THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CV 2017-03634
IN THE MATTER OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT, 2000
AND
IN THE MATTER OF PART 56 OF THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS RULES
1998 (AS AMENDED)
AND
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY
SHIVAUGHN RAMROOP
FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
1. THE DECISION AND/OR ACTION TO REVOKE THE GRANT OF
HIGHER QUALIFICATION FOR THE SPECIALTY CERTIFICATE IN
DERMATOLOGY (FEDERATION OF ROYAL COLLEGES OF
PHYSICIANS OF UK & BRITISH ASSOCIATION OF
DERMATOLOGISTS) HELD BY DR. SHIVAUGHN RAMROOP

BETWEEN
DR. SHIVAUGHN RAMROOP

APPLICANT/CLAIMANT
AND
THE MEDICAL BOARD OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT

Date of Delivery: October 12, 2018

Appearances:
Applicant/Claimant: Mr. Stefan Mungalsingh
Respondent/Defendant: Mr. Rajiv Persad
Instructed by Mr. Lionel Luckoo

JUDICIAL REVIEW

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[1] By Fixed Date Claim filed on the 16th October 2017 the Claimant sought
leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of the Medical Board
of Trinidad and Tobago (The Medical Board) dated 11th May 2016
revoking the grant of Higher Qualification regarding the Speciality
Certificate in Dermatology (Federation of Royal Colleges of Physicians
of UK and British Association of Dermatologists) held by the Applicant.

[2] The Applicant sought the following reliefs:

1. A declaration that the decision of the Medical Board made on or
about the 11th May 2016 revoking the grant of Higher
Qualification regarding the Speciality Certificate in Dermatology
(Federation of Royal Colleges of Physicians of UK and British
Association of Dermatologists) “the said Qualification” held by the
Applicant was and is ultra vires, invalid, contrary to law, null and
void;

2. An Order of mandamus restoring the grant of Higher

Qualification regarding the Speciality Certificate in Dermatology
(Federation of Royal Colleges of Physicians of UK and British
Association of Dermatologist) held by the Applicant;

3. Damages for loss of earning and or loss of opportunity for

promotion;

4. Costs.

[3] The Applicant relied upon on the following grounds in support of his
application for leave to apply for Judicial Review:

i. Deprivation of Legitimate Expectation

a. The Applicant reasonably expected that he would continue
to enjoy the benefit of having the Speciality Certificate in
Dermatology (Federation of Royal Colleges of Physicians of

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 UK and British Association of Dermatologists) qualification
recognised as a higher qualification under the Medical
Board Act Chap 29:50 until there had been rational
grounds for revoking the said higher qualification status
and he had been given an opportunity to comment before
such revocation.

ii. Bad Faith and Improper Motive

a. The revocation of the said Qualification status as a higher
qualification and re-classification as an additional
qualification was done to fraudulently and dishonestly
prevent the Applicant from automatically entering the
Medical Specialist Register via Pathway A which allows any
Medical Doctor with higher qualification to automatically
enter the Medical Specialist Register which is currently
being established.

iii. Illegality as a result of acting under dictation

a. The Council of the Medical Board of Trinidad and Tobago
ought to have based their decision as to the status of the
said Qualification on an exercise of independent judgment,
but instead the decision to revoke the higher qualification
status was dictated by those not entrusted with the power
to decide - that is, the Dermatological Society of Trinidad
and Tobago.

iv. Irrelevant Consideration/Unreasonableness

a. Whether the said Qualification is categorised by the
Dermatological Society of Trinidad and Tobago as a high
qualification is an irrelevant consideration which the
Council of the Medical Board of Trinidad and Tobago ought
not to have considered.

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 v. Unreasonable Process
a. The decision was a product of an unreasonable decision -
making process which did not balance the relevant
considerations and accorded manifestly inappropriate
weight to the opinions and/or classification of the
Dermatological Society of Trinidad and Tobago.

vi. Unreasonableness as a result of violations of common law

rights and constitutional protection
a. The Applicant’s constitutional right to equality before the
law has been infringed as medical doctors in other fields of
medicine continue to have their Speciality Certificates
recognised as High Qualification and there had been
discrimination to the class of medical doctors in the field
on Dermatology, including the Applicant.

