THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015

ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 21, 2012 Decision,1 as effectively
reiterated in the October 31, 2012 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Crim. Case Nos. 28259-60, finding and declaring herein
petitioner Albert G. Ambagan, Jr. (Ambagan), among others, guilty of the crime of double homicide by inducement for the deaths of SPO2 Reynaldo
Santos (Santos) and Domingo Bawalan.chanrobleslaw

The Facts

On April 6, 2005, two (2) Informations were filed charging petitioner Ambagan, together with Domingo H. Villasis, Michael T. Malabanan, Celestino
"Ely" B. Garcia, Alberto C. Angcanan, Juanito S. Loyola, Melanio S. Bayot, Rosendo V. Causaren, Flor R. Amparo, Reo A. Rojales, and Roger V.
Causaren, for two (2) counts of homicide, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 28259

That on the 5th day of July 2004, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Amadeo, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ALBERTO AMBAGAN, JR. y GARCES, a public officer being the Municipal Mayor of Amadeo,
Cavite, and committing the offense herein charged in relation to his Office as such, specifically in overseeing and maintaining peace and order in his
municipality, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously induce, command and order accused DOMINGO VILLASIS y
HARION, MICHAEL MALABANAN y TIBAYAN, ELY GARCIA, and ROGER CAUSAREN, all public officers being the Barangay Captain of Barangay 5,
Amadeo, Cavite, Sangguniang Member of Amadeo, Cavite, and members of Civil Security Unit of Amadeo, Cavite, respectively, to attack, assault and
shoot SPO2 REYNALDO SANTOS, and by reason thereof, accused DOMINGO VILLASIS y HARION, MICHAEL MALABANAN y TIBAYAN, ELY GARCIA,
ROGER CAUSAREN, oblige, follow and execute said command and order by then and there firing and shooting at SPO2 REYNALDO SANTOS with their
firearms hitting the latter/victim on the head and different parts of his body and inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his
instantaneous death and which act of the aforenamed accused was perpetrated in the presence of accused ALBERTO ANGCANAN y CAUSAREN,
JUANITO LOYOLA y SAMIANO, MELANIO BAYOT y SUMAGUI ROSENDO CAUSAREN, FLOR AMPARO, and REO ROJALES, who are likewise public
officers being members of Civil Security Unit of Amadeo, Cavite, who gave moral support to accused ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., DOMINGO H.
VILLASIS, MICHAEL T. MALABANAN, ELY GARCIA, and ROGER CAUSAREN to commit the crime of homicide to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim in such amount as may be proved in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Criminal Case No. 28260

That on the 5th day of July 2004, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Amadeo, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ALBERTO AMBAGAN, JR. y GARCES, a public officer being the Municipal Mayor of Amadeo,
Cavite, and committing the offense herein charged in relation to his Office as such, specifically in overseeing and maintaining peace and order in his
municipality, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously induce, command and order accused DOMINGO VILLASIS y
HARION, MICHAEL MALABANAN y TIBAYAN, ELY GARCIA, and ROGER CAUSAREN, all public officers being the Barangay Captain of Barangay 5,
Amadeo, Cavite, Sangguniang Member of Amadeo, Cavite, and members of Civil Security Unit of Amadeo, Cavite, respectively, to attack, assault and
shoot DOMINGO BAWALAN, and by reason thereof, accused DOMINGO VILLASIS y HARION, MICHAEL MALABANAN y TIBAYAN, ELY GARCIA, ROGER
CAUSAREN, oblige, follow and execute said command and order by then and there firing and shooting at DOMINGO BAWALAN with their firearms
hitting the latter/victim on the head and different parts of his body and inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his instantaneous
death and which act of the aforenamed accused was perpetrated in the presence of accused ALBERTO ANGCANAN y CAUSAREN, JUANITO LOYOLA y
SAMIANO, MELANIO BAYOT y SUMAGUI, ROSENDO CAUSAREN, FLOR AMPARO, and REO ROJALES, who are likewise public officers being members
of Civil Security Unit of Amadeo, Cavite, who gave moral support to accused ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., DOMINGO H. VILLASIS, MICHAEL T.
MALABANAN, ELY GARCIA, and ROGER CAUSAREN to commit the crime of homicide to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such
amount as may be proved in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At the time the Informations were filed, petitioner Ambagan was already on his second consecutive term as municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite,
having been elected to the same post during the 2001 National and Local Elections.5 As mayor with salary allocation of grade 27,6 the cases against
him and his fellow accused were filed with the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Republic Act No. 8249.7 Ambagan eventually ran and won for a
third term in 2007, and was subsequently elected as member of the provincial board of Cavite.8

Arraigned on August 11, 2005, petitioner and his co-accused, except for Domingo H. Villasis who earlier passed away, pleaded not guilty to the
offenses charged.9 Thereafter, joint trial ensued for the related cases. For its part, the prosecution offered in evidence the testimonies of the
following witnesses: Benigno M. Cabillo, Group Director (GD) of the Cavite Police Provincial Mobile Group;10Edgardo R. Mamuyac, a Patrol and
Traffic Officer of the General Trias Police Station;11Regina B. Salazar, barangay captain of Banay-banay, Amadeo, Cavite;12Lervin Causaren, son of
Leandro Causaren who in turn is one of the casualties in the July 5, 2004 shooting incident;13Victor J. Patam (Patam), a policeman who was present
at the scene of the crime at the time of the shooting incident;14Ronnel Bawalan, brother of Domingo Bawalan who claimed to have personally
witnessed the incident;15Donato T. Malimban, a policeman who reported to the crime scene to investigate;16Guillermo L. Poblete, a laboratory
technician assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Cavite;17Lorenzo V. Balbuena, Assistant Chief Investigator IV of the Amadeo Municipal Police
Station;18Roger Delgado, team leader of the SOCO and a forensic examiner;19Roy A. Camarillo, a doctor of medicine working with the PNP;20Lorna
R. Tria, chief of the Chemistry Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory;21Jupri C. Delantar, Forensic Chemical Officer of Batangas Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office;22Ernesto L. Olaes, the police officer who collected the statements taken in connection with the shooting incident;23Roberto
Soriano, chief of PUB Cavite Provincial Police Office;24Erlinda Bawalan, widow of Domingo Bawalan;25 and Editha Santos, widow of Reynaldo
Santos.26

Of special relevance to the instant petition are the accounts of Patam and Ronnel Bawalan, the only two among the prosecution witnesses who
claimed that they were present or within the proximate vicinity of the crime scene. Their testimonies, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Victor J. Patam, a policeman. He testified that on July 4, 2004 at 1:00 in the afternoon, he. with Domingo Bawalan, went to Barangay Litlit, Silang,
Cavite, to attend the birthday party of his son's kumpadre. From Litlit, they then proceeded at 5:00 in the afternoon to the house of Edgardo
Mamuyac for the birthday party of Mamuyac's son, where they had singing spree and a little drink. They stayed there until 11:00 in the evening.

Upon reaching Barangay Biclatan, General Trias, Cavite, Patam received a call from Reynaldo Santos who was at Mamuyac's place. Santos requested
Patam to go back to Mamuyac's house which was already closed, as Santos had no companion there. Santos arrived late because he came from a
follow-up operation in Maragondon, Cavite.

When Patam and Domingo returned to the place of Mamuyac, they saw Santos in front of his Space Gear van. After a little chat, Patam invited
Santos and Domingo to go home. Domingo rode with Santos, while Patam took his own car. Santos and Domingo left ahead of him.

Upon reaching the boundary of Tamacan and Banay-banay, he saw the van of Santos parked at the side of the street behind another van whose
owner he did not know. He likewise saw Ronnel Bawalan, the brother of Domingo, standing at their gate, looking at the direction of the vehicles
parked.

Patam parked his car behind Santos' van and alighted therefrom. Immediately, Santos handed him a baby annalite, which according to Santos, he
got from Mayor Ambagan's men. Patam placed the baby annalite at the driver's seat of his car. When he returned to where Santos was, the latter
ordered the four apprehended men to line up at the other side of the street. Two of them put down their short firearms upon the order of Santos.
After telling the group to step away from the firearms. Santos came near the firearms, but without touching them. Thereafter, Santos phoned
Superintendent Cabillo and informed him of what happened.

While Santos was talking to Cabillo, somebody called Patam "Kuya Taring." Patam recognized him to be Alberto Angcanan. Patam told them to just
stay put and they would help them after Cabillo had arrived. After a few minutes. Mayor Ambagan arrived.

Patam went near Mayor Ambagan and greeted him. The Mayor greeted him back, and asked who was at the other side. Patam told him that it was
Reynaldo Santos, a policeman. Mayor Ambagan then told Santos, "Rey, baka pwede namang pag-usapan nalin yan kung amiman yang problema."
Santos replied, "Mayor, wala na hong desisyon akong magagawa dito. Intayin niyo si GD. Siya na lang ang kakausapin ninyo." Repeatedly, the Mayor
made the same request to Santos, but Santos gave him the same answer. Patam felt that the situation was heating up, so he asked Mayor Ambagan
to go to the house of Patam's cousin, Miling Javier.

While Patam was pushing Mayor Ambagan, who was angry and cursing Santos, to Javier's house, Patam heard the first gunshot emanating from
where he and the Mayor were, but did not see anything when he looked back. The Mayor wanted to go back to see what happened to his men.
Patam also wanted to go back to his companions, so he left the Mayor with Alberto Angcanan and Rosendo Causaren. However, Patam's gun fell,
thus, he instead proceeded to the house of his brother near the place of the incident. While he was already near his brother's house. Patam saw
three men with long firearms - two at the back of his car and the other one in front of the MB 100 van. all firing towards the south direction where
he left Rey. Upon reaching the house of his brother, he asked his niece Susan Patam to call the police. Patam was not able to get out of his brother's
house anymore, because he was prevented by his mother and brother, as he might be suspected of being responsible for the killing. Patam called
the chief of Police of General Trias. Cavite, Chief Inspector Portento, to fetch him because his life was in danger. On July 5, 2004, he executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay and Karagdagang Salaysay.

Ronnel Bawalan, brother of Domingo Bawalan and cousin-in-law of Reynaldo Santos, he testified that on July 5, 2004 at around 12:00 midnight, he
parked his passenger jeepney at his garage, and prepared it for the next day's use. When he was about to sleep, at around 1:00 o'clock in the
morning. Santos riding in his vehicle with Domingo, entered the garage. They asked if they could hire his jeepney the following day. When he
agreed, Ronnel guided them from the garage to the road. While outside answering a call of nature. Ronnel looked towards the south direction and
he saw Santos and Domingo about less than 100 meters from him park the van and alight from their vehicle. He also saw the car of Patam parked
behind Santos' vehicle. He crossed the road and walked towards them. When he was already near them, he heard Santos saying to the four men
from the van parked in front of Santos' vehicle. "Dyan lang kayo, wag kayong aalis." Upon hearing this, he went to Domingo and inquired why Santos
was asking these men to get out of the van. Domingo told him that these men were carrying firearms.

While Ronnel and Domingo were standing at the right front side of the parked van. Ronnel heard a sound of a radio coming from the four men
accosted by Santos. At that time, Santos was in the middle of the road, making a call from his cellphone. Thereafter, Mayor Ambagan with his
bodyguards carrying long firearms arrived. Mayor Ambagan told Santos that they should just talk it out whatever the problem was.

When Domingo saw the Mayor, he directed Ronnel to leave the place as it was dangerous, and shoved him away. Ronnel walked a few meters
towards the southern direction and hid, lying flat on his belly behind the bushes at the entrance of an old poultry house. Being approximately 10 to
15 meters from where Santos was standing, he heard Santos say to Mayor Ambagan, "Hintayin nalang natin si GD at sa kanya ka nalang makiusap."
Santos did not agree. From a calm voice when he made his first request. Mayor Ambagan's voice became loud and angry when Santos many times
turned him down. At that time, Patam was just an arm's length between Santos and Mayor Ambagan.

Then, Ronnel heard the Mayor say, "Sige yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama, banatan na ninyo yan." After the mayor had uttered these words,
Ronnel heard a gunfire from Rene Amparo in the direction of Santos. The men of Mayor Ambagan (referring to Rene Amparo, Domingo Villasis,
Michael Malabanan, Ely Garcia, and Roger Causaren) were spread along the road, firing their guns at Santos and Domingo. After several gunshots
that lasted for about five minutes, he saw Mayor Ambagan's men board their vehicles and left in the direction of Amadeo, after taking the guns from
Santos and Domingo.

Ronnel quickly went home and told his parents that his brother just got killed. They went to the place of incident after the policemen had arrived.
On July 27, 2004, he executed a Salaysay. It took him long to give a statement because he feared for his life and his
family's.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The defense, on the other hand, offered the testimonies of accused Roger V. Causaren,28Celestino "Ely" B. Garcia,29Alberto C. Angcanan,30Juanito
S. Loyola,31Melanio S. Bayot,32 and that of petitioner Ambagan to refute the charges leveled against them. The Sandiganbayan recapitulated
petitioner's testimony in the following wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Albert G. Ambagan. Jr., Mayor of the Municipality of Amadeo, Cavite, at the time material to these cases and one of the accused. He testified that
during the last week of June to the first week of July of 2004, they encountered robbery (akyat-bahay) and theft occurrences in their place. Robbers
went inside houses, aimed guns at the households and robbed them. One of the victims was the Angcanan family.

In order to address the problems, he met with the policemen, the barangay captains, the committee on peace and order, and the chiefs of barangay
tanods, where they decided to form a ronda team, to be composed of civilian groups, barangay officials, and policemen. The team would conduct
regular patrol in the Municipality to prevent crimes, and maintain peace and order.
In the afternoon of July 4, 2004, on his way home from a wake of a relative, he received a text message from Barangay Captain Gina Salazar of
Banay-banay, Amadeo saying, "Humanda kayo. May mangyari sa inyo mamyang gabi." So, he called Salazar and told her that he would send
policemen, volunteers, and the ronda team to her barangay. He just needed to bring his fiancee to Manila, but would be back later.

From Manila, Mayor Ambagan went directly to Salazar's place, then to the police station where he was told that the policemen and the ronda team
were to bring a motorcycle rider accosted earlier. At the station, he was informed that the owner of the motorcycle was freed, because there was no
basis that the apprehended person was a suspected robber. So, he went back to the house of Salazar. At about 11:30 to 11:40 in the evening, while
he was having a conversation with the officials of Banay-banay, he received a radio call from Alberto Angcanan, through Rene Amparo, saying that
Santos was harassing the group of Angcanan. He was calling the police when Rene called again telling him, "Nagpaputok na Mayor kailangan po kayo
dito at maayos po lahat ito kung kayo'y nandito." Being the mayor and considering that those who were being harassed were his constituents, he
thought he needed to go to them even if he was fearful.

On board his Isuzu Trooper, he went to the boundary of Banay-banay and Tamacan, with the Chair of the Peace and Order Committee Michael
Malabanan, his friend Leandro Causaren, and his driver Ariel Mendoza. When they arrived, he saw his MB 100 van at the left side of the road, and
two cars parked at the back of the van. On the right side of the road were Angcanan, Juanito Loyola, Melanio Bayot, and Edrelin John Jamon, with
Santos pointing a gun at the group. Domingo Bawalan was standing beside the car holding a long firearm. Santos was wearing a sando and short
pants, while Domingo was wearing a t-shirt and maong pants. Both looked drunk.

He told Mendoza to park far from the area, and his companions to stay in the vehicle as he would go down alone to pacify the situation. Victorino
Patam approached him and apologized for the altercation that happened between Angcanan's and Santos' groups. He went near Santos and asked
the latter to just settle the issue because anyway all of them were one in trying to solve the robbery in their place, and pleaded him to put the gun
down. But Santos with his gun still pointing at the group of Angcanan and waiving his cellphone, responded that he instead should talk to "GD." He
continued pleading for Santos to put down his gun and to just talk out the issue as the Amadeo police were already coming. But Santos moved near
him and pointed the gun at him. At that moment, Rene grappled the gun from Santos. He heard a gunshot and saw Rene fall to the ground.
Angcanan, Patam and Loyola embraced and ushered him to the house of Miling Javier, while he was shouting to bring Rene to the hospital. Then, he
heard a series of gunshots. He hurriedly called the police who said that they were already coming.

After the gunshots had stopped, he heard the vehicles from outside leaving. Worried that they had nothing to ride on, he called his house after they
left Javier's house through the backdoor. They were picked up by a vehicle by the mango tree in Banay-banay. When they arrived at his house, he
made a phone call to Provincial Director Col. Rosales instead of Amadeo police because its Chief, Major Aspiras, was not around. At Col. Rosales'
office, Angcanan, Bayot and Loyola were separately investigated and underwent a paraffin test. He did not know about Mendoza who just left the
Isuzu Trooper in front of his (Ambagan) house.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ester D. Amparo34 and Ariel A. Mendoza,35 the late Rene Amparo's mother and petitioner Ambagan's driver, respectively, likewise took the witness
stand to corroborate the testimonies of those charged.

In rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimony of Reynaldo D. De Guzman as an expert witness, being the Chief of Firearms and Identification
Division of the Philippine National Police, Camp Crame since 1994.36

In the Decision now on appeal, the Sandiganbayan made the following findings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the evening of July 4, 2004, before the shooting incident happened, accused Roger V. Causaren (Roger), Michael T. Malabanan, Celestino (Ely)
Garcia, Flor Amparo (Flor), Domingo Villasis, and the deceased Leandro Causaren (Leandro), were at the place of Barangay Captain Gina B. Salazar in
Banay-banay, Amadeo, Cavite, to address a robbery threat to the barangay. When two suspicious speeding motorcycles passed by they all dashed to
catch them. Leandro drove the MB 100 van. Villasis the barangay patrol owner-type jeep, and Flor, his owner-type jeep.

Hours later, accused Mayor Albert G. Ambagan went to Salazar's place. Not long enough. Leandro followed him after purportedly having turned over
to the police station one of the two motorcycles they had chased earlier.

Meanwhile, the victim Reynaldo Santos coming from a police station in Maragondon, Cavite, went to Edgardo R. Mamuyac's house. Since Mamuyac
was already asleep, Santos called Victorino J. Patam who was with the victim Domingo Bawalan, for company. After a little chat outside Mamuyac's
house, at past 11:00 in the evening, the three decided to go home. Domingo rode with Santos in the latter's Space Gear van, while Patam drove his
Toyota Corolla car. Santos went ahead of Patam, although both took the southern direction going to Barangay Tamacan.

When Santos and Domingo reached the boundary of Tamacan and Banay-banay (after passing by the latter's parents' house and having a short talk
with Ronnel Bawalan), they came across an MB 100 van owned by Mayor Ambagan, parked at the right side of the road facing south (Poblacion of
Amadeo). Santos positioned and parked his vehicle at the back of the MB 100 van, and as soon as he has alighted, ordered the four men armed with
long and short firearms to get out from the van and line up at the other side (left) of the street. These men turned out to be Alberto C. Angcanan,
Juanito S. Loyola, Melanio S. Bayot, and the deceased Edrelin John Jamon.

Santos Called Superintendent Cabillo, referred to as "GD," to inform him of the situation. Cabillo said that he was coming. On the other hand,
Angcanan called Mayor Ambagan, through Rene Amparo, over the two-way radio saying that Santos apprehended him and his companions.
Thereupon, Mayor Ambagan, Leandro, and Rene boarded the Mayor's Isuzu Trooper and headed to Tamacan where the group of Angcanan was.

When Mayor Ambagan arrived at the place of the incident, he approached Santos and requested the latter that they just settle whatever the
problem was. But Santos replied that the Mayor should just wait for GD. While Santos and Mayor Ambagan were talking, Rene Amparo went near
Santos. Mayor Ambagan repeatedly made the same request, but Santos stood pat and rejected the Mayor's requests. Mayor Ambagan then got
angry and said: "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo iyan." Thereupon, the first gunshot was fired, followed by successive
gunshots from the men of Mayor Ambagan, namely, Michael Malabanan, Ely Garcia, and Roger Causaren. The shooting incident which lasted for
about five minutes left five men dead - Leandro, Rene, Jamon, Santos, and Domingo. The first, three were from the group of Mayor
Ambagan.37ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In its June 21, 2012 Decision in Crim. Case Nos. 28259-60, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner, among others, of the crime of double homicide,
thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 28259, accused ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., and accused MICHAEL T. MALABANAN, CELESTINO "ELY" B. GARCIA, and ROGER V.
CAUSAREN are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide for the death of Reynaldo Santos, the first as principal by inducement, and the
rest as principal by direct participation, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
minimum, to Twelve (12) years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.

Further, the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Reynaldo S. Santos, the following
damages:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The sum of P787,875.00 as reimbursement for the burial and funeral expenses:

(c) The sum of P1,647,979.32 as compensatory damages; and

(d) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. In Criminal Case No. 28260, accused ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., MICHAEL T. MALABANAN, CELESTINO "ELY" B. GARCIA, and ROGER V. CAUSAREN
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide for the death of Domingo Bawalan, the first as principal by inducement, and the rest as
principal by direct participation, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.

Further, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Domingo Bawalan the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;cralawlawlibrary

b. The sum of P40,000.00 as actual damages;cralawlawlibrary

c. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Finally, in Criminal Cases No. 28259 and No. 28260, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be applied to all the award of damages from the
finality of judgment until fully paid.

3. In Criminal Cases No. 28259 and No. 28260, accused ALBERTO C. ANGCANAN, JUANITO S. LOYOLA, MELANIO S. BAYOT, FLOR AMPARO and
ROSENDO V. CAUSAREN are hereby ACQUITTED, for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, no civil liability is assessed against said accused.

The hold departure order issued against them by reason of these cases are hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and their bonds RELEASED.

SO ORDERED.38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In holding petitioner criminally liable as principal by inducement for the deaths of Santos and Domingo Bawalan, the Sandiganbayan gave credence
to Ronnel Bawalan's testimony that it was Amabagan's utterance ("Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan"), which
impelled his men to aim and shoot at the victims.39

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted ruling.40 The Sandiganbayan, however, would deny petitioner's motion through
its assailed October 31, 2012 Resolution.

Hence the instant petition.chanrobleslaw

The Issue

Petitioner Ambagan seeks reversal of the Sandiganbayan's judgment on the following assignment of errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE COURT A QUO GRAVEEY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION'S 2 MAIN WITNESSES (RONNEL BAWALAN AND
VICTORINO PATAM) ARE IRRECONCILABLY CONTRADICTORY TO EACH OTHER.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FAILING TO RECONCILE ITS CONCLUSIONS WITH THE FACTS THAT 3 OF MAYOR'S MEN DIED IN THE
FIREFIGHT AND THE DECEASED AMPARO TESTED NEGATIVE OF GUNPOWDER.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT EVEN CONSIDERING THAT DECEASED SANTOS AND BAWALAN WERE DRUNK (WHICH CONDITION MADE
THEM MORE DARING, ARROGANT, AND ASSERTIVE) AND THAT IT IS ALSO A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT IT WAS SPO1 DOMINGO BAWALAN WHO FIRED
THE FIRST SHOT.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING COMPELLING INDICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (FROM RONNEL BAWALAN'S OWN
TESTIMONY) THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE VERY SCENE OF THE CRIME.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE TIME-SEQUENCE AND DISTANCE FACTORS BELIE WITNESS RONNEL
BAWALAN'S CLAIM THAT ACCUSED MAYOR AMBAGAN GAVE ANY ORDER TO SHOOT.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APRPECIATING THE FACT - THAT MAYOR AMBAGAN IS STILL ALIVE - INDUBITABLY PROVES THAT HE DID
NOT MAKE ANY ORDER TO SHOOT.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT WITNESS PATAM'S TESTIMONY (OR LACK OF IT) NEGATES THE CLAIM THAT MAYOR
AMBAGAN MADE ANY ORDER TO SHOOT.

WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED FOR DOUBLE HOMICIDE.

WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. CONSPIRED WITH OTHER ACCUSED FOR THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. CAN BE HELD AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

WHETHER OR NOT RONNEL BAWALAN WAS ACTUALLY PRESENT AT THE PLACE OF INCIDENT AT THE TIME OF THE SHOOTING.41
As can be gleaned, the threshold issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioner can be held guilty for double homicide as principal by
inducement. On the main, petitioner ventures to discredit Ronnel Bawalan, one of the only two prosecution witnesses who allegedly personally
witnessed the prelude to the shootout, if not the shootout itself.
In its Comment,42 the Office of the State Prosecutor (OSP), representing the People of the Philippines, countered that the Sandiganbayan
committed no reversible error in convicting petitioner for double homicide. The OSP pointed out that the prosecution sufficiently established
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through the testimony of Ronnel Bawalan, who only lived 100 meters away from the crime scene, and
was even seen by Patam to be looking at the direction of the parked vehicles moments before he (Patam) joined Santos and Domingo Bawalan; and
that Ronnel Bawalan was unwavering and steadfast in his testimony that he witnessed the attack, assault and shooting of Santos and Domingo
Bawalan; and that Ronnel Bawalan categorically heard petitioner direct his men "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama, banatan na ninyo yan."
Petitioner's command, so the OSP claims, was what triggered the exchange of gunshots, making him liable as principal by inducement for the
resultant deaths of Santos and Domingo Bawalan.

On August 28, 2013, this Court resolved to deny the petition for its failure to show any reversible error in the challenged judgment of the
Sandiganbayan.43 This prompted petitioner to move for reconsideration, and the Court, through its December 9, 2013 Resolution,44 to order the
OSP to comment thereon.

In its Comment, the OSP argued that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was a mere rehash of arguments already submitted to and denied by
the Court for lack of merit; and that the issues raised in the petition pertain to factual findings of the Sandiganbayan and that there is no cogent
reason for the Court to review the same.45

Subsequently, on September 29, 2014, the Court issued a Resolution46 setting aside the August 28, 2013 Resolution and reinstating the petition.

We now resolve.chanrobleslaw

The Court's Ruling

After a careful review of the case, the Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit.

Findings of fad reviewable under exceptional circumstances

Resolving the issues posed by the petitioner, as aptly pointed out by the OSP, indeed requires a review of the Sandiganbayan's findings of fact, which
is generally not a function of this Court. The oft-quoted rule is that factual findings of the court a quo and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.47 This rule, however, is not ironclad as it admits of
exceptions48 such as when the lower court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance,49
which the Sandiganbayan, as will be discussed, committed in the case at bar.

There is reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Ambagan criminally liable as principal by inducement

It may be recalled, in the case at bar, that petitioner was charged for two (2) counts of homicide for the deaths of Santos and Domingo Bawalan.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code defines the offense charged as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be guilty ol homicide and shall be punished by reclusion
temporal.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In relation thereto, the Court, in Villanueva v. Caparas, held that the following elements must be proven to sustain a conviction for homicide: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4)
the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.50

The Sandiganbayan is correct in its observation that the Court need not belabor on the elements of the offense since it is not disputed that Santos
and Domingo Bawalan were killed during the July 5, 2004 shooting incident, and that the killing was not attended by any of the circumstances that
would qualify the offense to murder, parricide, or infanticide.51 Verily, what is left to be determined is the extent of petitioner's participation in the
adverted shooting incident, if any. Here, the Sandiganbayan adjudged petitioner guilty for two counts of homicide as principal by inducement for
allegedly uttering "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan" which impelled petitioner's bodyguards to open fire at the
victims.

