Corey Porterfield

Treyvon Harlin
Summer Shi
EA 7780 Education Law
Mr. Kevin Sutton

Supreme Court Case

The Supreme Court decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista presents the troubling scenario of a

sexual relationship between a student and a teacher. Spring of 1991, petitioner Alida Gebser

joined a book discussion group, led by Frank Waldrop, teacher at Lago Vista High School.

During discussions, Waldrop often made sexually suggestive comments to students.

Fall 1991, Gebser entered high school and had classes taught by Waldrop in both semesters.

Inappropriate comments continued by Waldrop and more suggestive comments toward Gebser.

Spring 1992, Waldrop visited the home of Gebser to give her a book. While he was there he

kissed and fondled her. Waldrop and Gebser had sexual intercourse on a number of occasions

during the remainder of the school year. This continued into the summer and into the following

school year. The two of them had sex during class time, never on school property. Gebser never

reported to school officials. She said that she realized Waldrop’s conduct was improper, she

was uncertain how to react and she wanted to continue to have him as a teacher.

October 1992, two parents complained to high school principal about Waldrop’s

inappropriate comments to class. The principal had a meeting with Waldrop, during the meeting

Waldop indicated that he did not believe he made any offensive remarks, but he would

apologize to the parents and said that it would not happen again. The principal told counselor

about meeting with Waldrop, but did not inform superintendent.

January 1993, police discovered Waldrop and Gebser engaging in sexual intercourse and

arrested Waldop. Lago Vista terminated his employment and Texas Education Agency revoked
his teacher’s license. District did not promulgate or distributed an official grievance procedure

for lodging sexual harassment complaint; nor had it issued a formal anti-harassment policy.

November 1993, Gebser and mother filed suit against Lago Vista and Waldrop. Raising

claims against the school district under Title IX and the state negligence law. They both sought

compensatory and punitive damages from both defendants.

When a district may be held liable in damages in an implied right of action under Title IX

of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373 amended. (Title IX), for the sexual

harassment of a student by one of the district’s teachers.

In 1992, parents complained about teacher’s comments, but the damages claim wasn’t

upheld because the supervisor wasn’t aware of sexual conduct. In 1997, insufficient evidence

was administered to prove sexual misconduct under title IX, but the idea of title VII emerged

as a way to address the suit. Meanwhile, an agent of the school was aware, but not the

supervising agent. Under title VII monetary damages could suffice, but under title IX the

supervising agent must have been aware in order to impact governmental funds. The

supervising party was not informed of the student- teacher relations.

In 2001, title IX is judicially implied, the court has a measure of latitude to use its own

judgement in shaping remedial schemes. Congress amendment to title IX would eliminate the

states 11th amendment immunity. In 2007, title IX governance have been instructed by the

Secretary of Education to install procedures for “prompt and equitable resolution” of

complaints specifically referred to sexual harassment under the civil rights code of 1972.

While appealing to the Supreme Court, Gebser argued that the 1997 "Policy Guidance"

document issued by the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education (OCR)
states that school districts may be held liable for monetary damages when a teacher is aided in

carrying out the sexual harassment of a student because of his or her position of authority with

the school district, regardless whether district officials had any knowledge of the harassment,

and irrespective of the district's response once the harassment is discovered. Gebser also argued

that, at a minimum, a school district should be liable for damages when the district knew or

"should have known" about the harassment but failed to discover and address it. Finally, Gebser

alleged that the District should be held liable for damages based on its failure to promulgate

and publicize a sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure.

However, the Supreme Court rejected all of Gebser's arguments, determining that it would

frustrate the purpose of Title IX to permit an award of monetary damages when an appropriate

official did not have actual notice of the harassment. An appropriate official is defined by Title

IX as an official of the school district who has the authority to take corrective action to end the

discrimination. Accordingly, the Court found that a private claim for damages under Title IX

is only available when a school district official who has the authority to institute corrective

measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of the discrimination, and then fails to

respond in an adequate manner. The Court further noted that for a school district response to

be judged inadequate, it must amount to "deliberate indifference" to the discrimination.

Thereafter the question of “when can monetary damages be collected under title IX as title

VII cases started to become settled with compensatory conclusions. The issue was that title VII

was a civil suit and funds did not involve the governmental sector, nor did they have

governmental protections. Title VII also wasn’t amended to include returns for damages until

1991, while the title IX was never inclusive of punitive damages outside of the knowing of
supervising agents. The comparison between the two foiled down to the fact that title VII aims

to compensate centrally for discrimination, while title IX focuses on “protecting” individuals

from discriminatory practices carried out by federally funded institutions. Which ultimately

leaves title IX as a judicial decision as to “were all of the components in title IX satisfied to the

extent of compulsory punishment?” Thus concluding the courts have the “measure of latitude”

to use its judgment in deciding under title IX.

In the Franklin case the idea of common law was enacted to try to amend title IX as to

where in a case of a supervisor sexually discriminating against a teacher, damages could be

collected, the same should be enacted towards a teacher sexually discriminating against

students. The underlying issue with this is that the supervising agent will be inevitably aware

in one as opposed to the other. Title IX is explicit to the supervising agent knowing and was

not designed for the victim to receive monetary damages in return via claims of violation.

In 2007, defense for the victims the Courts policy ranks protection of the school district's

purse above the protection of immature high school students that those rules would provide.

Because those students are members of the class for whose special benefit Congress enacted

Title IX, that policy choice is not faithful to the intent of the policymaking branch of our

Government. Therefore, they will hear the victims out, but unless the victim reported the

wrongdoing and/ or wrongdoing was reported, the title IX claims will not rule in favorable to

damages. There has to be administrative notice and disciplinary discourse that takes place, if

nothing is violated then damages will not be collected nor will funds be extracted from an

educational institution.