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- - 181.51.32.95 - 10/06/2019 03h00. © De Boeck Supérieur CONSTRUCTION OF AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF

CONSTRUCTION OF AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGICAL MILITARY/CIVILIAN DUALITY

François-Xavier Meunier

De Boeck Supérieur | « Journal of Innovation Economics & Management »

2019/2 n° 29 | pages 159 à 182

Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse :

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VARIA

Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological Military/ Civilian Duality

François-Xavier MEUNIER

ENSTA ParisTech, France francois-xavier.meunier@ensta-paristech.fr

ABSTRACT

The concept of duality covers a vast and complex area. This contribution provides a systemic analytical framework for understanding dual techno- logical innovation beyond case studies. The question is to know in which institutional perimeter and according to which organization of the innova- tion process the dual potential of a technology must be understood. Thus, in parallel with the Defense Industrial and Technological Base DITB concept, for dual technologies, the Dual Innovation System concept would allow a more integrated management between defence innovation policy and indus- trial policy. The objective is to highlight a complementarity between the two concepts, the first serving to approach, defence as a whole, while the second focuses more specifically on a technical system in order to consider all its applications.

KEYWORDS: Duality, Dual Innovation System, Innovation System, Technological System, Governance

JEL CODES: O32

The relationship between civilian and military production has changed significantly over the centuries. However, this relationship largely developed, but also became more complex, after the Second World War. There were then several phases. Until the 1970s, there was a successful period of “spon- taneous” technological spin-offs arising from military innovations produced

n° 29 – Journal of Innovation Economics & Management 2019/2 DOI: 10.3917/jie.029.0159

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François-Xavier MEUNIER

during the Second World War. Since the end of the 1980s, the technologi- cal initiative attributed to the defence industry has been questioned; it is the end of the spin-off paradigm (Alic et al., 1992). From a purely economic viewpoint, military expenditure also became more difficult to justify. It was between 1970 and 1980 that the term dual use appeared in the United States to justify civilian R&D expenditure on defence budgets, and thus circumvent the rules of the WTO (Uzunidis, Bailly, 2005). Crudely, the duality between the civilian and military spheres evokes the mechanisms relating to the rap- prochement of these two spheres. Since it appeared, duality experienced a turbulent destiny, both in the academic field and in the operational framework. First, in the operational framework, duality took on different realities. For example, for a defence firm, a dual strategy can just as well mean diversifying its markets towards the civilian sector, based on a technology that operates in the military market, as externalising production of some technologies to suppliers in the civilian field to supply a military market (Mérindol, Versailles 2015). This ambiva- lence is characteristic of duality and is found in both public policy (Guichard, Heisbourg, 2004), or in technologies (Cowan, Foray, 1995). In the area of research there is, then, no clearly established consensus in the economic literature around its definition. However, since the end of the 1980s, duality has become a key subject of study for the defence economy (Gummet, Reppy, 1988; Alic et al., 1992; Cowan, Foray, 1995; Molas-Gallart, 1997; Kulve, Smit 2003; Mérindol, Versailles, 2015, etc.). But if anything, through the diversity of approaches, all of these works reveal the ambiva- lence of a concept that still needs to be clarified, rather than the unity of a formally defined concept. The concept of duality therefore covers a huge and complex system. The aim of this proposition is to analyse the different approaches of duality and to propose a systemic analytical framework of dual technological innovation. This proposition allows us to summarise these approaches and to incorpo- rate all the dimensions that they have helped to highlight in order to pres- ent a precise analytical framework for this concept. The question is that of knowing within which institutional area and according to which organisa- tion of the innovation process the dual potential of a technology should be approached. The objective is to present a standardised analytical framework that allows us to study all the issues of technological duality, depending on the different actors who participate in this. This analytical framework would help to ensure the consistency of public policies of defence innovation and industrial policies by incorporating the constraints linked to the diversity of

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

actors (of the civil and defence world, public authorities, research centres, etc.), and constraints linked to the development of a given technical system. It would therefore be appropriate to first distinguish the different ways of approaching duality and thus establish a typology of approaches. Then, by using this basis and mobilising systemic approaches, we will propose a global analytical framework.

Literature Review

Since the 1980s, duality has gradually liberated itself from the simple strategy of circumventing the rules of international trade, without managing to clearly define this concept. Several authors have already worked on this concept by approaching it from different viewpoints, gradually developing this.

