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 COSMOPOLITANISM AND
THE CIRCLE OF REASON

PRATAPBHANUMEHTA
Harvard University

WhatI requireis a conveningof my culture'scriteria,in orderto confrontthem with my

words and life as I pursuethem and as I may pursuethem; and at the same time to con-
frontmy wordsandlife as I pursuethemwiththe life my culture'swordsmayimaginefor
me: to confrontthe culturewith itself, along the lines it meets in me.
-Stanley Cavell'

As globalizationjoins our divided histories in new and unprecedented

ways, as it forces open hithertorelativelyclosed horizons, as it compresses
space and time so that the effects of distant causal chains are felt almost
simultaneously,as it displacescultures,as it makesmobility often a matterof
necessity not choice, it seems threetasks arein order.The firstis an analysis
of what the causal processes named globalization amount to. Is the
nation-stateweakening, or can it reinventitself? Has it really been dispos-
sessed of such powersthatgive it unprecedentedlegitimacyas a formof orga-
nization?Whatnew patternsof stratificationandpowerwill emergefromthis
new constellation?Whatkinds of intemationalinstitutionswill be adequate
to the challenges globalizationposes? The second is figuring out the Zeit-
geist: whatdo these trendsportendfor the humancondition?Globalizationis
a complex andcontradictorystate;it is not yet a clearset of meanings.Does it
signify the emergenceof a new eclecticism or a dawningof a worldwearinga
uniformlystreamlinedpackaging?Fortunately,I will not takeit uponmyself
to say much aboutthese difficultquestions,althoughsome of what I say will
be connectedwith these in complicatedways. Instead,this articlefocuses on
a thirdset of issues thathave once againcome to the forefrontof debate.Do

AUTHOR'SNOTE: For valuable commentsand discussions, I am grateful to Homi Bhabha,

Joan Cocks, April Flakne, Stanley Hoffmann,Steven Lukes, Glyn Morgan, Sheldon Pollock,
Nancy Rosenblum,Michael Sandel, RichardTuck James Tully,Bernard Yack,and an anony-
mous reviewerfor Political Theory.
POLMIICALTHEORY,Vol. 28 No. 5, October2000 619-639
? 2000 Sage Publications,Inc.

619
620 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

we have a hermeneuticof a global "we"thatis appropriateto a world factu-

ally in the process of unificationundera common destiny?Is therea way of
being in the world, a way of constructingan identity for oneself, a way of
expandingone's horizonthat is appropriateto our condition?In contempo-
rary debates, there is a renewed interestin cosmopolitanismas being just
such an appropriateway of being in the world. In short, this article is con-
cernedwithcosmopolitanismas a thesis aboutcultureandculturalidentity.
The argumentof this articlehas four steps. In the firststep, I try and show
the ways in which contemporarycosmopolitansdistinguishthemselvesfrom
old-fashioned moral universalistsby claiming to be respectful of cultural
diversity,interestedin a dialogue acrosscultures,andcommittedto forms of
culturalhybridization.Inthe secondstep, I arguethatthe cosmopolitanclaim
that we can discuss, evaluate, understand,and integratepractices from a
diverse range of culturesis implausiblesince it ignores the dependence of
these practices on incommensurablebackgroundpresuppositions.I argue
that culturalpracticesare groundedin reasons. But it does not follow from
this propositionthatthese reasonscan alwaysbe sharedor made commensu-
rable.In fact, the processof reflectionratherthanopeningup the possibilities
of borrowingand hybridizationmay only serve to remindus of the distance
betweencultures.The only kindof cosmopolitanismthatmay be compatible
with takingthe integrityof these reasonsseriouslyis whatI call a cosmopoli-
tanism of distance ratherthan a cosmopolitanismof hybridization.Third,I
arguethat ratherthanconfrontingthe limits of reflection,many cosmopoli-
tans discount these either by labeling other culturesas nonreflectiveor by
invoking question-beggingpremises that enact the very parochialismthey
claim to disavow.And finally,I suggest that attentionto the ways in which
culturaldiversitymightbe erodedby powerfulsociological forces makes the
stakes in the cosmopolitanposturemuch less than might appear.

SECTION I

Cosmopolitanismis a proteantermwith a complex historythatI shall not

recount.2At least fromRousseaudownto RogerScruton,this way of being in
the world has had pejorativeconnotations.For Rousseau,a restless being if
there ever was one, cosmopolitanismwas an "excuse to love the Tartarsso
thatone did nothaveto love one's neighbors."Orin RogerScruton'sformula-
tion, the cosmopolitanis "akind of parasitewho dependsuponthe quotidian
lives of other to create variouslocal flavors and identities in which he dab-
bles."3In contemporarydebates,the qualifiersattachedto cosmopolitanism
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 621

are liable to make its meanings confusing. We have cosmopolitanismsthat

are"situated," "vernacular,"
"rooted,""discrepant," "firstworld,""thirdworld,"
"critical,""elite,"and so on. If we could agree on what cosmopolitanismis,
can we agree on who its best exemplarsare? Exiles? Diasporas?Tourists?
Migrantlabor?Entrepreneurs?Jet setters?Intellectuals?
Different cosmopolitanisms are, however, united by a suspicion of
closed horizons.They arean attemptto, in Tagore'swords,make "theGod of
Humanityarriveat the gate of the ruinedtempleof the tribe."4Cosmopolitan-
ism is often articulatedas an existentialthesis, an accountof the properway
of being in this world, of conceptualizingthe self in relationto its surround-
ings. Cosmopolitanismis suspicious of the demandsof purityand singular-
ity. It is an identityinsistentlymindfulthatthe abundantpossibilities of life
may not be fully realizedwithin the horizonsof one traditionor cultureand
thatthe fabricof one's self is enrichedby being stitchedtogetherfromcloths
of differentcolors andhues.5Cosmopolitanismoften makesmoraldemands:
it claims thatthe reachof ourmoralobligationsoughtnot to be confinedonly
to our conationalsor any groupsmallerthanhumanity.The precise natureof
these obligations is a matterof contention.Some argue that cosmopolitan-
ism, properly speaking, involves enacting the requirementsthat the equal
moral worth of individuals entails. Acting on such requirementswould
requiredismantlingthe entire structureof privilege that is entailed by the
mere fact of membership in one particulargroup. It would require, for
instance, that bordersof nation-statesbe made open, not just to particular
classes of aspirants-refugees, skilled workers,andso forth-but to human-
ity at large. Forthereis, on this view, no justificationfor protectingthe privi-
leges thataccrueto some by virtueof theirmembershipin some societies as
opposedto others.Othersleave intactthe structureof privilegethataccruesto
one by virtueof membershipin particulargroupsbut argueneverthelessthat
we have some obligations to others-usually obligations of beneficence.6
Cosmopolitanismis also used to designate a particularkind of political or
legal relationship,especially one that accrues between or altogether sup-
plants the relationshipbetween states. Such a relationshipmay be imagined
as a utopianideal of a polity constitutedon a worldscale, butit need not be. In
Kant's usage, for instance, "cosmopolitanright" is almost like the term
"internationallaw" and refersto the rules thatgovernthe mutualobligations
of states towardeach other.7Althoughthereareinterestingconnectionsto be
drawn between the differentlevels of cosmopolitanism,these connections
are not straightforwardand obvious. For example, the extent of our moral
obligationsto otherscannotbe derivedsimply from an accountof the proper
way to constructan identity.Therefore,my skepticismregardingcosmopoli-
622 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

