1.) PH Credit Corp vs CA- no digest on the net but naa ko anis a yellow pad.

Ingnan lang tika later

2.) Lafarge vs. Continental

GR No. L-155173

FACTS:
1. Petition for review.
2. 1998, LETTER OF INTENT EXECUTED BY BOTH PARTIES
1. LAFARGE, in behalf of Luzon Continental Land Corporation (LCLC), agreed to purchase the cement business
of respondent Continental Cement Corporation.
2. Parties entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA).
3. LAFARGE aware of CONTINENTAL pending case with the Supreme Court (Asset Privatization Trust (APT)
v. Court of Appeals and Continental Cement Corporation)
i. In anticipation of the liability SC might adjudge against CONTINENTAL, the parties, under Clause 2 (c) of the
SPA, allegedly agreed to retain from the purchase price a portion of the contract price in the amount
of P117,020,846.84 -- the equivalent of US$2,799,140. This amount was to be deposited in an interest-bearing
account in the First National City Bank of New York (Citibank) for payment to APT, the petitioner in Asset
Privatization Trust V. CA/Continental.
ii. LAFARGE refused to apply the sum to the payment to APT, despite decision in APT vs CONTINENTAL, in favor
of CONTINENTAL and the repeated instructions of CONTINENTAL.
1. Fearful that nonpayment to APT would result in the foreclosure, not just of its properties covered by the SPA
with Lafarge but of several other properties as well, CONTINENTAL filed “Complaint with Application for
Preliminary Attachment” against LAFARGE. Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-41103,
a. For LAFARGE to pay the “APT Retained Amount” referred to in Clause 2 (c) of the SPA.
b. LAFARGE moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it violated the prohibition on forum-shopping.
i. CONTINENTAL had allegedly made the same claim it was raising in Civil Case No. Q-00-41103 in another action,
which involved the same parties and which was filed earlier before the International Chamber of Commerce.
ii. Trial court denied LAFARGE’s Motion to Dismiss
1. LAFARGE elevated the matter to CA.
3. LAFARGE to avoid being in default and without prejudice to the outcome of their appeal, filed Answer and
Compulsory Counterclaims ad Cautelam before the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-00-41103 (issued for them
to pay APT Retained Amount).
1. Denied the allegations in the Complaint.
2. They prayed -- by way of compulsory counterclaims against CONTINENTAL, its majority stockholder and
president Gregory T. Lim, and its corporate secretary Anthony A. Mariano -- for the sums of (a) P2,700,000
each as actual damages, (b) P100,000,000 each as exemplary damages, (c) P100,000,000 each as moral
damages, and (d) P5,000,000 each as attorney’s fees plus costs of suit.
3. Prayed that both Lim and Mariano be held “jointly and solidarily” liable with CONTINENTAL.
4. On behalf of Lim and Mariano, CONTINENTAL moved to dismiss petitioners’ compulsory counterclaims on
grounds that essentially constituted the very issues for resolution in the instant Petition.

4. RTC dismissed LAFARGE counterclaims:

1. Counterclaims against Respondents Lim and Mariano were not compulsory.
2. Ruling in Sapugay was not applicable.
3. LAFARGE’s Answer with Counterclaims violated procedural rules on the proper joinder of causes of action.
5. LAFARGE Motion for Reconsideration:
1. RTC admitted some errors in Order, particularly in its pronouncement that their counterclaim had been pleaded
against Lim and Mariano only.
2. However, the RTC clarified that it was dismissing the counterclaim as it impleaded Respondents Lim and
Mariano, even if it included CONTINENTAL.
 ISSUE:
WON RTC gravely erred in refusing to rule that CONTINENTAL has no personality to move to dismiss
petitioners’ compulsory counterclaims on Respondents Lim and Mariano’s behalf.

WON RTC gravely erred in ruling that (i) petitioners’ counterclaims against Respondents Lim and Mariano are
not compulsory; (ii) Sapugay v. Court of Appeals is inapplicable here; and (iii) petitioners violated the rule on
joinder of causes of action.”

May defendants in civil cases implead in their counterclaims persons who were not parties to the original
complaints?

HELD:
Petition GRANTED and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The court of origin is hereby ORDERED to take
cognizance of the counterclaims pleaded in petitioners’ Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims and to cause
the service of summons on Respondents Gregory T. Lim and Anthony A. Mariano. No costs.

