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RULES ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS - A.M. NO.

004-07-SC, 15 December 2000

People v. Baring Jr.


G.R. No. 137933
January 28, 2002

FACTS:

Valentin Baring, Jr. was indicated for statutory rape against a 7 yrs. Old girl. He pleaded not guilty. Jennifer
Donayre was left under her grandmother when she was only 8 months until she was 7yrs old. Baring was the
common-law-husband of her grandmother. Thus, Jennifer calls Baring as papa. According to Jennifer, the repeated
sexual abuse happened when she was about 6 years old whenever she was left alone in the house. Baring would
touch her private parts, and on such occasions, and would remove her panty, mount on her and violate her. When the
mother of Jennifer found out about the sexual abused, they went to the NBI and filed a complaint. he medico-legal
officer found that Jennifer was in non-virgin state physically. The external vaginal orifice admits tip of the
examiners smallest finger. During the Jennifer’s testimony, she identified and pin point Valentin as theone who
abused her. The RTC convicted Baring and sentenced him to death by lethal injection. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the medico-legal certificate is indispensable to provevictim’s testimony thatshe was raped

RULING:

NO. A medical certificate is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. Medical examination of the victim
is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as thevictim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient
toconvict the accused of the crime.Testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible, and the
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit.

The court adopted theRule on Examination of a Child Witness to govern the examination of child witnesses who
may either be victims, accused or witnesses to a crime. This rule ensures an environment that allows children to give
reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate
the ascertainment of truth. Forensic examination inclusive of physical examination and forensic interview of
sexually assaulted children [adolescents included] must be conducted withmaximum sensitivity to the young
victim’s feelings of vulnerability and embarrassment. The value of collecting evidence should always be weighed
against the emotional cost of the procedure and examination of the child.

GENIL V JUDGE RIVERA


A.M. No. MTJ-06-1619
January 23, 2006

Facts:
Nancy Silfaban, a minor, filed two criminal complaints against Roderick Sales for rape and forcible abduction with
rape.

Respondent conducted a criminal investigation two and a half months later which preliminary investigation was
made in open court. Nancy was called to the witness stand and was subjected to humiliation since all those present
were laughing.
Complainant requested a change of venue. Respondent explained that the preliminary investigation was not
immediately conducted as the evidence was weak and unbelievable. He claimed that not only did Nancy not request
otherwise; she, albeit a minor, looks energetic, psychologically mature and somewhat aggressive who answers
questions quickly, and there was nothing in her affidavit or testimony which warranted the exclusion of the public
from the proceedings.

Respondent disclaimed the occurrence of any laughing incident during the preliminary investigation, he adding that
all were eager to observe the proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not Rivera should be penalized for gross ignorance of the law

Held:
Yes. The Rule on Execution of a Child Witness provides that when a child testifies, the court may, motuproprio,
order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons who do not have a direct interest in the case.

In issuing such order, the court is to consider, inter alia, the developmental level of the child, the nature of the crime,
and the nature of his testimony regarding the crime. It may also exclude the public from the courtroom if the
evidence to be produced is of such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals.

The criminal complaints of Nancy were filed on May 30, 2003 before the MTC, it was only on August 13, 2003 or
after two and a half months that respondent conducted the preliminary investigations. And, per the Investigation
Report of Judge Velasco, as of October 16, 2003 or more than four months after Criminal Case was filed, no action
had yet been taken thereon by respondent.

By respondents admission, as of August 13, 2004 or more than a year after the criminal complaints were filed and
exactly a year after the preliminary investigation for Criminal Case Nos. 3791 and 3792 was conducted, his
resolutions thereon had yet to be transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental,
Dumaguete City.
As the above-quoted provisions of the Rules direct, after a preliminary investigation is conducted, the investigating
judge must perform his ministerial duty to transmit within ten days after the conclusion thereof the resolution of the
case together with the entire records to the provincial prosecutor. If on the other hand he determines, after examining
the complaint and other documents offered in support thereof, that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry,
he should dismiss the complaint and transmit the order of dismissal together with the records of the case to the
provincial prosecutor within ten days from the filing of the complaint. And, examination or cross-examination by
the parties is proscribed. Yet respondent not only allowed SPO4 Cadungog who acted as prosecutor to cross-
examine the accused Roderick Sales; he also allowed the defense counsel to propound questions to Nancy and her
mother.