tanismas a thesis aboutcultureoughtnot to be readas havingdirectimplica-

tions for cosmopolitanismas a moral or legal thesis aboutwhich I say rela-
tively little.However,cosmopolitanism,in all its senses, sharesaffinitieswith
universalismfrom which it historicallyoften has been indistinguishable.
Contemporaryinvocations of the cosmopolitan ideal have, however,
attemptedto distancethemselvesfromuniversalismto a certaindegree.8The
suspicionof universalismin partstemsfromits associationwith imperialism.
To be a universalistwas to participatein a projectto emancipateindividuals
and cultures from their traditions and quotidian forms of existence into
modes of collective life whose authoritycould be underwrittenby universal,
tradition-independent normsorjustifiedin the name of an ideal or a concep-
tion of the good, higherthanthose of the culturesit soughtto replace.But in
recenthistory,universalismwas not simply a philosophicalidea. It was often
embodied in a concretehistoricalproject:imperialism.The historicallegiti-
macy providedto imperialismby threeof the most powerfuluniversalistide-
ologies of the West,Christianity,Liberalism,andMarxism,has madeuniver-
salism an object of suspicion.
Althoughthereis no straightforward argumentdemonstratingthatuniver-
is
salism necessarily imperialist,the charge of potentiallyimperialistconse-
quences of an argument is enough these days to send manyphilosophersscur-
ryingfor cover.Inmorephilosophicalterms,universalismis often vulnerable
to the chargethatit is premisedon positingcommonalitiesof needs, interests,
or ideals betweenmembersof differentcultures.The worryis thatthese com-
monalities often are presumed and in their presumptuousnesswork to
exclude differentperspectives.They often elevate to the statusof a "univer-
sal" what is in fact quite transitoryand local.
Often, appropriatingsomething underthe sign of universalis a way of
depoliticizingit. It is to claim special authorityand warrantfor it thatputs it
beyond ordinarycontestation. Even universalscan and ought to be chal-
lenged and interrogated.How has theircontentbeen determined?Why has a
particularconstellation been signified as authoritative?Why have certain
considerationsbeen excluded?In short, universalismis consideredimperi-
ous, presumptuous,depoliticizing, and a search for uniformityratherthan
contrasts.
Cosmopolitanismis, by contrast,a willingnessto engage with the "Other."
It entails an aestheticand intellectualopennessto diversestrivings,cultures,
and forms of reasoning.As David Hollingerputs it, "one can distinguishan
universalistwill to find a common groundfrom a common will to engage in
humandiversity."9Unlike universalism,it does not presumecommonalities
by positing a transcendentsubjectwho is no subjectin particular.It does not
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 623

claim special authority for itself by putting things beyond contestation.

Rather,it attemptsto createa space in which genuinedialogueandopeningof
horizons are possible. Unlike some forms of universalismthatseem to deny
the claims of ourembeddedness,ourlocations,andsubjectpositions,cosmo-
politanismis awareof the inevitablepull of ourlocations, ourembeddedness
in particularculturesandcontexts.It enjoinsus to transcendour local affilia-
tions and context, but the mannerin which we will detachfrom our local or
restrictiveidentities will not necessarilyissue in a commonalityof perspec-
tive. Cosmopolitanismenvisions diverse modes of transcending,displace-
ment, detachment.It enjoins us to transcendlocal horizons but withoutthe
expectationthatthis processwill resultin the same constellationaboveus.'0
The form of affective identificationmuch of the new cosmopolitanism
envisions is also different.Like most cosmopolitanisms,it is suspicious of
too largean affectiveinvestmentin the nation-state.Inmanyplaces, it argues,
"the project of a national society of citizens . . . appears increasingly
exhaustedanddiscredited.""Butit does not enjoinus to replacethose invest-
ments with identificationwith an enlargedand possible "we" of humanity.
Instead,it seeks to more effectively pluralizeour attachments,enhance our
solidarities, especially with groups that exemplify transnationalmodes of
belonging, in a way commensuratewith the complex macrointerdependen-
cies that affect us.
Cosmopolitanismin this form seems attractivebecauseit respondsto two
conundrumssimultaneously.It coincides with a sense thatthe global was not
quite out therebutlodged everywhere.In Geertz'swords,"Foreignersdo not
startat the watersedge but at the skins, the wogs begin long beforeCalais."'2
Cosmopolitanismwould be a way of conceiving citizenship appropriateto a
multiculturalsociety, a way of being receptiveto othersthatavoidedboth the
logic of assimilationthateroded difference or an enclavisim that made dia-
logue impossible. In many respects, the interest in cosmopolitanism also
coincided with a debate over American identity. Reconceiving American
identity in cosmopolitantermsprovideda plausible way of taking on board
some of the criticism of Americanidentitythatmulticulturalismhad gener-
atedwithoutgiving upthe thesis of Americanexceptionalism.It allowedcos-
mopolitanism,at least for Hollinger,to be the basis for a common "we,"one
that could be the object of a properpatriotismbut was not exclusionary in
being tied to a particularethnic or culturalhue."'
There is much more to be said about the politics and political ambiv-
alences of the new cosmopolitanism.But at its best, it strivesto reconcile the
transcendingof partialitythatuniversalismenjoins with a vigilant attentive-
ness to difference.It promptsus to "hybridize"andenrichouridentities;to be
624 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

"responsiveto the potentialfor creatingnew culturalcombinations"through

reflective dialogue. It shares the sentimentsexpressed by those who have
attemptedto modify universalismin a more dialogic direction.'4
Cosmopolitanismdependson the possibilities of reflectivedistancefrom
one's own culture.This thoughtseems to be quite straightforward. But what
kind of cosmopolitanismdoes reflective distanceentail? Is the kind of dia-
logue with "Otherness"thatcosmopolitanismenvisages a possibility?What
is the extent to which it is possible to create "new cultural"combinations?
More specifically, does reflection itself make cosmopolitanisma difficult
way of being in the world? In this article, I want to express some skepti-
cism aboutour abilityto seriouslyengage with deep differences,some skep-
ticism about our abilities to actively hybridize cultural forms, and some
skepticism aboutthe possibility of occupyinga middle groundbetween uni-
versalism and ethnocentrismthat cosmopolitanismenvisages. Cosmopoli-
tanismseems to me to be guilty of whatwe mightcall the fallacy of the possi-
ble middle. We are often rightly tempted to occupy a middle ground that
seems logically to exist between two extreme positions. But this middle
groundmay be a shaky one to standon.
I proceedin the following steps. In the nextsection,I suggest some imped-
imentsto dialoguethataregeneratedby theprocessof reflectionitself andthe
limits these place on cosmopolitanism.In section 3, I makesome remarkson
the politics of "reflectivedistance"to highlight some of the traps that the
deploymentof the demandfor reflectionoften falls into. In the finalsection, I
briefly discuss some of the pressures toward universalismthat make the
stakes of engaging with diversityless thanthey appear.