1. WON RTC gravely erred in ruling that (i) petitioners’ counterclaims (claim to rebut a previous claim) against
Respondents Lim and Mariano are not compulsory---- YES, COUNTERCLAIM IS CONSIDERED
COMPULSARY:
1. SEC 6 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: “any claim which a defending party may have against an
opposing party.”
i. Purpose of this is to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to facilitate the disposition of the whole controversy in a
single action, such that the defendant’s demand may be considered by a counterclaim rather than by an
independent suit.
ii. LIMITATIONS:
1. Court should have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim
2. It could acquire jurisdiction over third parties whose presence is essential for its consideration.
2. PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM: an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
i. Does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.
3. COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM: does not require for its adjudication (consideration) the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
i. Arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim
ii. Should be set up in the same action; otherwise, they would be barred forever.
4. COMPULSORY OR PERMISSIVE?
i. Issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
ii. Would res judicata (judged matter; matter considered by the court and may not be pursued further) bar a
subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
iii. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
iv. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
1. YES TO ALL four questions = COMPULSORY
5. LIM AND MARIANO were the persons responsible for making the bad faith decisions:
i. Caused plaintiff to file this baseless suit and to procure an unwarranted writ of attachment, notwithstanding their
knowledge that plaintiff has no right to bring it or to secure the writ.
ii. LIM AND MARIANO ARE LAFARGE’S TORTFEASOR (commits a tort; tort- infringement of right leading to
legal liability)
1. They should be held jointly and solidarily liable as plaintiff’s co-defendants to those compulsory counterclaims
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sapugay v. Mobil.
iii. Allegations show that LAFARGE’s counterclaims for damages were the result of LIM AND MARIANO’s act of
filing the Complaint and securing the Writ of Attachment in bad faith.
6. CASE AT HAND: LAFARGE’s counterclaim for damages fulfills the necessary requisites of a compulsory
counterclaim.
 i. Damages as a consequence of the action filed against them.
ii. Papa vs. Banaag:
1. “Compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, allegedly suffered by the creditor in consequence of the
debtor’s action, are also compulsory counterclaim barred by the dismissal of the debtor’s action. They cannot
be claimed in a subsequent action by the creditor against the debtor.”
2. “Aside from the fact that petitioners’ counterclaim for damages cannot be the subject of an independent action,
it is the same evidence that sustains petitioners’ counterclaim that will refute private respondent’s own claim
for damages. This is an additional factor that characterizes petitioners’ counterclaim as compulsory.”
3. Since the counterclaim for damages is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it would be
barred forever.
4. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground
of litis pendentia
5. If filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata.

2. WON RTC gravely erred in ruling that Sapugay v. Court of Appeals is inapplicable here—YES.
SAPUGAY VS. CA IS APPLICABLE.
1. In Sapugay vs. MOBIL:
i. MOBIL filed before the trial court of Pasig an action for replevin against SAPUGAY.
ii. Couple failed to keep Dealership Agreement.
1. In their Answer with Counterclaim, SAPUGAY alleged that after incurring expenses in anticipation of the
Dealership Agreement, they requested the plaintiff to allow them to get gas, but that it had refused. It claimed
that they still had to post a surety bond which, initially fixed at P200,000, was later raised to P700,000.
2. The spouses exerted all efforts to secure a bond, but the bonding companies required a copy of the Dealership
Agreement, which respondent continued to withhold from them.
3. Later, SAPUGAY discovered that MOBIL had intended all along to award the dealership to Island Air Product
Corporation.
iii. SAPUGAY impleaded in the counterclaim Mobil Philippines and its manager -- Ricardo P. Cardenas -- both
jointly and severally liable.
iv. MOBIL and Cardenas failed to respond to their Answer to the Counterclaim, SAPUGAY filed a “Motion to
Declare Plaintiff and its Manager Ricardo P. Cardenas in Default on Defendant’s Counterclaim.”
v. ISSUES: WON Cardenas, who was not a party to the original action, might nevertheless be impleaded in the
counterclaim.
1. COUNTERCLAIM is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against
an opposing party.
2. GENERAL RULE: DEFENDANT CANNOT BRING INTO ACTION ANY CLAIMS AGAINST PERSONS
UNDER THIS EXCEPTION: ‘when the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required
for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order
them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.’
a. Prerogative of bringing in new parties to the action at any stage before judgment is intended to accord complete
relief to all of them in a single action and to avert a duplicity and even a multiplicity of suits thereby.
2. CASE AT HAND:
i. CONTINENTAL argue that new parties cannot be included in a counterclaim, except when no complete relief can
be had: CONTINENTAL as a corporation with a separate [legal personality] has the juridical capacity to
indemnify petitioners even without Messrs. Lim and Mariano.
1. COURT DISAGREES.
a. Inclusion is due to allegations of fraud and bad faith on the part of the corporate officer or stockholder. These
allegations may warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, so that the said individual may not seek
refuge therein, but may be held individually and personally liable for his or her actions.
ii. CONTINENTAL ASSERTS THAT Lim and Mariano cannot be held personally liable [because their assailed
acts] are within the powers granted to them by the proper board resolutions; therefore, it is not a personal
decision but rather that of the corporation as represented by its board of directors.”
1. Matter of defense that should be threshed out during the trial; whether or not “fraud” is extant under the
circumstances is an issue that must be established by convincing evidence.
 3. SUABILITY AND LIABILITY NOT THE SAME.
i. While the Court does rule that the counterclaims against CONTINENTAL president and manager may be
properly filed, the determination of whether both can in fact be held jointly and severally liable with
respondent corporation is entirely another issue that should be ruled upon by the trial court.
4. However, GENERAL RULE IN RESPONDING TO COMPULSORY CLAIM:
i. Defendant need not file any responsive pleading, answers, adopting allegations in the complaint, does not apply.
ii. New party impleaded by the plaintiff in a compulsory counterclaim cannot be considered to have automatically
and unknowingly submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
iii. Court may consider possibility that new party is unaware of counterclaims filed against it.
5. RECORDS SHOW THAT LIM AND MARIANO ARE UNAWARE OF COUNTERCLAIMS FILED
AGAINST THEM. THEREFORE, CONTINENTAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS CANNOT BE TREATED AS
BEING FILED IN THEIR BEHALF.

