SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

Mang-oy vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-27421. September 12, 1986

FACTS: On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a “last will
and testament” wherein he appointed his son, Bando, to fulfill or carry his
testament. The contents of the said document were read to the beneficiaries named
therein who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to
them. In implementation of this document, they then, on September 7, 1937,
executed an agreement as to the partition of the land. Two days later, Old Man
Tumpao died. The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them,
apparently in obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last
“will” and affirmed by the other abovequoted instrument. But things changed
unexpectedly in 1960, twenty three years later, the respondents executed an extra-
judicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the
three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the aforesaid
documents.5 By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao’s title was cancelled and
another one was issued in favor of the three respondents.6
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for
reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial court. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the “will” executed by Old Man
Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated. The agreement of
partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a
partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the said will is valid.
2.) Whether such can be sustained.
HELD:
1.) The said will is not valid since the will, not having been probated as required by
law, was inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of
decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court
2.) The Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the trial court and found that the
document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899,
which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao
in 1937. The said article reads as follows:
“Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the forced heirs.”
Solivio vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 83484. February 12, 1990

FACTS:
The late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino
novel “With-out Seeing the Dawn,” died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1)
his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother,
Salus-tia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javel-lana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javel-lana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died before he was born. Later her
mother, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to
help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died
of a heart attack without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia agreed to carry out the
desire to set up the foundation. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would
take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in
good faith filed for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. Later, she filed an amended petition praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and
that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the
estate be adjudicated to her. The trial court then declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other
obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the “SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA.
DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION” which she caused to be registered in the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
Concordia later on filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order
declaring Celedonia as “sole heir” of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the
deceased but her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing
the denial, Concordia filed after a year later, a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 26, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
Branch 26 rendered judgment in favor of Concordia.
On Concordia’s motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred
that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the
possession of, the “Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation.” The trial court
denied her motions for reconsideration.
Celedonia appealed and the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the trial court in toto.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain the civil
case for partition and recovery of Concordia’s share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23 of
the same court;

HELD: No. The Supreme Court found that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva’s action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate
proceedings) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratrix’s inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to
the heir, and terminating the proceedings. In the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should
not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried
by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate
or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.”

Fernandez vs. Dimagiba

G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967

Facts:
Ismaela Dimagiba, filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes.
Such Petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez et al. on the ground .The court
ruled in favour of the probate. Fernandez et al. appealed but it was beyond the
reglementary period. They argued that they were entitled to await the other
grounds for oppositions before appearing and the will to probate should be
considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and
revocation propounded in their opposition.

The CA later ruled that the case had become final and executor due to failure to
appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal.
Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand
is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are
valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and
appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109,
that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment where such order or judgment: (a) allows or
disallows a will."

TRILLANA vs. CRISOSTOMO

G.R. No. L-3378 August 22, 1951

FACTS:
The deceased, Damasa Crisostomo, allegedly made two wills: one will was made on
August 16, 1948 and the other will was executed on October 19, 1948.Trillana, the
administrator of the estate, presented the subsequent will executed on October 19
for probate, and was granted by the court. Crisostomo and others, claiming to be
nephews and nieces of the deceased, filed a petition for relief of the judgment
rendered by the probate court to disallow the subsequent will and allow the former
will executed on August 16, alleging that the proceedings during the probate of the
subsequent will was attended by fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the revoked will of August 16, 1948 should be included in
probate of the subsequent will of October 19, 1948.

HELD:
NO. The petitioners-appellants failed to show that the judgment of the lower court
probating the October 1948 will of testatrix was obtained through fraud thus the
lower court did not commit any error in denying the appellants' petition for relief
under Sec. 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and therefore it is not necessary for the
court to discuss and pass upon the other propositions of the appellant.

