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RULE / TOPIC CASE TITLE DOCTRINE

Preliminary Consideration Ong Chia vs. Republic The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) is clearly not applicable to a petition for naturalization; Decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provides that “these
rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other
cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” A
final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on
the basis of the same documents.

The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility.

Where a party fails to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of
documents which have been executed under oath, the court may rely on them.
Preliminary Consideration Zulueta vs. CA Privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable. The only exception in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as prescribed by law.”

A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Preliminary Consideration People vs. Yatar An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, so long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented to
prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.

Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.

The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission
of guilt—it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Preliminary Consideration Tating vs. Marcella The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence; It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.

As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the
strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant
Preliminary Consideration People vs. Salafranca The statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a
dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted
when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is
a victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and

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(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

The term res gestae has been defined as “those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act
and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out
of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous
with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant
to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
Preliminary Consideration SCC Chemicals Corp vs. CA
What Need Not Be Proved LBP vs. Banal Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the
absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party.

Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial
notice of a certain matter, thus: “SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.—During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon. “After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”
What Need Not Be Proved People vs. Kulais As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have
been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. This is
especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him.
What Need Not Be Proved Laureano vs. CA The party who claims the applicability of a foreign law has the burden of proof, and where said party has failed to discharge
the burden, Philippine law applies.
What Need Not Be Proved Maquiling vs. COMELEC
What Need Not Be Proved People vs. Baharan
What Need Not Be Proved Republic vs. Sandiganbayan Courts will not hesitate to set aside executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in
the rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to any ordinary reader without
need for interpretation or construction.
What Need Not Be Proved Ligtas vs. People It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases
that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.
Rules of Admissibility People vs. Mallilin Chain of Custody Rule; The mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt—more than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was

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and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is
not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness
has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering— without regard to whether the same is advertent or
otherwise not —dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. Indeed, the likelihood of
tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused
lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless
and until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Rules of Admissibility People vs. Pagaduan In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the
following elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a
crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in
court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug
pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fail.
Rules of Admissibility People vs. Eric Rosauro Where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, the Supreme Court (SC) will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses since the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during
trial.

The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of
certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit.
Rules of Admissibility People vs. Calantiao Unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of
the evidence has been preserved will remain.

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frameup must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.
Rules of Admissibility People vs. Constantino Denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with disfavor by the courts, being a self-serving negative
evidence. In view, however, of the constitutional presumption that an accused is innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption by presenting the
required quantum of evidence. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness
of the defense.

In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and

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the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, “[in]
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.” And in the prosecution of these offenses, the primary
consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have been preserved
from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court.

The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case as the Court can no longer
consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly
preserved.
Rules of Admissibility People vs. Mercury de la Cruz
Documentary Evidence Sps. Silos vs. PNB It must be said that it is not the function of the Court to reexamine or reevaluate evidence adduced by the parties in
the proceedings below. The rule admits of certain well-recognized exceptions, though, as when the lower courts’ findings
are not supported by the evidence on record or are based on a misapprehension of facts, or when certain relevant and
undisputed facts were manifestly overlooked that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. This case falls within such exceptions.
Best Evidence Rule MCMP Const. Corp. vs. Monark The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever its contents are the
subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.”
Best Evidence Rule Loon vs. Power Master, Inc. While we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection.
Best Evidence Rule Dimaguila vs. Monteiro Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake.

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making
it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

As to the Best Evidence Rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a
public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that
when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of
public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a
witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

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Best Evidence Rule Republic vs. Mupas The essence of procedural due process is the right to be heard.

Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and nothing in the evidence
inclines a conclusion to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. If the facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with the
defense of the defendant, the evidence does not fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of
the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the
burden of proof fails. The reason for this rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the defendant’s claim. Thus, even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant,
there is no preponderance of evidence on his side when this evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document
must be produced in court. The best evidence rule ensures that the exact contents of a document are brought before the
court. In deeds, wills, and contracts, a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in the rights and obligations of
the parties. A substantial hazard of inaccuracy exists in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting.
Moreover, with respect to oral testimony purporting to give the terms of a document from memory, a special risk of error is
present, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. The best evidence rule likewise acts as
an insurance against fraud. If a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute
inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes
that its production would expose and defeat. The rule likewise protects against misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.

Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
he asks permission from the trial court to produce a summary of numerous documents, whose originals are available to the
adverse party for inspection. He does not ask permission from the trial court to present in evidence the numerous non-original
documents. Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court would be defeated. In that case, every
exhibit of non-original documents would be identified, authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to a tedious and
protracted litigation. Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original documents, he must first establish that
the presentation of photocopies is justified under Section 3(a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He must establish
the presence of all the elements under these
Provisions.

In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of non-original documents must first prove the following elements
before secondary evidence is admitted before the court:
(a) the existence or due execution of the original;
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non- production in court; and
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
To conclude otherwise is to allow the party to circumvent the best evidence rule and the requirements under Section 3(a),
(b), and (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court by merely invoking Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Parol Evidence Ortanez vs. CA Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain
purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth
and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such

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communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections
of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Parol Evidence Lapu-Lapu Foundation vs. CA Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that “when the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.”

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
Parol Evidence Leoveras vs. Valdez When the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed
upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement.Whatever is not
found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying,
explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not
prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
Parol Evidence Paras vs. Kimwa Const. & Dev. Corp Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of
documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written
agreement. The term “agreement” includes wills. Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities
observed, “forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.”

Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the four (4) items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
Section, “a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement[.]” Raising any of these
items as an issue in a pleading such that it falls under the exception is not limited to the party initiating an action.

In Philippine National Railways v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 83 SCRA 569 (1978), this court noted that “if the defendant
set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the complaint does not express the true agreement of the
parties, then parol evidence is admissible
to prove the true agreement of the parties[.]” Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a

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party’s failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained. Apart from pleading these
exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence
sought to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to
“induce belief in [the] existence” of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to
introduce parol evidence. In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
Parol Evidence PNB vs. Pasimio It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts a right and the quantum of evidence required by law in
civil cases is preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater
weight of credible evidence."

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:


Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number
of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Just as settled is the rule that the plaintiff in civil cases must rely on strength of his or her own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of the defendant.
Electronic Evidence Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in
evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally
offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure— cases in which no full-blown trial is held.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of
whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence.
Electronic Evidence Torres vs. PAGCOR In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that: A
facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in
fact, be a sham pleading.

A facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, 536 SCRA 408 (2007), We determined the question of whether the original
facsimile transmissions are “electronic data messages” or “electronic documents” within the context of the Electronic
Commerce Act, and We said: We, therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and

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is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Electronic Evidence Ang vs. Republic The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions,
quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
Electronic Evidence People vs. Enojas Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them.
Electronic Evidence Syhunliong vs. Rivera The matter contained in the text message is privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code which
[negates] the existence of malice in – a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, [moral] or social duty.

A text message is not actionable libel. There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to induce the hearer or reader
to suppose and understand them as impeaching the honesty, virtue or reputation of another. The question is not what the
writer or speaker meant by his words but what they convey to those who heard or read them.
Testimonial Evidence / Marcos vs. Heirs of Andres Navarro In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a
Disqualifications witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the
outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21
disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage.
Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by
reason of privileged communication.

In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein. We said: The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome
of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not grounds for disqualification.

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally
incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides
for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called.

There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for non-
disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses
excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and
merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. x x x
As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no
other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in
evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

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For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the
testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will
be superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape
notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

The use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert
witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this
Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. However, we have also recognized that
handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining
forged documents
Testimonial Evidence / Marital People vs. Golimlim
disqualification
Testimonial Evidence / Marital People vs. Castaneda Wife may testify against husband for crime of falsification of a deed of sale of conjugal house and lot where wife was made
disqualification to appear as having given far consent to the sale. The actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and
domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranguility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous
decisions, “identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing
but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.” Thus, there is no reason to apply the
marital disqualification rule.
Testimonial Evidence / Dead Razon vs. CA That a person is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.
man’s statute
In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private complainant’s testimony
irregardless of her “monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity,” this Court held: A mental
retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a
vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a
valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as
the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

A mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is
coherent, the same is admissible in court. To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a
ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only
person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence. Thus, in a
long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the
victim who was a mental retardate.
Testimonial Evidence / Dead Sunga-Chan vs. Chua The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
man’s statute insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the
introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound
mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of
unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred

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before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

When it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the
deceased to defeat the counterclaim.
Testimonial Evidence / Dead Bordalba vs. CA The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in
man’s statute any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the
witness.
Testimonial Evidence / Chan vs. Chan The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while
Privileged communication professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to
him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that
ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and
narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health
at great risk.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court.
Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a
question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall
become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the
offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records ― the results of tests that the physician ordered,
the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him.
Testimonial Evidence / Lacurom vs. Jacoba
Privileged communication
Testimonial Evidence / Samala vs. Valencia
Privileged communication
Testimonial Evidence / Almonte vs. Vasquez At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
Privileged communication diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself
transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce
his legal rights.
Testimonial Evidence / Executive Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
Privilege exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.”

The phrase “executive privilege” is not new in this jurisdiction; Executive privilege has been defined as “the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress,” as well as “the right of the President
and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.” In
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested
information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given
procedural setting.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is
privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official
from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.

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Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as
already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure
is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised
on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President", which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the
executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even
less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence.
Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
Testimonial Evidence / Executive Neri vs. Senate Committees Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect public
Privilege interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the
benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the President and
his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the
Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It
is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and
more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a
matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given
preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such
presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence
in favor of executive privilege.
Testimonial Evidence / Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the
Admissions Constantino, Jr. instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that
the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues
to be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., this Court emphasized that: Once the stipulations are reduced into
writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become
judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated.38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed
to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.

Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court declared that: A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact
as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained
in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent
with what was pleaded

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In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial
admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions:
1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and
2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by
denying that he made such an admission.
Testimonial Evidence / People vs. Gandia
Admissions
Testimonial Evidence / Doldol vs. People Partial restitution of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds.
Admissions
Testimonial Evidence / Ladiana vs. People It is wellsettled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-judicial
Confessions confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the constitutional
provision “exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons.”

Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
“SEC. 26. Admissions of a party.—The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.
“SEC. 33. Confession. —The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.” In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in
an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which one is charged.

In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their


untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the
admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of
facts.
Testimonial Evidence / People vs. Ulit As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of the improvidence
Confessions thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives,
independently of his plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged and the
precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent
on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate conviction.

By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be attributed
to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from whom the witness has
received the information; In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional
provision guaranteeing the accused the right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him.
Testimonial Evidence / People vs. Sayaboc Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption,
Confessions however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during
custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced.
The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in
the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may
appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession
valueless and inadmissible.
Testimonial Evidence / Tanenggee vs. People It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the

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Confessions burden of proving the contrary.
Testimonial Evidence / Conduct People vs. Santos An affidavit of a prosecution witness in a case, other than the instant one, shall be admissible in evidence for the limited
and Character purpose of proving knowledge, plan or scheme employed by the accused and failure to seasonably object to its admission is
deemed waiver of the hearsay character of said evidence.

Testimonial Evidence / Conduct People vs. Nardo Be that as it may, recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for
and Character there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon
retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused
deserve only scant consideration.

Any recantation or affidavit of desistance, by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called “private crimes,” is not
a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The pardon to justify the dismissal of the
complaint should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action.

An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.
It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it
later on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.

As a rule, we do not disturb the findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, for the trial court is in a better
position to pass upon the same.