SECTION2: REFLECTIONAND INCOMMENSURABILITY

Thereis a certainstrongandgenerousignorancethatconcedes nothingto knowledge in
honorandcourage,an ignorancethatrequiresno less knowledgeto conceive it thandoes
knowledge.15

The view that any cosmopolitanismseeks to combat is the following,

describedby IsaiahBerlin as:

the notion that one of the most compelling reasons, perhapsthe most compelling, for
holding a particularbelief, pursuinga particularpolicy, servinga particularend, living a
particularlife, is that these ends, beliefs, policies, lives are ours. This is tantamountto
sayingthatthese rulesordoctrinesor principlesshouldbe followed notbecausethey lead
to virtueor happinessor justice or liberty,. . . or are good and right in themselves . . .,
rather they are to be followed because these values are those of my group-for the
nationalist,of my nation.16
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 625

Jeremy Waldronhas commented on the oddity of this view.'7 There is

somethingpeculiarin this attemptto defendthe obligationsthatstem from a
particularset of practicesby theiroriginsor the fact of possession; to defend
them because they are mine ratherthan being valuable. I do not think the
defense thata particularpracticeis mine ormy group'sis always illegitimate.
In the case of beleagueredminorities,for instance,it might be legitimateto
refuseeven the faircriticismsof the majoritywhen thesecriticismsarearticu-
lated in a context thathas no meaningotherthanto humiliatethe minorityin
question.In such circumstances,the requirementsof self-respectandsolidar-
ity both mightrequiresuch identifications.The degreeto which this response
is justified varies from context to context and is a matter of historical
judgement.
But in general,I agreewith Waldron.Culturalnormsandpracticesexist in
a context of reasoning and deliberation.Human beings have preferences,
desires, and beliefs. Phenomenologically speaking, these preferences,
beliefs, and desires-at least those thatmatterto an individual'sconception
of his or her well-being-are held for reasons.It is also an importantpartof
the self-image of cultures-at least those thatarenot completelymoribund-
thatthey claim to be ableto tell storiesaboutthe goods theirnormsembody.It
is a fairly elementarypoint thatit is importantto humanbeings and cultures
thatthey take theirnormsseriously in this way by thinkingof them as being
embeddedin a structureof reasonsandreasoning.The embeddednessof cul-
turein the activityof giving reasonsdoes not rest on a definitiveview of what
counts as good reasons, reason with a capital "R."It claims only that they
standin the space of reasons.To respecta cultureor culturepracticeis to take
their standingin this space seriously.
This standingin the space of reasonsone might supposeto be a propitious
site for cosmopolitanism. For unlike the identitarian,who from the start
excludes othersfromthis space,who presentsa versionof an irrefutable,non-
negotiable claim, this space allows for two things: it sees humanbeings as
engaged at least in the recognizableenterpriseof makingsense of theirlives
and holds out the possibility thatways alien to us might make sense to us. It
would be thereforea better way of our being in the world to be open and
receptiveto alternativepossibilitiesjust in this kind of way. But althoughwe
all standin this space-unless we willfully abdicateit-can its possibilities
be redeemed?And why arethey so often thoughtto be unredeemableso that
the only recourseends up being politics of an identitariansort?
On the view just articulated,a culturalpracticeis a kindof social interpre-
tationof a good, andas such it may havea rationale.But unlikeWaldron,I am
more pessimistic about the possibility of articulatingthat rationaleto those
who do not in some significantsenses alreadyshareit. I should clarify thatI
626 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

do not mean to advancea radicalincommensurabilitythesis that these rea-

sons will be unintelligible to others.'8They will in fact be often perfectly
intelligible.
Let me take two examples to show what I have in mind. Suppose you
belong to a culturethatbelieves in marriageas a sacrament,thattakesthe "till
deathdo us part"clauseutterlyseriously.Supposeyou pose thequestion,what
is the point of viewing marriagein this way? Whatis the point of defending
this relationshipas being a worthyideal? You might say somethinglike-or
else you will burnin hell-the fundamentalistresponse(or simplythatthis is
how we do thingshere).Oryou mightsay somethinglike, thereis a particular
set of relationshipsin which it is of the utmost importancethat you do not
treatthe personwith whomyou enterinto thatrelationshipas a means,a mere
objectof yourconvenience.One of the ways of ensuringthatis to makecom-
mitmentthe centralvalue of the institutionof marriage.Commitmenton this
view is thus not supervienanton othervalues like fulfillmentor expression.
Thatinvolves tryingto ensurethatif thatbondis to broken,it is not to be bro-
ken for merely your convenience.An expression of that desire would be to
makethe conditionsunderwhichyou oughtto be ableto exit froma marriage
appropriatelyrestrictive.'9
Ortake anotherexample:the Jainapracticeof sallekhana,a formof a fast
unto death that some select monks (mainly men, althoughoften women as
well) are allowed to undertakein the final stages of their life. This practice
still survivesand involves the refusalto take any nutrientsin the final stages
of life. The point of this springsfroma vision of life andlife processthatsees
no finalityin death.The vow of nonviolence,andits accompanyingsupports,
is said to diminish the karmasthat preventone from reaching the highest
state. This final vow of fastingacceleratesthis process by honing down even
hunger,the most basic of humanand hence karmicdesires. It demonstrates
thatthe adepthas acquiredthe abilityto extinguishall desire,which is said to
be at the root of violence towardothers.The extinguishingof all desire is the
final stage of a life led assiduously to avoid violence towardall beings.20I
mention this example in partbecause it is an interestingcounterpartto the
practiceof sati, which-for understandablereasons-always gets discussed
in these contexts.In part,becauseit illustrateshow cultureshave an elaborate
grammarof death. (It should be noted that Jainismgenerally prohibitssui-
cide.) This grammaris embeddedin an elaboratedcontextof reasoning(after
all, Max Weberdescribesthis doctrine,along with Protestantism,the harbin-
ger of Occidental rationality,as the most rationalizedof theodicies) and
encapsulatesa whole outlook on life andexistence thatfor manyis as mean-
ingful as any of its rivals.And its ostensible premise-the avoidanceof vio-
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 627

lence to the maximumdegreepossible-seems to be a plausiblecandidatefor

a universalvalue.
The point of these two examplesis this. One might be able to presentcul-
tural practices as embodying a context of reasons. But no sooner are these
reasonsproposedthen it is open to the interlocutorsto ask, what is important
about those particularreasons?You might ask in the case of marriage,why
should not a marriagecommitmentbe contingenton fulfillmentratherthan
the otherway around(with all the appropriateprovisosaboutresponsibility)?
Or what is the point of an outlook on life and the insistence on nonviolence
that leads to the extinguishingof desire in such a manner?
Questionslike these become difficultto answer,not because thereare no
answers but because the persuasiveness of those answers rests in part on
sharinga form of life-sharing thatis a whole rangeof otherpresuppositions
abouthumanexistence, the humancondition,and so forth. Reflective ques-
tioning of this sort,if it bringsaboutchange,usuallydoes so by undermining
the whole rangeof backgroundpresuppositionandsubordinateclauses (like
the sociological context,for example)thatarealwayspartof any structureof
reasoning. But it may also reveal that we may have good reasons for some
normorpracticebutnot reasonsthatwe can all share.It is not simply a matter
of the hearthavingreasonsthatreasondoes not know of. The matteris rather
this: the entirerangeof good reasonscannotbe arrayedon a single scale and
made commensurable for even the most reflective consciousness. Just
because a reflective standpointis available is no guaranteethat one can in
principle participatein and choose the best among the goods that emanate
from a diverse arrayof sources. When confrontedwith questions about the
importanceof reasonswe give, we may be left with nothingotherthana point
of inarticulacy.But does the idea of there being good reasons that are not
good reasonsfor all makesense? Don't we thenjust haveto say,this reasonis
mine or ours? Doesn't the specter of aligning cultureand identity reappear
underthe pressurenot of culturalparticularismbutbecause of the realization
thatreasons-although theyarereasons,notmerepreferences-are notshared
by others?
In a curiouskindof way,two greatcosmopolitans-MontaigneandHume-
came to similar conclusions. Philosophical reflection, they argued, often
enacts a species of customwithoutowningup to it. Moreimportant,theyrec-
ognized thatit is the hallmarkof a trulyreflective consciousness thatit sub-
vertsthe prideof reflectiveconsciousness.The point of all this is to foundthe
following thought.Cosmopolitanismrequires,properlyspeaking,more than
simply the willingness or ability to adopta reflective standpointthat allows
distance from one's own presuppositions.It may also requirea prior ethic
628 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

groundedin the suppositionthat in dealing with importantmatterslike the

meaning of life and the practicesthat express those meanings, the conclu-
sions of reflection will be necessarily varied and indeterminateand that
reflectionwill only heightenthis sense, not transcendit. It may requirea sen-
sibility thatrenouncesthe confidencethatone caneasily possess thatwhich is
different.But abjuringthedesireto possess may weakenthe motivesunderly-
ing cosmopolitanismthatoften revel in its claims thatgoods from different
culturescan be easily possessed andcombined.Dialogue of the kind cosmo-
politans and interactiveuniversalistsadvocateoften aspiresto two goals. It
aspiresto yield a point of view acceptableto all; butcan thatgoal be recon-
ciled with anothergoal: to acceptall? If we aspireto a standpointthatcan be
acceptedby the whole of humanity,can we also aspireto acceptthe whole of
humanity?
If the view advancedhere, thatreasoningis embeddedin largercontexts,
in forms of life, is correct,what implicationsdoes it have for the cosmopoli-
tan claim to be able to pick and choose, mix and match freely, the various
scripts and narrativesthatdifferentcultureswill have to offer?What are, in
otherwords,the limits of "hybridization"-afamiliarself-descriptionof cos-
mopolitans?Canhybridizationbe extendedto the deepestissues thatgive our
lives the purposeswe thinkit has, or will it extendonly to those activitiesthat
danceat the surfaceof ourlives (andthatmay be appropriatelydefinedby the
image of "consumption")-the restaurantswe visit, the movies we see, the
carpets we drape our floors with, and so on. What does the cosmopolitan
really put at risk?Two furtherconsiderationsmay be pertinenthere.First,to
whatextent is it possible for any individualto enactthe requirementsof rival
ways of being in a way thatpreservesthe integrityof a particularway of life?
The second considerationis the following. Culturesare,amongotherthings,
teleologies of everydaylife investinga diversearrayof goods, practices,and
occasions with meaning. These teleologies are expressed and reproduced
across time throughcommon institutionsthat often provide a stable set of
expectationsand delineate structuresof responsibility.To what extent is it
possible that different sections of any given populationpractice different
formsof commoninstitutions?This, I think,is an open question.But the fact
thatin contemporaryinvocationsof cosmopolitanismthereseems to be very
little roomfor such institutionalpluralismonly bolstersthe suspicionthatthe
attentionto differenceis "safe"because it does not put the way we think of
our dominantinstitutionsat risk in any way.
It might be more honest to say, as perhapsMontaigneintendedto, that a
deeperreflectionon the diversityof goods andculturesmightlead to the con-
clusion that it is difficult to possess other cultures, to actively appropriate
them for our hybridizingprojects.It ought to lead us to a recognitionthat
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 629

diversityand access to otherculturesdoes not increaseourrangeof options,

for culturesare not options in any straightforwardsense. They at most allow
us to appreciatethe singularity or distinctiveness, the strengths or weak-
nesses of our own. They allow as it were a languageof perspicuouscontrast
thatmay put certainpresuppositionsinto bolderrelief. At its best, this ambi-
tion has been articulatedin anthropologistslike Dumont and Geertz who
makethis languageof perspicuouscontrastavailable.Conversionis certainly
possible. But the idea thatwe can easily mix and matchdifferentculturesor
increaseouroptions,at least in mattersin which somethingseriousis at stake,
needs a lot more argument.Cosmopolitanismis at most a deeper way of
understandingwho one is ratherthanradicallytransformingtherangeof pos-
sibilities available in our corner of the world. Its hermeneuticpotential is
greaterthan its transgressivepossibilities.
Even the hermeneuticpotentialcan work in surprisingand contradictory
ways. It can, as it did Montaigne,make one less presumptuous;it can deepen
our understandingof the presuppositionsof our own performances.But it is
also threatening.As Ricouer suggested,

When we discoverthatthereare severalculturesinsteadof just one and consequentlyat

the time when we acknowledgethe end of a sort of culturalmonopoly,be it illusory or
real, we arethreatenedwith destructionby ourown discovery.Suddenlyit becomes pos-
sible thattherearejust others,thatwe ourselvesare an "other"among others.All mean-
ing and every goal having disappeared,it becomes possible to wanderthroughciviliza-
tion as if through vestiges and ruins. The whole of mankindbecomes an imaginary
museum:where shall we go this weekend-visit the Angkorruinsor take a stroll in the
Tivoli or Copenhagen?We can easily imagine a time when any fairly well to do person
will be able to leave his countryindefinitelyin orderto taste his own nationaldeathin an
interminableaimless voyage.21