BACKGROUND/CHRONOLOGY

[4] By letter dated 22nd July 2013, the Claimant sought clarification from
the Medical Board as to whether the Specialty Certificate Examination
(SCE) in Dermatology offered by the Federation of Royal Colleges of
Physicians in the UK (the said Qualification) would entitle him to
specialist status as a dermatologist in this jurisdiction. By letter dated
19th September 2013 the Secretary of the Medical Board advised the
Claimant that at its meeting on 11th September 2013, it had been
agreed that the SCE in Dermatology offered by the Federation of Royal
Colleges of Physicians of the United Kingdom will be recognised as an
Additional Qualification by the Medical Board. This inquiry was made
prior to the Applicant sitting the SCE in Dermatology for the said
Qualification.

[5] On the 31st March 2015 the Applicant submitted two applications to
the Medical Board:

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 i. To register with the Medical Board as an Additional Qualification
as Master of Science (with distinction) Dermatology Skills and
Treatment;
ii. To register with the Medical Board as a Higher Qualification, the
said Qualification

[6] Following a meeting of the Council of the Medical Board, by letter dated
9th April 2015, the Secretary of the Medical Board wrote to the Applicant
informing him that the said Qualification was recognised as a Higher
Diploma and it would be entered on the Register of Medical
Practitioners.

[7] In January 2016 the Medical Board met to consider further applications
from doctors, including holders of the said Qualification, requesting to
have their respective qualifications registered on the Register of Medical
Practitioners as a Higher Qualification. A decision was made to have
the Registration Committee review the said Qualification in order to
ensure that it was being properly categorised and applied in like
manner among all holders of the said Qualification. The Registration
Committee determined that the said Qualification had to be reviewed
by the Council of the Medical Board in order to assess whether the said
Qualification should be treated as a Higher Qualification or an
Additional Qualification.

[8] On April 1st 2016 the Council of the Medical Board, in the course of a
review of the said Qualification, sought the view and comments of the
Dermatological Society of Trinidad and Tobago. The Medical Board
received recommendations from the Dermatological Society of Trinidad
and Tobago on the 5th April 2016, and at the monthly meeting of the
Council of the Medical Board on the 11th May 2016, the
recommendations of the Dermatological Society were tabled for
discussion. Following these discussions, the Council, by letter dated
16th May 2016 advised the Applicant of the revocation of its decision for

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 the grant of Higher Qualification status for the Specialty Certificate in
Dermatology (Federation of Royal Colleges of Physicians in the UK and
British Association of Dermatology) the Defendant advised the Claimant
that the said Qualification will now be recorded as an Additional
Qualification (the said Decision). The Council also requested that the
Applicant return the original letters sent him by the Medical Board at
the earliest opportunity.

[9] On the 18th July 2016 the Claimant wrote to the Council of the Medical
Board requesting information regarding the said Decision1. By letter
dated 22nd August 2016 the Medical Board advised the Claimant that
the requests contained in his letter of 18th July 2016 would be tabled
and dealt with at the September 2016 meeting of the Council of the
Medical Board. By letter dated 31st January 20172 the Council of the
Medical Board wrote to the Claimant in response to his letter of the 18th
July 2016 seeking clarification of the said decision made by the Board
made on 11th May 2016. In that letter the Board advised that the
reconsideration of the said Qualification arose out of enquiries made by
other physicians. The Board also revealed that the decision by the
Council to revoke the said Qualification as a Higher Qualification and
to re-categorise it as an Additional Qualification was based on the fact
that the Speciality Certificate was not recognised as a Higher
Qualification by the Dermatological Society of Trinidad and Tobago.
Significantly, the Medical Board disclosed to the Applicant that all