The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of
the crime; and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.52 As applied, the Sandiganbayan
would have been correct in holding petitioner criminally liable if he indeed made the utterance immediately before the shooting incident. However,
this Court is not inclined to believe that petitioner indeed made the declaration that started the fray. The court a quo failed to take note of
substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star prosecution witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan. These contradictions refer not only to minor
details but even to the facts constituting important aspects of the case, seriously eroding the weight of the evidence of the prosecution, and casting
reasonable doubt on the culpability of petitioner Ambagan.

a. Only Ronnel Bawalan allegedly heard petitioner made the utterance

It is a cardinal principle in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.53 It is the
primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion, with moral certainty.54 If the prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it
becomes the Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.55

Noteworthy in the present controversy is that out of the eighteen (18) prosecution witnesses presented to satisfy the quantum of evidence
required, only Ronnel Bawalan testified that petitioner uttered "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan" just before the
shooting. As per the testimony of Ronnel Bawalan:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Q
And you mentioned a while ago that Mayor Ambagan talked to Reynaldo Santos. And what was the reply of Reynaldo Santos, if any?
xxxx
A
Ang sabi ni Kuya Rey hintayin milting mil in si GD at sa kanya ka nalang makiusap.
Q
After making that request and after Reynaldo Santos denied such request, what happened next, if any?
A
Mayor Ambagan repeatedly made his requests but these requests were also repeatedly denied by Kuya Rey.
Q
And how did Mayor Ambagan's voice sound during the time when he was making these requests?
A
At first, the request was made calmly. But when his requests were repeatedly denied by Kuya Rey, his lone of voice was already loud and he spoke in
an angry tone, Ma'am.
xxxx
Q
So after Reynaldo Sanios repeatedly denied the requests of Mayor Ambagan. what happened next, if any?
xxxx
A
I heard the loud voice of Mayor Ambagan saying: "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan?"56
Curiously, this is in stark contrast with the testimony of the other star prosecution witness, Patam, who, despite being only two to three arms-length
away from petitioner during the latter's altercation with Santos, never testified that Ambagan uttered the imperative
phrase:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q
Then after that, what happened next, if any, after those repeated request[s] from the mayor and the repeated denial[s] of such request[s] from
Reynaldo Santos?
A
When I felt that the situation was heating up. I asked the mayor to go to the house of my cousin Miling Javier.
Q
Why did you feel that way that the situation was heating up?
xxxx
A
"Siyempre, mainit na si mayor, mainit na rin ang kasama ko gawa ng medyo ayaw niya ngang ibigay yung nire-request ni mayor kaya dinala ko si
mayor papalayo sa karsada papasok sa bahay ni Miling Javier."
xxxx
Q
And how did the mayor react when you pushed him towards the house of Miling?
A
"Dumiretso lang siya nung una tapos nung pumutok na, nung makarinig ako ng putok sa labas, ayun na."
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
I think because of the interruption, there will be inaccuracy in translation. It is very clear in the testimony of the witness. He was bringing the mayor
to the house of Miling Javier then he heard the gunshots.
J. DE CASTRO:
Let him complete the answer.
A
"Medyo galit siya nun. Tapos habang tinutulak ko doon sa bakod ng bahay, noon po ako nakarinig ng putok nung malayo-layo na kami sa fence."57
(emphasis added)
And during Patam's cross-examination:
xxxx
Q
Now, why were you pushing Mayor Ambagan inside the house of Miling Javier?
A
Because the Mayor was angry and I did not want any incident to happen.
Q
But his gun was not drawn at that time?
A
No, sir.
Q
His gun was tucked in his waistline?
A
Yes, sir. It was tucked, sir.
Q
So, when you pushed him inside the house of Miling Javier, you did not see the Mayor drawing his gun?
A
No, your Honor.
Q
Did you hear him uttering some words when you were pushing him inside the house?
A
I heard some words, sir, but I did not understand.
Q
You heard some words but you cannot understand what he was saying?
A
I understood the first words that he said, your Honor, he shouted some invectives after he said, ANG HIRAP MONG KAUSAP.
Q
Then later on he kept on talking but you could not anymore understand what he was saying?
A
Yes, your Honor.
Q
Do you know when he spoke those words and NAGMURA, to whom were these words directed?
A
It's directed to Rey Santos, your Honor.
Q
Where was Rey Santos in relation to the place where you were at the time that you were pushing the Mayor inside the house?
A
He was in the other side of the street, at the left side of the gate fronting the mayor.
Q
How far was he in relation to your place to the place of the Mayor at that time?
A
Around two (2) to three (3) arms length, your Honor.
Q
So, by the time that you pushed the Mayor inside the house of Miling Javier and he was uttering those words, Patrolman Rey Santos was still on that
place where he was on the left side?
A
Yes, your Honor.
Q
And that was [the] time you heard gunshot two (2) at a time?
A
When we were already inside the gate, that was the time we heard gunshots.58 (emphasis added)
Interestingly, between the two star prosecution witnesses, it is Patam, being in closer proximity to Ambagan, who was in the better position to know
whether or not Ambagan ordered his men to open fire at the victims. Yet, Patam claimed that he only heard Ambagan shout invectives at Santos
and that when the shooting started, he and petitioner were already in the compound of his cousin, Miling Javier.

Despite having been presented several opportunities to do so, Patam did not declare under oath that he categorically heard petitioner say "Sige, yan
pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan." As petitioner pointed out, the first opportunity was when Patam made his Sinumpaang
Salaysay59 on July 5, 2004, when the incident was still fresh in his memory. The second was when he executed a supplemental sworn statement60
on the same date.61 And last, when he underwent the rigors of direct and cross-examination during trial.62 Sans this categorical declaration from
Patam, it is only on Ronnel Bawalan's uncorroborated testimony - that petitioner allegedly uttered "Sige, yan pala ang gusto mo. Mga kasama
banatan na ninyo yan" — on which petitioner's conviction is hinged.

b. The testimony of Ronnel Bawalan is not entirely credible

The finding of guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon in our jurisprudence.63 Time and again, We have held that the
testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.64
Such rulings were, therefore, premised on the fact that the credibility of the sole witness was duly established and observed in court.

Prefatorily, this Court has consistently ruled that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, in ordinary criminal
proceedings, are given weight and respect by appellate courts and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Deviation from this rule will only be
allowed if there is any showing that the trial judge overlooked some material or substantial facts which, if given consideration, will alter the assailed
decision.65So, too, this Court is not bound by the findings of the Sandiganbayan should it discover that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are marred with inconsistencies that are neither collateral nor trivial, but are material and substantial in matters determinative of petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

In the extant case, several circumstances militate against the credibility of Ronnel Bawalan, the sole witness to the alleged inducement. His
testimony defies the basic precept that evidence, to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible
in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the knowledge and common experience of mankind.66 To elucidate:

First, Ronnel Bawalan claimed that he personally saw the shootout and that he intently observed the events as they unfolded without blinking. He
testified that he saw petitioner engage Santos in a verbal altercation in the middle of the street, but nevertheless claimed that he did not see
petitioner's whereabouts when the shooting began. As he narrated during his cross-examination:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. BATACAN
Q
Mr. Witness, last time you testified that you hid yourself along the poultry area, is that correct?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
And when the shooting started you lie flat on your belly, is that correct?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
And you also testified that you hid yourself in the bushes in a flash, in that point of Hash, in the area?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
And you also said that when the shooting started for almost five (5) minutes, you did not close your eyes or cover your ears brought about by the
shooting rampage?
A
I was already afraid but I did not cover my eyes, ma'am.
Q
You did not wink your eyes for the successive shots?
A
No, ma'am.
Q
You did not feel deaf from the sound of the gun fire?
A
No, ma'am.
Q
So there was no reaction from you?
A
None, ma'am.
Q
So, you observed everything that transpired during the five minutes exchange of fire in the crime scene?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Mr. witness, where was mayor Ambagan at the time the shooting started?
A
He was at the middle of the scene before the start of the shooting, ma'am.
JUSTICE PERALTA
In the sketch drawn by the witness. Mayor Ambagan the accused, and Patrolman Patam, the one who earlier testified were outside of the house. So,
they were in the middle of the street? Immediately before the shooting. That's according to this witness.
ATTY. BATACAN
Q
During the actual firing of guns, where were Patam and accused Ambagan?
WITNESS
A
I do not know, ma'am.
xxxx
Q
From the place where you were positioned hiding in the bushes, were you able to see Mayor Ambagan and SPO Patam before the shooting?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And according to you, they were here, in the middle of the street?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And according to you, you did not close your eyes nor cover your ears when the shooting started?
xxxx
A
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BATACAN
Q
When the shooting started, where were these persons Patam and Mayor Ambagan when according to you, you did not close your eyes nor cover
your ears and just observed?
A
I do not know, ma'am.67
If it were, as Ronnel Bawalan claimed, that he watched the events closely as they unfolded, he would have noticed that petitioner and Patam walked
towards the house of Miling Javier, which was only about eight (8) meters away from where they were previously situated.68 For someone who did
not even as much as wink during the ordeal, it is indeed quite curious why he would miss such a significant detail - the location of one of the main
characters in the spectacle.

Second, it is unfathomable why petitioner, who, according to Ronnel Bawalan, was still in the middle of the road facing Santos immediately before
the shooting, would order his men to open fire at Santos and Domingo Bawalan given that he himself would have been caught in the crossfire if they
had done so.

Third, Patam's testimony interestingly, is congruent with petitioner Ambagan's version insofar as petitioner's reaction during the shooting is
concerned. As can be recalled, Patam testified that petitioner wanted to go back to check on his men during the exchange of
gunshots:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
PROSEC. NIDUAZA:
Q
How many gunshots did you hear?
A
"Hindi ko na po nabilang eh. Basta ang putok niya dala-dalawa, yung putok ng baril."
Q
And what was the interval of two gunshots at a time did you hear?
A
Seconds only, Ma'am.
Q
Then after that, what happened next, if any. after hearing those gunshots at a time?
xxxx
WITNESS:
I was still pushing the mayor to the house of Miling Javier, Your Honor.
PROSEC. NIDUAZA
Q
And what was the reaction of the mayor when you pushed him towards the house of Miling?
A
When we were getting near the house of Miling, the mayor wanted to go back because he wanted to find out what happened to his men, Ma'am.69
So, too, did petitioner claim that he wanted to check specifically on Rene Amparo after he allegedly saw the latter get shot first.70 The question then
is why would petitioner want to traipse back into the line of fire of a shootout he allegedly initiated? It simply fails to see the light of reason.

Fourth, if petitioner himself was armed, as Patam claimed him to be,71 and willing to start a shootout, according to Ronnel Bawalan, why would he
then not draw his own pistol? As petitioner argued, having his gun tucked to his waist indicated that he himself was not mentally ready to engage in
a gunfight.72 Had he had the mind to start the firefight, he would have spontaneously drawn his gun. He would not have let Patam, a member of
Santos' group and an easy target given his close proximity, survive the ordeal.

Fifth, Ronnel Bawalan claimed that only Santos, from his group, was wielding a firearm.73 He likewise testified that Rene Amparo was the first one
to fire his gun, hitting Santos.74 If indeed the other victim, Domingo Bawalan, was unarmed, this would have meant that Santos, by his lone injured
self, and before he fell, was able to shoot down three (3) of petitioner's men: the other casualties Leandro Causaren, Rene Amparo, and Edrelin John
Jamon. Needless to say, this would have been a difficult feat to accomplish in his wounded state.

Not even Santos' rifle and marksmanship skills as a police officer could have improved his odds since he had alcohol in his system at the time of the
incident. Based on Patam's narration of the events prior to the shootout, Santos came from six straight hours of merry-making, from 5PM to 11PM
on July 4, 2004, at a birthday party hosted by Edgardo R. Mamuyac. Patam continued that, during the celebration, Santos downed shots of liquor,75
which could have adversely affected his focus and aim.
Moreover, believing Ronnel Bawalan's testimony - that only Santos, from their group, was armed - would only bolster the defense argument that, in
all likelihood, it was Santos who first pulled the trigger. Otherwise, he would not have had ample time to shoot and kill all three of Ambagan's
bodyguards by himself before getting killed by his assailants who have already surrounded him and were armed by automatic rifles.76 Ronnel
Bawalan's version then makes it quite possible that it was Santos who drew first blood. While it may be, as the CA correctly observed, that even if
Ronnel Bawalan was mistaken (deliberately or not) for saying that Santos first shot Rene Amparo, this could not be made to exclude the
participation of Michael Malabanan, Roger Causaren, and Celestino "Ely" Garcia,77 this would, nevertheless, negate the assertion that petitioner
Ambagan initiated the shooting incident.

Sixth, Ronnel Bawalan's contradicting testimonies as to the details of Ambagan's bodyguards' demise further damage his credibility. According to
Ronnel Bawalan in his Sinumpaang Salaysay,78 he personally witnessed the deaths of Leandro Causaren and Edrelin Jamon as casualties of friendly
fire. To quote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
22. TANONG: Habang ikaw ay nagkukubli doon sa lugar na iyong binanggit, maaari bang isalaysay mo kung ano pang mga kaganapan ang iyong
nakila at naobserbahan?

SAGOT: Dumating po si Mayor Ambagan na naglalakad doon sa kinapaparadahan ng kanyang van na nasa gawing unahan ng sasakyan ni Kuya Rey
Santos. Kasunod po ni Mayor sina Rene Amparo, SP04 Causaren, Konsehal Michael Malabanan, Kapilan Domingo Villasis, Ely Garcia, Flor Amparo,
Roger Causaren at iba pa na di ko namumukhaang mga kalalakihan na pawing armada ng mga baril. Narinig kong nagsalita si Mayor Ambagan ng
PAG-USAPAN NAT1N YAN KUNG ANUMAN ANG PROBLEMA at sumagot naman si Rey ng "MAMAYA PAGDATING NI GD SA KANYA KA MAKIPAG-
USAP, DI KAMI ANG MAKAKAPAGDESISYON NITO". Hang ulit pang nagsalita si Mayor ng "PAG-USAPAN NA LAMANG NAT1N ITO" at paulit-ulit din
naman siyang sinasagol ni Kuya Rey ng "SI GD NA LAMANG ANG KAUSAPIN N'YO, HINTAYIN NA LAMANG N'YO MAYOR." Kasunod noon ay narinig
kong sumigaw si Mayor Ambagan ng "SIGE, IYAN PALA ANG GUSTO MO, MGA KASAMA BANATAN N'YO NA YAN". Kasunod noon ay sunod-sunod na
putok ng mga baril mula kina Ely Garcia, Kap. Domingo Villasis, Konsehal Michael Malabanan, Roger Causaren at iba pa nilang mga kasama ang
nakila kong direktang patama sa kapatid kong si Domingo Bawalan at Kuya Rey Santos na kapwa nagtamo ng napakaraming tama ng bala sa ulo at
ibat-ibang bahagi ng katawan na nagging dahilan ng kanilang kamatayan. Natamaan din ng bala at namatay dahilan sa walang habas nilang
pamamaril sina SPO4 Leandro Causaren, at Egoy Jamon na pareho ding namatay. Bago sila nagsialis ay pinagkukuha nila ang mga baril nina Kuya Rey
Santos nakalibre 45. pati iyong service firearm ni SPO4 Leandro Causaren na maigsing baril at sinakyan din nila at dinala ang kulay maroon na MB
100 van napag-aari ni Mayor Ambagan.79 (emphasis added)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
But on further prodding during trial, Ronnel Bawalan admitted to not having personally witnessed the deaths of Leandro Causaren and Edrelin
Jamon and that he only learned of such information from other sources:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q
Did you come to know how many victims died in that shooting incident?
A
I learned there were five victims, Your Honors.
Q
Why do you say "napag-alaman ko"?
A
Because I only knew that my brother and Kuya Rey were killed. As to the others who died, I was only told about them, Your Honors.
Q
Who told you that?
A
By the people who went to the place of the shooting incident, Your Honors.
Q
But you knew for a fact that the three other persons who died, died because of that shooting incident?
A
Yes, Your Honors.
Q
But you cannot actually tell what really happened because according to you, you only learned of the death of the three other persons from other
people?
A
Yes, Your Honors.80 (emphasis added)
Minor inconsistencies, far from detracting from the veracity of the testimony, even enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any
suspicion that the testimony was contrived or rehearsed.81 However, the death of three (3) other individuals in this case is not a minute detail, so
much so that one who claimed not to have blinked during the entire incident, as Ronnel Bawalan alleged, could not have possibly overlooked the
same. This cannot simply be glossed over and treated as a badge of truthfulness, but instead plausibly raises suspicion as to his presence in the
scene of the crime when it was committed.

Lastly, there is, in the case at bar, reason to believe that Ronnel Bawalan is biased against petitioner, having an axe to grind against the latter for the
untimely demise of Reynaldo Santos and Domingo Bawalan, Ronnel Bawalan's "cousin-in-law" and brother, respectively.82 Bias is that which excites
"a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are."83 A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the
cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or
to state what is false. To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship,
the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.84

Here, Ronnel Bawalan's bias was first made manifest when he was caught in a bold-faced lie. He claimed that only Santos was armed during the
firefight when in fact, his brother, Domingo Bawalan, tested positive for gunpowder nitrates.85 This detail - whether or not Domingo Bawalan was
armed - is substantial in this case since this tends to establish the probability or improbability of Santos starting the gunfight, as earlier discussed.
Likewise, We have earlier demonstrated how Ronnel Bawalan distorted the truth by first claiming that he personally witnessed the deaths of
Leandro Causaren and Edrelin Jamon only to recant later on and admit that he only learned of their deaths afterwards from other people who went
to the site of the shooting incident. Additionally, despite having keenly observed the events unfold, Ronnel Bawalan failed to identify the location of
Ambagan during the shootout, in spite of tagging the latter as the main perpetrator of the crime.

The general rule may be that where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.86 In this case, however, there are
sufficient circumstances and discrepancies in Ronnel Bawalan's testimony that impel this Court to look at his version of the facts with reasonable
skepticism.

From the foregoing circumstances, We have gotten a clearer glimpse of petitioner's state of mind at the time of the shooting. These seemingly
minute details - the second, third, fourth, and fifth circumstances specifically - readily render it unlikely, if not at all improbable, that petitioner
initiated the gunfight by saying "banatan na ninyo yan." The rest of the enumeration, on the other hand, cautions this Court not to swallow Ronnel
Bawalan's testimony in its entirety hook, line and sinker for his narration of facts may not be truthful or accurate.

Worthy of note is that my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, in his dissent, echoes the observation of the Sandiganbayan
that there are indeed inconsistencies in Ronnel Bawalan's testimony, but regretfully downplays such discrepancies as inconsequential to the
outcome of the case. Citing the Sandiganbayan, the position advanced is that:87
It is of no moment that Ronnel's allegation that Rene fired first at Santos may be disproved with the paraffin test result, showing that Santos was
positive for gunpowder nitrates while Rene was found negative. Immaterial too is the argument that Ronnel was not consistent as to when he
actually learned of the deaths of the victims, other than Santos and Domingo. If Ronnel failed to accurately testify on this part, his other testimony
worthy of belief cannot, nonetheless, be excluded. Even assuming that Santos shot Rene first, it should be noted that the evidence cannot believe
that Santos and Domingo both died from the gunfire of Malabanan, Roger, Garcia, and other unrecognized men of Mayor
Ambagan.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With all due respect, these inconsistencies are not "of no moment" and neither are they "immaterial" to the case at bar.

First, Ronnel Bawalan claimed that after petitioner Ambagan allegedly uttered the imperative phrase "banatan na ninyo yan" one of his bodyguards,
Rene Amparo, was the first to fire at the direction of the victim, Santos. However, Rene Amparo's negative paraffin test would already belie such
claim. Such circumstance is not "of no moment" for it raises material doubt as to who started the firefight. If Rene Amparo was the first to fall, this
would mean that Santos was the first to open fire. And if the victim was the first one to open fire, then the firefight may not have been started by
petitioner Ambagan's alleged instruction after all.

Second, the Sandiganbayan claimed that "[e]ven assuming that Santos shot Rene first, it should be noted that the evidence cannot belie that Santos
and Domingo died from the gunfire of Malabanan, Roger, Garcia, and other unrecognized men of Mayor Ambagan." This statement misses the
point. Again, the issue in the instant petition is whether or not petitioner is criminally liable as principal by inducement. Identifying Santos as the first
one to shoot raises the probability that petitioner's men opened fire only in retaliation, and were not, by any means, induced by petitioner to do so.

Third, Ronnel Bawalan's knowledge, or lack thereof, of the deaths of the other victims, Leandro Causaren and Edrelin Jamon, petitioner's two (2)
other bodyguards, is a material detail which tends to establish his presence or absence at the scene of the crime. If the star prosecution witness was
indeed present, it would be too difficult to believe that he only witnessed the deaths of his two relatives, aside from Rene Amparo who was the first
to fall. He would have at least seen that there were other dead bodies even though their identities were not known to him at that time. Confusion as
to the number of casualties may be understandable if most of their identities are unknown to the witness, but for the witness to skip the detail and
effectively claim that the only deaths he saw were those of the people he knew is far too convenient an omission and militates against his very
credibility.

In determining the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, We entertain the probability or improbability of alternative scenarios other than
what is offered by the prosecution. For this purpose, We were urged "to view Ronnel Bawalan's testimony as a whole"88 to reconcile the
inconsistencies in his statements, but as extensively discussed, Ronnel Bawalan's narration of events is not airtight and even brings to fore more
reasons to disbelieve his version. Indeed, there are far too many inconsistencies in the testimony "taken as a whole" does not foreclose the
probability that Ambagan did not initiate the firefight, and casts reasonable doubt as to his guilt as principal by inducement.

In conclusion, the scant evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of petitioner as principal by inducement. It was not
convincingly established, beyond reasonable doubt, that petitioner indeed ordered his men to open fire at Santos and Domingo Bawalan. The
evidence offered against him in court does not pass the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to rebut the presumption of innocence that
petitioner is entitled to under the Bill of Rights.89 And where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of an accused, he must be acquitted even
though his innocence may be questioned,90 for it is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged
is more likely to be true than the contrary.91 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, more than mere likelihood, requires moral certainty — a certainty
that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.92

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Albert G. Ambagan, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the two counts of homicide
subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28259 and 28260 on reasonable doubt. The June 21, 2012 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Crim. Case
Nos. 28259-60 is hereby MODIFIED accordingly as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 28259, accused MICHAEL T. MALABANAN, CELESTINO "ELY" GARCIA, and ROGER V. CAUSAREN are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide for the death of Reynaldo Santos as principals by direct participation, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as minimum, to Twelve (12) years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.

Further, the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Reynaldo S. Santos, the following damages:

(e) The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(f) The sum of P787,875.00 as reimbursement for the burial and funeral expenses;
(g) The sum of P1,647,979.32 as compensatory damages; and
(h) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. 28260, accused MICHAEL T. MALABANAN, CELESTINO "ELY" B. GARCIA, and ROGER V. CAUSAREN are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide for the death of Domingo Bawalanas principals by direct participation, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.

Further, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Domingo Bawalan, the following:

d. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;cralawlawlibrary

e. The sum of P40,000.00 as actual damages;cralawlawlibrary
f. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary

Finally, in Criminal Cases No. 28259 and No. 28260, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be applied to all the award of damages from the
finality of judgment until fully paid.

3. In Criminal Cases No. 28259 and No. 28260, accused ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., ALBERTO C. ANGCANAN, JUANITO S. LOYOLA, MELANIO S. BAYOT,
FLOR AMPARO and ROSENDO V. CAUSAREN are hereby ACQUITTED, for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, no civil liability is assessed against said accused.

The hold departure order issued against them by reason of these cases are hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and their bonds RELEASED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24491 September 30, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFINO GENSOLA, FIDELINA TAN and FELICISIMO TAN, defendants-appellants.

CAPISTRANO, J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding the defendants. Rufino Gensola, Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan, guilty as
principals of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering said defendants to pay in solidum the sum of
P6,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miguel Gayanilo.

Rufino Gensola was the driver, while Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were the conductors, of a passenger truck, Gelveson No. 17 (belonging to Jose
Tan, father of Fidelina and Felicisimo) with station at Guimbal, Iloilo. They suspected Miguel Gayanilo of having punctured the tires of the truck
while it was parked in front of his carinderia on Gerona St., Guimbal, on November 18, 1958. In the afternoon of the following day, November 19, on
the return trip of the truck, then driven by a temporary driver, Restituto Gersaneva, from Iloilo City, Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela were among
the passengers of the truck. Before the truck entered the poblacion of Guimbal, it parked on Gonzales St. to discharge a passenger and his baggage.
Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela overheard Fidelina Tan mutter to herself, obviously referring to someone she did not name: "He does not appear
because I will kill him." ("No aparece porque le voy amatar.") The truck then continued on its way and parked in front of Teodora Gellicanao's
carinderia on Gerona St. in the poblacion. All the passengers got off the truck. Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela crossed the street towards the
carinderia of Pedro Genciana to await another passenger truck for their respective barrios. The Gelveson No. 17 then left in the direction of the
nearby carinderia of Violeta Garin, returned a short time later, and parked in front of the bodega of its owner, Jose Tan. The time was about 6:30
p.m. Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street from the public market in the direction of his carinderia with Rufino Gensola, holding in his right hand a
stone as big as a man's fist, following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and Fidelina Tan were standing in the middle of the street. After Miguel
Gayanilo had crossed the middle of the street near the two, Fidelina Tan shouted, "Rufino, strike him." Upon hearing the shout Miguel looked back
and Rufino suddenly struck him on the left face with the stone. Felicisimo then struck Miguel with a piece of iron on the back of the head causing
serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Not content with the two blows already given, Fidelina struck Miguel with another piece of iron on the left
forehead causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Miguel fell to the ground near the canal along the side of the street. Rufino Gensola
immediately left for his house situated on Gonzales St. Felicisimo and Fidelina observed the prostrate body for a few seconds until Fidelina
muttered: "He is already dead." ("Ya esta muerto.") The two then left the scene of the crime.

The autopsy report shows that Miguel Gayanilo suffered lacerated wounds on the left face, serious wounds and fracture of the skull on the back of
the head, and serious wounds and fracture of the skull on the left forehead. Death was caused by traumatic shock.

The death of Miguel Gayanilo caused by traumatic shock which resulted from the strong blows inflicting trauma on the back of the head and on the
left forehead, was admitted particularly by the accused Rufino Gensola who assumed sole responsibility for the same.1awphîl.nèt

The lower court found the three defendants guilty as principals of the crime of murder and rendered judgment as follows:

Por tanto, el Juzgado declara a los acusados Rufino Gensola, Fidelina Tan y Felicisimo Tan culpables, fuera de toda duda racional, del delito de
asesinato tal como se alega en la querella y, no habiendo circunstancias que pueden modificar su responsibilidad criminal, condena a cada uno de
los tres a sufrir la pena de reclusion perpetua, a indemnizar, mancomunada y solidariamente, a los herederos de Miguel Gayanilo en la suma de
P6,000.00 sin sufrir prision subsidiaria correspondiente, en caso de insolvencia, dada la naturaleza de la pena principal, a las accesorias de la ley y a
pagar ademas, cada uno una tercera (1/3) parte de las costas del juicio.

Defendants appealed.

Appellants contend that Rufino Gensola alone inflicted with stone blows the serious wounds and fractures of the skull which caused the death of
Miguel Gayanilo, but that he did so in legitimate defense of Fidelina Tan and of himself. The contention is unmeritorious in view of the following
considerations: (1) The testimony of Rufino Gensola and Fidelina Tan that Miguel Gayanilo, then drunk, angrily demanded to know from Fidelina
why she suspected him of having punctured the tires of the truck and was about to strike Fidelina with a stone, and that in legitimate defense of
Fidelina and of himself Rufino picked up two stones, struck Miguel on the left face with one stone and threw the other stone at him when he started
to run away, hitting him on the back of the head and causing him to fall and strike his forehead against a pile of stones, is belied by, first, the serious
wound's and fractures of the skull on the back of the head and on the left forehead of the victim, which could have been caused only by strong
blows with pieces of iron; and, second, by the testimony of Dr. Juan Encanto who performed the autopsy, that he did not see any pile of stones near
the dead body of Miguel Gayanilo when he arrived at the place in response to a call. (2) The admission of Rufino Gensola that he alone was
responsible for the serious wounds and fractures of the skull inflicted upon Miguel Gayanilo in legitimate defense of Fidelina Tan and of himself, has
no probative value because it constitutes, in the face of contrary credible evidence for the prosecution, an assumption by Rufino Gensola of the
criminal liability of Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan. The penal law does not allow anyone to assume the criminal liability of another.