The consequenceof the discoveryof the pluralityof good reasonsmay be

to divest the idea of "goodreasons"of anycontent.Canthe phrase"goodrea-
son" have any warrantif its authoritycannotbe groundedin agreement?Or
does it merely express a preferencewith no more authoritythan any other
preference?The lightness of the descriptionsone usuallygets of a cosmopol-
itan life just bolstersthis suspicion. ConsiderJeremyWaldron'scelebration
of Rushdie's life "lived in the shadow of Hindu Gods, Muslim film stars,
Kipling,Christ,NabokovandtheMahabharata."22 This image seems to con-
jure up precisely the specterthatRicouerwarnsagainst.Can the constitutive
goods thatthese differentitems listed embody and expressedbe really taken
seriously,be really given theirdue as goods, if they can be appropriatedwith
the seeming ease with which Waldrondescribes them? Rushdie's life has a
meaningandheroismthatcan be defended.Butthe sourceof it seems to me to
630 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

be not located in its cosmopolitanism.It consists in his battle to show that

exclusive interpretationsof religious doctrinescan be exercisedin bad faith.
But it is not clear why one needs a cosmopolitanstandpointto admirethese
efforts.
The mere fact that goods thatoriginatein differentculturescan so inter-
mingle in the same social space seems to Waldronto be enough to make the
claim thatwhatis occurringin these instancesis a case of culturalhybridiza-
tion. But this argumentdoes not quiteattendto theforn in which these goods
are appropriated.Americansmay quite freely practiceBuddhistmeditation
as partof theirquestfor a betterlife, butif thatappropriationis not accompa-
nied by the takingon boardthe broaderpremiseswithinwhich those medita-
tion techniqueswere lodged-namely, eschewing violence, liberationfrom
the cycle of birthanddeath,a sensibilityantitheticalto the projectof master-
ing nature,and so forth-quite what has been appropriated?The context in
which these techniquesareappropriatedaltersthembeyondrecognitionand
often, ratherthan complicatingthe culturethat appropriatesthem, is made
quite compatiblewith its governingpremises.I would not wish to claim that
thereforesuch appropriationsareillegitimate.I only wantto suggestthatthey
aredone so in a way thatdoes not putanythingseriousin one's cultureat risk.
I do not wantto claim thatno culturalborrowingsever occuror thatnew cul-
turalforms cannotemerge fromthese exchanges.The burdenof this section
has been to establishthatif one takes the meaningsof culturalpracticesand
the goods embodied in them seriously, it is considerablymore difficult to
enactthe requirementsof culturalhybridizationthanits proponentssuppose.

SECTION3: THEPOLITICSOF REFLECTION

I hope I am as greata believerin free air as the greatpoet. I do not want my house to be
walled in on all sides andmy windowsto be stuffed.I wantthe culturesof all landsto be
blownaboutmy landas freelyas possible.But I refuseto be blownoff my feet by any.23

If my argumentthatthe sortof cosmopolitanismmost consonantwith the

demands of taking diversity seriously is a cosmopolitanismof distance is
plausible, then cosmopolitans need to attend to the limits of reflection as
muchas they do to its possibilities.In this section, I explorethe veryrealpos-
sibility thata properappreciationof diversitymightbe occludedby discount-
ing these limits. The insistentdemandfor reflectionand the historicalprac-
tices throughwhich thatdemandhas been articulatedcan often enactthevery
parochialismit decries.
Take,for instance,the following statement:"Togain distancefrom one's
own traditionsandbroadenlimitedperspectivesis the advantageof Occiden-
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 631

tal rationalism."24 One could readthis statementas an aberranthangoverfrom

the days of a Macaulay,except thatit comes fromthe pen of one of ourother-
wise most liberal-mindedthinkers:JurgenHabermas.And statementsof this
sort are more ubiquitousthanone might suppose.The enormityof this claim
is staggeringin more ways thanone could list. Trueto its Hegelianorigins, it
not only installs the Occident as the site of Universalhistory but makes the
self-identity of the Occidentdependenton projectinga series of binarieson
the restof the world.This accountnot merelycharacterizesthe "Other"nega-
tively as not having been capable of a reflective consciousness and so on.
What is strikingis the extent to which the agency of the membersof those
benightedculturesis displacedonto essences and the agents of actions seen
as expressionsof those essences. Membersof these culturesareprisonersof
their mythic world views, their culturepossesses them ratherthan they it.
They are not agents and subjectscapableof autonomousthoughtand action,
making and remaking their worlds, sometimes imaginatively sometimes
ineptly,and therefore,nothingthey can come up with places any burdenson
the reflective consciousness.
There is one simple objectionto Habermas'sclaim: it is patentlyfalse. I
cannot imagine any culturethathas not in variousperiodsof its historybeen
subjectto seriousinternalcriticism,whichhas notborrowedfromothers,or if
it has refused to do so it is because it might have plausiblereasons for doing
so. Indeed,if thereis anythingof valuein recentanthropology,it is the thought
thatthe image of cultureas somethingthatcan be individuatedand identified
apartfromits immersionin widerprocessesis a mistake.Thereusuallyareno
"natives,"fixed and localized as opposed to cosmopolitanstravelingfreely.
The natives themselves are immersed in interculturalcommunicationand
exchange;therearefew localities thatexist apartfromthe world.The imagin-
ing of place is itself formed in crucial ways by its relation to the outside
world.25A reflective consciousness is not the prerogativeof members of a
particularculture but a ubiquitousfeatureof the human condition-less a
privilege thanfate. Self-doubt,even implacableself-doubt,skepticism,even
radical skepticism, have been elements in all cultures. To be sure, not all
social systems have institutionalizedthe practicesof reflexivity to the same
degree, and some have, at various points in their history, altogether sup-
pressed it. But that was also trueof the Occident as well, and not all of the
West's componentpartsdisplay reflective consciousness in equal measure.
In any case, it has neverbeen clearto me why the unpropitiousnessof particu-
larsocial systems for reflexivityshouldlead one to concludethatmembersof
those cultures could not reflexively think about their social arrangements.
JudithButler'sevocativephrase,"Kantiansin everyCulture"is a more accu-
632 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

rate reflection of the possibilities of criticaldistancein most cultures.After

all, as even Max Weber,a profoundinvestigatorof OccidentalRationalism,
well knew, each culture had, throughthe applicationof a reflective con-
sciousness, producedits own formsof disenchantment,even if it did not pro-
duce the same social system as the West.
Nor is this reflectiveconsciousness,it bearsrepeating,simply a productof
the encounterwith the West.Thatencounterperhapsplacedextraburdenson
the activityof reflectionin so-calledpostcolonialsocieties,burdensthatmade
them more ratherthan less conscious of the legacies of modernity.If any-
thing, they suffer from too much ratherthantoo little self-consciousness. It
mightbe possibleeven to arguethatit is only in thesepartsof the world,where
living deeply in two cultures-the modem "Occidental"andthe vernacular-
translatingback and forth between them, negotiating their contradictory
demands and incommensurableoutlooks, is not a matter of choice but a
deeply internalizedpractice that makes the complacencies of the West, or
even its gesturestowardsmulticulturalism,seem decidedly settled and pro-
vincial. The point of raisingall this is not to appropriatea moralsuperiority
thathardlyany cultureis innocentenoughto be entitledto. It is to raise some
mattersthat speak directlyto the questionof cosmopolitanism.
If one takes a reflectiveconsciousnessto be a sine qua non of cosmopoli-
tanism, one of its essential conditions, it is unhelpfulto treat it as a given
propertyof a cultureas a whole. For it shields the concept of reflection and
criticism from furtherinvestigationat the precise moments at which more
needs to be said. Whataremomentsat which the shuttersof unreflectiveness
fall on philosophicalreflection in the Occident?Conversely,take a suppos-
edly archetypicalcase of a cultureprisonerof its closed view of the world,
Islam? What is it that allowed MuhamadIqbalto compareGod to a whore
and chargehim with being fickle and still be rightly regardedas one of the
creative geniuses of South Asian Islam, while Rushdie could not get away
with his postmodernlevities? In circumstancesin which thereis often a will-
ful turningawayfromthe demandsof a reflectiveconsciousness,it behooves
us to ask questions such as, underwhat conditionsdo membersof a culture
have confidenceto own up to the demandsof reflection?Thatis, underwhat
conditions is a cosmopolitandialogue even plausible?What encumbrances
of the self have to be repressed,hidden,discarded,disowned to incorporate
oneself into dominantglobal structuresof awareness,not to mention global
structuresof power?Is such a dialoguepossible when the dominantmode of
thatdialogue disowns or negates the substantivemodes of self-definitionof
all culturesexcept the modem Westandconstruesthemas havingneverexer-
cised the prerogativesof reflection?
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 633

