Dawn Janelle O.

Manzano

People of the Philippines vs. Silvino Salarza, Jr.

Facts of the Case:

Silvino Salarza, Jr. was sentenced to death for the charge of rape filed
against him by Zareen Smith, a British national. Complainant was on vacation
with her lover, Enrico de Jesus in Palawan, where he introduced her to his friend,
the accused. On the night of the incident, the accused made his way to Smith’s
cottage where he removed her underwear and placed himself on top of her and
commenced sexual intercourse. The complainant made no move to stop him
because she thought he was de Jesus, her lover. It was only when the accused
spoke and said “Zareen, it’s not Ricky, it’s Jun. I love you,” that the complainant
recognized he was not de Jesus and she pushed him away and proceeded to
scream and call for help.

The accused claims that the complainant was the one flirting with him and
that she expected him at her cottage that night and insisted that he take a
shower in the bathroom there instead of the public one outside. He also claimed
that Smith kissed him and when he tried to stop her, that was when she
pretended that she was being raped and asked for help.

The lower court convicted the accused on the basis that it could not believe his
claims that the complainant would flirt with him given that de Jesus is younger,
taller, and better endowed physically. They sentenced him to death, hence the
appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether or not Salarza is guilty of the crime of rape.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court acquitted Salarza because the facts contained in the
information did not constitute the crime of rape. Under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659, rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) by
using force or intimidation; (b) when the woman is deprived of reason or

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otherwise unconscious; and, (c) when the woman is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented. The facts of this case do not show the existence of any of
these circumstances. Nothing in the evidence say that Salarza used force or
intimidation on her. Salarza did nothing to dupe Smith into thinking that he was
de Jesus and so the mistake was entirely Smith’s fault. Salarza also did not
deprive Smith of reason or that she was unconscious because she said she
woke up to find someone removing her underwear.

Francisco, J., Concurring Opinion:

Smith’s tale of rape is unconvincing. It makes no sense for Salarza to

stealthily accomplish penetration then reveal his identity. Smith’s reaction of
washing herself and talking to Salarza also makes no sense because a victim
would instinctively flee her attacker. Her reaction was too casual.

Regalado, J., Dissenting Opinion:

The peculiarity in the accused’s denial of raping the complainant is he also

says that if in case he did molest the complainant, it would not be rape because
she would have wanted it also because she was flirting with him. Legally and
logically, the complainant would have no reason to put false charges of a heinous
crime like rape against the accused. The accused’s explanation is both bizarre
and melodramatic. The complainant’s reactions are consistent with that of a
woman whose virtue was violated. A comparison of both accounts of both parties
will show which one is fabricated and which one is true.

Davide, J., Jr., Dissenting Opinion:

The testimony of the complainant is very credible. It is natural, simple,

straightforward, convincing and consistent with human nature and the run of
things in this world. She lost no time in taking appropriate action. The incident
was duly reported and accordingly entered in the blotter. This is a natural
reaction of any aggrieved party. She made loud cries, shouts and screams
immediately after the accused sexually abused her. These are proofs enough
that show that she did not like what the accused did to her. The complainant
being sexually active with her boyfriend should also not be taken against her.

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 Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC and Cirilo Roy Montejo

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for

the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial
Election Supervisor. She indicated 7 months in the period of residency preceding
the election which was less that the required time in the Constitution which is one
year. Montejo who is a candidate for the same position, filed for a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC because Marcos did not
meet the one year residency requirement. She then amended her application to
say “since childhood” instead of seven months. She explained in her Answer that
her initial answer was an “honest misinterpretation” which she sought to rectify by
adding the words “since childhood”. COMELEC disqualified the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner is considered a resident of the First District of

Leyte for election purposes for a period of one year.

Rulings:

The Court ruled that in election law, residence is synonymous with

domicile. Domicile, in jurisprudence, is interpreted as one’s “permanent home”.
Domicile includes the two elements of physical presence and the intent to return.
The Petitioner’s domicile of origin was Tacloban and did not lose it even after her
marriage to Mr. Marcos. After the entry of “seven months” as an honest mistake.
The COMELEC was wrong in disqualifying the Petitioner.

Romero, J., Separate Opinion:

Widow like the Petitioner cannot be bound by the domicile of the husband.
She may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin, or in this case, she reverts back
to her domicile of origin. Petitioner demonstrated by overt acts that she intends to
reestablish Tacloban as her domicile of origin.

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Puno, J., Concurring Opinion:

Petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her

husband in 1989. Petitioner’s erroneous Certificate of Candidacy cannot be used
as evidence against ther. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We
cannot frustrate this sovereign will on arguable technical considerations.

Francisco, J., Concurring Opinion:

In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence, it means

domicile. COMELEC misapplied the concept of domicile which led to Petitioner’s
disqualification. Petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban upon her
husband’s death.