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1. What led to this matter being discussed at the monthly council meeting on 11 th May 2016? Additionally, if
this was on the agenda to be discussed, why was I not invited to this meeting? 2. What was the rationale for no
longer recognising this qualification as a Higher Qualification? 3. Did the other person or persons (I know of at
least one other individual with this registered as a Higher Qualification in Dermatology) with the said
qualifications, which were previously registered as Higher Qualifications also have them downgraded to
Additional Qualification? 4. Are all Speciality Certificates (from the Federation of the Royal Colleges of
Physicians) in other field such as Respiratory Medicine, Neurology and Gastroenterology which were previously
registered as Higher Qualification downgraded to Additional qualification prior to this in Trinidad and Tobago?
5. Has anyone ever had a Higher Qualification downgraded to Additional qualification prior to this in Trinidad
and Tobago 6. On what exact date did the above qualification stopped being recognised as a Higher
Qualification? Please note that even though the letter was dated 16th May 2016, it was not received until 8th
June 2016.
2
‘T.S.4’

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 Specialty Certificates in Dermatology were revoked and recognised as
Additional Qualifications, and that over the past twelve months the
Board had downgraded other medical professionals with the said
speciality certificates from Higher Qualifications to Additional
Qualifications in areas outside of dermatology.

[10] The Applicant sent a Pre Action Protocol letter to the Defendant on 22nd
May 2017 and this letter was responded to on the 25th May 2017. There
was further communication between attorneys for the parties until the
12th July 2017 when it was agreed that the parties would convene a
meeting in order to amicably resolve the matter. On the 8th August 2017
the parties met. The Medical Board, by email dated 15th August 2017
to the Applicant and his attorney, advised that the Applicant make an
application to the Subcommittee on Specialities in an effort to have that
committee consider whether the Applicant’s qualifications and training
would entitle him to have said qualification classified as a Higher
Qualification in the area of Dermatology. The Applicant did not make
any such application. By email dated 21st August 2017, Counsel for the
Applicant responded by requesting the names of all members of the
subcommittee assigned to determine the Applicant’s application for
reconsideration of his Qualification prior to his deciding whether to
make any appeal to that subcommittee. Further, the Applicant, through
his Counsel, asked that the Medical Board provide the objective
standard for Speciality Qualifications in the field of Dermatology.

[11] The Applicant acknowledged that this application for leave was filed
outside of the three month limit specified by s.11(1) of the Judicial
Review Act and Rule 56.3 of the Civil Proceedings Rules (As
Amended) (CPR), since the said three month time limit to review the
decision would have expired on the 11th August 2016. Notwithstanding
this fact, the Applicant contended that the delay was not unreasonable
and there was good reason for extending the period within which the
application was made.

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DELAY

[12] Delay in filing an Application for Leave to apply for Judicial Review,
especially where an Order of Certiorari is sought, may operate as a bar
to the grant of such relief. In light of this, it is necessary to determine
this issue before considering the question of leave.

THE LAW

[13] In Devant Maharaj v National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and

Tobago3 Bereaux JA opined:

“[3] The objection of the respondent was to the fact that the
appellant had not acted promptly. Lack of promptness
raises a different consideration under section 11(1) of the
Act. It is not linked to questions of substantial prejudice or
hardship to third parties or detriment to good
administration.
[4] It is important to note that section 11 deals only with the
application for leave. It does not address the refusal of relief
after leave has been given to file for judicial review. The
threshold is that the application must be filed:
(i) promptly and
(ii) in any event not later than three months after the
grounds for making the claim arose.

Promptness is the governing concern. If there is a failure to

act promptly or within three months there is undue or
unreasonable delay. Speed and expedition are at the heart
of judicial review. See Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v. Mackman
[1983] 2 AC 237 at 284. See also Auburn, Moffett and

3
Civ App No 115 of 2011 para 3-5

8
 Sharland on Judicial Review (First edition, 2013) at page
602, paragraph 26.30 which refers to CPR 54.5 of the
English CPR. CPR 54.5 refers to the “claim form” being filed
“promptly” and “not later than 3 months” but other than
that there is no major difference in wording between that
rule and section 11(1).

[5] Once there is a lack of promptitude there must be a good

reason shown for extending the period within which the
application shall be made. If there is no good reason leave
will more than likely be refused. It is unnecessary to add to
Smith JA’s judgment at paragraphs 14 and 15 as to what
constitutes good reason.”

