Cordora vs Comelec

Carpio, J:
FACTS: Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against Tambunting asserting
that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that Natural
Born Filipino and resident before the election in 2001and 2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was
not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and
residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated
that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16
December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these
travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make
any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not
a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was
born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as
an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s
father petitioned him through INS Form I -130(Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tam bunting’s
citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean
that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18November
2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003.The Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of complaint because it failed to
substantiate the charges. TheCOMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his
accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence. Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a
separate opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento
pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively
renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran
for public office. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.

HELD: Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I- 130 (Petition for Relative) because
of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is
both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insist s that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen. We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-
130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips
where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is
enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and
swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about
by the individual’s active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No.
9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino
citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an
oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship

DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE
GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship
under RA

9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and
political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in
the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA
9225.

HELD: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship for:
Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country;
1. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a
foreign country.
2. The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner’s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225
which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such,
he is disqualified from running for vice mayor.
IX. The Legislative Department

1. Tobias vs Abalos,
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the
provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.

With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show
that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were
not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for
the establishment of separate legislative district

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

2. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during
1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila.
She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil
Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos
in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a
new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

3. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC

586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party List System;
Proportional Representation; Proper Computation

Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the
People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).

FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20%
share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to

Party-List Representatives

Hence,

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a
seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-
lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of
the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their
deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections
provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately
ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country
shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-
list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-
list system.

4. Bagong Bayani Labor Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.

Facts: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying
that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May
14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.

On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed
a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed
COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR
No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents
named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001;
and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the COMELEC may
proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following
issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is
there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785."

Held: WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin
its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as
to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC is further DIRECTED to submit to
this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC"to refrain from
proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the
COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785

Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections
of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought
before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en

banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under
Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. The COMELEC,
however, did not act on that Petition.

In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency
of petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has not yet formally resolved the Petition before
it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the COMELEC, through theOffice of the Solicitor
General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the
absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of
law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably
imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of
20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."

Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
In view of the participation of political parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political
parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." For
its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties."

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the
point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders
and members as candidates for public office."

In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite character
of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseasworkers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization
or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable

electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized
and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

In view of OSG contention

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General contends
that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the
elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the
super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot
be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are
manifestly disparate; hence, theOSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common
sense.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority
who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was
enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to
be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a
direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State.

In view of COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or
ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to
apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.

In view of the Courts assistance

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed
to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the
Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in its work.
 In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list representation is a type of
proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House
of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a
nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and
underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-seat
districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-
seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.

Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win
seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes
cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are represented.

What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for
"marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only one-
half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the
"third or fourth placers" in district elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to
those who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable
them to be represented in the House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or
"underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need to give
the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two
systems are identical.

In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-
take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this
problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-
list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list
system.

Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list
system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors.

For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose
of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is
to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning.
These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.

5. Benjamin Ligot vs Ismael Mathay

56 SCRA 823 – Political Law – Salaries of Representatives – Retirement

FACTS: Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30,
 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
“fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government”
was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators
and congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the
Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.”

Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth
Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement
gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of
employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law.” The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the
then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay,
also disallowed the same.

The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of
his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic
Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum
would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving
indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation
within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other
emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of
Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary
of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during
their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the
salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of Ligot’s
colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for
it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what cannot be done directly.”

6. Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

17 SCRA 876 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee
on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus
Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor
Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are
being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is
covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”

The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members
of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the
time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was
published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as
a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

7. MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al

G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992

Facts: On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his
office, on the ground that the latter is a green card holder and a lawful permanent resident of the
United States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as
permanent resident. Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis
of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Held: No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for
the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of
office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case
rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued
against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de facto public officer,
respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are
as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered.

8. Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison

156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Appointment of “Head of Bureaus” – Officers Requiring Confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned
the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution,
heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department
of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s
appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission
on Appointment.

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation
by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of
Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need
to be confirmed by the COA.
9. Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado
27 SCRA 703 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Franking Privilege of
the Judiciary

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw
franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain
agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal
service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the
postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the
PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of
RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary
needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high
expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending
that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is
untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of
the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other
departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is
no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other
agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the
mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need
of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no
reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege.

10. COMELEC V. JUDGE QUIJANO-PADILLA and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP. (2002 – Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez)
FACTS: Pursuant to the “Voter’s Registration Act of 1996,” COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify
and bid for the supply and installation of information technology equipment and ancillary services
for the Voter’s Registration and Identification System Project. The said Project envisioned a
computerized database system or the May 2004 Elections. PHOTOKINA’s winning bid amounted to
6.588 Billion Pesos. COMELEC issued a Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA. However, under the General
Appropriations Act FY 2000, the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC’s modernization
project was only 1 Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of
Availability of Funds were only 1.2 Billion Pesos. COMELEC did not formalize the contract with
PHOTOKINA. Subsequently, PHOTOKINA filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC. The RTC sided
with PHOTOKINA.

The Supreme Court held that mandamus does not lie. The Constitution clearly provides that “no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Since the bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the project, the proposed contract
is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void.

Facts :
· RA 8189 (“Voter’s Registration Act of 1996”) was passed providing for the modernization and
computerization of the voters’ registration list and the appropriation of funds thereof. Pursuant
thereto, COMELEC promulgated a Resolution approving in principle the Voters’ Registration and
Identification System Project (VRIS Project)

. The VRIS Project evisioned a computerized database system for the May 2004 elections.

· The COMELEC issued invitations to prequalify and bid for the supply and installation of information
technology equipment for the VRIS Project. Private respondent PHOTOKINA pre-qualified.
PHOTOKINA, with its bid in the amount of 6.588 Billion Pesos, was declared the winning bidder.