Further, Under Sec. 3 of Rule 77, the court shall set aside a date for proving a will
even without petition when it is delivered to the court having jurisdiction. The
lower court was right in not setting a date for proving the will of August 16, 1948,
because this will was expressly and absolutely revoked by the subsequent will of
October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix, which was filed for allowance on
November 1, 1948, with the same probate court

Sumilang vs. Ramagosa

G. R. No. L-23135. December 26, 1967

Facts:
On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and
testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. The will was
written in tagalong and Mariano institute himself as the sole heir.
The petition for probate was opposed by two sets of oppositors: first,
Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa who claimed that they were entitled to inherit the
estate of the deceased, instead of Sumilang. Second, other relatives of next of kin of
Hilarion Ramagosa prayed only for the disallowance of the will. Both oppositors
questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under
duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament.
However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition
for probate mainly on the ground that “the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-
matter because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really
executed by him was revoked by implication of law six years before his death.
Allegedly, after making the will the testatort sold the land to Mariano Sumilang and
his brother Mario the parcels of land described in the will.
In his answer Mariano Sumilang moved to strike out oppositor pleadings on
the grounds that (1) the oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are
bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of the
testator and (2) oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of
(the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.
The probate court granted the motion to strike out the pleading from the
record on the ground that the oppositors have no have no relationship whatsoever
within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore a total strangers to the
deceased whose will is under probate.
Issue: Whether or not the probate court is correct in striking out the oppositors
pleadings.
Held: Yes, the probate court is correct.
First, in petitions for probate, the Court’s area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity of the will, as the testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions
presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions thereof or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
Second, an alleged disposal by testator prior to his death of the properties
involved in his will is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate
is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides
the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the
second relates to descent and distribution.
Lastly, in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property
to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party is on who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor. Where oppositors do not take issue with the
probate court’s finding that they are totally strangers to the deceased, or do not
attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must be protected,
the order striking out their opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto
must be affirmed.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid
G. R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. She was survived by her legitimate
parents Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed
Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17,
1951, some 11 years before her demise and prayed that she be appointed as an
administrator.

On June 25, 1963 Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid opposed the probate of the
will. Accordingly, the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of
the deceased preterited those compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line and
therefore the institution is void. The oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preterition.

The probate held that the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce
create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the
petition without costs.
Issue: Whether or not the will is complete nullity.
Held: Yes, the will is void. The decedent left no descendants legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forved heirs in the direct ascending line her parents and the
will completely omits both of them depriving them of their legitime.
Further, in a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is
limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet
that issue.

Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. L-62952. October 09, 1985

FACTS:
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament
duly executed. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner
Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in
the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he
had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been
estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as
husband and wife. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner.
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed
an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by
undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having
admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and
thus letters testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground
that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from
December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will
be an idle exercise because on the face of the Wills the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the Will. The respondent court declared the
Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void and
properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to Rufina Gomez and her
children in equal shares.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was
denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28,1982.
ISSUE:
whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of
herein petitioner?
HELD:
The fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its
face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the
fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to
present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in
Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio
Martinez, et al (G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the
admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner
put in issue the legality of the devise.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to
be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and
declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited
to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass
upon certain provisions of the Will.
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive.
The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.

Suntay vs. Suntay

95 Phil., 500 , July 31, 1954

FACTS:
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines,
died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and
personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province,
China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely,
Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr.
and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim
Billian who survived him.
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and
after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the
latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been
executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay.
This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the
petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to
establish the loss of the said will.
An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court
held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further
proceedings.
In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April
1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7
February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing
sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition.
In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had
found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and
that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province
of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying
for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the
will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assignment of interest in the estate is a bar to probate of a lost
or foreign will?
HELD:
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother
Maria Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will
or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of their share right, title
and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the
spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño and the subsequent assignment
thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico C. Suntay,
for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in this
proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament
executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly
executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed to have been probated in the
municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.

As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February
1938 was no bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the
expiration of ten years.