Appellants contend that the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses, Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela, are unworthy of credence
because of contradictions and uncertainties, showing that they were not present and did not witness the commission of the crime. The contention is
untenable for the following reasons. (1) The contradictions pointed out involve only the relative locations of the three carinderias near the scene of
the crime, not the acts of commission of the three defendants at a distance of about seven meters from where the two state witnesses were then
standing. (2) The uncertainties pointed out refer to the description of the pieces of iron used by Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan, that is, as to the
size, length and other details. Considering that the place was not well-lighted and that there was little time to observe, accurate description of the
weapons used could not be expected three years later when the witnesses testified. (3) The contention that Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela
testified against Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan out of spite because the latter had refused to transport the former to their respective barrios, is not
well-taken. It is not natural for a person to testify under oath against his neighbor on a matter of life and death just because of a trifling incident
causing slight inconvenience. (4) We find the testimonies of the four defense witnesses, Fidelina Tan, Felicisimo Tan, Elias Gensola and Salvador
Gayatao, that Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela were not present at the scene of the crime because they had already left Gerona St. walking to
another street to await transportation to their respective barrios, unworthy of credence.

Let us now consider the criminal liability of the three appellants. The lower court found them guilty as principals of the crime of murder on the
assumption that there was conspiracy among them. We do not agree, for the following reasons: (1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the words
she muttered to herself, "He does not appear because I will kill him," was not shared by Felicisimo Tan, who kept silent. Silence is not a circumstance
indicating participation in the same criminal design. With respect to Rufino Gensola, he was not even in the truck at the time. (2) When Miguel
Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it was only Rufino Gensola who followed closely behind. Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in the middle of the
street. The words shouted by Fidelina Tan, "Rufino strike him," were meant as a command and did not show previous concert of criminal design. (3)
The blows given with pieces of iron on the back of the head and on the left forehead by Felicisimo and Fidelina after Rufino had struck with a piece
of stone the left face of Miguel, do not in and by themselves show previous concert of criminal design. Particularly when it is considered that Rufino
immediately left thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for a few seconds observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina muttered,
"He is already dead."

In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants is individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act.

Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds inflicted by him on the left face of Miguel Gayanilo. Such lacerated wounds caused
disfigurement ("deformity") of the face within the meaning of Article 263 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishable by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The offense having been committed with treachery, the penalty should
be imposed in its maximum period.

Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the offense considering that she gave the command "Rufino, strike him"? The second class of principals,
according to Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, comprises "those who directly force or induce others to commit it (the act)." Those who directly
induce others to commit the act are called "principals by inducement" or "principals by induction," from the Spanish "autores por induccion." The
word "inducement" comprises, in the opinion of Viada and the Supreme Court of Spain, reward, promise of reward, command, and pacto. With
respect to command, it must be the moving cause of the offense. In the case at bar, the command shouted by Fidelina, "Rufino, strike not," was not
the moving cause of the act of Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows that Rufino would have committed the act of his own volition even without said
words of command.

Are the appellants Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan both liable for the death of Miguel Gayanilo? Our opinion is in the affirmative. The trauma
inflicted by Felicisimo and the trauma inflicted by Fidelina, combined, produced death due to traumatic shock. When Fidelina struck with a piece of
iron the left forehead of Miguel, he was not yet dead. It was only after the trauma inflicted by Fidelina that the dying Miguel fell to the ground and
died seconds later. This is clear from the evidence that after Miguel had fallen to the ground Felicisimo and Fidelina observed his prostrate body for
a few seconds until Fidelina muttered, "He is already dead."

Assuming that the trauma inflicted by Felicisimo was by itself sufficient to produce death due to traumatic shock, should Fidelina be also held liable
considering that death could have resulted anyway from the act of Felicisimo and that a person cannot be killed twice? The obvious answer is that
although a dead person cannot be killed again, a dying person can still be killed. Miguel was not dead but dying when Fidelina struck his left
forehead with a piece of iron. Hence, the trauma inflicted by her hastened the death of Miguel from traumatic shock made doubly severe. She must,
therefore, be also held criminally liable for the death of the victim.

Was the killing murder? Our opinion is in the affirmative because it was attended with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There was alevosia
because after Rufino suddenly struck Miguel Gayanilo with a stone, Miguel, defenseless, was struck by Felicisimo Tan with a piece of iron on the
back of the head and by Fidelina Tan with a piece of iron on the left forehead.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, that part of the appealed judgment sentencing each of the appellants Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan to reclusion perpetua
is affirmed. Said appellants are also ordered to pay in solidum the sum of P12,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, Miguel Gayanilo. That
part of the judgment against appellant Rufino Gensola is modified by sentencing said appellant to an indeterminate penalty of from 3 months of
arresto mayor as minimum to 3 years of prision correccional as maximum.

Costs against the appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Sanchez, JJ., are on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10473 January 28, 1961

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSARIO LAO, ET AL., defendants.
ROSARIO LAO and ALBERTO PADIAMAT, defendants-appellants.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Hon. Hermogenes Calauag, presiding, finding Rosario Lao and Alberto Padiamat guilty
of kidnapping with murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and jointly and severally to pay to the heirs of
Rosa Baltazar the amount of P6,000. In the information the other accused are Vicente Lao, Osias Feliciano was dismissed and he was utilized as a
government witness. Bienvenido Santos had not yet been apprehended at the time of the trial.

Vicente Lao and Rosario Lao are common-law husband and wife, residents of 550 Echague, Manila. They are engaged in poultry raising, maintaining
a poultry farm at Mango Road, San Francisco del Monte. They had a store at No. 532 Echague, Manila where they sold the products of their poultry
farm and poultry feed.

Osias Feliciano was helper at the store earning a monthly salary of P30.00 in December, 1953. Vicente Lao had another common-law wife in the
person of one Rosa Baltazar. He already had two children by her in the month of December, 1953. She became his mistress as early as 1949, when
she was still living with her father Manila. In November, 1953, she was brought by Vicente Lao to the poultry farm at San Francisco del Monte to
reside there and to supervise the work in the poultry farm, with the assistance of a maid by the name of Carmen Gutierrez. Osias Feliciano testified
as follows: About two weeks before December, 1953, Ben Santos came to the store of Mrs. Lao, with one Gorio. Before Ben Santos and his
companion left the store, Mrs. Lao gave the former P5.00 for transportation. After they had left, Rosario Lao told Osias — "You know, I want Rosa to
be taken away from the poultry farm. Since she had been living with your Manong, we have had bad luck in our business." (t.s.n., Vol. 3, p. 118).
Osias answered that it was up to her. The following day Ben Santos again came to the store between 2 and 3 p.m. and conferred with Mrs. Lao. That
same afternoon a customer bought poultry feed from the store and as Osias had received the payment therefor he went to the table of Mrs. Lao to
deliver the money to her. As Osias walked behind Ben, who was in front of the table of Mrs. Lao, Ben became alarmed and asked Mrs. Lao who he
was, pointing to Osias. Mrs. Lao answered: "Oh, don't worry, he is a good man; we trust him." After that Ben followed Osias and asked him: "Are you
really a good boy? Can we really trust you?" To which Osias answered: "Yes, you can just ask Mrs. Lao how I am serving them." (t.s.n., Vol. 3, pp.
121-122). Ben further informed Osias that they Ben and a companion) were taking Rosa from the poultry farm and then asked Osias if he slept there,
to which Osias answered that sometimes he did. Then Ben told him that if he should go there to get the woman (Rosa) he must not cry for help, and
not to tell he truth should anybody ask him if he knew the persons who entered the farm. Osias promised to do so. Ben stayed with Mrs. Lao for
about three minutes, and before he left, Mrs. Lao handed him a P20.00 bill.

In the evening of December 4, 1953, Osias slept in the hatchery of the Lao poultry farm at San Francisco del Monte. At about midnight, while Osias
was asleep, he was suddenly awakened by a stone thrown at his breast. He got up and saw Ben Santos and Padiamat. Ben told him to tell Mrs. Lao
that they were not able to take Rosa because her doors were locked. After that Ben and Padiamat jumped over the wall and went away. The
following morning when Osias went to Manila, he reported the matter to Mrs. Lao. Upon being thus informed Mrs. Lao remarked: "Mahina sila.
Bakit hindi sila pumasok" (t.s.n., Vol. 2, p. 92).

The following day, December 5, at two in the afternoon, Ben and Padiamat went to the store of the Lao's at Echague Street. They sat in front of the
table of Mrs. Lao who ordered black beer for them. It, was then that Ben promised to take Rosa away on the 7th.

In the evening of December 7, Vicente and Rosario Lao, together with Osias, went in their car to San Francisco del Monte, arriving at their poultry
farm at 11 o'clock that evening. Osias went down the car and then ordered a boy working in the farm to help him load five sacks of poultry feed in
the automobile of the Laos. That night the boys working in the poultry farm asked the Laos to allow them to quit their work. However, the latter
refused to grant them permission to leave, and instead told them to retire in their respective places, and then instructed Osias to spend the night in
the farm. Osias prepared a bed in the hatchery. Before going to bed Osias put out the light but Rosa Baltazar asked him to open the light but as she
had not yet finished reading. That night while Osias was lying in bed, he heard Rosa calling his name in a loud voice. As he turned towards her, he
saw two men walking beside her, the trio heading for the hatchery. The two persons were Ben Santos and Alberto Padiamat. Padiamat was in
fatigue uniform with an MP arm band and a sergeant's chevron. Ben Santos was also wearing a fatigue uniform and an MP arm band and a
lieutenant's bar in his jockey cap and on his collar. Ben and Padiamat took Rosa to the back of the hatchery. There they climbed over the wall to the
other side, taking Rosa along with them.

The following day, December 8, the kidnapping of Rosa Baltazar was reported to the Quezon City Police department, which endorsed the matter to
the secret service. But it was not until January 9 that the mortal remains of Rosa Baltazar were found. A hole 2 feet by 4 feet was noticed beside a
creek about 6 to 10 meters away. When the hole was dug they found the remains, a red sweater, a printed blouse, two handkerchiefs, one tied
around the neck and the other tied about the hands of the victim. The post-mortem findings are as follows:

"A portion consisting of the head, neck and upper-part of trunk below the mamma, to which the whole right upper extremity is attached. Soft
tissues in moderately mummified state are still present except in the frontal and right parietal regions of the skull.

"Several loose dried bones entirely devoid of soft tissues consisting of: —

Ten ribs - one fracture at shaft.

Five vertebra - one with broken body.
One scapula - only a portion.
One humerus - with broken off ends.
One radius - with broken off ends.
One ulna - with broken off ends.
Two pelvic bones - only portion of each.
Two femurs - with broken off ends.
Two tibia - with broken off ends.
Abundant black straight hairs averaging 38.0 cm. long are present and still attached to scalp.

Skull and cervical vertebrae intact.

Anatomical features of parts indicate female sex.

Probable age of the individual is below 22 years of age. (Exhibit "H").

The clothing found near the remains were identified by the maid of Rosa Baltazar. The teeth were also identified by Rosa's dentist. There is no
question that the remains thus found on January 9 were those of the kidnapped woman Rosa Baltazar.

One of the persons investigated by the Quezon City detectives immediately after the kidnapping was Osias Feliciano. During the investigation, he
denied knowing the persons who had taken Rosa Baltazar away from the farm the previous night. Subsequently, however, he changed heart. He said
that as his conscience bothered him he decided to tell the truth and point out the persons who had actually committed the crime. So accused
Alberto Padiamat was taken into custody and subjected to questioning by the National Bureau of Investigation.

In a statement (Exhibit "S") dated February 16, 1953, Padiamat made a confession admitting that it was he and Ben Santos who had taken away
Rosa Baltazar from the poultry farm of the Laos at Mango Road, Quezon City, describing in detail the conferences that Ben Santos and he had with
Mrs. Lao prior to December 6 and 7, how Rosa Baltazar was taken away from the poultry farm and brought to some distance therefrom and killed by
a blow with a mason's sledge hammer found in a nearby and stating further that after Rosa had been quarry, killed, he (Padiamat) was ordered by
Ben to dig a grave two feet wide, four feet long, and knee deep, in which the body of Rosa Baltazar was interred. Padiamat's confession, Exhibit "S",
contains in detail the conferences that Osias described in his testimony before the Court. It also states the fact that upon receiving money from Mrs.
Lao on December 5, after having promised to kidnap Rosa on the 7th, Ben Santos and Alberto Padiamat went to buy for themselves fatigue suits, MP
arm bands, a sergeant's chevron and a lieutenant's bar.

It is worthy to note that in the same statement, Exhibit "S", Padiamat declares that the day following the abduction and killing of Rosa Baltazar, and
after he had rested the whole day, he and Ben Santos went to the store of Mrs. Lao; that on that occasion Mrs. Lao told Ben that she had already
learned from Osias the news of what happened in the poultry farm; that Mrs. Lao and Ben talked together and Mrs. Lao ordered beer for them; that
later Padiamat was asked by Ben to go out and so Padiamat went out and stayed in a restaurant; that after he got tired waiting he went back to the
store and asked Ben to go home; that they went away and on the way home Ben told Padiamat that Mrs. Lao had given him the sum of P400; that of
this sum Ben gave Padiamat P200 upon reaching Ben's house; that about one week thereafter Ben brought Padiamat again to the store of Mrs. Lao
in Echague and there Ben was given P200, of which amount he gave P100 to Padiamat.

On January 16, 1954, Padiamat again made another statement confirming the various statements contained in Exhibit "S". This statement was
introduced at the trial as Exhibit "T".

At the trial Alberto Padiamat did not admit having signed Exhibit "S" voluntarily, but explained that he signed it after having been given a blow on
the nose by Osias. He, however, denied the statements therein to the effect that he and Ben had received money from Mrs. Lao, and declared that it
was Ben Santos who ordered him to wear a fatigue suit and who directed where Rosa was to be taken. He also denied that it was he who hit Rosa
with a sledge hammer, declaring that it was Ben who boxed Rosa Baltazar, as a result of which she died. But he admits that it was he who dug the
grave, upon orders of Ben Santos.

The above evidence is, in short, the basis of the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants are guilty of the offense charged. As appellants are
represented by different attorneys, and have presented separate briefs, each of these will be considered separately.

We will now consider Padiamat's counsel's brief. It will be noted that appellant Alberto Padiamat, while admitting having accompanied Ben Santos in
the kidnapping of Rosa Baltazar claims not to have done anything except to keep Ben Santos company and to dig a grave after Rosa was killed by
fistic blows given by Ben Santos. Counsel de oficio argues that that portion of his confession, Exhibit "S", relating to his participation in the killing of
Rosa Baltazar, by delivering blows on the back part of her head with a mason's sledge hammer, can not possibly be true because had the sledge
hammer introduced in court really been used to kill Rosa, the blow delivered at the back of the head would have produced a fracture in the skull and
there would have been blood stains on the sledge hammer. However, it is argued, the medical examination showed that the skull was not fractured,
and neither were blood stains found on the sledge hammer. The argument would be valid if there were evidence to show that the blow given was a
strong one. However, there is no statement in Exhibit "S" that would indicate how strong the blow was. Since the blow came from behind, it is
possible that only a slight blow was delivered, sufficient to down and kill her without producing a fracture in her skull. As to the absence of blood
stains in the sledge hammer, it is not shown that the hammer had never been used for any other purpose after Rosa Baltazar was killed. In all
probability it must somehow have been used during the period between December 7 and January 8, and the use had erased he blood stains, if there
had been any. Counsel further argues that in the confession Padiamat and Ben returned the sledge hammer and shovel to the stone quarry near the
place where the body was interred, when as a matter of fact the same were found in the house of Ben Santos. In answer to this statement, it may be
stated that Ben Santos may have later on taken the hammer and shovel to his house in order to avoid detection, for fear that if the hammer and
shovel were found in the quarry near the grave, identification of the owners of said instruments might eventually lead to the perpetrators of the
crime. So we believe said instruments may have been removed from the stone quarry in which they were dumped, on the very same evening when
the crime was committed or soon thereafter.

As appellant Padiamat admits having accompanied Ben Santos in the kidnapping of Rosa Baltazar, we do not believe that he merely performed the
part of a spectator without actually helping Ben Santos in the commission of the crime. If, as Padiamat himself admits, he received orders from Ben
Santos, it does not seem at all possible that Padiamat did not take part in the killing of Rosa Baltazar. But even admitting that his participation
consisted merely in helping Ben Santos kidnap and bury the remains of the victim, that would not relieve him from any responsibility.

At any rate, we are not convinced about the truth of his modified story and we are more inclined to think that his confession, Exhibit "S", contains
the true facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, no claim having been made and no satisfactory evidence having been submitted by him to
prove that his confession was secured through force, intimidation or threat.

Counsel for appellant Rosario Lao argue that what makes the testimony of Osias Feliciano unreliable is the fact that he never once disclosed the plot
to Vicente Lao, his master. The evidence, however, does not indicate that Osias worked directly under Vicente Lao so as to make Osias owe loyalty
to him and not to his wife. Osias worked directly under Mrs. Lao, took orders from her and, perhaps, received his salary from her, thus making him
closer and loyal to her than to her husband.

The presence of Osias in the poultry farm from which Rosa was taken away and his presence during the conferences between Rosario Lao and Ben
Santos and later between Rosario Lao and Ben Santos and Padiamat would, it is also claimed, indicate the improbability of Osias' testimony. We
think otherwise. Osias must have been brought to the poultry farm on the night of December 7 on orders of Mrs. Lao, in order to check whether or
not the conspiracy was actually being carried out. This is very natural indeed. The presence of Osias at the conferences is explained by the fact that
Osias was a helper in the store, running errands acting as sales clerk, etc. Naturally, he was in the store on those occasions when Mrs. Lao, Santos
and Padiamat planned the killing of Rosa Baltazar.

Neither do we find any improbability in the incidents surrounding the taking away of Rosa Baltazar, as Osias described them. Osias knew when the
two men came, that they were going to take Rosa away. As he had been taken into confidence by Mrs. Lao, it was but natural for him to pretend not
to recognize the two men clad in army uniform. We make the following observations on the arguments of counsel that Osias' story is unworthy of
belief. A person who refuses to believe can always find fault with any minor incident which is inconsistent with his own belief. So it is with counsel
for the appellant Rosario Lao. They refused to believe in the testimony of Osias and, therefore, find reason or ground for suspecting every statement
he made. But this Court is duty-bound to review the evidence free from bias or prejudice. It is in this light that we have read the testimony of Osias
as well as the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense. And our conviction after an impartial reading of the testimonies and other evidence, is
that Osias told the truth. His story is not only rational, logical and direct but also corroborated in most of its essential details by the facts stated in
the confession of the other appellant, Padiamat. We also take into account that the judge below who heard the witnesses testify believed the
testimony of Osias. With this additional circumstance, we find no reason for refusing to believe his testimony.

Resuming what has been stated above, we find that the evidence submitted at the trial proves beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants Alberto
Padiamat and Rosario Lao, participated in the commission of the crime, the former as principal by direct participation and the latter as principal by
induction. The he committed is not kidnapping with murder as stated in the title of the information, but murder, for the reason that the conspirators
had planned to commit the latter crime, not that of kidnapping her first, and killing her later. (People vs. Camo, May 7, 1952). The crime is attended
by the following qualifying and aggravating circumstances: On the part of Alberto Padiamat by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation,
and the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and consideration of a price or reward; in the case of Rosario Lao, by
the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. The appellant Padiamat should be sentenced to the supreme penalty of death but considering
that he played merely a secondary role in the commission of the crime, there is lack of sufficient vote to impose said penalty; his sentence is,
therefore, reduced to that of reclusion perpetua. Rosario Lao is sentenced also to reclusion perpetua. Both of them are to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, jointly and severally, in the sum of 716,000. With costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. Nos. L-31042-31043 August 18, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, v. MARLO CANIAL Y ALIMON, ALFREDO EDWARDS Y CONTRERAS, and JANET CLEMENTE Y HERNANDEZ,
defendants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Automatic review of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in CCC-VI-234, 235 and 236, imposing upon each of accused Marlo Canial y
Alimon, Alfredo Edward y Contreras, and Janet Clemente y Hernandez three death penalties, and ordering them, jointly and severally, to indemnify
each set of the respective heirs of Benjamin Galang, Irineo Navasca and Zosimo Felarca in the amount of P12,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay
the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It appears that at about 9 o'clock in the evening of April 29, 1969, a shooting incident took place at Elias street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, resulting in death
to Benjamin (Totoy) Galang, Ireneo (Erning) Navasca, and Zosimo Felarca. On May 27, 1969, three separate informations for murder were filed in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Manila charging Marlo Canial, Alfredo Edwards, Janet Clemente and Francisco Sevilla with having conspired and
confederated in the shooting of the abovenamed persons, which was allegedly attended with evident premeditation, treachery and use of motor
vehicle. Arraigned, the accused entered pleas not guilty. Upon agreement by the parties, the three case were jointly
tried.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution tried to establish its case through the testimonies of its witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

LEONARDO FLORES declared that at 8 o'clock in the evening of April 29, 1969, a white Toyota car bearing five passengers stopped in front of the
residence of Dolores Hernandez in Elias, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where a party was then being held. The passengers - Marlo Canial, Alfredo Edwards,
Francisco Sevilla, Janet Clemente and Clarita
Divina 1- got out of the car and went inside the house. Later, he saw them come out. The witness was then at Aling Anding's store across the street
drinking (presumably liquor) with Totoy Galang, Romy Dalusong, one Jimenez and Toning Lañgis. 2As he was called by one Vicente Lladoc who was
with Canial's group, he crossed the street and talked to Clarita. Clarita told that Chit, the wife of a certain "Junior Ipis", was jealous of her and saying
bad things against her. While they were thus conversing, one Momoy 3arrived whom Clarita confronted with - "Why are your relatives like that?" At
that instance, Janet Clemente, who was standing with her three companions near the car, addressed Clarita: "Katak ka nang katak. Sandali na lang".
(You are always talking. Just a little more time.) 4chanrobles virtual law library

Then, he saw Janet pointing to Canial and Edwards the houses of Juancho Rodrigo, Chit, Totoy, Romy, and the persons who were then standing at
the street corner. Canial and Edwards said nothing, but Canial went at the back of the car, took a paper bag from the baggage compartment and
placed it inside the car near the driver's seat. He noticed the handle of a long firearm protruding from the paper bag. 5chanrobles virtual law library

His wife came and told him to go home, so he left the group. But when he had moved about 15 meters away, he heard gunfire. He turned his head
and saw Erning Navasca sprawled on the middle of the street near the parked car. He went behind an electric post and from there he saw Totoy
Galang grappling with Edwards for possession of a gun. 6Then, he heard gun report and Totoy Galang fell the ground. 7Janet, who was then standing
near the wall told Edwards, "Iyan pa ang isa dumarating" (There is another one coming), referring to Zosimo Felarca who was running toward the
car. Edwards aimed at Felarca, shot him once and hit him. 8He saw Canial kick the body of Navasca then shot it with a long gun. Thereafter, Canial
boarded the car and left with Janet and his two companions, 9but not before he had fired a volley of shots at the house of Jockey
Rodrigo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

CARLOS BOLANTIS testified that at about 8 o'clock the evening of April 29, 1969, he was resting inside the "bahay kubo" built at the corner of Elias
and Balaguer streets when a white car with five passengers arrived. The occupants of the car where Clarita Divina and accused Marlo Canial, Alfredo
Edwards, Francisco Sevilla and Janet Clemente. The two women alighted first and went up the house of Aling Loleng (Dolores Hernandez) followed
later by the driver of the car. 10Later, one of the men (Canial) came down, went behind the car, got something from baggage compartment and
placed it at the front seat. 11chanrobles virtual law library

After a while, Janet and Edwards came down from the house and talked to Canial. Then, he saw Janet pointing to his two companions the house
where Juancho Rodrigo, Chit, Romy and Totoy live. Canial thereafter moved around the car and went near the driver's seat. At this point, he noticed
Totoy Galang and another man walking towards parked car. After the other man (Erning Navasca) had passed the door of the car, he turned back
and a gunshot was heard. He saw Erning recoiled. He then ran towards the yard in front of the house of Aling Loleng and lay flat on his stomach
under a G.I. iron sheet supported by drums. 12He saw Totoy Galang leaning on the right side of the car, his two hands and head inside the vehicle.
Then, when the shot rang coming from the car, Totoy withdrew. Edwards came out of the car and shot Totoy who fell face down. Janet, who was
then leaning against the wall of the yard, told Edwards - "Ayon pa ang isa (There is another one). 13Edwards fired at somebody at the rear of the car,
and Zosimo Felarca fell. 14He Saw Canial went around the car, and fired at the house of Jockey Rodrigo. Janet then said to Canial, "Tama na darling.
Patay na." (That is enough, darling. He is already dead.) Canial fired a few more rounds of bullets, then returned to the car and it sped off, with Janet
and Edwards inside.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ROMEO DALUSONG narrated the incident as follows: He was standing behind the parked car watching basketball that evening of April 29, 1969,
when he heard Janet Clemente saying, "That is Romeo." He was about to go home when he met Totoy and Erning. Then, he heard gunshots. He
dropped to his stomach. When he made a move to stand, somebody poked a gun at him, so he remained flat on the ground. 15He was able to pick
up a piece of wood and threw it at the car hitting the rear mirror. Thus, he was able to stand and run and hid behind the drum about 5 meters away
from the car. While he was behind the drum, somebody came out of the car and fired at him; it was Edwards. Then, he saw Edwards aiming his gun
at Felarca who was running towards the car, and Felarca was hit. 16chanrobles virtual law library

EDUARDO MENESES testified for the prosecution as follows: He was drinking with Erning Navasca and a certain Ben in a house on Karapatan street
that evening of April 29, 1969, when Totoy Galang came. 17Totoy talked to Erning, then the two left. They came back after a while only to leave
again. When Erning failed to return after about 10 minutes, he went out to look for him. 18He found Erning in Elias street standing by a white car
talking to the driver. So, he approached the car together with Zosimo Felarca. But when they were almost behind the vehicle, somebody opened its
door and he heard gun reports. He ran and hid himself behind the drums along the road. 19And, he heard someone said, "There, behind the drums,
there is somebody in white." The drums were shot at, and the person who fired the gun was Francisco Sevilla. After while, he heard an unidentified
female voice saying, "That is enough, let us go." 20chanrobles virtual law library

ROGELIO BONIFACIO declared that at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 27, 1969, he saw Janet Clemente in Karapatan street, riding in a white
car with Marlo C Canial, Alfredo Edwards and Francisco Sevilla. 21Canial inquired for the whereabouts of Totoy Galang, and he gave the information
that Galang was at the race track. 22Then, they talked about Junior Ipis and his wife, and Janet remarked, "P... i ... nila. Inaagrabiyado nila ang
familia ko. Baka hindi sila tatagal." (s ... o ... b... They are oppressing my family. They may not last.) He relayed to Totoy Galang and "Junior Ipis" Janet
and Canial's inquiries, and the two wondered, "Bakit kaya?" (What could it be?) 23chanrobles virtual law library

FLORENCIO SAN MIGUEL, alias "Junior Ipis" gave the alleged motive behind the shooting incident. He declared that for about three months, he
carried on intimate relation with Clarita Divina; that his wife Chit discovered the affair, so he decided to put an end to it; that four days before April
29, 1969, Clarita's mother and sister (Janet) threatened him that if he would continue living with his wife, they would kill him, his friends and
relatives; 24that Benjamin Galang, Erning Navasca, and Zosimo Felarca were his friends. 25chanrobles virtual law library

