1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Moral Theory of Human Action proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………… 2

1. GENUS (GENERE)……………………………………………. . 4

2. THREE FONTES MORALITATIS……………………………….. 5

2.1. Object (objectum)…………….……………………………. 5

2.2. End (finis)…………………………………………………… 7

2.3. Circumstances (circumstantia)…………………………… 7

3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND THE

END………………………………..………………………….... 9

4. VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE AND HUMAN ACTS………………. 11

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………… 12

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………… 14
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Introduction

In the analysis of human action according to St. Thomas Aquinas, accepting at the
same time only God can fulfill the ultimate meaning of human life, it is appropriate to
mention at the outset that “although the vision of God is a gratuitous gift,
nevertheless, ‘good acts are necessary’ by God’s providence as our human response
in love to his gift.”1 Even though, in an evaluational level, the teaching of Aquinas
would seem to suggest that all human acts are singular and must ultimately be
evaluated on this level, it is clear that a deeper look shows that all human actions are
integrally connected to the person who wills these acts and thus are rightly called
„human acts‟2 and not just mere „acts of man‟3. Because of this fact alone, one must
see, behind each and every human act, the willing person with his entire history.4 This
means that a human action is good or bad depends on the fact they are willed by an
agent guided by right reason; in other words, they are willed and are directed by the
virtue of prudence because St. Thomas recognizes prudence as the ability to apply
right reason to action.5 Moving forward from the basic idea of Aristotle with regard to
human action as coming from a virtuous person, Thomas Aquinas gives importance to
human action itself, putting forward the three fontes moralitatis, viz., object, end and
circumstances.

The criteria that Thomas developed for analyzing the morality of human actions falls
within the theory of good and evil in general. In Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 18, a.1,
Thomas draws attention to his theory of good, which links the concept of good to
being. When a being is complete that being is good. In the same way, the absence of a
good in a being, which it ought to have, is something evil. Applied to human actions,
goodness implies the right ordering of relationships, of the will or reason, and of the
person both to created reality and to God. When something is lacking in these

1
J. ZAGAR, Acting on Principles. A Thomistic Perspective in Making Moral Decisions, University
Press of America, Lanham, 1984, 45.
2
Actus Humanus, means those actions that proceed from the will with knowledge of the end.
3
Actus Hominis.means actions such as reflexes and sensory reactions to pain and pleasure.
4
J. ZAGAR, Acting on Principles. A Thomistic Perspective in Making Moral Decisions.
5
T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae., II-II, q. 47, a. 4 (hereafter cited as S. Th.).
 3

relations, that is, when something that ought to be there for a complete being is
missing, then an action can be called evil.6 Therefore, the goodness or the evilness of
an action depends not on the action alone but rather on the fact that such action is
generated by a willing person, guided by right reason.

St.Thomas distinguished sharply between the “natural” or “physical” species of

human actions and their “moral” species. Human acts, precisely as human or moral,
are constituted in their moral species by “forms” determined by “human reason.”7
Willing makes an act a moral act. Human actions acquire their forms from human
intelligence, which places them in their moral species by discerning their “ends,”
“objects,” and “circumstances.”

St. Thomas cites a fourfold goodness in every human action.8

a. Genus (derived from goodness of being)9

b. Species (derived from suitable object)
c. End (as the cause of its goodness)
d. Circumstances (derived from accidents)

However, only three of these are aspects with respect to which a human action can
also be evil.10 The three elements according to which a human action can be either
good or bad are:
a. Object
b. End
c. Circumstances

It is also appropriate to cite here the so called “Dionysian Principle,” which states “an
action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from
6
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 1.
7
Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 10.
8
Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 4. This is also called “The fourfold Goodness Principle.”
9
It has to be noted that since every being is good, the genus in human action cannot be used as a
criterion to judge the goodness or evilness of a moral action.
10
This principle is called “The three determinants principles.”
 4

any single defect, but good from the complete cause.’ ”11 First, I will examine each of
these three concepts clearly and then secondly I will relate their integral connection to
the intellectual virtue of prudence.

