LIANAS SUPERMARKET v.

NLRC
G.R. No. 111014 | May 31, 1996 |

DOCTRINE: ​What makes the situation a proper case for a class suit is the circumstance that
there is only one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many persons,
not separately or severally to distinct individuals. The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or
against numerous persons as a group or as an integral entity, and not as separate, distinct
individuals whose rights or liabilities are separate from and independent of those affecting the
others The rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the parties be so
numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court.

FACTS: Petitioner entered into a 3-year contract with Warner Laputt, owner of BAVSPIA
International Services to supply petitioner with Laborers. Rosa Sy met with the employees and
told them quit their membership, or be suspended, dismissed or criminally prosecuted. Some
employees refused and many were dismissed without any charges and others were given
memorandum on concocted offenses and violations. On another occasion, Petitioner, through
Rosa Sy and Peter Sy required the other employees to resign from employment and to
accomplish information sheets and/or application forms with BAVSPIA otherwise they would be
dismissed and/or not paid their salaries. Respondent Union, on behalf of its members filed a
complaint against petitioner and/or Peter Sy, Rosa Sy, BAVSPIA and Warner Laputt before the
LA.

The complaint was amended since respondent Union manifested that it was intended as a class
suit. 3 more cases were filed: 2nd case - Elorde Padilla, Jr. et al as complainants 3rd case -
Carmelita Reyes, Elizabeth Mahanlud, Danny Sida, Omar Napiri and Edgar Mahusay, as
individual complainants 4th case - Gloria Estoque and Estrellita Bansig as individual
complainants

The 4 cases were consolidated. The NLRC submitted 2 lists of 136 workers, 73 assigned at
Sucat and 63 at Pasig. There were 85 original complainants in the lists. BAVSPIA participated
during the initial stages of the hearings but later moved to have its name dropped as
co-respondent when it noted, after complainants have rested, that the evidence formally offered
was directed only against petitioner. The LA ruled in favor of complainants.

Petitioner was the employer of complainants with BAVSPIA being engaged in labor only
contracting; Complainants were illegally dismissed; Peter Sy and Rosa Sy were not personally
liable; and the charge of unfair labor practice and all labor standards claims were
unsubstantiated by evidence. The NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. Petitioner Argues; There are
only 7 individual complainants whose names appear in the captions of the decision of the LA.
Sec 3, Rule 5 – the names of residences of the parties, plaintiff and defendant must be stated in
the complaint. Sec 1. Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of NLRC - the full names of all the
real parties in interest, whether natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law, shall be
stated in the caption of the complaint or petition as well as in the decision, award or judgment. o
Cases do not fall under the definition of class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 31 - The parties are not
so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court. 1 Sec. 12, Rule 3 -
Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case the court shall
make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that
all interests concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in
protection of his individual interest.
ISSUE: ​W/N the NLRC was correct in recognizing that there are 85 complainants.

HELD: Yes. The case is a representative suit, and not a class suit as defined by Sec 12, Rule 3.
A class suit contemplates:
a) the subject matter in controversy is of common or general interest to many persons;
b) those persons are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court
What makes the situation a proper case for a class suit is the circumstance that there is only
one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many persons, not separately
or severally to distinct individuals. The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or against
numerous persons as a group or as an integral entity, and not as separate, distinct individuals
whose rights or liabilities are separate from and independent of those affecting the others The
rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the parties be so numerous
that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court. In the present case, there are
multiple rights or causes of action pertaining separately to several, distinct employees who are
members of respondent Union. Therefore, the applicable rule is that provided in Sec. 3, Rule 32
, of the Rules of Court on representative parties. Art. 242 of the Labor Code grants legitimate
labor organizations to sue and be sued in its registered name. A union is authorized to file a
representative suit for the benefit of its members in the interest of avoiding an otherwise
cumbersome procedure of joining all union members in the complaint, even if they number by
the hundreds. A representative suit is akin to a class suit in the limited sense that the phrases
found in Sec. 12 of Rule 3: o One or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all, and the
parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative, are similar to the phrase
may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or
defended found in Sec. 3 of the same Rule. o Both suits are always filed in behalf of another or
others. That is why the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Respondent Union, the
LA, and the NLRC erroneously denominated the suit as a class suit when in reality, it is a
representative suit. Considering that the NLRC held that there are 85 complainants, the Court
held that the instant cases have been filed by the Union in representation of the 85. Section 1,
Rule III, of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure cited by petitioner is simply inapplicable because
it was issued on 31 August 1990 or six (6) years after the complaints in these cases were filed
in 1984.
 DAVID REYES v. JOSE LIM
G.R. No. 134241 | Aug. 11, 2003 |

DOCTRINE: ​The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is
hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court - If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in
unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. ​Here the court exercised equity
jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where
the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.