The Dual Object

The first works that used the concept of dual-use technologies referred to specific technologies which, because of their characteristics, found applica- tions in the civilian and the military field. This dissemination process moved in particular from the defence to the civilian world, what was called the spin- off paradigm by Alic et al. (1992). This understanding of duality focused above all on the result rather than on the process of technological rapprochement between the military field and the civilian field (Gummett, Reppy, 1998). This analysis was based on several case studies, in particular those carried out in the United States at the end of the 1980s, which identified technologies that could be transferred, most often from the military to the civilian field, but also in some cases in the other direction. Industrial sectors such as IT, electronics, or aeronautics, were particularly cited as examples in several works, such as those by Alic et al. (1992), Guichard (2004), Mérindol, Versailles (2015). This vision that was structured around the use of technologies largely endured in the literature beyond the 1980s. Nevertheless, few authors still believe today that this dual use is inherently linked to the nature of the technology. The idea put forward is that this duality depends, above all, on a process of appropriation by a particular social milieu (Stowsky, 2004). So there is a particular study of modes of transfer. This way of understanding duality refers to the ways in which objects (prod- ucts and artefacts) used in one area can be adapted to others (Molas-Gallart,

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1997). This poses the question of the mechanisms of technological transfer from civilian to defence (spin-in), and defence to civilian (spin-off). In this approach, the reciprocal nature of duality is highlighted much more often. The idea of a relationship between civilian and military innovation which is understood over the long term emerges, which can give rise to reversals in trends (Galbraith et al., 2004). Another point of view can be added to this approach, which consists in saying that, beyond the technological object itself, technology can be defined through all the knowledge which forms it (Carlsson, Stankiewicz, 1991). So studying dual technologies is like studying the dissemination of knowledge produced in the field of defence, and the similarities that can exist between this knowledge and that produced within the civilian sphere. This reinforces the idea that it is difficult to determine a priori if a technology is dual or not. So “the issue here lies (…) in the balance between specialisation and the constitu- tion of a shared foundation of knowledge between the actors” (Mérindol, 2005, p. 52). In addition, observing the duality of knowledge is more awkward because it is still more difficult to define it. Here two conceptions of the duality of knowledge can be set against each other. The first would be to consider the duality of knowledge as a spillover (knowledge transfers), strictly speaking between the civilian and military fields, without premeditation by one or other of the fields. This vision is quite close to that proposed by Chinworth (2000) and Acosta et al. (2011). The second would indeed consist in considering the presence of spillovers as a consequence of the lack of duality (Cowan, Foray, 1995, p. 852). In this vision, duality lies in the co-conception of knowledge between civilian and military and the transfer is proof of the lack of co-conception. In this case, duality is input data for technological change, it assumes an evolution that, if not identical, then is at least compatible with the technical characteristics of civilian and military applications. Three key stages in the research allow us to move towards a systemic method to analyse knowledge in duality. First, studies at the level of firms, which point out in particular that the knowledge used by defence firms comes both from defence firms and civilian firms (Chakrabarti, Anyanwu, 1993). Then studies at the level of technologies, which seek to summarise all the links between knowledge produced in the field of defence and those produced in the military field (Acosta et al., 2011, 2013). They focus in par- ticular on spillovers, as is the case, for Japan, in the dissertation by Chinworth (2000). Finally, case studies which try to reveal the similarities and specifici- ties between civilian research and defence research in different technological

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

domains (Lapierre, 2001; Acosta et al., 2017). Consequently, duality is char- acterised, not by transfers but by a potential co-production of knowledge and

it highlights a shared foundation used by both sides (Meunier, Zyla, 2016).

Today, defence systems have become highly complex. They combine sev- eral components organised hierarchically to produce an integrated functional system. For these Complex Product Systems (CoPS) (Hobday et al., 2005) in the defence sector, the specificity is more often at the level of system archi- tecture than at the level of its components (Lazaric et al., 2011). When the prism of the production of knowledge is chosen, the time- related dynamic is also highlighted, duality should be considered from the start of a product, in other words in the research phase, and will probably end in the development phase (Gagnepain, 2001). Although duality is not

a a constant phenomenon, then there is a brief dynamic during which this

potential evolves (Cowan, Foray, 1995). The concept of a technological life cycle (Utterback, Abernathy, 1975) highlights two phases: experimentation then standardisation. The experimentation phase presents the greatest poten- tial, while standardisation reduces the potential for dual use. In addition, for Cowan and Foray (1995), a product-oriented project has a lower potential for dual use because it is more limited by the specific demands of the area of application than a process-oriented project. Here, organising R&D according to the principles of duality would allow a greater number of potential applica- tions to emerge, to delay the technological lock-in linked to standardisation, and thus to preserve technological variety (Cowan, Foray, 1995).

In short, for approaches focused on the technological artefact, the issue

is that of technological transfer. Civilian and military uses can exist for the

same technology and the objective of duality is to facilitate transfers from

one sphere to the other, taking into account the problems of technological

Figure 1 – The technological cycle and dual use potential

Source: Cowan, Foray (1995), p. 858 n° 29 – Journal of Innovation Economics & Management
Source: Cowan, Foray (1995), p. 858
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François-Xavier MEUNIER

adaptation that this operation can produce. As for approaches in terms of technological systems, these refer to the innovation process and the chal- lenge of duality is to facilitate technological co-production between the civilian and the military sphere. Transfer is no longer an issue because the defence and civilian specificities are taken into account during the innova- tion process.

Actors and Objectives of Duality

Implementation of duality combines performance issues and objectives, which sometimes conflict depending on the actors involved, ranging from the management of knowledge to the challenges of public policy (Lu et al.,

2015).

