MACY
CASE NO. 1 (IPRA) claiming they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over
Carino v Insular Government
FACTS: The applicant and plaintiff Mateo Carino is an Igorot of the province of
Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the treaty of Paris, and
as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as
owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for
the holding of cattle. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he
had inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom.
No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in
1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal
decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it. In 1901 the plaintiff filed a
petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered
to him, establishing only a possessory title. Even if the applicant have title, he cannot
have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's act No. 926, of 1903, excepts
the province of Benguet from its operation. But that act deals with the acquisition of
new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun
under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is
entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's act No. 496, of 1902, which
established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction 'throughout the Philippine
archipelago,'
ISSUE: WON The plaintiff owns the land
RULING: Yes. The plaintiff is entitled to the registration of the land. The land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have
been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the
Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Under the
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall
be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, 30. Thus, Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at
any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Every native who had
not a paper title is not a trespasser. There must be a presumption against the
government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went so
far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.
Case No. 4
Cruz v. Sec of Environment and Natural Resources
GR No. 135385
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Indigenous People Republic Act
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources as it
broadens the scope of the ancestral domains and Petitioners also content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas violate the
rights of private landowners.
Issue: W/N contentions are valid
Ruling: Dismissed. Votes were divided equally
Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 837.
The term "ancestral lands" under the statute refers to lands occupied by individuals,
families and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities, including
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
These lands are required to have been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or
through their ancestors "since time immemorial, continuously to the present”. On
the other hand, "ancestral domains" is defined as areas generally belonging to
indigenous cultural communities, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and lands no
longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural communities but to which they
had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of indigenous cultural
communities who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also
include inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein. Again, the same
are required to have been "held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present". Under Section 56, property
rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of
said law "shall be recognized and respected." It bears stressing that a statute should
be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the fundamental law. The
reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted within
its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts
should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible,
and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
Important notes that can be found in the book in case tanungin ni atty:
Kapunan:
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular
Government, it institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to
land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
Puno:
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities
or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership
given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its
origin to native title.
Vitug:
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular
Government,13 holding that a parcel of land held since time immemorial by
individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed never to have been public
land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override
the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that
sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates. 14 It is
not then for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the
fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign
act that must, between them, stand inviolate.
TARADJI
Case No. 3
Secretary of DENR vs Yap
G.R. No. 167707 & 173775
FACTS:
The case is about the right of the present occupants of Boracay to secure titles over
their occupied lands.
Petition 1: Petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision affirming RTC
decision granting the petition for declaratory relief filed by Yap and ordered
the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
Petition 2: Petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of
Proclamation No. 10654 issued by Pres. Arroyo classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.
G.R. No. 167707
On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among others, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). Mayor Yap, et al. filed a
petition for declaratory relief with RTC-Kalibo claiming that said proclamation and
the corresponding circular implementing the same precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes. They claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. That they declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes
thereon. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain which formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest”
and not available for disposition hence, whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership. The trial court upheld respondents-claimants’ right citing Section 87
and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands
in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of
the forest reserve.
G. R. No. 173775
During pendency of 167707, Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioners (landowners) filed a petition
for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of the said proclamation alleging that it
infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay which they have been
in continued possession since time immemorial. Petitioners-claimants contended
that being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 (known
as the first Public Land Act) and no need for proclamation classifying the same into
Agricultural land. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required
period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. OSG argued that
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705.
Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
ISSUE:
Whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay.
RULING:
NO.
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under any of the classification provided
under the Constitution (agricultural, forest or timber, national parks). Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. *SC here discussed Regalian
Doctrine and the legislative history exactly the same sa discussion sa book. Please
refer na lang sa Chapter 1* A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable
is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. Incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. In the case at
bar, no proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing
that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Absent such, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership.
Hence, they may apply for a title in their name. Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the
friar lands. Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. PD No.
705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass
of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not." Even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of
Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed
the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest,
or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each. The proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not
address the areas’ alienability.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Classification of public lands
is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President. Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. Contrary to private claimants’
argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about
the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No.
1064.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands
under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12,
1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes
that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. Where
the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. Neither may private claimants
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with
respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants
failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
Case No. 4
Republic v. Naguiat
FACTS
Celestina Naguiat filed for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land
located in Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of the said parcels of land
having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation; which likewise acquired
the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty actually looks like. When appropriate, the declassification of forest and mineral lands,
(30) years; and that the said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an
kind. Petitioner filed an opposition on the ground that neither the applicant nor her express and positive act from the government.
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands
applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed
of, and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. Republic faults
the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondent’s occupation of
the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the
fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified
from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE
Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of
forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain

RULING
No. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title. Respondent never
presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. Aside
from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical
descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information
respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain. In said cases, the disposable and
alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not
put in issue.

MAIN POINT
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive