ,

and the best are those in which the most o f them are
found . The general shows his skill in m aking th e
best use of every advantage presented by his position ,

and in supplying what is wanting by fi el d works o r a -

,
'

good disposition o f his troops or both ,

.

In order that a Village m ay form a stro n g point

u pon the front or flank of a position it should { b e o f
'

solid construction Wooden houses far from being

.
,

favorable i n the defence m ay become very hurtful

, ,

because they may be so readily fired V illages m ay .

be occupied by several battalions by sharpshooters ,

and by artillery according to their importance ; the

,

walls of the outer enclosures by b ei n g loopholed, ,

g rea t ly assis t in the defe n ce and g,

un s m ay be con
c e a l e d behind the houses in favorable positions for

procuring a flank or Slant fire upon the troops o f the

enemy The line of which the villages are the salient
.
,

points should be near enough to support them read

,

ily and prevent their being turned and surrounded

, .

However excellent the features of a position m ay

b e an army should seldom be sat isfied with a purely
passive defence O n the contrary it should always
.
,

t ak e the o ffensive whenever a favorabl e opportunity

offers for striking an efl e cti v e blow By moving out .
 F
DE E N S I E V B A TTL E S . 2 25

to att a ck instead o f waiting to be attacked the weaker

, ,

party by s eeming bo ldnes s m ay conceal real weak

, ,

ness by unexpec ted o fl e n s iv e movemen ts a detached

'

o r venturesome corps o f the enemy may be cut o ff at

any rate h e wil l be made more circu mspect in his

,

proceedings an d the mor a le o f the defensive army

,

wi l l be elevated .

D isp os i tion f or Me q ens i ve

'

Since stron g posi f

.
-

tions are not always to be found and obstacles ,

are n o t always at the proper distances apart to

form good points for the flanks to rest upon it is ,

n ecessa ry fo r a general while k nowing how to take ,

advantage o f an y favoring features o f the gro u nd to ,

be able also to supply the want of these as far as ,

practicable by a j udiciou s arrangement o f the troops

,

at his disposal The essential thing is to m ake the

.

wings secure against a flank attack To guard these .

we ak points against charges o f cavalry it is su fficien t ,

t o place there several battalion s which m ay be drawn ,

u
p in squares A t the battle
. o f Mo l w i tz gained by ,

F rederick in 1 741 th e caval ry o f his right wing had

,

b een routed and the infantry were about to be taken

,

in flan k but th e victorious caval ry o f the enemy was

,

checked by three battalions which for want of space , ,

could not be deployed as was expected in the line o f

, ,

battle and were drawn up behind the wing This

,
.

infantry although repeatedly charge d stood fi r m

, ,

until Marshal Schwerin brought up th e left wing ,

hitherto retired and gained the victory H ad not

,
.
226 P RINC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

these three battalions been accidentally in the positio n

they occupied Frederick would probably hav e been
,

defeated It i s seldom an evil when want o f space

.

compels some of the battalions to remain in column

behind the line or several companies b ehind a b at
,

talion .

The wi n gs may also be strengthened by forming

behind them in echelon several squadrons of cavalry ,

t o make counter charges in case th e enemy shoul d

-
,

attack in flank In the orders for the b attle o f Hohen

.

friedberg F rederick directed a regiment of hussars to

,

form a third line behind each of the wings , o f th e

army either to cover the flanks o r to b e used in th e
,
“

”
pursuit If no cavalry can be formed for such a
.

pur p ose battalion squares i n echelon o n the wings

, , ,

will secure the m against en veloping attack from th e

cavalry o f the enemy .

The more serious efforts o f infantry again st th e

flanks during a battle while the front is strongly e n ,

gaged may be paralyzed by causi n g the second line

,

to o u tfl an k the fi rst and the third to o u tfl a n k th e

,

second so that the enemy is h imse lf turn ed when he

,

attempts to assail the flank or he is obliged to m ake ,

an extended and hazardous circular movement should ,

he endeavor to turn all the lines at once In this .

way d uring the first attack of the enemy and until

, ,

his real designs are displayed as few troops as possible ,

are exposed : O n e of the wings may thus be k ept

dise n gaged o r the whole disposable force brought
,
 DE FE N SIV E A L
B TT E S . 22 7

into action as occasion requires by successive por

, ,

tions wi t h out interference o r confusion .

In order to give a clearer understanding of the pre

ceding remarks the same army o f four divisions al
, ,

ready described as fighting a n o ffensive battle will now ,

b e supposed placed upon the defensive A plain will .

be taken as the field o f battle entirely bare o f obsta ,

cles that we may examine S imply the arrangemen t o f

,

t he t roops and strip the example o f every thing extra

,

neons .

The comm anding general wishing to retain a strong ,

reserve withdraws t wo battalions o f each division

,

in order to form a supplementary brigade which he ,

attaches to th e rese rv e division The di v isions o f the .

line of battle have each eight b attalions t wo b atteries , ,

and four companies o f sharpshooters The cavalry .

and the remainder o f the sharpshooters are j oined to

the reserve which is thus compo s ed o f six teen b at
,

talions twel ve squadrons ten batteries fift e en compa

, , ,

nies o f sharpshooters and fo u r companies o f engi

,

n e e rs .

The fi rst two divisions will be deployed in two lines ,

with their artillery o n the right as shown in figure 2 3 ,

the second lin e o u tfl a nk in g the first by the leng t h of

two battalio ns on the right o f the first division an d ,

o n th e left o f th e second The two battal ions on th e

.

right and o n th e l eft of the second line will be de

ployed the others remaining in column as usual The
.
.

i ntervals bet wee n the ends o f the two lines will be

P RIN C IP LE S OF S TRA TE GY .
 V
D EF E N S I E A L
B TT E S . 22 9

occupied by three companies o f sharpshooters in ,

column at the extremities o f the first line ; the two

,

other companies of sharp shooters i n eac h d ivision , ,

will form a part o f the secon d line i n the vacant space

,

in the centre occasioned by the second lin e o u tfl a n k

,

ing the first These companies however will only

.
, ,

take up these positions a fter they have opened th e

engagement in the capacity o f skirmishers .

The third division forms in echelon o n the le ft ,

farther in rear than the second lin e but will deploy ,

only two battalion s of its fi rst brigade th e re maining

t w o battal ions o f thi s b rigade wil l remain in colu mn

behind the left wing and the whole of the second b ri

,

gade wi ll be m ass ed ready for movement The artil .

lery o f this di visio n wil l be placed in battery on the ,

prolongation of the second line and t wo companies

,

o f sharpshoo t e rs will be placed as a link between the

battery and the fi rst battalion .

The re serve wil l approach the right which seems ,

t o b e threatened ; the suppleme n tary brigade o f in

fa n t ry wil l support the right wing ad op t ing the same
,

formation as the brigade of the left wing O f the five .

compani e s o f sharpshooters accompanying this bri

gade t wo will take position o n the left in advan ce
, ,

o f t he bri gade and near the adj acent battery ; the

,

other three companies wil l re m ain with the column ,

an d may b e extended to th e right as skirmishers .

Half o f the cavalry will form in echelon on the extreme

right which will complete the de fensive arrangements
,
.
2 30 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

S uch dispositions as have been i ndicated will only ,

last until the moment when the en emy displ ays his
designs and will then be modified to suit circu m
,

stan ces A n attack upon the right is supposed but

.
,

the le ft is not left without resources The latter i s .

su fficiently strong to resist a serious attack until th e

reserve can be brought up ; the second brigade o f the
third division is disposable for a flank attack upo n
any bodies of the enemy attempting to o u tfl a n k the
army on this S ide or it may for m squares if circum
, ,

stances require .

If on the other hand the real attack is m ade on

, ,

the r ight every thing is in readiness to receive it ; the

,

enemy finds four echelons before him which com p els ,

h i m to extend his line very much unless he prefers ,

to attack one of the echelon s and then he is hi mself

,

exposed to attack If it becomes necessary to call the

.

reser ve into action the disposable brigade of t h e left

,

wing may replace it .

A lthough this order of battl e makes su fficient pro

vision for the securi ty of the flanks still it occupies a ,

third mo r e space than if the first three divisions were

S imply deployed in tw o lines in the usual way The .
,

army may thus resist four divisions o f the sam e

strength ; and i n order that the enemy may attempt to
envelope it with any chance of success he m ust be
, ,

in decidedly superior numbers In the places where .

there is but o n e line of infant r y and a consequent ap ,

e a r a n c e o f weakness the infantry is covered by a

p ,
 V
D EF E N S I E A L
B TT E S . 2 31

good line o f sharpshooters who restore t h e e q u il ib ,

ri u m. It may b e obs erved that the defensive dispo

sitiou adopted by the army w h ile in a state of ex p e c
,

t a t io n prese n ts a con vex line to the front in i ts gen eral

,

outline This form to which the reasoning has led

.
,

us is th e o n e which o ffers the greatest facilities for

,

m oving the reserves to threatened points by following ,

chords or radii which are the S hortest lines ; the army

,

o n the defensive has thus the ad vantage o f greater

mobility This fu nda m ental pri nciple is discovered

.

in for t ifi ca tions : every work whose extremities d o ,

n o t rest on nat u ral obstacles should have an outlin e ,

convex towards the front But if this for m is a dv a n

.

t a eo u s for providing against the prepara t ory mov e

g

m ents made by the en emy for carrying out his plans ,

it i s so no longer when the lin es are act ually engaged

and fighting h as taken the place o f man oeuvring ;
then the concave for m is t h e best because it i s n a t u ,

rally enveloping a n d delivers a con verging fire T h e

,
.

skill o f a general is shown in passing fro m one to th e

other for m during the battle by taking advantage of ,

s uccesses gained by o n e of the wings When the .

ground presents fi r m points of support i t becomes ,

possible to adopt the right line or the concave lin e in

defen c e as there is then no danger o f being enveloped
,
.

The ground will always have a great influence upo n

the arrangements adopted as well i n the o ffensive as,

the defensive .

It is very important whenever the field of battle is

,
2 32 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

obstructed and cut up to make wide openings thro u gh

,

hedges &c and to provide ample communications

,
.
,

across ravines and small strea ms lying between di ffer

ent corps of the army The existing roads S hould b e
.

repaired and widened .

Sq au r es — In the case now under consideration ,

squares are formed by divisions o r brigades Bat .

talion squares are too small to serve as a basis for a n

order of battle but they are excellent when a part of
,

the line is strongly pressed These small squares are .

rapidly formed especially when the b attalion s are

,

already in close columns as usually h a p p e n s p i t is

,

easy to place them in echelon or quincunx order to ,

flank each other These battalion squares m ay be

.

considered as a good man oe u vre in certain cases but

when squares are the basis o f the order of battle
against an enemy whose principal stre n gth is in cav
al r they hould be formed of t least four battalion s
y ,
S a ,

that they may double their ranks without diminishing

too much the inter ior space This S pace is n ecessary .

for the reception of the staffs and sometimes to con ,

tain even the cavalry when it is too weak to act .

This doubling ranks when forming squares is par

, ,

t ic u l a rly applicable to those troops whose usual forma

tion is in two ranks It should not be don e however

.
, ,

by doubling companies or platoons as there would b e ,

an improper mixture of subdivisions and confu sio n ,

would resul t at critical moments a thing to be Sp e ,

c i a ll y avoided . The doubling should be effected by

 F
DE EN S I E BATTV L ES . 2 33

p lacing the le ft h alf o f each battalion behind th e

right half o r by placing even divisions be hin d the
,

o dd.

When the troo ps are thu s formed in a doubled

square the front ranks o f o n e or more faces m ay b e
,

detached without breaking the square The angles .

are the weak points an d it is well to put the shar p

,

shooters there i n smal l solid s quares flanking th e ,

larger The artillery i s also placed at the angles the

.
,

pieces ou tside an d the caissons inside ; or it may be ,

in the middle of a face o r on the di a g on al line j oin

, ,

in g two adj a cent sq u ares Se ve ral companies dis

.
,

tributed as reserves in the interior will be very usefu l , ,

in r e enforcing points that are a t tacked and givin g

-
,

s u ppor t wherever n ecessary .

The cavalry is placed between the squares so as to ,

be flanked by them F ro m these pos itions it m ay

.

fall upon the cavalry o f t h e en emy when disordered ,

by th e fire o f the infantry ; but when too w ea k to act ,

it takes refuge inside the squ ares .

Do fens i v P op er
e r t ies
f
o G r ou n d — When the groun d
is n ot precisely what is called a p os i ti on but still pre ,

s ents som e favorable features they mu st be taken ,

ad v an tage o f no matter h o w insignificant they m ay

,

appear for whatever is not for us i n such cases is

, , ,

against us Thus in 1 6 9 0 Wa l dec lost the first bat

.
, ,

tle of F leurus because he did n ot t a k e possession of a

,

pl ateau which had a very slight command of the field

o f battle Marshal L uxembourg saw the fault an d
. ,
2 34 P RINC IP L ES OF S TR A TE GY .

at once too k advantage of it and in consequen ce , , ,

gained a victory .

A simple wood in which a fe w companies o f skir ,

m is h e r s may be thrown permits the line of battle to ,

be extended and a strong front to be presented equal

, ,

i n extent to the enemy s A piece of high ground ’

.

gives advantages o f another kind : if isolated and o f ,

limited extent forming a little eminence in the mid s t

,

o f a plain it is proper if there is n o oth er reason to

, ,

the contrary to place the centre o f the lin e upon it

, ,

as th e enemy will generally be obliged to attack t here ,

which will usually be unfavorabl e for him .

When for an y cause whatever as for example to

, , , ,

cover the l ine of retreat it becomes necessary to have ,

the high ground on the flank instead of in the centre ,

it Should be held by one o f the wings as strongly as
possible A S it is advantageous to you if held dur
.
,

in g a battle so will it be of importance to the enemy

,

to seize it If the rising groun d is of varying eleva

.

tion the highest is the most important point Much

, .

w ill be gained if in such a case a block house or r e

, ,
-

doubt can be erected .

The heights may form a l ine o f hills whose dir e c

tion is either parallel to the line of retreat or cuts it .

What has been said above is applicable to the first

case an d in the second the heights present in a
,

greater o r less degree the advantages of a good posi

tion The first line will then be placed at the crest
.
 DE F E N S IVE B A TTL E S . 2 35

plate au or the rever s e slopes so as t o be greatly or

,

entirely out o f vie w o f the enemy The line of battle

.

thus follows the general direction o f the chai n of

hil l s and w ill be more advantageous as it cuts the
, ,

li ne of retreat more nearly at right angles O n the .

other hand t he more oblique the li n e o f retreat the

, ,

less favorable is the position The arm y A B (fig

.

u re occupyi ng the he ights whose general direction

forms with i ts line o f retreat XY an obtuse angle
, , ,

has its left flank very much exposed ; for the enemy
may envelop this extremity with superior forces by
taking a position E F perpendicular to its lin e of
Operations ; that is to say by a natural deployment
, ,

and without an eccentric movem ent it is ready to ,

m ake a flank attack which can only be counteracted

,

successfully by changing the position of A B Thi s .

2 36 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

can only be made when the high groun d presents a

plateau o f su fli cie n t extent to permit a change of
front which is contrary to the supposition In such
,
.

a case it becomes necessary either to receive the flank

attack or to abandon the high ground It appears .
,

therefore that when there is high groun d upon the

,

li ne of retreat it will not n ecessarily be proper for

,

the army to occupy it and await the attack o f th e

e nemy but the ground should have a suitable position
,

an d direction with reference to the line o f retreat .

.

The two lines Should form nearly a ri ght angle

”

The danger just pointed ou t is not the o n ly on e .

The enemy may take the position C I D preferring ,

the strategical to the tactical consideration O n his .

right C I will su ffi ce to guard his own line of retreat

, ,

whi l e the m ain e ffor t is made o n the left If this .

attack succeeds it is evident the a rm y A B is in great

,

danger of being cut off from its line o f retreat .

Us e of F o r tifica ti o n s — It is sometimes necessary to

.

take positions where there is no n atural s upport for

the wings Ar t ificial ones must be create d under
.

s uch circumstances if t ime permits

,
Very slight .

works of this kind if judiciously constructed may

, , t

have a great value .

The e n gineer h a s someti m es also the import ant

duty of fortifying a posi tion selected and prepared for
one of those mighty battles which decide the fate of
empires Time that precious element in war is then
.
, ,

all owed him he may then be extremely useful if he ,

 F
DE E N S I E V A L
B TT E S . 2 37

h as that eye for ground whi ch enables him to make

the best disposi tions o f his works and that activity ,

an d devotion which ensures their execution He .

should gi ve ample oppo rtunity for o ffe n sive move

m en ts as a mere p as sive defence o f intrench ments is
,

i nju di cious The works whatever may be their char

.
,

acter should be se parated from each other leaving

, ,

wide open ings through which troops may debouch

with considerable front E a ch work should be well
.

a rran ged fraised palisaded and closed at the gorge

, , , ,

i n order t o o ffer a strong resistan ce I t is better to .

h ave a fe w works with a co nsiderable relief and large

di tches than a number of insignificant affairs whic h
,

would n ot check good troops for five minutes Under .

protection o f t hese works and in a favorable position

, ,

an active defen ce may be made which is so well ,

s uited to me n o f S pirit and tends so much to in creas e

,

the mor a le o f s oldiers This method is the best

.
.

becau s e the impe tuosity o f attack is n e c essary for

victory A man feels inspirited when he is moving
.

forward To adopt a continuous system o f intr ench

.

m ents is t o confess our ow n weakness t o re nder o u r ,

s elves incapable o f getting at the enemy and to chi l l ,

the ardor o f the troops The influen ce of fo rt ific a

.

tion s in deciding battles is too well known to make it

n ec ess ary to cite any examples o f th e fact .

D efe s v
n i e M a oe v res
n u — We have hitherto supposed
an ar my obliged to act on the defensi ve to have
, ,

c hosen a good po s itio n with flan k s well suppo rted by

.
2 38 P R IN C IP LE S OF S TR ATE G Y .

obstacles or by troops suitably posted It m ay hap

,
.

pen to be attacked in flank before its arrangements

are completed What Shall be done then ? It m ay
.

either change front pivoting o n th e least exposed

,

wing or a crotchet to the rear may be formed or th e

, ,

second l ine disposed in echelon to o u tfl a n k the first

at the menaced end or the reserve thr own upon th e
,

flank of the enemy making the attack The last i s .

the best course as there is a boldness about it which

,

i s inspiring It does not derange the positions o f the

.

several corps that may then act to suit circumstances

, ,

under the protection of the attack o f th e yr eser v e ,

i
which will surprise the enemy an d check h s move
m ent .

The other plans are dangerous The crotchet h as .

the disadvantage of being easily enveloped an d hav ,

in g two long branches exposed to e n fil a de fire from

ar til lery which may prove very destructive The faces
,
.

are i n such relative positions to each oth er that the

troops cannot move forward without separating the m
at the angle and making an opening through which
the enemy may advance nor c an they fall back with ,

o u t c rowdi n g
'

If the crotchet is formed under the

.

fir e of the enemy confusion is the almost certain r e

,

sult F or a still stronger reason should a chan ge

.

o f front of the entire army be avoided under such

circumstances .

To m ove the second line by the flan k towards the

poin t attacked is scarcely better The troops o f th e .
 DE F EN S IV E BATT E S L . 239

first lin e seeing themselves unsupported lose their

, ,

confiden c e an d do not hold their groun d well The .

t wo lines should be kept together as well as possible .

Moreover the second line may be ou tfl an k e d as well

,

as the first an d the movement referred t o becomes

,

impossible It is only by arrangements m ade previ

.

o u s to the battle that the secon d line can be m ade to

o u tfl a n k the first by echelon But at present we are .

speaking o f movements m a de at the instant of fig h t ‘

ing It is prudent then to m ak e no chang e in the

.
, ,

primitive order of battle , an d to leave the lin es su p

porting each other .

The reserves alone are disposable for use every

where The reserves must n ow be thrown against
.

the wing o f the en emy In the mean time what are.

,

the other troops to do ? They Should e ffect a change

o f front not in a m eth odical manner as upon a dri l l
, ,

ground where each corps mus t prese r ve its di stan ce

,

and ali g nmen ts with the utmost rigor but each will ,

move by the shortest path to the point where it m ay

s oon est en ter e ffectively i n t o action To explain by .

an example : take the l i ne M figure 2 5 surprised on , ,

its le ft flank by the a rmy N which prepares to attack , .

A s soon as the en emy is discovered the line M which , ,

is supposed to be composed o f four brigades is broken ,

t o the le ft by di vision s and form e d in close column in

each brig ade While these preparatory movements
.

are going on the reserve R moves to the position S

, ,

Whe re it deploys so as t o threaten the right fla nk of

2 40 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

the enemy The fourth brigade will b e deployed

.

upon its left division and the following brigade upon

its right division in such a way that when the deploy
ment is ended which will require b u t a short tim e
, ,

these two brigades wi ll be in echelon in front o f th e

l ine of the enemy and having a connection wi th the
,

reserve The second brigade moves off di agonally

.

and takes position in echelon to the right of the fourth .

The first brigade remains in column behind the cen

tre to act as a reserve In this way there is very
, .

rapidly brought into line in the n ew direction a force

equal to that in the form er lin e if we suppose the
,

reserve to have been on e fifth of the whole

-
.

If the army, N , extended towards its right still

 F V
DE E N S I E B TT E S A L . 2 41

m ore than shown in the figure the reserve Sh ou l d n o t ,

attemp t t o take N in flank as this would separate it ,

t o o far fro m the third brigade It would the n be .

proper for the reserve simply to d eploy in front o f N .

b ut the secon d brigade would threaten the left fl ank

o f th e en emy a n d the general res ult would b e the
,

s ame in character .

F or the sake o f simplicity we have suppose d bu t ,

o n e lin e
. If there were t wo th e second would follo w ,

the movements o f the first The man oe uvres we have .

j ust indicated are equally applicable t o the ca s e of a

column suddenly arrested while o n the m arch by an, ,

enemy in position They are equally suitable for

.

weak corps and for l arge armies Thus a battalion .

,

would first deploy two companies to receive the firs t

shock o f t h e enemy while t h e remaining compani e s
,

would be man oeuvred into position A n inversion .

m ay be necessary and hence the propriety o f p r ac ti s

,

m g Inversions at drill .

R etr eat — Whate ver precautions m ay h ave b een

taken o r whatever courage displayed it often becom es
, ,

n ecessary to yield to mere numbers o r to the caprices ,

o f fortun e .Happy then is the general who succeeds

, ,
,

a fter a battle long an d severely contested in with ,

drawing h is army fro m the field in comparatively

good order .

The movement to the rear is begun unnoticed in a ,

measure the troop s insensibly falling back as the

,

enemy gain s ground o n account o f his superiority

, ,

11
2 42 P RIN C I P E S L OF S TR ATE GY .

which becomes more and more evident Then comes .

the moment when longer resistance appears useless ,

and the general gives orders for the retreat .

Taking for granted that the army is drawn up in two

l ines the retreat is begun by the first which retires
, ,

checkerwise ; that is to say the even n umbered batta ,

-

lions fall back to the rear some sixty or a h u ndred

paces while the o dd numbered b attalions hold their
,
-

ground When the former have halted and take n

.

position and are ready to receive the enemy t he others

, ,

retire in the same way a n d so on ,

.

In the mean time the reserve infantry and artillery

, , ,

o r part of the reserve goes to the rear to occupy the

, ,

defil e s the army has to pass in retreat The second .

line regulates its movements by t h ose of the first ,

sometimes hastening them in order to gain som e ,

advantageous position where it m ay check the enemy

temporarily If the first line has su ffered greatly
.
,

the second should replace it a p assage o f lines being ,

executed It is better for the secon d line to pass

.

offensively thr ough the interval s o f the first th an for ,

the first to fall b a ck through thos e o f the second .

Each battalio n being formed i n a close col u mn i s

, ,

moved a few paces to the fr ont of the second lin e and ,

rapidly deployed o r b etter still charges wi th the

, , ,

b ayonet The en emy i s thus in a m easure thrown

.
, ,

upon the defensive an d becomes much more circum

,

spect in his onward movemen t The second method .

is dangerous because the first line Comi ng back in a

, ,
 F
DE E N SI E V A L ES
B TT . 2 43

state of some co n fusion upon the second may produce ,

disorder in t he ranks of the latter The moral effect .

u po n the tro o ps of bo t h lines is also bad .

In general t roops wh o are falling b a ck should do

,

so slowly and calmly keeping thei r ranks well closed

,

and in good order They should frequently halt and

.

t urn to delive r their fire upo n t he enemy if he p resses

too closely They m ay thus succee d without ve ry
.
,

great di s order i n reaching some a dv a n t a g e o rfs posi

,

tion o r being covered by th e S had es o f night

,
.

C avalry alone m ay retire ra p idly it i s even its du ty

to do s o beca u se in its rapidity o f mo v e ln e n t con sists
,

i ts safety It should ho weve r retu rn as rapidly to

.
, ,

the charge when rallied i n order to disengage the

, ,

infantry .

When a regiment or a battalion is entirely broken ,

an d the men absol ut ely r u nning the co m m ande r ,

should seize a flag and plant it in S ome conspi c uou s

place at the same time ca using the drum me rs t o beat
,
.

The men ashamed to abandon the flag they have

,

vowed to defend with life even will g ra du a ly rally , ,

and if the o fficers of all grades are active i n reforming

the ranks order may be restored and confidence r e
,

gain ed Upon such occasions the value o f good

.
,

o fficers is displayed as well as the excellent effect o f

,

the example o f old soldiers .

While the two lines are retiring the reserve does

n o t re main inactive but the infantry will occupy
,

oi n ts where a fir m stand may be made or will for m

p ,
2 44 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

into squares between which the army m ay fall back

,
.

Thus at Marengo the C onsular G uard formed th at

, ,

famous square against which all the c harges of th e

A us t rian cavalry failed and which gained from the
,

army the name o f the g r an i te s q u a r e A t the same .

time the cavalry S hould make e v ery e ffort to protect

,

the retreat by d aring and repeated charges It

,
.

should never stop to count the numbe rs of the enemy ,

b u t should rush upon him wh erever he may be and

,

however strong in order to oblige h i m to d ep l oy and

, ,

thus delay his movemen t fo r ward It is absol u tely .

essential to Safety to gain time an d nothing is more,

likely to effect this than dashing furious att acks o f ,

caval ry no matter what may be th e result to itself Th e

, .

artillery should cross its fire upon all p o m t s to be

passed over by the en emy i n pursuit sel ecti n g favor ,

able positions for this purpose It mu st run some .

risks even to the loss of a fe v ie c e s as witho u t it s

, ,

effective support the retreat of the infantry under th e

close murderous fire of the enemy m ust b eco m e a rout .

In the mean time the baggage train S hould mo ve o ff

,

rapidly under the escort of some troops It has been

, .

kept at a considerable distance during the b attle an d ,

is set in motion as soon as the order is give n to re t reat .

Its movement should be hastened as much as possible ,

in order to clear th e way for the army .

Night at last comes on The enemy tired of

.
,

fighting and exhausted by his losses is forced to halt ,

.

This is th e time for rallying and reorgani z ing t h e

 F
DE EN SIVE BA TT E S .L 245

retreating army and giving the m e n some food ; b ut

,

sleep is o u t of the ques t io n as this o p portuni t y must

,

be used fo r getti ng the start o f t he enemy A strong .

rear guard commanded by a bold and experienced

-
,

office r remains i n position t o cover th e retreat Thi s

,
.

rear guard when forced t o retire will do so S lowly

-
, , ,

and fo r c m g the enemy t o be cautious by disputing ,

t h e ground foot by foot .

The worst con se quen ce o f a defeat is n ot the number

o f men killed and canno n captured but the de m o r a l i
, ,

z a t io n o f th e troops Every m ean s sh ould t herefore

.
, ,

be used to remove their sad depression o f spirits The .

o fficers should wear cheerful countenances and speak

en couraging words The command er in chief far
.
- -
,

from appearing disheartened Should seem entirely ,

calm and collected ; S hould visit the di fferent bivouacs ,

and gi ve h is orders as if n o reverse had occurred He .

will thus impart to the men confidence in his firmness

and courage The troops will recover their S pirits
.
,

and be ready to meet the en emy agai n The victor .

o f the preceding day may find to his cost that he

, ,

did not know how to u se his success if h e has per ,

m i tte d his army to sleep and his ad versary to recover

from his defeat He will verify again th e ad a ge th at
.
,

“
in war nothing is don e so long as there remains any
”
thing to do .

F rederick t h e G reat recommended that a beate n

army should not retreat far but h alt a t the first favor
,

able position t o restore spirit and order to the ranks .

2 46 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

The Dukes of Weimar and Rohan th e two grea test ,

generals of their day aft er losing the b attle of Rhi n

,
*

feld halted about fift een miles from the field and there
, ,

rallied the remains of their army By a night m arch .

,

they presented themselves suddenly before the camp

of the Bavarians who did not expect such an attack
, ,

a n d were keeping a very poor lookout They were .

surprised and routed completely losing all their ,

cannon and baggage Here the Bavarian s were

.

accessory to their o w n r u in by sleeping on th e field

o f battle and giving themselves up to idle j oy instead ,
,

o f vigorously pursuing their beate n en emy The rul e .

laid down by F rederick which h e put i n practice

,

aft er t he battle of Hohenkirch accords with what has ,

just been stated but it is not al w ays practicable for a

defeated g enera l to hal t his ar m y when and where h e
pleases The more faithfully the army has performed
.

i t s duty on the b attle fi el d the more d ifficult it is for

—
,
"
h i m to do s ci ; for the greater the obstin acy it has dis
played and the more determined the resistance the
, ,

less the probabili ty of its withdraw ing i n order It .

then beco mes necessary to retreat to a considerable

dis t ance to collect its scattered frag me n ts an d to
,

receive r e enforce ments

-
.

We ofte n see an ar my with one wing defeated while ,

the other stil l holds its g round and serves as a rally

ing point for the scatte r ed ba t talion s of t h e former ,

the whole then moving impetuously upon the ene my .

S uch co n d u c t is often followed by complete su ccess .

 DE F E NSIVE BATT E SL .
2 47

If instead o f that the gen eral orders a retreat h e may

, , ,

succeed in retiri ng without serious losses but h e is ,

not the less certainly beaten Indeed victory is a

.
,

prize su fficiently great to b e renounced only after

strenuous e fforts to secure it The first o f duties is to
.

fight well and then to do whatever else is possible

,
.

A victory which is th e result o f a b attle faithfully

fought may be equivalent to the destr u ction o f the
,

oppos ing army an d the conclusion o f the war O n .

the contrary ev en in de feat under such circumstances

, , ,

honor is sa fe and the Vigor displ ayed in th e fight

,

an d the losses incurred m ay diss uade even a successful

e nemy from eng aging in si m ilar contests .
 C H AP TE R V .

V A N D M O UN TA INS — C OV E RIN G A
DEF E NC E O F RI E RS

S IE GE .

A r t . I .— D e f e n ce o f R iv e r s.

D i sp os i ti on of th e To rder to defen d a
p oo
p s — In
ri ver the army should be divided into several corps
,

of observation placed in front of the points m ost threat

,

ened by the enem y and not so near the banks as t o be

,

exposed to artillery fire Each corps remains c o n c e n

.

t r at e d only sending o u t sm all detachments to ob serve

,

what is going on upon the Opposite bank C ommuni .

cation between th e corps is constantly kept u p by

patrols The detachments Should be as few as can per
.

form the duty thoroughly They Should be posted i n .

clumps of trees and behind rising ground ; in fact ,

wherever they can best observe the opposite bank

wi thout being seen themselves The distance between .

the corps of observation will depend upon the breadt h

o f the river and the time required for constructing

bridges across it The corps S hould be so near together

.
,

th at either may receive the support of those next i t i n

t ime t o prevent the enemy fro m passin
g t he r i ver In

its vici n ity If two or t hree hours are req uired for
.
 F
DE EN C E O F R I E RS .V 2 49

building th e bridges the c orps m ay be from six to ten

,

miles a part Three corps o f observation would thus

.

watch twenty o r t wenty fi v e m iles of th e river as th e

-

enemy could not at t empt a passage above or b elow all

th ree o r between any two o f the corps without resist
, ,

ance first fro m one an d soon fro m two or three

, ,
.

A strong reserve o r principal corps should be kept

to the rear at a distance depending upon the fron t
,

occupied by the corps of observation and such that it ,

can arrive at th e point where the attempt is made t o

cross be fore the enemy can carry o u t his obj ect If
, .

th e pa rt o f the river to be w atched is very lo ng two ,

res erv e s S hould be formed instead o f one .

To enable the co rps to move readily fro m point to

point there Should b e a good r e a d parallel to the
,

river an d cross roads connecting it wi th the positio n

,
-

o f the rese rve When the parallel road is very near

.

the ri ver and u n der fi re from th e opposite bank it

, ,

lose s its advantages and a n ew on e must be cut far

, ,

ther to the rear .

Besides the general dispos itions already mentioned ,

there are many details to be attended to There .

S hould be a good system o f signals both fo r night and ,

d ay ; boats should be brought to the bank which i s

held by the army and those that cannot be brough t
,

over S hould be sunk ; the largest o f them should be

carried up stream to be filled with stones and floated
,

down to break the bridges of the enemy If t he rive r .

is fordable in some places pits a n d trenches S hould b e

,
*
11
2 50 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

du g in the bottom if possible ; if not the en d of th e

, ,

fo r d should be obstructed by an aba t is or a field for ,

t ifi c a t io n of suitable cha r acter If between two fo r ds .

or two points favo r able for passing th e r iver a n arr o w ,

defile exists i t should be fortified and held i n order

, ,

to control the road and prevent the bodies of th e ,

enemy which may have passed fro m effecting a junc ,

t ion without being attacked When the b r idges are .

of suc h a character as to be defended with di ffi culty ,

they S hould be cut notwithsta n ding t h e opposition of

,

the inhabitants of the country In such cases private .

,

interests must yield to the general welfare A s far as .

'

possible however such de m olitions should b e av oided

, ,
.

’
If a partial destruction will stop the enemy s progress ,

more tha n that is unj ustifiable .

B r i d g e fi-
en ds — If the b
. ridge is to b e preserved it .
,

should b e covered by strong field fortifications while ,

all proper precautio n s are taken upon th e bridge

itself an d behind it A bridge thus held g ives to the
,
.

possessors the power of passing the river whenever it ,

is desirable The fortifications erected to control a

.

bridge constitute what is called a br i dg e h ea d an d -

should be arranged to su it the circumstances of the

case in accordance with the principles laid down in
,

trea t ises o n the subj ect o f F ield For tifi ca tio n s .

The river instead o f crossing the line of operations

,

o f the enemy may be parallel to it In this case a

, .
,

bridge that is to be held must b e defended by fo r tifi

cations on both sides as it is impossible to say on ,
 DE F EN C E OF RI E R SV . 251

which S ide the attack may be m ade There is thus .

formed a double bridge head S u c h a work gives -

.

great advant ages to the party o n the de fe n s i ve i f i t ,

~

man oe u vres rapidly for there is always a s afe passage

,

from o n e bank to the other and the bridge head may ,

-

b e occupied by only a su fficient garrison to hold it

against the enemy ; this g a rrison may be relieved or
r e enforc e d at pleasure so as to make a very e fli c ie n t
-
,

defence The enemy cannot safely p ass by leaving

.
,

s u ch a point upon h is line o f Opera t ions He must .

therefore a t tack the fortifications and m ay thu s be ,

forced to a considerable loss o f time men and mate , ,

rial If he divides h is forces to surround t h e work

.
,

and attack both Sides at once the army o n the de fe n ,

S ive may concent r ate in for c e against a fraction of the

e n e my and destroy it In order to Ope rate success

.

fully there fore ag a inst s u ch a work the en e my m u st

, , ,

have a very great su p eriority of force .

The A rchduke C harles remark s There is no !

bett er de fensive position than o n e which keeps the

e n e my c onsta n tly apprehensive o f b ei n g attacked .

A n army behind a river wit h strong bridge heads is

,
-
,

in prec ise ly such a position A l most a ny other may

.

b e tur n ed b u t a bridge head wel l b uilt secure from

,
-

, ,

capture by assault and perfectly cove ring a passage

,

o f the river n eed never s u ffer fro m a n insu f

,
fi ciency of
numbers in the garrison or fro m want of p rovision s ,

an d munitions o f war The enemy is forced t o.

watch carefully such a communication , by which

252 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

sup erior forces may be at any moment thrown upon

”
hi m .

When a S imply passi ve defence of a river can alon e

b e made which i s an unfortunate state o f affairs
, ,

special attention must be give n to thos e points that

o ffer the enemy advantages for b uilding b ridges .

S u ch are those where t he river makes an elbo w con ve x

t owards the enemy as batteries may be construc t ed t o
,

cross the ir fire in front of the ground where his lead

ing troops would be landed O ther favorab le points .

for h i m are those where the river is divided into seve

ral arms by islands that may conceal the prepara tions
,

made for passing also the mo u ths o f tributary streams ,

by means of which the enemy m ay bring up fro m th e

i nterior boats and other materials for brid ges Bat .

t e ri es should be constr u cted at such places so as to ,

sweep with their fire the opposite banks and th e ,

ground adj acent When there is no time to finish in

.

a complete manner such works o f fortification as may

be suitable S imple trenches and r ifl e pits should be
,
-

rapidly built so as to envelope the S pace upon which

,

the enemy must pl ace the foremost o f hi s troops an d ,

e xpose the m to a close converging fire Upon one .

occasion E ugene had gained a march upon V e n dcm e ,

and was attempting to throw a bridge across the A dda

at a very favorable spot V end ome c am e up as soon
.

as he could and arrived before the bridge was com

,

p l e te d He tried to arrest the work of the pontoniers

.
,

but in vain The ground was so well swept by the

.
 F
D E EN C E OF RI E RS . V 2 53

artillery of Eugene that he could not get near enough

,

t o inj u r e t he workmen S till t he passage o f th e ri v er

.
,

m ust be p re vented V end ome put his army to work

.

u p o n a trench and parape t surrounding the groun d ,

which t he Imperialists mu s t occupy after crossing .

They were fini shed nearly as soon as the bridges ;

Eugen e deemed the passage o f the rive r i mpracticable ,

and ordered a retreat .

When th e att a cking party is thus caught in the act

o f constructi n g his bridges he is take n at great dis a d
,

v ant age because the main body of his army is n ot

,

a cross while the few troops who h ave passed i n boa t s

,

are n o t i n sufficient numbers to force their way for

ward an d m ake roo m for the a rmy to debouch fro m
,

the bridges and deploy in line o f battle even if it be ,

practicable for it to do so under the converging fire

o f the artillery and infantry o f the defenders .

The enemy is also in a perilous condition if a por ,

tion o f his forces have crossed and t h e defen ders suc ,

c e ed i n breaking the bridges and t hus cutting his ,

army in t wo E very e ffort should therefore be mad e

.

to do this If large boats filled with stones an d

.
, ,

h eavy rafts constructed o f t ru nks o f trees b e sen t

, ,

down the stream t here is great probability if the cur

, ,

rent is rapid that so m e o r all o f them will strik e th e

, , ,

bridges and b reak t hem In 1 809 the A ustrians suc .

,

c e e de d in cu tt ing the F ren ch army in two by throw ,

ing into the s tream several wooden mills whi ch were

upon the banks o f the D anube The corps which had .
254 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

passed the river and taken possession o f Gros A spern

,
-

and Essling on the left bank were surrounded by the ,

whole army o f the A rchduke C harles and obliged , ,

after a heroic b u t ine ffectual resistance to retire to ,

the large island of L o b au that here divid es the Dan ube

,

into two channels After this check two months

.
,

were consumed by th e French in immense an d per

severing labor in building several strong bridges and
, ,

preventing them from rup t ure by stockades above

t hem .

S econ da r y M ea n s — It is very important for an army

engaged in defending a river not to b e decei ved by
false demon strations and to have timely warn i ng o f a
,

real attempt at a passage O fficers o f experi ence .

should b e sent to the posts o f obs ervation who are ,

n o t easily deceived by feints S ignals mu st be agreed

.

upon by which timely notice may b e given o f s a spi

,

cions movements of the enemy .

There is moreover a military law a l a w which

, , ,

can never be violated without dishon or that requires ,

a commander to go i n the direction o f a cann onade

when it is so near and so prolonged that there can b e
n o reasonable doubt in his m ind of a serious engage

ment being in progress No excuse can j u stify h im

.
,

for re maining unmoved in his position when the thu n

der of the cannon tells him that a b attle is going o n
at no great dis t ance He cannot even plead the orders
.

o f a senior for contrary orders may have been sent

,

but intercepted or their bearers may have b e en killed

, .
 DE FE N C E OF V
RI E RS . 255

m
He ust decide as to the urgency o f the case and ,

take the responsibility of moving where honor and

danger call If the soldier and subordin ate o fficer
.

shoul d render implicit ob edience to t he orders o f t heir

su p eriors the cas e is different with a chief o f lon g ex
,

e r ie n c e in war ; h e mus t necessarily exercise a cer

p
t ain d egree of discretion in the performance of his
du ty e specially whe n an u n foreseen case arises Unity
,
.

o f e ffo r t towards a co m mon end is a fundamental

princi p le in the operations o f war and this requires ,

m ovemen t towards the sound o f the can non when ,

there is doub t i n the mind of the co mma nder .

M ov eme n ts of Tr oop s A S soon as the alar m is

.
-

given t he posts of o b servation neares t the point o f

,

passage haste n up and charge the troops al ready over ,

wha t e v er may b e their numbers to drive the m into ,

the river if possible before others can c ro s s to their

, ,

assis t ance o r at leas t hold them in check until r e—e n

,

forcements arrive from t he rea r If the en emy com .

m its t he fault o f commencing the construction of his

bri dges bef ore he has possession o f bo t h b ank s the ,

sharpshoote rs m ay draw nea r an d pick o ff th e p e n

t o n ie rs with ease .

The artillery and cavalry ought to be th e first to

arrive to the suppor t o f the advanced posts If the .

ground favors the cavalry charges vigorously while

, ,

the artillery takes position to reply to that of the

enemy o r to crush the troo ps already over The
,
.

horse art illery may be ve ry useful o n such occasions ,

2 56 P RIN C IP E S L OF S TR ATE GY .

fro m the rapidity with which it may be brought upon

t he ground and placed in position Th e corps o f o b .

servation on the right and left are put m motion i m

, ,

media t ely and l ose no time in coming up an d taking

,

pa r t in the action which becomes continually warmer

,
.

The position of the enemy becomes more critical as ,

he c a n scarcely use his artillery for fear of firing upon

his own troops He will be unable t o hold his groun d
.
,

pressed and surrounded as he is if he has n o t suc ,

‘

c e e de d in completing his bridges by the tim e the re

serve comes u p The troops that h ave crossed mu st

.

lay down their arms .

It often happens that the defenders are taken by

surprise notwithstanding all their precautions b e
, ,

cause the enemy may decei v e the m i n a thousan d

ways The troops will the n reach th e groun d t oo
.

l a t e or coming up in successive portions may b e de

, , ,

s t royed The p assage is forced and as the assailant

.
, ,

is usuall y the stronger in such cases t he other ar my ,

must fall back to some other position in rear .

Whatever may b e the danger o f the passage of t h e

river by th e enemy there is n o reason for o ccupyin g
,

a great extent of the river to prevent it and th us ,

S preading out the troops in a long w e ak l in e Th e '

enemy must do o n e of two things He must ei t her .

kee p his forces united o r divide them If he coneen , .

tra t es the army o n the defen sive S hould pursue the

,

same course remaining opposite to h i m a n d gainin g

, ,

all possible i n for mation of his movements It will b e .

 F
DE E N C E OF RI E R SV . 257

di fficult fo r the enemy in such a case to e ffect a pas

, ,

sage by surprise unl es s t h e locality is very favorable

,

to him and information o f his movemen ts cannot

,

b e obtained either t h r o u g h s p ie s or the inhabitants

'

o f the country If h e occupies a great exten t o f

.

coun t ry by separate corps he n eed not b e feared ,

a t any point The army o n the defen sive shoul d

.

b e kept together opposite the centre of his lin e

thrown upon any co rps that might succeed in crossing ,

and crush it before th e arrival o f other detachments ,

which in the case su p posed are qui t e distant By

, , .

concentration is n o t m eant crowding the whole army

,

i n a singl e ca mp It w oul d then be imp ossible to

.

watch the banks o f the stream The troops are s u ffi .

c ie n tl y concentrat ed when the corps are near en ough

to afford mutual suppor t ; and it is quite certain that

when t his is the cas e the enemy cann ot e ffect a pas
,

sage between t w o of the corps before they c a n resist

h i m with e ffect The word con cen tr a ti on m ust there
.
,

fore b e not understood in an absolute sense b u t r e

, ,

ce i v e a liberal interpretation as ind e ed is th e case , , ,

wit h all military term s .

A very effectual method o f disconcerting the en emy ,

and neutralizing the moral e ffect o f the successful

passage o f a river by him is to cro s s at som e other
,

point and begi n Offensive operations upon his terri

-

tory S uch a determination upon the part o f a ge n eral

.

would show him to be a m an o f S pirit The imagi .

n ation o f the troops is excited their hopes aroused , ,

25 8 P R IN C IP L E S OF STRA TE GY .

and their courage renewed while at the sam e time , , ,

the ene my is astonished and demoralized at the very

natural supposition that th e opposing army is i n
greater force and better supplied than was believed .

The enemy will speedily repass the r i ver to protect ,

his own territory In 1 6 74 M o n t e c u eu l i crossed the

.
,

Rhine Turenne at once crossed in the other dirce

.

tion instead o f seeking to defend the frontie rs of

,

F rance by the usual means The init iative that Mon .

t ec u e u li had so skilfu lly taken was o f n o avail as h e ,

was obliged by the still more skilful m anoeuvre o f

,

T urenne to return to the right b ank of the river

,
.

Sometimes the defenders withdraw designedly fro m

the river in order to entice the enemy across a n d
, ,

then return upon him before his whole army i s o ver

and in position The general who retir es in this way
.

is only justified in so doing by th e character of the

ground which permits him upon his return to have
, , ,

a good position while the enemy is crowde d and

,

unable to deploy his forces Unless these are the cir.

c u m s t a n c es of the case he runs th e risk o f a de feat

,

if the enemy succeeds in throwing over troops enough .

Such a mistake has b een actually made Marsh al .

C ré q u i at C on s arb r u ck su ffered the ene m y t o cross

, , ,

deferring his attack with t he expectation of en v elop

ing an d re n ting a greater number To those who .

were surprised at his course a n d expostulated wit h ,

him he replied that the greater the number who

, ,

passed , the more decisive wo uld b e their defe a t .

 D E E NC E F OF O
M UN TA IN S . 259

However so many p a ss ed that he could not resis t

,

them and the m arsha l was completely beaten and

,

covered with sha m e This mistak e made a fine gen

.

eral fo r F rance as C r é q u i was cured o f his rashn ess

, ,

but still retained ardor enough for great undertakings .

We may learn also from the life o f C ré q u I that a

, , ,

m an who is truly great and worthy to command ,

others knows how to profit even by his o w n faults

, .

A rt . l L— D e fe n ce o f M o u n ta i n s .

Such a country is best defen ded by rapid m a n oeu

v r in and energetic attacks upon the e n e my His
g .

plan s are thus thwar t ed and he i s obliged to think ,

a bout his own safety He h as n o t the sa m e freedom

.

o f movement as the defenders because h e i s obliged ,

to protec t and k eep open hi s line o f operation s whilst ,

they are at home an d find a line o f retreat in any di

rection T h e inhabitan ts of the coun try are also gen
.

e r a lly ready to a id the defenders a n d fa ll upon the ,

a s sailants at all favorable Opportunities They will at .

least render important services by watching the m o ve

m ents of the enemy and givin g n otice o f them S om e .

o f the m will always act as partisa ns an d do m uch ,

valu able service .

The first rule to b e observed in defending a mo u n

t a in o u s region is not t o try to close all the pas ses as ,

an a t tempt to do this would lead to inj udicious S cat

tering of the troops and a very weak front is o ffe red
,
2 60 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

to th e enemy at every point The plan of concentra

.

t ion should be followed as far as the country will

,

permit Those positions Should be strongly h eld

. ,

f rom which troops may be rapidly moved to any

point threatened by the enemy It is possible to as
'

semble several battalions only in the Vall eys ; these ,

then will usually be the places where the defence will

,

be mainly made ; but the advantages given by t h e

higher groun d in arresting the movements o f the
assailan t s must n o t be lost sight of .

In the next place there are two things to be don e

,

in a warfare of this kind to m a n oeu vre oj en si vely in

'

order to dislodge the enemy tak e his columns i n

,

flank sepa r ate his detached corps seiz e his convoys

, , ,

& c ; and to fig fit defen s i vely tha t is to say to take

.
, ,

posi t ion in the most advantageou s way possible when

ever it is n ecessary to engage seriously A lthough .

these two precepts may see m contradictory a skilfu l ,

o fficer will know how to apply them together ; he

manoeuvres to get upon the flank o r rear of the en emy ,

and having succeeded in d o ing so he takes a position, ,

or at any rate does not attack unless he has the de

‘

, ,

cided advantage over the enemy The latter being .

,

unable to move far ther without danger of having his

line of retreat cut is obliged to turn upon the corps
,

whi ch is in position and a t tack it Unti l that is done

.
,

h e is in constant danger o f being separated fro m his

r e enforcements and means of subsiste n ce
-
He must .
,

therefore be the cost what i t m ay march upo n this

, ,
 F
D E E NC E OF M UNT O A IN S . 2 61

position and attack it before advancing to o t her o p e

rations To oblige him to do this was the obj ect of
.

the man oeuvre ; if his attack succeeds he will at any ,

rate su ffer greatly ; an d if he fails hi s position is ,

critical .

A r tifie ia l Obs ta c k s —Besides m anoeuvres o f the

'

troops whose impo rtan ce is undoubt ed there are other

, ,

m eans not to b e n eglected in a good defensive sys

,

tem ; t hese art provides for the purpose o f delaying

,

o r completely arresting the movements o f the enemy

in certai n l o caliti es and for st rengthening positions for

,

engagements Thus preparations should be m ad e i n

.
,

ad vance fo r obstr u cting ro a ds Mines will be pl aced .

i n the piers o f stone bridg es and combustible in a te ,

rial s got i n readiness for b urnin g those of wood .

P a rts o f the road s that are n arro w and canno t b e

turned will b e blown o u t with powder and temporary ,

bri dges m ade which can be readily destroyed A t

,
.

other places m in es will be prepared to thro w dow n

m asse s o f ro ck in the roads ei t her i n antici p a tio n of
,

th e approach o f the enemy or when he is passing and ,

thus be the occasion o f m uch dam age to h i m A ba .

tis may be formed across n arrow roads or barricades ,

construc ted o f earth ti m ber o r rocks These meas

, ,
.

u res suppos e som e has te in their execution ; but when ,

time is abundant th e better plan is to build bloc k

,

houses o r larger earthen works in those parts of the

valleys which are commanding fro m their position ,

and yet so contracted as not to require works o f great

262 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

extent A strong redoubt well fraised and having a

. ,

considerabl e command is a di ffic u lt obstacle for a n

,

enemy to pass in such a locality as is here spoke n of .

P os iti on s — G ood posi t ions wel l de fended will , ,

always give the ene my m uch tro uble in mo u ntainou s

warfare He can take th em by assault only at great
.
,

loss to him self and much time will be consum ed if

,

he attempts to turn them .

P ositions will be fou n d u p on the high ground or i n

the valleys Th e first although ordinarily strong
.
,

against attack in front a re ofte n easily turned It is

,
.
,

moreover generally d iffic ul t to furn ish food a nd w ate r

,

to the troops holding the m and they S ho u ld there , ,

fore be held by only su fficie n t forces to repulse th e

,

enemy with loss if he at t acks in front S mall b o d .

i e s will retire wi t h facility an d witho u t fear of being

overtaken ; they will take every ad v antage of the
g round to check the enemy and will give th e msel ves ,

up more to figh t ing tha n to gettin g out of the way .

F inally if a small body is u n fort u nately capt u red

, ,

the moral e ffect is not near so great as would be pro

du c e d by the loss of a large detachment .

Th e detach m ents that defe n d th e heights usuall y ,

b elong to more nu m erous corps encamped i n the

lowe r ground Th e troops should not b e scattered
.

aro u nd holding every little b y path as this will pre

,
-

vent a s t rong resistance being mad e at any point .

The detach m ents wil l be grouped near the m ain pass ,

which they S ho uld hold long e noug h to give time

 F
DE E N C E OF O
M UN TA IN S . 263

to the troops below to come to their support By .

placing reserves i n rear and o n the flanks at poin ts ,

wh ere th e lateral roads com e in they will guard ,

a ain st being cut o ff The n atives may be very

g .

u seful in giving warning by S ign als o f the approach

o f the enemy and a few o f them with arms in their
, ,

hands will guard t he b y paths as well as the best

,
-

soldiers and with more confidence o n account o f

, ,

their being perfec t ly acquainted with th e country ,

and cer t ain o f their ability to escape at the l a st mo

ment .

The bes t pos i t ions are usually i n the valleys b e ,

ca u se they are ge nerally better supporte d being ocen ,

pied in force and wi t h the high ground o n the flanks

,

guarded The enemy canno t turn them so easily as

.

those upon t he hills ; if he wi shes to do so h e is ,

obliged to make wide détours through o t her val leys .

P ositions properly so called are comparatively few

, ,
.

They are either ac ross o r along a valley .

When the defence is made while ascending a val

ley the enemy attacking from below the ground ,
, ,

without presen t i n g what are called positions is never ,

th e l e ss favorable almost e verywhere But when the .

top of the ascent is p ass ed an d the defenders are de,

scending while the enemy i s higher he has the deci ,

ded ad vantage It is only at considerable intervals

.

that such elevations in th e valley occur as to form

defensible position s ; but these are generally very good ,

b ecause con tracted in extent and hav ing the flanks ,

2 64 P RINC IP L E S OF STR A TE GY .

u pon the precipitous S ides of the mountains These .

posi tions oft en have the disadvantage o f being cut

in two by t he stream which flows at the foot o f the
valley and if it is not fordable the wings cannot
, , ,

support each other Thus the e n emy may attack one

.

wing with supe r ior n u mbers and when it is driven , ,

back threaten the o ther in flank an d oblige it to re

,

tire also S uch positions therefore to be available to

.
, ,

the defence should o ffer free com munication s b etween

,

the differe nt corps o f the ar my while those of th e ,

enemy are difli c ult or impossible With this Vi ew the .

,

bridges above t he position should b e cut while those ,

upon it and below should be re t ain ed a n d even n ew

ones constr u cted S uch is the position across a valley
. .

A position is taken up along a valley when it is ,

desired to arrest the progress o f an enemy wishing to

e m e r ge fro m a cross valley Th e ground wil l u sually
.

rise like an amphi theatre in front o f the mouth of the

~

transversal valley so that the heads o f the column s

,

o f the enemy in debouching will be exposed to a cross

, ,

and e n fil a din g fire an d it wil l b e extremely di ffi cult

,

for h im under these disad vantages to ad v ance to th e '

attack Bu t in order that the position be thus favor

.
,

able to the defence and that the general may expect

,

to force the assailant to retire the valley must be so ,

narrow as to enable troops on the opposite slope to

reach with their fire the enemy emergi ng from the
transversal valley If the main valley is to o wide
.

for this plan to b e pursued the army on the defensi ve

,
 F
DE E N C E OF O
M U NT A IN S . 265

m ust be o n the S ide next the secondary valley and ,

must act o ffensively en veloping the enemy as he

,

debouches Th ere will n ot be the same advantage o r

.

position as before b ut th e defenders are enabled t

,
o

bring fresh masses o f tro ops a g ainst th ose o f th e

enemy w h o are necessarily m uch strung o u t and
, ,

perhaps fatigued by painful m arching When an .

att ac k is thus made upon an enemy seeking to debouch

from a se condary in t o the m ain valley the artillery ,

ought to be placed in front o f the infantry thi s is i n

v iolation o f the ordinary rule but it i s per missible ,
,

becaus e the enemy i n such a case will usually hav e

, ,

little o r n o artillery in action ; and it is n ecessary b e ,

cau s e the S pace required for the ordinary disposition s

is wantin g and the artillery must be in front to attain
,

the enemy at the greatest possible distance .

In tren dzm en ts .There are some examples o f valleys

-

defended by intrenched lines Th e se are undoubtedly

.
, ,

good when the valley is narrow and the mountains o n,

the flanks very steep and only turned with great diffi
culty ; when the intrenchments have m asonry revet
ments and the ground o n which they are built h as such
,

a comm and o ver the valley that the artillery can sweep
it to a great distance These condition s are not so
.

often sat isfied as is supposed and hence the proper

,

use o f this kind o f defences i s n ot frequent Refer .

ence is n ot now intended to small redoubts for detached

posts nor to the larger earth works often advantage
,

o us l
y used in mo u ntain warfare b u t to those extensi ve
,

12
266 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

li nes intended to close up an entire v alley such l ines ,

to have any real value must fulfil the condition s laid

,

down above .

M ovemen ts of Tm op s When all hope of a su ccess

—

ful defence o f a valley is lost the commander m ay ,

attempt an Offensive movem ent t hrough a lateral

valley ra ther than retire immediately into the interior
,
.

Nothing can b e more honorable and brilliant tha n

such an effort an d it is often cro w ned with the success
,

F ortune loves to bestow Upo n daring actions A timid .

chief who thinks only of defending positions and wh o

, ,

falls back constantly as the enemy adva n ces deser v es ,

and receives n one of her favors In warfare in a .

mountainous country so m e risk must be run i n

making eccentric movements upon the flanks and rear
of the enemy because the character o f the topography
,

favors ; t he body of troops m aking the movement is

not likel y to be enve loped even when very i nferior i n
,

numbers because the enemy usually S pread out in

, ,

the valleys o ver a great length can with difli c u l ty ,

assemble his troops and even when that is practicable

, , ,

he requires some time to re ach the high ground an d

rid himself o f the restraint imposed upon his actions
by want of space A small body well posted wil l
.
, ,

perhaps fight al l day before the e n emy can reach its

flanks so di fficult will he find it to make combined
,

move m ents when attacked thus un expectedly Th e .

paucity of communications i s unfavorable t o the

prompt transmi s sion of his orders and w hen at last , , ,
 F
DE E NC E OF M O UNT A IN S . 267

they reach their d estination the time for their e x e c u

,

tion m ay have p a sed The attacking party has

s .
,

therefore m any chances of gaining some sign al success

, ,

an d the fa m e o f it increasing as it goes will m ak e

, ,

t he enemy uneasy and encourage the defenders The .

worst thing that can h appen in such a case is to be

obliged to fall back after a n unsuccessfu l attack b u t
retreat is easy an d not very dangerous as the troops ,

that re t ire are get t ing constantly neare r their supports ,

while the enemy is leaving his behi n d H ere is .

another example o f the modifying infl u ence o f lo

c a l it ie s upon general rules .

When a de fensive corps h as s u cceeded i n regaining

s ome important pass o r high ground by which m eans ,

the communications o f the enemy are interrupted it ,

may either take the o ffensive or remai n in position .

The first course will b e pursued if the ene my is n o t

in great force and the ground is favorable ; in the
other c ase t he defen ders wil l simply hold o n to what
,

h as been gained and m ake preparatio ns to receive an

,

attack by occupying woods and commanding groun d

,

with sh arpshooters by making abatis a c ross the roads

, ,

and collecting large rocks and trunks of trees to roll

do w n upo n the assailan t s Th e ene my will make a
.

powe rfu l e ffort to reopen his lin e of co m munications ;

if it is unsuccessful the assailed should not give t hem
,

selves u p to an imprudent pursuit but S hould reoccupy

,

their position and prep

,
a similar
r eception whenever he
2 68 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

A great advantage is gained in an attack in such

country by occupying a height which h ad been d eemed
i naccessible and planting a piece or two O f artillery
,

upon it even if of small calibre The enemy is dis

,
.

concerted and alarmed an d inclined to abandon hi s

,

position at once e specially if attacked in front ; Thus

, ,

at the co mbat of V al C arlos G eneral No g n es h ad a

,

piece o f artillery carried by m ain stre n gth up Very

steep slopes to the heights which co m m anded the
camp of t he Spaniards The latter were astonish ed
.
,

as they had supposed the heights inaccess ible and ,

they rapidly retired fro m their position before an

enemy greatly inferior in forces .

It has been already seen how the character o f the

ground will modify general rules S till another .

example in point may be mention ed The combined .

movement of several detach me n t s to en velop th e '

enemy in an open country is very properly con

de mn ed but among mountains such a m an oeuvre
, ,

may be safe and very successfu l The enemy i s unabl e

.

to interpose betwee n the detachments an d beat them

separately ; each Should be strong enough to d e fen d
the valley it occupies and it is then i n no danger of
,

being surrounded ; moreover all th e de t a ch m e n ts c a n

,
r

retire safely if they fail in their attempt They should .

have at least mountain artillery with th em n ot only

, , ,
'

for the e ffect to b e produced upon the enemy but to ,

m ak e signals This is often the sole mean s of communi

.

cating between the detachment s .

 D EF EN C E OF O
M UN T IN S A . 269

If a detachm ent o f the enemy is m et in o n e o f the

valleys it S hould be att a cked in fron t while infantry
, , ,

in dispersed order attempt to gain the high groun d

,

o n the flanks and rear This precaution should b e

.

taken in all movemen ts along valleys .

With the precautions that h ave been mentioned ,

boldn ess may be di splayed even to rashness and will , ,

generally lead to success The A rchd u ke C harles

.

says Nowhere are such wonders accomplished by

boldness as i n broken countri es and especially amo n g ,

high mountains where the warfare is necessarily one

o f posts the engagements are generally unexpected
, ,

and the enemy surprised by unusual daring is

, ,
”
paralyzed at the critical moment In combined .

movements rivers and lakes m ay fu rnish a very

,

excellent mean s o f communication The transports .

should be propelled by steam an d arm ed or escorted , ,

by gu nboats .

If after disputing th e u pper valleys foot by foot

, ,

by taking successi ve positions in them o r by m a n ce u ,

v r in to separate the columns of th e en emy and dive rt

g
them fro m their obj ect it becomes necessary to ,

abandon th em the lower valleys still re m ai n to b e

,

defended where larger bodies of t roops can be con

,

c e n tr a t e d and the grou nd o ffers m any positions whe re

,

a good general may use his t a ctical ability mo st

effecti vely A point will be selected for example at
.
, ,

the j u nction o f se v er al vall eys or a t the mou t h of a ,

single o n e The defensive army will have great fa

.
2 70 P R IN C IP L ES OF S TR ATE GY .

for moving rapidly frOm o n e outlet to another

c il i tie s

by the shortest lines while the enemy can only Ope ,

rate in a single valley or can not commu nicate b etwee n

,

adjacent valleys except by great labor o r w ide det o ur s p

.

The plan then wil l b e to retard him S imply i n the

narrow valleys which can be done by small detach
,

men ts while the main body at t ack s wh ere a greater

,

display of force is practicable A ft er b eating the .

enemy here a rapid movement m ay be m ade to the

,

outlet of the nearest valley where it is more than ,

probable a si milar success may be gained .

S u ppose for example that an army of

,
m en ,

is advancing by three valleys towar ds an obj ective

point M figure 2 6 which is probably the principal
, , ,

city on the outskirts o f the mountains The roads .

through these valleys con verge towards M but t he

~

two o n the right unite before reaching M The .

invading ar my in order to occupy these three valleys

, ,

is obliged to send an equal force of men into

each S uppose the defensive army to contai n abou t
.
’

m en They may or not have been also divided

.

into three equal parts but the moment has n o w ,

arri ved for a decisive concentration ; m en c a n

check i n each valley or at least delay the m ,

sufficien t ly by cutting bridges closing defil e s taking , ,

flank position s & c Th e general wil l therefore

, .
, ,

leave thre e detachments a b 0 each o f men , , , , ,

in these valleys and w i th m e n wil l take up

,

a position at n ear m where t wo of the roads m eet

, , .
2 72 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

If the valley on the right is most accessible he will ,

strike his first blo w there He will inform the com .

m ander of b of his intentions orde ring him to m ain ,

tain his position firmly while he joins a and fights a

,

battle He will have

. against of the
enemy s forces and the result cannot be very doubt
’
,

ful especially if the ground favors his operations If

,
.

the enemy retires without a battle the news must be ,

proclaimed far and wide but the general should not ,

engage in a pu rsuit by which he would b e removed

too far from m which is now the essential point ; h e
,

will on the contrary after a S how of p u rs u i t 'r e tu rn

, , ,

to his former position to man oeuvre from it as circum

,

stances may justify or require .

If the enemy fights an d is beaten the corps a ,

S hould be sent in pursuit while the main body hastens

,

to b to fight again with a similar superiority of forces

, .

Immediately aft erwards th e main b ody d moves by

the cross road m n to the third detachmen t e 6 having
-

been sent in purs u it o f the enemy in the middle val

ley or ordered to hold him i n check Upon this last
, .

occasion the victorious army will follow up its a dva n

tage pressing the third co r ps of the enemy vigorously
,
,

and gaining the flank of the other two which will ,

thu s be forced to retreat .

If o n the contrary the enemy does not ad vance

, ,

along several valle y s as has been supposed in the ex

,

ample above but by a S ingle road wi t h a View of pen e

, ,

tr a ting i to the interior of t he country his forces will

n ,
 DE FE N C E OF O
M UN T A INS . 2 73

be concentrated it is true but he will want room to

, ,

use them e fficien t ly The defende rs should n o t be

.

alarmed at thi s concentration but bravely prepare to,

meet the enemy at the mouth of th e valley S uch a .

position and order o f battle will be selec t ed t hat th e

enemy will be en veloped as he debouches and exposed ,

to powerful cross fi re s C ourage and firmness are espe

-
.

c ia ll necessary now for if the defensive army is beaten

y ,

in this position with the ground favoring it so much

,

it will not probably be succe s sful elsewhere .

C o mm u n i ca tion s — The preceding remarks demon

s trate the nec es sity o f g ood roads for the defence of a

m ountainous country as without them it would be i m

,

possi ble to move rapidly to threatened points to effect ,

the S peedy concentration of troops whe n desirable an d ,

to m ake those o ffensive returns whic h h ave so excel

lent an e ffect i n raising the m or a le o f the army and
disconce rting th e enemy If possible therefore a sys
.
, ,

tem o f roads should be prepared in ad vance for the

defence of a mountainous country A t ten o r twelve .

miles to the rear o f the prin cipal crests o f the chain ,

a road should be built parallel to it passing over the ,

S purs and crossing the perpendicular roads thus giving ,

an opportunity to mo v e freely from right to left in case

o f need . Each of the perpend i cular roads should be
closed by a strong fort well located between the crest
,

o f the chain an d the par al lel road S till far t her to .

the rear at the foot of the mountain a second parallel

, ,

road should be built , crossing the outlets of the val

*
12
2 74 P RINC IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

ley . By means of such a network o f cross and longi

t u din al roads the defence might be m ade as active
,

as possible If such an arrangement is impossible

.
,

on account o f topog raphical difficulties the S pirit ,

o f it at least may be a t tained

, ,
.

S a mm wry — From what has bee n said on th e subj ect

.

of conducting a defensive war in a mountai nous coun

try it appears it Should be characterized by peculiar
,

boldness and activity E very thing depends upon .

rapidi ty of movement and the art of acting o ffensively

,

even if upon the defensive The ene my cannot b e .

d r iven out by attacking h im in his chosen pos itions ,

but by man oeuvres to turn his fla n k and get in h is

rear ; by obliging h im to fight o ffensively and upon u n
favorable ground ; in a word the course to be pursued ,

is as before stated to m a n ceu vre of en s i vely amdfig /t t

, ,

A r t . I I I .— C o ve r ing a Sie g e .

While a portion of the army is besieging a fortified

place the remainder repe l s the enemy if he attempts
, ,

to succor it The besi eg in g a r m y performs all the a c

.

tual labor of the S iege ; the covering army is called

sometimes an a r m y of obs er va tion The former is .

established i n camps n ear the besieged place and

, ,

beyond the range o f its cannon ; the camps a r e

fortified both against sorties from within and a t
tack from a succoring a r my The detai l s of siege .

operations are described in treatises especially de voted

 C OV E R IN G A S I EG E . 2 75

to such subj ects We will simply state some r ules for

.

the government o f the covering army .

It S hould not be to o distant from the besieging army ,

in order that i n case o f need r e—enforcements may b e

, ,

drawn fro m the latter who will return to their camps

,

after the n ecessity for their assistance h as passed away .

S uc h re enforceme nts arriving at an oppo rtun e m o

-
,
'

m ent when an e ng ag me n t is i m minent or in p r o g re s s ,

will be o f great value and will have a powe rfu l effect

,

i n d efeating o r repulsing the enemy When Bon a .

parte was b esieging Mantua he did not limit himself ,

to drawing seve ral b attalions fr om the besieging ar my

when about to engage the numerous forces that s e emed
to surround him but h e brought up the whole b e
,

s i eging army a n d un iting it t o the army o f observa

, ,

tion he gained the battles o f L onato and C astiglione

,
.

But it is disad vantageou s to be obliged th u s to with

draw the whol e besieging army because the siege ,

works mu st then be suspended and the S iege artillery

abandoned ; the lat t er can be only recovered by de
feating the succoring army and capturing the besieged
place If the covering army is t o o distant the enemy
.
,

m a y by a rapid mo v ement come unexpected ly upon

, ,

th e b e sieging army which i s often indeed generally

, , ,

in n o condition to fight a battle The consequence .

o f such an occurrence would be the raising o f the

s iege and the ab andonment o f all t h e S iege ma terials .

In such a case the covering army should rapidly fol

l ow u p on the heels o f the enemy and attack hi m in
 2 76 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE G Y .

rear while the besieging army Should con centrate and

,

attempt to hold its ground by the aid of t h e fo r tifi c a

tions al ready erecte d aro u nd the camps Th ere is n o .

other way of recove ring fro m the inj u ry caused by th e

rapid march of the en emy .

The cove ring army will remain in a fo r tified posi

tion only when it is accessible in a S ingle direction .

If the enemy can pas s along some other route or c a n ,

come up by several roads they should be all watched

,

by detachments while t h e cen t ra l mass far fro m being

, ,

tied down in intrench m ents Should be as easily moved

,

as possible ; with this obj ect the c o m ma n de r ls h o u l d

send to the camps of t h e besieging ar my all u n n ec e s
sary bag gage and all the S ick an d wounded ; his artil
lery sho uld be in perfect m arching order the ro ads ,

S hould be repaired &c

,
Bu t if the main body in the
.
,

case supposed should not make u se of i ntrenchments

, ,

the detachments of observation should by al l means

do so when the ground favors ; de fil es s h ould be for ti
,

fi ed and bridge hea ds constructed to enable these

-
,

detachments to resist superior forces and for a time ,

even to check the entire succoring army .

Scouting par t ies S hould be sent o u t to a distance ,

and frequent r ee on n oi s an c es made to ascertain what

,

the enemy is doing or going to do If he is c o n c e n .

tr a tin g his forces an attack may be ex ected an d pre

p ,

a r a t io n s must be made accordingly i f he i s collect

p ;
ing wagons and provisions he is abo u t to atte mpt to
,

t hrow supplies into the besieged place the besieging

;
 C OVE RIN G A S IE GE 2 77

ar m v sh ould be info r m ed o f this design an d arrange ,

ments made to capture the train or at least prevent its ,

passing in .

If several roads lead from the en emy s position s to ’

t he city under S iege the covering army occupies the

,

central o n e defending the o t hers indirectly by the

, ,

fear occasioned the ene my of b eing tak en i n flank o r

rear should he attempt t o pass along o n e of the lateral
,

roads Here as i n e very other case of defence dis p er

.
, ,

sion of the forces that inevitably leads to partia l r e

,

verses o r to t al ruin must be carefully guarded against

, .

When the enemy has developed his designs th e ,

co vering army S houl d march to meet him an d attac k

resolutely whatever m ay be t h e relative forces ; this
,

is no time for counting numbers In the mean time, .

the noise of the cannon staff o fficers an d couriers will , ,

have given notice to the besieging army of what is

passing Its commander will call o u t his whole dis
.

posable force a fter making su fficient provision for

,

guarding the trenches an d ta k ing proper precautions ,

for repel ling sorties from the place which are more to ,

be apprehended at this than at any other time The .

troops intended to participate in the engagement

should lose no ti m e in leaving an d when they arrive
, ,

upon the field O f battle they take their places in the ,

l ine or form a reserve or fall upon the flank or rear

, ,

o f the enemy according to circumstances

,
N othing .

can have a more powerful effect in procuring a Vi c

tory than the appear ance of such r e —enforcements upon
 2 78 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

th e field of battle at a critical moment in the contest .

D e s aix s division suddenly debouching upon the field

’
,

o f Marengo regained the day for the F rench

,
If not .
,

withstandi ng the assistance rendered by the b eS Ieg m g

to the covering army the latter is obliged to fall back
, ,

it Should endeavor to do so i n good order an d take ,

position at a l ittle distance from the field of battle in ,

o rder to keep the enemy in a state of uneasiness and ,

tb prevent him from falling with all his force upon

the S iege works The covering army will be put in as
-
.

good condition as possible calling in all detachments at

,

some distance and if it is then s u fli c ie n tly stro ng a n

,

other attack may b e made upon the succoring army ,

which will have been during thi s time arrested by the

intrenchments of the besieging army Then if both .
,

parties are equally determined will be witnessed the ,

S ingular spectacle o f two armies at once besieging an d

besieged .

If th e covering army has been un able to resist t h e

succoring army and the latter has immediately
,

attacked the lines of the besiegers and forced them ,

affairs are certainly in a bad state and the S i ege must ,

b e raised ; but all is not yet lost The remains of the .

t wo ar m ies m ust be rallied an d a n ew o n e formed

,

which will soon be in condition to fight ag ain .

If the enemy is fearful of compromising himself ,

an d rem ains closely withi n the walls o f the fo rt ifi c a

tions n o attack can be m ade u pon him ; but many
,

m on th s to be fill ed soon exhaust the suppl ies and the

,
 C OV E RIN G A S IE GE . 2 79

place will capitulate for want o f provi sions E very .

thing that h ad been previously lost will n o w be r e

covered and at the same time the result is Obt ained
,

wi t hout loss of life — a most pleas in g thi ng to a chief

who loves hi s m en and is averse t o shed ding their
blood .

If on the contrary the enemy h as more confidence

, , ,

an d remains in the open field rather than shut him

self u p in the fortificati ons n ew combats will follow ,
,

and the e ffort m u st be made by partial successes or , ,

by the gain of a battle when the enemy will fight

o n e to force him i nto such a position that he may be
,

blockaded If finally the enemy divide his forces ,

.
, ,

leaving a part in th e place for its defence an d with ,

the remai n der takes the field so much the be t te r for ,

the other party as there is an Opportunity offered for

,

cutting O ff from the garrison the portion in the field .

The attempt should be made to slip i n between the

two by a night march such precautions ha ving been
,

taken that the corps in the field may be attacked ,

t horoughly beaten an d dispe rsed o r captured before , ,

as sistance can arrive fro m the place Thus Marshal .

,

Soult at the S iege o f Badaj oz having to deal with an

, ,

army stronger than his o wn skilfully took ad vantage ,

o f an opportunity that o ffered o f restoring the e q u i li b

ri u m Ten thousand S p a niards to avoid being too

.
,

m uch crowded p assed o u t of Badaj oz an d encamped

,

upon some high ground which was separated fr Om the

,

F rench army by the G u adi ana and covered by the

2 80 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

G eb o r a F ire was opened upon the Spanish camp

.

from the F rench camp with long range ho w itzers

,
-

with a View of obliging it to be pitched as far as pos

sible from the outworks of the place A n hour before .

dawn a passage o f the G uadian a was e ffected in boats

, ,

the G eb ora was forded and whi le Marshal Mortier

, ,

made an attack in front upon th e high ground an d ,

sent his cavalry to turn the right two or three thou ,

sand infantry were posted in the valley between the

fortress and the camp The Spaniards were thus
.

completely cut off Eight thousan d prisoners were

.

taken five or six hundred killed an d the rest escaped

, , .

This was the brilli ant combat o f G eb or a , foug ht F eb

y
r ua r 1 9 ,
1 81 1 .
 C O MBATS A ND A FFAIRS . 2 81

C HAP TE R VI .

C OLIBA TS AN D A FFAIRS .

TE E t erm com ba t is
appli ed t o a partial engage
m ent— t o a conflict o f part s of t w o Opposin g arm ies .

G en erally the losses in combats are proportionally

,

greater than in battle ; o ften when the forces e n ,

g e d are numerous the action is called a battle al

(r
, ,

tho u gh m ore st rictly a Si mple combat But t oo much .

i mportance must not be ascribed to mere definitions ,

for the name has really n o in fl uence upon the thi ng
a combat is a small battle an d a battle is a great,

combat .

A co mbat m ay occur between t wo bodies o f in

fan try between t w o bodies o f caval ry or between a
, ,

body o f infantry and on e o f cavalry between troops ,

with a rtillery and troops without artillery It may .

occur in the open field or in intrenchments 85 0 It ,

.

is well to examine these di fferent cases separately ,

although it generally happens that they all may b e

discovered in a S ingle enga g ement .

A rt . I .— C o mb a t o f I n fa n t ry w ith I n fa n t r y .

A combat of infantry against infantry presents

much the same appearan ce as a bat t le ; skirmishers
in front to open the en g agement the firs t line de ,
2 82 P RINC IP LE S OF S TR ATE GY .

ployed to deli ver its fire the secon d line covered by

,

accidents of the ground and out of range of fi r e arms

,
-

several masses upon the wings and i n reserve to ,

guard against turning movements If the troops are .

fe w they will form a S ingle line with a reserve

,
In .

such an engagement , the best armed m en and th e

best marksmen have a great advantage for the op ,

posing li nes are not very distant and the fi ring is ,

kept u p a long time as there is n either cavalry nor

,

artillery to be feared .

When several battalions are engaged some o f the ,

man oeuvres prescribed in the works o n tactics [may be

applied and may lead to important results for the
,

party that knows how to perform them with p r o mp ti

tude and precision ; these are changes o f front of a
whole line & c ; the study of mi nor tactics is there
,
.

fore principally important as a preparation for partial

engagements for combats In more extensive affairs
,
.

the movements are more simple and are l ittle else ,

than deployments and form ations in column the pas ,

sages of lines the formations o f squares of echelons

, , ,

& c whi ch are in common use

.
,
But o u r object now .

i s not to discuss or explain tactical man oeuvres which

are prescribed by regulations ; it is tak en for granted
that these are well known .

A commander who exp ects an engagement Should

cause his troops to take some food for the reason ,

that it can no longer be done aft er the action begins

'

and men wh o ar e fasting cannot be expected to dis

 C OM BAT OF F
IN A N TR Y W IT H IN FANTRY . 2 83

play much Vigor If the weather is cold they Should

.
,

n ot be marched across a ford to meet the enemy b e ,

caus e half frozen limbs are not active and a soldier

-
,

who is thoroughly chilled is already half beaten A n .

excepti on m ay be made to this rule in case o f passing

thro ugh the water to use the bayonet because the ,

blood is then kept warm by the excitement o f the m o

ment and such a movement will generally succeed
,

o n account o f its dari ng .

Before engagi n g an inspection o f the arms should

,

be m ade to see that all are i n good condition that

, ,

nothing is wanting the cartridg e boxes full & c The

,
-
,
.

general should assemble the principal subordinates

and infor m them o f his intentions and expectations ,

a s well as a ll he knows o f the plans of the enemy .

He encourages them by the confidence thus mani

fes te d a n d a proper spirit o f e m ulation is excited
,
.

He especially recommends them t o lend mutual ass ist

ance to avoid partial e fforts to ac t impetuously and
, ,

together to S ho w a fine example to the soldiers an d

, ,

to do nothing but what is perfectly honorable P oints .

o f assembly in case of reverse are agreed upon an d ,

they are then sent back to their respective commands .

If the combat is foreseen the troops should fight in

full uniform This mark of politeness is due to a r e
.

s e c t a b l e enemy an d troops who are t rying to appea r

p ,

to the best advantage will u sually do their du ty best

in the engagement .

I a P la
n i n — The action is b egun by the Skirmish
2 84 P RIN C IP E S L OF S TRATE GY .

ers who are S pread o u t to th e fron t S Ufli c ien tl y far to

,

cover the deployments ; and when after a longer or ,

S horter time ac cording to circumstan ces th e skir

, ,

m is h e r s have unmasked the front and rallied to th e

rear the firing o f the real line will begin The firing
,
.

sho uld n o t be commenced at too great a distan ce for , ,

in that case some of t he shots are lost n either from

, ,

an excess of confidence which has sometimes pro ved ,

fa t al Should the firing be delayed until the enemy

,

gets too near because th e ranks having to receive

, ,

several discharges become somewhat thinned espe, ,

c i all as the first sho t s are always better aimed tha n

y
the sub sequent ones F iring by file i s almost exclu
.

s ivel
y used because
,
that by platoo n s can seldom b e

m aintained on account of the noise and confusion and

, ,

m oreover the soldier fires more accurately when he

,

takes his o w n time Volley firing by battalion o r .

,

half battalion sometimes has a good e ffect as for ex

, , ,

ample when poured into a body of troops boldly a d

,

v an c i n
g to the charge In s u c h a case as this bold
.
,

n ess S hould b e met by boldness the fire reserved unti l ,

the ene my is within thirty or forty paces a volley de ,

livered in his face an d then a rush made upon him ,

wi t h the bayonet A body of troops ad vancing fi n d

.

themsel ves but little injured by distant firing their ,

courage is really in creased and they b ecome i rr es is t ,

ible .
If o n the contrary , the fire i s reserved the
, ,

men are di sconcerted at their unexpected reception ,

and when a t last the volle y comes they are ready to ,

 C OEIBA T O F IN FA N TR Y W IT H
'

IN FA NTRY .

take to their h eels If this murderous discharge is

.

followed up by a rapid charge it will almost certainly ,

prove successful .

While a fu silade is going o n fro m both sides o n e ,

o r the other will insensibly gain ground by that i n ,

s tin c t of th e soldier which urges h i m to press u p on an

adversary he dee ms his inferior Thus without an .

,

appare n t movement with out any com m a nd being

,

given a wing wil l be grad u a lly ad vanced T h e n a

,
.

reserve force sho u ld be brought up an d deployed

against the yielding ene my o r thro w n u pon h i m in,

column If this attack is successful the whole line

.
,

advances an d attacks the enemy w ith the bayonet ,

m arching i n line o f battl e o r forming columns of ,

attack with skirmishe rs in the intervals .

This last cou rse is prefera b le i n ord inary cases ; the

commanders encourage their col u m ns and correct the ,

disorder which is almos t inevitable i n those which

have su ffered most A S soon as a battalion has b roke n
.

the line o f the e n e my it should pre p a r e to att a ck i n

,

flank the n earest tro o ps which are st ill in good order .

F or that purpose each col u m n sho uld be so organized

,

that it may readily be divided in two parts and moved ,

by bo th fla nks ; the col u mn of attack permits t his .

If the enemy s line is broken in this way at t wo or

’

thr ee places it cannot stand much longer at any

,

point .

But w hen the op p osing bodies are v ery near it is ,

s ometim es better t o ch arge in li ne than to take ti m e

286 P RIN C IP LE S OF STR A TE G Y .

to form the col u mn s of attack If the battalions are .

well drilled this last method is very e ffectu al in break

,

ing the line of the enemy when he see m s to be waver

ing or has su ffered greatly By attacking thus along
,
.

t he whole front the enemy is una bl e to practise the

,

stratagem of making a n openi n g in his line with the ,

purpose of drawing on the assailants and then e n vel ,

Oping an d destroyi n g them .

S ometimes the line wil l advance upon the ene my

with so m e battalions deployed and others in columns , ,

th e latter being formed under cover of the S kirmish

ers and the deployed battalions continuing their fire
,
.

The whole line then moves for ward the deployed bat ;
,

talions halt at short range an d pour in their fi re while

, ,

the colu mns rush upon the enemy break through his ,

line and threaten the flanks The deployed battalions.

advance again and sweep the grou n d with their fire .

Mutual assistance and support are th u s r endered by

the deployed battalions a n d those in col u mn This .

order is sometimes adopted at the outse t of the en

a e m e n t to giv more solidit to the line while pre
g g , e y ,

serving t h e advantage o f a good front for fi ring It .

will b e used when it is desired to act o ffensively upo n

a particular part of the ene my s line to seize the k ey ’
,

point of the field & c ,

A t the battle of F uentes de
.

O nore in 1 81 1 a brigade composed of fi v e battalions

, , , ,

h ad th ree formed in close column s by division and ,

the two intervening deployed In his admirable Italian .

campaign in passing a ford of the Tagliamento Bo

, ,
 C O MB A T OF IN FA NT RY W IT H IN FA NTR Y . 2 87

na a rt e
p had i n each regiment o n e battalion d eployed
,

and the other two in close columns o n the wings of

the fi rst O ftener still this order o f attack res ults
.

from the fact th at at the moment of ad v ancing some

, ,

battalion s are formed in column while others being , ,

be t ter situate d for delivering their fire remain in line ,

.

The openings thus formed in the line should be filled

by Skirmishers .

The rule for charges is t o persist in them when once ,

begun not to fire a Shot but to press u pon the enemy

, ,

as rapidly as possible both to avoid the e ffect of his

,

fire and to o ve rt hrow hi m by the sh ock The bayo .

n et should not be brought down until within ten paces

o f the enemy as order in the ra n ks is much better
,

preserved in this way There is nothing more i m .

posing than a column advancing in this way at the

double quick the ground trembles under th e tread
o f many feet .

When the line o f the enemy is routed a few compa ,

nies should be detached in pursuit and the ranks are ,

reformed for a ren ewal o f the contest if necessa ry with , ,

the second line or the reserv e No longer hal t how .

,

ever should be permitted than is necessary to rally

,

the troops ; an advance S hould at once be m ade upon

the second line which being discouraged by t he de
, ,

feat O f the fi rst and perhaps thrown into confusion by

,

i t s di s ordered and flying battalions will probably ,

make but a faint resistance .

If the combat is obstinate and his first line has suf ,

288 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

fe r e d se v erely ,
the general should bring up his second ,

and move it through the intervals of t he first This .

o ffensive movement made under cover of the S kirmish

,

e r s wil l shake the enemy s line ; he wil l wi t h di ffi

,
’

culty be able to stand the fire of these n e w battalions ,

that have just deployed their fresh troops in front of

his who are wearied an d harassed Here it S houl d
,
.

be Obser v ed that if the passage o f the lines were e f

,

fe c t e d by t he battalions of the first line falling back

,

throu gh the in t ervals of the second the result woul d

have been much more doubtful E very retrograde .

movement is dangerous because of its bad e ffect upo n

,

the m ora le of the troops To fall back is with most

.
,

m e n to acknowledge the mselves wors t ed

,
It is par .

t ic u l arly important to avoid movements to th e rear

with r a w troops who easily lose their equani m ity
,

In the mean time the first line beco m es the secon d

, ,

reforms sends off its wounded men takes some rest

, , ,

and makes preparation s for n e w e fforts i n order to ,

bring the contest to a close .

Bu t fortune may be adverse an d the general will,

then observe his troops begin to g i ve ground and to ,

waver and fall into confu sion A porti on of th e r e

.

serve should then b e brought up an d if these fresh ,

troops do not succeed in regaining the lost ground it ,

is time to prepare for retreat Th e fi rst line will

.

already and in S pite of its efforts have fallen back

, ,

towards the second line and may be so near that

, , ,

to avoid producin g disorder in the latter it may be ,

 C OM BAT OF IN AN TRF Y W IT H IN FA NTR Y . 2 89

necess ary t o effe ct a pass age o f the first to the rear of

th e s econd If the firs t line falls back in good order it
.
,

s hould halt at three o r four h undred paces to the rear

,

and face ab out ; but if some o f the b attalions are

s catter ed their chiefs should plant their colors i n some
,

conspicuous places and cause th e drum s to h e at at the

,

s ame ti m e The soldiers wi ll have rallying points in

.

this way .

In the mean time th e secon d line cannot hold its

,

gr ound long against the victorious troops o f the e n

emy ; it must therefore commen c e to reti re i n a n
orderly way either falling b a ck i n line o ccasionally
, ,

h alting t u rning upon the enemy and giving h im seve

,

ral volleys ; o r adopting the checker formation either ,

by battalion s o r half battalions o r moving in echelon , ,

if o n e wing is less pressed than the other A t t h e .

same time S ki rmishers should if practicable be throw n

, , ,

o u t upon the flanks o f the ene my to check his pur ,

suit Thi s is the moment for eng aging the troops

.

which h ave thus far been held i n reserve These w ill .

p as s to the front and rush impet u ously upon t he ene my

,

with th e bayonet ; by vigorous cond u ct of this sort

they m ay ch ec k his advance o r oblige h i m at l east,

to move wi t h more slowness and circumspection In .

this way efforts will be m ade to dispute the field inch ,

by inch until night The baggage and the wounded

,
.

are sen t to the rear to b e o u t o f the way of the r e

,

treating troops If there is a defile such as a bridge

.
, ,

o r caus ew ay through a marsh & c to be passed the ,

.
, ,

13
2 90 P RIN C IP E S L OF S TRA TE GY .

troops must for m line of battle in front of it and per ,

form the man oeuvres prescribed for passing defil es in

retreat If the defile is S hort t h e troops will reform
.
,

o n the other side ; if it is o f con siderabl e length an d ,

the enemy presses o n i n pursuit a defen ce must be ,

made fro m point to point advantage being tak en of ,

the ground S ometimes an ambuscade m ay be pre

.

pared for an incautious enemy This is a resource .

upon which too much reliance should not be placed .

Still it should not be forgotten or neglected .

It may happen and unfortunately oft n does ,

e , ,

happen that a vigorous defence of a posi t io n agains t

,

superior numbers m ay result in the defenders being

surrounded S u ch a state o f affairs is certainly very
.

critical b u t it n eed not necessarily end in a surrender

, .

O n the contrary the commander should gather all

,

his forces before he is too closely pressed and rush

, ,

headlon g upon the enemy at the point where his line

seems weakest o r in the direction where th e chances
,

o f escape a r c greatest
-

F ortune usually smiles upo n

.

such effor t s ; the envelopin g line is weakened by its

extent is pierced and all or part of the troops escape
, , .

In 1 79 5 the P iedmontese general Ro ce a v i v a being

, , ,

su r rounded at L oano by a F rench division refused to ,

surrender fell in mass U pon the en veloping line

, ,

broke through it and succeeded in joining the A us t rian

,

army Even if such an attempt fails the capt u red

.
,

soldiers will at least have done every thing required by

the m ost exalted honor .
 C O MB AT OF IN F ANTRY W

Up on H ei g h ts — C ombats
do n ot always occur i n
level ground ; o n the contrary undulations o f the ,

ground are often advantageo u s to the defence an d ,

lead to its occupation It t h e n becomes n ecessary to

.

attack the enemy in position if he cannot be t urned ,

.

A height m ay be attacked ei t her in front or on the

side Most frequently both attacks are u sed toget h er
.
,

because it i s necessary to divide the attention of the

en emy Without that he might have too m uch the
.
,

ad vantage If the defenders are uncovered occupy

.
,

ing t he slopes and not the crest the attack may b e ,

opened by firing u po n him to thin his ranks But , .

this will not be kept up long as the ad v ancing column s

,

will soon put an end to it ; they will slowly ascen d

the slopes stopping occasionally to take breath
,
.

When they have nearly reached the enemy they ,

should increase the pace an d charge with the bayonet

, .

Th e column s should be rather n umerous than long ;

too great length m ak es them heavy and they present ,

too good a mark for t he fire of the enemy They .

should a l l ad vance equally otherwise th o se leading,

m ay b e seriously checked and the effect p rod u ced is

,

b ad.

If the enemy is entirely o n the summit i t will b e ,

useless to fire as the crest hides him u nless h e has

, ,

s ome troops o n the S lop e s for the purpose of firing .

The columns being in readiness to a t tack aft er

,

ascending the S lopes h alt to take brea t h and reform

, ,

especially if fro m the for m of the g r oun d and the

,
2 92 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

retired position of the enemy both parties are con

,

c e a l e d fro m each o t her A war m reception an d a

.

murderous fi r e must be expected for the defenders , ,

being three quarters covered by the ground have a

-
,

very great advantage over th e assailants when they

first S how themselves Moreover the defenders are
.
,

fresh and in line whereas the assailants are more or

,

less fatigued and in column Therefore when the

.
,

movement is begun it S hould be made with g reat

,

impetuosity an d rapidi ty to prevent the defenders

,

fro m firing e ven a single volley if possible A ruse ,

.

may sometimes be resorted to to draw the ir fire , by

,

sending for w ard a fe w skirmishers in open order and , ,

under their protection the mai n body may advance

, ,

the men stooping down and raising their caps on t h e

end of their bayo nets so as to make the fire pass over
,

their heads ; if t h e ene my fires an immediate rus h ,

must be made upon h i m .

The column s S hould always be accompanied b y

n umerous S kirmishers closi n g the intervals between
,

the m and covering the flanks These S kirmishers

.
,

forming a closer line than usual fi re rapidly ; they ,

act like a deployed line preparing the way by its

,

fire for the adva n ce of the colu m ns of a t tack .

The course to be pursued i n defending heights is

i ndicated by what has already b een said The troops .

who first S ho w themselves having been received by a

well aimed fire a rush should be made upon them
-
,

without reloading ; when they are repulsed t he ,

 C OMBAT OF IN FANTRY WIT H F
IN ANTR Y . 29 3

defenders m ay return to their former covered position .

Thi s method w as more than once successfully practised

by the English against the attacks o f the F rench
columns and particularly at P ampelun a in 1 81 3
, ,
.

If the defenders do not halt an d fall back to their

position after re p e lling the enemy they run t he risk
, ,

o f be ing drawn on by a pretended flight to the bot t om

o f the hill where the assailants turn upo n t hem and

,

defeat them It is never safe to indulge in a h e a dlo n g

.

pursuit even of a disordered enemy

,
C ertain p r e .

caution s S hould always be taken which have been ,

more than once pointed o u t .

If th ere are fortifica t ions o n the high g round care ,

S hould be taken n o t to m ask their fi re as otherwise ,

their W hole ad vantage m ay be n eutralized G en e ral .

Taupi n c o mmi t ted a faul t of this ki n d at the bat t le

o f Toulouse whe r e he placed hi s troops in fron t of a
,

redoubt which w as really the strong point of his

,

posi t ion He m ade another mistake which it m ay b e

.

W ell to point o u t as i t rela tes to the s u bject n o w

,

under consideration He formed his whole division

.

into a S ingle column which was enveloped by the

,

fire o f the enemy and could only reply fr om the head

,

o f the leading battalion it lost its momentum was

; ,

rep u lsed and driven in disorder o ff the ground This

,
.

kind o f at t ack was prope r again st an enemy w ith

a stream behind h im a nd climbing a hill with diffi
,

culty but there should have been several col umns

, ,

and not a single one If the F rench had been less

.
2 94 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRATE GY .

impetuous and had bee n deployed upon the t o p of

,

the high ground imitating the method u sed by th eir

,

adversaries the presu m p t io n i s a reason able one that

,

they might have d rive n them back to the strea m and

into it.

Hence i t appears th a t if the defenders are deployed

, ,

an d the en emy advance in a S ingle colu mn there is ,

no cause for apprehension The line S hould be formed

.

in a circle or like the letter V i n order to e n velop

, ,

the column whic h can only fi r e from its head

,
.

C oolness and good aiming are a l l that are requisite ,

an d this formidable colu mn wi ll almost S urely b e

checked in disorder if it cont inues to move on resist ,

ance to it in front is useless ; the line should yield an d

the attack b e made upon the flanks not a single sho t
wil l be lost and t h e over t hrow of the ene my is certain
,
.

It is more difficul t to resist the attack o f several

columns . However if it is foreseen if the troops
, ,

o n the defensive are i n good order a steady fi re S hould

,

b e opened at good range The flan k companies will .

deliver their fire upon th e flanks o f the advancing

colu mns and the ene my seeing his losses increase
, , ,

will either halt in order t o deploy a n d ret u rn t he fire ,

o r his impetuosity will at leas t be much di m inished .

I n Woods — If the enemy is holding a wood skir ,

m is h e rs must be principal ly used to dis lodge h i m as ,

great loss would be caused t he assailants were they to

attack at the outse t ei ther in l ine or in col u mn T h e .

skirmishers should enve lo p the sal ie n t po rt ions of the

 C O M BAT OF IN
FA NTRY WITH IN A NTRF Y . 295

wood for they will i n thi s way be enabled to take

,

in flank those men who are t rying to conceal them

selves behind trees If t he r e is any part of the wood
.

commanded by neighboring heights o r that may be ,

approached unobserved the skirmishers should select

,

these points as they are evide n tly weak

,
.

In order to get near the point o f attack th e assail ,

ants should take advantage of a l l local feature s ,

creep i ng along hedges and di t ches and co vering them

,

s elves by every little elevation o f ground by clumps ,

o f tre es & c
,
The ene my should be fired upon fro m
.

every point that is gained i n order to harass h i m as

,

m uch as possible ; and even when he is really not much

inj ured t he accuracy of his fire will be affected While
,
.

e ffo rts are made t o adva n ce in front b y quite open

lines of ski r mishers the a t tention of the en e my should
,

be d iverted b y false at t acks a t distant p oints .

A s soon as the skirmishe rs have taken poss ession o f

the outskirts of the w ood and are covered by the trees ,

detachments should be brought up to their support ,

and as they penetrate into the forest the m ain body ,

advances divided into several smal l columns that

,

move for w ard to the sound of dr u ms an d tru mpets ;

they S hould al w ays b e at some distan ce behind t he
skirmishers but ready to sup p ort them if n ecessa ry
,
.

If a n open space is found the troops m ust be ral lied

,

b efore crossing it and n e w measu res taken to attack

,

the o ther part of the forest the sa m e course should be

pursu ed whenever any obstacle is encountered ; no
296 P RIN C IP L E S OF S T RA T E GY .

I ndividuals or detached bodies S hould alone cross a

ditch o r a ravine or a strong hedge for there is always ,

danger of meeting t he en emy in force on th e oth er

side and it may be impossible to assemble men enough
,

to resist him .

When the forest is o f small extent it is better to try ,

to turn it ; i n this case the assailants wil l keep o u t o f

,

range o f fi re arms -
.

In the defence an e ffort should b e made to occupy

,

the skir t s by S kirmishers ; if time permits the adj oin ,

ing gro und should be cleared up ditches filled &c , , .

,

in order to afford a better Vie w of the assail a n ts and

to remove every thing which might cover his a dvance ;
abatis sho u ld be constructed in the most accessible
places and especially by cutting down the trees at the
,

most salient positions ; salients m ay also be flanked

by small fi e l d works in order to prevent th e assailant
-
,

from envelop i ng the m trunks O f trees laid o n e upon ,

the other and held in place by stakes are excellent

, ,

for this purpose .

Behind the l ine of ski r mishers supports are placed , ,

ei t her to secure their ret reat or to r e enforce them ; -

they are also on the wings to prevent them fr o m being

,

t u rned Still farther to the rear and at a point equally

.
,

d i stant from the threatened points is placed the reserve , ,

to act according to circu mstances Th u s for ex am .

,

ple if the attack is d iscon nected and the defence of

,

the outskirts is s uccessful th e reserve may tak e th e ,

o ffen sive by debouching fro m the wood or by pass ing

 C OM BAT OF IN FA N TRY W IT H IN FA NTR Y .

aroun d it Such an operation may succeed because

.
,

the troops that execute i t are concealed during the

mo vement and the assailant may b e surprised .

i
In In k a b te d P l a ces — The at t ack of a b ody o f in ‘

fa n try posted in a town o r village wh i ch is favorable

,

to defence is a very di fficul t Opera t ion wi t hout the ai d

,

o f artillery In such affairs t h e artillery is the most

.

i mportant arm However if the enemy has not had

.
,

ti me to for t ify hi m self the attempt may b e m ade with

,

in fantry alone if the assailant i s in superior numbers

,
.

We will suppose that infantry alone is used G en e r .

ally the attack will be m ade in columns skirmis h e rs

should envelop the village to drive the defende rs fro m ,

hedges and garden walls to fire into windo w s and a t , ,

tempt to take possession of several d etached houses ,

where they m ay take post and fight the enemy o n

equal terms .

The colu m ns will not ad vance until the fire of the

skirmishe rs has produced its e ffect which will b e i n ,

ferred fro m the sl a ckening o f the fire of the defenders .

Until this time t h e columns should keep out o f range or

covered by some accide n t of t h e g round While one .

col u mn attacks in front a n d attempts to penetra t e the

principal street of the Village others should be at its ,

S ides to look for other entrances or to turn the p lace , ,

if possible The columns will be preceded by sappers

.

o r workmen p rovided with axes and crowba r s shov

, ,

els and picks who throw down walls cut hedges and
, ,

palisades fill up ditches ; in a word re m ove all obsta

, ,

*
13
 2 98 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

cles that migh t impede th e movements of the troops .

If a house o ffers a pa rticularly ob stinate resistance it ,

should be surround e d an d a t tacked on all sides ; a n d ,

if the defe n ders obstinately refu se to l a v do w n their

arms they should be threatened wi t h hav i ng t he house
,

burned o ver their heads F or that purpose st r aw and

.

piles of brush wil l be brought up but fire sho u ld no t ,

be set to it until the de fenders h ave again been s u m

moued to surre n der as no unnecessary cruelty sh ould
,

b e prac t ised eve n in war .

If the enemy defends the village from house to

house the same course m u st b e pursued by t h eassail
,

ants that is to say fire will be poured from t h e win

, ,

do ws an d roofs of those which a re in possession of the

la t ter It will readily be perceived that this kind of
.

a contest can only take place in large villages or to w ns

where the streets are like those of cities lined with
, ,

continuous rows of houses solidly constructed In .

such places one precautio n m ust be take n : it consists

i n ad v ancing singly along a s treet that is to be seized
;
men slipping along the walls are covered by very small
projections and may succeed at last in reach i ng Im
,

portant points without too m u ch exposure G enerally .

,

when troops are making an assault in a defile they ,

should not be crowded as a repulse of those i n fr ont

,

m ay lead to terrible slaughter and confusion The .

advance should in such cases be made by successive

, ,

companies at conside r able interval s those not actually ,

engaged being kept under cover In proceeding along .

 C O M BA T OF IN FAN TRY WIT H IN F A N TRY . 299

a street an entrance may be effected in one house and ,

t he assailants may then som etimes pass from house to

house under co ve r breaking down division wal ls
, .

In order to defend a vill age t h e infantry sho uld be ,

distributed in the gardens b ehin d walls and hedges , ,

and at the windows of houses A single rank is s u ffi .

cient for such purposes and conseq u en tly a quite ex

, , ,

tended line may be o ccupied ; howeve r it should n o t ,

b e more so than necessary This is a fine opport u nity

.

for rifl e me n a n d sharpshooters to Show their skill b e ,

cause t h ey are o u t of sight of t he ene my and can

,

quietly take perfect aim P latoons or companies .

should b e placed in the streets o r avenues to sup p or t ,

the line o f sha rpshooters and a reserve at the centre

,

o f the village o r a little to the rear in readiness to ,

move in any direction to m eet the enemy If ti me .

permits openings S hould b e pierced in the walls to

,

serve as loopholes ; the principal streets should be bar

r ic a de d
,
&c .

When the Village i s surrounded or preceded by a

ravine o r a little stream o r any other obstacle the de
, ,

fen ce should commence there ; i f necessary a retreat ,

will be made upon the Village which will have been ,

previously occupied by a portion of the troops and put

rapidly in a defensible condition T he resistance that .

m ay be made under cover o f the houses walls and other , ,

enclosures will be the more energetic and prolon ged

, ,

as the enemy will be less likely to turn the position ,

either on account o f its na t u ral features or the disposi

300 P R INC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

tion of the troops In this case vigorous sor ties will

.
,

succeed well if made at suitable places and no t pushe d

,

too far for fear of the parties being c u t o ff ; the a ve

,

nues by which they will return Should b e suitably o c

c u p ie d so t hat the enemy may n o t r e enter pellmell
—
,

with th em O ffensive re t urns of thi s sort al w ays pro

.

duce a good e ffect and t hey should be frequently re

,

at e d they elevate the m or a l e o f the defe n ders an d

p e

disconcert the assailants .

In order to avoid confusion each detachment S houl d ,

be charged with the defence of a particular part of th e

village and instructed in th e manner of doing th is an d
, ,

of effecting a retreat in case such an operatio n b ecomes

,

necessary This precept is applicable not only to the

.

defence of a village but to any military o p eration

, .

A ft er all that has been said it must be rememb ere d ,

that wooden Villages are rather dangerous than useful

to occupy because they are readily set o n fire A
, .

village which can be surrounded on all sides cannot

be wel l defended To make a good defence it is
.
,

therefore necessary : l s t that the villag e b e built of

,

m asonry ; 2 d that it rest upo n so m e obstacle whic h

,

prevents its being turned or else it m ust be suppo rted

,

in rear by good troops .

A r t. I L — C a va l ry a g a in st C a va lry .

The fundamental rule for cavalry is n ot to wait to ,

receive an attack but to a c t always offensively an d to

, ,

be galloping at the moment o f meeting the ene my .

 C AVAL RY A G AIN ST CA VAL RY . 3 01

O therwise it will b e thrown into confu sion and dis

e rs e d for it h as been clearly de monstrated by expo
p ,

ricuce that a squadron even of heavy cav alry cannot , ,

withstand at a halt the attack of another squadron of

, ,

which th e horses are very small provided the latter ,

is at the gallop T h is is not bec ause the S hock o f a

.

body of cav alry i s proportional to the mass and th e

velocity with which it moves but because the gallop ,

gives impetuosity excites the horses an d timid ride rs

, ,

are dra w n along with th e others .

When two bodi es o f cavalry are advancing to wards

each other to eng a g e in front that one will have the ,

advantage which has several squadrons in a position to

charge at the same time upon the flank of the other .

The result o f such a m ovement is even more decisiv e

th an in combats o f i nfantry both on account of the ,

rapidi ty with whi ch it is executed and the difficulty ,

the assa iled line has i n opposing it There Should .

,

therefore be placed i n rear o f th e wings of a line of

,

cavalry columns composed of sever al squadrons or

,

platoons according to the strength o f the force i n

,

line These col um ns formed at full distance while

.
, ,
’
they enable an attack to be m ade upo n the enemy s
flan k are the surest means of guarding against a Sim
,

il a r attack from hi m S ince a column at fu ll distan ce

,

may i n a m oment deploy an d be ready to meet a n at

tempt to envelop the extremity of the line In a n .

attack made by heavy cavalry th e columns on th e ,

w i ngs may be formed o f light horse which in addi , ,

302 P R INC IP L ES OF STR A TE GY .

tion to the duty already assigned them may pursue ,

the enemy after the charge while the line of battle is ,

reforming A s the enemy may a de p t the same meas

.

ures the precaution S hould be taken of holding a

,

small reserve if only a platoon i n echelon with the

, ,

columns o n the wings To avoid inversions in de .

ploying these columns that on the right wing Should ,

have its left in front and that on the left its right in
,

front But as has already been explained cavalry

.
, ,

S hould be perfectly accustomed to inversions in order ,

to be always ready to deploy in either direction .

When cavalry can rest its wings o n any n atural

Obstacle which prevents the enemy from m an oeifvr in g
o n the flank the columns on the wings are no longer
,

necessary but as a general rule their presence can

, , ,

not be too strongly insisted o n It appears ; therefore .

,

that a body of cavalry moving to the attack is partly ,

deployed and partly in column While satisfying .

these conditions it Should occupy as large a front as

,

possible because it is important to have as m an y e n

,

gaged at once as po ssible If a body o f cavalry should .

advance in column it would be almost certainly ,

beaten as none but the men in front could use their

,

weapons ; enveloped and attacked o n th e flanks the ,

column could only extricate itself by a speedy flight .

If cavalry advances in a single unbroken line with ,

but small intervals between the squadrons it is said ,

to charge en m u r a i l le or a s a w a ll This method o f

, .

attack is very imposing but is only practicable for a ,

 C AVALR Y A GA IN ST C AVALRY . 3 03

few squadrons because on account of the irr eg ul ari

, ,

ties o f the groun d and other obstacles an d the inevi ,

table crowding that takes place in a line of consider

able length the S hock is not a single o n e but com
, ,

posed o f partial shocks whose e ffect is by no means so

,

great ; if the line is thrown into confu sion at any

point and especially if it is pierced by the enemy
, ,

the d isorder may beco m e general throughout the line ;

mistakes are correcte d with di fficulty ; finally one of ,

the principal advantages of this arm — its mobility— is

lost The charge in a continued line of great extent
.

is hardly practi cable when the design is to sweep

,

over a field of battle covered with broke n battalions ,

o f which some are m aking a S ho w of resistance .

The attac k i n e chelons is much used by cavalry

commanders and o ffers the advantages o f not enga
,

ging the whole force at once and of g iving better Op ,

o r tu n it ie s o f retrieving ch a n ce reverses d u ring the

p
action The m os t re t ired ec helons are last engaged
.
,

and up to the moment of being so are disposable for

, ,

the support o f the others o r to attack the enemy ,

in flank T h is for mation is especially advantageous

.

whe n the cavalry i n order to attack passes from

, ,

column into l ine as would happen for example in

, , ,

issuing fro m a defile ; u n der such circ umstances it is

not necessary to wait u n til all the echelons are in
line before making the charge as it is s u fli c ie n t for ,

the fir st to b e formed an d the others will come up in

,

succ es sion S o long as the deployment is unfinished ,

.
304 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRATE GY .

the ene my is uncertain where the attack is to b e

made and this is an adva n tage for the ass ailant
,
.

Two or three echelons m ay be placed in position to

threaten his left ; he will re enforce that part The -
.

remaining echelons may then be launched against his

weakened right which will very probably give way
, ,

as there is not time enough for a counter m anoeuvre -

on his part If the leading echelon is successful it

.
,

m ay tak e the line i n fla n k whi le the others attack in

fr o nt The echelons m u st have considerable strength
.

in them s elves that their successive Shocks m ay p r o

,

d uce the expected e ffect They S hould therefore b e

.
, ,
l
formed of regi m e n ts or at le ast o f squadrons ; eche
, , ,

lons of platoons are of little Value We repeat cav .

,

al r i n attacki n g cavalry should al w ays form a fron t

y
o f considerable extent without ho w ever dispensing
, , ,

with the colu m ns on the wings or other means o f a t

tacking the ene my i n flank at the same time as in
fr ont.

Whatever dispositions are adopted the rules for th e ,

charge are i n variable The troops move o ff at a walk

.
,

then taking the trot which becomes gradually more

,

rapid until they fall into the ga110p at some distance

from the enemy and at last into the fu ll run when at
,

about a hundred paces uttering at the same time loud

,

cries Without these precautions if the gallop is

.

“
,

taken too s o on the horses are blown an d the ranks

,

disunited before the ene my is reached the imposing ,

e ffect of the onset of on e great mass is lost the shocks ,

 C AV A L RY A GA IN ST CA VAL R Y . 3 05

are part ial an d o f n o avail The shouts inspire the

.

men an d excite the horses A t t h e moment of the

.

shock and in the ensuing m el ee it is better generally ,

to use the point rather than the edge o f the sabre .

If light cavalry finds itself in presence o f heavy cav

al ry it should not receive attack but S hould scatter ,

and charge in dispersed order upon th e flanks some ,

times cantering around the line flyi ng before it an d , ,

e l u di ng it by superior S peed and agility sometimes ,

pouring in a fire from muske t oons o r pistols This is .

almost the only cas e where fi r e arms can be employed -

in combats o f cavalry for the musketoon is placed in

,

the hands of the horsemen not for use in li ne o f battle

, ,

but simply for skirmishing for getting out of a diffi

,

cult position when di s mounted and for other e x c ep ,

t io n al cas es
. To s te p during a charge an d fire would
be a great mistake as the momentum would be lost
, ,

an d the attack almost certainly repelled It would .

be equally an error to receive an attack in this way ,

for the line would be routed before the musketoon s

could be put away and the sabres be drawn .

When the cavalry is numerous it is formed in two ,

li n es like infantry The fi rst is always deployed

,
. .

The secon d which is o ft en inferior i n numbers is

, ,

either deployed in part and o u t fl an k in g the wings of

the first so as t o prevent its being turned or formed
, ,

in as many col u m ns o f platoons at full distance as

there are squa drons A ll these columns are ready to
.

form l i ne o f battle by a very rapid movement to the

306 P RINC IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

front and they als o leave wide i ntervals b etween

,

them throug h which t h e squadrons of the first lin e

,

may readily pass to the rear after being route d or

thrown i nto confu sion by an unsuccessful charge .

Without this precaution the second line would run

,

the risk of being pressed back by the first The .

second line remains at several hundred paces from

the first whose movements it follows whether in
, ,

advance or retreat If the first line i s repulsed the

.
,

second sends its flank squa drons to take the enemy i n

flank and disengage the first In the mean time the
,
.
,

columns move to the front at a trot in order to de ,

ploy as soo n as they are un m asked and to r u sh upon ,

the enemy s line which must be also more or less In

’
,

confusion Th u s in combats of cavalry a body at

.
, , ,

first Vi ctorious i s checked by other squadrons taking

,

the places of those that have been beaten and the ,

whole face o f affairs is change d in a moment .

To avoid accidents it i s well a lw a ys to rally even

, ,

after the most brilliant success But it is not neces .

sary that all should halt several platoons in dispersed

order should harass the enemy while the standards ,

are moved forward at a walk The soldiers obedient .

,

to the call o f the trumpet will regain their places in

,

ranks and the squadrons all the time advancing are

, , ,

soon reformed and ready to charge again .

The close column is best for the man oeuvres of In

fa n t ry o n the field of battle ; but for caval ry the usual , ,

formation is at full distance because the subdivisions

,
 C AVAL RY A GAINST IN FA NTRY . 3 07

m ay thus wi th greater facility and rapidity for m li ne

in wha t ever d irection the enemy may appear How .

ever when cavalry h as not h ing to fear upon its flanks

, ,

it m ay man oeuvre at half distance i n order to have ,

less depth o f column The e n emy m ay be deceived

.

as to the nu mber o f cavalry if so m e columns move at

,

ha lf and others at full di s t ance .

Ar t. [I L — C a va lry a g a i n st I n fa n t r y .

C harges agains t i nfantry are principally made in

col u mns of squadr ons at double di s t ance so t ha t if one , ,

sq u a dron is repu l sed the m e n may t u rn to the right

,

and le ft and rally behi n d the c o l u mn The secon d .

sq u adron charges a n d performs the same man oeu vre as

the first the third co mes in turn and the n the fourth ,
.

If the infantry is not very firm and does n o t manage ,

its fire well i t wil l undoubtedly be broken

,
.

A ttacks in col u m ns at do u ble distance are chiefly

'

directed agai n st the angles of squares w h ic h are n o t

w ell defended A gainst deployed lines that cannot
.
,

be t u rned charges are usually made in echelon H o w

,
.

e ver charges in col u m n would answer we ll in such a

,

case if made S imultaneously at several points Both

,
.

are better than a charge in a continuous line agains t

i n fantry because the loss o f a squadron does n o t check
,

t h e whole and there is su fficient freedom of movement

,

to allow attack upon weak spots or those temporarily ,

deprived of fire finally renewed or s u ccess ive shocks

,
308 P RIN C IPL E S or S TRA TE GY .

are more exhausting to infantry an d prod u ce more ,

real e ffect than a single charge however grand and ,

imposing th e latter m ay be A charge in an unbroken .

line against infantry can only succeed when the latter

has been much cut up an d disorganiz ed by artillery ,

o r when bad weather prevents them from firing At .

the battle of D resden Murat took advantage o f such

,

a state o f affairs broke a li ne o f A ustrian infantry

, ,

and sabred many o f the men .

C avalry should avoid passing near woods an d thick

ets unless certain they do not conceal infantry skir
,

m ish er s as m u ch inj ury might b e caused them b y the

,

fire of the infantry to which n o reply could be made

,
.

When a charge is successful and the enemy s line ,

’

broken the import ant thing is not to sabre the fugi

,

t i ve s b u t to t urn upon those who still stan d their

,

ground F or this purpose the caval ry is rallied an d

.
, ,

man oeuvred to en velop the flan k of the portions o f the

line yet fighting The infantry w ill b e almost cer
.

t a i n l y swept away .

When on the contrary a charge is repulsed the

, , ,

horsemen should gallop back to the place for rallying .

If there is a second line it should be promptly u n,

masked to give it an opport unity o f coming into a c

,

tion The ranks are reformed preparations are made

.
,

for a n ew charge as the failure of the first attempt

,

should be no cause for discouragement G ood cavalry .

will charge again a nd again .

When infantry is formed in square it shoul d di s

 C A VA LR Y A GA IN ST IN FANTRY . 3 09

miss all apprehensions and pour i nto the cavalry a well

,

aimed fire that should not b e begun t o o soon ; volleys

, ,

commenced when the cavalry is at about one hundred

yards will have a good e ffect The fire by ranks is the
, .

best to use In this way four well aimed volleys may be

.
,
-

del ivered and wi thout precipitation while the cavalry

, ,

is p assing over the one hundred yards which separates

it from the infantry when the fi ring begins This sup .

poses th e front o f the square to c onsist o f four ranks .

Fir st the two rearmos t ranks fire succ essively while

, ,

the m en of the two foremost ran ks stoop These then .

rise and fire at the word of command the front rank ,

last and in the very fa ces of the cavalry In the mean

,
.

ti me the two re a r ranks have reloaded their arms and

, ,

m ay again use them against those horsemen who may

h ave succ eeded i n reaching the line This firing by .

ranks when there are four is only practicable when

, ,

each rank fires but on ce for a renewal of it would be ,

dan gerous to the m en of the front ranks in the midst ,

o f the smoke and confu sion of the combat F our suc .

c e s s i v e volleys well aimed are enough to check the

, ,

best cavalry F our ranks are absolutely necessary

.
,

unless artill ery is at han d to keep the cavalry at a

distance Infantry formed in two ranks is too weak
.
, ,

for such combats ; at least three are n ecessary and ,

four are better .

The b ayonet is th e last resource against cavalry

that h as not been checked by fire It has been pro .

posed to s tretch ropes and place chevaux de f ise in

—r
,
-
31 0 P R IN C IP LES or S TR A TE GY .

front of the infantry but these devices which answer

, ,

very well on a drill ground are of no practic al value

-
,

in presence of an enemy ; they S imply embarrass the

infantry and clog its movements The foot soldier
,
.
-

may and Should expect to r epel cavalry by the use o f

hi s ordinary weapon he should be cool and con v inc ed ,

that horses can never pass through a l ine o f in fantry

well closed u p and bristling with bayon ets timidity ,

confusion and the ravages of artillery are the only

,

things that can compromise him L et alarm be felt .

~

n either at the approach of the horses nor the cries o f ,

the horsemen ; let the ranks be well closed up ; l et the

fire be carefully husbanded and there need be no ,

doubt as to the result o f a charge .

It is not to be expected that this confidence in their

weap ons will be felt by other than veterans w h o have ,

had occasion to test their value an d know from e x p e , ,

r i en c e what they are worth It is for such as these

.
,

to ask as was done in Egyp t and at Mare n go th at

, ,

the cavalry be permitted to c o m e within fifty paces ,

and even less when a most des t ructive fir e may be

,

poured into their ranks It would be dangerous t o

.

try this with raw troops who may experience a not

,

unreasonable feeling of apprehension at the approach

o f cavalry upon them for the first time F or such .

soldiers one hundred paces is about the distance at

,

which they Should b egin to fire .

Th e resistance o f infantry to cavalry is chiefly due

to the order of battle adopted for th at purpose Its .
 C AVAL RY AGAIN ST IN FA NTRY . 31 1

power o f resistance is greatly i ncreased by forming

several squares which protect each other by their fire ;
,

and the flank and reverse fire procured in this way is , ,

much more feared by the cavalry than that coming in

front Mention has been made in another place of
.

large squares formed by divisions o r brigades We

, .

have n ow reference to battalion squares because we ,

a r e considering a simple co mbat between a body of

infantry and one of cavalry ; in this case the small ,

n ess of the squares is not only not disadvantageous as ,

interior space is not required but several small sq u ares

,

are better than a single large o n e because if the latter , ,

is broken through o n on e front all is lost ; but one or , ,

more of a co mb in ation of small squares may be de

stroyed and the remai nder hold firm ; besides they
, ,

give mutual support by cross and flank fires and the ,

en emy s attention is m oreover divided

’
, ,
.

The formation o f these battalion squares is very

simple and is explained in detail in the authorized
,

works on tactics There may be either a lin e o f ob

.

lique squares or i n echelon with a view of flanking

, ,

each other S quares if small may be moved c o n s id

.
, ,

crable distanc e s without material inconvenience .

The infantry should carefu lly avoid throwing away

its fir e u pon ski rmishers sent for w ard by the caval r y ,

often for the very purpose of drawing it or raising a ,

dust under cover o f which some movement may be

,

c on c ealed If the infantry imprudently delivers its

.

fir e upon these skirmishers the squadrons should ,

31 2 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR A TE GY .

immediately charge before the arms can be r e ,

loaded The skirmishers Sh ould be kept at a distance

. ,

by sending out a few good marksmen in front of the

squares .

The only man oeuvr es and form ations in fan try m ay ‘

safely adopt in presence of caval ry are those of squ ares ,

and close columns .

Ar t. I V .— C o mb a ts o f A r til l e r y.

A rtillery should n ever be brought into action unless ,

well supported by other troops The supports take .

positions to the right and left of the batteries covering ,

themselves by any features of the ground , from the

,

fire o f the enemy only emerg ing to resist attacks

,

upon the battery or upon themselves P ositions are .

selected for artillery where it m ay a c t with greatest

effect A firm soil is requisite to prevent the wheels
.

from sinking too much A rocky site would be u n fa .

v o r ab l e from the many dangerous fragments produced

,

by the shot of the enemy The space should be s u ffi .

c i e n tl y extensive t o afford room for all the pieces of

the battery and high enough to give a good command

,

over the surrounding ground within range but not so ,

high that the fire would be too plunging S l opes .

o f about o n e hundredth are the best

-
If the obj ect .

aimed at is near the elevation of the site of the bat

,

t e ry sho u ld be smal l but thi s m ay be greater a s th e

,

range Increases .
 C O MBA TS or LL E RY
A RT I . 31 3

A rtillery duels rarely lead to decisi ve results and ,

are usually avoided Sometimes they are in e v it a

.

ble In such a case other thi ngs being equal th at

.
, ,

party wi ll evidently have the advantage whi ch has the

bes t vi ew o f the enemy an d has at the same time the ,

best cover A r tillery cannot endure a flank or very

.

oblique fire and when such a fi re is received an im

, , ,

mediate change o f position becom es necessary This .

m ay sometimes be accomplished under cover of the

smoke or some undulation o f the ground A t the
,
.

battle of I ena C olonel S e ru zi e r was in comman d o f a

,

battery o f twenty pieces whi ch was Opposed by a very ,

superior o n e and his was o n the poin t o f being de

,

s troyed He immediately withdrew the altern ate

.

pieces k e ep ing up the fire with the others u ntil by a

, , ,

rapid movement under cover o f the smoke he reached ,

a position where he had a very slant fire upon the

e nemy his remai n ing pieces were soon disengaged .

A battery in taking position to get an e n fi l a ding

,

o r slant fire upon an opposing bat tery run s th e risk ,

o f ex osing its own flank to attack

p A b attery m ay .

present a poor m ark to the enemy by having wide

interval s between its pieces while at the same time , , ,

s ome o f the m must obtain a slant fire upon him the

fire o f all th e pieces is convergent The effect of such .

a fire is very powerful A battery o f eight pieces .

united wo uld scarcely b e able to conten d successfully

w ith o n e of six pieces divided into two or three
parts at some distance from each other but all con
, ,

14
31 4 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR ATE GY .

verging their fire on the larger battery It should .

b e observed th at in this we do not find a v iolation

f the principle which sanctions the employment f
‘

o o

as many pieces as possible i n a battery C on centra .

tion o f fire is the obj ect to be attained in both cases ,

and there is no contradiction between th e two .

The caissons shou ld be covered as m uch as possible

from fire and even from sight It is better to aim
,
.

low than high to use the ricochet when i t is p ra c ti

,

cable to fire slowly at distances greater than 700

,

yards and rapidly inside of that and every sho t

, ,

s hould be well aimed Th e use o f shells is re c o m

.

mended for broken ground solid shot against colu m n s

o f attack although at close range grape an d canister
, , ,

are better as also against cavalry and infantry in line

, .

A strict defensive should not be observed for if it is ,

well to select a strong position an d to profit by every ,

accidental co ver presented by the g round it is equally ,

:

so to inspire the enemy with an apprehension o f

attack and to advance upon his position when pru
,

dence permits as the mora l and real e ffect o f s u ch a

,

course is great .

The cavalry is the best arm for supporting that

portion of the a r tillery which S hould move rapidly from
point to poi n t but the suppo r ts of batte r ies of position
,

should be of infantry and indeed that a r m is the b est

, , ,

in all cases when the simple protectio n o f the artillery

is considered If both arms are united as supports ,
.

i nfantry sk irmishers will be to the right and left to e n

 C O M B A TS or A R TI LL E RY . 31 5

gage the opposing skirmish ers ; the m ain body of th e

infantry will be some what to the rear as well cover ,

ed as po ssible and the cavalry in echelon o n the flanks

,
.

A battery whose supports are very weak o r do not

,

contain cavalry to meet that o f the enemy m ay be in ,

danger of being captured and should select a posi

,

tion unfavorable to t h e ac t io n of cavalry C olonel .

F oy seeing a body o f Ru ssian cavalry issuing fro m

,

the bridge near S c h afl h a u se rapidly withdrew his a r

'

tille ry into a clump o f pines which was fortunately

at hand ; he there formed his battery into a square ,

and was en abled to keep th e cavalry o fl u ntil t wo

'

regi m ents o f infantry cam e up to his assistance .

When a battery is very d estructive in its effects ,

it m ay become n ecessary to attempt i ts C apture .

S kirmishers will precede the assaulting party th e ,

intervals o f th e line being a s great as possible to o ffer ,

a poor mark t o the en emy and to enable the men to

,

shelter themsel ves behind any l ittle accidental covers .

These skir m ishe rs will b e specially u seful if they are ,

'

good m arksmen in ki lling the gunners and horses

, .

While skirmishers advance on the front of the battery ,

small columns will threaten the flanks If the fire is .

directed upo n the colu m ns the skirmishers will ,

advan ce rapidly upon the front ; if o n the contra r y , ,

the skirmishers at t ract the fire the colu m ns m ay ,

advance withou t m uch l e ss Whe n these are near the

.

supports they w ill charge vigorously and if the

, ,

suppor ts are driven o ff the battery is attacked in rear

,
.
31 6 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR ATE G Y .

A s cavalry moves very rapidly it is a good arrange ,

m ent to h ave the assaulting party contain both infantry

and cavalry the former to act as S kir m ishers and
,

occupy the battery i n front while the latter form the ,

columns on the flanks .

If the pieces are captured a n d th e horses are still ,

at hand for use they S hould b e rapidly carried o ff ;

,

if this is impracticable they S hould be spik ed and the

, ,

elevating screws and rammers carried off .

A r t . V — A t ta
. ck an d D e fe n ce o f a R e do ub t.

l
A redoubt may be armed with cannon o r defended ,

by infantry alone In the fi rst case the can non m u st

.
,

b e S ile nced by other cannon but in the second case ,

the attack may b e made without any such prelimina

ries .

M arksmen en velop a part o f the redoubt aiming ,

at the crest of the parapet to prevent the defenders

from Showing themsel ves o r at least to cau se the m
, , ,

to fire rapidly and inaccurately The circl e of skir .

m ish e r s i s grad u ally contracted an active fire being ,

all the time kept up When su fficiently n ear the

.

ditch they advance at a run and j ump into it u nless

, ,

they are checked by some such obstacle as ab atis ,

palisades trous de loup &c if these are encountered

,
- -

, .
,

a way must be Opened through them b efore farth er

progress is m ade While some descend into the
.

ditch others remai n upon the counterscarp to fire

,
 ATTAC K AND DE F E NC E or A RE D UBT .O 31 7

u pon the defenders who show themselves When the .

troops in the ditch h ave rested som ewh at they m ake ,

the assault Th e soldiers assist each other in ascend

.

ing the sca r p and getting upon the berme from which ,

point they r u sh over the parapet i n a body a nd co m ,

pel the defenders t o l a y down their arms .

If the redoubt is armed wit h cannon an d of greater ,

stren gth than is supposed above it would be meces ,

sary to use a rtillery to break down palisades di smoun t

, ,

the pieces and breach the parapets The best posi t ions
,
.

for the artillery a re those fro m which a plunging or

e n fi l a di n g fi re can be obtained If the redoubt has
.

embrasures o n e o r two pieces S ho uld b e directed

,

against each o f them as there is an Opportunity not

. ,

only Of dismounting th e pieces but also of firing ,

through the emb rasures into the i n terior of the work .

A fe w good marksmen may also be detailed to pick

o ff the gunners whene v er t h ey S ho w themse l ves a t
,

the embrasures .

When the artillery h as produce d its ful l effect t he ,

skirmishers will b e advanced as above described The

,
.

skirmi shers will gen erally be followed by supporting

columns that will advance u pon t he salients O f the
,

work Each column should be preceded by workmen

.

provided with axes and l adders S hould be carried by

,

m en detailed for the purpose I t is a good plan to

.

gi ve each O f the leading men a fascine wi t h w hich h e ,

m ay Shield his body greatly and he may use it fo r

,

partly filling up the di tch The skir mishers open o u t

.
31 8 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

and permit the columns to pass through their lin e ,

keeping up a rapid fire until t he ascent O f t he parapet

by the storming party begins The important thing .
,

at this decisive moment i s unity o f movement ,

and action an entrance being ma de o n all sides at

,

once The troops should t h erefore pause a moment

.
, ,

o n the berme until a signal is given a n d then all wil l

, ,

rush forward together Such an attack as this is

.

almost certain Of s u ccess .

The commander of a redoubt Sh ould use every effo rt

to In crease the confidence of hi s men especially by ,

his own demeanor still every thing should be kep t i n

the best possible order If the atta ck is not to take
.

place at once the redoubt Should be surrounded wit h

,

an ab atis ; large stones should be obtained to roll

down into the ditches ; sand bags and sods should b e -

prepared for m aking loopholes along the parapet A s .

soon as the batteries of the enemy are seen fire should ,

b e at once opened upon the m ; b ut when th eir gun s are

fairly in position and partly covered by the ground ,

the con test becomes an unequal on e O nly th ose .

pieces will be kept in position w h ich are covered fr o m

the enemy s fire by traverses or otherw i se A few
’
.

other pieces may som etimes be temporarily run into

battery and fired with grape upon the infantry Th e .

e ffec t will be good .

A few marksme n will at fi rst shelter the mselve s

wherever they can along the parapet ; but when the
fir e O f the assailants ceases for fear of inj u ring their
,
 A TT A C K AND DE F E NC E OF A O
R E D UBT . 31 9

o wn men the defenders will lin e the parapets an d

,

o p en a w arm fire O f muske t ry and artillery upon the

columns O f attack and upo n the skirmishers who are
,

attempting to pas s the obstacles in fr ont Of th e di tch .

This is the ti m e to explode any mines that m ay

h ave b een prepared i n the ground over which t h e
a s sailan ts must pass If the enemy succeed in getting
.

in to the di t ch and collecting their forces to make th e

,

assault shells s h ould b e rolled down upon them as

, ,

well as trunks Of trees l arge rocks beehi ves any

, ,
-

thing that may cause confu sion The defenders must .

then mount the parapet to receive the enemy at the

point of the bayonet More than o n e attack has been
.

repelled at this stage Of it At Huningue i n 1 79 6 .

, ,

C aptai n Fe y O f the artillery Ob serving that the enemy ,

h ad planted s c al ing la dde rs to ascend into a demil une

he was holding had shells rolled down upon them by
, ,

which conside rable inj ury was done them crowded as ,

as they w ere in the di t c h The gunners seized their .

rammers and handspikes and mounting the parapet , , ,

knocked on the head an d back into the ditch the

first men who showed themsel ves The enemy .

ab andoned the attack When we reflect upon the

.

d isordered condition o f the assailants at s uch a

m oment and the di fficulty they must experience in
,

u sing t heir weapons as well as upon the physical an d

,

m oral advantages in favor of the d efenders who have ,

a fi r m foothold upon the parapet an d nothing to clog

th eir freedom O f motion it will be mani fest that not
, ,
32 0 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

only have the defenders many chances o f success b ut ,

it seems impossible that such an attack can res ult in

any thing but failure .

A r t . V L— A t t a c k an d D e fe n c e o f a str o n g D w ell
in g -h o u s e
, w i th o u t -b u i l di n g s an d en c lo su r e s ,

a ll o f m a s o n r y.

A careful examin ation Of t he locality should b e

made before the attack and this m ay be attempted ,

wi t h least danger just b e fo re da wn Nothing i s s up .

‘
posed to be known o f th e arrangement Of the in t e
rior All that meets the eye are several walls pi erced
.

with Ioopholes an d several ways of approach along

,

w hich an attack may be made By the time th e o u t .

skirts are seized there will be light e n ough to see h o w

,

t o advance farther Much danger will be incurred in

.

the onward movements and it might well be desired to ,

have them m ade u nder cover of the darkn ess but this ,

always leads to confusion and gives those who are S O

inclined an opportunity to skulk In night attacks .

there is gene r ally a want o f concert mistakes occur , ,

panics take place by all of which means the best plans

,

miscarry T herefore it is better to m ake every prepa

.

ration for the attack in the n ight an d execute it

j ust at dawn Darkness is only favorable in case O f
.

a surpri se .

E very preparation should b e made for forcing lock s

a n dhinges and breaking through doors If none o f the .

s oldiers have the skill n ecessary for using tools n at i ve

,
 A TTA C K F
AN D D E E N C E OF H O US E S , E TC . 32 1

m echanics must be pressed into the service and m ade ,

to act if t hey are u nwilling L adders should be col

, .

l ec te d in Order to facilitate entrance by t he windows

, ,

o r at least to enable grenades to b e thrown i n

,
The .
,

attack is supposed to b e made by infantry alone for ,

ar t illery c a n soon destroy s u ch structures as we are

n o w considering .

The approach should be made in silence until the ,

sentinels challenge and the enemy begins to fire ; a

rush must then be m ade u p o n several points at once ,

i n order to divide his atten t ion A loopholed wall is.

supposed to be the first Obs t acle b ut by inserting the ,

muske ts o f several men into ea ch hole the enemy may ,

soon be forced to leav e it Th e gate O f the enclosure

.

m ust then b e broken down o r a portion of the wall

. .

The fo ot O f the wall O f the house is reached the first

thing is to stop u p the lower lo o pholes with bags of
earth or wi t h timbe rs ; e fforts must be made to break
down the door wi t h axes o r by battering or to burst
, ,

O ff the hi n ges ; this will soon be accomplished unless ,

the doors are strongly braced from behind ; i n the

mean time sharpshooters should watch the windows
,

and fire wheneve r a m an shows himself The men .

should keep dispersed as much as possible When .

ever a window seems abandoned a t tempts should be ,

made to enter it To increase the number of open i ngs

.

into the in t erior the wall m ay be battered down wi t h

,

any heavy ti m bers that are at hand F inally an e n .

,

trance is e ffected into the lower story and the defend ,

*
14
32 2 P RINC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

ers driven above They may n ow be summoned to sur

.

render If they accept all is over and the captives

.
, ,

should recei ve the treat m e n t du e to b rave m e n If ‘

.

they decline to surre n der a large fire lighted belo w ,

will soo n bring the m to terms .

In the defence doors wi ll be b arricaded and loop

,

holes made in all the stories taking care to have the m ,

as small as possible and those of the lower story so

high that the enemy cannot close the m nor fi re
through them Banquettes to stand upon m ay b e
.
, ,

made of plank placed o n b arrels b oxes & c The , ,

.

angles are weak points and an e ffort must b e m ade to

,
‘

pierce loopholes there If the roof will b u rn i t m u s t

.
,

b e taken O ff and the upper floor covered with earth .

The principal beams O f the frame O f the h ouse S hould

b e propped so as not to fall if the wal l is breached ;
,

to close the breach various household articles m ay be

,

u sed Books are quite impe n etrable to musket balls

.
-
.

Be ds ack s and pillow cases filled with earth also car

-

pets rolled up resist bullets well Balcon ies m ay be

, .

fitted up as machicoulis &c ,

.

A r t . VI L — A t ta c k a n d D e fe n c e o f a V i l la g e.

In A rt I Of this chapter some Obse r v ations were

. .

m ade with reference to combats O f infantry i n towns

an d villages b u t they were supposed to be O f an o p en
,

character What follows i s to be understood as relat

.

ing to an intrenched village .

 A TT AC K A ND DE F EN C E OF A VILL AG E . 32 3

Here the artille ry pl ays the principal part because ,

it would be other wise impossible to prostrate the O h

s t ac l es prepared by the defence t o aid in holdi n g a post

whi ch may be O f great importance either as a bridge ,

he ad or a strong point Of a line Of b attle o r a pivot

, ,

for man oeuvres The most favorabl e posi tions should

.

therefore be selected that are O ffered by the surroun d

ings Of the village either commanding points or others
, ,

fr om which the principal stree t m ay be e n fil a de d o r ,

the walls bre a ched that give shelter to the enemy

‘

If a redoubt defends the approaches it should be first ,

attacked for success at other points will lead to no de

,

c is iv e result so long as th at holds out Several pieces .

o f a rtillery may be directed against a single embrasure ,

and their fire directed to othe rs in succession as fast as ,

the guns are d ismounted or withdrawn O ther pieces .

should e n fil a de the terre pl ei n break down palisades

-
, ,

&c . All this may be done openly if ti m e press es and ,

th e ground favors but it is m ere prudent to m ake a

,

careful ex amination Of the locality in the first place ,

and during the night throw up epaulemen ts O f earth to

, ,

cover the guns in the position selected for them It is .

also the part Of a wise man before attempting a deci ,

si ve movement to procure ladders and tools Of every

,

kind n eces sary for throwing down walls and parapets .

These arra n gements h avi n g been made fire will be ,

open ed at dawn The artillery will make vigorous e f

.

forts to produce the effect expected There will b e the

’

greater probability o f this as the pieces are of heavier

2 2 4: P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

metal When the breaches begin to open an d some Of

. ,

the artillery of the work is sil enced the skirmi shers ,

may be advanced to envelop wi t h their fire as much O f

the village as they can The skirmishers S hould n o t
.

m ask the artillery which continues its fire but they

, ,

will aim at windows loopholes at every man wh o shows

, ,

himself They will be followed by workmen provided

.
,

wit h tools for l evelling hedges and palisades filling u p ,

ditches breaking down gates enl arging breaches & c

, , ,
.

In the mean time the skirmishers close in upon the

,

village Th e artillery is now silent except it may

.
,

thro w shell s into the town The skirmishers still , a d

.

vance the boldest even approachi ng the breaches an d

,

attempting to enter while the workmen are busy with

,

their tools preparing the way for the advan ce O f the

,

colum n s over th e outer Obstacles un t il now they have

b een out O f range or concealed by the ground trees
, , ,

&c . They move out at a give n signal towards th e

breaches and other points indicated ; they destroy any
b arriers which may still exist leap i nto the ditches and
,

scale the parapets break dow n palisading burst Open

, ,

gates by means O f powder bags o r l evers During the

-
.

same time the Skirmishers between the col u mn s e n

ter by any availabl e Openings leaping o ver hedges , ,

climbing walls wherever they do not meet a tO O fo r m i da

,

ble resistance F in ally the exterior defences are car

.
,

ried the troops b efore penet r ating farther ought to

, ,

rally an d make new disposition s for dri ving the enemy

from any houses still in their possession .
 A TTAC K A N D D E EN C E F OF A V ILL AG E . 32 5

If the defence is obstinate much ca ution is requisite ,

in pushing forward in to the interior The outer houses .

should be se ized as they might be occupied by parties of

,
'

the defenders who could t ake the troops in the streets

,

at great disadvantage If the houses are detached they

.
,

will be captured by surrounding them if contiguous

and vigorously defended a passage m ay be effected ,

fro m o n e to another in succession by breaking through

the separating walls The defende rs h a v ing thus been
.

driven from point to point an e ffort will be made to ,

cut the m O ff from the line o f retreat which is usually ,

through a defile such as a bridge or n arrow street ;

,

this m anoeuvre will generally hasten the evacuation

o f the village .

A village is seldom without support from troops on

the exteri or ; it would there fore be impossible to a t
, ,

tempt a n attack without having force eno ugh to hold

,

these supports in check or to engage them To Obtai n .

success a marked superiori ty O f forces i s requisite as ,

well as in the number an d calibre of cannon I t .

would be very ras h t o a t tack an intrenched village ,

which formed part O f a line of bat t le without this eu ,

p erio ri t
.
y A n isolated village should be turned rather ,

than attacked .

Some time is necessary to prepare for the defence

o f a vill age for there is much to be done if a v igorous
,

res istance is t o be made A continuous enclosure .

must be arranged advantage being taken O f hedges

,

and wall s which will answer the purpose and all ,

32 6 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

others being thr o w n down in order to gi ve n o covers ,

for the enemy Those may be left standing which

.

are completely under fire an d will b e hindr ances to ,

their movements The same course wil l be pursued

.

with di tches Beh i nd the enclosure every facility for

.
,

circulation of troops Should be found The enclosure .

should be a broken line i n order that its parts m ay

flank each other and give cross fi r e s If it is inter
— .

r u p t e d at any point the break should be supplied by

,

abatis palisades barricades or earthworks ; batteries

, , ,

are constructe d for the cannon an d sometimes re ,

doubts built .

1
Behind the stan ding hedges trenches m ay b e dug ,

and the earth thrown to the fro n t as shelter from the ,

fire of infantry is thus Obtained A wall th a t is over .

S i x feet high is more valuable loopholes may be

made in it and they should be small and beyond th e
,

reach of the enemy A banquette for them of boards

.
, ,

may be s upported on barrels or any thing o f that kind .

It is not always easy to make these loopholes Of suit

able dimensions as the stones in the wall m ay be too
,

large this defect may be cured by using sti ff mortar

or sods .

F inally a keep should be arranged in th e interior

,

o f the village to secure t he retreat O f the defenders

, ,

and to give them more confidence in resistance This .

m ay be a church and cemetery or a large dwelli n g ,

house and enclosure .

A fortified village is a strong point Of support for

 O BS ERVA TIO NS UP ON M AN G EUVR E S . 32 7

an army on a field Of battle as frequent examples

,

have proved .

A r t . V I I l .— o b se r va tio n s u p o n th e Sub je c t o f

Ma n mu vr e s .

A fter what has been said with reference to various

operations in war i n which the m an oeu vres an d evo
,

lu t io n s prescribed in the tactics find applications it ,

will not be out of place to close this chapter by some

remark s with reference to the s e m ove m en ts in order ,

that their spiri t m ay be appreciate d Their charac .

t e ris ti cs should be as follows

l s t P r omp tn es s fo r while a man oeuvre is in pro
.
,

gress the troops are comparatively helpless as a mass ,

,

an d it Should be consu m mated as speedily as possible .

2 d S imp l ic i ty i n order that O fli c er s and soldiers

.
,

m ay execute the manoeu vre mechanically SO to speak , ,

an d without thinki n g O f it A co m plicated move .

m ent produces confusion and this m ay lead to defeat

,
.

Simplicity i n this case mea n s facility of execution

, ,
.

3 d S ec u r i ty ; that is to say if the enemy appears

.
,

unexpectedly w h ile the movement is being executed ,

the troops should be in the best order to resist him .

4th P r eci s ion i n order that every movement may

.
,

have well de fin e d limits which regulate its progress

-
,

an d direction .

5 th A br ief a n d c le a r co mm a n d for upon the na

.

ture Of the command Oft en depends the success o f a

32 8 P RIN C IP L E S OF STR ATE GY .

m anoeuvre If the comman d is such that a man

. ,
’

hearing it cannot doubt as to the meaning the m a ,

n oeu v r e will s u cceed If o n the contrary the language

.
, ,

is ambig u ous i n sense or the words improperly ar

,

ranged there can b e neither certainty o f conception

,

nor promptness Of execution .

A man oe u vre to be good should as far as possible

, , , ,

be of en s zve that is to say it is better in its execution

’

for the troops to move for w ard than to the r e ar b e ,

.

cause a retrograde movement has a dishearteni ng e f ~

fe et and may bring on a shameful flight on the con

,

t rary the courage O f the troop s is better susta ine d

,

whe n they advance as it were to meet the en emy

, ,
.

Ma n oeuvres should be not only well arranged but ,

properly executed S ki ll can only be gained and r e

.

t a in e d by constant practice an d therefore the drill is,

n ecessary for veterans as well as for recruits While .

keeping soldiers in good drill it is n ecessary to avoid ,

insisting too much upon things really of little import

ance Insist upon what is necessary and rej ect what
.
,

is superfluous S oldiers should b e accustom ed to r e

.

main together and in good Order but it is su ffi cient , ,

with this Vie w to require the to u ch of th e elbows ;

,

that is to say that each m an feel his neighbor

,

lightly and that the whole b attalion facing in the

, ,

same direction be o n a line n early straight NO com

,
.

m ander should be S O foolish as to bring his gui des o n “

”
the line i n a shower Of grape or musket balls or ,

should l isten to the re m onstran ces Of a m aj or or an

 OBS ER VA TIO N S UP ON M AN CE UVR E S . 32 9

adj u t an t who woul d think all was lost if the b attalion

were not in a perfectly straight line A nd as to th e s e .

wonderful firings o f a whole battalion as o n e m an ,

that are someti m es esteemed S O highly is any thing ,

li ke the m ever heard in a great b attle ? A mid th e

thundering of the artillery the b eating Of drums the
, ,

cries of the wounded an d dying the excitement Of th e

,

co mbatants are they able to give tha t close attention

,

to the w ord o f co mm and which alone makes such fi r

i ng possible ? If possible what value has it ? A re
,

more of the enemy killed and wounded than by a roll

ing fire ? E very Operation i n war is accompanied by
m ore or less disorder but this to the eye Of the real
, ,

s oldier is grand and beautiful when it is the result O f a

,

n oble dari ng and enthusias m an d is infinitely prefer

,

able to the frigid reg ularity of indi fference or luke

war mness It is a n excellent thing to drill soldier s
.

upon irreg ular gro u nd s u ch as they find upon the

,

field O f battle .

G ood marching is the important thing A body o f .

troops that m arches well is al w ays imposi ng and by ,

this alone victory is o fte n attracted indepen dently Of ,

all the advantages procured by that good order which

r esults fro m fine m a rchi n g It is not o u t O f place to
.

repeat agai n the ma xi m O f Marshal S axe that victory ,

resides in the legs of the soldiers Marching should .

,

therefore be dee m ed O f great importance an d muc h

, ,

time and pains should be devoted to it first in level ,

drill grounds then along roads and finally over ir

, ,
330 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

regul ar ground of all kinds The cadenced step lig ht

.
,

n ess Of carriage and the touch o f the elbow are the

,

things for each man to learn ; and for the whole body ,

the preservation of distances and di rection .

By keep i n g the s tep wavering is avoided an d a

, ,

whole battali on moves like a S ingle man If a body .

Of troops is charging another it is only by all keeping

,

the sa m e step O f uniform length th at t h e enemy s li ne ’

is attacked along the whole front at once By the .

tou ch of th e elbow soldiers remain together an d pre

,

s erve the alignment n ecessary for an enga g ement .

A ny pressure coming from the dir ection O f the guide

, ,

S hould be yielded to gradually and without c rowd ,

ing A t the same time the touch towards the guide

.
,

shall always be lightly k ept up The p r es er va ti on of .

dis ta n ces o n the m ar ch is of the greatest importance .

It is a less evil for the distance to be diminished than

i ncreased because it is much worse to have gaps in a
,

line than to have some men crowded to the rear who ,

m ay be usefully employed in replacing or cari ng for

the wounded The preservation Of distances is in the
.

hands o f the Officers an d non commissioned Officers -

,

who taken together form what is called the f r a m e

, ,

w o rk ( cadre) of the battalions It is o f very great im .

portance that the ca dr e be well composed Y oung .

soldiers di rected upon th e field of battle by good O ffi

,

cers and non commissioned o fficers will rival veterans

-
,

upon the field of battle, as Lu tzen and Ba utze n

testify .
 O BS E R VA TIO N S UP ON M A N CE UV R E S . 33 1

The preservation Of direction is quite as import ant

as distance i n order that crowding and confusion in
,

ranks be avoided an d that there be any certainty in

,

the execution of m a n oeuvres It is i mportant to prae

.

tise battali on s in run ning as it is sometimes n e c e s

,

sary in order to achieve success to get over groun d

,

very rapidly and it is frequently advantageous It

,
.

usually produces m ore or less confu sion and the m en ,

should lear n to avoid that evil as much as they can .

There is a thing rarely seen at dri lls which is how , ,

ever very im p ortant ; that is rallying to the Colors on

, , ,

the supposition that a battali on may be dispersed and

rally again to r e enter the engagement
-
S oldiers .

should b e taught how obligatory it is upon them to

rally to the flag as long as it floats and to sac r ifice ,

their lives to save it from capture Honors paid to .

the flag are not mere empty ceremony ; they are in

tended to inspire the respe ct due from every soldier
to this sym bol O f valor and devotion S e e the veteran .

u ncover hims elf i n presen ce o f the ensign that he has

O ften followed to Victory he is proud as of his own ,

wounds Of th e marks o f the en emy s bullets upon it

,
’

he venerates those folds which have survi ved twenty

battles The n ames inscribed upon it are his ti t les of
.

nobility they bring to mind gran d and glorious

memori es ; he valu e s more those brilliant and de
served mementoes of his services than every thin g else
whi ch men usually so m uch desire .
332 P RINC IP L E S OF S TRATE GY .

C H A P TE R V II .

RE C ONN O IS S ANC E S .

are eithe r a r med o r top og r ap hi ca l

RE C ONN OIS S AN C E S .

Bo t h kinds will b e treated briefly although the last ,

.

have little to do with o u r gen eral subj ect .

Ar t. L — Ar m e d R eco n no issa n c e s.

Armed reconnoissances are m ade to procure In fo r

mation with reference to the position and force of th e
enemy S O long as a commander i s ignoran t upon
.

these points he can have no confidence in his m ea

,

sures ei ther for attack o r defence if he is o n the

,

march he must feel his way with great caution ; he

,

is in dan ger of falling into an ambuscade or of making ,

a blundering Offensive movement or of being suddenly ,

attacked It is therefore necessary to endeavor not

.
, ,

only to learn exactly the composition strength and , ,

p o si t ion of the di fferent corps i n the opposing army ,

but to be informed of their move m en t s an d S impl e

changes of position in order to divin e the intention s
,

Of their commanding general a n d take precaution s to

thwa r t his proj ects A s much information as practic
.

able should be gathered fro m intercepted c o m m u n ic a

tions S pies deserters and travellers This S hould be
, , , .
 AR M E D RE C O N N OIS S A N C E S . 333

cl assified under various heads and always kept com ,

p l e te an d ready for reference With these notes

. an d
a good map upon which are indicated the positio n s of
,

the several corps by means Of numbers or c o n v e n

,

t io n al colors or colored pins a very good idea may be

,

formed O f the force an d the locatio n Of the hostil e

forces When the en emy is very n e a r it is n ecessa r y
.
,

t o ascertain every day what changes Of position have

been m a de for the purpose either Of concentration o r

withdrawal . Hence arises the n ecessity for armed
reconnoissances which are Often very bloody affairs
,
.

The custom usually prevailing O f covering camps

, ,

with chains of posts and sentin els makes it impossible ,

generally to see them an d the arrangements of the

e n emy for attack o r de fence To remove this u n c e r
,
.

tainty a reconnoissance becomes necessary which mu st

, ,

be pushed on past the screen o f post and sentinel s ,

to a point where the o fficer in charge may see plainly

the hostile army , apprec iate the advantages or i n c o n
v e n ie n c e s o f its position count i ts battalion s j udge of ,
,

i ts means o f resistance whether it is intrenched and

,

is strong in artillery whether the ground i s favorable

,

for the action Of cavalry & c These di fferent Objects

,
.

S hould be seized with the promptness O f a practised eye ,

for such an operation will u sually call to arms t he

whole of the enemy s force which may be very supe
’
,

rior in nu mbers and it may be n ecessary to l eave the

,

ground speedily But the Object has been attained ,

s ince the enemy h as displayed his forces .

3 34 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR AT E G Y .

Such reconnoissances usually precede battles By .

means of them t he general ascer t ains the true con di

tion of affairs before g iving his final orders ; he sees
,

whether the corps O f the enemy have the positions

they have been reported to occupy ; are in supporting
distance Of each other ; are too much spread out
have their wings supported &c O n the march the ,
.
,

ad v anced guard reconnoitres the e n e m v Sometimes .

the reconnoissance is made in order to discover if a

single point is strongly occupied ; if a bridge has been
broken if a defile is fortified if the enemy has canno n
in a particular place if he holds a certai n vil l age ; if
he is moving along such and such a road aft er a
defeat &c In some cases the r e c on n C itr in g p ar ty is
,
.

less numerous and composed of cavalry alo n e i n order

, ,

that its march m ay be more rapid But when the .

party is expected to have an engagement it S hould b e ,

composed of all arms a n d com m ande d by an o fficer

Of experience .

The commander usually receives writte n i n s tru c

tion s These he Should understand perfectly before
.

setting out He should have a map a glass and a l l

.
, ,

necessary materials for writing and S ketching He .

should procure two O r three of the residents O f th e

country to act as g uides and answer his questions rela
,

t ive to the names and sizes Of Villages the character ,

o f the roads the extent of woods the features O

, f stream s ,

and the country generally &c He sho uld t ake wi t h

,
.

him a n o fficer who speaks the language of the country ;

 A RM ED RE C ON N O IS S ANC E S . 33 5

i t is better still if he kn ows the langu age himself .

F in ally h e should carefully inspect every m a n animal

, ,

and vehicle O f the command to be certain th at all are ,

in good condition and provided with provision s and

munitions .

A detachment intrusted with such a duty should

, ,

take all the precau tions O f advanced guard fl a nk e rs ,

& c ; scouts S hould examin e hollow road s woods

.
, ,

villages every place where the enemy might be con

,

c e al e d E very on e who is met should be questioned

.

as to the road &c When a detachment passes

,
.

through a village the commander should halt som e

,

minutes t o obtain n ews Of the position Of the enemy .

If he suspects deceit he should take hostages and re

, ,

lease the m only when he is certai n that correct informa

tion has been gi ven him His inquiries S hould n o t be
.

t o o prolonged lest t h e enemy might learn his where

,

abouts and take measures to thwart h i m in hi s

,

object .

The commander should n ote particularly the features

Of the country he passes through i n order to deter ,

min e in ad vance points upon which he might fall

back and make a stand if necessary A t cross roads ,
.
-

he should question the gui des to ascertain their dirce ,

tion and termination He wil l test and correct his

.

m ap To get an accurate notion Of the country he

. ,

should turn b ack frequently and examine it in its

various aspects from different points of View .

The detachment remains united as well as possible

3 36 P RINC IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

during the m arch in order to be always in con dition

,

to sustai n an attack or dr ive i n an ad vanced post .

The main body should therefore not lose S ight of the

, ,

advanced guard no r that of its scouts A t nigh t the

,
.

scouts may be called in as useless o r at least they

, , ,
.

may be dra wn i n within hearing distan ce In such .

cases frequent halts must be made i n order to l isten

,
.

V illages S hould not b e entered if any thing suspiciou s

is discovered and until the return o f two or three
,

m en sent o u t to examin e them .

When the length o f th e march requires a halt it ,

S hould b e m ade behind a wood o r som e feat ure Of ,

the gro u nd which will conceal the troops Sentinels .

,

placed in the woods or upon high points so as to see ,

the country without being seen will give notice of ,

every thing that goes on C avalry sentinels i n pairs

.
, ,

will be posted at a still greater distance on th e roads

towards the en emy in order that o n e m ay leave their
,

pos t and bring any i nformation th e comm ander should

have while the other re m ains on th e lookout If it
,
-
.

is necessary to halt near a village to take food the ,

troops should pass through and take position on the

S ide n e x t th e en emy in order that he may not seize it
.
, .

The commander will oblige the inhabitants to supply

provi sions which he will distribute n either o fficers n or
, ,

m e n being permitted to o c cu p y h o u s e s A guard will be .

stationed in the Village to enforce this regulation and ,

to see that the requisition for provision s is complie d

with It is the better plan to pay for these if possib l e
.
,
.
 AR MED REC ON N O IS S A N C E S . 33 7

SO long as the Obj ect o f the reconnoi ssance is n o t

attained the detachment Should press forward w ith
, ,

o u t fear o f bei n g compromised as it is here suppose d ,

to be strong enough to over throw easily any body of

troops it m ay probably encounter There are other .

reconnoissances made by smal l detachments where

, ,

stratagem is e m p l o ve d rather than force to discover

, ,

what is desired and i n such cases of cou rse an e u

, , ,

a e m e n t i s to be avoide d In a stro ng reconnoissan ce

g g .
,

o n the contrary where the Obj ect is to penetrate as far

,

as the posi t ions o f th e en emy the de t achmen t S hould

,

n o t permit its elf to be checked by any body o f troops

it m ay chance to meet but ra t her regard it as a piece

,

Of good fortune as prisoners may be captured w h o can

,

give v aluable information and a runni n g fight m ay,

be kept up to the outposts o f th e enemy where the ,

flying par ty will give th e al arm The line IS soo n .

pierced an d a good Opportunity is given of seeing the

,

troops of the en emy as they deploy to repel the attack .

They a re thus forced to S how their stren g th The .

comm an der should at this moment look for a high

, ,

point wh e n ce h e m ay ex amin e th e ground and get an

idea o f th e posi t ion itself and the man ner In which i t
,

i s occupied as well as the force and composition o f

,

the troops He m akes or causes to be m ade a rapid

.
, ,

sketc h Of th e ground and t he position of the enemy .

He should n ot i n th e heat of a first success permit

, ,

an inconsiderate pursuit of t he fugitives a n d losin g , ,

sight o f the Obj ect o f his expedition beco m e en gaged ,

15
3 38 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

so deeply as to be unable to withdraw O n the con .

t r a r y he m ust know h o w to stop a n d order a retreat

, ,

eve n in the mi dst o f a s u ccessful engagement when ,

he has seen what he wi shes P rudence must here

.

control courage and coolness regulate the whole

,

Operation .

The commander of a recon noitring party S houl d

avoid an engagement that would draw h i m O ff from
his Obj ect for h ismission i s not to damage the enemy,
,

but to discover his plan s and acquire a n accurate idea

o f his position .When it comes in his way he may ,

attack defeat detachments o f the enemy m ake

, ,

prisoners capture or spike cannon ; but he would b e

,

reprehensible for turning out of his route and losing

time to attempt to surprise a park or carry o ff a con ,

voy or disperse a careless body of troops even if suc

, ,

c e ss ful . S uch opera t ion s are not allowable unless it ,

would b e too dan gerou s to ad vance without driving

O ff troops who might b e at th e S ides O f his route .

S ecr et reconnoissances are con ducted upon pri n ci

ples entirely di fferent F ew m e n are taken in order to
.
,

el u de b e t ter the observation of the enemy o r his pur

suit The e ffort is made to approach by night th e
.

poin t t hat i s t o b e reached The detachment moves

.

stealthily through ravines and hollow roads making ,

lo n g detours to avoid meeti n g the patrols O f the enemy ,

and returning by some other way so as to escape any ,

trap he m ay have laid .

A party of this sort is usually composed of but one

 A RM ED R EC ONN OIS S AN C E S . 339

kind Of troops cavalry in a flat O p e n e ou n try and in

, .
,

fa n t ry in a rugged or Obstructed cou ntry It may be .

commanded by an O fficer of low rank if he is in te lli ,

gent and brave F ro m such services young o fficers

.

a c q uire reputation an d receive ad vance m e n t The .

detachment moves cautiously ; it is not O f su ffi cient

n umbers to have an ad v anced guard b u t is preceded ,

by a group o f scouts and one of these is i n front of

,

the o t hers Two or three fl a n k e r s are n ecessary on

.

each side The commander has wit h h i m a guide or

.

two a special n ecessity for him as he must Oft en leave

, ,

the mai n roads If the scouts report the p resence of a

.

body o f th e enemy he turns to one side and tries to

,

avoid it by riding behind a clump Of trees a rise in

, ,

the ground or in any other way If he cannot escape

,
.

Observa tion he wi ll fight or re t reat according to the

, ,

n u m bers o f t he enemy If it is a strong colu m n O f

.

the ene my and he has been able to remain concealed

, ,

he scans it closely and endeavors to form an accurate

idea of itss t reng t h before g iving notice of its presence
,
.

He then sends o n e of the fl e e te s t soldiers by a détour ,

wi th a brief n o te to th e general In the mean time .

if the c o l u m n i s abou t to reach the advanced posts he ,

S hou l d a t tack in orde r to sto p it and give the alarm

,

but he should be carefu l n o t t o engage the main bod y

indeed to avoid every thing but the leading detach
,

ment of the advanced guard if the enemy is in fo r ce ,

.

His Obj ect is thus accomplished The ene my being .

,

uncer t ain wha t force is before h im Is compelled to halt ,

340 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

and prepare for defence Time is thus gained The . .

commander O f the reconnoitring par t y will t ake ca r e

to send several order lies to the commander of the a d
v a n ce d posts but as they might b e captured an d th e
, ,

firing might not b e heard several bundles of straw ,

s hould be s e t on fire .

When the party has reached its destin ation the ,

commander conceals it behind a screen of some kind ,

as a clump o f trees a hill an Ol d w all in a ravin e or

, , ,

hollow and taking a few men who m he places along

, ,

at intervals he ascends to some place where he can see

,

the enemy be ing accompanied to that point on ly by

,

the g uide and t w o o r three men H e makes notes of .

what he sees along with the explanations given him

,

by t he g u ide If the position s of the enemy a r e i n

.

plain sight he m akes a ske t ch which it is well to do

, , ,

even if the drawing is very rough He must not p e r .

mit himself to be satisfied with a m er e glance b u t e x ,

a mine e v ery t hing with cool n ess and endeavor to gai n ,

exact inform ation even at considerabl e personal risk

,

false reports are worse tha n total ignorance in s u ch

matters It requires e xperience to perform a duty O f
.

this kind satisfactorily Man y examples might be .

cited where incorrect information m ade so ei t her b y ,

i nexperience or fear has led to grave mistakes or seri

,

o u s disasters If the o fficer is discovered while making

.

his Observations and sees a b ody of troops approach

,

ing that he cannot resist wi th the few m en n ear him ,

he hastens to rej oin the detach m en t at the foot of the

 AR M ED RE C O NN O IS S A NC E S . 341

h ill , in order to fal l back upon th e reserve which will ,

advance to his support as concealment can no lo n ger ,

be practised When his whole force is united he may

.
,

attempt to repulse the enemy if his task is not com ,

p l e te d
; but if it is he S hould reti r e even
,
if sure Of ,

suc cess When the Obj ect of his mission i s once a t

.

t a in e d it is to his credit to bring b ack his whole c o m

,

m an d rather than be seeking trophies from t he enemy .

In this connection may be men t ion ed a remarkable

instance of p resence of mind At the siege of L uxe m .

bourg V auban wishing to ascertain by pe rsonal o b

, , ,

se rvation the real condition of affairs as was his cus

, ,

tom adv anced u nder th e escort of a fe w gren a die r s

, ,

who were left in rear lying upon the ground He was .

crossing the glacis alone under co v e r of th e twilight ,

d arkness when he was discovered He beckon ed

,
.

wi t h his han d to the sentinels not to fire and con ,

tinned to advance instead O f re t iring Th e enemy .

took him fo r one of themselves and Vau b an having , ,

seen wha t h e wished retired slowly and was saved by

,

his ad mirable cool ness .

We will i ndicate some of th e precau t ions that should

b e taken to assure the success of a secret r e c o n n o is
sance In the fi rst place the detachment Should con
.
,

sist of tr u sty m en and of n on commissioned o fficers

,
-

who i n case of need might take the place of o fficers

, ,
.

If they know the l anguage of t he ene m y i t will help ,

them greatly in atte m pting those ru s es by whi c h a ,

quick wit extricates i t s possessor fro m c r i t ical situa

342 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

tions In ev ery case it is n ecessary for som e o f the

.

party to speak the language Two guides should be .

Ob t ained who are moun t ed if the detachment is o f

, ,

cavalry an d al w ays watched by men detailed for t hat

,

p u rpose They should not be permitted to communi

.

cate wi t h each other as they might concer t some plan

,

for the destr u ction or injury of the party S ilence .

sho u ld be observed b u t especially at night whe n

, ,

e v ery m an should be all c a r s When there is d anger .

o f discovery m ain roads should be avoided and cross

,

roads used e fforts being m ade by th e party to find

,

conceal m ent behin d woods hedges rising ground , ,

wi t h this Obj ect field s may be crossed i t is not safe

,

to pass by a hill wi t hout ascertaining whether any o n e

is behind it a d u ty perfo rmed by the scouts who mak e
, ,

S igns if al l is safe The sa m e precaution is necessa ry

.

in passing n ear woods ravines farm houses &c where

, ,
-
,
.
,

the enemy might be concealed V illages are avoi ded .

as much as possibl e in order not to g ive t he al ar m

, ,

especi ally in going out upon the expedition ; if i t is

necessary to pass through a Village it sh ould be pre ,

v io u s l
y examined wi t h care some of the p rincipal

persons should be questioned as to t h e posi t ion an d

plans of t he enemy at the s ame time inco rr ec t i n fo r ,

m a t ion will be given as to t he destination of the de

t a ch m e n t F ood an d other necessaries will b e p r O
.

cured for t he troops if t hey we re no t bro u ght along

,
.

T h e best plan is t o ca r r y eve r y thing t hat is necessary ,

b u t some t imes i t is imposs i b le t o do this for w a nt of ,

 A R M ED RE C ON N OIS S A NC E S . 343

ti m e ; t he first Oppo r t u nity should then be taken to

procure wha t is w a nting .

At night t he m en are not permit ted to smoke .

When t he party ar ri ves a t daybreak n ear the advanced

, ,

pos t s of the enemy it should b e ca r efully put under

,

cover b ecause it is the time w hen patrols are moving

,

about sentinels are placed upo n all t he a v enues so “

,

that notice m a y be gi v en O f t he a pproach of patrols ,

o r measures may b e taken to capture them If pris .

o n e r s are taken u seful information i s Obtained This

,
.

i s also an excell en t time fo r ascertaining t he strength

o f the en emy fo r t he tr o ops are usu ally u n der arms
,

unti l th e retu r n o f t he pa t rols Th e comm ander wil l

.

look for a high point fro m w hich h e m a y by using

, ,

his glas s and withou t b eing seen discover what is ,

passing at the outposts The fires smoking in the dis

.
,

ance indi c ate in a general manner the force and lo

, , ,

c a t ion Of the co r p s covered b y th e ad v anced posts .

If it is n ecessary t o pen et rate so far it can only b e ,

done by a night m arch and b y m aking a wide dé t our

, ,

i n order to reach by t he rea r the vill ages occupied

, ,

b y the enemy ; for there woul d b e no probability of

success in atte m pting to pass through the lin e of posts
covering the front A t this ti m e the men who s p e ak
.

th e language are useful ; they approach the villages

carefully replying to the challenges o f the sentinels
, ,

and gainin g access to som e farm house in order to -

ques t ion the inh abitan ts The sentinels in the rear

.

are gen erally n either numerous n o r vigilant and it is ,

344 P R INC IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

possible to capture them and l earn every thing that

may be desired TO accomplis h such a n Obj ect the
.

F rench company which gained such renown at the

,

siege of Dan tz ic under the orders of C h amb a re made

, ,

use of the following stratagem : several soldiers o h

t ai n e d bells and mingling wi t h t he ca tt l e c r ept up to
, ,

t he sentinels and killed them ; they then a tt acked the

p st by assault an d the remainder of the company
o
, ,

which had b een concealed ran up an d the village w as

, ,

soon in their possession In order to a v oid r e c o g n i

.

tion by their accent C h a m b u r e s men replied i n Ru s

,
’

sian to the P russians when they crossed the posts ; and

,

in G erman to the Russians There will be many o p .

o r t u n i t i e s fo r imitating thi s ruse when the hos t ile

p ,

army is compo s ed of troops of two or more nations .