[14] In Devant Maharaj v National Energy Corporation of

Trinidad and Tobago4 supra Smith JA stated:

14. The grant of this extension of time is not an arbitrary

process. It is left to the discretion of a judge who can grant
an extension “for good reason”. The courts have also
developed and expanded upon this concept of good reason
in a way that ensures a balance between good
administration and the vindication of rights.

15. Indeed in the decision of Abzal Mohammed v Police

Service Commission4 at paragraph 25, Kangaloo JA noted
the wide breadth and scope of this concept of good reasons
in judicial review by citing 6 of the common considerations
that guide “good reason”. In addition he recognized that
there is also the exceptional case where a court can grant
an extension of time even if a claimant failed to show good

4
Civ App No 115 of 2011 para 14, 15

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reason. I quote at length the paragraph since it is a pithy
summation of this expansive concept of “good reason”.
19. In summary therefore, Sections 11(1) and (2) of the JRA
recognize a primary time limit of 3 months for applying for
leave. If more than 3 months have passed since the making
of the decision and/or the application is not otherwise
prompt, the applicant must seek and obtain an extension of
time to apply for leave. The applicant must show “a good
reason for the extension.” Even if a good reason is shown
to overcome the 3 month time bar or the requirement of
promptness, then by Section 11(2), a Court still retains a
residual discretion to refuse leave to apply for judicial
review if the granting of leave would be likely to cause
hardship or prejudice or detriment to good administration.

“25. The question of what amounts to a good reason is the

subject in many cases all of which are set out in the texts
dealing with Judicial Review. It is sufficient to say that
among the factors to be taken into account are (a) length of
delay (b) reason for delay (c) prospect of success (d) degree
of prejudice (e) overriding principle that justice is to be done
and (f) importance of the issues involved in the challenge.
This is not an exhaustive list of factors. It is to be noted that
R v London Borough of Newham exp Ajayi (1996) 28HLR
suggests that in an exceptional case, the Court may
entertain judicial review even though the claimant has
failed to show a good reason for extending time. This was
a case dealt with under the old RSC Order 53 r (4)(1) in
England, which is what is replicated in S.11(1) of the
Judicial Review Act, 2000 as set out above.” 5 (footnotes
omitted)

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 26. Third, the interpretation as proffered in the Fishermen
and Friends of the Sea case is consonant with both the
parent Act (the JRA) and the CPR since it preserves both (a)
the time filter provided in the Act and the Rules of Court and
(b) the discretion of the trial judge to balance the needs of
good administration and the need to avoid creating a
stymie on deserving applications.

29. It is important to remember that in this case, the parties

had agreed that the only factors for the judge to consider
were delay and costs. Having found that this was a clear
case where there was unreasonable delay in bringing the
application for leave (a decision I agree with), the trial judge
could rightfully have exercised his discretion to set aside
his earlier grant of leave. Further, in arriving at that
conclusion, the trial judge did not accept that there was a
good explanation or reason for the delay. Having thus
decided the matters that the parties had agreed to submit
to him, for consideration, he was not bound to go on to
consider detriment and prejudice as further grounds for
refusing leave.

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

[15] The issues that fall for my determination are, firstly, whether the
Applicant acted promptly in filing this claim for leave – that is, within
three months of the impugned decision; secondly, whether there was
undue or unreasonable delay in filing this application.

[16] On the facts of this case this application for leave was not made
promptly. The decision complained of was made on the 11th May 2016

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 and the application was filed one year and five months thereafter. The
reasons given by the Applicant for the late filing of his application were5:
1. That he attempted to settle the claim without instituting
proceedings;
2. extreme delay by the Respondent in responding to his letters;
3. the fact that the Applicant was recognised as a holder of a Higher
Qualification by the Respondent at its Annual General Meeting
held on the 24th August 2016.

Was there good reason for the delay in filing this application

[17] The length of delay in this case certainly demands a good explanation.
It is to be noted that while the three month period for bringing an
application for Judicial Review does not amount to a limitation period,
the reason for setting a time frame is an acknowledgment that public
authorities must be allowed to implement decisions for the good
administration of the bodies or entities that they manage, taking into
account the timely challenge to decisions made. Late challenges long
after decisions have been implemented for which there is no good
reason will serve to undermine this principle.