It is settled that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial court finds said
testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the course of things.

Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their
credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do
not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. Besides, a rape
victim cannot be expected to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her virtue.

In order to overcome the evidence of the prosecution with the defense of alibi, accused-appellant must establish not only
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
Testimonial Evidence / Conduct RP vs. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third person
and Character may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of
such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or
(b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.
Hearsay Evidence Rule Patula vs. People It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to
solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she
entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party
who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.

The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the

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credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as
an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant
was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the
accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.
The distinction is, therefore, between
(a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and
(b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay
should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed,
the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the
adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the
administration of justice.

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose
of their presentation in evidence, viz.:
Section 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and
© Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.

The terse yet sweeping manner of justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the
concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay rule.

The requisites are as follows:


(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Dying Declaration People vs. Gatarin et Al. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted
when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records, no questions
relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was under the
consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration

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admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether
the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending.

However, even if appellant’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements may still be
appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main
fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the
act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Definitely, the statement
is relevant because it identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by
appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
Dying Declaration People vs. Palanas For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must concur:
(a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is
conscious of his impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.

On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the rule
on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as
a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
Declaration against interest People vs. Bernal In kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the
victim will not exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor.

Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may
be sufficient to support a conviction.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was
aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed
such declaration to be true.

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Declaration against pedigree Tizon vs. CA Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to
introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear
the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is
to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the presumption, the party
against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is an entire lack of
competent evidence to the contrary, and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu
of evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is
based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima
facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.

Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is
sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other member of the family.

Where a party claims a right to a part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that The former is her niece is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other
preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.

Where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as
a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein
private respondent’s failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts
therein asserted.
Family Reputation Jison vs. CA For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Art. 172 of the Family Code, a
“high standard of proof” is required—specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as
his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.

The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one’s filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition
and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

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It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue
of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the
Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the
inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the
signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter’s part.

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem
generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as “family possessions,” or those articles which represent, in effect,
a family’s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects “openly exhibited
and well known to the family,” or those “which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition.”
Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family’s reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the
family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree.
Thus, matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
Common Reputation
Res Gestae People vs. Feliciano It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an
eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the
criminal could be apprehended. It has also been previously held that: It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed.
Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased
from their memory.

As a general rule, “[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, x x x.” All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of
Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae,
thus: Section 42. Part of res gestae.—Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence.
Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact,
admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
Res Gestae People vs. Villarico The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for, even if the
commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond
reasonable doubt.

In Marturillas v. People, the Court observed that the familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any doubt
that the witness could have erred; and noted that a witness related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the
faces of the person involved in the attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with
seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law.

The term res gestae refers to “those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which

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are admissible when illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations
that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately
after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or
event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
Res Gestae People vs. Palanca
Entries in the course of business Phil Airlines vs. Ramos A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue,
when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the
oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection.

The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the
main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part
of the res Gestae.
Entries in Official Records Lao vs. Standard Insurance A police blotter is admissible if the following requisites are met. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said
rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another
person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Entries in Official Records Sabili vs. COMELEC In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc., 374 SCRA 653
(2002), we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in
evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.
Entries in Official Records Cercado-Siga vs. Cercado As early as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 (1915), it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages,
and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Order No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer
public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must
therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.

Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated
either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present
and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to
the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.

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A signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original
and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the original. But, an unsigned and
uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer
acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.

Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old;
2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion.
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably be
expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the
particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and
naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.

While the Supreme Court (SC) acknowledges the difficulty of obtaining old records, it simply cannot ignore the rules on
evidence, specifically the rule on authentication with respect to private documents which is precisely in place to prevent the
inclusion of spurious documents in the body of evidence that will determine the resolutions of an issue.
Commercial lists Meralco vs. Quisumbing Statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only “if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.” As correctly held in our Decision dated
January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis
or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented.
Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in
their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with
the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these
reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence
when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be
admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is
necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.
Testimony or deposition at a People vs. Ortiz-Miyako In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts
former proceeding directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the
acts committed by himself.
Testimony or deposition at a Go vs. People The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases
former proceeding where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face.
The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness’
credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct
court testimony.

For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the
case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.—When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence
of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted
in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice
shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

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To take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending
would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’ deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case against the accused.

The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a two-fold
purpose:
(1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and
(2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 (1980),
that the constitutional requirement insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the
threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood
and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.
Child Witness Rule People vs. Ibanez Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and the testimony in court do not militate against witness’ credibility since
sworn statements are generally considered inferior to the testimony in open court.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is that the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest
respect because of its direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine if they are telling the truth
or not. This opportunity enables the trial judge to detect better that thin line between fact and prevarication that will
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the competence and credibility of a witness will not be
disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the records that his judgment is erroneous.

With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which
specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the
party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court,
motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
Child Witness Rule People vs. Esugon As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness,
experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social
status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as
listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs,
interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for
disqualification.

Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004- 07-SC, 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed
qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s
competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of
a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court. All questions bearing on the credibility

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of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of actually examining the real and
testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’
testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the
reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is even more
stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.
Opinion Rule: Expert Witness People vs. Abriol
Opinion Rule: Expert Witness Bautista vs. CA
Opinion Rule: Expert Witness Avelino vs. Peole Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the witness has
been qualified as an expert.

Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the probative value of the
testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. The case of Madali v. People, 595 SCRA 274 (2009), elucidates
thus: Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident,
slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled
that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on
the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points,
minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the
integrity of a prosecution witness.

It has been consistently held by this Court that in criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has
the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not.
Opinion Rule: Ordinary Witness People vs. Duranan The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition
of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the
matter. It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided
the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify
as to what it is.

As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: “A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another,
when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact
bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.

Any person who can perceive and make known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness.

At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify should have been raised by the defense at the outset.
It cannot be raised for the first time in this appeal. It has been held: A party may waive his objections to the competency of a
witness and permit him to testify . If after such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party
having knowledge of the incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want of mental
capacity or for some other reason. If the objection could have been taken during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the
objection will not be available on writ of error.
Character Evidence People vs. Deopita Religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob
and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary
conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had

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discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Burden of Proof vs. Burden of FEBTC vs. Chante Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely:
Evidence (a) the risk of nonpersuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and
(b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or
the burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the
law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning
or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its
second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the party
asserting the affirmative of the issue. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
is given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and
presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of proof,
which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the
complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability.

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court sets the quantum of evidence for civil actions, and delineates how preponderance of
evidence is determined, viz.: Section 1. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved
lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. As the rule indicates, preponderant evidence refers to evidence
that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. It is proof that leads the trier of
facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.
Conclusive Presumptions Ibaan Rural Bank vs. CA When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be
construed as consent; When estoppel in pais arises. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another
to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the
former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
Conclusive Presumptions Alcaraz vs. Tangga-an Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions.—The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:


(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it.
Conclusive Presumptions University of Mindanao vs. BSP Presumptions are "inferences as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another
which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily take."95 Presumptions
embody values and revealed behavioral expectations under a given set of circumstances.

Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable.

Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is. They
are made conclusive not because there is an established uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise.
They are conclusive because they are declared as such under the law or the rules. Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
identifies two (2) conclusive presumptions:

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SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions.— The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them.

On the other hand, disputable, presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence. They are
disputable in recognition of the variability of human behavior. Presumptions are not always true. They may be wrong under
certain circumstances, and courts are expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that may
render the expectations wrong.

Thus, the application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based on the existence of certain facts on
which they are meant to operate. "[Presumptions are not allegations, nor do they supply their absence[.]" Presumptions are
conclusions. They do not apply when there are no facts or allegations to support them.

