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At least since the times of C.P. Snow it has been "officially" known
that the natural and social, or human, sciences occupy largely
incongruent spaces in human scientific endeavors. Despite
occasional attempts at connecting them (logical positivism,
psychophysics, cognitive science, and complexity science may come
to mind), the clash of the two cultures seems to be in full swing. A
recent hoax by Alan Sokal, a physicist who successfully published in
a respected social science journal a parody of a philosophical article
about, nota bene, parallels between esoteric natural sciences and
social and cultural phenomena, was by some interpreted as a vicious
and unfair attack in the so-called Science Wars between the natural
sciences and the humanities. To quell this unnecessary conflict
between the two branches of science, sober and meritorious voices
of reason are sorely needed. One such voice is represented by the
book Between Literature and Science: Poe, Lem, and Explorations in
Aesthetics, Cognitive Science, and Literary Knowledge by Peter
Swirski.
The crucial point in the field of artificial, but also natural, intelligence
is the problem of creativity. Who creates and who simply assembles
pre-existing pieces, such as words, notes, or color shapes, following
some pre-determined (preprogrammed) syntactic rules? It is
obvious that Hemingway's typewriter is not the author of
Hemingway's novels. It is probably less clear who was the real
winner in the famous chess match between the computer Deep Blue
and the world chess champion Kasparov. Who was the author of the
machine's winning strategy: the programmer or the software? But
the most difficult question is who is the author of computer-
generated literature (for which Lem invented a quirky neologism
biterature, from BITic litERATURE). Swirski does not pretend to have
all the answers. The value of his book resides in the thorough
formulations of the questions and in the scientific approach to
possible solutions. His modification of the old Turing test (TT) is
both hilarious and meritorious. Alan Turing was a mathematician
who attempted to answer the question "Can machines think?" by an
imitation-game test. To explain briefly, an interrogator questions
two subjects and, after a certain time or a number of
questions/answers, the interrogator is asked to determine which of
the two subjects is human and which is a computer. If the
computer, one of the two subjects, can successfully hide its identity,
it may be said to think. In answer to some of the drawbacks and
published criticisms of TT, Swirski devises his own version, boldly
named the Swirski test (ST). In ST, the computer is the interrogator
that must determine the sexes of the two test subjects, which may
be males, females, or computers, in any possible permutations. Of
course, ST is not immune to ambivalences, most notably its
dependence on cultural and pragmatic factors, but is not the
question "Can machines think?" itself dependent on cultural and
pragmatic factors? In the opinion of this reviewer, the proposed
Swirski test deserves the attention of psychologists and computer
scientists, and I would wish to see the results.
There are only few places in the book which provoke some, arguably
minor, criticisms. In an extensive quote from Bach and Hamish (p.
11), the labels S and H are used without definition, but the reader's
conjecture that they mean Speaker and Hearer is plausible.
In the section titled "The Fact and Method of Unified Inquiry" (p.
46), Swirski briefly and explicitly discusses the methodological and
fundamental differences and similarities between natural and social
sciences. I do not disagree with the author's conclusion that the two
kinds of science are more similar than different, but one might point
out that controlled experiments and reproducibility are the two core
tenets of the natural sciences. Unfortunately, social sciences can
never fully embrace the idea of controlled experimentation (perhaps
fortunately for subjects of such experiments) and, due to the
incessant flow of history, can never fully satisfy the requirement of
reproducibility. Nevertheless, this should not cause social scientists
to doubt the process. Although not routinely acknowledged, the
"poetic intuition" often plays a role in natural scientists' decisions
and the related progress in science. A notorious example is the case
of the cyclic formula of benzene, which allegedly occurred to the
chemist Kekule in a dream.
The final little delight of this scholarly, but entertaining, work awaits
a thorough reader after he finishes the book and closes it. A back-
cover blurb claims that "Peter Swirski, a brilliant literary critic and a
superb translator, deserves wide recognition as a scholar in
American and Polish literatures." In a self-referent manner, this
meta-comment is written by none other than Stanislaw Lem, one of
the book's subjects! And by the way, the statement appears to be
true.