· The parties proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Sadain and Atty. Sta. Ana,
acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.

· However, under RA 8760, the budget appropriated by Congress for COMELEC’s modernization
projectwas only 1 Billion Pesos and the actual available funds issued by the Chief Accountant of
COMELEC was only 1.2 Billion Pesos. · Subsequently, the term of COMELEC Chairman Demetriou and
Commissioners Desamito and Dy-Liacco expired. Appointed their successors were Chairman
Benipayo and Commissioners Borra and Tuason, Jr.

· Chairman Benipayo announced that the VRIS Project has been set aside. He further announced his
plan to “re-engineer” the entire modernization project of the COMELEC.

· Commissioner Sadain submitted a draft of the contract providing a price that would not exceed the
certified available appropriation but covering only Phase 1 of the VRIS Project – issuance of
registration cards for 1,000,000 voters in certain areas only. Under the draft, the “subsequent
completion of the whole project shall be agreed upon in accordance with the bid Documents and
annual funds available for it.
· PHOTOKINA wrote several letters to the COMELEC requiring formal execution of their contract, but
to no avail. It filed a petition for Mandamus, Prohibition and Damages against COMELEC and all its
Commissioners. The RTC ruled in favour of PHOTOKINA.

Issue
1) Is a petition for mandamus the proper remedy to enforce contractual obligations? NO.
2) May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project? NO.

Held/Ratio

Issue 1

· Mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations.

· Mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of private contracts. The remedy, if any, is by
an original action in the CFI to compel the city to pay the agreed price or to pay damages for
breach of contract. (Quiogue v. Romualdez)
· In the present case, what PHOTOKINA sought to enforce are its rights under the accepted bid
proposal. It is worth stressing that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right
is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. Here, the alleged contract is being
disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is illegal and
against public policy.
· While there may be cases where the writ of mandamus has been used to compel public officers
to perform certain acts, it will be observed that in these cases, the contracts have been
completely performed and nothing remained to be done except for the government to make
compensation (Isada v. Bocar). In the present case, the alleged contract has not yet been fully
performed by PHOTOKINA; and though it avers readiness to perform, COMELEC raised serious
questions as to its validity.
· COMELEC cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the
exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is
concerned.

Issue 2
· The contact is patently void and unenforceable.
· Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI of the Constitution states that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Thus, in the execution of government
contracts, various agencies must limit their expenditure within the appropriations made by law for
each fiscal year.
· Complementary to this constitutional provision are pertinent provisions of law and administrative
issuances that are designed to effectuate the said Constitutional mandate. (See Secs. 46 and 47 ,
Chap. 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Admin Code.)
· The existence of appropriation and the availability of funds are indispensible prerequisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts.
· The SC cannot accede to PHOTOKINA’s contention that there is already a perfected contract.
While the SC, in MMDA v. Jancom, held that the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer
of the bidder is to perfect the bidder, however such statement would be inconsequential in a
government where the acceptance referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold
otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate the
 government in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract
was attempted to be made. This is a dangerous precedent.

· In the present case, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the
bidding stage.

· The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee is to determine whether the bids comply with the
requirements. The amount of PHOTOKINA’s bid is 6.588 Billion Poses. However under the
Appropriations Act for that year, the only fund appropriated was 1 Billion Pesos and under the
Certification of Available Funds only 1.2 Billion pesos was available. There is no way that the
COMELEC could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was beyond the amount
appropriated by law. The Committee should have rejected the bid right away.

· The draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain that provides for a contract price of 1.2
Billion Pesos covers only the Phase 1 of the VRIS Project (issuance of identification cards for only
1,000,000 voters in specified areas). In effect, the implementation of the contract will be segmented
into several phases. This arrangement is disallowed by the budgetary laws and practices. It is also
disadvantageous to the COMELEC because of the uncertainty that will loom over its modernization
project for an indefinite period of time. The completion of Phase 1 of the VRIS Project would do no
good. Entering into a multi-year contract without a multi-year obligational authority is prohibited by
law .
· The contract is inexistent and void ab initio. It cannot be validated either by lapse of time or
ratification.
· PHOTOKINA’s remedy is found in Sec. 48 of EO 292, which explicitly provides that any contract
entered into contrary to the legal requirements shall be void, and “the officers entering into the
contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to
the same as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.”
· When the contracting officer acts beyond the scope of his legitimate powers, the Government is
not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract were a private one, where the officer
binds only himself, and thus, assumes personal liability thereunder. The proposed contract is
unenforceable as to the Government. Procedural

Issues

1. COMELEC contends that OSG has no standing to file a petition since its legal position is contrary
to that espoused by COMELEC Commissioners. (Note: OSG filed the present petition for certiorari in
behalf of then Chairman Benipayo and Commissioners Borra and Tuason, Jr.)

SC: The OSG is an independent institution. Its hands are not shackled to the cause of its client
agency. In the discharge of its task, it must see to it that the interest of the government is upheld.
Furthermore, petitions are also public officials entitled to be represented by the OSG, The OSG is the
lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents.

2. The present petition violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

SC: The said doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In cases of national interest and of serious
implications, the SC never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial
determination of the case. The present case is of national interest involving the disbursement of
public funds and the modernization of the country’s election process.

LINDAIN � SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the
unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed
expenditure;

� SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in the case of a contract for
personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the
estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking transactions of government-owned or
controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any government agency
shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned
shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly
appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the
current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the
auditor concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who
verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and the sum
so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose until the
obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.

� SECTION 33, RA 8760. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. - In the implementation of multi-year

projects, no agency shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational Authority
issued by the Department of Budget and Management for the purpose. Notwithstanding the
issuance of the multi-year Obligational Authority, the obligation to be incurred in any given calendar
year, shall in no case exceed the amount programmed for implementation during said calendar year.