1. Genus (genere)

The genus of a particular human action is always the same. The genus is that it is a
human action. St. Thomas Aquinas says in I-II, q. 18, a. 1 that every being is good
and every lack of being is evil. One can speak of goodness or evilness „in actions‟ as
goodness or evilness in „things‟ Thus St. Thomas Aquinas states, “We must speak of
good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is,
such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has
being: since good and being are convertible.”12. So in so far as a person is in being
he is said to be good and in so far as a person is lacking in being, even in whatever
particular aspect of being, he is said to be evil, because being and goodness are
interchangeable. For example, a blind man is said to be good in so far as he „lives‟
and is evil in so far as he is „blind‟. Evil, in this sense, is the lack of fullness of being,
or more precisely, lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being and
therefore it is evil. Therefore, evil is defined in relation to goodness.13 The presence of
being gives the possibility of action and it is necessary that every action comes from
being, hence every action is good in being. But precisely by the fact that this being
can be „deficient‟ evil action exists. St. Thomas says, “We must therefore say that
every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness,
in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being; and thus it is
said to be evil.”14 It is derived from this argument that for an action to be good it has
to be good in fullness and for an action to be evil whatever deficiency in goodness is

11
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad. 3.
12
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 1.
13
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 1, ad. 1. “Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For if there were nothing of
good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not
deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently, the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a
certain respect, but simply evil.”
14
S. Th., I-II, q.18, a. 1b.
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sufficient. St. Thomas states, “However, an action is not good simply, unless it is
good in all those ways: since ‘evil results from any single defect, but good from the
complete cause.’ ”15

2. Three fontes moralitatis

2.1. Object (objectum)

As stated already the good or evil of an action depends on its fullness of being or its
lack of that fullness. The first thing that belongs to the fullness of being is that which
gives a thing its „species‟, that is, what kind of action it is. Therefore, an action has its
species from its „object‟.16 Object means what the person or agent is planning to
achieve in the immediate sense. So the „primary goodness‟ of a moral action is
derived from its „suitable object‟ (obiecto convenenti). According to St. Thomas
Aquinas it is the ‘object’ that gives an action its specific morality, an action to be
good or bad.17 In the sentence which states, “I am doing, performing, or committing
X”, this specific X willed by the agent is the “object” of the action. For example,
praying, giving alms, caring the sick or killing of a person, lying to another, robbing,
etc. are objects of an action. It is clear in this example that it is not the matter or the
final action that makes the object but the fact that action is willed by the agent for a
specific goal which makes the object.

St. Thomas states, “ just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action
has its species from its object, as movement from its term.”18 A thing, such as a ball or
a pen, is defined by its „form‟. So is with action, which is defined by its object, i.e.,
what the agent has in mind to achieve with the action. Actions, in themselves, have no
moral quality. For example, the physical act of taking a pen has no moral significance
in itself. But, with its specific object in view this action becomes morally good or evil.
For example, to use the pen to pursue one‟s studies is the object of the action, and

15
S. Th., I-II, q.18, a. 4, ad. 3.
16
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 2.
17
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 2. The object must be distinguished from the larger purpose or „end‟, which is
also relevant to the moral assessment of an act, but does not give the action its specific nature.
18
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 2.
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thus gives that action a morally good character. But if someone uses the pen to stab
another, this specific object of the action gives the action a morally evil character. Let
me consider another example. The object of an act of theft is not the thing taken,
considered barely in itself, but as possessing a particular quality, namely, that of not
being one‟s own. The object of theft, then, is taking something not one's own. This is
the essential characteristic of the action or the object or the species which explains it.
Without this characteristic, there is either no action or a different action.

St. Thomas clearly states that the object is not the matter „of which‟ a thing is made19,
but the matter „about which‟ something is done20; and stands in relation to the act as
its form, as it were, through giving it its species.21 For example, the pen in itself is not
the moral object but pursuing one‟s studies using the pen is its moral object. Since the
species is determined by the object of the action, often the object itself is said to be
one of the determinants of morality. Just as the object of an act of throwing is the
thing thrown, so the object of a human action is the thing done; for example a murder
or an act of adultery22. It can stand alone independent of the end or circumstances.