When the reconnoissance is finished th e o fficer who ,

has had charge o f it gives the general a w r itten re

port when a verbal report would be i nsu f ficient
, .

This Should be clear simple and as brief as possible

, , .

The obj ect of the report is the important thing an d ,

not the more or less elegant m an ner in which it i s

written The O fficer S hould mention only those thi n gs
.

o f which he is certain his conj ectures should be pre

sented with caution ; he Should carefully avoid draw
ing upon his imagination for facts F inally he Should .
,

not speak much of himself ; for if there is ground for

pride on account of the manner in which the duty has
been performed the troops should receive all the
,

praise from hi m at least

. .
 AR M ED RE C O NN O IS S A N C E S . 345

The small reconnoissan ces every morni n g at the

advanced posts to ascertain t hat the enemy has not
,

come n earer during the night are made by patrols , ,

who advance a short di stance beyond the line of posts .

This is a special duty for whic h all the o ffi cers should

be detailed in turn They seldom remain out more
.

than an hour and in the mean time the grand guards

,

an d pickets are kept under arms A ll the p re c au .

tions prescribed for secret reconnoissances are a p p l i

cable to these The commander should move with
.
’

much circumspection sending out scouts advan cing

, ,

i n silence and under such covers as the country m ay

,

a fford stopping Often to listen and examin e giving

, ,

the alarm if the enemy is met and avoiding engage ,

ments with him If the reconnoissance has a special

.

Obj ect at some distance an d it is necessary to kn o w

, ,

the result speedily mounted men should be distri

,

b uted along the route passed over to form a continu ,

o u s con nection between the detachment and the out

post.

A mong the m eans Of Obtaining n ews Of the enemy ,

spie s should be men tioned It is u nfortunately too .

, ,

tr ue that men are found everyw here who are ready to

sell their honor an d to betray their country for a
greater or less sum according to the position th ey oc
,

cu
py in society This.means costly as it is should , ,

not be neglected for n ews opportunely received oft en

,

decides the result of an enterprise L arge sums m ay .

therefore be paid for such services however contem p ,

*
15
346 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

tible the agents a r e They are Often in the pay of

.

both parties and spying for both A treacherous spy

,
.

should receive no pity if his guilt is clearly proved .

A r t . l l .— T o p o g ra p h ic a l R ec o n n o i ssa n c e s.

S uch reconnoissances are no less important than

those treated above as a general can not arrange a
,

plan of attack or make the least movement of h is

,

forces unless he has an accurate knowledge Of the

,

gr ound . He shou ld kn ow the distances between

places a n d the obstacles to be encountered in order
to arrange a combined m arch of several columns .

This information can only be obtained by special re

c on n o i s s a n c e s for the most finished maps are in c o m
,

p l e t e for his uses they never S how the nature o f the

soil the quality of the roads the state O f rivers an d
, ,

bridges t he thickness o f woods nor the exact slop es

, ,

o f mountains and hills which are all things that must

,

be known before any plan can be carried o u t .

It is di ffi cult to give a perfect representation of

ground upon paper ; at any rate it can only be don e ,

by those who have bestowed upon the subj ect much

study and practice Moreover to make an accurate
.
,

map req u ires time I propose therefore several sim

.
, ,

p l ifi c a t io n s
. S lopes may be indicated by two lines ,

o n e at the top an d the other at the bottom ma r king

,

simply the contour These are not level lin es but

.
,

are readi ly sei z ed by the eye and indeed prese n t ,

 TO P O G R A P IIIC A L RE C O NN OIS S A N C E S . 347

themselves when it is desired to give but an outl ine of

a plate a u a hill a ridge & c Th e space between
, , ,
.

t hese lines gives room enough t o write a fe w de s cr ip

tive words It will be noted whether the mp e is
.

gentle or steep accessible o r not for cavalry what is

, ,

its approximate height In order that the ci r c u m .

s cr ibi n g lines Of heights be not confounded with those

which give other indications they are made broken , ,

as S hown in F igure 2 7 A t the top of the sketch the

.

two circumscribing lines point out plainly a plate a u

which is connected with the plain by a gentle slope .

L ower and near the river there are two other lines
, ,

representing an elongated hill an d what is written b e ,

tween the curves gives an idea of the n ature of the

l p e s or at least all that i s necessary in a military
, , ,

point o f View O n the rig h t o f the sketch is a spur

.

shown by the circumscribing lines terminated at the ,

river by steep rocky slopes ; a small hill risi n g at its ,

extremity is also indicated by its circumscribing lines

,
.

The numbers in brackets give the heights of the points

o f t h e upper curve above those directly below in the

lower curve it being understood that these heights

,

are only estimated We see therefore that the pla

.
, ,

teau is o n the right 1 00 feet above the plain in the

, ,

centre 9 0 and on the left 75 ; the isolated hill is 1 0

,

feet high at o n e end an d 1 2 feet at the other & c

, ,
.

It is not easy to j udge of heights by the eye and they ,

are rarely placed upon a mere S ketch I have only .

desired to Show how it is possible to put such informa

348 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR AT E G Y .

F ig
x
27 .

tion o n a sketch wi t hout causing confusion E very .

O fficer should be able by using such simple mean s as

,

those indicated to repres ent with con siderable accu

, ,

racy the features o f a piece of ground he has passed

,

over attentively .

Having now shown how a milit a ry s k etch may be

 T P O O G R A P H IC AL RE C O NN O IS S A N C E S . 349

m ade in a S imple manner it remains to settle upo n ,

some con ventional signs to represent the different oh

j oe te found in a co u ntry These are streams ponds .
, ,

m arshes roads rocks woods Vineyards towns v il

, , , , , ,

lages large isolated houses which m ay play an i m

,
-

portant part in a combat dikes , boats ford s bridges , , ,

Of stone or wood A ll of these are shown in F ig u re

.

27 . We wi ll examine them separately .

l Va te r cou r s es
-
These are represented e ither by
.
-

two lines one larger than the other or by a succession

, ,

o f parallel lines between the first t w o A blue t int .

m igh t well replace the interior lines Th e arro w i n .

dic a t e s t he direction o f the current O n the l ower .

part o f the stream is a water mill The a ffluent o n -

.
,

the right is a brook whose ba nks are stee p which is ,

i ndicated by two irregular lines traced along the

banks .

M ea n s of P a s s i g n — O n t he left is a ferry boat i n

.
-
,

the centre a stone bridge which is distinguished from ,

t he wooden bri dge cons t r u cted over the affluent by

t h e n arrowness O f the lat t er and its having no abut

m en ts o n the banks Higher up is a ford indicated

.
,

by a finely do t ted line across th e stream .

S ta g n n t
a W a te r — P On ds and lakes are repr e sented
.

in t he same way as rivers the only di fference being in ,

t he shape Marshes are shown by an outline and

.

seve r al lines drawn parallel to the bott om of the

paper wi t h a fe w t uft s of grass scat t ered It may b e .

n t ed whethe r t h e marsh is impracticable or not

o .
35 0 P RIN C IP L E S OF STR ATE GY .

l Voods a n d V y
i n e a r ds — It takes much time to
draw these in th e usual way We ha v e simplified it .

by tracing the outline and m aking o n the in sid e

, ,

s t raight parallel marks for woods and a small imitatio n ,

o f a vine for Vin eyards A tint o f In dia n ink or yellow

.
-

ish green may replace the marks for woods if colors are ,

used as well as a purple tin t for Vineyard s Besides

,
.

t he marks the character O f t he woods S hould be written

,
.

R och a — The most di fficult thing is the represen t a

tion of rocks on account of their great variety o f
,

form A single S ign is not s u fli c ie n t to disti nguish

.

all the cases A n atte mp t must be m ade to imitate

.

t hem to a certain deg r ee t e n th ey have long .

w alls it will be sufficient as shown in the S ketch to

, , ,

draw the t O p and botto m line with a few crossings to

g ive an idea of the obj ect This method is shown o n .

the right of the d r awing .

H a bi ta ti on s — If i t w ere n ecessary to dra w all th e

.

houses in towns and villages as i n a regular topo ,

graphical map i t would require considerable ti m e

, ,

and discourage most O fficers If a simple S ign is used .

to mark the place the thing becomes very easy A

,
.

village will therefore be represen t ed by a circle

, ,

crossed cl o sely a n d the t o w n b y changing the circle

,

in t o a square A is a town o n our Sketch ; B C D

.
, , ,

and E are villages If i t i s i m portant t o have the

.

for m o f one of those v illages a special S heet will be ,

n ecessary o n a large scale A red tint may replace .

the cross lines .

 TO P O G R A P II IC A L RE C O NN O IS S A N C E S . 35 1

Isola t ed h ou s es such as farm houses large e n c l o

,
-

sures po s t houses inn s & c are shown in t heir real

,
-
, ,
.
,
.

form and wi t h o u t regard to t h e scale A s m a ll bu g le

, .

o r hor n m ay i ndicate a post house a cup an inn On

;
-
.
,

th e left of the plateau is the usual S ig n for wind

mills.

Co m m u n ic t
a i o n s — What has b een said of isolated
.

buildings applies also to roads t hat i s to say it is ,

n ecessa r y to exaggerate t heir wid t h in order t o make ,

the m more visible A main road such as that from

.
,

A to B is represented by two parallel lines ; i n the

,

same way the wagon road from C to D wi t h the ,

singl e di fference that th e lin es are m ade somewhat

n earer together . Roads practicable only for smal l
v ehicles such as that from C to B are in dicated by a
, ,

single full line and a do t ted lin e ; path s for pack ani
m al s by a single lin e ; t hree o f these mee t nea r t he
,

fe r ry Distan c es being v e ry impor t ant in a drawing

.
,

suc h as we a re con s ide r ing t hey should be writte n ,

al o ng t he roads be t w een s t riking Obj ects The n u m .

be r s indica t e t he times requi r ed by a foot soldier to

pass over the co rresponding spaces at the rate of three ,

miles to the hour If these di stances w e re t aken fr om

.

the walk o f a horse a note Should be appended tell

, ,

ing th e rate o f mo v ement o f th e horse When roa ds .

lie par t ly on the sheet there should be writ t en on

,

each the n ame O f t he place towa rds which it lead s ,

with an indication of the distance if i t is known ,

.

Lew es a n d B i k es — It is impo rtant to represent

35 2 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

these objects because troops may be S hel tered by them

,
.

If t h e parallel lines were u sed they migh t be t aken to ,

mean a road to avoid this un certainty th e space b e ,

tween the lines is filled by cross m arks This is shown .

upon the left bank Of t h e stream n ear th e bridge .

These are the d ifferent conven t ional Signs by means ,

o f w h i c h an O fficer may promp t ly and easily trace

upon paper the result of hi s Observation s i n a recon

n o iss an c e He will not prod u ce a fine map but he
.
,

w il l have a m i li ta r y s k etch whic h may b e very useful

, ,

if t he forms of obj ects an d relati v e distances are only

ap p roximately Obtained To complete the sket ch a
.
,

merid ian line sho uld be ad ded and a scale of yard s to , ,

deter m ine distan ces not written This scale is de .

du c e d from the space a man on foot can p ass over i n

an ho u r about three miles A lso as distan ces alon g
, .
,

the roads are exp ressed in the ti m e req u ired to pass

over them it will be well to add a secon d scale ag ree
,

i n g wi t h t he first gi v ing dis t an c es passed i n a minute

, .

O fficers wil l find it co n venie n t to have these scales

m arked upon a littl e rule in order to save them th e ,

trouble of re m arking the m conti n uall y

-
.

A n o ffi cer w h o expects to make a re connoissan ce ,

should p repare his paper if he has ti m e by attaching

, ,

it to paste b oard to keep the win d from blowing it

,

about an d by marking upon it th e scales a n d approx

, ,

i m a t e ly t he positions of known obj ects within the

,

limi t s O f his work b ut so lightly that they c a n b e

,

e ffaced and corrected if necessary , .

 TO P O G R A P IIIC A L REC ON N OIS S A NC ES . 35 3

We will suppose that the patrols of the en emy

have S ho w n t hemselves in the country and that the ,

O fficer has been put on his guard against them He .

h as arrived the evening before in the town A wi t h ,

his d e t ach m ent ; he h as S lept t here and ga t hered all,

the informatio n he can wi th respect to the surround

ing country He knows already th e population of B
.
,

C D and E t heir distances apar t a n d also from the

, , , ,

plac es t o which roads lead fro m the m ; he learns that ,

in addition to t he bridge on the m ain road he c a n ,

pass the r iver in the ferry boat a t D and that there

-
,

sh o uld be higher up a ford p racticable for cavalry

, ,
.

He has embodied t h is informat io n in his note book -

and h as secured a good guide be f ore seeking any rest .

It i s scarcely n ecessary to say that the usual m ili t a ry

p recautions fo r safe ty S hould be taken as he is i n ,

formed o f t he p r esence of the ene my upon the heights

across t he ri v er .

The n ext day he S hould be on his way before the

rising o f the sun his d etachment having been as s em
,

bled a t d awn A small par t y is sent ou t in cha rge of

.

an O ffice r to examine the v illages D and E and as oer

, ,

tai n whe ther an y on e is there ; another pa rty is sent

o u t to the right to visit the country house and to scout ,

the ravin e and t he banks of t he strea m T h ese p a r .

ties a r e ordered to rejoi n h i m at t he b ridge He pro .

c e e ds along t he m ain road wi th the principal body of

t h e troops b u t stops a half hour at the inn to give

, ,

time for the two detachments to m ake their circuits ,

35 4 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR AT E GY .

and collect precise infor m ation abo ut th e ford which

has been spoken of to him some o n e being sent to ,

sound it He then moves on m arking di stances by

.
,

his watch and commencing to trace the direction

,

upon his paper Having reached the bridge he waits

.
,

until his detachments rejoin him A third O f the .

troops are then left to guard the bridge and he con ,

t in u e s with the remainder to move on towards B pre ,

ceded by scouts and accompanied by fl a nk e rs who ,

n e v er should be out of Sight he sketches in the road

as he advances laying dow n distances by the times
,

required to p ass over them He m arks the branching .

of roads and paths the feet and tops of Slopes post , ,

house s &c O n the subj ect of slopes it S hould b e o h

’

.
, ,

served that the lengths gi ven by the s c al e O f minutes

S hould be diminish ed i n proportion to th e steepness

Of the slope because the horizontal distances whic h

, ,

are alone put upon the S ketch are less in s l opes and ,

also in such ground less space is passed o v er in a

,

g i v en ti m e A red u ction of o n e tent h for gentl e

.

S lopes Is sufficient an d one fifth for steepe r

,
Th e e ye -
.
,

whe n it i s practised in the esti m ation of distances ,

i s a great help in such cases E v ery S oldier S hould .

,

endeavor t o acquire this faculty .

A rrived at the village B the O fficer leaves a third ,

o f his detachme n t an d with th e remaining portio n

,

pushes o n a mile or t w o to ascer t ain wheth e r a n y on e

,

i s approaching in that direction He may t hen h a v e .

an engagement w ith the enemy If he meets a force .

 TO P O G R AP IIIC A L REC ON N O IS S A NC E S . 35 5

inferior to his o w n o r comes on a small post h e a t

, ,

tacks and end eavors to capture seve r al prisoners who ,

m a y inform him of the posi t ion of the corps fu rther

on After pushing t o t he front in this way he retires
.
,

rapidly to B and t hen his topographical labor really

,

begins He is preceded by a fe w scouts and is a c

.
,

companied only by a good non commissi o ned O fficer -

and two or three soldie rs ; t he m ain body O f his

detach m ent remains at B where it is es t ablished i n
,

a mili t ary mann er o n the side t owards t he enem y .

The o ffi c er goes i n the first place t o the left of t h e

, ,

p l ateau t owards th e wind mills in order to see the

, ,

sl o p es and c oun try o n t hat side He passes a round .

t he plateau and returns to the village by way of the

,

post h ou s e Thence h e goes to the village C wi t h

-
.
,

hal f o f t he troops h e has with him ; the o ther half

is o rde red to lea v e th e village in an hour and t ake ,

position a t t he foot of the l p e S The o ffice r pre .

,

ce ded by scou t s advances along t he road B C s t op

, ,

ping a mo m en t at t he top and bottom of the sl o p es t o

ma rk their direc t ion o n h is S ketch In the vill a ge C .

he learns where the two road s go fro m th at poin t ,

and w hat a re th e distances of the n eares t v illages ;

,

these will be writ t en upon the plan He proceeds as .

far as the s t ream by th e pa t h and c rosses t he wood ,

and ret u r n s to the v i llage In this way the p rincip a l

.

b end of t he rive r is ma ke d upon t he ke t ch

r S F r o m .

the village t wo m e n S hould attempt to c ross t he ma r s h

and arriv e at the ford it will only be aft er receiving
35 6 P R IN C I P L E S OF S TR AT E GY .

t h ei r report th at the O ffi cer wil l write the word i m

r a c ti c a ble and it would be better still if h e has t h e
p , ,

time t o ascertain th e fact for himself for subordinates

, ,

are apt to be deterred by small di ffi culties F rom C .

,

th e detachment returns to t he bridge by the road In .

passing t he O fficer detaches two m en to go aroun d

,

the marsh cross the ford and return to A He then

, ,
.

estimates the distance to the foot of t he hill and puts ,

in t h e curve on his pl an .

He next passes around the little hill followi n g o u t ,

t h e foot of the S lopes and the paths ; he ascends the

hill whence he discovers plainly the for m of the

,

river ; he Sketches both in and proceeds as far as th e ,

farm hou se always m easuring the distan ces

-
,
The .

farm house is m arked down and he returns a secon d

-

ti m e to the bridge by the pa th aft er t aking no t e O f ,

the ferry and th e m ill The whole force is now col

.

l e c t e d between the bridge and the hills whe r e it wil l ,

remain an hour while t he commander accompanied

, ,

by t he guide and fo u r or five horsemen passes aro und , ‘

th e Villages D and E ; the troops will t hen proceed to

A and wait for their comman der Th e l atter in pas s .
,

ing over this part of the ground ma r ks u pon his ,

sketch the woods pond and s tr eam as well as in fo r

, , ,

ma t ion concerning the roads fr o m D an d E .

By the time t he Office r reaches A t he d ay l ight m ay ,

be past or a portio n of it stil l left In t h e la tt er ca s e

,
.
.
,

he will l e t his troops rest and if he is cer tain o f n ot

, ,

m eeting the enemy he will take t wo or three of the

,
 T O P O C R A P H IC A L R EC O N N O IS S A N C E S . 35 7

best m en and go to the heights o n the right pass ing ,

by the stone country house F rom the O l d cha t eau

-
.
,

o n t he sugar loaf at the end of the S pur he can see

-
,

dis t inctly t he course of the stream and correc t his ,

sketch if n ecessary He will endeavor to represent

, .

this broken ground as we ll as he can In ret urning .

,

he will go down the little brook down the river t o ,

the bridge measuring the lengt h of the dike His

,
.

work is don e and he should then return to his quar

,

ters to complete his Sketch an d n otes .

Thi s S ketch wil l be undoubtedly insu fficient if an ,

accurate m ap is required for it is not to be expected ,

that a work so rapidly don e will n o t contain con

s ide r a b l e errors ; but wh at is essential is S hown in a

clear and simple m ann er and the general can by its , ,

aid discover what it is important for him to kno w .

A sketch mad e wi t h the pencil S hould be gon e over

, ,

wi t h pen and i nk .

When the d uty can be divided between several o ffi

cers a recon noissance even of greater extent may be
, , ,

m ade more rapidly O n e o ffice r examines the roads ;

.

a second the streams noting their bread th depth , , ,

velocity heigh t o f banks & c a third goes thro ugh

, ,
.

woods examin es villages as to their defe n sive p roper

,

ties and resources 85 0 E ach O ffi cer has his shee t on

,
.
,

which he makes his S ketch and adds his n otes A n .

O ffi cer o f highe r rank superintends the whole He .

takes precaution ary m easures for t he safe t y of his

parties and studies the general outline of the country
,
.
35 8 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE G Y .

P rovided with his glass he seeks elevated places

, ,

whence he can better see the g round to b e examined .

However rapidly this m ay all be done it is some ,

times n ecessary to reconn oi t re much more so al m ost ,

at a gallop even A ll that can then be done is to take

.

a few rough notes and pu t down a few hasty lines

the sketch must then b e m ade from memory .

Iti e n r a r i es — Reconnoissances are muc h S implified

when they have no other Obj ect th an to in dicate th e
features of a road ; they are then termed i tin er a r i es .

They are made in two ways ; either by means o f con

v e n t i o n al sign s o r by notes written in a t a b l e ! w ith
, ,

columns prepared in advance .

N O march should be made witho u t an Officer bei ng

selected to make an i t inerary He notes th e specia l .

features of the road what is rem arkable o n the right

,

and left the breadths of de fil e s the decli vities of slopes

, , ,

the repai r s needed 8 0 D istances from point to point

,
3
.

are expressed in hours of march .

Itineraries of t h e first kind are made upon S heets

prepared as in Figure Th e S heets are then united
to represen t the whole road and mo u nted upon lin en ,

for preservation . The top of each sheet mu st be

attached to the bottom of the n ext The notes are .

commen ced at the bottom Of the S heet and carried o n

to the top A s t raight line i n t he mi ddle m arks the
.

road ; sq u ares or circles indicati n g inhabited places .

O ther lines to the right an d left represent side roads ,

S ee lso R g l tio s f
a e u a U S A r my p g 1 00
n or . .
,
a e
 T O P OG RA P H IC A L RE C O N N O IS S AN C E S . 359

near which are written the n ames of th e n ea r est

places C r ooked lines mark streams crossing the
.

road &c E very o n e m ay adopt such signs as he

.

r e fe IS
p .

If the S heet is too small to receive all the notes

th at are proper a special n ote book may b e kept in
,
-

addition .
36 0 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE GY .

Fig . 28
.

W oo ds at 300 y ard s fr o m M a ny s c a t t ere d h ou se s in

th e n e i g h b orh oo d
th e ro a d.
.

D i s t a nc e fr o m A to D .
T O WN S u rr oun d e d b y Ol d w a ll s ;
a c c o m m o d a te s
411 fl y
, . Th e ro a d is go o d
b c t we e n t h es e p o in t s, e x
c r p t n e a r t h e ri v e r, w h o i e

ar e deep r uts , w h i ch
m us t be fi ll d fo r
“W e? fo r d ab l e , S to n e
"“ l g e
e
1 a d m i t s 10ab r e a s t
p a s sag e
.

o f a r t ill e ry .

F ro m th e b ri dg e t o th e
h i gh e s t p o m td d o ub l e
team s a re n e e d ed .

A cc o m m o da te s men .

M a r s h y s tr ea m .

Th e p l a te au o ffe rs a go o d
p o s i t io n fo r d e fe n ce Th e .
FA R M H O U S E

fro n t is c o v e re d b y th e
m a r s h y s t re a m, th e fl ank s Road t o Y i n 4b . .

re s t on w oods l e a vm g ,
P ra c t i ca b l e f or w ag o n s
l
.

an i n t er va of y ar d s .

No t bl e o f d e fe n ce
c ap a .

C IT Y A c c o m m o d at e s
men .

Pa r i cut l ar Rema r ks .
 36 1

C H AP TE R V III .

O
M IS SI N S , A ND G IVIN G R E ST TO TR OOP S .

Art. l . C
- o n voy s.

IF convoys move elsewhere than o n ground c on

trolled by the arm y an d consequ ently at a distance
, , ,

fro m the pri n cipal force of th e enemy they will cer ,

t a in ly b e captured for there is n o task more di fficult

,

than to de fend a convoy of considerable extent against

a seriou s attack F rederick lost a large convoy on its
.

w ay to O lmutz because i t was obliged to follow roads

,

i n the possession of the enemy N either the bravery .

o f the e s cort nor the nearn ess of the army could sa v e

it from falling into the hands o f th e A ustrians and ,

F rederick was obliged to raise the siege o f O lmutz in

con sequence o f its loss .

Usually these convoys are only exposed to the a t

t a cks o f partisans o r light troops who have succee ded , ,

o n account o f the smallness Of their forces in passing ,

unperceived to the rear Of the army Against such .

attacks precautions are take n in giving escorts to con

vo s
y . These escorts are principally composed of
infantry because troops o f this kind can fight on all
,

ki n ds O f ground and m ay in case of need take posi

, , ,

16
36 2 P R INC IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

tion behind the wagons or even in th em i n order to

, ,

dri v e Off an enemy C avalry i s also necessary b oth

.
,

to scout the country to a great distance fro m th e con

V oy and give prompt n otice o
,
f the approach o t he
f

enemy and also to take part in the defence against an

,

attack Of c a v a l r v The latter being able to move

.
,

very rapid ly from one end to t he other of t h e con voy ,

would soon discover som e unprotected poin t if the ,

escort were composed only o f foot soldiers .

It will b e taken for granted therefore that the e s , ,

cort o f a convoy of imp ortan ce ought to be composed

o f infantry an d cavalry the former being th e more
,

numerous They should m arch in the following

.

order : A leading advanced guard composed of cav ,

al r
y will,
precede the convoy from two to five miles ,

in order to examine the road i n front and the groun d

o n the flanks But as th e enemy might escape th e
.
,

ob servation of the leading detachment and place him ,

self i n ambush in the i nterval b etween it and the

head of th e con voy a second detach ment is necessary
,

immediately in front from which scouts wil l be se n t

,

o u t in ad v ance and fl a n k e rs on the sid es The longer .

is the string of carriages o r pack animals the g r eater is -

,

th e danger of surprise and consequently the greater

, , ,

the n ecessity for precaution s to avoid it A convoy .

is exposed to attack in rear nearly as much as i n

front ; it is therefore necessa ry to form a rear guard -

a part Of which will be cavalry to give speedy notice ,

Of what is ass m l Il rear The troops for m ing

p g .
 C ONVOY S .

the m ass o f the escort principally infantry will be

, ,

divided into three bod ies one of which will march at

,

the head o f the con voy accompanied by work m en

, ,

carrying with them several wagon s filled with tools

of all kinds ropes timbers— indeed every thing meces
, , ,

sary for repairing bri dges and ro ads The second de .

t a c h m e n t wil l be placed in the middle of the column ,

and t h e third at the tail .

Th e troops should be by no means scattered along

the whole length of the con voy beca u se i n case of , ,

surprise every part would be equally weak to resist

,

at t ack There should however be a fe w m en de

.
, ,

tailed from the de t achments of the mai n body to

m arch along the sides of the road and compel the ,

drivers to keep their places and distances O rde r o n .

t he m arch is one o f the most important things Th e .

drivers a re generally ready to cut loose their horses

and take to flight at the first appearance o f danger ,

and at all times to be very negligent They sho uld .

,

therefore be kept in a rigid state o f disciplin e an d

, ,

carefully watched .

The head of t h e convoy S hould move slo wly and

regul a rly in o rder to avoid breaks in the col u mn
,
.

The dri vers sho u ld be forbidden to water their horses

except by pe r mission If there is powder in t he con
.

voy no smoking S hould be allowed If a wagon

,
.

breaks down its load Should b e speedily divided

,

among the o t hers tha t can receive i t mos t c o n v e n i

en t ly There should be a sig n al agreed upon for the
.
364 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TRA TE GY .

halting of the whole column when such an accident

happens If only some slight repairs are necessary
.
,

the convoy moves on while th e d isabled wagon falls ,

to one S ide an d takes its place in rear o f the column ,

to return to its proper place at the fi rst general hal t ,

unless th e comman der decides otherwise Th e sol .

diers should never b e permitted to put their knap

sacks & c in t he wagons stil l less should they ride
,
.
,

th emselves .

Whenever the road is wide enough the carriages ,

should be formed in double file The length o f the .

col u m n is thus dimi nished o n e half and if circum -

,

stances require the defen s i ve p a r k m ay be rapidly

,

formed which is done by the carriages wheeling to the

,

right a n d left so as to form i n two compact lines with

, ,

the horses h eads towards each other and q u ite nea r

’
.

In this way the horses are better covered the drivers ,

cannot ge t O ff w ith them and the whole space oc ,

c u p ie d is much less than when in col u mn T h is for .

m ation evidently requires so m e ti m e and s h ould on ly ,

be adopted when n ecessity requires .

A halt Of a few min utes shoul d be m ade every

hour to gi v e the horses time to breathe to adj ust th e
, ,

harness &c In the middle o f the day a longer h alt

,
.

is made to feed and water the animals but wi thout

, ,

u nhitching The n ecessary food for this p ui p o s e

.

Should b e carried both by men and beasts The c o n .

voy usually halts at night near a Village as pro v i ,

sions are to be fo u nd there for m an and beast as well ,

 C ON VO Y S . 3 65

as Shops for repairs o f harness and wagon s and for ,

shoeing horses Unless it is ab solutely n ecessary to

.

do otherwise the park should be form ed beyon d the

,

village because it is better to h ave a defile of that

,

sort in rear than in front if it should during the ,

night fall into the hands of the enemy .

A good place for the park is a S pot en closed by

walls or thick hedges as it is most secure In th e ,
.

interior of th e park the most valuabl e Obj ects are put ,

suc h as despatches or other valuable papers money o r , ,

muni t ions ; a guard should always be placed to pre

vent the d rivers m aking a fire n ear the w agons c o n
taining powde r The horses are tied up inside the
.

enclosure each team n ear its own wagon The troops

,
.
,

excep t the guard of the park bivouac at a li ttle dis ,

tance occupying the ground wi t h the usual p r e c a u

, ,

tions o f outposts &c No one Sh ould be permi t ted

,
.

to leave the park without th e con sent of the com

m ander Those who are to go for provision s and
.

forage S hould b e designated Nei ther o fficer soldiers .

, ,

nor drivers should b e su ffered t o go to the inns an d

shops of the village The commander should take all
.

n ecessary measures for providing food for the whole

command as well as straw t o sleep on for t his pur

,

pose as well as to select a place for the park o fficers

, ,

and a few m en should be sent in advance .

The park is commonly a hollow square b u t the ,

locali t y will always determin e its fo r m which Should ,

make an enclosure either to contain the horses and

,
36 6 P RIN C IP LE S OF S TR A TE GY .

drivers o r as a kind o f defensive work in c ase of

,

attack The carriage s may be in file or S ide by side

.
,

according to the fr on t of the squ a re they for m ; the

rule being that all th e poles b e turned in th e same
direction an d towards the place of destination It is .

proper to double the carriages i n file so that in case ,

of need the intervals o f o n e row may be rapidly

covered by pushing forward th e carriages o f the
o ther When the space occupied i s contr a cted an d
.
,

the number o f carriages large they are placed i n ,

several lines with su fficient intervals between them

,

to receive the teams .

When the convoy sets out th e n ext day each car ,

r ia e retakes its o w n place i n the column and to e n

g , ,

able i t to do so each has its own n umber which pre

, ,

vents all quarre ls on the subj ect O f precedence among

the drivers The O ffice rs should also see that each
.

enters the colu m n in its turn and without delay .

T h ese precautions may appear very minute but they ,

are quite necessary There are others that S hould be

.

taken by the commander of the convoy for example ,

h e Should satisfy him self th a t all the carriages an d

animals are in good order before setting o u t He .

should s e e wheth er the loads are not too heavy and ,

remedy the di fficulty if th ey are either by employing ,

more wagons or lengthening the teams He prepares .

a list of all the wagons with their contents and th e

,

n ames of t he drivers He requi r es the o fficers to assist

.

in his duties o f supe rvision and gi v es them i n s t ru c

,
 C O NVO Y S .
36 7

tions what the y sh ould do i n di fferent circum stances

that he may foresee He should cause a defensive
.

park to be formed several times that the d r ivers may ,

know h o w to perfor m thei r part without confusion .

Th e passages o f de fi le s are dangerous for a con

vo
y which is surrounded by numerous par t ies of th e
enemy A defile should therefore never be entered
.

until the ou t let from it is secured and it Should be ,

passed with all practicable speed In passing bridges .

,

precaution s should be taken against att a cks on both

banks It i s m anifestly th e duty O f a commander of
.

a convoy to Obtain all t he information h e can of the

route he is to follow and e ven to make a personal
,

examin ation O f it i n advance if he has ti m e enough ,

.

When the ene my is reported i n front by the leading

detachment which falls back rapidly upon the escort
, ,

the carriages close up as m u ch as possible and halt ,

o r better still fo r m i n double file if the road is wide

, , ,

enough The ad vanced guard and the head detachment

.

Of the escort take a posi t ion to receive the enemy the

centre detachment fo r m s alongside of the first or i n ,

echelon as the ground m ay permit and as one o r

, ,

other flank is more expose d Th e third de tachment .

,

joined by the rear guard re m ains in reserve ready to

-
, ,

charge the enemy when he has t urned the wing of the

troops i n front and is attemp t ing to fall upo n the
,

flank o f the convoy to c u t it in two or thro w it into

, ,

confusio n This reserve should b e immediately in

.

front of the carriages that it may pass readily from

,
368 P RIN C IP LE S OF STR A TE GY .

right to left In this position it has the advantage o f

.

replying by small detachm e n ts to the circli n g move

ments of the attacking party A l l the cavalry of th e
.

escort should be in the reserve If the main body is .

too near the head of t he convoy the reserve m ay be ,

obliged to tak e position somewhere o n the flank ; in

this case an opening S hould be made in t he colum n to ,

allo w passage through from S ide to side I t is very .

n ecessary for the reserve to have much mobility b e ,

cause it is called upon to look out for the feint s o f th e

enemv ,
and repel all the lateral attacks which th e ,

ma i n body cannot at t end to The soldiers placed.

along the convoy to watch the drivers must now give

, ,

special attention to their d u ties an d Should at once ,

shoot down any who attempt to c u t loose their horses

in order to escape .

If the attack is repulsed the commander Of th e e s

,

cort must be very c areful how he indulges i n a pursuit ,

for the flight may be a feint t o draw h i m into an a i n

,

b u s c a de or away from th e train while another body

, ,

o f t he enemy a t ta cks it His Object is to arrive safely

.

at his destination with his charge This however .