The difficultywith Habermas'sclaim is thatit quite strikinglymirrorsand

may itself contributeto some of the self-presentationsof those who engage in
identity politics. Habermas'shistorical narrative,if not his formal theory,
rules out right from the startany standingto others within the space of rea-
sons. Culturalpractices are ruled out from the start as having anything of
value, one thatcan pass the test of a reflectiveconsciousness;or if they do, it
is moreby accidentthandesign. This is a matterof some importancebecause
any possibilities for a reflective cosmopolitanismhave to seriously reckon
with the politics of culturalrepresentationof which Habermas'saccountis an
all-to-familiar instance. This historical narrativeraises the self-defensive
barriersthat are typically importantbarriersto cosmopolitandialogue.
It should be apparentthat I firmly believe that cosmopolitanismand its
kindredconcept, universalism,need not be ethnocentricin the sense of being
identifiedwith the practicesof one particularset of cultures.But the historical
practicesthroughwhich both cosmopolitanismand universalismhave been
articulatedoften enact the very parochialismthey decry.And they have left
little space for participantsof other cultures to participateon the same
ground.
Since Habermasis not Macaulayor Hegel, one cannotattributehis refusal
to see the mistakein his alignmentof reflectiveconsciousness with only the
Occident to the conceit that only the nineteenth century could properly
invoke. There might be a deeper philosophical temptationat work. I have
dwelt at some length on Habermas'smistake, not to question his larger
account of discourseethics but to exemplify the kind of temptationsthatthe
demandfor reflectioncan often fall prey to. This temptationmay stem from
the tensions underlyingtwo differentaspirationsof the so-called Enlighten-
ment projectto which Habermasandmany othercontemporarytheoristsare
heir.26On one hand,this projectdefends a formaland discursiveconception
of criticalreason:a conceptionthatcan put any claims, includingthose of its
own authority,to question.27On the otherhand,it held out the possibility that
the exercise of criticalreason will lead to a greaterconvergenceon substan-
tive principles. Those who pronounceon the failure of the Enlightenment
project like John Gray and McIntyre stress the second of its aspirations.
Those who defend it andits inclusionarypossibilitieslike OnoraO'Neill and
Seyla Benhabib stress the former. Historically, the two have often run
together;those who have vindicatedthe standpointof criticalreasonusually
also have articulatedan accountof whatcounts as good reasons.The trouble
is thatthe formalpropertiesof discursivereasoningradicallyunderdetermine
what counts as good reasons.28I take thatto be the heartof McIntyre'sunan-
swered challenge to the Enlightenmentproject.
634 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

What happens when there is deep disagreementafter reason has been

freely exercised?29How does one explainit? The dilemmais this:we can say
thatthe exerciseof reasoncan resultin pluraloutcomes.But if thatis the case,
where is the authorityof any one of these sets of reasonsto be grounded?Its
putativegrounding-agreement of free beings-is not available.You might
takethis optionandsay,that'spreciselythe point:these arematterson which
no set of reasonsareauthoritativefor everybody(it mightbe a shortstep from
thatto say thereforethese reasonsarenot reasonsat all). They aremore akin
to subjectivepreferences.Or,and this is the recurringtemptation,since oth-
ers have not arrivedat the sameconclusionas you haveit mustbe becauseof a
deficientprocess of ratiocination.And those who do not reachthese conclu-
sions mustthereforenot be exercisingtheirratiocinativecapacities.(Thereis
a similartemptationunderlyingrecentattemptsto deriveliberalismfrom the
requirementsof being reasonable.By implication,this makesthose who are
not liberal "unreasonable."This is implausible.) I lay out this temptation
ratherpointedlybecause we all too often fall prey to it, and the only way to
overcome it may be to supplementthe demandsfor reflectionwith an ethos
thatis insistentlymindfulof the limits of reflectiveargumentandcommitted
to a pluralismthatdoes not see differenceas a mistake.
The second temptationthata reflectiveconsciousness may fall prey to is
not unrelatedto the first. Faced with putativedifferences, Habermastakes
recourse to something like the following move: some of the interlocutors
have not experiencedor understoodthe implicationsof this concept we call
"modernity." If onlytheinterlocutorshadunderstoodwhatmodernityrequires,
what forms of reasoning,premises,and argumentsit invalidates,what back-
groundpictureof the world is not availableto us, the likelihood of conver-
gence is greater.This move, which implicitly invokes a backgroundpicture,
usually does a lot of work in moral argument.30 It takes the authorityof a
backgroundpictureof the world, or the universalityof the backgroundpre-
suppositionsof modernityfor granted,withoutdefendingit in termsthatare
not questionbegging. Invocationsof "modernity"in such argumentsare un-
persuasivefortwo reasons.Not only is "modernity" a rathermorecomplicated
beast than Habermassuggests, but more important,because invocationsof
modernityareoften ourversionof the "dothis or you will burnin hell" argu-
ment-a real conversationstopper.It seems to me thatany genuine cosmo-
politanismwill have to allow the serious possibility of complicating,if not
outrightquestioning,the premisesof modernityitself. If these premises are
not allowed to be questioned,thenthe demandfor reflectionbecomes a trap.
It obligatesone to conformto whatarein effect particularviews of the world.
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 635

SECTION4: THESTAKESOF DIVERSITY

I hope this note of irritationwith cosmopolitanismis not in the service of
nostalgia or a defense of closed communities.It ratheris an attemptto sug-
gest perhapsthat those very things in which closed communitiesoften find
their succor and sabotage-the demands for reflectiveness;the always, in
some senses, hybridcharacterof ouridentities;the availabilityof alternative
vistas of contemplation-do not automaticallymakecosmopolitanismpossi-
ble or necessary.It is an attemptto more forcefully examine what it would
take to make cosmopolitanism a way of being in the world, examine the
impedimentsto its promiseof a dialogue across cultures,and force its hand
on the extent of diversityit is willing to contemplate.Considerthe following
descriptionof cosmopolitanism:

I prefera thirdoption:cosmopolitanismas the provocativelyimpurebutirreduciblecom-

binationof a certainprivilegeat home, as partof a realbelonging in institutionalplaces,
with a no less real but much less common (and thereforehighly desirable)extension of
democratic,anti imperialprinciplesabroad.31

One wonderswhatattentionto diversityanddialogueis at stakein this for-

mulation,whatis being put at risk thatis differentfrom standarduniversalist
teleologies. All talk of attentionto difference,creatingnew culturalforms,
andhybridizingidentitiesmay be obscuringthe force of a powerfulhistorical
process at work. The conceptualdifficultiesI have outlinedare bad enough.
Culturaltrendsmay make cosmopolitanismbeside the point. Many would
arguethatthe languagethatI have used to describeculture,as a kindof gram-
mar of the good, is quaintlanguage anyway.We all now know that cultures
are ruses of power,designed to exclude some while protectingthe privileges
of others. This claim, whetherin its liberal versions or more postmodernist
ones, is fueled by the genuine emancipatoryimpulses of modernity.And
althoughwe may not be able to give satisfactoryphilosophicalgroundingto
these impulses, they will continueto remainoverwhelminglyattractive.But
whetherany of the visions of the good or even the vocabularyof "good"that
diverseculturesembodiedcan survivethis hermeneuticsof suspicionas any-
thingotherthanprivatebeliefs remainsan openquestion.Add to this the pres-
sures of adaptingto thatforce-first designatedas cosmopolitanby Mill-
capital, to which so many of the teleologies of daily life have to adjust,and
one is left wondering what the diversity that cosmopolitanismseeks to be
attentiveto is all about.I thinkboth the crisis in the concept of "culture"and
the relatedcrisis of "nationalism"reinforcethese questions.Most contempo-
rarydefenses of difference,whetherethnicor national,haveless to do, except
at the margins,with the defense of a distinctway of life, a distinctset of social
636 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

practices, but more to do with valorizing markersof difference. As many

observershave noted, ethnic identificationis no longer connectedto partici-
pation in distinct culturalpractices. In fact, cultures and nations have, for
good or for ill, ceded so muchto the moderneconomy,the modernstate, and
often to liberalism'semancipatoryaspirationsthatall thatis left for them is
the policing of boundaries,the politics of culturalrepresentation,and affec-
tive attachmentsto place butrarelya way of life.32Itmay be preciselybecause
substantivedifferences of value and horizons of meaning are effectively
shrinkingthat greaterand inordinateweight is being placed on markersof
difference.We are, in short,talkingaboutdifferencebecause we cannottalk
aboutdiversity.ValentineDaniel's remark,"nationalismis the horripilation
of culture in insecurity and fright,"may be the most insightful thing said
aboutrecent nationalism.33
But, andthis is whatI wantto suggest in closing, the crisis of nationalism,
its inabilityto generatea raisond'etre,shouldalso portenda crisis for cosmo-
politanism.Theremay be verylittle, in which anythingseriousis at stake,left
to be cosmopolitanabout.Castoriadisarguedthat

if we look at the life of the thirteenthcentury,passing from Chartresto Borobudurand

from Venice to the Mayas, from Constantinopleto Peking and from Kublai Khan to
Dante,fromthe house of Maimonidiesat Cordobato Nara,andfromthe Magna Cartato
the Byzantine monks copying Aristotle;comparethis extraordinarydiversity with the
present state of the world, where countries are not really differentfrom each other in
terms of their present-which, as such, is everywherethe same-but only in terms of
their past. Thatis what the developed world is.4

Theremay be a rhetoricalflourishhere, andCastoriadismay have under-

estimated the inventivenessand diversitythat the horizons of "modernity"
allow.35Theremay be no reasonwhatsoeverto regretthe passing away of the
world Castoriadisdescribes;no reasonto worry,if one wants an alternative
picture,that"we may be faced with a worldin which theresimply aren'tany
more headhunters,matrilinealists,or people who predictweatherfrom the
entrailsof a pig,,,36butit does raise at least the following possibility.Is it eas-
ier to leave home becausehome truthswill be availableeverywhere?Is being
cosmopolitanlike possessinga checkcashableata bankthatno longerexists?

NOTES

1. StanleyCavell, TheClaimof Reason(Oxford,UK:OxfordUniversityPress, 1979), 382.

2. One irony is thatthe two greatcosmopolitansthatMarthaNussbaumcelebrates,Seneca
and Kant, had rathersurprisingviews on the matter.For Seneca, to be echoed by Pascal later,
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 637

"The greatest contributionto humanpeace would be for the seas to be closed of." Quoted in
James Romm, The Edges of Earth in Ancient Thought(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1992). Kant, following Pufendorf,arguedthat the Chinese were perfectly within their
rightsto close off contactswith Europeans.For interestingand criticalreflectionson a rangeof
cosmopolitanisms,see TimothyBrennan,At Home in the World:CosmopolitanismNow (Cam-
bridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1997).
3. Roger Scruton,A Dictionary of Political Thought(London:Macmillan, 1980), 100.
4. RabindranathTagore,TheReligion of Man (London:Unwin, 1961).
5. Two examples of cosmopolitanism as a way of being in the world-rather than an
accountof our moralobligations-are JeremyWaldron,"MinorityCulturesandthe Cosmopoli-
tan Alternative,"in The Rights of MinorityCultures,ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford, UK: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1995), 93-122; AnthonyAppiah,"CosmopolitanPatriots,"in Cosmopolitics,
ed. Bruce Robbins and Pheng Cheah (Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1998), 98-
117. The latteris strikinglypanglossianin thatit conveys no sense of the conflicts between spe-
cial attachmentsand cosmopolitanobligations.
6. Martha Nussbaum, in "Patriotismand Cosmopolitanism,"in For Love of Country:
Debating theLimitsof Patriotism(Boston:Beacon, 1996), is the mostradicalrecentexample.
7. ImmanuelKant,"Onthe Common Saying: 'This May be Truein Theorybut Does Not
Apply in Practice,'" in Kant: Political Writings,ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge,UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
8. This characterizationis based on a largenumberof sources:the principalones are David
Hollinger,PostEthnicAmerica(New York:Basic Books, 1995);ArjunAppadurai,Modernityat
Large (Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1996); and manyof the pieces containedin
Cosmopolitics.I have obviously not done justice to subtle differences of nuance among these
writers.
9. Hollinger,Post EthnicAmerica, 84.
10. The differencesbetweenthe new cosmopolitanismand universalismarewell articulated
along the lines suggested here in AmandaAnderson,"Cosmopolitanism,Universalismand the
Divided Legacies of Modernity,"in Cosmopolitics,265-90.
11. ArjunAppadurai,"Citizensand Citizenship,"Public Culture8 (1996): 187-204.
12. CliffordGeertz, "TheUses of Diversity,"Michigan Quarterly25, no. 1 (1987): 112.
13. Hollinger,Post EthnicAmerica, 44. Hollingerwrites, "Thenationalcommunityof the
United Statesmediatesmoredirectlythanmost othernationalcommunitiesdo betweenthe spe-
cies and the ethno-racialvarietiesof mankind."
14. It is no accidentthat writerslike Hollinger who preferthe label cosmopolitanendorse
Seyla Benhabib's model of interactiveuniversalism.Seyla Benhabib,Situating the Self (New
York:Routledge, 1992):