JESUS VALDEZ testified that in the evening of April 25, 1969, he was in his house with Benjamin Galang, Ramon Hernandez, Romeo Dalusong, Hilario
Gutalban and Renato Tayag. Galang wanted Ramon Hernandez, a nephew of Dolores Hernandez (Janet's mother), to apologize to him (the witness)
for having made ugly remarks to his sister over the telephone. Ramon refused to do so, and there was an exchange of heated words between him
and Galang. 26Provoked, Galang slapped Hernandez. 27Thereupon, Dalusong brought Hernandez down the house and took him home. Witness and
Galang followed them. At the corner of Karapatan and Balaguer streets, Hernandez met Anita (a sister of Dolores Hernandez and aunt of Ramon)
and they conversed in the Bicol dialect. This angered Galang who did not understand the conversation and said: "Akala ninyo kung sino kayo dito.
Palabasin ninyo ang mga lalaki ninyo at haharapin ko." (You think you are people of importance in this place. Send out your menfolk and I am going
to face them.) 28chanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution also presented the testimonies of the forensic chemist of the Central Investigation Laboratory of the Manila Police Department to
establish that paraffin tests made on the hands of the victims of the shooting incident on April 29, 1969 found them negative for powder burns.
Tests on the bullet holes in the garment of Benjamin Galang also produced negative result, indicating that he must have been more than one yard
away from his assailant or assailants. 29chanrobles virtual law library

The medico legal officers of the MPD also affirmed on the stand the result of their examination of the bodies of the three victims and the causes of
their death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

For the defense, ALFREDO EDWARDS was allowed to take the witness stand and he testified that in the evening of April 29, 1969, he and Marlo
Canial attended the birthday party of Violeta Hernandez, Janet's younger sister; that after staying in their house for about half an hour, they agreed
to attend the wake of a deceased relative of Janet; 30that he, Canial and Lladoc went down the house and boarded the car; that while waiting for
Janet who was still bidding goodbye to the mother 31about 6 persons with guns approached the car; 32that one opened the door of on car on the
right side and pulled out Lladoc, while another person pulled Canial out on the left side; that when the man on the right side was trying to get him
out, he grabbed the man's .45 cal. gun; 33that while they were grappling for possession of the gun, he was able to pull the trigger successively to
save himself; that the man was hit and fell near him. The witness further declared that as there were other persons firing at them, he fired back with
the gun he had wrested from the fallen man; 35that when he was about to board the car, he noticed a man hiding behind a drum, so he took cover
and fired at him; 36that he did not notice where Janet was, it was only when they were about to leave that he saw Janet at the backseat of the car.
37chanrobles virtual law library

Accused MARLO CANIAL testified that on April 27, 1969, he was with Francisco Sevilla, Alfredo Edwards, and Janet Clemente when he met Rogelio
Bonifacio; that Janet talked to Rogelio, but he could not remember what the topic of conversation was; 38that he attended the birthday party of the
sister of Janet in the evening of April 29, 1969; that they first dropped by the house of the aunt of Janet because he and Edwards did not know how
to go to the house of Janet's mother; that with Janet and Clarita who rode with them, they went to the house of Janet's mother in Elias street;
39that they stayed in the house for only about half an hour; that they agreed to attend the wake of a dead relative of Janet, so he, Edwards, and
Vicente Lladoc went down the house and boarded the car; that he sat at the wheels, Edwards was in the middle, and Lladoc was seated at the right
side on the front seat of the car; 40that while they were waiting for Janet to come down, a group of armed men approached the car and surrounded
them; that one of the men opened the door at the left side, held him by the collar and tried to pull him out, pointing a gun at his head and saying, "p
... i ... ninyo. Mamamatay kayo ngayon." (S ... o ... b You are going to die). To which remark he answered, "Maawa po kayo sa amin. Bisita lang po
kami dito." (Have pity on us. We are only visitors here.)chanrobles virtual law library

Canial declared that he had then a gun beside him, and since he was not certain who was going to survive, he took his gun and fired first; that he
could not remember how many times he shot the man who pointed a gun at him; 41 that when he ran out of bullet, he took a carbine from the
baggage compartment of the car and fired it, since there were many who were shooting at them; 42that after firing the carbine, he placed it back
inside the car. He admitted on cross examination that both the .45 caliber pistol and the carbine that he used were unlicensed; 43that he had not
met Navasca or Galang before, and he did not know why those people would gang up on them that night; and that when they left Elias street, they
proceeded to Makati, then went to Baguio and finally holed up in Tarlac. 44chanrobles virtual law library

Accused FRANCISCO SEVILLA testifying for his defense denied being with the group of Canial in the evening of April 29, 1969. He declared that he
was then in a repair shop in Makati, Rizal, drinking with some friends; 45that when he learned the following morning that he was being implicated in
the shooting that took place in Elias street, he tried to contact Captain Sto. Tomas of the Manila Police Department, and when he failed to locate
him, he went into hiding in Nueva Ecija; that he surrendered to the police on May 22, 1969, upon learning of the shoot-to-kill order issued in the
case. He admitted, however, that he was with Canial and Janet on April 27, 1969, when they went to the house of a relative of Janet in Dimasalang
street. 46chanrobles virtual law library

The testimony of Sevilla was corroborated by NESTOR SORIANO, owner of the Saguitsit Motor Shop in Makati, who declared that Sevilla was in his
shop from 3:30 to 9:00 in the evening of April 29, 1979. 47chanrobles virtual law library

VICENTE LLADOC testified that in the evening of April 29, 1969, a birthday party was being held in the house of Dolores Hernandez; that Canial and
Edwards were among the visitors; that while they were in the house, it was agreed that they would pay their respect to a dead relative, so he, Canial
and Edwards went down and rode in the parked car; that Canial seated himself in the driver's seat, Edwards sat in the middle, while he sat at the
right side of the front seat; that while they were waiting for Janet and Clarita who were supposed to go with them, a group of men came toward the
car; 48that two of the men came near, Totoy Galang on the right side and Erning Navasca on the left; that Totoy poked a gun at him, while Navasca
pointed a gun at the head of Canial, saying, "Kung sino ang may baril sa inyo diyan, lumabas at papatayin ko" (Whoever has a gun among you, come
out and I'll kill you); that Totoy also said, "Magdasal na kayo at wala na kayong ligtas" (You better say your prayers because you have no more
escape); that Canial answered, "Wala po, maawa po kayo sa amin, hindi po naman kami nangaano; kami ho ay bisita lang dito" (Have pity on us, sir;
we are not doing anything, we are only visitors here); that Totoy then grabbed him by the shirt and pulled him out of the car; that he was dragged
and almost dumped into the canal; that when he got up, he ran into the house of Dolores Hernandez. 49Witness admitted that he did not see the
actual shooting of Galang and Navasca.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Accused Janet Clemente did not take the witness stand, counsel resting her case with the formal offer of the testimonies of Canial, Edwards, Lladoc,
Sevilla, and prosecution witness Florencio San Miguel. 50chanrobles virtual law library
On July 12, 1969, Judge Manuel R. Pamaran rendered judgment finding accused Marlo Canial, Alfredo Edwards and Janet Clemente guilty of murder
for the killing of Benjamin Galang, Ireneo Navasca and Zosimo Felarca, and sentenced them in each of the three cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CCC-VI-234,
235, and 236) to the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify each set of heirs of the victims in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay them
P20,000.00 by way of moral damages, and the costs. For lack of sufficient evidence against him, accused Francisco Sevilla was
acquitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The trial Court considered the killing as qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation, and aggravated by abuse of superior strength and
use of a motor vehicle. In addition, it found that the accused conspired and cooperated with one another in committing the
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Appellants Canial and Edwards, while admitting the slaying, pleaded the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The constant jurisprudence is that,
in such circumstances, the burden of proof lies on the accused to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the integrating
elements of their defense, 51i.e., illegal aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the attack, and lack of provocation on
their part. (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We agree with the trial Court that the claim of self-defense was not adequately established. None of the accuse suffered any wounds, although they
were allegedly surrounded by the victims and the allegedly armed companions to the latter; the hands of the deceased were found by the Police
forensic experts negative of powder burns, and so were the bullet holes in the garment of the late Galang, indicating that he must have been shot at
a distance of one yard or more by his assailants (ante, p. 5).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, going over the evidence adduced in these cases, we find no sufficient proof to sustain a finding that the three accused appellants
Marlo Canial, Alfredo Edwards and Janet Clemente are guilty of premeditated murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It has been shown, through the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses, that Janet and her sister Clarita arrived at their mother's
place in a white Toyota car with Canial and Edwards to attend a birthday party; that after staying in the house for a while, Canial, Edward and
Vicente Lladoc came out and sat at the front seat to the parked car; that there were then men standing and drinking at the store in the street
corner; that some of the men walked towards the car, Galang going to the left side of the vehicle where Canial was seated, while Navasca took to
the right side.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, these men were never able to come close to the vehicle much less talk to its occupants, as the defense would like to impress upon the
Court. The deceased were coming from the opposite direction and their approach was properly noticed by the trio who were seated inside the car. It
is likewise admitted that Canial had then an unlicensed 45 cal. pistol placed on the seat beside him. Certainly, a ma who carries with him unlicensed
firearms, including a carbine would not have allowed himself to become a sitting duck to any group of supposedly armed men. Canial and his group,
who must have been accustomed to violent encounters with armed persons (witness the presence of unlicensed pistol and carbine in the car),
would have readily sensed that the approaching men were not there for a friendly talk. So, before the men could reach them, Canial must have
gotten out of the car, as testified for the prosecution, and opened fire at Navasca who was within his direct view. This is clear from the downward
direction or trajectory path of the two wounds sustained by Navasca on the left chest almost close to each other, 52 indicating that his assailant was
at his front, and the absence of gunpowder around the bullet holes, showing that the gunwielder was more than one yard away when the wounds
were inflicted. After Navasca fell face down, and Canial had emptied his pistol, he went to the back of the car and took the carbine from the baggage
compartment. He shot the sprawled Navasca once more, hitting him at the left pre-auricular region (near the cheekbone), the bullet coming out on
the right side of the neck. The direction of this wound indicates that the gunwielder was situated overlooking the body of the
victim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is, of course, understandable that Edwards was not able to fire at Galang at once and he had to grapple first with the latter for possession of his
(Edwards) gun. It must be remembered that this accused was seated at the middle with Canial and Lladoc at his sides. In fact, Lladoc had to get out
of the car and run. Galang, who appears from the records to be an alert, aggressive person, must have tried to grab Edward's gun before the latter
could make use of it. Nevertheless, after a scuffle, Edwards was able to rid himself of Galang and shot him. This is evident from the absence of
gunpowder burns on the bullet hole in Galang's garment, establishing that Edwards was more than one yard away when he fired at Galang. Then,
after firing more shots at Galang, 53Edward shot Felarca who was coming from behind the vehicle.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Considering the proved circumstances, the incident appears to be more of a chance encounter between the two groups rather than the result of a
preconceived plan of the accused to go on a killing rampage on the particular occasion. Note that Canial, Edwards and Lladoc were seated in the car
ready to leave for another place when the victims came. That Canial and Edwards did not anticipate any untoward incident that night may be
gleaned from the fact that they had the unarmed Lladoc with them, who was even near the door, while Edwards was seated in the middle which
rendered him less free to move. Then, other than the uncorroborated declaration of witness Bonifacio that two days before the incident, Canial was
making inquiries as to the whereabouts of Galang, there is no record that the two, (Canial and Galang) really knew each other or that there was a
standing feud between them to warrant a conclusion that the accused purposely sought confrontation with the victims that night. The simultaneous
shooting on Navasca and Galang by Canial and Edwards was a reaction drawn by the sight of the men closing in on
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Janet's alleged grievances against Florencio San Miguel alias "Junior Ipis", for having abandoned her sister, or against Galang, for having slapped a
relative, do not prove anything. Assuming the truth of San Miguel's declaration that four days before April 29, 1969, Janet did threaten to kill him,
his relatives and friends, or that she really uttered in the presence of Bonifacio the veiled threat that "they (presumably referring to San Miguel or
Galang) may not last", such threats alone do not establish premeditation nor conspiracy among the accused to commit the crimes. Unless it is shown
that murder was planned, mere threat to kill do not amount to evident premeditation. 54For premeditation, as an aggravating circumstance,
requires direct proof that the crime was planned, that the accused clung to such determination to commit the offense, and that sufficient time had
elapsed from the time of planning to its fulfillment for him to dispassionately consider and accept its consequences. 55In fact, it has been held that
even where there was actual plan to kill, if the killing resulted in death to persons other than the intended victims, the circumstance of evident
premeditation can not be considered. 56chanrobles virtual law library

Since the encounter that led to the killings was casual and not sought, there can be no premeditation. For, as pointed out by counsel de oficio for
appellant Edwards (former Justice Conrado V. Sanchez) in his brilliant briefs, "[T]he fact of the matter is that had the three - Benjamin Galang,
Ernesto Navasca and Zosimo Felarca - not approached the car that night (and it may be added, from the left, the right, and the back), no killing could
have happened."chanrobles virtual law library

Because there is no proof that appellants expected to meet the deceased on the particular occasion, or had reason to anticipate that they would
approach the car wherein Canial, Edwards and Lladoc were crowded together in the front seat, it was error to declare the existence of evident
premeditation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This Court, through Mr. Justice Fernando, in the recent case of People vs. Torejas (L-29935, Jan. 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 158, 169), expressed the rule on
evident premeditation as supported by abundant jurisprudence, to be as follows:

In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only when there had been a cold and deep meditation, and a tenacious persistence in
the accomplishment of the criminal act. There must be "an opportunity to cooly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the
consequences of what they had planned to do, an interval long enough for (the) conscience and better judgment to overcome (the) evil desire and
scheme." Where "there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation' it cannot be said to exist" since it is not enough that premeditation
be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious untoward acts evincing determination to commit the crime. It is
not "premeditation" merely; it is "evident premeditation.'" It follows then that if at most, the accused was heard to express a resolve to commit a
crime without any evidence that he did seek out the deceased to kill him, it cannot be said that the crime was so attended, as it must "be well-
defined." It must be remembered in this connection that to justify such a finding, it is not enough that there be a threat on the life of the victim; it
must be proved that the accused not only had decided to commit the crime but also that the decision was the result of meditation calculation and
reflection. Nor is it to be forgotten that premeditation as in the case of any other aggravating circumstance must be duly proved. Otherwise stated,
the evidence must such as to dispel any reasonable doubt as to its existence. The same quantum as is necessary to establish the crime is required;
that degree of clarity is indispensable.

It may be added that the fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter in question likewise rules out the idea of its having been the effect
of a conspiracy. The peppering of the house of San Miguel with shots fired by Canial alone and after the three victims had lost the lives, is no
indication of concerted action on the part of the three appellants from which conspiracy can be legitimate
inferred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the cases at bar, no evidence whatsoever has been presented to show that on account of her grievances, Janet had planned with her two other
co-accused to kill Galang, Navasca and Felarca, or anybody for that matter; or they clung to that plot, and went to Elias street that evening of April
29, 1969, to carry out such a plan. The presence alone of unlicensed guns in the car does not establish any preconceived arrangement to kill
anybody that particular evening; the guns could have been there for a various of reason, such as habit or precaution, not necessarily commit
murder. The fact remains that Canial, Edwards and Lladoc (who had nothing to do with the shooting) boarded the car to go somewhere else, and
that it was while they were waiting for Janet to join them that the victims walked towards the car. The accused evidently did not seek the
confrontation. And in this regard, it may be noted that not even one of the prosecution witnesses was able to convincingly place Janet or to testify
on her participation during shooting of Galang or Navasca. For according to defense witnesses, she was still inside the house when Galang and
Navasca fell victims to Canial and Edward's guns.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It may be true that Janet pointed to Edwards the deceased Felarca, who rushed to the aid of his friends, despite the gunfire, from behind the car of
the accused, and that Edwards promptly shot the latter. But considering the situation that Edwards had already hit Navasca, and Canial on the other
side of the car was using and firing a carbine, it is unlikely that Janet's statement - "Iyan pa ang isa dumarating" - was taken and obeyed by Edwards
as an order to shoot. From all indications, Edwards then did not need prodding or instigation from anybody to fire at anyone who would rush
towards him, as Felarca had imprudently done. Janet's statement partook more of a warning to Edwards of an impending threat than an inducement
to shoot.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

For the utterances of an accused to make him a principal by inducement, it is necessary that the words be of such nature and uttered in such a
manner as to become the determining cause of the crime, and that the inducement precisely was intended to serve such purpose. 57In other words,
the inciting words must have great dominance and influence over the person who acts; they ought to be direct and as efficacious or powerful as
physical or moral coercion or violence itself. 58Thus, where the alleged inducement to commit the crime was no longer necessary to incite the
assailant, then the uttered can not be held accountable for the crime as a principal by inducement. 59Her statement do not, therefore, make Janet
Clemente incur criminal liability for the killings effected by her co-accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The foregoing conclusion renders irrelevant the claim of Janet Clemente that she was deprived of her right to fair trial; that she was denied
opportunity in the court below to present her evidence and, therefore, the decision under consideration as to her is a nullity. Moreover, such claim
is devoid of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The records bear out the fact that during the entire proceedings, she was properly represented by counsel de parte; that her said counsel cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses, and like her other co-accused, she had every opportunity to present proof on her behalf. That her counsel
perhaps as part of their strategy, desisted from abduction evidence and relied merely upon the strength or weakness of the proof thus presented by
both parties, can not be taken against the regularity of the proceedings in the lower court much less against the validity of the decision of the trial
judge. It is elementary that a party is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case that he can not be heard later to complain that the
result might have been different had he proceeded differently. 60A client, in fact has to bear the adverse consequences of the mistakes, 61even of
the negligence 62of his counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Neither can we sustain the trial court's consideration of the use of motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 14, paragraph 20 of
the Revised Penal Code, motor vehicle would be an aggravating circumstance if the crime were committed by means thereof. There is no question
that in these cases, the arrival and departure on the accused in a white Toyota car had nothing to do whatsoever to the slaying of the
victims.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The court below, however, properly considered abuse of superior strength to have aggravated the crime. The use by the accused, particularly Canial,
of firearms against the deceased who were found unarmed, gave to the former that element of superiority which they took advantage to prevent
any retaliation or defense from their adversaries. The claim of the accused that the deceased were also armed and with companions has not been
fully substantiated. What has been proved is that the deceased Galang, Navasca an Felarca never fired guns and no such weapons were found with
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is modified as follows:chanrobles virtual law library

(a) On ground of reasonable doubt, Janet Clemente is acquitted of the charges against her;chanrobles virtual law library

(b) Accused Marlo Canial is found guilty of homicide for the killing of Irineo Navasca, attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and he is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and
1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Irineo Navasca in
the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay them moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and � of the cost, together with all the accessory penalties of
the law;chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Accused Alfredo Edwards is found to have caused the death of Benjamin Galang and Zosimo Felarca. However, said accused, having died
pending this appeal, on July 19, 1972, at the National Penitentiary, his criminal liability for the wrongs he had committed is declared to have been
legally extinguished.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Fernando and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is constitutionally presumed innocent, depends upon the strength of the
prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his prosecution for murder with assault upon a person
in authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even stronger by the defense itself.

As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to Napoleon Montealegre was committed as follows:

At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilia was eating at the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the
smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his
car whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and soon thereafter the two
smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente Capalad and the accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and
collared both of them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' Forcing them up, he asked the waitress ff she knew them but the waitress said she did
not. 1 Then the mayhem began.

While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad with his left hand, Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously
pulled out a knife from a scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist and started stabbed Camantigue in the back. 2 Camantigue let loose
Montealegre to draw the gun from his holster but Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from defending
himself Montealegre used both his hands for his purpose 3 as Capalad continued stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three
fen to the floor and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered toward the door. Camantigue fired and, continuing the pursuit
outside, fired again. 5 Capalad fled into a dark alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalad was later
found slumped in the alley with a bullet wound in Ms chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad survived, both expiring the following day. 6

The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7 Having been informed of the incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police
immediately organized a team that went to look for him that very night. 8 They did not find him in his house then but he was apprehended in the
morning of March 12,1983, on board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he was the fugitive being sought. 9

Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testified that death was caused by shock due to massive internal hemorrhage
caused by seven stab wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and diaphragm.10 The weapon used was 6" in length and about 2
to 2.5 cm. in width and the blood found on it was analyzed as human.11 The stabbing incident was narrated in detail at the trial by Abadilla, 12 who
was corroborated by Generoso San Juan. 13

On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre prevented Camantigue from drawing his pistol while he was being stabbed by Capalad,
demonstrating with the aid of court personnel the relative positions of the three during the incident. 14

On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more emphatically, thus:

Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue upon drawing his gun, what happened to Camantigue?
A. He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense because he was being held by Montealegre and he was being stabbed at the back.
15

He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of the accused-appellant —

Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at the back, accused Montealegre was being held by Pfc. Camantigue at that
time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of Camantigue at that time?
A. Yes sir.
Q And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir, he knew. 16

In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared:

Q. And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to draw gun, Montealegre grabbed the hand of Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. With what hand?
A. Both hands, sir.
Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?
A. No. sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.
Q. With both hands?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands rights hand of Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both hands the hand of Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?
A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor. 17

San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct examination.
Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was Montealegre?
A. He was on the right side.
Q. What was he doing at that time?
A. When Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun but Montealegre held his hand.
Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?
A. No. sir.
Q. What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun? They slammed down on the floor and when they were already on the floor, I ran
away because I was already figures lightened. 18

The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he insisted:
A. When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue.
Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue, what happened to Camantigue?
A. He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was holding his hand, Capalad was stabbing him at the back. 19

And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows:

Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while Montealegre was holding the right hand of the policeman to prevent him from
drawing his gun?
A. Yes, sir. 20

The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in confinning his own guilt. He claimed he ran away before the stabbing but his
testimony, consisting of denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have the
ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the charge established against him by
the prosecution.
Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad, what happened if any?
A. Camantigue pulled his gun.
Q. What happened after that?
A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened. 21
xxx xxx xxx

A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really happened.
Q. Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A. I did not see. 22

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From whom did you come to know that Pfb. Camantigue shot and killed Vicente Capalad?
A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that Camantigue killed Capalad. 23

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc.Camantigue was holding both of you, did you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc.
Camantigue?
A. I did not see anything. 24

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue while Capalad was on the left side?
A. I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the left.
Q. But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of Camantigue?
A. I am not sure if that is the right side.
Q. But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster were placed?
A. I cannot remember. 25

It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was happening on that evening of March 11, 1983. As one of the principal
figures of the stabbing incident, he could not have not known, nor could he later not remember, that startling event that even more onlookers could
not forget. The evidence has established that the accused-appellant was directly and personally involved and was in fact one of the two persons held
by the victim when he was stabbed. Yet Montealegre would now insist, quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that night.

If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would have been less likelihood of Capalad's attack as Camantigue's attention
would have been fully concentrated on his lone captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing to restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol
and defending himself against Capalad if the accused-appellant had, by his own account, already escaped before the stabbing.

It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the accused-appellant did was attempt to hide, only to be found the
following morning on board a bus bound for outside Cavite City. When apprehended, he first gave a false name before he finally admitted his
Identity, thus beginning the mesh of contradictions, admissions and denials, in which he would enshare himself.

The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the time of the stabbing, the victim was in uniform and, therefore, could
easily be recognized as a person in authority. Several witnesses testified as to his attire when he was killed. 26 And even assuming that the victim
was in civilian clothes on that tragic night, the record shows that no less than the accused-appellant himself, replying to questions put to him by the
prosecution, declared twice that he knew the victim to be a policeman. 27

The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted
in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him from
drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true that the accused- appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless
equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or
unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence correspondence of a prior agreement between Capalad and Montealegre, their
subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view, which conforms to our consistent holding on this
matter:

Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that, at the time the offense was
committed, participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be inferred from the attendant circiumstances. 29

xxx xxx xxx

We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill Regino Bautista. The whole incident happened because the accused came upon
Bautista and Mallabo fishing within or near the fishpond enclosure of Carlo Aquino which was under the care of Vicente Cercano.

But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be established, it is not necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or
agreement to commit the assault; it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all the accused by their acts manifested a common intent or
desire to attack Bautista and Mallabo, so that the act of one accused became the act of all. 30

xxx xxx xxx

If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven. A conspiracy only be entered into after the
commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime. 31

As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:

There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from behind when the latter was stabbed by his collaborated Victor Buduan, was
a positive act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed
that had not appellant held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could have partied the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By
immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and although there was no anterior conspiracy , the two cousins showed unity of criminal
purpose and intent immediateIy before the actual stabbing. 32

xxx xxx xxx

It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized the running decedent in such a manner that the latter could not even move or tum
around. This enabled the pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo and was barely five meters away from the decedent, to finally overtake
him and stab him at the back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore performed another act-holding the decedent—without which the crime
would not have been accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable cooperation. 33

The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, as qualified by
treachery, with assault upon a person in authority. Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there
being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical and
fimeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at the trial.

Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty while enforcing the law against the abuse of dangerous drugs. He was
struck down with no less than seven vicious stabs by a man who, by his own admission, was at the time of the incident "burned" on marijuana. The
kiner also eventually succumbed, and that made the second life needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug addiction. There was another Iife also
ruined, this time of the 28 year-old accused-appellant himself, although, fortunately for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever
foreclosed. In the somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he has done, he may yet find his ultimate redemption in
rehabilitation and remorse.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12990 January 21, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAZARO JAVIER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

MALCOLM, J.:

We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as follows:

Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche
municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral
open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of
sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de
Chavez leading the carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found
this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by
Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the
possession of the accused.

As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases of this character is that, although the persons
who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal
is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession
they may be properly convicted of the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil., 425.) In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to
insinuate that one of the Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.

The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit
B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the
justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine
Bill of Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted
at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day
said in a case of the Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as
facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence,
and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-
examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal
may have before it the department and appearance of the witness while testifying. ( U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provisions on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example U. S. vs.
Tamjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U. S. vs. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil., 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the
present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some exception thereto.

The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the
testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former action between the same parties relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception
provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the
statement of Presa a dying declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination. Under these
circumstances, not to burden the opinion with an extensive citation of authorities, we can rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk.,
281 [King's Bench Div.]) occurring in the year 1696. It appears that a deposition of B., examined by the Mayor of Bristol under oath, but not in P's
presence, was offered. It was objected that B, being dead, the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench
consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of both courts that these deposition should not be given in evidence, the defendant not
being present when they were taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are faced with the
alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-examination and
the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court.

With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further find this to be reversible error and remand the case for a
new trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of
the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants
are each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-
third part of costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22087 November 15, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAURICIO LABIS and ISABELO CABILES, defendants-appellants.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Mauricio Labis and Isabelo Cabiles are appealing from a judgment of conviction for murder. The two were, on February 29, 1960, charged by the
provincial fiscal for the killing of the deceased Clarito Fabria in Barrio Taytay, Municipality of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental sitting at Cagayan de Oro City, on September 12, 1963, found both accused guilty as charged and sentenced each
to "suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Clarito Fabria in the sum of P6,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs."

The prosecution, relying mainly on the testimonies of two eyewitnesses — Vidal Masong and Ahenor Pagasihan and that of Dr. Megdonio Bacal,
attending physician, established the following:

At about 3:00 p.m. on August 1, 1959, in Barrio Taytay, Municipality of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, appellant Labis, with a bolo, chased the
deceased Clarito Fabria near the national highway. When the latter happened to pass by a coconut tree, appellant Cabiles who was standing there,
grabbed him and locked his arms around the shoulders of Clarito Fabria with Cabiles' chest pressing against the right shoulder of Clarito. This
enabled Labis to overtake Clarito Fabria and thereupon, the former stabbed the latter with the bolo at his back.

Appellant Cabiles then released the deceased who, badly wounded, tried to run further towards his father's house. Later, Clarito Fabria was brought
for treatment to the provincial hospital at Cagayan de Oro City, where he died two hours later.

The attending physician, Dr. Bacal, found an opening stab wound, about three inches long, at the back lumbar region, middle, which deviated
laterally to the left, and causing an exit wound of one inch in front, at the left iliac region (lower abdomen).1 Dr. Bacal also testified that the two
wounds could have been caused by a bolo and that the decedent's death was due to profuse internal hemorrhage resulting from multiple
perforation of the sigmoid and mysentery of the intestine, organs usually found on the left of the abdominal cavity.

The defense narrated the events differently. According to appellants Labis and Cabiles and three of their alleged eyewitness, what transpired was
this:

On the morning of August 1, 1959, Labis and Cabiles with several of their barriomates attended a community group work, locally known as "pahina",
at the public school compound. About noontime, they all proceeded to the wedding party at Pedro Estrada's house where the deceased and the
latter's brother-in-law. Raul Espejon were also present. Lunch over, the group left the place together at the invitation of the decedent and Espejon.
On the way home, the two walked ahead while Labis, Cabiles and the rest followed about 20 meters behind.

As the decedent Fabria and Espejon neared the national highway, the latter stopped near a coconut tree. As appellant Labis approached, Espejon
confronted him with a bolo, asking whether he had a grudge against Clarito Fabria. Labis answered that they ought not fight as they were brothers.
Sensing trouble, Francisco Labis, a third degree cousin of Mauricio Labis, intervened and advised the two not to fight. Raul Espejon then repaired
towards the nearby house of Dionisio Gaid and Labis with the others went their way.

At this moment, Clarito Fabria, brandishing a bolo, came running towards them and asked Labis of the latter had any grudges against him. Labis
retreated with upraised hands and endeavoured to pacify the deceased by calling him brother and pleading that they should not fight. Clarito
answered by slashing his bolo at Labis who, in trying to parry the blow, was wounded on his left wrist. Labis retreated further but Raul Espejon
reappeared on the scene and bolo Labis at the nape, wounding him also. Appellant Labis then turned to face Espejon when Clarito Fabria hurled his
bolo at him with the handle-end thereof hitting Labis on the breast The decedent now bent down to pick up the bolo which fell by Labis' left side but
the latter immediately warded off Clarito's hands. This caused the decedent to turn halfway to his right, exposing his left flank to Labis. Instantly,
Labis drew his own bolo from the waist and thrust it at the decedent's back, at the left side of the lumbar region on the level of the pelvis.

Clarito Fabria then ran away wounded towards Dionisio Gaid's house. A few moments later, policeman Maximo Gallego, who had fired several shots
upwards while still at a distance, arrived at the scene of the incident and Labis surrendered to him the bolo (Exh. C, also marked as Exh. 12) he used
in stabbing Clarito Fabria and also the bolo (Exh. 14) which the latter allegedly hurled at him. Policeman Gallego placed Labis and Cabiles under
custody and then went after Raul Espejon in the house of Hugo Fabria and got Raul's bolo. Still later, Gregorio Salas, the Chief of Police of El
Salvador, arrived and brought appellants Labis and Cabiles to the municipal building for investigation.

Appellant Cabiles denied having held the decedent Clarito Fabria as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. He claimed that when the deceased
confronted Labis with a drawn bolo, he (Cabiles) and Francisco Labis stood between the protagonists and tried to pacify them and prevent a fight.
However, when Clarito Fabria threw his bolo at Labis, Cabiles retreated about four meters away since he was afraid that Clarito carried a dagger also
which he might use.

As between the two conflicting versions, the trial court upheld the prosecution's and rejected that of the defense. And We quote the findings and
conclusions of said court:

At first blush the theory advanced by the defense would seem foolproof but a closer examination of the same reveals weaknesses that cannot stand
the test of judicial scrutiny. The defense witnesses, either close friends or relatives of the accused, gave evidently well-rehearsed testimonies likely
to mislead the gullible and unsuspecting person. However, a careful evaluation of their version of the incident would show its inconsistency with the
natural course of events and human conduct. For instance, their claim that the accused Mauricio Labis delivered the fatal blow at the back of Clarito
Labis while they were embracing each other and as the latter was about to pick up his bolo from the ground, is not borne out by the position and
direction of the wounds of said victim. Their observations do not also coincide because one declared that Mauricio Labis pushed aside Clarito Fabria
instead of embraced him as two others testified. Some even asserted that Clarito Fabria was hit on the left side of his back which is not true.

The finding of Dr. Megdonio Bacal, the examining physician at the Provincial Hospital of Misamis Oriental, located the entrance wound of about 3
inches in length at the back of Clarito Fabria across the lower portion of his spinal column, and the injury deflected laterally towards his left front
side below the waistline causing an exit wound of about an inch in length (Exhs. "B", "B-1" and "B-2"). Since it is admitted that the accused Mauricio
Labis, who is right-handed, used the bolo, Exh. "12", about two feet long, pointed and wide at its middle, by no stretch of imagination could the
wound have followed such a course, irrespective of whether said Clarito Fabria was slightly bending to pick up his weapon or in a standing position
locked in an embrace with said accused as the defense tried to picture during the reenactment of the incident in open court. The wound should
have come out on the right side of the deceased if the accused was in front of him when he delivered the fatal thrust. The only plausible hypothesis
deducible from the position and direction of the wounds of Clarito Fabria is that it was inflicted behind him or towards his right side. Such
circumstances therefore, lend color of truth and bear out the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Mauricio Labis stabbed Clarito Fabria
from the back as Isabelo Cabiles was holding the deceased. It must be remembered, however, that according to the defense witnesses themselves,
Clarito Fabria was more robust and stronger in build than the accused Mauricio Labis so that he could not have been easily bested by the latter. But
as the defense would put it, the encounter involved Clarito Fabria and his brother-in-law Raul Espejon on one side against Mauricio Labis alone on
the other, and if that is true, the latter must be a superman to have come out of the struggle practically unscathed.

Furthermore, it would seem odd if not contrary to human behavior for Clarito Fabria to have hurled his own weapon at Mauricio Labis in the course
of their armed struggle and endeavor again to retrieve it knowing that Mauricio Labis was also provided with a bolo. The court cannot also conceive
why the wound of Mauricio Labis on his left forearm allegedly caused by the thrust of Clarito Fabria's bolo appeared small and superficial, involving
only the skin, and that on his nape only an abrasion, although it was supposedly produced by a slash administered by Raul Espejon with another
bolo, considering the sharpness of the weapons used and the strength of the blows delivered as described by the witnesses for the defense.
Certainly a potent bolo like the one allegedly used by Raul Espejon would not have produced just an abrasion which according to medical science
may be caused by mere hubbing of the skin against a hard object. Likewise, the arm wound of Mauricio Labis would have been bigger or deeper
because the bolo (Exh "14") allegedly used by Clarito Fabria is not only sharp but also double-edged at its point.

The court, nevertheless, is inclined to believe that the deceased Clarito Fabria was not provided with a bolo at the time because he came from the
wedding party in the house of Pedro Estrada and the accused themselves observed him carry none while they were yet there. On the other hand,
Mauricio Labis admitted having brought his bolo along and declared that Isabelo Cabiles also carried a bolo as both of them came from the "pahina"
(group labor) at the schoolhouse. Isabelo Cabiles, nevertheless, denied having a bolo at that time, but Federico Labis and Dionisio Gaid declared that
he was also provided with a bolo.

It is very probable that one of the bolos delivered by Mauricio Labis to patrolman Gallego may be that of the accused Isabelo Cabiles and Gallegos'
testimony about the ownership of that bolo by Clarito Fabria is unworthy of credence because of his affinity to said Mauricio Labis by marriage.

The testimonies of Dionisio Gaid and Demosthenes Dadolo are not entitled to belief as is that of the Chief of Police Gregorio Salas because it appears
that these witnesses were never investigated by said Chief at all although according to him, he saw them immediately after the incident and he went
back to the place the next day to look for eyewitnesses but could only find the prosecution witnesses Ahenor Pagasihan Vidal Masong and Simplicio
Martinez. Moreover, if the Chief of Police believed that Isabelo Cabiles did not have any participation in the killing why did he include himself as one
of the accused in his amended complaint filed before the Justice of the Peace of El Salvador on August 7, 1959? But the actuations of said Chief of
Police in connection with this case are susceptible of suspicion for his failure to take immediate steps to insure the testimonies of eyewitnesses to
the incident before they had a chance for reflection.2

In their first three assignments of errors, appellants assail the above findings and conclusions and would have this Court believe their witnesses —
whom the trial court discredited — rather than the prosecution witnesses. The issue posed then is one of credibility of witnesses. And the rule is
that unless appellants satisfactorily show that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance as would offset the results of the case, the appellate court will not disturb said court's findings especially when the same are based on the
evidence on record.3

Appellants here failed in that task. They merely harped on the requisites of self-defense and casually excused the inconsistencies in the testimonies
of their witnesses as "immaterial". Their theory of self-defense is negatived by the nature and location of the victim's wounds which, having a right-
to-left direction, could not have possibly been inflicted by a right-handed person in front of the victim with a two-feet long bolo. Moreover, it
appears highly improbable that appellant Labis suffered no serious cut wound,4 as per the medical certificate Exh. 8, altho the defense witnesses
uniformly testified that Labis was slashed at the wrist with a sharp bolo by the decedent, and on the nape with a similar lethal instrument by Raul
Espejon. Appellant Cabiles was even emphatic that he saw blood oozing from Labis' nape.5 Having advanced self-defense, the burden was on
appellant Labis to justify the killing of the decedent by clear and convincing evidence. And the trial court having discredited his witnesses, it was
further his duty in this appeal to prove the lower court in error. Unfortunately, appellant has submitted no cogent reason for Us to disregard the trial
court's findings and conclusions which are all based on the evidence on record.

Altho motive need not be considered anymore on account of the positive identification of the accused,6 yet contrary to appellants' insistence, there
is ample proof of motive. Reuben Bajuyo testified7 that on July 23, 1959, appellant Labis and one Isaias Bahian went to his house looking for the
decedent to kill him for having stolen his (Labis') chicken. The trial court did not disbelieve Bajuyos' testimony but rather held it insufficient to
establish evident premeditation.

Appellants' next submission that prosecution eyewitnesses Pagasihan and Masong were not present in the scene of the crime is without merit. They
base their claim on the testimonies of their witnesses whom the lower court found devoid of credibility. Moreover, the negative testimonies of
these witnesses cannot prevail over the positive statements of said prosecution witnesses.

However, the testimony of prosecution witness Pagasihan cannot be given full credit in view of its serious contradiction with his sworn affidavit,
Exhs. 5 and 5-A where in Pagasihan claimed to have seen only the chasing of Raul Espejon by Rufo Labis and that in the fight between Mauricio Labis
and the decedent, appellant Cabiles did not hold the decedent but even tried to stop the fight. Of course Pagasihan when confronted with said
affidavit, repudiated it and claimed that he was bribed and threatened into signing it by appellant Labis.8

Still, Masong's lone testimony is sufficient to sustain appellants' conviction.9 The fatal stabbing of the decedent occurred just about five meters
away from him.10 No improper motive has been shown why he would impute actuations of serious consequences against appellants. The minor
flaws in his testimony he satisfactorily explained, thus: altho he also saw the chasing of Raul Espejon by Rufo Labis, he did not mention that fact
anymore in his direct testimony since it was not the subject of the case being tried, a point which was also noted by the trial court.11 Masong stated
that as of the date when he was testifying he could no longer remember the exact amount of Asuncion Fabria's debt which he was trying to collect
since it was only a little account from the sari-sari store.12 He was not able to collect from Asuncion that day since the door of her house was closed
and because of the stabbing incident that happened in his presence.13 The reason why he saw no policemen in the scene of the crime and why he
was not investigated there, was because he immediately went home after the incident14 and Masong did not tell his wife about the stabbing since
he did not want to get nervous.15
His defense of justified killing unsustainable, appellant Labis must suffer the consequences for his unlawful act. The killing of the decedent was
qualified by treachery. It has been clearly established that Clarito Fabria was being held firmly by appellant Cabiles thereby preventing the former
from moving or making any defense when Labis struck him from behind with a bolo. There was hardly, if any, risk at all for Labis; the decedent was
defenseless.16 Appellant Labis is liable for murder.

This brings Us to the liability of appellant Cabiles. Unlike Labis, Cabiles did not advance self-defense. His stand was non-participation in the killing.
However, the entire defense version of the incident was discredited by the lower court. Even with particular reference to appellant Cabiles, We are
satisfied that the trial court did not err.

First, it is clear from the evidence on record that Cabiles' alignment and sentiments were with Labis They went together at the "pahina". They went
together to the marriage celebration and then went home in company. Secondly, it strikes Us as strange behavior for appellant Cabiles to act
courageously and bravely when danger is near and real, and then to lose such courage when danger has become less imminent and remote.
According to the defense version, Cabiles was standing between Labis and the decedent, who had a drawn bolo, trying to prevent the fight. And yet,
after the decedent had allegedly thrown his bolo at Labis and had, to all appearances, become unarmed, Cabiles withdrew about four meters away
on the conjecture that the decedent might still be possibly armed with a dagger. A man sincerely desirous of putting an end to such incident would
have immediately taken advantage of the decedent's mometary armlessness by holding him. Cabiles himself admitted his being a cousin of the
decedent.17 And besides, there were two of them he and Francisco Labis — who could have subdued the decedent whom they pictured as the one
itching for a fight. Lastly, it appears odd why appellant Cabiles never vigorously insisted on his innocence from the very start. It does not appear that
he ever strongly protested being placed under police custody together with appellant Labis — who openly admitted having stabbed the decedent —
and being brought with Labis to the municipal building for investigation. If he had no participation really, why should he be placed under arrest like
Mauricio Labis? Francisco Labis was, allegedly, in exactly the same situation as he was. Yet, Francisco Labis was never placed under police custody.
These considerations are incompatible with Cabiles' belated plea of innocence.

On the other hand, it has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized the running decedent in such a manner that the latter could not
even move or turn around. This enabled the pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo and was barely five meters away from the decedent,
to finally overtake him and stab him at the back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore performed another act — holding the decedent —
without which the crime would not have been accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable cooperation.18 Consequently, appellant
Cabiles is also liable for murder.

As recommended by the Solicitor General, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender will be appreciated in favor of appellants Labis and
Cabiles. Instead of running away, they voluntarily went with the policemen who took them into custody. With no aggravating circumstance to offset
voluntary surrender, We must impose the penalty for murder — reclusion temporal maximum to death — in the minimum period, which is reclusion
temporal maximum.

Since the resulting penalty is neither death nor life imprisonment, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies.19 Appellants are therefore entitled to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which is reclusion temporal maximum — the penalty to be imposed in view of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender — and the minimum term — which is one (1) degree lower from the penalty prescribed by the Code for murder
— is anywhere from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
medium.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified and appellants Mauricio Labis and Isabelo Cabiles are sentenced to imprisonment for
a minimum term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, and not to exceed a maximum term of twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal maximum. In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ alias "Moding", and FEDERICO CONRADO, defendants-appellants.

PADILLA, J.:

Before the Court is Federico Conrado's appeal from the decision * of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, Branch I, in
Criminal Case No. L-2593 entitled, "The People of the Philippines vs. Melquiades Fernandez, alias 'Moding' and Federico Conrado" convicting him
and the other accused of the crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer inter alia two (2) death penalties.

The criminal complaint dated 2 June 1982 filed before the trial court, reads as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1982, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at barangay Taloy, municipality of Malasiqui, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned offended party Rebecca M. Soriano,
a virgin and 15 years old, by means of force and intimidation and against the will of the latter. 1

Assisted by counsel, the accused Fernandez and Conrado, uncle and nephew respectively, pleaded not guilty on arraignment 2 and underwent trial.

Teofilo Malong employed Rebecca Soriano as a househelper since September 1981. Residing in Teofilo's house were his wife and daughters Amelita
and Ma. Theresa. Rebecca Soriano testified that on 13 January 1982 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and after she had just finished taking a
bath and still naked, the two (2) accused, both in short pants, surreptitiously entered the bathroom. To prevent her from making an outcry, a piece
of cloth was tightly tied around her neck, after which she was forcibly laid down. Conrado held her hands behind her while Fernandez sexually
abused her. She declared that, immediately after Fernandez had raped her, Conrado in turn went on top of her and likewise succeeded in having
sexual congress with her against her will. She added that, thereafter, Fernandez got a handful of mud near the bathroom and placed it on her
vagina. Thereupon, she ran to the upper floor of the house to report the tragic incident to Amelita Malong. 3

During the trial, Amelita Malong declared that in that afternoon of 13 January 1982, she was combing her hair in her room when she saw the
approaching Rebecca, naked with smeared mud on her lower private part and a piece of cloth around her neck. She testified that after she was told
by Rebecca about the incident, they reported the same to her father, Teofilo, who was in his store. She also declared that she knew both the
accused because Fernandez used to spray their mango trees while Conrado sold to them a dog sometime in November 1981. 4

Teofilo Malong likewise testified for the prosecution. He stated that upon being informed that his housemaid Rebecca was raped by the accused, he
and his family, together with Rebecca, proceeded to the office of the INP Police Station of Malasiqui to report the crime and had Rebecca physically
examined by Dr. Wilfredo Claudio of the San Carlos General Hospital in that same afternoon. He further said that the following day, or on 14 January
1982, he, Amelita and Rebecca gave their written statements to the police. 5

Submitted as evidence for the prosecution was the "Medico-Legal Certificate" issued by Dr. Claudio, indicating his findings of "hymenal lacerations
at 6, 10, 3 o'clock positions and one dead sperm cell seen on a slide examined." 6

In defense, the two (2) accused denied any involvement in the offense, both claiming they were nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was
committed.

More particularly, Fernandez claimed he was in his house at Taloy, Malasiqui weaving baskets when the incident happened. He admitted having
been formerly employed by Teofilo for about two (2) years to spray his mango trees and stated that during the period he was hired as such, he lived
alone in a small hut constructed under a mango tree. 7 Conrado, on the other hand, alleged that when the crime was committed, he was at
Malimpuec, Malasiqui as he was hired to spray the mango trees of a certain Mr. Overo Bo. Malimpuec is his hometown but he admitted that he
used to go to Bo. Taloy, prior to the incident, as his parents-in-law lived there. 8

In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt of both accused had been established beyond shadow of any doubt, the following observations and
conclusions are made:

As already stated, the defense of both accused is alibi, which is not even corroborated by a single defense witness. It is well-settled rule that alibi is
the weakest defense that can be resorted to by an accused, as it is easy to concoct or fabricate. . . .

. . . the alibi of both accused can not prevail over their positive identification by the prosecution witnesses (especially by complainant victim of rape,
Rebecca Soriano) as the perpetrators of the crime charged, they having testified in a clear, straightforward, positive, truthful, and convincing
manner, with no motive to fabricate this serious charge of rape or falsify the truth. The alibi of both accused can not also be given credence or
weight, considering that at the time of the rape, accused Melquiades Fernandez was in his house at Bo. Taloy, which is just 150 meters away from
the house of the Malongs, where Rebecca Soriano was raped; and accused Federico Conrado was at Bo. Malimpuec, which is only 9 kms. away from
Bo. Taloy, where Rebecca was raped that afternoon of January 13, 1982. The evidence disclose that said distance of 9 kms. can be negotiated in only
about 30 minutes by motorized vehicle, on good road connecting the 2 barrios.

xxx xxx xxx

The clear, positive, straightforward, and convincing testimony of rape victim Rebecca Soriano, as well as her immediate reporting of the incident to
the police authorities, just 30 minutes or so after she was raped that afternoon of January 13, 1982 and her giving of a sworn statement (Exh. A) on
January 14, 1982 just the day after she was raped) which was corroborated by the statements on the same date (January 14, 1982) by prosecution
witnesses Amelita Malong and Teofilo Malong, more than convinces and satisfies this Court that the came charged was, in truth and fact,
perpetrated by both accused. 9

Hence, the judgment of conviction, now the object of this appeal, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds each of the accused MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ, alias "Moding" and FEDERICO CONRADO, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two crimes of rape, aggravated by cruelty or ignominy, and, pursuant to law, hereby sentences each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of
death, to indemnify the aggrieved party, Rebecca M. Soriano, in the amount of P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 10

In an effort to reduce the imposed penalty of death to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), without disproving the charges against them, the two
(2) accused assigned the following errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR TWO (2) CRIMES OF RAPE.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE RAPE WAS ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
CRUELTY OR IGNOMINY.

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING EACH OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO SUFFER TWO (2) PENALTIES OF DEATH. 11

In the light, however, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Section 19(1), Article III thereof, under which a death penalty already imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua, Fernandez withdrew his appeal. 12 The lone appellant therefore is Conrado who insists on his appeal, notwithstanding the
advice of his counsel de officio to discontinue the appeal allegedly on the ground that "it has become moot and academic." 13

This Court nonetheless proceeded to consider accused-appellant's arguments for the sake of verifying the correctness of the sentence imposed. We
find no merit in the appeal.

First Assignment of Error

The trial court is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of offenses in that, the accused were convicted for two (2) crimes of rape even when
under the criminal complaint against them, there is only one (1) crime of rape alleged. The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
which states that there should be only one (1) offense charged in a criminal complaint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the
defendant a necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. But it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of
offenses is committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint; and failure of the accused to interpose the objection
constitutes waiver. 14 Conrado, after he had been convicted by the court a quo, can no longer assail its judgment by raising this issue. Neither can
he claim, as he now does, that he was denied the information that he was to be tried for two (2) separate crimes of rape. The acts complained of, as
constituting the offenses, were stated in the 2 June 1982 complaint in ordinary and concise language that any person of common intelligence would
be able to understand and thereby know what acts he was to defend himself against.

The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to two (2) crimes of rape is proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. As
clearly found by the trial court:

Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime, considering that they entered the bathroom where Rebecca was,
together and at the same time. Accused Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around her neck, while accused Conrado held her
hands placing them behind her body, to prevent her from struggling or resisting. Then after accused Fernandez had raped Rebecca, accused Conrado
raped her. Both accused, thereafter, fled from the scene of the crime together and at the same time. All these circumstances show beyond shadow
of any doubt conspiracy on the part of both accused, which renders each of them liable for two (2) crimes of rape, . . . 15

In a long line of decided cases, it has been held by this Court that in multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally
committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the rape
perpetrated by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. 16

Second Assignment of Error

The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The
testimony of the examining physician that he did not find mud on the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's asseveration that
the accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private part. It is worthwhile mentioning that the victim was examined and
treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or about almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this circumstance, the absence of mud in
the victim's private part when she was examined by the physician, may be attributed to the possibility that the mud washed or fell off even before
the victim left the house for her physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's testimony was corroborated by that of Amelita Malong who swore that
she saw mud smeared on Rebecca's private part when she (Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the
offended party, young as she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of fabricating this portion of her testimony notwithstanding
the consequent humiliation on her person and disgrace on her womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial court's finding that the offense was
aggravated by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word "cruelty" used in the dispositive portion of the judgment, to describe an
alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The act of "plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped, is adequately and
properly described as "ignominy" rather than "cruelty or ignominy."

Third Assignment of Error

Lastly, the original death sentence was correctly imposed pursuant to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, namely, Article 335 which states
that when the crime of rape is committed by two (2) or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death, and Article 63, which
provides that when the penalty prescribed is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties (as in this case) and the offense is attended by an aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no longer imposable under the present Constitution and are reduced to
reclusion perpetua, the sentence on appellant Federico Conrado has to be reduced to two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. 18 But the indemnity
he has to pay to the victim must be increased to P20,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, as above modified, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the accused-appellant Federico Conrado.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-
appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged with and convicted in the then Court of First
Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of the court a quo the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and
Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo
and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances to
mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for
the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of
arresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as
accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, for the
death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita
de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo
Doctolero; and the additional penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury suffered by the minor child,
Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania
Escosio, in the sum of P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00; and the heirs of the deceased
Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-
fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1

The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as follows:

That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring
together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and
with extreme cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania
Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the same accused while already on the road, conspiring together and mutually aiding one
another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting upon
him multiple mortal wounds which caused his death.2

Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its decision, the trial court made the following findings and a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution thus:

It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio
Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was
on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of his mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun,
Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he died on the way. . . .

The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible
for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter,
with their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.

The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at
about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-
Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came from the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road
in Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun
with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo
of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo
of the former, so she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.

Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo
Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While
throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial
Sagun and saw the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going towards her. She told them: "Why can't you
be patient and forget?" But she was asked not to interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of
the three accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo
Doctolero told them why they can't be patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you." Then they
struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a
bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.

The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who
declared that while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun,
she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at their house and called to all the men in the house to come out. She
was about to go to their house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio going up. So she hid behind the
palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your
children." Then she saw the three accused coming down from the house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they
also boloed several times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:

On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian,
Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the
brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company
were on their way home. (p. 8, Ibid).

Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So,
he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing.
He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).

At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid)
with the two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were
towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).

Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at
the back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).

Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal, together with his small children upstairs, while accused-
appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-
Salazar).

He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might meet something bad that night. He did not enter the
house anymore: he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father asked him what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p.
4, Salazar).

He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins, Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his
house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get
down. When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who
told him that Marcial Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of his neck, causing him to see
darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).

Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he
did not notice anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from
the yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out
however, that the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial
Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow,
Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick and
pulled it away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed Ms bolo. When the
latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4

The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to the child. A doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the
crime and pictures were then taken.5

Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below established that ––

. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side of the forehead. There is fracture of the underlying skull.
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with fracture of the underlying skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with fracture of the underlying skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left eyebrow to the right eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying
skull.
(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the month towards the lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the
ear is detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a severance from the level of the middle finger.
(8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm, left.
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.

xxx xxx xxx

One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab wound around 3 cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal
space just at the left border of the sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right clavicular region.
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the second wound.
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying skull at the right frontal portion of the head.
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the head.
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony portion, left.
(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of the hand right. There was fracture of some of the underlying
bones.6

Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained
the same as follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was
another about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch, temporal right." He further
testified that the child was admitted to the hospital on November 8, 1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later.7

During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on May 17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the
withdrawal of his appeal8

and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day.9

In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for accused-appellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio
Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death certificate attached thereto as Annex "A".10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability
of appellant Conrado Doctolero.

The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his
defense, appellant denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the
place where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the
other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source
and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion.11

This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the
prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the prosecution Witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves
more credence.12

There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against appellants. The only imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy
may have had against appellants occurred years ago and she was, at the time she testified, on good terms with appellants as shown by the following
testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:

Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic) your relationship with her was harmonious and
rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail to see you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13

As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house that night of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have
a grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that previous incident at the crossing yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria
Sagun should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero in the commission of the crime."14

When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused,
identification should be given full credit.15

And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.16

In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain inconsistencies that allegedly render the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not so substantial as to destroy their credibility. As correctly explained by the
People, the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by the appellants in their
brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each observer in relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and
inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all
persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor
details.17

In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses.18 And where the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as the authors of the crime and
the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil material points, the contradictions become insignificant.19

Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the investigation himself and personally examined the
scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness
was motivated by an improper motive other than that of accomplishing his mission.20

Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police department of San Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were
committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros were involved. He further testified that when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime
and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came with bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun.21

In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his investigation and the weight to be accorded to his findings was properly
addressed to the trial court.

The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as accomplices in the slaying of the women and the infliction of
injuries on the child. We agree with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its evidentiary substantiation:

Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have
already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-
146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio
Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two women Lolita de
Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature,
number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not have been possible for
Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either the screams of pain of their
brother's victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several
times. . . . Under these circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going on inside the
room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women
victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother Ludovico
Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two appellants
upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in
committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a child.22

We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the
former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.23

Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their
minds. This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the principal
provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.24

This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where the accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of
forcible abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
accomplices.

Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or
not they were liable but only with regard to the extent of their participation. There being ample evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt
exists on the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is that of being mere accomplices,26

no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.

The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention
for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense
on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice.

The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated only his criminal liability but not his civil liability.27

Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he
having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the trial court having long since become final and executory with respect to
him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3)
indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each for the death of
Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical
injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of
P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-
half (1/2) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115182. April 6, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RESTITUTO ROCHE y NICANOR, MARCELINO FALLORE y NICANOR, FRANCISCO GREGORIO y
MONCADA and DORICO CABALLES y NICANOR, accused.

RESTITUTO ROCHE, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kaloocan City, finding accused-appellant Restituto Roche guilty of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Roderick Ferol, in the amount of
P50,000.00.

The facts are as follows:

On June 4, 1992, an information for murder was filed against accused-appellant Restituto Roche and three others, namely, Marcelino Fallore,
Francisco Gregorio, and one John Doe. The information, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City, alleged -

That on or about the 31st day of May 1992 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
and being armed, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab one RODERICK FEROL Y TUDIC @ DIKDIK with bladed
weapons on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which injuries caused the victims death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

When arraigned on June 18, 1992, all of the accused, with the exception of John Doe, pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged, whereupon they
were tried. The prosecution presented Dr. Dario L. Gajardo, Helen Amarille,[3] Rodel Ferol, PO3 Orlando Valencia, Rosalinda Ferol, and Rogelio
Rossel whose testimonies and documentary evidence showed that, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon of May 31, 1992, Roderick and Rodel Ferol
were having drinks with a friend named Bobot inside the Ferol compound at Block 4, Lot 40, Bagong Silang, Kaloocan City. Without any warning,
accused-appellant Restituto Roche and Francisco Gregorio barged into the compound. Francisco tried to hit Rodel Ferol with an empty beer bottle
marked "Beer Grande" but failed because his common-law wife, Helen Amarille, pulled him away on time.[4] Roderick Ferol was not as lucky as his
brother. Roderick was stabbed on the back with an ice pick by accused-appellant. Roderick ran towards the house of his friend Bobot[5] but, outside
the compound, Dorico Caballes caught up with him. Roderick fell to the ground and was repeatedly stabbed with a knife by Dorico. Rogelio Rossel
tried to stop Dorico but he was chased by the latter. A brother of the victim, Jon-Jon, threw bottles at Dorico, forcing the latter to run away, and
leave his victim behind. Roderick was then taken to his house by Rogelio and Jon-Jon.[6] But at the time, Roderick was already dead.[7] marie

Helen Amarille sought assistance from the police station in Bagong Silang.[8] She led PO3 Orlando Valencia, PO3 Celerino Vertez, PO3 Jose Marle,
and PO2 Gil Torres, all of the Kaloocan City Police Station, to the scene of the crime, but as the victim was no longer there, they proceeded to Roches
residence. Helen pointed to accused-appellant, Marcelino Fallore and Francisco Gregorio as the assailants of Roderick Ferol. The suspects were
taken to the Bagong Silang Police Station for investigation.[9]

Dr. Dario L. Gajardo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Laboratory Service Station, conducted an autopsy on the body of Roderick Ferol. His findings
were embodied in Medico-Legal Report No. M-0899-92[10] which, in pertinent parts, reads:

...

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Cadaver of Roderick T. Ferol, about 21 years old, student, 165 cm in height and a resident of Phase 5, Pkg 4, Blk G Lot 2, Bagong Silang, Kalookan
City.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

. . . To determine the cause of death.

FINDINGS:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae and
lips are pale. Nailbeds are cyanotic.

HEAD, TRUNK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES:

(1) Stab wound, left maxillary region, measuring 3 by 0.8 cm, 10 cm from the anterior midline, 4 cm deep, directed downwards, anteriorwards and
medialwards, fracturing the left maxilla.

(2) Stab wound, left shoulder, measuring 2 by 0.6 cm, 21 cm from the anterior midline, 4 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and
medialwards.

(3) Stab wound, chest, measuring 5.5 by 2 cm, 2 cm right of the anterior midline, 5 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards,
fracturing the sternum at the level of the 2nd thoracic rib, lacerating the upper lobe of the right lung.

(4) Abrasion, right shoulder, measuring 1.5 by 1 cm, 12 cm from the anterior midline.

(5) Linear abrasion, right infraclavicular region, measuring 2 by 0.5 cm, 12 cm from the anterior midline.

(6) Stab wound, chest, measuring 2 by 1 cm, 1.5 cm right of the anterior midline, 4 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards,
fracturing the 5th right thoracic rib, lacerating the middle lobe of the right lung. novero
(7) Stab wound, left lumbar region, measuring 2 by 1 cm, 12 cm. from the posterior midline, 3 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and
medialwards, passing thru the 9th left intercostal space, lacerating the lower lobe of the left lung.

(8) Stab wound, left lumbar region, measuring 2.8 by .8 cm, 12 cm from the posterior midline, directed downwards, medialwards and anteriorwards.

(9) Stab wound, left costal region, measuring 1 by 2.5 cm, 2 cm from the anterior midline, 5 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and
medialwards, lacerating the left lobe of the liver.

(10) Abrasion, right cubital fossa, measuring 3 by 2 cm, 2 cm medial to its anterior midline.

(11) Grace abrasion, middle 3rd of the right forearm, measuring 7 by 7 cm, along its anterior midline.

(12) Incised wound, distal 3rd of the right forearm, measuring 4 by 0.5 cm, along its anterior midline.

(13) Incised wound, proximal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 8.5 to 0.3 cm, 2 cm lateral to its anterior midline.

(14) Incised wound, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm, 3.5 cm lateral to its anterior midline.

(15) Abrasion, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 3.5 by 0.7 cm, 2 cm medial to its posterior midline.

There are 1,500 cc of blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic and abdominal cavities.

Stomach is full of dinuguan.

xxx xxx xxx

CONCLUSION:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds in the head and trunk.

...

EXAMINED BY: (signed)

DARIO L. GAJARDO

Superintendent MS (PNP) nigel

Medico-Legal Officer &

Chief

The defense presented as witnesses accused-appellant, Francisco Gregorio, Marcelino Fallore, and Leticia Costo whose testimonies are as follows:

At about 10:00 oclock in the morning of May 31, 1992, accused-appellants son was baptized in a church with Francisco Gregorio as godfather. After
the baptism, at around 12:00 oclock, as the party was on its way to accused-appellants residence, accused-appellant noticed Roderick and Rodel
Ferol having drinks inside their compound.

After reaching his residence, accused-appellant went out to buy two cases of beer from a nearby store. On his way back to his house, he was
stopped by Roderick and Rodel Ferol. Roderick tripped him, so he fell to the ground. As Roderick drew a knife, accused-appellant did not fight him,
rather, he ran home. After learning what had happened, some of the guests, among whom were Francisco Gregorio, Marcelino Fallore, and Dorico
Caballes tried to help him, but they were initially prevented from going out of the house by the women. However, Dorico Caballes and the other
guests were later able to get out of the house. Dorico Caballes, with knife in his hand, went after Roderick Ferol. Francisco Gregorio followed Dorico,
holding in his hand a beer bottle marked "Grande."

At past 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, policemen, accompanied by Helen Amarille, arrived at the house of accused-appellant. On the information of
Amarille, the police arrested Francisco Gregorio, Marcelino Fallore, and accused-appellant.[11] Dorico Caballes escaped and has remained at
large.[12]

On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on December 21, 1993 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the prosecution evidence has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Restituto Roche for the
crime of murder but could not make a pronouncement as to the guilt of accused Dorico Caballes because he remained at large and therefore could
not be arraigned.

The Court hereby sentences accused Restituto Roche to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, and to indemnify the heirs the sum of P50,000.00.

Finding that the prosecution evidence failed to establish the guilt of accused Francisco Gregorio and Marcelino Fallore, both accused are hereby
ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends: ella

1. The finding of guilt against the accused-appellant is contrary to the evidence;

2. The trial court erred in failing to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the testimony and/or affidavit of prosecution witness Rogelio Rossel
and other facts in the case at bar;

3. For clear lack or absence of conspiracy among the accused, the accused-appellant herein should have been acquitted.[14]

First. Accused-appellant contends that he could not have stabbed the victim with an ice pick, considering the nature and extent of the injuries
suffered by the latter. He questions the credibility of witnesses Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, both of whom stated they saw accused-appellant
barge into the Ferol compound and stab Roderick Ferol at the back with an ice pick.

To be sure, Helen Amarilles testimony is, by itself, clear, categorical and consistent. She testified that in the afternoon of May 31, 1992, she was in
the kitchen doing the laundry while her common-law husband, Rodel Ferol, was having drinks with Roderick Ferol and a friend named Bobot when
all of a sudden accused-appellant and Francisco Gregorio came. Immediately, accused-appellant started stabbing Roderick Ferol on his left side with
an ice pick. On the other hand, Francisco Gregorio tried to attack Rodel with a beer bottle marked "Grande," but she was able to pull him away.
Marcelino Fallore also tried to attack Rodel Ferol with a stainless knife but she intervened and stop Marcelino from harming Rodel. Angered by her
intervention, Marcelino threw a stone at her. Rodel then ran away. Roderick also ran but Dorico Caballes was able to catch up with him. Accused-
appellant and Francisco Gregorio followed. She ran to the police station in Bagong Silang for help.[15]

We note, however, that Helen Amarilles testimony detailed the events leading to Roderick Ferols death with such thoroughness it raises the
suspicion that it had been rehearsed. "A witness whose testimony is perfect in all aspects, without a flaw and remembering even the minutest
details which jibe beautifully with one another, lays herself open to suspicion of having been [coached] or having memorized statements earlier
rehearsed. . ."[16]

Amarilles testimony sounds so perfect that instead of inspiring belief, it becomes suspect. It differs so substantially from the testimony of her
common-law husband Rodel Ferol, who also claims to have been present during the incident, that its credibility is placed in doubt. In contrast to
Amarilles version, Rodel Ferol testified:

Q: At about 5:00 p.m., on May 31, 1992, do you remember where you were?
A: I was in our house, sir.
Q: Who was with you at your house on said date?
A: My brother Roderick, sir. marinella
Q: What were you doing at that time?
A: We have a drinking spree in front of our house, sir.
Q: Aside from your brother Rodel and you, were there other persons who were drinking with you at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were these other person who were with you at that time?
A: The friend of my brother, sir.
Q: What is the name?
A: Bobot, sir.
Q: Aside from Bobot, are there other persons with you?
A: No more, sir.
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened at about 5:00 oclock of May 31, 1992 while you and your brother were having a drinking
spree?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident that you are referring to?
A: When Restituto Roche entered our compound, sir.
Q: You mentioned the name of Restituto Roche, how many persons were there who entered your compound with Restituto Roche?
A: Three (3) sir.
Q: Do you know who are these three (3) other persons?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who are these three (3) other persons?
A: Restituto, Marcelino and Francisco, sir.
Q: What happened when these three (3) persons entered your compound at about 5:30 in the afternoon on said date?
A: They suddenly stabbed my brother, Restituto stabbed my brother, sir.
Q: With what instrument was your brother stabbed by this Restituto Roche?
A: Ice pick, sir. alonzo
Q: On what part of the body of your brother was he hit by this instrument?
A: At the back, sir.
Q: How many times was your brother Roderick Ferol stabbed by Restituto?
A: Two (2) times, sir.
Q: You mentioned that he was stabbed at the back portion near your left side, where was the other stab made?
A: Also at the back portion but I cannot be sure [where] exactly, sir.
Q: When Restituto Roche stabbed your brother at the back, what was these Mario [or Marcelino Fallore] and Afran [or Francisco Gregorio] doing at
that time?
A: Mario boxed me while Afran was holding a bottle, sir while standing, sir.
Q: What kind of bottle was Afran holding at that time?
A: A bottle of Grande, sir.
Q: You mentioned that you were boxed by Mario, where were you hit?
A: At my nose, sir.
Q: Now what was Restituto Roche saying at that time he was stabbing Roderick [Ferol] at that time, if any?
A: He was not saying anything because I already fell down [when] I was boxed, sir.
Q: How about this Mario, what was he saying at that time this incident was [occurring]?
A: He is not saying anything, sir.
Q: How about this Afran, was he saying anything at that time?
A: None, sir.

Court :
This Mario refers to Marcelino?
A: Yes, [Your] Honor.
Court :
And Afran refers to Francisco Gregorio?
A: Yes [Your] Honor.

Fiscal Quimpo: brando

How about your brother Roderick Ferol was he saying anything at that time he saw Restituto Roche?
A: None, sir.
Q: How about you did you say anything?
A: None, sir.
Q: What happened when your brother was stabbed and you were boxed by Mario?
A: My brother ran away, he was able to [run] away, sir.
Q: Towards, what direction did he [run] to?
A: Going towards his friend, sir.
Q: And where is that friend that you are referring to?
A: At the house of Bobot, our drinking companion, sir.
Q: Now when Roderick Ferol ran towards the house of his friend, what if any did Restituto Roche do?
A: He ran after him, sir.
Q: And what was Restituto Roche holding at that time when he was running after Roderick Ferol?
A: An itak, sir, bolo.
Q: How about the ice pick that you mentioned that he used in stabbing, where was that ice pick at that time he ran after Roderick Ferol?
A: I do not know where he left the ice pick, sir.
Q: When you first saw him [arrive] at your compound referring to Roche, what [was] Restituto Roche holding at that time that you first saw him?
A: Ice pick, sir.
Q: Is it ice pick only?
A: Yes, sir, but when he ran after my brother he was holding a bolo, sir.
Q: When your brother ran towards the house of his friend, what did you do if any?
A: I followed him, sir. micks
Q: How about this Mario and Afran, what were they doing when Roche was running after your brother?
A: I was not able to see what they did, sir.
Q: Why did you not go after Restituto Roche and your brother?
A: I was not able to see what [they] are doing because I was not able to catch up with them, sir.
Q: Now after Restituto Roche ran after your brother Roderick Ferol when was the last time that you saw your brother Roderick Ferol?
A: When he was already lying face down in front of the house of his friend, sir.
Q: How far was that place [where] he was lying down from the place where you had a drinking session?
A: It is far sir more or less five (5) meters, sir.
Q: When you saw your brother lying down on the ground where was Restituto Roche?
A: I was not able to see him there, sir.
Q: What did you do with your brother Roderick Ferol when you saw him lying down?
A: I carried him, sir.
Q: What was his condition at that time you saw him?
A: He was already dead, sir.
Q: And how did you know that he was already dead?
A: He was not breathing anymore, sir.[17]

A comparison of the testimonies of Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol reveals discrepancies on material points. While Amarille claimed that Marcelino
Fallore tried to attack Rodel Ferol with a stainless knife, Rodel Ferol stated that Marcelino boxed him (Rodel) in the nose. Amarille said she
intervened to protect Rodel Ferol from the attack. However, Rodel Ferol makes no mention of Helens presence during the incident. Neither did he
mention any attempt by Marcelino Fallore to hit him with a knife. On the other hand, Helen Amarille remembered no "itak" or "bolo" which
accused-appellant carried. It taxes ones credulity that while Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol could remember such details as to the kind of bottle
Francisco Gregorio was carrying, they could not remember who tried to punch whom and who carried what kind of weapon, or even who was
present during the incident. These are inconsistencies concerning substantial matters that cannot just be overlooked. It is settled that "where the
testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere
concoction."[18]

Whose testimony then may be believed by this Court? The testimony of neither one.

There is no question that Rodel Ferol was present at the time of the incident. He was having drinks with the victim Roderick and a friend. He belied
Amarilles claim that she was present when the incident happened. Rodel testified: nigella

Q: How about your wife did you see her [get] out from the compound?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did she go if you know?
A: She went to the house of my grandmother, sir.
Q: What time was that when she went to the house of your grandmother?
A: Around 4:00 oclock sir.
Q: And she never came back up to the time this incident happened?
A: She returned sir but it was after the incident, sir.
Q: So at that time of the incident your wife was not in your house?
A: Yes, sir.[19]

On the other hand, Rodels testimony is contrary to the physical evidence. Rodel testified that accused-appellant stabbed the victim with an ice pick.
Recalling the events, he said:

Q: Now Mr. Witness you said you were present when Restituto Roche stabbed your brother with an ice pick, where were you [at] that time when
you saw for the first time Roche holding an ice pick?
A: He was inside our compound, sir.
Q: Where was your brother when you claimed you saw Roche holding an ice pick?
A: I was also inside the compound, sir.
Q: Now, you mentioned that Roche was able to [approach] your brother with that ice pick?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This ice pick that you saw which Roche was holding was this the kind of ice pick which you used in breaking ice?
A: I did not say it is being used to break ice, sir. Sc
Q: Why did you say that the one he was holding was an ice pick?
A: Because it is sharp, sir.
Q: It is pointed and round that is why you said it is an ice pick?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far were you from Roche when you saw that ice pick being held by him?
A: Five (5) steps away, sir.
Q: So you could clearly see this ice pick being held by the hand of Roche?
A: Yes, sir.[20]

Contrary to Rodel Ferols testimony, however, the autopsy report reveals that the stab wounds sustained by Roderick Ferol at the back, (stab wound
nos. 7 and 8), measuring 2 x 1 cm., with a depth of 3 cms. and 2.8 x 0.8 cm. respectively, could not have been inflicted by an ice pick. As the medical
examiner Dr. Gajardo observed, these injuries were caused by a pointed single-bladed weapon.[21]

The victim sustained stab wounds in the front and back parts of his body. "[Stab or puncture wounds] are wounds whose depth is greater than their
length or breadth, and are produced by an instrument being driven through the skin. The size and shape varies with the instrument."[22] Different
types of weapons, as well as the manner in which the victim was stabbed, can produce different types of wounds:

. . . With a sharp-edged weapon like a knife the form of the skin opening is determined not only by the shape of the blade but also by the direction in
which the elastic fibers in the dermis of the wounded area happen to be directed. If a flat blade enters in a direction parallel with the fibers a slit-like
or elliptic wound with sharp edges and pointed ends is produced. On the other hand, if the elastic fibers are severed transversely, the wound usually
gapes because of the contraction of this tissue. If the fibers are severed obliquely, the opening in the skin may gape unevenly and assume an
asymmetrical oval shape. If the knife blade is drawn out in a slightly different direction from that in which it entered, other fibers are cut and the
wound may show a notch . . . An instrument with three-cornered edges, like a triangular file, produces a three-cornered wound . . . An implement
with a thin circular shaft like an ice pick inflicts a round hold or a slit in the skin. If the shaft is comparatively thick and roughened there may be a
marginal abrasion around the opening . . . Other weapons produce their own characteristic lesions.[23]

Undoubtedly, an ice pick would cause a wound that is considerably smaller than that inflicted on Roderick Ferol. That an ice pick could not have
produced surface wounds measuring 1 x 2 cms. and 2.8 x 0.8 cm., (stab wound nos. 7 and 8 respectively) is a material fact which the trial court
obviously overlooked.

The wounds found in the front parts of the victims body (stab wounds nos. 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9) measured as follows: Scmis

...

(1) Stab wound, left maxillary region, measuring 3 by 0.8 cm, 10 cm from the anterior midline, 4 cm deep, directed downwards, anteriorwards and
medialwards, fracturing the left maxilla.

(2) Stab wound, left shoulder, measuring 2 by 0.6 cm, 21 cm from the anterior midline, 4 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and
medialwards.

(3) Stab wound, chest, measuring 5.5 by 2 cm, 2 cm right of the anterior midline, 5 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards,
fracturing the sternum at the level of the 2nd thoracic rib, lacerating the upper lobe of the right lung.

...

(6) Stab wound, chest, measuring 2 by 1 cm, 1.5 cm right of the anterior midline, 4 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and lateralwards,
fracturing the 5th right thoracic rib, lacerating the middle lobe of the right lung.

...

(9) Stab wound, left costal region, measuring 1 by 2.5 cm, 2 cm from the anterior midline, 5 cm deep, directed downwards, posteriorwards and
medialwards, lacerating the left lobe of the liver.[24]

Dr. Gajardo testified that the stab wounds found at the front and back of the deceased could have been inflicted by a single-bladed weapon.[25]
They could not have been caused by an ice pick. As clearly stated, an ice pick is a pointed circular shaft, not a pointed single-bladed weapon. A
puncture wound resulting from an ice pick attack would obviously be different from that produced by a single-bladed weapon. It has been held that
a cane knife, having a maximum width of five inches, cannot cause a fatal wound which is only one centimeter in length.[26] Conversely, an ice pick
cannot create a surface wound that is more than one inch, such as stab wound no. 8, but would produce a wound so minuscule in length and width
that it can be missed even by an experienced medical examiner.

Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and uncorroborated testimony of witnesses. We have held:

. . . Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases
such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical
evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez, where the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail.[27]

Thus, among the testimonial evidence, only the testimony of Rogelio Rossel remains. He declared: Mis sc

Q - Do you remember any unusual incident at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 31, 1992 while you were standing in front of your house?
A - Me and my companions were telling story when somebody shouted there is trouble.
Q - And what did you do when you heard somebody shouting that there is trouble?
A - I tried to see it.
Q - And what is that trouble that you saw?
A - There were persons who were [stabbing] sir.
Q - How many persons that were stabbing?
A - Two (2) sir.
Q - And who was the person if you know being stabbed?
A - Roderick Ferol, the victim sir.
Q - And do you know this Roderick Ferol referring to the victim?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Do you know these persons that were stabbing Roderick Ferol?
A - I know them sir.
Q - How many were they?
A - I only saw one (1) person.
Q - And who is that person you saw stabbing Roderick Ferol?
A - Doric sir.
Q - Now, will you look around this courtroom and check if that Doric is present today?
A - He is not here, he escaped.
Q - Now, what was the position of Roderick Ferol when he was being stabbed by Doric?
A - He was lying down, sir.
Q - Aside from this Doric were there other persons you saw in the trouble?
A - No more, sir.
Q - What did you do after that? Mis spped
A - I pacified Doric so that he would stop stabbing the victim, sir.
Q - And what happened when you approached Doric?
A - He attempted to chase me, sir.
Q - And what did you do when Doric attempted to chase you?
A - I ran away, sir.
Q - Towards what direction did you [run] to?
A - I turned left of our house, sir.
Q - And what happened after that when you turned left to your house?
A - The brother of Roderick by the name of Jon-Jon arrived sir.
Q - And what happened when Jon-Jon arrived?
A - He threw bottles against me, sir.
Q - Against who?
A - Against Doric, sir.
Q - And who were there aside from Doric and Jon-Jon?
A - No more, sir we are only three (3) persons at that time.
Q - What happened after that?
A - Doric ran away, sir.
Q - And how about you what did you do?
A - I went to the person who [was] stabbed.
Q - Are you referring to Roderick Ferol?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What did you do when you approached Roderick Ferol?
A - Jon-Jon, Rodel and me carried him, sir.
Q - Towards what direction or to where did you carry Roderick [Ferol]?
A - In front towards our house, sir. Spped
Q - Do you know certain person by the name of Restituto Roche or Toto?
A - Yes, sir I saw him because he is one of my friends.
Q - Was there any occasion that you saw him in the afternoon of May 31, 1992?
A - I did not see him.
Q - How about Marcelino Fallore also known as Mario was there any occasion that you saw him in the afternoon of May 31, 1992 at 5:00 oclock?
A - I did not see him there, sir.
Q - How about Francisco Gregorio also known as Afran, did you know him?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Was there any occasion when you saw him Francisco Gregorio in the afternoon of May 31, 1992?
A - I did not see him, sir.[28]

Rogelio Rossel positively identified Dorico Caballes as the assailant. Dorico Caballes is the brother of accused-appellant. He escaped after the
incident and until now is still at large. It is quite probable that the victims relatives pointed an accusing finger at one they perceive could be
responsible for the victims death. They blame accused-appellant for the incident because it was the latter who, by telling Dorico that it was the
victim who had caused him (Restituto) to fall to the ground, made Dorico angry. Had not accused-appellant told Dorico Caballes that the victim was
the one who had tripped him, Dorico Caballes would not know the person responsible and would not have killed Roderick Ferol.

Second. Nor can accused-appellant be held liable for the killing of Roderick Ferol on the ground of conspiracy. "[F]or conspiracy to exist, proof of an
actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest."[29]

In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol.[30] Apart
from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no other witness was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly
participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is
assumed as true that accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto), this would
not suffice to find accused-appellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes. As we ruled in People v. Elijorde:[31] Jo spped

. . . Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an
accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed
unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by
proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design.
Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that
inference.

Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-appellant, together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved to attack Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the
assault on Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes borne out of the desire to get even with him for the offense committed against his
brother. In no way can such act be attributed to accused-appellant.

Neither can accused-appellant be held liable as an accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites must concur in order that a person
may be considered an accomplice:

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;

(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,

(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[32]

There is no evidence to show that accused-appellant performed any previous or simultaneous act to assist Dorico Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol.
In fact, it has not been proven that he was aware of Dorico Caballes plan to attack and kill Roderick Ferol. Absent any evidence to create the moral
certainty required to convict accused-appellant, we cannot uphold the trial courts finding of guilt. "Our legal culture demands the presentation of
proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. The hypothesis
of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them."[33] This is certainly not the case here.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kaloocan City, is REVERSED and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of
murder. He is, therefore, ordered immediately released from custody unless he is lawfully held for another cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5)
days from receipt hereof. Spped jo

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT
PILOLA, appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164,
convicting him of murder, sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa y Rulloda
in the amount of P50,000 for the latters death.

The Indictment

On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were charged with murder in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large and no fixed
address and mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with double-bladed knives and a bolo and with intent to kill, treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault hack and stab one Joselito Capa y Rulloda, as a
result of which the latter sustained hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested[3] and tried, and subsequently convicted of murder.[4] The decision of the trial
court became final and executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a month after the
incident. Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He was arraigned on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not
guilty to the charge.[5] Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

The Evidence of the Prosecution[6]

On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her
husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian
invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking, the
conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified
the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also
about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted:
Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached Aling Soteras store at the end of the street, about twelve
to fifteen meters away from Elisas store. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian
swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselitos intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out
his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselitos neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the
appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives,
rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom.
The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he
noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow
block and with it bashed Joselitos head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the
scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselitos house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.[7]

The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver
of Joselito and prepared Autopsy Report No. N-88-375,[8] with the following findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.

Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0 cm.; back, suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid
region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.

Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.

Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.

Stab wounds:

1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial extremity is sharp, lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior
chest wall, level of 3rd intercostal space, right, 5.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, non-penetrating, with an
approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;

2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral
aspect of chest, level of 3rd intercostal space, left, 3.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, into the left
thoracic cavity, penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.;

3. Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral
aspect of chest, level of 4th intercostal space, 12.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating upper
lobe of left lung with an approximate depth of 9.0 cm.;
4. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral
aspect of chest, level of 5th intercostal space, left, 15.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating the
left thoracic cavity and then lower lobe of left lung and then penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;

5. Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall,
level of 7th intercostal space, left, 16.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity and
then penetrating the lower lobe of left lung with an approximately depth of 10.0 cm.;

6. Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the lumbar region,
left, 14.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal cavity and then penetrating ileum;

7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral,
level of 9th intercostal space, left; 14.0 cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and medially, non-penetrating with an
approximate depth of 4.0 cm.;

8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen,
postero-lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the abdominal cavity and then perforating
the spleen and pancreas with an approximate depth of 13.0 cm.;

9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper
third, anterior; directed backward, downward and medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an approximate depth of 6.0 cm.;

10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm,
upper third, anterior; directed backward, upward and medially and communicating with another wound, arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0 cm.;

11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity blunt, lower extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower
third, posterior aspect, directed forward, downward and medially, communicating with another wound, arm, left, lower third, posterior aspect, 1.5
cm.