De Aranz vs. Galing

161 SCRA 628 , May 28, 1988

FACTS:
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a
petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late
Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola.
On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing
on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the
"Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared.
The hearing was then reset to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued
the following order:
“There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby designated Commissioner to receive evidence ex-parte of the
petitioner.
“SO ORDERED."
On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-
parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness
stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12
May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required
by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period
of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent
and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On 13 January 1987, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the
petition. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirement irement of the law for the allowance of will was
satisfied by mere publication of notice of hearing?
HELD:
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.
— The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence,
and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty
(20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the
notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not,
the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their
places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten
(10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for
the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such
places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein
petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for
the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not
cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for
the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of
hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Vda. de Ramos vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-40804. January 31, 1978

FACTS: Adelaida Nista, who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition
for the probate of the alleged will and testament and codicil of the late Eugenia
Danila, which is the subject matter of the case..
However, Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra,
filed an opposition and an amended opposition to the petition alleging that they are
the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses and that the purported will
and codicil subject of the petition were procured through fraud and undue
influence; that the formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil
have not been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed
and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported testatrix.
 Later on, the petitioner and the oppositors entered into a Compromise
Agreement which was approved by the trial court.
But thereafter, Rosario de Ramos, et al filed a motion for leave to intervene as
co petitioners alleging that being instituted heirs or devisees, they have rights and
interests to protect in the estate of the late Eugenia Danila. They prayed for the
probate and/or allowance of the will and codicil and filed a motion for new trial
and/or re-hearing and/or relief from judgment and to set aside the judgment based
on compromise agreement.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its allowing the probate of
the will. Oppositors Marcelina Guerra and the heirs of Buenaventura Guerra
appealed but the CA however, disallowed the probate of the will on the ground that
the evidence failed to establish that the testatrix Eugenia Danila signed her will in
the presence of the instrumental witnesses in accordance with Article 805 of the
Civil Code, as testified to by the two surviving instrumental witnesses.
Hence this appeal by way of certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were
executed in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering the complicated
circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testifed against their due
execution while other non- subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.
HELD:
The Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and restore the
decision of the trial court allowing probate of the will and codicil in question.
Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation
clause which, significantly, is a separate memorandum or record of the facts
surrounding the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it
affirms that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed.
This Court had previously held that the attestation clause basically contradicts the
pretense of undue execution which later on may be made by the attesting
witnesses.4 In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the
signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their
signatures following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact attested not
only to the genuineness of the testatrix’s signature but also to the due execution of
the will as embodied in the attestation clause.5By signing the will, the witnesses
impliedly certified to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the
sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence,
and the like.6
In the case at bar, the records bear a disparity in the quality of the testimonies of
Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz on one hand, and the Notary Public, Atty. Ricardo
A. Barcenas, on the other. The testimony of Odon Sarmiento was contradicted by his
own admission. Though his admission to the effect that “when Eugenia Danila
signed the testament (he) and the two other attesting witnesses Rosendo Paz and
Calixto Azusada were present” was made extra-judicially, it was not squarely
refuted when inquired upon during the trial.
With respect to the testimony of Rosendo Paz, it had been refuted by the
declaration of Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas. The records show that this attesting
witness was fetched by Felix Danila from his place of work in order to act as witness
to a will. Rosendo Paz did not know what the document he signed was all about.
Although he performed his function as an attesting witness, his participation was
rather passive. We do not expect, therefore, that his testimony, “half-hearted” as that
of Odon Sarmiento, be as candid and complete as one proceeding from a keen mind
fully attentive to the details of the execution of the deeds. Quite differently, Atty.
Ricardo A. Barcenas, more than a direct witness himself, was purposely there to
oversee the accomplishment of the will and codicil. His testimony is an account of
what he actually heard and saw during the conduct of his profession. There is no
evidence to show that this lawyer was motivated by any material interest to take
sides or that his statement is truth perverted.

Gago vs. Mamuyac

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

Facts:
This case stemmed when Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of
Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will
was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased
executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the
ground of the existence of the second will.

Another petition was filed by Gago, this time for the probate of the second will,
however it was opposed again, this time the oppositor alleged that the second will
presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly
revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the
document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was
actually cancelled by the testator.

The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and
revoked.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will thus it cannot be
probated.

RULING:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due
search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in
shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that
in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has
ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.