The object helps distinguish each action. The object, is the immediate reason that
explains the action. For example, to pursue studies using the pen and not stabbing
with it. In this instance the objects of the action is „pursuing studies‟ or „stabbing
another‟. The object is what makes an action to be an action of a certain kind. In
Thomistic terms this is the “matter” of the action, around which the action is
formed.23 The object helps distinguish this action from that action. For example the
same action of sleeping can have the object of sleeping for physical health or the
object of sleeping for lethargy. Object then is the objective of the action willed by the
agent. Since, there can be many small actions in one general act, there can be many
objects for each act that constitutes the general act. For example, the act of studying

19
Materia ex qua.
20
Materia circa quam.
21
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad. 2.
22
Here murder is defined as a willful killing of an innocent person, and adultery as engaging in sexual
intercourse with either outside marriage or with another other than one‟s spouse.
23
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad. 2.
 7

moral theology can have many acts such as studying particular topics, attending
classes, taking notes, listening, etc. Each of these have their specific objects. As
already explained in the theory proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas the moral object is
integrally connected with the act of willing by the agent, which I will explain in the
following passages.

2.2. End (finis)

All actions are human in so far as they are voluntary or willed by the agent. In a
voluntary action St. Thomas speaks of an interior action of the will and an exterior
action.24 The object of the interior act of the will is the „end‟ 25 and the object of the
exterior act is the act itself. For example in the act of theft the interior act of the will is
willing to take something that does not belong to the agent and the exterior act is
stealing. Often there will be no difference between the object of the action and the
purpose of the agent. But sometimes there is a difference. It is this distinction which
gave rise to scholastic terminology: the „object of the action‟ (finis operis), and the
„end‟ or „purpose of the agent‟ (finis operantis).26 In many (perhaps most) cases, the
end and object will be not only harmonious but by nature related.

The end can have a direct influence on the object of the action or an indirect influence
on the object of the action. For example fighting in battle (its object) has the direct
end of victory. But, if someone earns money (its object) in order to give to the poor
(another object) the end is indirect. Therefore, one end can produce many actions.
Hence, St. Thomas states, “he who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly
speaking, more adulterer than thief.”27

2.3. Circumstances (circumstantia)

If in „being‟ there is a relationship between „substance‟ and „accidents,‟ in human
action there is a relationship between the „object‟ and the „circumstances‟. If the

24
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 6.
25
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 6.
26
D. WESTBERG , Good and evil in human acts, in S. J. POPE, (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas, George
university press, Washington, 2002, 93.
27
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 6b.
 8

specific nature of an action comes from its object, then the object is like the
„substantial form‟ (forma substantiali) of an individual being, and the circumstances
of an action can be compared to accidents of the „substantial form‟.28 They don‟t
make the action but add to the already present action. Therefore, the full moral
goodness of an action depends not just on the object but on something added from
certain aspects that occur, like certain accidents: these are the due circumstances. In
De malo St. Thomas states the meaning of circumstance clearly:
Now that is called a circumstance which surrounds an act, as it were, outside of, not
within, the substance of the act being considered. Now this is in one way on the part of
the cause, either the final cause when we consider why a person did the act, or the
principal agent, when we consider who did the act, or as regard the instrument or what
aids he did the act. In another way that which surrounds the act as regards the measure,
i.e., when we consider where and when the person acted. In a third way as regards the act
itself, whether we consider the manner of acting, for instance, did the person strike
lightly, or forcefully, many times or once, or we consider the object or matter of the
action, for instance, did he strike his father or a stranger, or even the effect he caused by
acting, e.g., by striking did he wound or actually kill? Which are all contained in the
following verse: “Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.”29

Even though a circumstance is external to the act in certain situations it may become
the principal condition of the object to determine the specific nature of the act. 30 For
example, if you are walking through a field for exercise, then it usually makes no
difference who actually owns the field. But walking on a field that is restricted makes
that act of walking trespassing; and this circumstance now becomes the main
condition, i.e., you are no longer walking but trespassing. Another example can be the
act of robbing. Robbing 5€ is less grave an evil than robbing 100€. Still robbing from
a church is different from robbing from one‟s parents. These circumstances do not
make or take away the moral quality of the act but can diminish or aggravate the
goodness or evilness of an action. Theft is still a theft, whatever the amount of money;
but a greater or lesser amount may lessen or aggravate the offence. 31 St. Thomas
states, “Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does