Padilla, J., Dissenting Opinion:

The one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the
term “residence” is to be synonymous with “domicile”. The candidate’s intent and
actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental law because of the definite Constitutional purpose
of requiring the person to be familiar with the environment and problems of a
district if he intends to represent in Congress.

Regalado, J., Dissenting Opinion:

When Petitioner acquired her husband’s residence in Ilocos, it is the law

that declares where petitioner’s domicile is and not her helf-serving intent to hold
onto her former domicile. Petitioner did not automatically reacquire her domicile
of origin in Tacloban.

Davide, Jr., J., Dissenting Opinion:

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 Petitioner’s claim that she never intended to abandon her domicile in
Tacloban City is self-serving. Petitioner is presumed to have retained her
deceased husband’s domicile.

Vitug, J., Separate Opinion:

Not convinced that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

disqualifying the Petitioner. The Court should refrain from any undue
encroachment on the exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals which are
their exclusive domain by virtue of the constitution.

Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion:

For me the issue of this case is whether or not the COMELEC has the
power to disqualify a candidate on the ground of ineligibility. The declaration of
ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or an action
for quo warranto. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this case and the eligibility
of the Petitioner may only be inquired into by the HRET.

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 Carmen LL. Intengan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

Facts:

Citibank filed a complaint for violation of section 31, in relation to section

144 of the Corporation Code against two (2) of its officers, Dante L. Santos and
Marilou Genuino for their alleged highly anomalous activities wherein they
convince Citibank clients to transfer their monies to accounts with Torrance
Global Corporation and Global Pacific Corporation and wherein they are
compensated handsomely for this. The clients they assisted with such are
Carmen Intengan, Rosario Neri, and Rita Brawner. During the pendency of the
case, the US dollar deposit account details of the said clients were revealed
without their permission. Hence, they filed this complaint for violation of the Bank
Secrecy Law against the respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the disclosure of the bank records of the Petitioners violate
the Bank Secrecy Law

Ruling:

The parties of the case overlooked the important fact that the subject
accounts are US dollar deposit accounts and thus is not covered by the Bank
Secrecy Law -- it is instead covered by the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the
Philippines. Under said law, there is only one instance under which details of a
foreign currency deposit account can be disclosed, and that is with the written
permission of the owners of such account. Had the proper case been filed
against the respondents, the petition would be granted. However, given that the
period to file had already prescribed, even if the Court allows the petitioners to
file the proper case, prescription has already barred them from such.

The petition is dismissed.

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 Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, et al.

Facts:

Greg Bartelli, a foreign national, abducted 12 year old Karen Salvacion

and held her hostage for four days and raped her repeatedly. Karen was rescued
with the help of the neighbors and the police. Greg was thereafter arrested and
found guilty of Serious Illegal Detention and Rape. Greg had dollar accounts with
Chinabanking Corporation and the court ordered the publication of the decision
and petitioners tried to execute on the accounts with Chinabanking Corporation.
Thus, Petitioners file this petition. They ask the court to declare Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
which makes foreign accounts exempt from attachment or garnishment from any
government agency, unconstitutional so that they may execute the judgment of
award of damages on Greg’s Chinabank accounts.

Issue:

Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act which makes foreign accounts exempt from
attachment or garnishment from any government agency, be made applicable to
a foreign transient?

Ruling:

The Court partly grants the petition. This questioned law, therefore makes
futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents
fully deserve. It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at
a time when the country’s economy was in a shambles; when foreign
investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute
was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has
recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The
provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to be inapplicable to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances.

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 Ruben Del Castillo vs People of the Philippines

Facts:

Police officers were tipped that Del Castillo was selling shabu so they
conducted a test-buy operation at his house. They were able to secure a search
warrant thereafter. SPO3 Masnayon and other officers went back to the house to
implement the warrant but someone shouted “raid” and they saw Del Castillo
allegedly run out of the house and into a nipa hut a few meters away from the
residence. They chased after him. The barangay tanods who were with the police
searched the nipa hut and found 4 sachets of crystalline substance that they
suspected to be shabu.

The substance tested positive as shabu and an information was filed

against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425. He was
subsequently found guilty by the RTC. He contends however that the evidence
collected was fruit of the poisonous tree as the nipa hut was not part of the
places indicated in the warrant to be searched.

Issue:

Whether or not the four sachets of shabu should be admissible as

evidence and whether or not Del Castillo is guilty of violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425.

Ruling:

The accused is acquitted. The records are void of any evidence to show
that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used
the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that
petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion
and the character of the drugs. The prosecution failed to prove that the nipa hut
was under petitioner’s control and dominion, hence there is reasonable doubt as

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to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own
starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions,
he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.