[18] I do not consider that the Intended Defendant’s delay in replying to the
Applicant’s correspondence a good reason for delay in filing these
proceedings. The Claimant would have been notified of the said decision
by the Intended Defendant since May 2016. It ought to have been
apparent that he if intended to challenge this decision that he had to
move with some urgency. In any event by the 31st January 2017 he had
received the clarification that he sought on the said decision from the
Intended Respondent. Nothing prevented him at that stage from filing
his application whilst discussions were continuing.

5
Application for Leave to file Judicial Review para. 14 dated 16th October 2017

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Attempts to settle the claim without instituting proceedings

[19] There is no evidence before me of attempts to settle this claim amicably

until after the Claimant’s Pre Action Protocol Letter in May 2017, some
twelve months after the said decision had been made. Up to that time
no concrete steps had been taken by the Intended Applicant to progress
his claim or to enter into any discussions with the Intended Defendant
in relation to same. I do not consider that any discussions at this stage
can amount to good reason for the delay.

[20] The fact that the minutes of the Annual General Meeting of the Medical
Board reflected that in 2015 the Applicant was one of several doctors
granted a Higher Qualification cannot amount to a good reason for
failing to file the application promptly since:
a) he had been notified in May 2016 that the Medical Board had
revoked the Higher Qualification granted him in May 2015;
b) the minutes could not reasonably, therefore form the basis for the
Applicant believing that the said Qualification had been
reinstated.

[21] In the circumstances I hold that no good reason exists for the delay in
filing the application herein.

Legitimate Expectation

[22] The Applicant was supplied with the reason for the said Decision about
eight months after it had been made - in January 2017. Prior to
pursuing the course of study for the Qualification, he had been advised
that it would be considered an Additional Qualification ad not a Higher
Qualification. The Medical Board sought to resolve the matter by having
discussions with the Intended Applicant and his attorney. The
discussions were held and culminated in an offer by the Intended

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 Defendant to reassess the Applicant’s Qualification upon his
application – which the latter refused.

[23] Having regard to the reasons given for the said decision which was
applied across the board to all persons with a similar Qualification, the
opportunity for consultation, albeit after the said decision was made,
and the offer to reconsider the Applicant’s Qualification, I hold that the
Applicant had not established that there is an arguable ground with a
realistic prospect of success on this ground.

Bad Faith/Improper Motive

[24] The Applicant has adduced no evidence to support this ground. The
reasons for the said decision were clearly outlined to the Applicant in
January 2017. I consider that those reasons – concerns raised by other
physicians especially the Dermatological Society about the said
Qualification, do not amount to bad faith/improper motive. For this
reason this ground must fail since it does not amount to an arguable
ground with a realistic prospect of success.

[25] Ground 3 (iii-vi) will be considered together.

[26] There is no evidence that the Intended Defendant:

a) failed to exercise independent judgment on the status of the said
Qualification. Medical practice encompasses a broad range of
Specialities/sub specialities. It is entirely reasonable that the
council, which comprise doctors, should respond to an inquiry
raised by doctors of a particular speciality with respect to the
issue of qualification for that speciality. Indeed, the process by
which the Medical Council arrived at the said decision outlined
in the affidavit of Terrence Seemungal does not support an
arguable case with a reasonable prospect of success that the
Council acted under the dictation of the Dermatological Society.

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 b) arrived at an unreasonable decision or took irrelevant
considerations into account. As stated above, the process
adopted by the Council was reasonable in all the circumstances.

c) singled out the Applicant in revoking his Higher Qualification

status while allowing doctors in other fields to continue to
recognise their Specialty Certificate as Higher Qualification.
Indeed, the exact opposite was stated in the Intended Defendant’s
letter to the Applicant dated 31st January 20176. The Applicant
has adduced no evidence to contradict the Intended Defendant’s
assertion that all doctors with similar certificates had their
Higher Qualification revoked. This ground also fails to meet the
test.

CONCLUSION

[27] The Application for Leave is hereby dismissed by reason of inordinate

delay in breach of s 11(1) and (2) of the Judicial Review Act.

Joan Charles
Judge

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‘T.S.4’

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