, ,

should not prevent him fr om attacki n g t he enemy if

suitable opportunities o ffe r If n ecessity requires he
.
,

S hould take S helter in and behind th e wagon s In a d es .

perate case like this a protrac t ed resis t ance may be

,

useless o n account of the great superiority of the ene

,

my ; the commander m ay then endeavor to save a

portion of the trai n by abandoning the remainder o r
 C ON VO Y S . 36 9

else to destroy the whole by killing or m aiming the

horses breaking the wheels overturning the wagons
, , ,

and even set t ing on fire t hose easily burned .

The defence ag ainst an attack fro m t h e rear i s con

ducted o n the sam e principles — the centre de t ach
ment is united to the rear detachment an d the rear
guard t o for m a m ai n body to resist the ene my the
,

head detachment falls b ack to for m a reserve The .

c o n v oy should continue its ma rch while t he troops

fi gh t .The latter will re t ire g r aduall y keeping at no ,

great distan ce from the tail of the column bu t pre ,

senting a bold front in de fi le s and wherever the groun d ,

permi t s In the mean t ime the ad van ced guard r e

.
,

c e i v e s information of the attack and j oins t he reser v e , .

The most da n gerous attack is that in flank because ,

the convoy is more exposed in tha t direction In this .

case th e three de t achm ents unite on the side attacke d

, ,

and m ove o u t so far that the en emy will be obliged to

m ake a wi de dé t our i n attacking and expose his o w n
fl a nk The best arrangem ent is to thro w the c en t re
.

deta c h m ent well out and for m i n ech elo n t h e other

,

t w o strengthened respectivel yby the ad v a n c e d and rear

,

guard The convoy doubl es its files and moves on

.
,

regulatin g its movements by those o f the troops If .

th ey halt it m u st halt u nless the enemy has on ly i n

, ,

fa n t ry in which case the convoy will take the trot and

,

escape But the attacking party usually co n t ains c a v

.

a l ry ,
an d th e con voy must regulate its movemen t s by
those of the escort However it may sometimes gain
.
,
*
16
 P R IN C IP LE S OF S TR A T E G Y .

groun d in a defile or in some plac e where cavalry is

,

unable to act A t any rate th e di rector of the t r ain

.
,

must Obey exactly the orders of t h e com m ander of the

escort . If the la t ter thinks it n ecessary to form a
defensi v e park the former executes the mov e m ent at
‘

the fi r st suitable place .

It is some t i m es impossibl e to adopt the above dis

position s There may not b e men enough to fo r m
.

t hree detachments and in this case two are u sed one

, ,

at the head of the con voy an d the other a t the tail ,

perhaps even aft er fu rnishing th e advanced and rear

, ,

guards th e main body m ay b e too small for s u bdi v i

,

sion an d t hen it should all march together o n th e

,

most dangerous S ide The rule is n ever t o scatter the .

escort along t he con voy but to assemble it in on e or ,

more groups capab l e of e ffectual resistance A con .

voy of importance S houl d ne ver be risked on th e road

wi thou t a p r evious sweeping of the country by m ova
b l e columns If the convoy is put in mo t ion i m m e di
.

ately aft er the return o f the columns there are m any ,

chances in its favor and the escort m ay be considera

,

bly diminish ed .

I t is evident fro m wh at precedes that the attack o f

, ,

a con voy is a very safe operation e ven for a body of ,

troops inferior to t he escort for if the enemy is taken , ,

unawares the convoy m ay be destroyed or a part o f

, ,

it captured if t he attack fails the par ty m ay re tire ,

safely It should be partly infantry and partly cav

.

alr It is evident that if by hiding behind a wood

y
.
, ,
 C ON VO Y S . 3 71

a hill a field o f grain & c the head or tail of the con

, , .
,

voy can be surprised an d enveloped b efore assistance

can arrive the success is complete This p l an should
, .

be at tempted before resorting to an Open attack Bu t .

it is not right to expect such negligence upon t he p art

of the commander of the escort ; but o n the contrary , ,

that the escort will be prepared for the attack Hen ce .

,

his attention must b e div ided by se n ding against h im

s e v eral small columns and many skirmishers who seek ,

to get near the wagons to shoot t he horses and obstruct

,

the road The cavalry circling around moves rapidly

.
, ,

upon exposed points If several carriages are reached

.
,

i t i s s u fli c ie n t to frigh ten o ff the drivers and cut the

traces because in this way the rear part of the co n voy
,

is brought to a halt .

If the time and place of the attack can be chosen ,

it evidently should be m ade when the convoy is partly
i n a defile an d th e head o r the tail may be enveloped
,
.

S uccess i s then certain the inevitable crowding a n d

,

confusion in the defile preventing on e pa rt of the

t roops from coming to the assistance o f the other .

But such a piece o f good fortune is rare and there ,

a re chances enough of succe ss to justify attacking a

con voy wherever i t is found .

“Then the whol e or part of a convoy has been seized ,

the p r ize should be rapidly carried o ff to a secure

pl ace before the enemy can co m e up i n superior force
,

and recapture it Rather than pe rmit this the carriages

.
,

S hould be destroyed and only t h e mos t valuabl e part

,
3 72 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

of contents preserved and carried o ff on the back s

their
of the horses Fighting is to be avoided that is not
.

the object of the expe di t ion .

A rt . IL — A mb u sc a de s .

A s war is now waged and with the great number ,

of detachments with which armies a r e S urrounded in

the present day ambuscade s are scarcely possible
, ,

except for small bodies of troops V ery broken coun .

try is particularly sui t ed to them from the ease with ,

which troops may be concealed in it This m e hod

t .

o f attacking by surprise can only succeed when th e

'

enemy i s very negligent i n his m arches taking none ,

of the u sual precau t i o ns ; for as soon as notice is ,

given of an ambuscade it has failed In a n ambus,

.

cade the e ffort S hould be m ade not only to surprise

,

the enemy but to envelop him and cut O ff his r e

,

treat ; for this purpose the troops in ambush should

,

be divided into several bodies in order to attack on ,

a l l sides at once .

When moving to a position Of ambush the body ,

of troops should be preceded by a sm all ad van ced

guard and by scouts in the usual mann er to a v oid
, ,

falli n g into a similar trap laid by the en emy and to ,

seize all persons who might carry him word o f the

operation This is a rule in fact which Should never
.
, ,

be disregarded .

Woods hills rocks tall hedges &c are it is true

, , , ,
.
, , ,
 AM BU S C A DE S .
3 73

th e most ad vantageous places for ambuscades but ,

there are others by no mean s u seless for such pur

poses such as dikes fields of g r ain o r meadows of tall
, , ,

g r ass o r plains crossed b y g e n t l e un d u lations par t ie

, ,

u l arl
y as t he enemy is lulled into sec u rity by not sus
e c t in any probability of an attempt at surprise on
p g
such ground A n in ventive genius can make the
.

most o f circumstances of this kin d when he sees his ,

ad v ersa ry in clined to negligence and presumption .

In t his way Hannibal deceived Minuti n e P olybius .

says that b et w een the two camps was a hill whence

.

eithe r could greatly annoy the other Hannibal de .

t e rm in e d to seize i t first but suspecting that Minu

,

tius p r o ud o f a former success would not fail to pre

, ,

sent himself he had recourse to a stratagem A l .

though the plain com m anded by the hill was gener

ally l evel and Open Hannibal had observed several
,

undulations and hollows whe re some men might be

,

hid . He accordingly distributed among them i n ,

small bodies 5 00 horse and

,
foot M in u t iu s .

m arched up to d efend the hill without percei ving the ,

troops in ambush who took him in flank and rear ;

,

h e was completely defeated .

In p r eparing an a mbuscade those places are also ,

to be so u ght where the en emy cannot deploy easily ;

where he is obliged to move i n a long n arro w ,

column ; where on account of local difli c u l t ie s dis

, ,

order may b e expected to occur ; where the troops are

separated by Obstacl es &c ,
.
3 74 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE G Y .

A t what distance from the road followed by the ,

ene my should an ambuscade be established ? This

,

ques t ion can only b e solve d by con sidering the local

i ty and the kind o f troops to be attacked In general
,
.
,

it may b e said that if the pl ace of con ce almen t is to o

,

near the fl a n k e rs of the enemy will discover the trap

,

and if it is too far O ff t he enemy will have time to ,

escape C avalry Should station itself at a greater

.

distance than infantry because it can get o v er ground ,

more rapidly and the n oise of the horses cannot be

,

repressed F o r this reason and because cavalry c

.
,

not ac t in all kinds O f ground infantry is better suited ,

for a mb u scades However cavalry may be us ed i n .

,

small bodies .

The place o f ambush should be entered from the

sides and rear i n order to leave no tracks on the road
,

by which the enemy might be led to suspect some

thing Night i s the best time for moving in order
.
,

to arrive before day at the place It is a good p lan .

to t ake at first another road in order to mislead the

, , ,

inhabitants of the country who may be i n the interest ,

o f the en emy .

A body of troops in ambush should light no fires

each soldier should re m ain i n the place ass i gn ed to
him whether stan ding sit t ing or lying ; he should
, ,
,

n ot mo ve n or hold his arms in such a posi ti on as to

,

reflect the rays of the sun In t h e daytime a portion .

,

of the troop s may S leep if they have long to wait b e , ,

cause the e n emy is Visible at a distance an d there is ,

 A M BU S C A D E S . 3

ample time for preparation b ut at nigh t every m a n ,

must be on the alert t o seiz e the favorable moment

,

for rushing upon the enemy whe n the p reconcerted ,

S ignal is given .

The troops being di vided as has been stated into , ,

several bodies wi t h special d uties to perform eac h

, ,

S hould be informed precisely what it has to do in ,

order to avoid confusion and to have concert i n th e

attack . The infantry placed as near the road as
,

pos s ible fire a S ingl e volley and then rush upon t he

,

enemy uttering loud cries at the same time The

,
.

cavalry posted at a g reater distance mak e a circuit

, , ,

i n order to close the way both in front and rea r The .

pa rty in ambush should only rise up at a given S ignal ;

i t should no t stir o n account of a few shots that may ,

be accidental The com m ande r is the sole j udge of

.

t h e moment for action and i t is for h i m to give the

,

signal Too much i m patience may cause the opera

.

tio n to mi scarry .

A fter an engagement the enemy may often be , .

drawn in t o an a mbuscade by a feigned retreat This .

ruse i s wel l known but still i t s u cceeds because an

, ,

en emy who believes himself victorio u s and wishes t o ,

profit by his first success, does not al w ays take all the
precautions usual in an ordin a r y m arch and more , ,

over people are made p r esu m p tuous by good fortune

,
.

In 1 6 2 2 Tilly was p r essing Heidelberg closely The

,
.

K ing of Bohemia and Man s fe l d passed the Rhine to s u e

cor that city A t t he n e w s of the m a rch of t he K in

.
g
3 76 P R IN C IP L E S OF S TR ATE G Y .

of Bohemia Tilly encamped near Wi s lo ch in a very

, ,

advan t ageous position To dra w h i m from i t Man s

.
,

feld attacked and d u ri n g the engagement caused his

,

troops to fall back as if worsted Tilly pursued

,
.

warmly and advanced as far as M in g e lh e im where

, ,

Mansfeld had placed i n ambush a part O f his ar m y ,

and much artille r y The Bavarians take n unawares

.
,
-

in this way were at once defeated ; they had

,

m e n killed and los t t heir baggage cannon an d many

, , ,

p r isoners Heidelbe r g was relieved

. .

When information has been received o f an attempt

upon the part O f the enemy to prepare an ambus cade ,

an excellent Oppor tunity is O ffered to m ake a c o u ii t e r

plot for he will be surprised at the moment when he
,

expected to cause surprise his troops will be de m o r ,

a l iz e d and fear will give the finishing stroke With .

,

t his obj ect t he co u nter ambuscade should be arranged

,
-

a s n ear as possible to that of t he enemy P aulin i n .

,

fo r m ed by deserters that C e c in n a h ad prepared an a m

b u s c a de for him sent a portion of his troops to station
,

themselves in ambush n ear t hose of the ene my whil e ,

he moved up as if he kne w nothing of their design .

The party of C e c i n n a was c u t to pieces because his ,

m en lost confidence as soon as they saw P a ulin s ’

troops S how the m selves .

This proves that even in arranging an ambuscade

that i s to say when a commander dee m s him self su ffi
,

c ie n t ly i n control o f t he country to e ffect a sur p rise of

his enemy it is n ecessary to b e on his guard to post

, ,
 A i IBU se AD E s . 3 77

sentinels an d t o examine the neighborhood of th e

,

position he is going to occu p y The sentinels a re not .

only n ecessary for the sec urity of the party i n a m

bush but al so to gi ve n otice of the arri val of the
,

enemy who is to b e surprised and to communicate ,

any information that may be in t eresting to th e com

man der This d u ty should be committed to men of
.

intel l igence and experience i n war ; it is wel l even to

place a n o fficer o r non commissioned o ffi cer on th e
-

l o k out, wi t h t w o or three men to transmit his

o

repo rt s .

If t he patrol s or sentinels see any of the scouts of

the en emy they should n o t challenge but hid e o r
, , ,

retire without n oise ; th e least i i i dis c re t io n may cause

such an enterp rise t o fail If the enemy discover t he
.

ambushed party all t hat remains i s to rush out and

,

seize the mos t exposed men .

It i s well to have o n the two flanks of the ambus

,

ca de small d e t achments o f cavalry to ride aft er peas

,

an t s who migh t see the t rap an d endeavor to give

, ,

n o t ice of its existence to the ene m y The n eighin g .

of t he horses is ho w ever dangero us as it may lead

, , ,

to discovery .

It is scarcely necessary to say that if the troops are ,

to remain a long time conceal ed the commander b e , ,

fo r e setting out upon the expedition should see that a ,

supply of provisions i s laid i n for men and horses .

Having on ce entered the place O f co n ceal m ent n one ,

S hou ld be permitted to leave it even in disguise for , ,

3 78 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

fear of arousing the suspicions of th e inhabitants an d ,

also those of the enemy .

A r t . III . —A dv a n ce d P o st s.

When the circumstan ces o f the war permit the

troops to re m ain quietly resting they are either in camp ,

o r canton m ents Some remarks were made in a pre

.

vions ch apter o n the subj ect o f c a ntonments It i s .

proposed n ow to enter into more detail an d to treat ,

o f castram etation or th e art of choosing and

, laying
o u t camps . But first a few words will be said as to
,

advanced posts applicable alike to the case o f troops

,

long in a position o f repose or S imply m aki n g a tem,

p o ra r
y stay at some place .

The advanced posts of a station ary body o f troops

perform the same duties as the scouting parties an d
fl an k e rs o n a march Their o ffice is to prevent the
.

enemy from falling upon the m ain body wi th out being

perceived and the alarm given E very body o f troops .

which i s established in camp bivouac or cantonments , , ,

for a long time or for a si n gle day o r even for a fe w

, ,

hours should be covered by detachments whose n u m

,

ber and strength S hould be proportion ed to th e entire

force and the extent of ground t o be occupied These
,
.

detach ments form th e a dv a n ced p os ts If they are .

wel l posted and keep a good look ou t the enemy can

, ,

n o t present h imself in any direction witho u t bei n g

 A D VA N C E D P O S TS . 379

s een at a con sid erable distanc e an d time is thus given ,

for preparations for defence If o n the contrary they

.
, ,

are badly placed a r e too much separa t ed and perform

, ,

their duties n egligen t ly o n e of the detachments may

,

b e captured without the knowledge of its neighbors ,

and t he danger for the m ain body i s so muc h the

greater because it i s reposing in a false security O u t .

post ser v ice deserves therefore t he careful a t tention of

, ,

all Officers connected with i t .

The n ature of the ground d etermines the kin d of

troops to be u sed for this purpose In an open coun .

try cavalry will b e employ ed but infantry chiefly i n ,

a b roken country A few ho rse m en should al ways be

.

wi t h the de t achments for duty as orde r lies and mes

,

s e n e rs
g . Moun t ed soldiers are also ne c essary as v e

de tt es on the principal roads to give ti m ely notice of

,

the app roach of the enemy .

The distance at which the advanced posts S h ould b e

placed cannot be fi xed absolutely bec ause i t depends ,

upon t h eir n umber t he ground and th e s tr e n gth of the

, ,

m ain body . It is plain that a large body of t r oops ,

requi r ing some tim e to assemble should ha v e its out ,

posts more distant t han a smal l body which can get ,

u nder arms i n a moment Moreove r a la r ge force

.
,

can safely exten d its line of outposts because they ,

m ay b e m ade stronger and well supported .

A dvanced posts are divided into o u tp os ts and g r a n d

g u a r ds.
The first as,
their name implies are ou t s i de ,

l
o f all the grand g uards serv i ng as centres and ra ly ng
i
,
3 80 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

p o ints for them The gran d guards furnish the out

.

posts each sending out as many as may be n ecessary

,

fo r a good view of the surrounding ground In a ddi .

tion to these a n d intermediate between them and the

,

main body small reserves are placed in suitable posi

,

tions ; they are called supports o r p i cke ts .

The grand guards are pl aced as much as possible , ,

in covered positions such as low ground behind vil

, ,

l ages or woods o n the reverse of a hill & c Th e

, ,
.

essential thing is to keep th em o u t o f sight of the

enemy who migh t attempt to attack the m suddenly
,

o r capture them The outposts are still more to the

.

front say about 1 00 paces observing the same rul e of

, ,

keeping out of view o f the enemy Th ese posts .

,

dr a wn fr o m th e grand guar ds furnish an extensive ,

c h ain of sentin els or vedettes who are i ntended to see ,

e v ery t hing that goes on Each picket furnishes three

.

o r fou r g r and guards each gran d guard as m any out

,

posts an d each outpost several sentinels

, The .

st re n g t h of t he outposts can not be al w ays an d e v ery

w he r e t h e S ame being dependent o n the n umbe r of
,

sentinel s to be furnished In each ou t post t here

.

shou l d b e three times as m any m en as it furnishes

sentinels besides the o fli c e rs and n o n commissioned
,
-

o ffi ce rs .

In a woo ded co u ntry the sentin els occupy th e outer

,

ski rt s th e outposts the fi r st clear places the gran d

, ,

guards those more to the rear The pickets are placed .

behind the forest and always far enough so that the

,
 AD VA N C E D P O S TS . 3 81

enemy cannot fall upon them suddenly unde r cover ,

o f t he trees even if he should h ave succeeded in pene

,

t r a t in g the wood In gene r al woods a n d other co v e r s

.
,

should be vie w ed wi t h S i ISp ic i o n If the forest is t oo .

extensive to be left in front large open places should ,

be sought out for the pickets o r else abatis ma de to ,

co v er t hem The grand g u ards and outposts S hould

.

take similar precautions .

C ommunication between th e posts should be kept

u
p by frequent patrols ei t her to watch
,
the sentinels ,

to discover any Of the en emy who m ay slip past in

the d ark to prevent desertion s to seiz e spies & c
, , ,
.

The outposts should n ever be separated from t he

gran d guards by obstacles which would prevent t heir
promp t assem b ling if t he enemy S hould attack Th e
,
.

same rule should as far as possible b e observed b e

t ween the grand guards and pickets but sometimes ,

cannot on account o f t he greater distance In this

,
.

latter case the Obstacle should be hel d by an inter

m ediate post to keep the enemy in check and protect
,

the retreat of the advan ced troops .

The pickets m ay be composed of troops o f all arms ,

but t he gran d guards are ei ther cavalry or infant ry .

If of infan t ry there S hould be still a few mounted

,

m en for pu r poses already mentioned The pickets in

,
.
,

addition to the outposts a n dgrand guards S hould ha v e ,

their o w n small posts or at least their own sen tinels

, , ,
.

G en erally too m any precaution s cannot be taken to

,

guard ag ainst surprises The O fficer who perm i ts h i m

.
382 P R IN C IP LE S or STR ATE GY .

self to be surprised is entirely i n excu sable ; h e should

always take it for granted that the posts in front of
him are negligent o r m ay be cap t ured by the enemy
, ,
'

and his arrangements should b e m a de accordingly .

When the sentinels give no t ice o f the approach of

the enemy and see him coming they fall back upon ,

their respective posts then u p on the gran d guards ;

,

and the latter aft er ascertaining the exact state of a f

,

fai r s and th at a serious attack is m ade retire towards

, ,

the p ickets skirmishing as they go The pickets send

,
.

supports to the gran d guards ; receive them when

they come in ; fight i f it is n ecessary to hold their
,

positions o r fall back slowly upon the main body .

A t night the outposts are strengthen ed i n order to

, ,

increase the number of sentinels If the country i s .

wooded a n d favors surprises th e sen t inels are d rawn

,

in nearer thei r outposts at nightfall i n or der to avoi d ,

risk o f being carried o ff By t aking their places at

.

the bottom of the hills whose tops they may have

,

occupied d uring the day they have a better chance

,

o f seeing an approaching en emy .

When th e same points are occupied for several

days it is a good plan to fortify them either by throw
, ,

ing u p earthworks or by using ab atis .

No on e should leave t he outposts Houses shoul d .

be occupied n either by office r s nor men The m e n .

Sh ould never take o ff t heir clothes or accoutrements .

Not m ore than h alf the m en s h ould sit down or rest

at the same time t h e remainder being o n the lookout
, .
 A D VA N C E D P O S TS .

The outposts receive dese rters stop travellers and ,

inhabi t an ts coming in and quest ion them

,
Their .

reports are to be received wi t h cau t ion as they are ,

oft en false and generally inaccurate .

F requen t p atrols move about amo n g the o u tposts ,

called defen s ive p a tr ols to distinguish them from t hose

,

which are sent to the ex terior t ,

tances to make some discovery

, .

only intended to see that th e sen

a n d t hat th e en emy does n o t slip i n

the pos t s ; t o pe r fo r m t his d u ty a co ,

or four men are su fficient When a .

patrol i s sen t t o discover the cau se as every lit t le ,

t hing m ay be an indicatio n of t he approach of the

en e my A m an is sent for w ard to reconnoitre who
.
,

fires his piece if he sees the enemy The corporal .

causes his patrol to discharge their pieces and they ,

all fa l l back towar ds t h e n earest senti n el If the .

groun d i s very obstructed or covered the men of the ,

patrol are sepa rated in order to examine the groun d

,

more t horoughly ; but usually they keep together .

The patrol should follow the direction marked out for

it be perfec t ly s ilent m arch slo wly halt oft en and
, , ,

listen avoid ra t tling the arms must not smoke If a

, ,
.

senti nel is found n eglectful o f his duty the patrol ,

h alts and a m an is sen t to give n otice at t he outpost ;

it will only move forward when the sen t inel has been
replaced .

Near dawn patrols should be sent ou t more fr o

,
384 PRIN C I PLE S or S TR A TE G Y .

quently because thi s is the time to expect th e enemy

,
.

A pa trol is sometimes replaced by an i n telligent

soldier who makes the rounds o f the sentinels to
, ,

keep t he m on t he alert .

A r t . IV . —L a yin g o u t C a mp s.

In establishing a camp either ten t s barracks o r , , ,

bran ches of t rees m ay be e m pl oyed in giving shelter ,

depending upon the means at hand and the d uration

o f the encampmen t A camp should always be
.

located upo n mili t ary conside r ation s regard ! being ,

al so had t o t h e health of men an d animals It should .

be near wood and water b ut far fr o m swamps which

, ,

breed fatal fevers In a military point of v ie w a

.
,

camp should overlook the s urrounding coun try o r at ,

least not b e over looked and the wings should be ,

rested upon n atural obs t acles If a ri v er flows in .

front a t such a distance as to per m it the army to

,

be assembled and man oeuvred so much the better ,

.

Th e rear should be Open and present o n e or more ,

good woods by which a retreat m ay b e e ffected if

,

necessary .

Th e position o f a camp seems to h e therefore esse n

t ially defensive Hence come the m easures for i t s
.

safety ; all the avenues to the camp from the fron t ,

fl anks and rear should be held by detachments ; t he

,

bridges should be p articularl y guarded and covered

by intrenchments fords watch ed and defi les occupied
,
.
 L A Y IN G ou r C AM PS . 3 85

Besides these detachments , which may sometimes be

at a co n sidera b le distance the camp should be imme
,

dia t e ly surrounded by guards occupyi n g lin es parallel

t o the front flanks and rear at a distance of o n e or
, , ,

two hundred yards To avoid surprise the guards

.
,

may cons t r u ct smal l defensi ve works which will ,

en able the m to repel a charge of ca v alry or e ven to ,

resist for some time the attack o f superior forces of

infa n try These works m ay be very rapidly con
.

s truc t ed (S e e F igure in which th e unit of measure

is the yard If t he exact form shown cannot be
.

given a t any rate a mound of earth can b e thrown

,

up t hree o r four fe et high

,
.

The work may be in the for m of a redan or lunette ,

only l arge en ough to c ontain the guard when under

a r ms. A yard along the parapet i s t he allo w ance
for each man The work i s closed at the gorge
.

by a sm all trench and bank of ear th S ometimes .

abatis may be substi t uted for the earthwork .

l ¢ 00

F ig . 29 .

The front of the camp should be as great as that

o f the troops in line of bat t le not only for the whole ,

mass but for each batt alio

,
n & c The art illery camp
,
s .

17
3 86 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR ATE GY .

are u sually in rear of the infantry A s far as possible .

,

the c amp of the infan t ry a n d cavalry should form a

single line the cavalry b eing on the wings The
,
.

lines of the camp of an army should b e regulated b y

t he ground i n th e sam e way as an order o f battle
,
.

When the army is formed in two lines there are two ,

camps o n e before the other Th e reserve has its

,
.

own Th e same rules are observed in each camp as

.
,

if it were alone .

If a camp is to b e occupied a long time an d may ,

‘

be attacked it should b e fortified It is better to

,
.

have the works that are built for its protect ion fe w
and strong than m any and weak In an open an d
, .

l evel country the cavalry should camp upon th e

,

wi n gs o f t he infantry becau se that is their place i n

,

line of battle ; but in a broken coun try th ey would ,

form a secon d lin e b ehind th e infantry ; they shoul d

always take precaution s to avoid sudden a t tack as ,

som e time i s required to saddle the horses & c The ,

.

artille ry park should als o be in rear as n othing is ,

m ore to b e feared t han a su rprise o f a park Whe n .

there are n o n atural obstacles to cover the flanks o f

the camp brigades or division s m ay be placed i n
,

camps on the flanks pe rpendicular to th e genera l line

, .

S ometimes when attack m ay be also expec t ed i n

,

rear the second line m ay turn i t s co l or fr on t s to the

,

rear and th u s a l arge square o r rectangle b e formed

, .

It is better for several reaso n s to put soldiers i n

, ,

huts th an in tents : 1 s t n o transportation i s required

,
 BIv O U A c s . 387

for them ; 2 d th e huts are more healthy ; 3d the

, ,

con struction of the huts gives occupation to the sol

diers and develops their intelligence The general .

arrangement of a camp o f huts should be t he sam e

as for tents .

Ar t V .
— B i v o u a c s.
.

When the troops cannot be regularly establish ed in

c amp but still must be kept together they are placed
, ,

m bivouac . In bivouac as i n camp each body of

, ,

troops should be placed as in th e order of battle .

A regiment o f cavalry being in order of battle i n ,

rear o f the ground to be occupied is broken by ,

platoon s to the right The h orses of each pl atoon

.

are placed in a single row and fastened to pickets,

p l an t ed firmly in the ground n ear the enemy they ,

r e m ain saddled a l l night with gir t hs slacken ed

,
Th e .

arms are at first stacked i n rear of each row o f

horses ; th e sabres wi t h th e bridles hu n g o n them
, ,

are pl aced again st the stacks The forage is placed .

o n t he right o f each row o f hors es Two stable .

guards for each platoon watch the horses .

A fire for eac h platoon is m ad e n ear the color line ,

twenty paces to the left of the row o f horses A .

shelter i s m ade for the m en around t he fire if possi ,

ble and e a ch m an then places his arms and bridle

,

against the sh elter The fires an d she l ter for the

.

o ffi cers are placed in rear o f the lin e of those for the

3 88 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR ATEGY .

men The interval between the shelters shoul d be

.

such that t he p latoon s can take up a lin e of ba tt le

freely to the front or rear .

The interva l bet w een the squadron s must b e wi t h

out obs truction throughout the whole depth o f the
bi vouac The distance fr om the en emy decides the
.

m anner i n which the horses a r e fed and led to wate r

When it is permitted to unsaddle the saddles are ,

placed in the rear of t he horses .

F o r infantry t he fires are made in rear of th e

,

color l in e on t he ground that would be occupied by

,

t he tents in camp The companies a r e place daroun d

.

them and if possible con struct shelters When

, , ,
.

liable to su r prise the infan t ry should stand to arms at

,

d aybreak and the cavalry mo u nt until the return of

, ,

t he reconno itring par t ies If the arms are to b e .

taken apart to clean it m ust b e done by detach ,

ments successively
,
.
,

Th e artillery can have n o fixed rule for its bi vou acs ,

bei n g obliged to suit itself to localities but in every ,

case t he fires should not be near th e park The fol

,
.

l o wing is a good arrangement : l s t a si n gle row of ,

fires for cannoneers and drivers ; 2 d the ho r ses in ,

four ranks ; 3d the forage ; 4th t he pieces caisson s

, , , ,

and wagons parked in rear in two ranks The o fficers

, ,
.

have a fire to the front .

 C ANTO NM E NT S . 3 89

A rt. V L —C a n to n m e n ts .

In order to put troops i n canton ments they are ,

distributed in t lfe villages o f the country occupied by

them When an army is moving it m ust b e can
.
,

toned if at all in the order in which i t happen s to

, ,

be each corps u sing t o the best advantage th e villages

, ,

h amlets and farm houses it occupies all un der the

,
-
,

direction and superintendence o f the o fficers in order ,

to avoid fightin g among the men for the best quar

ters .

If th e army i s to remain i n the sam e position some

time it m av b e more extended i n ord er to burden
, ,

the country less and m ake th e soldiers more c om fo r ta

ble They are generally much crowded in cantoning
.

o n a m arch This distribution o f the troops amo n g

.

the villages and hamlets o f a country dema n ds mu ch

care and attention from the staff o ffi cers who have ,

t h e duty t o perform in order that the m en m ay be ,

securely and con venie n tly lodged and t hat they m ay ,

be uniformly distributed among th e peopl e in propor

tion to their ability to receive t hem .

C antonments should if possible be established , ,

behind a river for th e sake of greater security again st

,

attack This i s particularly n ecessary for wi n ter

.

quarters which are generally m ore extended The

,
.

di fferent corps should be near en ough for mutual sup

39 0 P RIN C IP L E S OF S TR A TE GY .

port A place of assembly should b e design ated i n

. ,

view of the con t ingency of an attack This point .

shou l d not b e too near t he enemy .

Th e di fferent arms o f the servi ce should b e so

can toned as to afford mutual support The artillery .

is placed near the roads so as to be able to move ,

rapidly wherever n eeded ; it should b e covered b y

the infantry The cavalry m ay b e placed whereve
.
r

forage and water are mos t convenient as th e rapidi t y ,

o f its motions enables it to reach the place o f asse m

bly in time from any part of the cantonm ent C are .

must be taken however not to station it wh er e it m ay

, ,

be easily surprised as it is n ot so able to repel a sud

,

den attack as infantry .

In each pa r ti al cantonment there should b e a place ,

for the troops to assemble at a given signal and all ,

the usual precautions for safety should be taken .

E ach battalion should have its place of assembly i n

c as e o f alarm each brigade each division each arm y
, , ,

co r p and finally the whole army This fin al position

, .

sh ould b e known to the command ers of divisions and

even of brigades to provid e for the case of a c c ide n
,

tal separation from the divisions to which they belon g .

The communicatio n between the di fferent places o f

assembly should be free ; with this obje ct bridges ,

should be repaired roads improved and n ew ly

,

opened if necessary If a river passes through the

,
.

canto n ment it m ust b e bridged ; and if there are

,

d eep ravines di ffi cult o f passage roads must be mad

, ,
e
 C A NTONM E NTS . 39 1

across the m for artillery When the cantonments .

are not covered by an u nford abl e river it is well to ,

break u p the roads by which the en emy can arrive ,

and to con str u ct aba t is and fi e l d work s in the most -

accessible places A still better safegu ard is great

.

v igilance upon the par t of th e ad vanced posts Both .

m eans should b e u sed .

G enerals should n ever leave their troops but r e ,

m ai n in their midst in t he most con venient place for

,

giving t heir orders In 1 6 9 4 C ount Tilly was cap

.
,

t a red in a house wh ere he was lodging because a ,

m arsh separated him from his troops S uch disgrace .

is reserve d for o fli c e rs who prefer their comfort to

their safety . “ hen troops bivouac the gen eral s
T
,

should bivouac wi t h them ; their tents if they have ,

them should be kept for maps and pa p ers which mus t

,

b e u sed and might be ruined by r a i n o r de w ; but

,

they should sleep out with the m en T h e latter .

should have n o g round fo r complaining that they are

exposed to hardships and privations which are not
shared by their o ffi cers This is especially n ecessary
.

with volunteers an d militia .

The com man din g general fixes th e l imits to be o c

c u p i e d by each corps the commande rs of corps dis
,

tribute their o w n division s the generals of division s

,

their brigades & c ,

To m ak e these dis tributio n s
. ,

m aps are required and the more they are i n detail the
,

b etter . A fter the fi rst assignments are made it ,

must be expected that many r e c t ifi c a tio n s will b e

392 P RIN C IP LE S or S TR ATE GY .

necessary When they are m ade tables will b e pre

.
,

pared sho w ing i n de t ail the position s of the di fferen t

,

bodies of troops A t the head quarters o f a division

.
-
,

for exam ple there wil l b e a tabl e embracin g the fol

, ,

lowin g heads : Head qu arte r s of the division ; Head

-

quarters of the brigades b a t t a l io n s h is ol a te d compa

,

nies P laces of assembly of brigades ; P lace o f assem

bly o f the divi sion ; Remarks S o for other bodies .

w hether larger o r smaller .