Hemothorax, left 900 c.c.

Hemopericardium 300 c.c.

Hemoperitoneum 750 c.c.

Brain and other visceral organs, pale.

Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple stab wounds.

The Evidence of the Appellant

The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that at around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in
the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City. He suddenly heard a commotion coming from outside.
Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on. The appellant remained inside the house because he was suffering from ulcer and was
experiencing excessive pain in his stomach. The following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that Joselito had been
stabbed to death. The appellant did not bother to ask who was responsible for the stabbing.[9]

Julian alias Buboy Cadion corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that the appellant was in their house on the night of February 5, 1988,
and was suffering from ulcer. The appellant stayed home on the night of the incident.[10]

Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int. 4, Allison St., Mandaluyong City, testified that on February
5, 1988 at around 11:00 p.m., she heard a commotion outside. Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen of the house of her niece
Teresita; he took a knife and run towards Nueve de Pebrero Street where Edmar and Julian were fighting. She then followed Ronnie and saw Joselito
trying to pacify the protagonists. Ronnie grabbed Joselito and instantly stabbed the latter, who for a while retreated and fell down the canal. Not
content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran towards the direction of the mental hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon or the
appellant anywhere within the vicinity of the incident.[11]

On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street, Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. Pilola is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of deceased Joselito Capa alias Jessie in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death jointly and solidarily with Odilon Lagliba who was earlier convicted herein. With cost against the
accused.[12]

In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ANENT THE ASSAILED INCIDENT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND
IN SETTING ASIDE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III
THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]

The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of probative weight. This is so because she contradicted herself
when she testified on direct examination that Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block. However, on cross-examination, she stated
that it was Edmar who struck the victim. The inconsistency in Elisas testimony impaired her credibility.

The contention of the appellant does not hold water.

First. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance. The victim died because of multiple wounds. The
appellant is charged with murder for the killing of the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused.

Second. The perceived inconsistency in Elisas account of events is a minor and collateral detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony,
as it even serves to strengthen rather than destroy her credibility.[14]

Third. Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men who stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon.
Elisas testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz and his testimony that the victim sustained eleven stab wounds. The
doctor testified that there were two or more assailants:

Q Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator in inflicting those two incise wounds?
A Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar instrument.
Q Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven stab wounds [are] located?
A Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds?
Q All the eleven stab wounds?
A One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side. Another stab wound was located also on the chest left side, another stab
wound was located at the antero lateral aspect, its the front of the chest almost to the side. And also another one, also at the chest, another stab
wound was at the left side of the chest and another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen left side or where the left kidney is located,
lumbar area. Another one at the side of the chest, left side of the chest. Another stab wound in the abdomen, another stab wound at the left arm.
Another one at the left forearm and the last one in the autopsy report is located at the left arm. These are all the eleven stab wounds sustained by
the victim.
A The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like a knife, kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.
Q Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there were several assailants?
A In my opinion, there were more than one assailants (sic) here because of the presence of different types of stab wounds and lacerated wounds.
This lacerated wound could not have been inflicted by the one holding the one which inflicted the instrument . . (discontinued) which inflicted the
stab wounds.
Q So there could have been two or three assailants?
A More than one.[15]

The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisas testimony.[16]

Fourth. Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not think of any reason why Elisa pointed to him as one of the
assailants. In a litany of cases, we have ruled that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against
the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as in the case at bar, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[17]

Fifth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisas testimony. Case law has it that the trial courts calibration of the testimonial
evidence of the parties, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not conclusive effect,
by the appellate court.

The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He contends
that for one to be a conspirator, his participation in the criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the criminal acts.
He asserts that even if it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon who had already decided,
and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter between the victim, the
appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not
categorically and positively assert as to what part of the victims body was hit by whom, and how many times the victim was stabbed by the
appellant. He asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation.

We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[18] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal
liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence.
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.[19] Conspiracy may be implied if it
is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment.[20] There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other
offenders,[21] and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning.[22] One
need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it.[23] One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all.[24] Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.[25]

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the conspiracy.[26] The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act
without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[27] Conspiracy to exist does not
require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[28] As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the
essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated
and labored to the same end.[29]

Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation
if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the
victims death. Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.[30] Absent
conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct
participation, and the other as an accomplice, under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts.

To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.[31] Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation
after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and
cooperate in its accomplishment.[32] However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves
are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.[33]

In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon
was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective
knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after
Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle.
Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show
that they conspired to kill the victim.

The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the
appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in
stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated.

All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the
latters death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.

Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a
principal by direct participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or
contributed materially thereto.[34]

The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it
is easy to concoct but hard to disprove. To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. For it to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to have been present then.[35] In this case, the appellant avers that at the time of the stabbing incident, he was resting in the house of his
cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he was suffering from stomach pain due to his ulcer.[36] But the appellant failed to adduce any medical
certificate that he was suffering from the ailment. Moreover, Elisa positively identified the appellant as one of the men who repeatedly stabbed the
victim. The appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification of the appellant as one of the victims
assailants. The appellant himself admitted that his cousins house, the place where he was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed, was
merely ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the stabbing. Indeed, the appellants defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Elisa Rolan.[37]

The appellants defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from the situs criminis and later left his house. The records show that
despite being informed that he was sought after by the authorities as a suspect for the killing of the victim, the appellant suddenly and inscrutably
disappeared from his residence at Nueve de Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988, a subpoena for the appellant was returned unserved because he was
out of town.[38] The appellants own witness, Julian Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was no longer seen at Nueve de Pebrero after
the incident, thus:

Q So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?
A One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve de Pebrero?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.
Q And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero. Is that what you were then saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola there?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.[39]

The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the victim. However, instead of surrendering to the police
authorities, he adroitly evaded arrest. The appellants flight is evidence of guilt and, from the factual circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, no
reason can be deduced from it other than that he was driven by a strong sense of guilt and admission that he had no tenable defense.[40]

The Crime Committed by the Appellant

and the Proper Penalty Therefor

The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery. Abuse of superior strength likewise attended the commission of
the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part.[41] In this
case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. Odilon, without provocation, suddenly placed his arm around the victims neck and forthwith
stabbed the latter. The victim had no inkling that he would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant,
both also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene and stabbed the victim, giving no real opportunity for the latter to defend himself. And
even as the victim was already sprawled on the canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block. The peacemaker became the victim of violence.

Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was executed in a treacherous manner, preventing any means of
defense on the part of the victim. As testified to by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times mostly on the
chest and the abdominal area. Six of the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage to the victims vital internal organs.[42]

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.[43] There is no mitigating circumstance that attended the
commission of the felony. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since no aggravating
and mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in
accord with current jurisprudence.[44] The said heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000, also conformably to current
jurisprudence.[45] In addition, the heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.[46]

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant
Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby directed to
pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity; the amount of P50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of
P25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133489 & 143970. January 15, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONALD a.k.a ROLAND GARCIA y FLORES,* RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES, ROTCHEL LARIBA y
DEMICILLO, and GERRY B. VALLER, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 accused-appellants Ronald a.k.a Roland Garcia y Flores, Rodante Rogel y Rosales, Rotchel Lariba y Demicillo and Gerry
B. Valler, along with a certain Jimmy Muit, were charged with and convicted of kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced each to death, except
aforementioned Jimmy Muit who has remained at large, for obvious reasons, and to indemnify their victim Romualdo Tioleco P200,000.00 and to
pay the costs.[1]

In a related case, Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050, which was decided jointly with Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, accused-appellants Rotchel Lariba and
Rodante Rogel were also found guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and each sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 plus the costs.[2] No notice of appeal[3] was filed in this criminal case; nonetheless, for reasons
herein below stated, we take cognizance of the case.

Atty. Romualdo Tioleco was jogging alone at Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, at about 5:30 oclock in the morning of 5 October 1996.[4]
He was heading towards 4th Avenue when he noticed a blue car parked at the corner of this street.[5] As he was about to cross 4th Avenue, the car
lurched towards him and stopped.[6] Two (2) men quickly alighted from the car.[7] One of them pointed a gun at Atty. Tioleco while the other hit his
back and pushed him into the back seat of the car.[8] Once inside, he saw two (2) other men, one on the drivers seat and the other on the back seat
directly behind the driver.[9] He found out later the identities of the driver whom he undoubtedly recognized during the abduction to be accused-
appellant Gerry Valler, and of the other person on the passenger seat behind Valler as accused-appellant Roland Ronald Garcia.[10] He described
the man who disembarked from the car and who pushed him inside to be 55 or 56 in height, medium built, and the other, who threatened him with
a gun, at 54 or 55 in height, dark complexioned and medium built although heftier than the other.[11] These two (2) persons have since the
commission of the crime have remained at large.

While inside the car Atty. Tioleco was made to crouch on the leg room.[12] As it sped towards a destination then unknown to the victim, the men on
board feigned to be military men and pestered him with the accusation of being a drug pusher and the threat of detention at Camp Crame.[13] As
they were psyching him down, they started putting blindfold on [him] and packaging tape on [his]face and handcuffed [him] on the back of [his]
body.[14] His eyeglasses were taken off when they were putting blindfold on [him] x x x.[15] Then they divested him of his other personal
belongings, e.g., his keys, wristwatch, etc.[16]

The car cruised for thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes.[17] When it finally stopped, Atty. Tioleco was told to alight, led to a house and then into a
room.[18] He remained blindfolded and handcuffed throughout his ordeal and made to lie down on a wooden bed.[19] During his captivity, one of
the kidnappers approached him and told him that he would be released for a ransom of P2 million[20] although the victim bargained for an amount
between P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 which according to him was all he could afford. While still under detention, one of his abductors told him that
they had mistaken him for a Chinese national and promised his release without ransom.[21] But he was just being taken for a ride since the
kidnappers had already begun contacting his sister Floriana Tioleco.

Floriana was at her office when her mother called up about her brothers kidnapping.[22] Floriana hurried home to receive a phone call from a
person who introduced himself as Larry Villanueva demanding P3 million for Atty. Tiolecos ransom.[23] Several other calls to Floriana were made
during the day and in one of those calls the ransom was reduced to P2 million.[24] Around 7:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, 5 October
1996, P/Sr. Insp. Ronaldo Mendoza of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) arrived at Florianas house to monitor her brothers kidnapping
upon the request of her friends.[25] Floriana received the following day about eight (8) phone calls from the kidnappers still demanding P2 million
for her brothers safe release.[26]

By the end of the day on 7 October 1996 Floriana was able to raise only P71,000.00,[27] which she relayed to the kidnappers when they called her
up.[28] They finally agreed to set her brother free upon payment of this amount, which was short of the original demand.[29] The pay-off was
scheduled that same day at around 8:00 oclock in the evening at Timog Avenue corner Scout Tuazon in Quezon City near the Lighthaus and Burger
Machine.[30] Upon instruction of P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, Floriana together with only two (2) female friends proceeded to this meeting place.[31] They
reached there at 8:40 oclock in the evening and waited for the kidnappers until about 10:30 or 11:00 o clock that evening.[32]

Meanwhile, P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza relayed the information about the pay-off and other relevant facts to P/Chief Insp. Gilberto Cruz at the PACC
headquarters.[33] With the information from P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, P/Chief Insp. Cruz, together with P/Chief Insps. Winnie Quidato and Paul Tucay
with P/Sr. Insp. Nilo Pagtalunan, immediately went to Timog Avenue corner scout Tuazon near the Lighthaus and Burger Machine in Quezon
City.[34] They surveyed this site and saw a blue Toyota Corona with three (3) persons on board suspiciously stopping about five (5) meters from
Floriana and her friends and remaining there for almost two (2) hours.[35]

Floriana and her friends left the pay-off site after waiting for two (2) hours more or less;[36] so did the blue Toyota Corona almost
simultaneously.[37] No payment of ransom took place.[38]3P/Chief Insp. Cruz then ordered P/Chief Insps. Quidato and Tucay and their subordinates
to tail this car which they did all the way to the De Vega Compound at Dahlia Street in Fairview, Quezon City.[39] This compound consisted of one
bungalow house and was enclosed by a concrete wall and a steel gate for ingress and egress.[40] They posted themselves thirty (30) to forty (40)
meters from the compound to reconnoiter the place.[41] Meanwhile, the kidnappers explained in a phone call to Floriana that they had aborted the
pay-off on account of their belief that her two (2) companions at the meeting place were police officers.[42] But she assured them that her escorts
were just her friends.[43]

At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of 8 October 1996 Floriana received a call from the kidnappers at her house[44] who wanted to set another
schedule for the payment of the ransom money an hour later or at 2:00 oclock.[45] This time the rendezvous would be in front of McDonalds
fastfood at Magsaysay Boulevard in Sta. Mesa, Manila.[46] She was told by the kidnappers that a man would go near her and whisper Romy to
whom she would then hand over the ransom money. Floriana agreed to the proposal. With her two (2) friends, she rushed to the place and brought
with her the P71,000.00.[47] About this time, the same blue Toyota Corona seen at the first pay-off point left the De Vega Compound in
Fairview.[48] A team of PACC operatives under P/Chief Insp. Cruz again stationed themselves in the vicinity of McDonalds.[49]
Floriana arrived at the McDonalds restaurant and waited for a few minutes.[50] Not long after, the blue Toyota Corona was spotted patrolling the
area.[51] The blue car stopped and, after dropping off a man, immediately left the place. The man approached Floriana and whispered Romy to
her.[52] She handed the money to him who took it.[53] Floriana identified this man during the trial as accused-appellant Roland (Ronald) Garcia.[54]

The PACC operatives tried to follow the blue car but were prevented by traffic.[55] They were however able to catch up and arrest Garcia who was
in possession of the ransom money in the amount of P71,000.00.[56] They brought him inside their police car and there apprised him of his
custodial rights.[57] Garcia informed the PACC operatives that Atty. Tioleco was being detained inside the De Vega compound in Fairview.[58] With
this information, P/Chief Insp. Cruz ordered P/Chief Insps. Tucay and Quidato who had been posted near the compound to rescue the victim.[59]

The two (2) PACC officers, together with their respective teams, entered the compound and surged into the bungalow house where they saw two (2)
men inside the living room.[60] As one of the PACC teams was about to arrest the two (2) men, the latter ran towards a room in the house where
they were about to grab a .38 cal. revolver without serial number loaded with six (6) rounds of ammunitions and a .357 cal. revolver with six (6) live
ammunitions.[61] The other PACC team searched the house for Atty. Tioleco and found him in the other room.[62] The two (2) men were arrested
and informed of their custodial rights. They were identified in due time as accused-appellants Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba.[63]

P/Chief Insp. Cruz arrived at the De Vega compound[64] and coordinated with the proper barangay authorities.[65] While the PACC operatives were
completing their rescue and arrest operations, the house phone rang.[66] Accused-appellant Rogel answered the call upon the instruction of P/Chief
Insp. Cruz.[67] Rogel identified the caller to be accused-appellant Valler who was then driving towards the De Vega compound.[68] In the same
phone call, Valler also talked with accused-appellant Garcia to inquire about the ransom money.[69]

Then a blue Toyota Corona arrived at the De Vega compound.[70] Valler alighted from the car and shouted at the occupants of the house to open
the gate.[71] Suspicious this time, however, he went back to his car to flee.[72] But the PACC operatives pursued his car, eventually subduing and
arresting him.[73] The operations at the De Vega Compound ended at 8:30 in the evening and the PACC operatives, together with Atty. Tioleco and
the accused-appellants, left the De Vega compound and returned to their headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City.[74] The ransom money was
returned intact to Atty. Tioleco.[75]

When arraigned, accused-appellants Ronald Roland Garcia, Rodante Rogel, Rotchel Lariba and Gerry Valler pleaded not guilty to the charge of
kidnapping for ransom in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, although during the trial Garcia admitted complicity in the abduction of Atty. Tioleco and in
the receipt of the ransom money from the victims sister Floriana.[76] In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba also pleaded not guilty.[77]

During the trial, Gerry Valler denied being part of the kidnapping for ransom and asserted that he was at the De Vega compound where he was
arrested on 8 October 1996 solely to pay for the fighting cocks he had bought from one Jimmy Muit, alleged owner of the compound.[78] Accused
Ronald Garcia, despite his admission to the crime, nevertheless disowned any role in planning the crime or knowing the other accused-appellants
since his cohorts were allegedly Jimmy Muit and two (2) others known to him only as Tisoy and Tony.[79] He also alleged that it was Jimmy Muits
red Toyota car that was used in the crime.[80] Explaining their presence at the De Vega compound at the time they were arrested, Rogel claimed
that he was employed as a helper for breeding cocks in this compound[81] while Laribas defense focused on an alleged prior agreement for him to
repair Jimmy Muits car.[82]

Accused-appellants filed separate appellants briefs. In the brief submitted by the Public Attorneys Office in behalf of accused-appellants Garcia,
Rogel and Lariba, they argue that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was not committed since Atty. Tioleco was released from detention by means
of the rescue operation conducted by the PACC operatives and the ransom money subsequently recovered.[83] They conclude that their criminal
liability should only be for slight illegal detention under Art. 268, of The Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba further assert that
they could not be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition since neither was in complete control of the firearms and ammunition
that were recovered when they were arrested and no evidence was offered to prove responsibility for the presence of firearms and ammunition
inside the room.[84]

The brief filed for accused-appellant Gerry B. Valler asserts the same defense he made at the trial that he was at the De Vega compound only to pay
his debts to Jimmy Muit,[85] arguing that Atty. Tioleco did not have the opportunity to really recognize him so that his identification as the driver of
the car was tainted by police suggestion, and that P/Chief Insp. Cruz testimony is allegedly replete with inconsistencies that negate his
credibility.[86]

Encapsulated, the issues herein focun on (a) the ransom as element of the crime under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended; (b) the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove kidnapping for ransom; (c) the degree of responsibility of each accused-appellant for kidnapping for
ransom; and, (d) the liability for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under RA 8294, amending PD 1866.

First. We do not find any quantum of merit in the contention that kidnapping for ransom is committed only when the victim is released as a result of
the payment of ransom. In People v. Salimbago[87] we ruled -

No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in
exchange for the victims freedom. In municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption
of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for
the crime to be committed. It is enough if the crime was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. Considering therefore, that the kidnapping
was committed for such purpose, it is not necessary that one or any of the four circumstances be present.

So the gist of the crime, as aptly stated in American jurisprudence from which was derived the crime of kidnapping for ransom,[88] is not the
forcible or secret confinement, imprisonment, inveiglement, or kidnapping without lawful authority, but x x x the felonious act of so doing with
intent to hold for a ransom the person so kidnapped, confined, imprisoned, inveigled, etc.[89]

It is obvious that once that intent is present, as in the case at bar, kidnapping for ransom is already committed. Any other interpretation of the role
of ransom, particularly the one advanced by accused-appellants, is certainly absurd since it ironically penalizes rescue efforts of kidnap victims by
law enforcers and in turn rewards kidnappers for the success of police efforts in such rescue operations. Moreover, our jurisprudence is replete with
cases, e.g., People v. Chua Huy,[90] People v. Ocampo[91] and People v. Pingol,[92] wherein botched ransom payments and effective recovery of
the victim did not deter us from finding culpability for kidnapping for ransom.

Second. Issues of sufficiency of evidence are resolved by reference to findings of the trial court that are entitled to the highest respect on appeal in
the absence of any clear and overwhelming showing that the trial court neglected, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance affecting the result of the case.[93] Bearing this elementary principle in mind, we find enough evidence to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the cooperation of all accused-appellants in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco.
Truly incriminating is the judicial confession of accused-appellant Garcia of his participation in the commission of the crime. He admitted that he
took part in actually depriving Atty. Tioleco of his liberty[94] and in securing the ransom payment from Floriana Tioleco.[95] He could not have been
following mechanically the orders of an alleged mastermind, as he claims, since by his own admission he was neither threatened, forced or
intimidated to do so[96] nor mentally impaired to resist the orders.[97] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is presumed to be in full
possession of his faculties and conscience to resist and not to do evil.

We cannot also give credence to Garcias asseveration that the persons still at large were his co-conspirators. This posture is a crude attempt to
muddle the case as discerned by the trial court from his demeanor when he testified -

Because he had been caught in flagrante delicto, Roland Garcia admitted his participation in the crime charged. From his testimony, however, there
appears a veiled attempt to shield Gerry Valler from conviction. First, Garcia claimed that the car they used was reddish in color (TSN, October 20,
1997, pp. 9, 19 & 20). Then he added that the owner of the car was Jimmy Muit and not Gerry Valler (TSN, October 20, 1997, p. 9). Next, he said that
there was no conspiracy and he did not know then Gerry Valler, Rodante Rogel and Rogel Lariba until they were placed together in Camp Crame
(Ibid., p. 22).

The Court however cannot simply accept this part of his story. To begin with, his repeated reference to the color of the car as reddish is quite
suspicious. He conspicuously stressed the color of the car in three (3) instances without being asked. The transcripts of the notes bear out the
following:

ATTY. MALLABO: Did you use any vehicle while you were there at Gilmore Street?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of vehicle was that?
A: Jimmys car, a Toyota, somewhat reddish in color x x x x
Q: By the way, what car did you use when you were roaming around Quezon City on October 6 in the evening?
A: Jimmys car, which was somewhat red in color. Reddish.
Q: And what car did you use the following day when you took the bag? The same car?
A: The same car, the Toyota car which was somewhat reddish in color.

Such a clear attempt to mislead and deceive the Court with such unsolicited replies cannot succeed. On October 8, 1996, in the vicinity of
McDonalds, he was seen alighting from the blue Toyota Corona (TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 28-32). As earlier pointed out, the blue Toyota Corona car
is owned by Gerry Valler who was the one driving it in the afternoon of the same day to the De Vega compound (TSN, April 28, 1997, pp. 64-67; and
November 10, 1997, pp. 22-28). Gerry Valler was also identified by Atty. Tioleco as the driver of the dark blue car used in his abduction (TSN, April
10, 1997, pp. 10-11; and TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 21-27).[98]

Accused-appellant Vallers profession of innocence also deserves no consideration. Various circumstances indubitably link him to the crime. For one,
he was positively identified by Atty. Tioleco to be the driver of the dark blue Toyota car used in the abduction on 5 October 1997, which car was
seen again twice during the occasions for ransom payment. This was followed by a telephone call made by Valler to the house where Atty. Tioleco
was being detained and in fact talked with accused-appellant Rogel to tell him that he was coming over[99] and with accused-appellant Garcia to ask
from him about the ransom supposedly earlier collected.[100] Given the overwhelming picture of his complicity in the crime, this Court cannot
accept the defense that he was only trying to pay his debts to Jimmy Muit when he was arrested.

We find nothing substantive in Vallers attempt to discredit the victims positive identification of him on the trifling observation that Atty. Tioleco was
too confused at the time of his abduction to recognize accused-appellants physical features accurately. It is truly evident from the testimony of Atty.
Tioleco that his vision and composure were not impaired by fear or shock at the time of his abduction and that he had the opportunity to see vividly
and remember unerringly Vallers face -

Q: Where were these two unidentified men positioned inside the car?
A: One of them was at the drivers seat and the other one was immediately behind the drivers seat.
Q: Now, could you please describe to this honorable court the person who was seated on the drivers seat?
A: He has a dark complexion, medium built and short hair at that time.
Q: If you see that person again will you be able to identify him sir?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And if hes present in the courtroom will you be able to point to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At this juncture your honor we would like to request with the courts permission the witness be allowed to step down from the witness stand and
approach the person just described and tap him on his shoulder.

COURT INTERPRETER: Witness stepping down from the witness stand and approached the person he had just described and tapped him on his
shoulder and who when asked to identify himself he gave his name as Gerry Valler.[101]

Even on cross-examination, Atty. Tioleco was steadfast in his reference to Gerry Valler -
Q: What stage was that when your eyeglasses were grabbed by these persons inside the car?
A: That was after the other accused entered the vehicle and the car zoomed away, that was when they were putting a blindfold on me, that was the
time when they started removing my eyeglasses, sir x x x x[102]
Q: So when you were inside the car, you had difficulty seeing things inside the car because you were not wearing your eyeglasses?
A: No, sir, that is not correct, because they were close, so I can see them x x x x[103]
Q: And as a matter of fact, it was the PACC operatives who informed you that the person being brought in was also one of the suspects, am I
correct?
A: That is not correct, sir. They said that, but I know that is one of the suspects because he was the person who was driving the vehicle at the time I
got kidnapped. So I know him.
Q: So you saw him at the time you were kidnapped that is why you were able to identify him when he was ushered in?
A: When he was brought into the kitchen I saw him. When I saw him, I knew he was one of the suspects.
Q: When you saw him, he was in handcuffs?
A: Yes, sir, that is correct.
Q: You were informed that his name is Gerry Valler?
A: When he went inside the house and the kitchen, they started interviews, that is where I learned his name, Gerry Valler x x x x[104]
Q: But I thought that when you were pushed inside the car, you were pushed head first, how can you easily describe this person driving the vehcile
and the person whom you now identified as Roland Garcia?
A: Even if they pushed my head, there was an opportunity for me to see the face of the accused.[105]

As we held in People v. Candelario,[106] it is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and
the manner in which the craven acts are committed. There is no reason to disbelieve Atty. Tioelecos claim that he saw the faces of his abductors
considering that they brazenly perpetrated the crime in broad daylight without donning masks to hide their faces. Besides, there was ample
opportunity for him to discern their features from the time two (2) of his kidnappers approached and forced him into their car and once inside saw
the other two (2), including Gerry Valler, long enough to recall them until he was blindfolded.

The victims identification of accused-appellant Valler is not any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention Vallers name in his affidavit. It is well-settled
that affidavits are incomplete and inaccurate involving as they do mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigators
questions.[107] As the victim himself explained -

Q: Now, in Question No. 5 and I quote x x x Why did you not identify here the name of the driver as one Gerry Valler?

A: Because they never asked me the name. They just asked me to narrate what happened. Had they asked me the name, I could have mentioned the
name.[108]

In light of the positive identification by the victim of accused-appellant Valler, the latters denial must fall absolutely. Clearly, positive identification of
the accused where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails
over his defense.[109] When there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely
against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[110]

Finally, we do not see any merit in Vallers enumeration of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of P/Chief Insp. Gilbert Cruz concerning (a) the
time and place of meeting between the PACC operatives and Floriana Tioleco; (b) the schedule of the first and second ransom pay-offs; (c) the
number of Floriana Tiolecos companions during the aborted first pay-off; (d) the number of occupants in the blue Toyota car; and, (e) the PACC
operatives recognition of Floriana Tioleco during the ransom payments. This is an argument that clutches at straws. For one, the purported
inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number, hence, the reference thereto by the witness would understandably vary.
Furthermore, they are too minor to warrant the reversal of the judgment of conviction. They do not affect the truth of the testimonies of witnesses
nor do they discredit their positive identification of accused-appellants. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen rather than diminish
the prosecutions case as they erase suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and negate any misgiving that the same was perjured.[111]

We also do not believe that accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba are innocent bystanders in this case. It taxes the mind to believe Rogels defense
that as a caretaker of the place where Atty. Tioleco was detained, he observed nothing unusual about this incident. An innocent man would have
immediately reported such dastardly act to the authorities and refused to sit idly by, but a guilty person in contrast would have behaved otherwise
as Rogel did.[112]

Accused-appellant Laribas defense is similarly incredible. He joins Gerry Valler in proclaiming that he too was allegedly at the wrong place at the
wrong time for the wrong reason of just wanting to tune up the car of Jimmy Muit. But for all these assertions, he failed to produce satisfactory
evidence that he was indeed there to repair such car. Of all the days he could have discharged his work, he chose to proceed on 8 October 1997
when the kidnapping was in full swing. There was even no car to repair on the date that he showed up. Like the submission of Rogel, Laribas defense
falls completely flat for he could have so easily observed the kidnapping of Atty. Tioleco that was taking place in the house of Jimmy Muit.