For firms, duality represents way of balancing and stabilising results in the face of a defence market that is contracting or, to say the least, is very cyclical (Depeyre, 2013). Intuitively, duality is therefore presented as a way to realise economies of scale or of scope. Duality is, therefore, the result of the firm’s strategic reflection where, in one case, the objective is to move specific resources to a new market (market diversification) while, in another case, it is about providing new resources for the same market (product diversification). More rarely, it is about combining both at once (Mérindol, Versailles, 2015). Such a strategy influences the competences and technological developments of a firm. Whatever it may be, this dual diversification requires us to find a compro- mise between two worlds that are sometimes far apart. The literature concen- trates on three challenges for firms: demand (Gummet, Reppy, 1988), which highlights consideration of users desires in the dissemination of technolo- gies, financing, which highlights the caution of financial markets and banks in the defence field (Besancenot, Vanceanu, 2006), and the management of competences and knowledge, which focuses on the establishment of new management tools (Lazaric et al., 2011). Depending on the kind of firm, these constraints will influence strategies in different ways. Concerning innovation in general and dual innovation in particular, theories in knowledge economics highlight the importance of knowledge networks and learning processes. Guichard (2004) recalls the significance of sociological approaches which understand the convergence between differ- ent social worlds in terms of process. This highlights the role of an actor who “moves and transforms ideas, means, objects, roles and their connections and who keeps the various interests aligned until a single solution emerges” (Guichard, Heisbourg, 2004, p. 97). In this solution, Guichard and Heisbourg describe

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

this role a “translator” within “ dual networks”. In such an approach, the con- struction of a network is a collective issue which is crystallised around this translator. The actors involved in developing a technology can also be decisive in the dual destination of a technology. Thus future applications of a technol- ogy depend in particular on the social network within which it develops or is used (Kulve, Smit, 2003). Kulve and Smit propose the concept of Socio- Technical Networks (STN). They develop the idea that the social network within which technologies develop determines the dual nature of a technol- ogy. A network of dual actors describes a dual technology (Guichard, 2004). With this in mind, new actors appear, and knowledge management becomes more complex (Mérindol, 2004) as the technology of defence sys- tems is diversified. New practices are established in the defence industry, and these modify the organisation of firms, as the management of IPRs requires new competences (Ayerbe et al., 2014). Without placing duality at the heart of their analysis, Uzunidis and Bailly look at the relationship between military innovation and civilian innovation (2005). They develop an analytical framework as a system of systems at the national level “the organic square of the valorisation of military research”. This system of valorisation is based on the interaction between regulation, tech- nological change, system strategy, and economic milieu (Figure 2). From this point of view, technological duality is a potential that the sys- tem of innovation enhances. The authors highlight the significance of mov- ing a Smithian model based on the market towards a Schumpeterian model

Figure 2 – Organic square of the valorisation of military research

– Organic square of the valorisation of military research Uzunidis, Bally (2005), p. 67 n° 29

Uzunidis, Bally (2005), p. 67

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of “cognitive capitalism”, based on a network organisation favouring “perma- nent innovation”. The works of Guichard are part of this connection and describe duality as “a method of managing research, innovation, and the production of systems of defence which seek to produce economies of scale, variety, and externali- ties with the civilian sector” (Guichard, Heisbourg, 2004, p. 97). This man- agement model should be rooted at the heart of the National Innovation System (NIS), and emphasises the dual policy. Therefore, it is no longer about observing the interactions between the NIS and a defence innovation sys- tem, but about considering duality as a component of the NIS. The duality of the NIS is a way of using a synergetic potential between defence innovation and civilian innovation through collective actions, coordination processes, and incentive mechanisms (Guichard, 2004). This method of managing duality therefore implies a mode of governance that connects public authorities, private firms, and research centres. In order to organise this relationship, it seems to be essential to establish public poli- cies. They are aimed at two objectives which may seem to conflict. The first consists in continuing to control technological flows in a more open world, and the second in making the most of the opportunities that are offered by this world. When public policy understands the question of international trade through the prism of duality, intuitively this implies the question of a higher risk of dissemination of technologies because of their normalisation. This risk does not have the same impacts, depending on the technologies involved. The most obvious risk is that of nuclear proliferation (Meier, Hunger, 2014), but studies focus on several other areas and assessing this risk for all so-called dual use technologies quickly became an objective (Tucker, 1994). Ultimately, this literature poses the question of a fair balance between technological change, growth, and the risk of dissemination of military technologies. A major challenge for exporters is therefore to behave in an appropriate way faced with dual use technologies. From a regulatory viewpoint, in the United States, for example, there is dual legislation. On the one hand, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is an American agency responsible for the Export Administration Regulation, which regulates exports of dual use goods. And, on the other hand, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which applies the regulation International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on exports of arms and ammunitions. This second regulation is even more restrictive, as it bans the export of even a civilian good if its components are of military ori- gin (Belay, 2017). The dissemination of dual technologies is therefore highly