FACTS: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages
against respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into
a contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly
rental of P35,000. The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate
the Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber
that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty of
P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived with
Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have
accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000. Keng and Harrison
Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved their
request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new
location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring
some of its merchandise to its new business location in Malabon.

Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase
price. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the signing of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their
meeting. Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was
having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and
proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had
already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with Keng and
Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
due to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against
Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of sale and title plus
damages before another trial court. The trial court granted the motion. In his Amended Answer
Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court granted this
motion. Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically granted
the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court
directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court. Reyes filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court be
set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:​ Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?

HELD: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is hiatus in
the law and in the Rules of Court - If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust
enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the court exercised equity jurisdiction.The
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to
ensure restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate. The Supreme Court also state that rescission
is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged
to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the
parties are restored to the status quo ante. In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the
trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of
Appeals.was affirmed.

BULAWAN v. AQUENDE
G.R. No. 182819 | June 22, 2011 |

DOCTRINE: ​The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of
course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action
should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is one
whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined
either as plaintiffs or as defendants.

FACTS: ​On 1 March 1995, Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title,
reconveyance and damages against Lourdes Yap (Yap) and the Register of Deeds
before the trial court docketed as Civil Case No. 9040. Bulawan claimed that she is the
owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 13733 having bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos and Francisco
Yaptengco (Yaptengco brothers), who claimed to have inherited the property from Yap
Chin Cun. Bulawan alleged that Yap claimed ownership of the same property and
caused the issuance of TCT No. 40292 in Yaps name.

In a letter dated 24 July 2002, the Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the trial
courts writ of execution and required Aquende to produce TCT No. 40067 so that a
memorandum of the lien may be annotated on the title. On 25 July 2002, Aquende
wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds questioning the trial courts writ of execution
against his property. Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any litigation involving his
property having received no summons or notice thereof, nor was he aware of any
adverse claim as no notice of lis pendens was inscribed on the title.

On 2 August 2002, Aquende filed a Third Party Claim against the writ of execution
because it affected his property and, not being a party in Civil Case No. 9040, he
argued that he is not bound by the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision. In a letter
dated 5 August 2002, the Clerk of Court said that a Third Party Claim was not the
proper remedy because the sheriff did not levy upon or seize Aquendes property.
Moreover, the property was not in the sheriffs possession and it was not about to be
sold by virtue of the writ of execution.

The Court of Appeals declared that Aquende was an indispensable party who was
adversely affected by the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision. The Court of Appeals
said that the trial court should have impleaded Aquende under Section 11, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. Since jurisdiction was not properly acquired over Aquende, the Court of
Appeals declared the trial courts 26 November 1996 Decision void. According to the
Court of Appeals, Aquende had no other recourse but to seek the nullification of the trial
courts 26 November 1996 Decision that unduly deprived him of his property.

ISSUE:​ W/N the CA erred in declaring Aquende as an indispensable party in the case.

HELD: ​Bulawan argues that Aquende was not an indispensable party in Civil Case No.
9040 because the lot Aquende claims ownership of is different from the subject matter
of the case. Bulawan clarifies that she claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B of
Psd-153847, while Aquende claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-187165.
Bulawan argues that even if Aquende will be affected by the trial courts 26 November
1996 Decision, this will not make him an indispensable party. Contrary to Bulawans
argument, it appears that Aquendes Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-187165 and Bulawans Lot
No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 actually refer to the same Lot No. 1634-B originally owned
by Yap Chin Cun. Both Aquende and Bulawan trace their ownership of the property to
Yap Chin Cun. Aquende maintains that he purchased the property from Yap Chin Cun,
while Bulawan claims to have purchased the property from the Yaptengco brothers, who
alleged that they inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. However, as the Court of
Appeals declared, the title of the Yaptengco brothers over Lot No. 1634-B of
Psd-153847 had already been cancelled and they were forever enjoined not to disturb
the right of ownership and possession of Yap Chin Cun.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in

interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. An indispensable
party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation. As
such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.