Indubitably then, respondent was remiss in the performance of his duties when he not only allowed the cross-
examination of the parties during the preliminary investigation but also failed to resolve the criminal complaints
within the period mandated by law.
Tacorda v. Judge Clemens

FACTS:

 Case filed by Atty. Jerome Norman Labor Tacorda (Atty. Tacorda) charging Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens
(Judge Clemens for gross ignorance of the law and alleged violation of the Child Witness Examination
Rule.

 Atty. Tacorda claimed that, he presented OdelGedraga (Gedraga) as witness, then fifteen (15) years old, in
Criminal Case pending before the sala of respondent Judge Clemens. The criminal case involved the
alleged murder of BeinvinidoGedraga, Gedraga ‘s father.

 Atty. Tacorda alleged that the Child Witness Examination Rule was not properly followed by Judge
Clemens, based on the following events that had transpired during the trial
1. The trial in open court when Gedraga was presented lasted from 8:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.,
with only a two-minute break.
2. In the course of the proceedings Judge Clemens made certain rulings that were not
implemented.
3. Atty. Tacorda claimed that despite his manifestation to let the official interpreter personally
interpret the questions and answers, Judge Clemens remained passive on so many occasions.
Thus, it was Atty. Mijares who also did the interpretations.
 Judge Clemens belied the allegations of Atty. Tacorda as having no basis. He claimed:
1. He did not know that allowing Gedraga to testify from 8:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. with only a
two-minute break was a violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. With respect to the
two-minute break, it was actually lasted 10 minutes.
2. He denied letting Atty. Mijares and the court interpreter surround Gedraga. Respondent judge
cited the TSN:
Atty. Jerome Tacorda: Your Honor please, may I ask the Court that the Interpreter as well
as the defense counsel will not surround the witness. The public is entitled to see the
demeanor of the witness and in accordance with the Court procedure specially that this
is a child witness. The defense counsel will maintain a distance because there might be
an intimidation, your Honor.

Court: All right, do not surround the witness.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda: Thank you, your Honor, for the wisdom of the court.

Atty. Allan Mijares: Your Honor, I would like to make my manifestation that from the view
point of the public, the----(Interrupted)I am making my manifestation, your honor.
The child was not being surrounded, in fact, everyone was supposedly facing the
public and he was not intimidated, he was being aided.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda: There is already a ruling, your Honor.

Atty. Allan Mijares: And the intention is to aid and not to intimidate.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda: Your Honor, that is the intention, but my concern is the ruling of the
court.

Court: Anyway, do not cover the witness.

Atty. Alan Mijares: Anyway, we submit your honor.Based on the foregoing, Judge
Clemens claimed that he did not violate the Child Witness Examination Rule because,
the demand of Atty. Tacorda was granted. If this accusation were true, the latter could
have asked the Court to hold Atty. Mijares in contempt of court for violating the order
not to surround the witness, but complainant did not.

Judge Clemens further explained that it was not true that he let Atty. Mijares do the
interpretation. Allegedly, when Atty. Tacorda made a manifestation to that effect,
respondent Judge immediately took appropriate action, as indicated by the TSN:3

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:Your Honor, we request to read back the transcript your Honor, and
not seek the statement from the defense counsel, since he already closed his question
your Honor.