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

regulated by this framework. In the same way, in France as in the other mem- bers of the European Union, control of exports of dual use goods and tech- nologies exists and is mainly carried out on the basis of European regulation. However, Member States play a major role and it is difficult to predict if they will fully transfer questions of security to the European Union (EU) as security, like defence, is at the heart of States’ sovereignty. Thus, even within the EU, these differences complicate the establishment of interstate collabo- rations (e.g. discussions on the rapprochement between KMW and Nexter which, in 2014, collided with the wishes of Sigmar Gabriel, then German Economic Affairs Minister, who wanted to limit German exports to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and who preferred a KMW – Rheinmetall alliance in order to ensure respect for this export policy). This literature review shows that the analysis of duality hinges on two ele- ments which are the object on which duality is based, and the actor who uses this (governance of duality). These elements represent two aspects which regulate approaches in relation to each other, from the most micro – an arte- fact for an actor – to the most macro – a technological system and all the actors that contribute to this, from design to use.

A Systemic Approach

“The concept of Systems of Innovation (IS) brings together different attempts to incorporate institutional elements in an economic analysis of technological change, the architecture of scientific systems, the origin of technological innovation and, for the most coherent approaches, to study the consequences of innovation on the long-term economic performance of nations” (Amable, 2003, p. 367).

Territorial innovation systems are the precursors, and widely represented, divided between national systems (Lundvall, 1992 and, at a lower level, regional innovation systems Asheim, Coenen, 2005). As for sectoral innova- tion systems, they are developed differently because it is no longer the terri- tory which determines the boundaries of the system, but the industry con- cerned (Malerba, 2002). Finally, technological innovation systems represent the last variant. Close to sectoral systems, they are established around a par- ticular technology, for which they deal with the development, dissemination, and use (Markard, Truffer, 2008; Bergek et al., 2008). They develop either within a sectoral system, or at the intersection of several sectoral systems. Understanding duality from the viewpoint of IS amounts to study-

ing arrangements (institutional, organisational, legal, financial

highlights the problems of governance of the system and, consequently, of

).

This

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public policies associated with this form of coordination between the civilian domain and the military domain. The concept of a dual policy or a policy of duality emerges. “It corresponds to the search by an organisation for a knowledge and information exchange and in which the State plays the role of facilitator. The public authorities should define common themes of research and initiate knowledge and information exchanges between the worlds of civilian and military research” (Mérindol, 2004, p. 102). In other words, the dual policy aims to converge the strategies of the different actors and, just like the three approaches cited above, defining the right level of analysis is a major challenge.

The Dual System of Innovation

By building on the characteristics of duality presented in the first sec- tion, we now construct the analytical framework which covers the whole of the approach. Using several studies, and more or less centrally, the approach in terms of the innovation system showed the role of interactions between the defence and the civilian sector in innovation processes (Guichard, 2004; Serfati, 2008). The Dual System of Innovation proposes a coherent level in order to both structure these interactions and respond to different objectives of duality. The literature review showed that there are two major categories of approaches that the Dual System of Innovation seeks to reconcile. Approaches which understand everything by seeking to explain its systemic organisation and to understand its mechanisms of governance, these are approaches in terms of IS (Serfati, 2008). They have the advantage of revealing the role of different actors, the way in which they interact within the system, and of observing the way in which the system evolves. Nevertheless, these analy- ses rarely succeed in measuring duality quantitively as they try so hard to approach it in all its complexity. On the other hand, other approaches, without denying the systemic nature of duality, are attached to a particular element. As an example we can cite analyses on: knowledge within IS (Lazaric et al., 2011), on transfer mechanisms, an essential component in the system (Molas-Gallart, 1997); on technological proximity as an element in the construction of the system (Guichard, 2004), etc. These analyses have the advantage of intensifying a particular characteristic of duality and facilitating quantitative studies, but sometimes they find it difficult to be consistent with a more global approach. Beyond duality, there are also concepts which allow us to analyse the defence industry as a whole. First, there is the concept of the military-industrial

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complex, used for the first time by American President Eisenhower in 1961, and which highlights the collusion that can exist between military manufac- turers and the authorities. This concept is not used very much in economics. In France, Serfati (2008) uses the expression of the Méso-Système de l’Armement (MSFA) [Arms Mesosystem] to describe commercial and non- commercial interactions between the organisations that contribute to manu- facturing arms. This approach assumes that the dynamic properties of the system are directed towards the objective of producing the technologies and weapons systems that are needed for defence use and national security. This concept helps us to study the whole of the French arms industry and highlights the importance of relations between scientific and technological policy, the defence industry and national competitiveness in a historical per- spective. Concerning duality, this approach allows an analysis of relations in the conception of technologies between technology, economics, and society. More commonly used, the concept of the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (ITDB) is defined by Dunne (1995) as all the firms that enable the armed forces to conduct their operations. However, as Hartley (2007) recalls, this definition poses problems of operationalisation. In par- ticular, it shows that the way in which this list is defined often depends on the question posed (strategic autonomy, supply risk, credibility of the national defence industry, etc.), and the nature of the goods considered (lethal arms, non-lethal systems used exclusively by the military, dual goods and services.). In this respect, duality is one of the main limits of this approach because it dilutes the boundary between what does and does not belong to the ITDB. Furthermore, this definition gives the idea of a homogenous group of firms, yet the actors are varied: private and public; specialised or diversified; strongly or weakly dependent on defence demands and proposing technologies or belonging to varied industrial sectors. Thus understanding all these actors in a uniform way does not help us to respond to the constraints that the particular development of a technology raise in terms of identifying the actors, organisation and allocation of tasks and the optimisation of the R&D process. By a priori including the duality question, the Dual System of Innovation provides an additional analytical tool which allows us, beyond the questions mentioned above, to study the institutional characteristics linked to the dual development of a particular technology in a dual context.