3. WON RTC gravely erred in ruling that petitioners violated the rule on joinder of causes of action. –NO.
LIM AND MARIANO ARE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST TO COMPULSARY
COUNTERCLAIM. IT IS IMPERATIVE THEY BE JOINED.
1. Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties.
i. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the
court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put
to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.”
2. This is for practicality and convenience; meant to discourage duplicity and multiplicity of suits.
3. SEC 7 of Rule 3 provides:
i. “Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.”

4. WON RTC gravely erred in refusing to rule that CONTINENTAL has no personality to move to dismiss
petitioners’ compulsory counterclaims on Respondents Lim and Mariano’s behalf. –YES.
1. COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES TO LIM AND MARIANO AND CONTINENTAL ARE JOINT AND
SOLIDARY.
2. Obligations are generally considered joint, except when otherwise expressly stated or when the law or the nature of
the obligation requires solidarity. However, obligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary.
i. JOINT TORTFEASORS (JOINT OBLIGATION) are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it
is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
1. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among themselves.
2. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and
severally liable for the whole amount.
3. Each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability.
ii. SOLIDARY OR JOINT/SEVERAL OBLIGATION, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects
is so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation.
3. CASE AT HAND: LIABILITY SOUGHT AGAINST CONTINENTAL IS FOR SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE/TORT; LIM AND MARIANO’S TORT DOES NOT NEGATE THE SOLIDARY
NATURE FOR THE TORTUOUS ACTS ALLEGED IN COUNTERCLAIMS.
i. Due to SOLIDARY CHARACTER of obligation, LIM and MARIANO may avail themselves as regards to part of
the debt for which they are responsible.
ii. THEREFORE, the act of CONTINENTAL in filing a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on grounds that pertain
only to its individual co-debtors -- is allowed.
iii. HOWEVER, SINCE MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS SHOW CONTINENTAL FILING IN
BEHALF OF LIM AND MARIANO, CONTINENTAL CANNOT BE DECLARED IN DEFAULT.
 1. If issues raised in the compulsory counterclaim are so intertwined with the allegations in the complaint, such
issues are deemed automatically joined.
iv. Counterclaims that are only for damages and attorney’s fees and that arise from the filing of the complaint shall
be considered as special defenses and need not be answered.