If the facts exist to set in motion the operation of a disputable presumption, courts may accept the presumption. However,
contrary evidence may be presented to rebut the presumption.

Courts cannot disregard contrary evidence offered to rebut disputable presumptions. Disputable presumptions apply only
in the absence of contrary evidence or explanations. This court explained in Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. v. Usec. Trinidad-
Lichauco:
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith" or "regular performance of official duty," yet these
presumptions are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Many civil actions are oriented
towards overcoming any number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can certainly be geared towards such effect.
The very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumptions involved.
Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary, owing to the perceived indisputability of the presumptions, the
judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a given case, nothing more.
Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as excess verbiage, save perhaps for the provisions laying down the
legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of Appeals were ever adopted as a jurisprudential rule, no public officer could ever be sued for
acts executed beyond their official functions or authority, or for tortious conduct or behavior, since such acts would "enjoy
the presumption of good faith and in the regular performance of official duty." Indeed, few civil actions of any nature would
ever reach the trial stage, if a case can be adjudicated by a mere determination from the complaint or answer as to which
legal presumptions are applicable. For-example, the presumption that a person is innocent of a wrong is a disputable
presumption on the same level as that of the regular performance of official duty. A civil complaint for damages necessarily
alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would serve as basis for the award of damages. With
the rationale of the Court of Appeals, such complaint can be dismissed upon a motion to dismiss solely on the ground that
the presumption is that a person is innocent of a wrong.
Disputable Presumptions Rosaroso vs. Soria Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions:
(1) private transactions have been fair and regular;
(2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and
(3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.
These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of
presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and
offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is
relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence unless rebutted.

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It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the
Rules of Court.
Disputable Presumptions Heirs of Trazona vs. Heirs of Canada It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while
notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by
evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
Disputable Presumptions Uy vs. Lacsamana There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However,
this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held that testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization
of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that the best documentary evidence
of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 114, which is applicable to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and
Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wife,
must be furnished by the person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the
Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The third
copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the solemnization of
the marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who
solemnized the marriage.
Disputable Presumptions Diaz vs. People Under Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns.
To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself
of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3(p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private
transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a
document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In
this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent’s possession of the
document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance
of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered,
the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent’s favor.
Disputable Presumptions: People vs. Padrigone Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
Suppression of Testimony produced” does not apply if:
(a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
(b) the suppression was
not willful;
(c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Disputable Presumptions: Metrobank vs. CA
Suppression of Testimony
Disputable Presumptions: De los Santos vs. COA Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the
Official Duty performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For
instance, in Reyna v. CoA (Reyna), 642 SCRA 210 (2011), the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein,
notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the
Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations.
Disputable Presumptions: People vs. Candidia In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
Official Duty prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the

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sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the
direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not.

The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is discharged when the arresting law enforcer
ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
defines the chain of custody as: b. “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody [was] of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody made in the course of safekeeping and use
in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

As to noncompliance of all the requirements laid down by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
regarding the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 states that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds
shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items as long as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. What is important is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The successful presentation of the prosecution of every link of chain of custody as discussed above
is sufficient to hold the accused liable for the offense charged.
Disputable Presumptions: People vs. Edualino Moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The court has ruled that
Cohabitation prostitutes can be the victims of rape.

Person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.

Medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisites in prosecution for rape.


Order of Presentation of People vs. Fabre In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else
Evidence when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is young and still immature, deserves faith
and credence for it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to invent a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself and her family to the trauma of a public trial unless she
indeed has spoken the truth. Most especially, a daughter would not accuse her own father of such a serious offense or allow
herself to be perverted if she were not truly motivated by a desire to seek a just retribution for a violation brazenly
committed against her.

The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-
examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against
whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence
theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon.
Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because
he is not cross-examined by the other party.
Leading and Misleading People vs. Perez
Questions
Impeachment People vs. Castellano
Reference to Memorandum People vs. Plasencia The initial assessment on the testimony of a witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard

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notwithstanding that the presiding judge who pens the decision is not the one who personally may have heard the
testimony. The reliance on the transcript of stenographic notes should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject
to challenge. The continuity of the court and the efficacy of its decision are not affected by the cessation from the service of
the judge presiding it or by the fact that its writer merely took over from a colleague who presided at the trial.