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Definition

The main characteristics of dual innovation determine the scale and the kind of systemic approach that should be adopted. Three characteristics appear as part of this work:

– The system depends on the the dual innovation studied: it is a tech-

nology and its particular duality that are studied. Yet institutions (govern- ment agencies, interest groups, firms, research centres, universities) which are involved in the development of a technology (particularly dual use) vary greatly from one technology to another. In broad outline the Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales (ONERA) will play a key role in the dual development of aeronautical technologies, while this will not be the case if the study is about satellites, in which case the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) will have a much more significant role to play.

– Dual innovation is mainly a multi-sector phenomenon: it is the poten-

tial for application of one technology for different uses that is at the heart of duality. And yet, if a sector is characterised by a group of economic agents participating in producing similar products (Storper, 1995), then duality has

a strong chance of concerning several sectors at once, because the products involved are very varied.

– The national dimension is a significant, but incomplete, element: it

is because of the strategic nature of the defence industry that the national

framework is a relevant level to analyse duality. In fact, technological duality

is a challenge for national defence in at least two ways. On the one hand, in

a positive perspective, it is one of the ways of responding to the technologi-

cal excellence required for defence equipment by developing the innovation capacities of the defence industry (an ability to draw on technological inno- vation from wherever it comes). On the other hand, with the aim of limiting the innovation capacities of defence in non-allied (or even allied) countries, the defence sector seeks to confine the dissemination of competences linked to defence innovation to the national territory and therefore seek to avoid the dissemination, through dual use technologies, of information on the technological content of the country’s defence innovation. Nevertheless, although the challenge is often national, there is interna- tional cooperation on this, particularly at the level of the European Union (cooperation in producing some equipment and the creation of European defence groups, or in export controls). The innovation environment is there- fore often international. In fact, the whole point of duality is to harness and/ or to produce a technology outside the defence sphere. But on this subject it must be capable of seizing opportunities outside the national territory.

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

Technology is thus at the heart of the Dual System of Innovation and, even if strategic issues strongly constrain the governance of duality, the pur- pose itself can be revealed beyond national borders. Ultimately there are two possible levels of interpretation. The first corresponds to the strategic issue of defence and often to national terrestrial, political and institutional borders. As for the second, this corresponds more specifically to identifying the tech- nological area within which the dual purpose can develop. This area has no reason to be limited to national borders. The most relevant approach seems to be, then, that of technological system of innovation (Bergek et al., 2008) under the constraint of national strategic issues. By taking all these elements, a Dual System of Innovation (DIS) develops within a territory, constrained by logics of autonomy and strategic alliance. Thus the national territory appears to be the appropriate level. Nevertheless, the internationalisation of defence production set in motion in the 1990s translated as an increase in international collaborations. The complexity of defence systems led to an international distribution of the value chain, par- ticularly within large groups. So a dual system can be established within a State or at the intersection of several of these. In this second case, the regu- latory characteristics of each State on the use of dual technologies and their dissemination can influence the scope and significance of the DIS, even within supranational institutions like the European Union. Thus, the DSI is, for a specific technology, a group of institutions in the sphere of defence and the civilian sphere which contribute to an innovation process within an institutional space constrained by the strategic issues of defence innovation. It is characterised by all the mechanisms of transfers and cooperation, formal and informal, which occur throughout the innovation process. It determines the potential for the co-production of a technology between these two spheres in different sectors, and it is as a function of this potential that governments implement policies aimed at supporting or con- straining the dual dissemination of a technology. By drawing inspiration from the representation applied to localised pro- ductive systems proposed by Carluer and Le Goff in 2002, Figure 3 is able to represent a DIS. This representation shows the different objects through which duality can be observed (knowledge, technologies, products or services, and finally uses) with a few of the key actors present at each stage. In addition, this representa- tion, which simplifies the reality by clearly distinguishing the defence sphere from the civilian sphere, has the advantage of showing the complexity of the system of interactions which allows these two spheres to interact. It allows us not to omit from the analysis the feedback loops that exist, not only within

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each sphere, but also between them. It is this kind of loop that came into play in the development of the Internet and it is with the help of this kind of loop that we can interpret the way in which this technology has developed. As Serfati (2008) points out, in the United States the development of the Internet quickly resulted in its division into two separate networks (Arpanet, 1966; Milinet, 1984) after the failure of attempts at direct collaboration. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the two developments have been completely separate, but it is through indirect mechanisms inherent in the American innovation system as a whole that these interactions were estab- lished (Serfati, 2008), one side expecting that the output of the other will emerge to be able, in fine, to take it over and include it in its considerations.