There is oft en no time for the preparation of such

tables where the distribution of th e t roo p s must b e
,

made very rapidly as for example i n cantonm ents o n

, , ,

a march . In such a case ea ch brigade q u a r te r ma s

,

ter accompanied by t he bat t alion qu artermasters and

,

an officer o f each company should precede t h e bri ,

gade several hours to prepare lo dgings the divisio n

, ,

quartermas t er h a v ing gi ven gen eral in s t ru c t ion s t o

t he b r iga de quarte masters To complete the subj ect
r
.
,

there are given b el ow som e extracts from a circ u lar

addressed t o commande r s of divisions i n anticipatio n ,

o f a gran d concentratio n of troops It may b e .

modified to suit varying ci r cumstances

l s t The companies of t h e sam e b attalion must be
.

always kep t togethe r and as fa r as practicable th e

, , ,

b attalio n s and regim ents of the same brigade .

2 d Th e soldiers o f the sam e company must be

.

lodged together by sections or at least by half sec ,

tions which will not pr ev ent p u tting sever al sections

in a si n g l e house if it a fford s room enough
,
.
 C ANT N O M EN TS . 39 3

3d . The commander of a ba t talion and his staff

should be placed as n early as pos s ible in the ce n tre
o f his battalion .

4t h The company officers should be lodged i n the

.

same house with their men o r very near the m ,

.

5 th The drummers must be n ear head quarte rs

.
-
.

6 t h Near the rallying place there should always

.
,

be the police —guard .

7th Barns are to be prep a red as lodgings an d the

.
,

first floors o f dwellings the u pper being left to the

,

inhabitan ts unless there is grea t scarcity of room

,
.

8t h The company o fli c e rs i n advance will mark

.

with ch alk upon the doors o f barn s and houses the

, ,

l etters o f companies and the number of men to b e

,

received in them .

9 th When a room i s six paces in width soldiers

’

.
,

m ay be mad e to sleep in two rows ; but if the width

is less i n but o n e row E ach man is allowed the
,
.

breadth o f a pace Thus a room twenty paces long

.
,

would accom modate forty men if six paces or more ,

in width ; but only twenty men if less than six paces in ,

width .

l 0th The distribution o f lodgings should com

.

m ence o n the righ t o f the village looking towards ,

the enemy ; th at is to say t he first company should ,

b e placed on the right an d s o o n ,

.

l i t h The same rule should b e followe d if several

.

b attalions ar e in the same village ; that is the first ,

battalion should be o n the right .

17
394 P RIN C IP L ES or S TR ATE GY .

1 2 th The non commissioned o fficers will see that

.
-

arms and accoutrements are placed in order in the

several rooms so that each man m ay easily lay his
,

hands u pon his own &c 85 0 ,

.
,
.

During cantonments of some duration e fforts are ,

made to r e establish t ha t perfect discipline and order

-

which are oft en m u ch dis t urbed by a lo n g an d painful

campaign D u ring the same period the caval ry i s
.
,

re m o u nted the ranks filled up the troops pai d

, , ,

clothed shod an d fully equipped i n every way In

, ,
.

marches i n their o w n country the troops live o n what ,

they carry with t hem and what m ay be procur ed for ,

dis tribution to them by the proper officers In an .

’
enemy s country they may live o n the prod u ct of
,

requisitions made upon t he inhabitan ts Those requi .

s i t i o n s Should be regulated in amount b

y t he ability
o f the peopl e to meet them and by the wants o f the

troops both present and prospective ; for it is always

,

well to have a supply of provisions for several days ,

i n order that the troops m ay not want the nec o s

s a ri e s o f life These requisitio n s are ren ewed as th e
.

army advances Bu t it i s on e o f the most difii c u l t

.

things to prevent t he soldiers fr om wasting their

rations when they h ave a supply i ssued for several
,

days at once .

D ep ots o f supplies are also formed from which the ,

troops m ay be subsi sted during the operations o f the

campaign if the c oun t ry through which th ey pass
,

cannot support them If extended requisitions upon .

 C A NTO N M E N TS .
39 5

th e country do not furnish su fficient supplies more ,

must b e purchased else where for money m ust be ,

expended to feed the m en who have at best to , , ,

u ndergo m any privations and su fferings .

If the war is conducted upon p r oper princ ip les the ,

soldiers should never b e permitted to seize food or

clothing for themsel ves E very thing should co m e t o
.

t he m th rough authorized o fficers o t h erwise the war ,

will soon d egenerate in to wholesale pillaging; U n

doubtedly t he men must n o t be permitted t o starve
,

n o r to su ffer in an abundan t country The enemy .

should be always made to bear as far as possible the , ,

burde n of the war But on t h e othe r hand leav

.
, ,

ing o u t o f consideration the calls o f hum anity ,

self interest requires that the n o n combatant inhabit

- -

ants o f any country be treated in person an d prop

e rt
y wi t h as much consideration as possible B y .

requiri n g a n i n vaded country to furnis h whatever sup

plies i t can without causing starvation to innocent
,

n o n combatants ; by exhibiting all t he kindness and

-

hu m anity possi b le consisten t ly wi th fi r mness and

,

j ustice provision is made for the future and especially

, ,

for the eventuality of a retrograde move m en t through

th e sam e country .By treating the inhabitants wi t h
justice and humanity an d g iving the m an equivalen t
,

for their property many friends are gained or at least

, , , ,

their hos t ility diminished ; they will not fly at your

approach ; they will give you bread for mon ey and ,

give you shelter in their habitations A ct otherwi se ; .

 P RINC IP LES OF S TR A TE G Y .

pillage ravag e the country ; force the timid non com

,
-

b a t a n t s to flee for their lives ; march with the sword

in on e hand and the fi re brand in the other ; surround
-

yourself with r uins mak e the country a desert and in

, ,

a lit tle while you may be yourself reduced to the direst

extremities To day you m ay be swimming in plenty
.
-
,

and to morrow enduring the pangs o f wan t I repea t

-
.

it ; require the inhabitant s o f a country to suppl y

your necessities fo r this is the right of war ; but u se
,

this right with wise discretion In this light must

.

we interpret the maxi m o f C ato Wa r s up p or ts w a r

TH E END.
 TA BL E OF C O N TE N T S .

C H A PTE R I
.

P RDICIP LES Ol
'
A
S TR TE G Y
.

to s
De fi n i i n
s s
Ba e o f O p r ti o s e a n

Li s f op r tio s
ne o e a n

S t t g ic po i ts
ra e n

Pl an of c mp ig a a n

S tr a te g ies ] r t io s
Op e a n

F orw rd mov m ts
a e en .

R tr ts
e ea .

Div rs io s — C o mb i d m rch s— Deta ch m ts

e n ne a e en .

P r it
u su .

H oldi g co q red co try

n a n ue un

C H APTE R II .

ATION
O RG ANIZ OF ARM IES
ART 1
. . C o mpo s itio n f rmy o an a

2 . For m t io s of troops
a n .

C H A P TE R III .

A HES AND MANtE UVREs

M RC .

1 . R le s to b obs rv d i m rch s
u e e e n a e

S co ti g p rt i s
u n a e

A dv c d g an erd ua

R r g ea rd ua

S tr g th f col m
en t h m rch
o a u n on e a

2. Fo rw rd mov m ts
a d t h co m
e b ts th y l ad to
en an e a e e

Ord r f m rch f div i io

e o a o a s n
39 8 C ON TE NTS .

Art . 2 . Forw rd mov em t s d th e comb ts th y l d t

a en an a e ea o

P ss g f bridg s
a a e o e

P ss g f w oo ds
a a e o

P ss g f r iv rs
a a e o e .

A rri v l f th col m i pr s
a c f th
o e u n n e en e o e e ne my
Fl k m rch s
an a e

M rch s i r tr t
a e n e ea

R r g rd ea ua .

P ss i g bridg i r tr t
a n a e n e ea

5 . Th s im lt
e o s mov m t f s v r l col m s
u an e u e en o e e a u n

C H APTE R IV .

A
B TTLE S .

P r l imi ry r
e rk s
na e ma

1 . D fi i ti
e n — Ord rs f b t tl
on s e o a e

N mb r f l i s i ord r f b ttl
u e o ne n e o a e .

R s rv e e e

Li s to b d ploy d or i col m s
ne e e e n u n

Div is io s f corps h w d istr b t d

n o a ,
o i u e

P r ll l ord r
a a e e

Obl iq ord r ue e

P r ll l ord r e
a a forc d
e e r -
en e

C o ti d ord r
n nu ed ord r w ith i t rv ls e an e n e a

C h ck r ord r e e e

C rotch t t t h r r e o e ea

C rotch t to th fro t e e n

E mplo y m t f th diff r t rms

en o e e en a

Off s iv b ttl s
en e a e

Th r co oiss c
e e nn an e

D t rmi t io e e f th poi t f tt c k
na n o e n o a a

A tt c k f h ig hts
a o e

Th v lopi g tt ck
e en e n a a

Th fl k tt c k e an a a

A tt ck po th c tra u n e en e

C o c tr t io n en a n

E mpl f tt ck i g w ith corps f fo r div is io s

xa e o a a n a o u n

P s its ur u
 C ONT ENT S . 39 9

P AG E.

Art 4 De fen i
. . s v b ttl s
e a e

P os it io s n

Dispos it io s f t h d f s iv n or e e en e

Sq rs
ua e .

D f s iv prop rt i s f g o d
e en e e e O r un

U se o f fo t ifi c t io s r a n

D f s iv m o vr s
e en e an e u e

C H A P TE R V .

DE FE NC E O F RI E RS AND M UNTAINS— C O
V O V
E RIN G A S IEG E .

A RT 1
. . Defe n c f riv rs
e o e

Br idg h ds e- ea

S co d ry m
e n s a e an

Mov m ts f troops
e en o

2 . D f c
e en e o f mo tis un a n

A rt ifi c i l bs t cl sa O a e

P os it io s n .

I tr
n chm ts
en en

Mov m ts f troops
e en o

E mpl xa e

C o mm ic tio s un a n

S mm ryu a

3 . C ov eri g n s iega e

C H A P TER VI .

C OMB TS A NDA AFFAIRS .

A RT 1
. . o b ts
C m a of i n fa n y tr a g a in st i n fan try
po h ig hts
U n e

I w o ds
n o

I i h b it d pl c s
n n a e a e

2 . C v lry g i st c v lr y
a a a a n a a

3 . C v lry g i st i f try
a a a a n n an

4 . C o mb ts f rtill ry
a o a e
4OO C O NTE N T S .

Art . 5 . Att k d d f c f do bt
ac an e en e o a re u

6 . A tt ck a dd f c f stro g d w ll i g ho s
an e en e o a n e n -
u e th
wi o ut

b ildi g s d clos r s ll f m so ry
u n an en u e ,
a o a n

7 . A tt c ka dd f c f v ill g
an e en e o a a e

8 . Obs e rv tio s po m o vr s
a n u n a n eu e

C H A PTER VII .

ONNO SS NC RE C I A E S.

A RT 1 . . A rm d r co e o iss c s
e nn an e

S cr t e e

Sp i s e

2 . Topo g ph ic l r co
ra oiss c s a e nn an e

Iti r i s n e ar e

C H APTE R VIII .

S PE C IAL MIS S IONS, AND G I IN GV RE S T TO TROOP S .

ART 1 . . Co voy s
n

2 . A mb sc d s u a e 3
3 . A dv c d posts
an e
N
4 . L yi g
a t c mps
n ou a

5 . Bivo cs ua .

6 . C to me ts
an n n
 S C I ENTI F I C BO O K S
P UB LIS H E D B Y

D . V A N N O STRA ND
23 Mu rr a y S t re e t and 2 7 W a r r e n S t re e t ,

N E W Y O RK .

Any Book in th i s C at al og u e , se nt fr ee b y mail on r ecei p t of p ri ce .

l Te c h a n ic s .

o rth Editio R is d 8F u C loth n, a e . vo . .

A M A N U A L o r T H E O R E T IC AL M E C H A NIC S By J l i s l Ve is b a ch Ph D . u u ,
. .

T r a sl t d fro m t h fo r th a g m e t e d a d i m prov e d G e r m an e d it i o
n a e e u u n n n,

w i th a n i trod u ct i o n to t h e C a lc l s b y E c k l e y B C o x e A M
n u u , .
,
. .
,

M in i g E g i e e r 1 100 p g e s a d 9 02 w ood c u t i ll u str a t io n s

n n n . a n -
.

F
’
r a n c is L o w e ll H y dr a u l ic s .

h rd Ed itio
T iloth n. 4 to . C .

LO WE LL H Y D R A U L IC E XP E RIM E N T S — b e i g a S l e ct io n fro m E p e i n e x r

m en ts o H ydr a l i c M otors o t h e F lo w O f IVa ter ov e r IVe i s a d i

n u , n r ,
n n

Op n C a a ls f Un ifor m Re ct a g u l a r S ct ion m a d e a t Lo we ll Ma ss
e n o n e , , .

By J B F r a c i s C i v i l E g in e r
. . n , T h i rd e d it i o n r v i s e d a n d e l a r g e d
n e .
, e n ,

i cl u d in g m a y Ne w E xp r i m e ts o n G a g i g \Va t e r i n O p e n C a a l s
n n e n u n n ,

a do
n t h e F lo w thro u g h S b m e r g e d O ifi c es a d Di v e r g i g T b e s
n u r n n u .

IVi th 2 3 copp e rpl a t e s b e a u t if ll y e g a v e d a n d a bo t 1 00 n w p a g s

, u n r ,
u e e

o f t ex t .

K ir k w o o d o n F ilt r a t io n .

to C loth 4 . .

RE P O R T O N T H E F I L T R A T IO N OF RIV E R WA T E R S fo t h e S u ppl y o f ,
r

C i t ie s as pr a ct i s e d i n E rop e m a d to th e Bo a rd o f IVa t er C o mm i s
,
u ,
e

s i o e s o f t h e C i ty o f S t Lo i s
u r By JA M E S P K IR K W OO D
; Ill u str a
u . . .

t d b y 30 do bl e pl a t e e n g r a v i g s
e u -
n .
 S C IE
'

I
"
I IF I C B O O
' '
KS P UBLIS H E D B Y

R e r s
’
G e o log y o f P e n n s y l v a n ia
o g
.

3V ols
h Po tfol io f M p s C loth
. 4t o , w i t r o a . .

T IIE G O LEO G Y O F P N N S Y LVA N A A G ov r mE e t S rv y IVi t h a g e I . e n n u e . . n

e r l i w o f th e G e olog y f t h e U i t d S t a t s E ss ays o th e C o a l F o
a v e o n e e ,
n r

m t i o a d i t s F oss i ls a d a d scr i pt i o o f t h e C o a l F i e lds O f N orth

a n n ,
n e n

A m er ic a d G r e t Br i t i
an By H E N R Y D A R W N RO G E R S La t e S t t e
a a n . I ,
a

G olo g i st o f P e
e s ylv a i S pl e d idl y i ll u str a te d with P l t s a dE
nn n a. n a e n u

g r a v i g sn i t h T nx t e e

M Ir o n T r u s s B r i dg
’
e r r il l s e s .

Th ird Editio 4to C lo th n. . .

IRO N T R U S S B R ID G E S F O R RA IL ROA D S Th e M thod o f C l c l t i g . e a u a n

S tr a i s i T r ss s w i th a c a r e f l co m p a r iso o f t h e m ost pro m i

n n u e ,
t u n n en

T r ss e s i r e fe r e c e to e co o m y i
u , n co m b i a t i o e t et By t
n n n n n, c .
, c. .

C ol W LL A M E M R R ILL
. I I C o rps o f E g i n e e r s
. E Ni e l i th o ,
n
,
n

g r a ph e d pl a t e s o f i ll str a t i o s u n .

S h r e v e o n B r idg e s a n d R o o fs .

l str tio s C loth

8vo , 87 w oo d c u t i l u v
a n . .

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1 2 mo . Ill u str t a ed. C loth .

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pr a ct i c a l ex ami at i o n o f th e c i rc msta c e s w h i ch d e t er mi n e th e
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I LO WTH IA N B E LL
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PL A T T N E R S M A N U AL OF Q U AL IT A T I VE A N Q A
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a n d M i e r a ls C o m p i l e d fro m v a r i o s so u r c e s
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N w Editio eR vi s d 12m Ill str t d n. C loth e e . o. u a e . .

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E S P E C IALL Y OF M IN E R AL S A N D F U R N A C E P R O D U C T S Ill str t e d . u a

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12 53 0 1 11 1 1

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s o n s e o r o i c a l T a b le s .

l ibl C loth 4 to . F ex e .

PR A C T IC AL T A BL E S I N M E T E O R OL O G Y A N D H YP S OM E T RY i n co ctio n , nn e

W th t h e s e o f t h e B ro m e t r
i u By C l R S IVILL I M S O N U S A a e . o . . . A
, . . .

B
’
u tle r s P r o j e c t il e s a n d R ifl e d C a n n o n .

l t s C loth to 3
4 . 6 P a e . .

P R O J E C T IL E S A N D C ANN O N A C r i t i c a l Disc u ss i o
RIFL E D of th e .
n

P r i c i p a l S y st e m s o f Rifl i g a d P roj e ct il e s w i th Pr a ct i c a l S
n n n
g g es , u

t i o s fo r th e i r Improve me t By C a p t JO H N S B U T L E R O rd n an c e
n n . . .
,

C orps U S A , . . .

B e n et
’
s C h r o n o s c o
p e .

co d Editio Ill str t d 4t C loth

Se n n. u a e . o. .

E LE C T Ro -
B ALL IS T IC M A C H IN E S a n d th e S ch lt z , u C hro n oscop e . By
Lt - C o l
. . S V B E N ET C h i f o f O rd a c U S A
. .
,
e n n e . . .

M ic h lis C h
’
a e r o n o g r a p h .

loth 4to . I ll str t d

u a e . C .

T H E LE BO U L E NG E C IIR O N O G RA P H Wi th thr ee l i tho g r a ph e d fold i g . n

pl a t e s o f i ll str a t io s By t C a pt a i n O E MIC IIA E LIS O rd a c e

u n . . . .
,
n n

C orps U S A ,
. . .

Nug e n t o n O p t ic s .

1 2 mo . C loth .

TRE A T IS E ON O P T IC S ; or Lig ht a d S ig ht th or et ic ll y a d pr a ctic ally

,
n e a n

tr e t e d;
a wi th
the a ppl i c a t io to F i e A t a n d I d stri l P rs its
n n r n u a u u .

By E N U G . E NT. Wi th 1 03 i ll str a t i o s u n .

An l y t ic M h ic
’
P e ir c e s a e c a n s .

4150 . C loth .

S YS T E M O F A N AL Y TIC M E C H A N IC S . By B E NJ A M IN PE IRC E ,
P ro
fe s s o r o f A stro n o m y a n d M a th e m a t i cs in H rv rd U i v e rs i ty
a a n .

C r a ig
’
s D e c im a l S y s te m .

Sq u a r e p 50
32 In o . Li m . 0.

IVE IG IIT S A ND ME AS UR ES . A A cco to f t

n h e D e c l yst
i m a S e m w i th un ,

T a bl e s of C o n v e rs i o n fo r o rc l
C mm e ia a n d S c i e t i fic U s e s B y B F n . . .

C RA G I . M I) . .
 Ale x a n de r
’
s D ic t io n a r y o f W e ig h ts a n d
M e a s u r e s .

Ne w E i i dto n. 8vo . C loth .

UN IV E R S AL DIC T I O N A R Y OF WE IG H T S A ND ME A S UR E S , A n c ien t a

M od e r n , r e d c d to t h e st a d a rds
u e n of t h e Un i ted S ta tes of Ame i r
By J H . . A L E XA N D E R .

L ig h t H
’
E ll io t s E u r o p e a n
-
o u s e s .

r vi g s
5 1 E ng c ts 8
a n C loth a n d 2 1 W ood -
u . vo . .

E U R O P E A N LIG H T H O U S E S Y S T E M S -
B ei n g a Re por t o f a T o u r .

I sp e ct i o
n m a d e i n 1 873
n By M jor G E O R G E H E LL IO T U . a .
, .

E g i e e rs
n n .

Rep C
’
S w e e t s o r t o n o a l .

W ith Ma p s . 8vo . C loth .

S P E C IAL RE P O R T ON C OAL . By S H . . S WE E T .

C o lb u r n
’
s G a s Work s o f L o n do n .

1 2 mo . B o rds 6 0 c ts
a . en .

G AS W
VO R K S OF LO N D O N . By Z E R A H C OL BU R N .

W a lk e r
’
s S c r e w P r o p u l s io n .

8vo . C loth . 75 c tsen .

NO T E S S C RE
ON PR P UL S I W O ON i t s Ri s e a n d H i story . By C a pt W . .

WALK E R, U S Na y
,

. . v .

Bo o k o n S h ip b u il d in g .

8vo . C loth . I ll str t d

u a e .

ME TH O D OF PR E P A R IN G T II E LIN E SH T IN G V E S S E A ND DR A U G
PR O P E LL E D B Y S A I L O R S T E A M i cl d i g a C h a pt e r o n La y i n g
, n u n

O n t h e M o u ld l o ft F loor -
. By S A M U E L M P OOK Na v a l C o str u ct .
,
n

S a e Ac o u s t ic s
ltz e r
’
s .

1 2m C loth 0. .

TR E A T I S E ON A C O U S T I C S i co n e ct i o n w i th Ve n t i l a t i o n
n n . By A L F
A N DE R S A E LT Z ER.

d M
’
P ic k e r t a n e tc a lf s A r t o f G r a in in g .

vol 4to Ti t d P p r C loth

1 . . n e a e . .

T H E A R T OF G R A IN IN G w i th d e scr i pt i o n o f C olors a d th e i r Ap p l i
,
n

t io n By C H A RL E S P IC K E R T a d A BR A H A M M E T C ALF IVi th
. n .
’

t i t e d pl a t es o f th e v a r i o u s wo ods u s e d i n i t e r i o r fi n i sh i g
n n n .
 Wan k ly n
’
s M il k An a l y s i s .

loth 1 2 mo . C .

M IL E A N AL Y S IS A P r a ct i c a l Tr e a t i s e
. on t h e E x a mi n a i t on of Mil k ,
a d i ts De r i v a t i v e s C r a m
n B utt e r , e a nd C h eese By J A LF RED
, , . .

WA N E LY N , MB .

R ic Jo h D i ff e r
’
e n s o n s e n t ia l F u n c t io n s .

r 1 m 5 0 c ts Pa p e ,
2
o. en .

O N A N E W M E T H O D O F O BT A INING T H E DIFF E RE N T I AL S OF F UNC

T IO N S w i th e sp c i a l r e fe r e c e to t h e Ne wto i a n C o n c e pt i o n o f Ra t e s
, e n n

or Ve loc itie s By J M INO T RIC E Pro f f M a th em a ti cs U S Na vy

. .
, . o , . .
,

a n d IV WO O L S E Y JO H N S O N P ro f o f M th em ati cs S t J oh n s
.
, . a ,
.
’

C o l l eg e An a pol i s
,
n .

N a v ig
’
C o ffi n s a t io n .

th Editio 1 2 m C loth Fif n. o. .

N AV IG A T IO N A N D NA U T IC AL AS T R O N O MY P r e p a r e d fo r th e u s e o f .

th e U S Na v a l A c a d e my
. . By J H C C O FF IN Pro fe ssor o f . . . .
,

A stro n o m y Na v ig a t i o n a n d S rv e yi g ; w i th 5 2 w ood c u t i ll str a

,
u n -
u

t io s n .

l N ig t io n
’
C la r k s Th e o r e t ic a a v a ,

loth 8vo . C .

H O
T E R E T IC AL N AV IG A O
TI N A N D N A U T I C AL A S T R O N O MY By LE W IS .

C LA R K L ei t C,
o m m a n d eur U. S
- N a v y Ill u str t e d w i th 41
,
w ood . . . a

c u ts i n cl u d ing t h e Ve r n i e r
,
.

T o n e r
’
s D ic t io n a r y o f E le v a t io n s .

8vo . Pa p e r ,
C loth ,

O
DIC T I N R A Y OF L
E E VA TI NSO A ND C L I M A T C R E G I S T E R O F TH E I

U N I T E D S T A T E S C o n t a i n i n.
g i n a dd i t i o n to E l e v a t o n s t
,
h e L a t t d e i ,
i u ,

Me an A n n a l T em p e r a t r e a d th e tot a l A n a l Ra n F a ll f m a ny
u u ,
n nu i o

oc l t s th br i trod ct i o n t h O ro r a ph i c a d P h y i
sc la n
L a i i e w i a i e f n u o e g n

P e c u l ia r it i e s o f North A m e r i c a B y J M T O N E R M D . . . ,
. .
18 S C IE N TIF I C B O O KS P UBLIS H E D B Y

VA N NO STR AN D S S C IE N C E S E R
’
IE S .

t en t i o n o f th e P bl ish e r o f th i s S er i e s to i ss e th em a t
It i s th e i n u u

i n t er v a ls o f a bo u t a m o th T h e y w i ll b e p t u p in a u ifor m n at . u n
, ne ,

a n d a ttr a ct i v e for m 1 8m o fa c y bo a rds T h e s u bj e cts wi ll b e o f a n

, ,
n .

e m i e n tl y sc i e t i fic ch a
n ct r a d e m br a c e as wi d e a r a g e o f top i cs a s
n ra e ,
n n

poss ibl e all o f th e h ig h es t ch a r a ct e r

,
.

P ri c e , 5 0 C e nts Ea ch .

I . C H IM N E Y S F O R F U R N A C E S ,
F IR E -
P LA C E S ,
A ND S TE A M B O IL E R S . By
R A RM S T R ON G C E
.
,
. .

II S T E A
. M B O IL E R E XP LO S ION S . By Z ER AH C OL BU RN .

III PR A C T IC AL DE S IG N IN G
. OF RE T A ININ G IVA LL S . By A R T H U R JA C O B ,

A B . . Wi th Ill u str at i o n s .

IV PR O P O R T IO N S
. O F PINS US E D IN BR ID G E S . By CH A RL E S E .

B E ND E R , CE . Wi th Ill u str a t io n s .

V VE N TILA T IO N
. OF B UILD IN G S . By W
V F . . B U T L E R Wi th Ill str a t i o ns
. u .

VI O N T H E D E S IG N IN G
. AND O N S T R U C TIO N OF S T O R A G E RE S E RVO IRS
C .

By A R T H U R JA C O B . Wi th Ill u str a t io s n .

VII S U R C H A R G E D A N D D IF F E R E N T F O R M S
. OF RE T A IN ING IVA L LS .

By JA M E S S TA T E , C E . . .

VIII A T R E A T I S E
. O N T IIE C OM P O UN D E NG IN E . By JO H N T U R NBU LL .

Wi th Ill ustr a t io n s .

IX F U E L By C W LL IA M S E M N S to wh i h i s app e de d th e v al e f
. . . I I E , c n u o

A R T IF IC I AL F U E L S A S C O M PA R E D W IT H C OAL By JO H N WO R M .
“

A LD , C E . .

X C O M O U ND
. P E N G IN E S . T r an sl a t e d fro m th e Fr en ch of A M ALL E T
. .

I ll u str a t d e .

XI . TH E OR Y O F ARC H E S By Pro f W . . . A LLA N , of th e Wa sh in g to n an d

Le e C oll eg e Ill u str a t e d
’

. .
 D . VA N N O S TRA N D .
19

XIII . A PR A C T IC AL A T IS E O N T H E G A S E S M E T WIT I IN C O AL
TR E I

M IN E S . By t h e l a t e J J A T K IN S O N G ov e r n m en t I sp e ctor o f
. .
, n

M i n es fo r t h e C o ty o f D rh a m E g l a n d
un u ,
n .

XIV . O N OF A IR IN M IN E S
F R IC T I . By J J AT K IN S O N, au thor
. . of
“
A
P r a ct i c a l T r e a t is e o th e G a s e s n m e t w i th i n C o a l M in es .

XV . W ARC H E S By Pro f E IV H YD E C
S KE . . . .
, . E . I ll ustra te d wi th
n u m e ro u s e g r a v i n g s a n d thr ee fold e d pl a t e s
n .

XVI . A G RA P H IC M E T HO D F O R S OLVING C E R T A IN A L G A IC E BR EQ U A
TI ONS . By P ro f G E O R G E L VO S E
. . . IVi th Ill u str a t i o n s .

XVII . IVA T E R
’
A ND IVA T E R S U P P L Y . By Pro f . W . H . C O RF IE LD ,
MA . .
, of t h e Un i v e rs i ty C oll eg e , L o n do n.

XVIII S E W E RA G E A N D S E W A G E U TIL IZ A TIO N By Pro f W

. . . . H .

C O RF IE L D M A o f t h e U ni v e rs i ty C oll e g e Lo n do n
,
. .
, ,
.

XIX . S T R E NG H OF B E A M S UND E R TR A N S V E R S E LO A D S By Prof

T . .

IV . ALLA N a u thor o f Th e or y o f A rch e s

,
Wi th Ill str a t i o s
“
.
”
u n

XX B RID G E A N D T UNN E L
. C E NTRE S . By JO H N B . M C MA S TE R S ,
OE With Ill u str at i o n s
. .

XX I S AF E T
. Y VALV E S . By RIC H A R D H . B UE L , OE . Wi th Ill u str a
t ions .

XXII H IG H M A S O NR Y
. DA M S . By JO H N B . M C MA S TE RS , C E . .

IVi th Ill u str a t i o n s .

XXIII T H E F A T IG U E OF M E T AL S u n d e r Rep ea t d S tr ain s wi th

.
e ,

r
va i uo s bl s
T a e o f Re u s lts of E x p e r i m e n ts F ro m t h e G e r m a n o f .

r W A
P o f LU D IG S P N G E N B E R G
. W i th a P r e fa c e b y S H S H R E VE
.
. .
,

AM Wi th Ill str a t i o n s
. . u .

XXIV A PR A C TIC AL TR E A T IS E O N T H E T E E T H O F W H L E E S w i th ,

W
.

B R
th e th eor y o f t h e u s e o f Rob i n so n s O do to g r ph
n y S O B IN ’
a . . .

m
.

Pro f f M ch i c l E i r i Ill i n o i s In d ustr i a l U v e s t y r r .

S ON o e ,
a n a n g n ee.
n g ,

By
XXV T H E O R.
Y AND AL C U LA TION S O F C
C B O N T INU O U S R ID G E S .

M AN S FIE L D M E R R IM A N OE W thi Ill

,
u str a t i o ns
.
.
 Th e U n iv e r s ity S e r ie s .

NO 1 . .
- HYS IC AL B A S IS O F LIF E By P ro f T H H UK L E
ON TH E P . . . .

LL D F R S
. .
, Wi th a i t o d c tio b y a P r ofessor i n Ya l e C o l l g
. . . n n r u n e

1 2 mo pp 3 6 , Pa p r cov e r 2 5 c e n ts
. . e ,
.

N o 2 —T H E C O R E LA TIO N OF VIT AL A N D P HY S IC AL F O R C E S
. .
‘
.

P ro f G E O R G E F B A R K E R M D o f Ya l e C oll eg e
. . 3 6 pp P ap ,
. .
,
. .

cov ers 2 5 c e ts , n .

No 3 —A s RE G A R D S PR O T O P LA S M i n r e l a t io n t o Pro f H UXL E
. . ,
.

P h y s i c a l B a s i s o f Li fe By J H U T C H IN S O N S TI RL IN G F R C . .
,
. . .

72 p p 2 5 c e n ts .
,
.

No 4 — O N T H E H YP O T H E S IS OF E V OL U T IO N P h ys i c a l a d M
. .
,
n

ph ys i c l By Pro f E D W A R D D C O P E 1 2 mo 72 pp Pa p e r cov e
a . . . .
,
.

2 5 c en ts .

NO 5 . . S C IE N T IF IC A D D RE S S E S
-
1 O n th e M e thods a n d Te n de ci -
. n

o f P h ys i c l In v st i g a t i o n a 2 O n H a z e a d D u st
e 3 O n th e S c i e . . n . .

t ifi c U e o f th e Im ag i a t io
s By P ro f JO H N T YN D ALL F R n n. .
,
. .

1 2 m o 74 pp , P a p e r cov e rs 2 5 c e n ts
. F l ex cloth 5 0 c e n ts ,
. .
,
.

N O 6 —NA T U R AL S E L E C T IO N A s A P P L I E D T O M A N
. . By A L E R .

RU S S E LL WALLA C E T h i s p a m phl e t tr e a ts (1 ) o f t h e D e ve l O p em e
.

o f H u m a n Ra c e s u n d e r t h e La w o f S e l e ct i o n ;
()2 t h e L i m it s
Na t u r a l S e l e ct i o n as a ppl ie d to M an 5 4 pp 2 5 c en ts . . .

N O 7 — S P E C T RU M A N ALY S IS
. . . hr e e Lect u r e s b y Pro fs Ro s c c
T .

H U G G IN S a n d LO C K YE R . Fin e l y Ill u str a t e d 88 pp P a p e r cov e . .

25 c e ts n .

No 8 . .
-
TH E S UN . A s k e tch
pr es en t sta t e o f sc i e t i fic O m of th e n

a s r e g a rds th i s b o dy By P ro f C A Y O U N G Ph D o f Da t mo u . . . .
,
. . r

C oll e g e 5 8 pp P a p e r cov e rs 2 5 c en ts
. .
, .

No . 9 .
— TH E E AR T HA GRE AT MA G N E T . By A M M A Y E R , Ph
. . .

Of tev e s I
S 72 pp n n sti t ut e
Pa p e r cov e rs 2 5 c e ts
’
. .
,
n . F l ex i
cloth 5 0 c en ts ,
.

No 1 0 —
. M Y S TE R IE S OF T H E VO IC E A N D E A R
. By P ro f O . . . N R0 0 .

C ol mb i a C oll e g e N e w Y or k
u B eau t if ll y Ill u str a t e d, . u . 38
P a p e r cov e rs 2 5 c en ts , .