5. CONTINENTAL’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN BEHALF OF LIM AND MARIANO NOT ALLOWED.

1. It lacks the requisite authority to do so.
2. A corporation has a legal personality entirely separate and distinct from that of its officers and cannot act for
and on their behalf, without being so authorized.
3. Thus, unless expressly adopted by Lim and Mariano, the Motion to Dismiss the compulsory counterclaim filed
by Respondent CCC has no force and effect as to them.
4. Summons must be served on Respondents Lim and Mariano before the trial court can obtain jurisdiction over
them.
 3.) Inchausti v Yulo
4.) Teodoro Yulo, died testate properties in Iloilo and Negros Occidental
5.) 1. Six of Yulo's children executed the mortgage of August 12, 1909, namely, Gregorio,
Pedro, Francisco, Manuel, Carmen, and Concepcion, admitting a debt of P253,445.42 at
10 per cent per annum and mortgaging six-ninths of their hereditary properties (5
installments from June 30th of 1909 to 1914)
6.) 2. Due to nonpayment, on March 27, 1911, Inchausti & Company brought an ordinary
action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, against Gregorio Yulo for the payment of
the said balance.
7.) 3. Of the six children who executed the first instrument, Francisco, Manuel and Carmen
executed the instrument of May 12, 1911, wherein was obtained a reduction of the capital
to 225,000 pesos and of the interest to 6 per cent from the 15th of March of the same year
of 1911
8.) 4. Per first instrument the maturity of the first installment was June 30, 1910. Per second
instrument, Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen had in their favor as the maturity of the first
installment of their debt, June 30, 1912
9.) 5. By sentencing Gregorio Yulo to pay 253,445 pesos and 42 centavos of August 12,
1909, this debtor, if he should pay all this sum, could not recover from his joint debtors
Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen their proportional parts of the P253,445.42 which he had
paid, inasmuch as the three were not obligated by virtue of the instrument of May 12,
1911, to pay only 225,000 pesos, thus constituting a violation of Gregorio Yulo's right
10.) 6. Wherefore we hold that although the contract of May 12, 1911, has not novated
that of August 12, 1909, it has affected that contract and the outcome of the suit brought
against Gregorio Yulo alone for the sum of P253,445.42; and in consequence thereof, the
amount stated in the contract of August 12, 1909, cannot be recovered but only that stated
in the contract of May 12, 1911, by virtue of the remission granted to the three of the
solidary debtors in this instrument, in conformity with what is provided in article 1143 of
the Civil Code, cited by the creditor itself.
11.) *OCC 1204 = NCC Art. 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by
another which substitute the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal
terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each
other. (1204)
12.) *an obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated in a new instrument wherein
the old is ratified, by changing only the term of payment and adding other obligations not
incompatible with the old one
13.) *OCC 1143 = NCC Art. 1215. Novation, compensation, confusion or remission
of the debt, made by any of the solidary creditors or with any of the solidary debtors,
shall extinguish the obligation, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1219.
14.)
15.) The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects
the debt, shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.
(1143)
4.) ERNESTO V. RONQUILLO, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONIO P. SO,
respondents.
This is a case of solidary liability. Ronquillo was one of four debtors for the sum of P117, 498.98 from Antonio So.
The amount represents the checks signed by the debtors in exchange for foodstuffs delivered by So.
When they failed to pay, So filed a civil case for collection before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Ronquillo and
his co-debtors negotiated with So, who agreed to reduce the debt to P110,000, with the payment to be done in two
installments of P55,000 each. The compromise agreement stated that the debtors agreed to pay “individually and
jointly” before June 1980 and that in case of failure to comply with the terms of the agreement, the innocent party will
be entitled to an execution of the decision based on this compromise agreement and the defaulting party agrees and
hold themselves to reimburse the innocent party for attorney’s fees, execution fees and other fees related with the
execution.
So filed a motion for execution when the debtors failed to pay the first tranche in December 1979, but Ronquillo said
they could not find So on the December 24, the last date for payment. Ronquillo and his co-debtor, Pilar Tan, later
deposited half of the P55,000 with the clerk of court because So at first wanted the full amount paid, but So later
withdrew the deposited amount.
The lower court however issued a motion for execution against the two other co-debtors, for the remaining half of the
initial payment. So moved for the execution of the order “against all defendants, jointly and severally.” Ronquillo
opposed this, saying that the lower court’s order did not declare the defendants’ liability to be solidary.
The court however noted that only one-fourth of the debt had been paid, and ordered a writ of execution for the
remaining P82,500. The sheriff issued a notice of sale for certain appliances and furnitures in Ronquillo’s residence to
satisfy the debt.
Ronquillo filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which was then denied. The issue was elevated to the Supreme
Court, which noted that Ronquillo and his co-debtors individually and jointly agreed to pay the debt.
“Clearly then, by the express term of the compromise agreement and the decision based upon it, the defendants
obligated themselves to pay their obligation “individually and jointly”.
The term “individually” has the same meaning as “collectively”, “separately”, “distinctively”, respectively or “severally”.
An agreement to be “individually liable” undoubtedly creates a several obligation, 14 and a “several obligation is one
by which one individual binds himself to perform the whole obligation.”
“The obligation in the case at bar being described as “individually and jointly”, the same is therefore enforceable
against one of the numerous obligors.”
5.) Inciong, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Co-maker (D) vs. Creditor (P)