Objectives and Function of the DIS The approaches presented in the first section of this
Objectives and Function of the DIS
The approaches presented in the first section of this article show that
technological duality follows both economic objectives (economies of
scope, of scale, market diversification, Defence budget optimisation, etc.)
and technological objectives (increase in technical performance, reducing
Figure 3 – Dual System of Innovation
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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

development time, diversification of innovation potential etc.). To respond to these objectives, the DSI expresses three main functions.

Function 1: Identification of Actors

This function is logically at the heart of a DSI because it marks its area. The objective is to identify all the actors who take part in the innovation process of a given technology in order to track their progress. So on the one hand, the public authorities are able to support the dual development of the system by supporting the emergence and development of actors in the two spheres and, on the other hand, like a Strategic Activity Domain for a market (Porter, 1982), the DSI marks the space within which firms should deploy their dual innovation strategy. Like a Technological Innovation System, these actors can only be located, depending on regulatory constraints and the geostrategic context relating to the technology, in a national or interna- tional territory, and within or at the intersection of several sectoral systems. With this in mind, the DSI mobilises all the additional resources needed for the dual development of a technology, whether these are non-financial or financial assets and human capital.

Function 2: Organising Dual Cooperation

In order to put in place and maintain a DIS, a set of mechanisms should be established to encourage and/or force organisations to engage. As part of the DIS, these are dual cooperations, in other words they involve actors that are both oriented towards the civilian sphere, and others oriented towards the defence sphere (knowing that some can incorporate a dual civilian- defence orientation). As Bergek et al., (2008) recall, the mechanisms are not all linked exclusively to the market or the government but also emanate from opportunities that entrepreneurial actors identify during a cumulative pro- cess of interactions between actors in the system. Thus the public authorities play a key role in the organisation of the DIS, but a variety of other actors also influence this organisation with a more or less dual purpose, depend- ing on their interests. But knowledge is the fundamental resource of such a system, while learning that allows this knowledge to be disseminated is the most important process (Lundvall, 1992). The objective of the public authori- ties is, then, to support incentives that favour the dual learning process. In this way, the learning process within the DSI allows the dual dissemination of knowledge between actors in the civilian sphere and the defence sphere. This guarantees the longevity of the technology, by maintaining the knowl- edge base that is needed within a variety of actors, whose orientation, both

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civilian and defence, helps to break the, often very marked, cycle of innova- tion in the field of defence.

Function 3: Creating Synergies

As for the final function, this is more particularly concerned with the dual performance of the DIS. This performance, both economic and tech- nological, depends on the synergies that develop between the actors. The system effect depends on these synergies. It is these that create economies of scope, of scale, and of variety (Guichard, Heisbourg, 2004), on which the economic performance of firms depends and which save time in terms of the “schedule” and in terms of the “event” (Cowan, Foray, 1995) – i.e. they do just as well more quickly or better within the same time – on which the techno- logical performance depends. These synergies generate positive externalities, which are key to formation of a cluster. In the form of spillovers, they particu- larly impact the production of knowledge and thus directly reinforce the dual performance of the system, but by also reducing the uncertainty linked to the innovation process and by reinforcing technological legitimacy they support the dynamic of the cluster and its economic and technological performance. These three functions show that the DSI is a useful tool to manage the policy of defence innovation, and to manage industrial policy beyond the traditional boundaries of the ITDB. Indeed, Bergek et al. (2008) show that the way in which we understand a technology influences the institutional area within which it is relevant for us to study this. If it is understood as part of a specific application – as is the case for the defence application in the ITDB concept – the area considered is limited to the actors who are concerned by this particular application. On the other hand, it is possible to study a technology beyond this area, considering all possible applications and, with this in mind, the institutional area that is taken into account will be more extensive. Innovation policy and industrial policy are thus rooted in

a broader context, providing more diversified prospects for cooperation, both

in terms of technological input and in terms of output. If such an opening is not conceivable at the level of the ITDB as a whole – the area would become too broad – it proves to be relevant at the level of a specific technology that has a dual potential.

A DSI for the Self-Driving Car?

For example, it seems interesting to use a DSI to study the case of the self- driving car. The purpose of this article is not to specifically define and study

a DSI but, using this illustration, the objective is to highlight the relevance of