The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of
Court states: “Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum.—A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or
immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly
written or recorded;but in such casethe writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who
may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such
a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.” (Italics supplied.) Allowing a
witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.
Reference to Memorandum Canque vs. CA The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

“What a man has actually done and committed to writing when under obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the
business he has undertaken, and he being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court.”
The person who may be called to court to testify on these entries being dead, there arises the necessity of their admission
without the one who made them being called to court be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. And this is permissible
in order to prevent a failure of justice.
Classes of documents Iwasawa vs. Gangan As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness;
Not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.

This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning.
Classes of documents Asian Terminals vs. Philam Insurance The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court.
Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no
further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing,
deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by
which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document,
or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically:

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(a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party;
(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or
(d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Offer of Evidence Aludos vs. Suerte Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.
Offer of Evidence Westmont Investment Corporation vs. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and
Francia, Jr. strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.

It is elementary that objection to evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered.
Tender of Excluded Evidence Fortune Tobacco Corp vs. Com of Int. Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Rev. Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. - If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may
have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

The rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's offered
documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to form part of the records of the
case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness
and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence
and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his appeal
assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt People vs. Caliso In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender like the crime itself must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal,
for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the
criminal beyond reasonable doubt.

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from
an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy
circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the
accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 (2000), to
wit:
(a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and
(b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the
crime.

A witness’ familiarity with the accused although accepted as basis for a positive identification does not always pass the test
of moral certainly due to the possibility of mistake.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome and he is entitled to an acquittal though his innocence may
be doubted. The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the
Prosecution.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt People vs. Patentes The time–honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge,

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observation and common experience of man.18 Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge,
observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles:


(1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent;
(2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that
the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution.
Clear and Convincing Evidence Supreme Court vs. Delgado
Clear and Convincing Evidence Govt of Hongkong Special Admin An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
Region vs. Olalia proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard
which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”
Clear and Convincing Evidence People vs. Fontanilla It is settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or
established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a
priest or minister. a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping of the
offended woman, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have been used if employed, has not been proved
(U.S. v. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the
persons enume rated in Art. 337 is constitutive of the crime of qualified Seduction x x even though no deceit intervenes or
even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin be cause in such a case, the law takes for the
existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple
seduc tion x x x taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence on
which implies fraud (U.S. v. Santiago, 41 Phil. 787).
Preponderance of Evidence PCIB vs. Balmaceda In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence
which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition. This Court, in Encinas v. National
Bookstore, Inc., 443 SCRA 293 (2004), defined “preponderance of evidence” in the following manner: Preponderance of
evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant,
who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to
the overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative
defense is one that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if
established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the claim.

Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be

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entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance
of evidence as defined must be established to achieve this result.
Preponderance of Evidence De la Llana vs. Biong It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence40 except in very unusual circumstance that is not
found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
Preponderance of Evidence Canlao vs. People
Substantial Evidence Office of the Ombudsman vs. Reyes Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary
to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
Substantial Evidence Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank
Prima Facie Evidence Lucas vs. Lucas
Probable Cause PNB vs. Tria While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for
the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such authority is far from absolute. It may be subject to review
when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion.

It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is probable cause to
believe that he is guilty of the crime charged.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable Cause Del Castillo vs. People The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a
flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant

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is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis
means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
Circumstantial Evidence People vs. Anticamara Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact
may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(c) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(d) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator.

Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the
other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when
it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received
with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and
concocted. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-
motive to testify against the appellants.
Circumstantial Evidence People vs. Deocampo
Circumstantial Evidence Celedonio vs. People Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as
the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant's participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial
evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be convicted.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:


1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

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