In sum, accused-appellants cannot rely upon the familiar phrase reasonable doubt for their acquittal. As demonstrated by the fastiduous references
of Valler to alleged inconsistencies of P/Chief Insp. Cruz, not all possible doubt is reasonable since in the nature of things everything relating to
human affairs is open to some imaginary dilemma. As we have said in People v. Ramos,[113] it is not such a doubt as any man may start by
questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony, for it is possible always to question
any conclusion derived from testimony. Reasonable doubt must arise from the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence, and it should pertain
to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. Accused-appellants have not shown the presence of such fatal defects in this case. Clearly, all the
elements and qualifying circumstances to warrant conviction for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention have been
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third. We go into the criminal liability of each accused-appellant. There is no doubt that Gerry Valler and Ronald Garcia are principals by direct
participation and co-conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco. Their respective participation in perpetrating the crime cannot be
denied. As regards their liability as co-conspirators, we find the same to have also been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it for which liability is joint.[114] Proof of the
agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and
after the commission of the crime disclosing a common understanding between them relative to its commission.[115] The acts of Valler and Garcia
in coordinating the abduction, collection of ransom and detention of their victim indubitably prove such conspiracy.

Lariba and Rogel were caught inside the house where Atty. Tioleco was detained. P/Chief Insp. Paul Tucay testified on their involvement -

Q: Okey, when you stormed the place, do you know where these two men were?
A: The two men were seated at the sala during that time, sir.
Q: They were seated at the sala when you entered the place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after entering the gate?
A: We announced that we were police officers of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.
Q: Do you know what happened with these two men during that time?
A: They were caught by surprise and they were about to run to the first room.
Q: What happened when these two men who were at the living room or at the sala, when they ran to the first room?
A: We surprised them and cornered them in that room.
Q: What about the team of Major Quidato, where did they proceed?
A: Major Quidatos team proceeded to the second room where Atty. Tioleco was being kept.
Q: According to you, you gave chase to these two men who were earlier in the sala and they ran upon your announcement that you were police
officers?
A: When we cornered them in that room, they were about to grab the two revolvers loaded with six (6) rounds of ammunitions.
Q: Where were these revolvers placed, Mr. Witness?
A: They were placed on top of a cabinet, which, when you enter in the room, is placed on the right side of the room.
Q: How many revolvers were you able to recover?
A: There were two revolvers.
Q: And can you please describe these revolvers to this Honorable Court?
A: Yes, sir x x x x The revolvers confiscated on that raid are one (1) .38 caliber revolver without serial number loaded with 6 rounds of ammunition,
live ammo, one .357 also loaded with 6 rounds of live ammunitions.[116]

Correlating the above testimony with the other evidence, it is clear that at the time Lariba and Rogel were caught, Atty. Tioleco had already been
rendered immobile with his eyes blindfolded and his hands handcuffed. No evidence exists that he could have gone elsewhere or escaped. At the
precise moment of their apprehension, accused-appellants Lariba and Rogel were unarmed although guns inside one of the rooms of the house
were available for their use and possession.

Assessing these established circumstances in the manner most favorable to Lariba and Rogel, we conclude that they were merely guarding the
house for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the successful denouement to the crime or repelling any attempt
to rescue the victim, as shown by the availability of arms and ammunition to them. They thus cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts by means of which they aided or facilitated the execution of the crime but without any indispensable act for its
accomplishment. Under Art. 18 of The Revised Penal Code, they are mere accomplices.

In People v. De Vera[117] we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner -

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal
intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached
the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.

In the instant case, we cannot deny knowledge on the part of Lariba and Rogel that Valler and Garcia had kidnapped Atty. Tioleco for the purpose of
extorting ransom and their cooperation to pursue such crime. But these facts without more do not make them co-conspirators since knowledge of
and participation in the criminal act are also inherent elements of an accomplice.[118] Further, there is no evidence indubitably proving that Lariba
and Rogel themselves participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. As the evidence stands, they were caught just guarding the house for
the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the success of the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim as
shown by the availability of arms and ammunition to them. These items contrast starkly with the tried and true facts against Valler and Garcia that
point to them as the agents ab initio of the design to kidnap Atty. Tioleco and extort ransom from his family.

Significantly, the crime could have been accomplished even without the participation of Lariba and Rogel. As stated above, the victim had been
rendered immobile by Valler and Garcia before the latter established contacts with Floriana Tioleco and demanded ransom. The participation of
Lariba and Rogel was thus hardly indispensable. As we have held in Garcia v. CA, in some exceptional situations, having community of design with
the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was,
relatively speaking, of a minor character.[119] At any rate, where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking and doubt created
as to whether the accused acted as principal or accomplice, the balance tips for the milder form of criminal liability of an accomplice.[120]

We are not unaware of the ruling in People v. Licayan that conspiracy can be deduced from the acts of the accused-appellants and their co-accused
which show a concerted action and community of interest. By guarding Co and Manaysay and preventing their escape, accused-appellants exhibited
not only their knowledge of the criminal design of their co-conspirators but also their participation in its execution.[121] But the instant case is
different. Considering the roles played by Lariba and Rogel in the execution of the crime and the state the victim was in during the detention, it
cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt that these accused-appellants were in a real sense detaining Atty. Tioleco and preventing his escape. The
governing case law is People v. Chua Huy[122] where we ruled -

The defendants statements to the police discarded, the participation of the other appellants in the crime consisted in guarding the detained men to
keep them from escaping. This participation was simultaneous with the commission of the crime if not with its commencement nor previous
thereto. As detention is an essential element of the crime charged, as its name, definition and graduation of the penalty therefor imply, the crime
was still in being when Lorenzo Uy, Tan Si Kee, Ang Uh Ang, William Hao and Young Kiat took a hand in it. However, we are not satisfied from the
circumstances of the case that the help given by these accused was indispensable to the end proposed. Our opinion is that these defendants are
responsible as accomplices only.

Fourth. In the beginning, we noted that neither Lariba nor Rogel who were both convicted of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in Crim.
Case No. Q-96-68049 filed a notice of appeal in accordance with established procedures, although the records show that accused-appellant Gerry
Valler needlessly did so exclusively in his behalf.[123] But in light of the enactment of RA 8294 amending PD 1866 effective 6 July 1997,[124] and our
ruling in People v. Ladjaalam[125] followed in Evangelista v. Siztoza,[126] we nonetheless review this conviction to give effect to Art. 22 of The
Revised Penal Code mandating in the interest of justice the retroactive application of penal statutes that are favorable to the accused who is not a
habitual criminal.[127]

In Ladjaalam we ruled that if another crime was committed by the accused he could not be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under
RA 8294 amending PD 1866 -

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of
illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor x x x x

The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294.
Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:

Sec. 1. - Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in
the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted
coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by
any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use
unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority
therefor.

x x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of
simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be
held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable
to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted
homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance x x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime
was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates accused-appellants x x x of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally
carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second, it is only prision correccional.
Indeed, an accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm
and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence necessarily arises from the language of RA
8294 the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court.[128]

Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 and set aside the judgment of conviction therein since accused-appellants
Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel cannot be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions there being another crime - kidnapping
for ransom - which they were perpetrating at the same time.

In fine, we affirm the conviction of Gerry Valler and Ronald Roland Garcia as principals and Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel as accomplices for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. This Court is compelled to impose the supreme penalty of death on Valler and Garcia
as mandated by Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.

The penalty imposable on Lariba and Rogel as accomplices is reclusion perpetua, the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for the crime
committed pursuant to Art. 52 in relation to Art. 61, par. (1), of the Code. We however set aside the judgment in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049
convicting Lariba and Rogel of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in light of the foregoing discussion.

As regards the moral damages against accused-appellants to be paid by them in solidum, we find the amount of P200,000.00 to be reasonable
compensation for the ignominy and sufferings Atty. Tioleco and his family endured due to accused-appellants inhumane act of detaining him in
blindfold and handcuffs and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological ordeal which constitute the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code[129] is too obvious to require still the recital
thereof at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade.

Following our finding that only Gerry Valler and Ronald Roland Garcia are principals by direct participation and conspirators while Rotchel Lariba and
Rodante Rogel are accomplices, we apportion their respective responsibilities for the amount adjudged as moral damages to be paid by them
solidarily within their respective class and subsidiarily for the others.[130] Thus, the principals, accused-appellants Ronald Roland Garcia and Gerry
Valler, shall pay their victim Atty. Romualdo Tioleco P150,000.00 for moral damages and the accomplices P50,000.00 for moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 (G.R. No. 133489) accused-appellants RONALD ROLAND
GARCIA y FLORES and GERRY B. VALLER are declared guilty as PRINCIPALS of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and are sentenced
each to death, while accused-appellants RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO are convicted as ACCOMPLICES and are
ordered to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law for the same crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention. Accused-appellants are further ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, with the principals being solidarily
liable for P150,000.00 of this amount and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the accomplices, and the accomplices being solidarily liable for
P50,000.00 for moral damages and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the principals.

Finally, in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 (G.R. No. 143970) the Decision of the court a quo convicting RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA
y DEMICILLO of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is REVERSED and SET ASIDE in light of the enactment of RA 8294 and our rulings in
People v. Ladjaalam[131] and Evangelista v. Siztoza.[132]

Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power. Costs against accused-
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of
bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy.
Petitioner pleaded “not guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.5redarclaw

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him.
Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if
she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was “without responsibility.”7redarclaw

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the
belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more
credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner
to be easily duped by a person like Santos.8redarclaw

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage.”9 Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined
and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos
had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license
effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:11redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In
advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court
cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of
Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’ narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack
of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.12redarclaw

THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos’s previous
marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their
marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met
him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be
denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s denial of any knowledge of Santos’s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the
previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior
marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

The Ruling of the Court

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s

knowledge of Santos’s first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is
valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse
married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she
knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its
findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the
important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.20redarclaw

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree
with the lower courts’ imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the
range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.”22
Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of
six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity.25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation
of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to
Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28redarclaw
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The
CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case open for review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and
wife for at least five years before their marriage.31redarclaw

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 199632 and that after six months of courtship,33 she
married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano,
Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from
her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first
met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36redarclaw

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the
two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted an
affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract
marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of
(1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2)
falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal
laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be
rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.”

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the
crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.40redarclaw

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an
illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.”41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression
of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.43redarclaw

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for
having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully
well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the
height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite
marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and
Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.”45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208170 August 20, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. "Susan", Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14,
2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC). in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found accused-appellant
Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, as defined and
penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accused-appellant
Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.

The Facts

Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the Information,3 dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the abovenamed accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM
was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky"
and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was
already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he
was kept for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was maltreated; that ransom in
the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was
demanded in exchangefor his safe release until he was finally rescued on February 11,2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Version of the Prosecution

In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of the kidnapping:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from
the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take
him from the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the
vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the
phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would
from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer
knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and
chained.

When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as "John"
approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom
and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder,
phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and
asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was
told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them thathe was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and
his kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as
room and board fee.

The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message purportedly from the former informing them that he was
kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.

On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the situation and a meeting with the
representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.

Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to
Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong
Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety and eventual
release.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he
was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten
with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.

On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon
instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crimeand Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to
Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the
PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught
sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they were able to chance upon the
said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told
that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to
ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his driver’s license and car registration but
appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the
police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is being
kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam
after being informed of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated. Upon
instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible rescue operations of the victim.

Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led back to the police car. The rest of the members of PACER
proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.

During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainant’s captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau.5

Version of the Defense

Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief6 to substantiate their claim of innocence:

Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the
subject case against him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to
the country in July 2001 for a vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he was in
Singapore running some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and time the victim was kidnapped),
Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.

On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her
shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger
than him held his hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes
with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.

When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was wet.
His head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about
twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus, someone removed the
cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to
the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.

When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his British passport, alien certificate, driver’s license,
Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some
cash given to him by his wife . He lost those personal properties.

After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the
PACER Custodial Center.

Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August
2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats), without an
aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as
an occupation since his driver’s license is non-professional.

Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him
(though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she
would visit him.

Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his
house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The
white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.

During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informedof his constitutional rights.

Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and
dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4,
Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with
his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.

On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia
Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 o’clock in the
morning. At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to the
hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.

Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an
office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together
with her children and helpers, were detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released and
they went home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.

Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying cars
for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had withher
Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring, necklace and
cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC

In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and
sufficient, with their versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive
identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It
stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the
heinous act.

With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in
bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.

The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein her
minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor,
she is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM.Accused are credited in full of the preventive
imprisonment they have already served in confinement.

Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred
Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until full payment, moral
damages of One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (200,000.00).

SO ORDERED.8

Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise lent credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
who were able to establish with certitude the commission of the crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.

Hence, this appeal.

ASSIGNED ERRORS:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF
OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED
KIDNAPPER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.10

Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not
considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if
there was another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the Department of Justice, dated
February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and not
because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11

On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties that they could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in
its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13 Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his arguments
raised in his brief filed before the CA.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the
commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accusedappellant for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v. Maxion15 that:

The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to
decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.Through its
observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept
and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.16

It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the
probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive
effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA17

In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses compared to those of the
accusedappellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the
commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here, the
prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.

Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost
consciousness on the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone
inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he
had a good look and an ample opportunity toremember the facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the
most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are
committed.19

Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the first to the
twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity,his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to
remember the culprit’s voice which had a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus.
Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the phone for three
weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with
Chinese accent. There was no showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence
showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper motive exists, and their
testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20

Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led tothe inescapable and reasonable conclusion
that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if
the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the circumstances
proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person.22

The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:

1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento
Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;

2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center
on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11,
2004;

3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;

4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain;
checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and
family footages, and the other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card; two
(2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the OfficialReceipts
and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau;
marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco
bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;

5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner
ofthe QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet; and

6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus
showed that both DNA profiles matched.23

The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together,
definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution
evidence effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the
accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting
ransom for the release of the victim.24

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First,
Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a
taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus
made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was
no evidence indubitably proving that Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against
her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper
whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner. Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with
Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there bea community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous
or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police
authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the
victim. Susana not only countenancedPetrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed.26 As keenly observed
by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression of sympathy orfeeling of support to her husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De
Vera,28 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather thanthat of a
principal.

Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February 12,
2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the
credibility of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the
investigator’s questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal ofan accused,
as testimonial evidence carries moreweight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn
statements are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full
the incident which transpired.31

Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the
accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.32 The
defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove.1âwphi1
In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their bare
allegations, no competent and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-
up and, thus, remain selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any dubious
reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify and
fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their only motive
was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.

As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless
arrests. This too must fail.

Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned
the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before theyentered their respective pleas to
the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-
appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons.35 Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.

Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that
support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the
illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial
free from error.37

With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of parole
against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that
the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.

The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the information
until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants, the Court findsthe award of ₱1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence,
the same is being reduced to ₱200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and his family endured
because of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the
ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and psychologicalordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade. The Court
also finds the award of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of demand for ransom, and to serve
as an example and deterrence for the public good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.38

The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of
the damages awarded because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus,
and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the
accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in
the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages in the amount of ₱273, 132.00; moral damages
in the amount of ₱200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, or a total amount of ₱573, 132.00. Taking into consideration
the degree of their participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages (₱573, 132.00 x 213)
or ₱382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or ₱191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be
liable for actual damages in the amount of P 182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount or
₱66,666.6 7; and Susana for the amount of ₱91,044.00 as actual damages; ₱66,666.67 as moral damages; and ₱33,333.33 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount
of ₱200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount or ₱273, 132.00 is maintained.
The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:

1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67; and

2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67 and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱33,333.33.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
ERNESTO GARCES, G.R. No. 173858
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated January 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the
Judgment[2] rendered by Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, finding petitioner Ernesto Garces guilty as an accessory to the crime
of Forcible Abduction with Rape. Also assailed is the Resolution[3] dated July 27, 2006 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In an Information dated December 10, 1992, Rosendo Pacursa, Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr., Aurelio Pira, and petitioner Ernesto Garces, were
charged with Forcible Abduction with Rape committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1992, in the evening, at x x x, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with criminal and carnal intent, with lewd design and by means
of force, accused Rosendo Pacursa, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, after covering her mouth, forcibly abduct, pull and take
away one AAA while walking to the church to the tobacco flue-curing barn and while inside the barn lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
and carnal knowledge of the offended party; that accused Ernesto Garces later on covered the mouth of AAA and take her out of the barn; that
accused Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira stand guard outside the barn while Rosendo Pacursa is raping AAA; to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of: (1) uninhabited place, and (2) nighttime.[4] (Emphasis supplied)

All the accused, except Senando Garces who is still at large, pleaded not guilty.

The prosecutions version of the incident is as follows:

On August 2, 1992, between 8:00 and 9:00 oclock in the evening, AAA was on her way to the chapel when the five accused suddenly appeared and
approached her. Rosendo Pacursa covered her mouth with his hands and told her not to shout or she will be killed. He then brought her inside a
nearby tobacco barn while his four companions stood guard outside.[5]

Inside the barn, Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought back but to no avail. Thereafter, Pacursa succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her. After a while, they heard people shouting and calling the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner Ernesto Garces entered the barn,
covered AAAs mouth, then dragged her outside. He also threatened to kill her if she reports the incident.[6]

Upon reaching the house of Florentino Garces, petitioner released AAA. Shortly afterwards, AAAs relatives found her crying, wearing only one
slipper and her hair was disheveled. They brought her home but when asked what happened, AAA could not answer because she was in a state of
shock. After a while, she was able to recount the incident.[7]

Rosendo Pacursa denied that he raped the victim, while his co-accused presented alibis as their defense.

Pacursa testified that he and AAA were sweethearts for almost a year prior to the incident. On the night of August 2, 1992, he was on his way to the
house of Antonio Pira, Jr. to watch a televised basketball game when he saw AAA. The latter allegedly wanted to have a talk with him so he led her
to the tobacco barn about 15 meters away, so that no one might see them. They were alone by the door of the barn talking, embracing and kissing.
They only parted ways when he saw the relatives of AAA. He denied having sexual intercourse with her. After the incident, he received a letter[8]
from AAA asking him to elope.[9]

On the other hand, petitioner, Antonio Pira, Jr., and Aurelio Pira, testified that they were watching a televised basketball game at the house of
Antonio Pira, Jr. at the time the alleged rape transpired. They denied seeing Pacursa that night.[10]

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision finding Pacursa guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape while petitioner Garces was
found guilty as an accessory to the crime. Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.[11]

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused ROSENDO PACURSA and ERNESTO GARCES are hereby found guilty of the crime of Forcible Abduction
With Rape punishable under the Revised Penal Code committed upon the person of AAA. The other accused ANTONIO PIRA, JR. and AURELIO PIRA
are hereby ACQUITTED as accessory for the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape.

ROSENDO PACURSA, the principal accused in this case is hereby sentenced to one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the offense, for
being 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime pursuant to Art. 68 of the Revised Penal Code. Taking into consideration the
aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and nighttime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 11 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 18 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Ernesto Garces, being an accessory to the commission of the crime is hereby penalized two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the
offense. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum.

Both accused are jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of actual and moral damages plus the cost of
this suit.

SO ORDERED.[12]
Both Pacursa and petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals. However, Pacursa subsequently withdrew his appeal.

On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision convicting accused ROSENDO PACURSA as principal and accused-appellant ERNESTO
GARCES as accessory of the crime of forcible abduction with rape is AFFIRMED.

However, accused-appellant Ernesto Garces sentence is MODIFIED in that he is to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
FOUR (4) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner claims that no rape was committed and that there is no evidence to show that he covered the mouth of the complainant when he
brought her out of the barn.

The petition lacks merit.

It has been established that Pacursa forcibly took AAA against her will and by use of force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her. The trial
court found complainants testimony to be credible, consistent and unwavering even during cross-examination.

Regarding the letter she wrote to Pacursa asking him to elope with her, she explained that she felt uncertain at that time and was trying to avoid the
possible trouble or scandal the incident might bring upon her,[14] which we find plausible. In pursuing the case, she had to transfer to another
school because of the threats of her assailants and their persistence in settling the case. Furthermore, no improper motive was shown why she
would accuse and testify against Pacursa who was her boyfriend, and the other accused, who are her relatives.[15]

Prosecution witness Grace Liberto likewise corroborated the testimony of complainant when she testified that she saw the latter crying, wearing
only one slipper, and her hair disheveled,[16] immediately after the incident. The medico-legal findings of Dr. Herminio Venus also showed that
there was a laceration in complainants private parts possibly caused by sexual contact.[17]

Pacursa, however, could not be convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with rape because the crime committed was only simple rape. Forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim.[18] Based on the evidence presented, the
accused intended to rape the victim when he took her to the tobacco barn. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.[19]

We also note that the trial court failed to make any definitive finding as to the existence of aggravating circumstances. However, we find that the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place did not attend the commission of the crime.

Nocturnity is aggravating when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure his unmolested escape.[20] The
mere fact that the rape was committed at nighttime does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance.[21] In the instant case, other than the
fact that the crime was committed at night, there is no other evidence that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately
sought by the accused.

The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot likewise be appreciated in the absence of evidence that the accused actually sought an
isolated place to better execute their purpose.[22] The records do not show that solitude was purposely sought or taken advantage of to facilitate
the commission of the crime.

Although Pacursa has withdrawn his appeal, the Courts ruling that the crime committed is simple rape and not forcible abduction with rape, shall
apply to him. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

As regards petitioners complicity, his defense of alibi cannot prevail over complainants positive identification of her assailants. Denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive
declaration of credible witnesses.[23]

For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[24] Petitioner alleged he was watching television at Aurelio
Piras house, which is about 20 meters away from the barn at the time of the incident. However, it will only take one minute for him to reach the
barn from the house.[25] Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Contrary to petitioners contention, there is proof that petitioner covered AAAs mouth when he dragged her out of the barn. Complainant executed
a sworn statement recounting her harrowing experience which she identified during her direct examination and offered as Exhibits A, A-1, and A-
2[26] for the prosecution and admitted by the trial court.[27] In her sworn statement, AAA narrated thus:

Q - Will you relate carefully the manner by which Rosendo Pacursa raped you?
A - x x x Then someone came inside the barn, shut-off my mouth, then brought me out and away southward and when we reach the house of
Florentino Garces he released me and as I walked down the path my uncle Bartolome Florendo was able to light me with his flashlight
xxxx

Q - Who was that person who later came inside the barn who brought you out shutting-off your mouth then took you away southward?
A - Ernesto Garces also from our place, sir.
Q - Why, has Rosendo Pacursa other companions?
A - He has, sir. They are Ernesto Garces, Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira.
Q - What did these companions of Rosendo Pacursa do?
A - They stayed outside the barn but it was Ernesto Garces who brought me out, sir.[28]
Complainants failure to testify during her direct examination that her mouth was covered by petitioner when she was pulled out of the barn does
not preclude resort to her sworn statement to provide the missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of her testimony. As held in People
v. Servano:[29]
Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open court; it includes all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the
witnesses, and other supporting evidence. It comprehends something more than just the mere testimony of a witness. Thus, when a sworn
statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution evidence which should not be ignored for it
complements and completes the testimony on the witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests credibility and trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails
to reiterate, during trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn statement useless and
insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that the sworn statement should be given more
probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and the open court declarations must be evaluated and examined together
in toto so that a full and thorough determination of the merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness oral testimony during the
trial should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like manner, the court cannot give
probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality
of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during trial. x x x[30]

Petitioner also faults the court a quo in finding that he threatened AAA while leading her out of the barn. He argues that complainant failed to
positively identify the person who issued the threats because she vaguely referred to said person merely as they.

The contention lacks merit.

The use of the word they in referring to the person who threatened complainant is of no moment. When the threats were issued, both Pacursa and
petitioner were inside the barn; thus, it is logical to conclude that the threats came from both of them.

Petitioner likewise cannot take refuge in the acquittal of Antonio and Aurelio Pira. Both were acquitted because there was no evidence to show their
participation in the crime. Complainant only testified that she heard their voices which the trial court considered insufficient. However, in the case
of petitioner, complainant positively identified him as one of the companions of Pacursa who remained outside the barn and who eventually
entered upon noting the presence of AAAs relatives nearby. He thereafter covered complainants mouth and led her out of the barn. All these
circumstances demonstrate petitioners complicity.

We do not agree, however, that petitioner should be convicted as an accessory to the crime.

It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any
error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. Such an appeal confers upon the appellate court
full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.[31]

In finding petitioner guilty as an accessory, the Court of Appeals found that his participation was after or subsequent to the rape and that his acts
were employed as a means of concealing the commission of the crime and assisting Rosendo to escape.

We find otherwise. The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even before complainant was raped. He was present
when Pacursa abducted complainant and when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with the other accused
as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa.

Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as an accomplice,[32] there being insufficient evidence to
prove conspiracy,[33] and not merely as an accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code, accomplices are those who, not being included in
Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.[34] The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as
an accomplice are present: (1) community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs
with the latter in his purpose; and (2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[35]

The crime committed in the case at bar is simple rape, the penalty for which under the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua. Since Pacursa was
a minor when the crime was committed, the penalty must be reduced by one degree, to reclusion temporal.[36] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the maximum of the penalty shall be within the medium range of
reclusion temporal, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years.[37]

With respect to petitioner, the penalty imposed upon accomplices in a consummated crime is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
for the felony.[38] Since simple rape is punishable with reclusion perpetua, the penalty of reclusion temporal should also be imposed on petitioner
in its medium period in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable
penalty should range from prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[39] If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, as in this case, the court
shall determine the amount for which each must respond[40] to be enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the
amount of damages to be awarded must be apportioned according to the respective responsibilities of the accused to be paid by them solidarily
within their respective class and subsidiarily for the others.[41]

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the complainant in rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape which is distinct from moral damages
awarded upon such finding without need of further proof because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the
victim to such award.[42]

In determining the civil liability of petitioner, a clarification of the trial courts decision is necessary. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision
held Pacursa and petitioner jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of actual and moral damages plus
the cost of suit. For our purposes, we shall treat the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court as the civil indemnity ex delicto for which, as
an accomplice, petitioner should be solidarily liable with Pacursa only for one-half of the said amount, or P25,000.00, and is subsidiarily liable for the
other P25,000.00 in case the principal is found insolvent.[43]
In addition, complainant must be awarded another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, this additional award should not apply to Pacursa who
has withdrawn his appeal as the same is not favorable to him.[44] Hence, the additional monetary award can only be imposed upon petitioner who
pursued the present appeal.[45]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Rosendo Pacursa guilty as principal by direct participation, and
petitioner Ernesto Garces as an accessory, to the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, is MODIFIED. Accused Rosendo Pacursa is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and being a minor at the time the crime was committed, is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Petitioner
Ernesto Garces is found guilty as an accomplice to the crime of rape, and is also sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Rosendo Pacursa and Petitioner Ernesto Garces are ORDERED to pay complainant P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto. Being an accomplice,
petitioner is held solidarily liable with the principal only for half of the amount or P25,000.00 and their subsidiary liability shall be enforced in
accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.