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

this analytical framework to study an emerging technology (or more probably a technological system) for which there is a military and a civilian interest. By taking the example of France, a very incomplete and very quick pan- orama shows the diversity of the actors who: are diverse in nature (univer- sity, laboratories, firms etc.), depend on several sectors (automotive, electron- ics, telecommunications etc.), mobilise different technologies (photonic, optronic, optic, etc.), and whose fields of activity are divided between defence and civilian. An approach in terms of DISs helps to incorporate the diversity of these actors. Thus the public authorities are well able to support their emer- gence/development in order to guarantee the dual nature of the ecosystem, while DSI actors organise their strategies by establishing long-term industrial cooperation. It is with this in mind that, for example, the DGA [Directorate General of Armaments] finances, as part of the Scorpion programme, the development of self-driving cars developed by Safran, surrounded by a “Team France” with both civilian and military elements, formed of universities and research laboratories (Mines Paristech, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (INRIA), Institut Pascal, the Centre de Recherche des Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coetquidan (CREC), Paris Dauphine, the Laboratoire d’Analyse et d’Architecture des Systems (LAAS), the Institut national de Recherche en Sciences et Technologies pour l’Environnement et l’Ariculture (IRSTEA), and industrial partners (Effidence, Technical Studio, Squadrone, Kompaï robotics, Sominex, 4D virtualiz). The DSI approach also allows us to consider the interaction between dif- ferent defence-oriented programmes, such as that of the DGA mentioned above, but also civilian programmes, like the Safran, Valeo and Ulis project on a technological building block of the DSI – all-weather cameras – funded by the former Direction Générale de la Compétitivité, de l’Industrie (DGCIS), in partnership with the Single Interministerial Fund (FUI), whose action is rooted in the policy of innovation centres and which is aimed at encourag- ing cooperation in R&D projects, funded by the Industry Ministry and the Defence Ministry (now the Ministry of Army). Here the Mov’eo, ViaMéca centres are under the leadership of the Industry Ministry and Astech under the leadership of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and includes defence and civilian manufacturers, so this motivational policy supports a dual process of knowledge dissemination highlighted by analysis in terms of the DIS. Finally, building synergies seems to be necessary for this technology to emerge, but also for the construction of a successful industrial sector. In fact, the self-driving car mobilises several technologies that are divided within a variety of complementary actors. They belong to the automotive sector (sys- tem integrators for the civilian sector), the aeronautics sector, particularly in

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the field of defence (for sensors such as Lidar), but also the digital sector (for artificial intelligence technologies), etc. Establishing synergies between these actors helps each to benefit from the competitive advantages of the other. The presence of the giants of the European digital sector in this technologi- cal race is nevertheless a threat for the strategic autonomy of a country like France if they monopolise all the technological building blocks relating to the digital sector. Establishing synergies between defence programmes and civilian programmes is a way of maintaining these skills in the country in the long term. Thus, identification of a French DSI allows arbitration between economic and technological performance, both in the short and the long term, between being alone or in partnership with other European countries relatively independently from the United States. So envisaging innovation at the level of the technical system and from

a dual perspective would allow a better balance between innovation policy and industrial policy. In France, for an actor such as the Defence Innovation Agency, the objective, according to Florence Parly (Minister for Army, 28 August, at the Mouvement des entreprises de France (MEDEF) summer school),

is to open defence innovation to the outside and to give it international vis-

ibility. With this in mind, managing innovation at the level of the techni- cal system helps us to think about the institutional area beyond that of the ITDB. This approach requires implementation of specific empirical measures enabling an analysis of the innovation process at the level of knowledge pro- duction. This allows us to identify, within the ITDB, all the actors involved in this process, to analyse their contributions and the way in which they interact, not only between themselves, but also, and above all, with the rest of the industrial base for a given technical system.

Discussion

In the United States, the balance between the civilian State - indus- try, defence – has gradually adapted to this context. Most works highlight the integration of a wide variety of actors within an innovation network and show the key role played by the Pentagon in its organisation. On this issue, Sapolsky (2003) focuses on the Pentagon’s competences to judge the behaviour of private system integrators who lead most R&D programmes. These competences, which are based in particular on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which has disruptive innovation in its DNA 1 , and the universities help to maintain an extensive database of

1. Its slogan is: “Creating breakthrough technologies and capabilities for national security”.

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

scientific and technological knowledge in the public domain, while allowing the private sector to have a significant share of the initiative in innovation. The Department of Defence thus has the necessary competences to arbitrate on the area, both in terms of knowledge and in terms of the actors or territo- ries within which a technology should develop. The Third Offset Strategy (TOS), introduced in 2014, emphasises that, to maintain their technological advance, the United States had to develop their defence innovation system. In response to the rise in power of China and Russia’s desire for rearmament, this strategy poses the question of the area within which a technology should be developed. The TOS aims to guarantee the defence sphere access to knowledge produced across the world in the area of civilian and commercial research and development, as well as the capac- ities to fully exploit these (Louth, Moelling, 2016). The link with Silicon Valley, through which civilian and military innovation capacities make use of synergies between the two spheres, although largely before the TOS, is encouraged there. The TOS identifies three main technological aspects which make up, with regard to the model presented in this article, so many DISs to define. They concern, respectively, railguns and direct-energy and laser-guided weapons, robotics for a submarine environment, and unmanned long endur- ance and stealth aerial systems. This analytical framework seems relevant as it highlights the many opportunities for interactions at different stages of development of a technology, both within and outside a country, and that this is about exploiting this for the United States depending on the diplo- matic relations they have with different countries. The DSI allows identifica- tion of the actors who will enable the United States to successfully complete targeted technological developments, while ensuring their integration within a network that is compatible with the country’s collaboration strategies. So, while benefiting from the dual potential, the two objectives of development and control of the dissemination of the technology can be pursued. In this regard, the American strategy appears to be a challenge for allied countries like European countries, who also see their innovation strategy constrained by this context. In her speech on 5 July 2018 on the reform of the Directorate General of Armaments, the Minister of the Armed Forces, Madame Florence Parly, highlighted “the new frontiers”, indicating that “tech- nologies are no longer the prerogative of a few powers” and that “the civilian economy completely grasps this”. In this context she identifies four issues:

– Efficiency: implies no longer thinking of technological development solely in a silo using programmes in order to find more flexibility, both in

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interactions between the actors and in the series of actions during the inno- vation process.

– Europe: highlights the need to think about technological development

within a collaborative space that can transcend the national framework. This objective uses, in particular, the creation of a “grammar of European equip- ment”, in other words a set of technological standards common to European actors, facilitating technological collaborations and interoperability in the- atres of operations.

– Industry: emphasises in particular the need to incorporate all demands,

in other words to take account of prospects for exports from the beginning of national programmes. Taking these demands into account will help to better respond to their needs and to anticipate these during the innovation process. The objective is to facilitate exports to maintain a market that is sufficiently large so that manufacturers can guarantee to “cover the whole spectrum of technologies (…) to preserve the full army model”.

– Innovation: ensures the need to incorporate the entire innovation eco-

system beyond the defence area and large firms. Start-ups are targeted in par- ticular, in order to accelerate innovation cycles and not miss the disruptive technologies of the digital world.

These challenges, although different from those of the United States, reflect these. They also show the need to think about the development framework of defence technologies within a more extensive environment, while controlling the space in which it is “prudent” to allow this knowl- edge to be disseminated. Again, faced with these challenges, the DSI con- cept helps to anticipate the need for flexibility through emphasis on feed- back loops and the variety of comparable actors, the need for collaborations within a controlled diplomatic space, the need for anticipation, with a vision for technological developments that incorporates all the opportunities, and the need to include firms and technologies from backgrounds that transcend the strict area of defence. For a country whose ITDB is not, or not much, developed, integration within a DSI can also prove to be beneficial. At first sight, this participa- tion helps to both integrate the technologies which are developing within foreign ITDBs and provides new opportunities for national technologies. But, beyond this simple effect, the integration of European countries that do not manufacture arms with European DISs would allow these countries to be interested in consolidating defence industry supply and demand, for which the Minister and the French President are calling. Beyond the offsets that are traditionally proposed, belonging to a DSI would involve the establishment of long-term incentives and would allow this objective to be supported.

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Construction of an Operational Concept of Technological

Conclusion

The literature review since the emergence of the concept of dual use until its recent developments shows the complexity of its expressions. The tech- nological aspects, although essential, are not the only focus that has to be considered in the analysis. First of all, the synthesis highlighted the diversity of objects that could be described as dual use, then emphasised the questions that this poses in terms of governance. The Dual System of Innovation (DIS) was defined by taking account of these two aspects. By considering this in its entirety, this offers the advantage of taking account of the diversity of interactions implied by duality; while enabling an analysis of dual use layer by layer in order to deal in depth with the different questions relating to each stage of the life cycle of the technology. In fine, the DSI concept is the framework for defence innovation policy in

a broader technological area (beyond defence applications). With the help of the specific empirical tool, it is, then, necessary to mark out an institutional area, transcending that of the ITDB, depending on the technology under consideration. So, concurrently with the ITDB concept, for dual technolo- gies, this concept would allow more integrated management between defence innovation policy and industrial policy. The objective is to highlight a sym- biosis between the two concepts, the first serving to approach, together, the actors who supply the goods and services needed for the armed forces, while the second is more specifically connected to a technical system in order to consider all the applications of this, and thus to think about its dual develop- ment beyond the military application and therefore the sphere of the ITDB. The question that arises is the implementation of such a system. Indeed, the way in which countries view the production of weapons systems varies greatly depending on the country’s history, military doctrine and diplomatic relations, to name but a few factors. Thus, DIS cannot be universally applied from one country to another and requires adjustment to the local context. For this model to be relevant at the country level, the state must maintain

a minimum level of defence R&D and have maintained a certain autonomy

in the development of the technologies concerned, otherwise, DIS can be envisaged in cooperation between several countries, each of which can con- tribute more or less strongly to the military or civilian component, while knowing that a balance between these two components must ultimately be maintained. Finally, the specific institutional characteristics of each country strongly constrain the form that DIS can take, particularly with regard to the balance between the State, research institutions and companies and their international integration.

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The different modalities of application of the DIS may be the subject of future research. Two perspectives are envisaged. The first, country-focused, consists of comparing two DIS for two technologies that one country devel- ops alone or in cooperation. The second, which focuses on a technology, consists in comparing for the same technology the different ways in which DIS is constructed in different countries. Such an analysis would highlight the institutional, and technological specificities related to the implementa- tion of DIS.

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