28
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 3.
29
T. AQUINAS, De Malo, q. 2, a. 6c.
30
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 10.
31
S. Th., I-II,. q. 18, a. 11.
 9

not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin.
The same applies to other evil or good actions.”32

3. Relationship between the Object and the End

In the task of interpreting the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on human actions,
some theologians33 have put more emphasis on the agent who wills the end and
thereby magnify the subjective aspect of the intention. This reduces the focus on
moral object in the action placing more emphasis on the motivation on the agent.34 On
the other hand some other theologians35 want to stress the intrinsic moral object of the
act, thereby reduce the importance of the end in shaping the nature of the act.36 Both
these approaches deviate themselves from the theory proposed by St. Thomas because
end and the object are integrally connected. It is fittingly explained in the following
passage by Westberg:

In many-perhaps most-cases, the end and object will be not only harmonious but by
nature related. In Thomas‟ example (in Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 7), fighting well in battle is
directly related to the goal of victory. But in some cases, the connection is incidental (per
accidens), as when one takes something in order to give to the needy. When the object is
not per se ordered to the will‟s end, the specifying feature of the object is not
determinative of the end, nor does the end shape the object of action. In other words,
instead of one species of action, you might well have a moral action coming under two
different kinds of act. In Thomas‟ example (taken from Aristotle), one might steal in
order to commit adultery: adultery is therefore the motive for the theft. In this case, one
37
cannot subsume the theft under the adultery-there are two evils committed in one act.

Nevertheless, the end and the object are two separate entities. The will can will
anything it wants other than that which it does not want. But whatever it wants must
first be something, and that something is an object.38 But still the object contains in it
the intention of the will, i.e., the immediate end of the will. Therefore the end is not in

32
S. Th., I-II,. q. 18, a. 11.
33
Revisionists.
34
D. WESTBERG , Good and evil in human acts, 93.
35
Traditionalists.
36
D. WESTBERG , Good and evil in human acts, 93.
37
D. WESTBERG , Good and evil in human acts, 93.
38
J. F. KEENEN, Goodness and Righteousness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, Georgetown
University Press, Washington, 1992, 79.
 10

the object but in the will. In general the end has no particular object and there has no
determinative form. But when it has a specific object, the object specifies the
proximate end and the inclination becomes an intention. This intention, specified by
the object, gives moral species to the human act.39 St. Thomas reminds that the
goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the object proposed by the reason.
The principal of all human action is the reason.40 The will is not drawn to a good
unless it is first apprehended as good by the reason. Here the good apprehended is the
proportionate object of the will, or the end. Intention is part of the act of willing.
Basically, „intention‟ means leaning of the will towards an object perceived as good. 41
Intention leans toward something which is an object of the human action. St. Thomas
derives the object that gives species to the human or moral act from the material circa
quam in the intention.42 The quality of intention determines the goodness or badness
of the will in choosing specific actions. This is because actions are generated when
one desires a certain end (which is intended). This leads to the determination of the
means and the choices of a specific action.43 For example fasting for God for a
spiritual end can be taken.

As one can see in the above analysis the close connection between the object and the
end as well as their separate function. One important point to record is that already in
moral object there is an act of the will, in that the object is intended by the agent,
which gives specific species to the moral action. This object forms a part of the whole
design of the end as an act of the will as we saw in the example of war.

4. Virtue of Prudence and Human Acts

St. Thomas Aquinas defines prudence as the ability to apply right reason to action.44
Therefore prudence is very much a part of the study of St. Thomas‟ theory of human

39
J. F. KEENEN, Goodness and Righteousness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 79.
40
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 8.
41
„Intention‟ is different from the „end‟. It is an inclination of the agent-the movement of the will-to an
object perceived as good, which may be directed to an ultimate end or to a proximate end.
42
. F. KEENEN, Goodness and Righteousness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 79.
43
S. Th., I-II, q. 19, a. 7; q. 12, a. 4.
44
S. Th., II-II, q. 47, a. 4.
 11

action. Importantly it relates his theory to that of Aristotle in that he defines the
human acts dependant on the virtuous person. For St. Thomas this precise virtuous
nature of the human action is characterized by the virtue of prudence. By that St.
Thomas shows that human action is not only about what is being done but also about
the agent who does them.45