Interactiveuniversalismacknowledgesthe pluralityof modes of being human,and dif-

ferencesamongsthumans,withoutendorsingall these pluralitiesanddifferencesas mor-
ally and politically valid. While agreeing that normativedisputes can be settled ratio-
nally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are
constituents,thatis necessaryconditionsof the moralstandpoint,interactiveuniversal-
ism regardsdifferenceas the staringpoint for reflectionand action. (p. 153)

The crucial indeterminacy in this ideal is who withholds endorsement in the case of
disagreement.
15. Michel de Montaigne,"Of Cripples,"in Complete Worksof Montaigne,trans. Donald
Frame(Palo Alto, CA: StanfordUniversityPress, 1971), 784.
638 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2000

16. IsaiahBerlin,Against the Current:Essays in the Historyof Ideas (Oxford,UK: Oxford

University Press, 1981), 342-43.
17. See most accessibly, Waldron,"MinorityCultures."
18. The unintelligibilityissue vexed Britishanthropologyand philosophya good deal. Two
prominentcollections thatgive a flavorof the debateareBryanWilson,ed., Rationality(Oxford,
UK: Blackwell, 1972); and Steven Lukes and MartinHollis, eds. Rationalityand Relativism
(Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1985).
19. I should perhapsclarify that these two examples will not argue a case for what laws
should be. What should be enacted as law requiresmore complex considerationsthan can be
given here.Theconsiderationformarriagegiven hereby itself maynot,even on its own terms,be
sufficientto underwritea legal position.Thisinterpretationmightbe supplementedwith the real-
izationthathumanbeings arein a fallen stateandin thatstateareliableto extractan inordinately
high cost fromthose with whom they live in close proximityif theirmoremundaneexpectations
are not fulfilled. To preventconditionsfrom arisingin which this cost-in the form of enduing
abuse, for example-becomes morelikely, the conditionsof exit mightbe made less restrictive.
This might allow for more liberaldivorcelaws but one whose rationaleis not to place iterative
choice as a centralvalue of thatinstitution.For an argumentin the same spirit,see also Samuel
Fleischakev,An Ethics of Culture(Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress, 1997).
20. For an accessible accountof this practice,see C. K. Chapple,Nonviolence to Animals,
Earthand Self inAsian Traditions(Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1993), chap.6.
21. PaulRicouer,Historyand Truth(Evanston, IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1965),278.
22. Waldron,"MinorityCultures,"108. Todorov's(no enemyof cosmopolitanism)reflections
mightbe appropriatehere. In Conquestof America(New York:HarperRow, 1985), he writes,

Exile is fruitfulif one belongs to both culturesat once, without identifying itself with
either; but if a whole society consists of exiles, the dialogue of culture ceases: it is
replacedby eclecticism and comparitivism,by the capacityto love everythinga little, of
flaccidly sympathizingwith each option without embracing any. Heterology, which
makes the differenceof voices heardin necessary;polylogy in insipid. (p. 250)

23. MohandasKaramchandGandhi,The Gandhi-TagoreControversy(Ahmadabad,India:

Navjivan, 1953), 27.
24. JurgenHabermas,"Remarkson Legitimation,"Philosophyand Social Criticism24, no.
2/3 (1998): 162. This thoughtcan be frequentlyencounterednotjust in the writingsof Habermas
but in many others and may still be partof the West's self-perception.
25. Claude Levi-Strauss,"Cosmopolitanismand Schizophrenia,"in The Viewfrom Afar
(New York:Basic Books, 1974).
26. I am aware,thanksin partto BernardYack,The Fetishismof Modernities(South Bend,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), of the pitfalls of using "epochal"terms like the
"Enlightenment." But I hope the complicationsof thattermhave no bearingon the matterbeing
discussed here.
27. The key thoughthere is the following passage from ImmanuelKant, Critiqueof Pure
Reason, trans.N. Kemp-Smith(London:Macmillan, 1932):

Reason must in all its undertakingssubjectitself to criticism;should it limit freedomof

criticismby any prohibitions,it mustharmitself, drawinguponitself a damagingsuspi-
cion. Nothing is so importantthroughits usefulness, nothingso sacred,that it may be
exempt fromthis searchingexamination,which knowsno respectforpersons.Forreason
its verdictis simplytheagreementof freecitizens.(A739/B767)
hasno dictatorialauthority;
 Mehta/ COSMOPOLITANISM 639

28. AlbrechtWellmerhad suggested a similarobjectionto Habermasin his ThePersistence

of Modernity(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1985).
29. I am not here taking a position that there could be no reasons that are not universally
shared.McIntyreseems sometimesalmostto suggest thata reasoncould not be a reasonif it were
universallyshared.Here,I am interestedin only those reasonsthatarenot. Foronly these pose a
challenge for the cosmopolitancall to be attentiveto difference.
30. For a characteristicallycogent reminderof how this works,see CharlesTaylor,"Leading
a Life," in Incommensurability,Incomparabilityand Practical Reason, ed. RuthChang (Cam-
bridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1997), 173.
31. Bruce Robbins,Secular Vocation(London:Verso, 1993), 211.
32. Perhaps I should clarify what I mean through some examples. For instance, Hindu
nationalism,in its contemporaryincarnation,has almostnothingto say abouta distinctiveHindu
way of life, about Hinduismas a site of alternativeuniversalitiesor ethical traditions,and so
forth.It simply has an obsession with "unity,"which is in the service of the modernnation-state
and the claim, following the venerablepedigree of John StuartMill, that nation-statesneed a
common culture.Most "identity"politics so-called, especially those not dealing with issues of
gender and sexuality, also do not defend an alternativeway of life. It is difficult to think of
Quebecois or Serbnationalismand doing that.Movementslike the Taliban,on the face of it, are
defendinga way of life. But it is not clear thatwhat they defend is an ongoing way of life of the
Afghan people ratherthan something inventedfor purposesof doctrinalpurity.
33. E. ValentineDaniel, CharredLullabies: Chaptersin the Anthropographyof Violence
(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1996), 202.
34. CorneliusCastoriadis,quoted in M. V. Moses, TheNovel and the Globalizationof Cul-
ture (New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1995), 3.
35. For a samplingof the debateon this, see FrederickBuell's very useful National Culture
and theNew GlobalSystem(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1994), chaps.7-12; Ulf
Hannerz,TransnationalConnections(London:Routledge, 1996).
36. Geertz, "TheUses of Diversity."

Pratap BhanuMehtais an associate professorof governmentand social studiesat Har-

vard University.His currentresearchproject,titledTakingPluralismSeriously,explores
the political implicationsof value pluralism.