GR 96405 [T]

Summary: A co-maker to a loan is facing collection demands from a creditor bank. One of his
co-defendant is outside the Philippine jurisdiction while the creditor chose to dismiss their claim
against the other.

Rule of Law: In solidary obligations, any one, some or all of the debtors may be proceeded
against for the entire obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against
whom he will enforce collection.

Facts: Baldomero Inciong, Jr. (D) cosigned a P50,000-promissory note with Rene Naybe and
Gregorio Pantanosas holding themselves jointly and severally liable to creditor Philippine Bank
of Communications (P)—PBCOM, Cagayan de Oro City branch.

The due date expired without the promissors paying their obligation. Consequently, creditor
PBCOM (P) demanded payment from the obligors who did not respond. So, creditor PBCOM
(P) filed for collection of the sum of P50,000.00 against the three obligors.

The complaint was dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the case, but the lower court
reconsidered and the summonses were eventually served. As prayed for by PBCOM (P), the
lower court dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas. With co-defendant Naybe in Saudi
Arabia, only the summons to co-maker Inciong (D) was duly served.

Inciong (D) contended that he only agreed to limit his liability to P5,000 and that his consent was
vitiated by fraud. On appeal, he annexed to his petition an affidavit supporting his claim of fraud.

Issues: Can the creditor file a claim for the entire obligation against a co-maker to a loan?

Ruling: Yes. Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three
signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be
proceeded against for the entire obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine
against whom he will enforce collection.

Consequently, the dismissal of the case against co-defendant Pantanosas may not be deemed as
having discharged petitioner from liability. As regards co-defendant Naybe, suffice it to say that
the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. Therefore, PBCOM (P) only have recourse
against his co-makers, as provided by law.

Inciong (D) signed the promissory note as a solidary co-maker and not as a guarantor.
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation.
—Tolention, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1991, p. 217.

On the other hand, Article 2047 of the Civil Code states:

By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation
of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.

If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter
3, Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such a case the contract is called a suretyship.

Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code states the law on joint and several
obligations.
When there are two or more debtors in one and the same obligation, the presumption is that the
obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt.
There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so
provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
—Article 1207 of the New Civil Code

BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

FACTS: In February 1983, Rene Naybe took out a loan from Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBC) in the amount of P50k. For that he executed a promissory note in the
same amount. Naybe was able to convince Baldomero Inciong, Jr. and Gregorio Pantanosas to
co-sign with him as co-makers. The promissory note went due and it was left unpaid. PBC
demanded payment from the three but still no payment was made. PBC then sue the three but
PBC later released Pantanosas from its obligations. Naybe left for Saudi Arabia hence can’t be
issued summons and the complaint against him was subsequently dropped. Inciong was left to
face the suit. He argued that that since the complaint against Naybe was dropped, and that
Pantanosas was released from his obligations, he too should have been released.

ISSUE: Whether or not Inciong should be held liable.

HELD: Yes. Inciong is considering himself as a guarantor in the promissory note. And he was
basing his argument based on Article 2080 of the Civil Code which provides that guarantors are
released from their obligations if the creditors shall release their debtors. It is to be noted
however that Inciong did not sign the promissory note as a guarantor. He signed it as a solidary
co-maker.

A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor does not become a solidary
co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference between a solidary co-debtor and
a fiador in solidum (surety). The latter, outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt before
the property of the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and
benefits which pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no other
rights than those bestowed upon him.

Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three signatories
therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be proceeded against
for the entire obligation. The choice is left to the solidary creditor (PBC) to determine against
whom he will enforce collection. Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Pontanosas
may not be deemed as having discharged Inciong from liability as well. As regards Naybe,
suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. Inciong, therefore, may only
have recourse against his co-makers, as provided by law.

6.) AFP retirement vs sanvictores- no digest. Ako lang ni istory nimo later.