According to St. Thomas prudence is an intellectual virtue that belongs to the reason
and is different from other intellectual virtues such as wisdom, knowledge and
understanding, and is concerned with contingent things of particular situations.
Therefore, prudence is concerned with the things done, or in other words “with things
that have their being in the doer himself.”46 Stephen J. Pope says,

Aquinas believed that all normally functioning human beings have a natural habit (Ia, q.
79, a.12) of synderesis (q. 47, a. 6, ad 1), an immediate, non-inferential grasp of
principles, the foremost of which is that one ought to do good and avoid evil (q. 79, a. 12;
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2). This natural moral knowledge directs one formally to the ends of the
moral virtue: that is, it tells a person to be just, temperate, courageous, and so forth, and
indicts actions that violate these standards.47

Even though prudence is not exactly the same thing as human action, each and every
human act involves this virtue of prudence, by way of its presence or of its absence.
What is more important is that with such an idea about human action St. Thomas
brings forcefully the agent who acts to the fore.

45
It is good to keep in mind that in his exposition of human action itself St. Thomas integrally connects
the external act of the action to the internal act of the will thereby showing there itself that agent is very
much a part of this process.
46
S. Th., II-II, q. 47, a. 5.
47
S. J. POPE, Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas, in S. J. POPE, (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas,
George university press, Washington, 2002, 40.
 12

Conclusion

In assessing morality, the interior act of the will and the exterior deed compose a
single act. Once again for an act to be good all the three elements, namely, object,
circumstances and end have to be good. But for an act to be evil only one element of
these is sufficient to be evil.48 The human acts receive their “forms” not from nature
but from human intelligence, which places them in their moral species by discerning
their “objects”, “ends”, and “circumstances”. He holds that the end and object are the
primary factors giving a human act its moral species insofar as willed by the agent.
Humans, as intelligent beings, act in the first place only for the sake of an end, the
object of the interior act of the will.49 St. Thomas says, “For the will, the proper
object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the
soul, the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.”50 The
object, chosen and commanded by the will, is also a primary source of the moral
species of the whole human act, precisely because this object is the object of an act of
the will or of choice. The end must be good if the whole human act is to be good since
it is the “proximate” end that the acting person intends.51 Thus, for example, a person
may choose to give alms to the poor. This is the “object” of an act of the will, for it is
the object chosen in the immediate sense and commanded by the will which includes
the intention.52 Therefore, in the final analysis, the response to the question when does
a human act is good, is that according to the theory of human action of St. Thomas
Aquinas a human action is good when all the three fonts of the human act, viz., object,
end and circumstances are good, and a human action is evil when any one of these
three fonts are evil.

48
S. Th., I-II, q. 20, a. 2b.
49
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, a. 1-3.
50
S. Th., I-II, q. 18, 7c.
51
S. Th., I-II, q. 20, a. 2.
52
It is good to note the difference between the intention and the end here. The intention is the
immediate end of the will. Each object contains this intention, which gives moral species to the human
act. The end appears first and foremost in the intention. This goes to show the very close relationship
the object, intention and the end have with each other.
 13

In the same way the entire process of the human act also involves his teaching on
virtues, especially the virtue of prudence, which is the ability to apply right reason to
action. The involvement of the virtue of prudence characterizes the function of the
agent or the subject in deciding on the goodness or the evilness of a human act. Even
though St. Thomas leans more towards the human act itself it is nonetheless
important to note that these acts are performed in reference to the virtuous agent.
Therefore, one can see in the theory of human action proposed by St. Thomas
Aquinas that importance is given both to the action itself and the acting agent.
 14

Bibliography

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Theologiae, Georgetown University Press, Washington, 1992.

POPE S. J., Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas, in S. J. POPE, (ed.), The
Ethics of Aquinas, George university press, Washington, 2002.

RIPPERGER C., “The Species and Unity of the Moral Act” in Thomist, 59, 1995, 69-
90.

WESTBERG D. , Good and evil in human acts, in S. J. POPE, (ed.), The Ethics of
Aquinas, George university press, Washington, 2002.

ZAGAR J., Acting on Principles. A Thomistic Perspective in Making Moral

Decisions, University Press of America, Lanham, 1984.