Court:Never mind, anyway you continue.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:May I move for the record, your honor, but my purpose is in
consonance with the Supreme Court Circular that in case there is a question as to the
presentation--- (Interrupted)

Atty. Allan Mijares:Actually there is no question on the statement being interpreted, only
that the interpreter has a hard time interpreting the statement in tagalog.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:Your honor, our point is the court of record. What is more important
that there is the official stenographer and with this kind of machinery that it be
recorded officially in accordance with hierarchy in the plantilla of the Supreme Court.

Court:Overruled, you continue your interpretation, we are wasting our time, there are other
cases to be tried.

Continue, by the way, Rhea, do not ask the defense counsel, you interpret because that is
your duty.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:I pray your honor, that the statement of the judge be duly recorded to
inform the interpreter about her duty and not to ask the defense counsel about the
interpretation because it is her duty.

Atty. Allan Mijares:Your Honor, we only have good intentions here. This representation
and was just observed by the court that I’m just trying to aid here because apparently
there is an apparent lapse of memory, so we are trying to lead only, your honor.

3. Judge Clemens refused to accept any fault as to the duration of the examination. He explained
that Atty. Tacorda conducted a very long direct examination of the witness. When respondent
judge noticed that this proceeding was taking too long, he granted the motion for
postponement. He cited the TSN. (the TSN showed that respondent Judge was very much
concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day
Examination of Witness Rule was followed;but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact
that the witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three hours.)

OCA: charges for gross ignorance of the law against Judge Clemens be dismissed. The OCA found that, aside from
bare allegations, no other proof was adduced by Atty. Tacorda to substantiate his claims.

ISSUE

Whether Judge Clemens is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for supposedly violating the Child
Witness Examination Rule.
RULING:

We sustain the findings of the OCA that the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad
faith as to justify any administrative liability on his part.8 A complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was vigilant
in his conduct of the proceedings.9 In the instances mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to
the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch.

It is doubtful that Judge Clemens failed to implement the directives he had issued during the conduct of the trial.
Based on the TSN, Atty. Tacorda did not have to make repeated manifestations to respondent Judge after pointing
out that the defense counsel tended to crowd the witness and/or that the court interpreter should be the one to
translate the testimony.

Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that respondent Judge was very much
concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination of Witness Rule
was followed;10 but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness was already exhausted, having
testified for almost three hours.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs IBANES


G.R. NO. 197813
September 25, 2013

FACTS:
Edwin Ibanes and Alfredo Nulla were charged with the crime of murder together with Jesus Montisillo for the
killing of one Wilfredo Atendido by assaulting and hitting the latter with a soil digger (bareta) on August 29, 2004.
Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty during arraignment, while Jesus remained at large. The case against Jesus was
archived.

The prosecution’s version was testified to by the victim’s wife and daughter, in succession.
o Wilfredo’s daughter Rachel (at that time was an adolescent) testified that on August 29, 2004, her
father was invited by Alfredo to have drinking session with Jesus and Edwin. While she was three
meters away from the place where the drinking session was, Rachel saw her father step away from
the group to urinate. But when Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby
clothesline and covered the head and face of Wilfredo. Wilfredo was attacked by Edwin and
Alfredo boxed the left side of the victim’s chest.
o The victim’s wife, Rowena, testified that on that same day, she heard a commotion coming from
the neighboring house and when she went to check, she saw his husband on the ground covered
with blood on his face and forehead. She also saw Jesus standing one meter away from Wilfredo,
holding an iron bar and beside him were Edwin and Alfredo. Jesus and Alfredo ran away while
Edwin went home.

2. For their defense, Edwin and Alfredo proffered a different version of the incident.
o They proclaimed their innocence saying that they were in the scene of the crime only because of
curiosity. They also pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit.
o Allegedly, when they heard about the commotion, they were having their regular drinking session
at Edwin’s house. And when they approached to see the incident, they saw Wilfredo prostrate on
the ground while Jesus was holding an iron bar and was being held back by his sister who was
shouting “Tamana! Tamana!” Then they called for a tricycle and brought the victim to the
hospital.
o AnicetaDosil corroborated the claim of innocence of Edwin and Alfredo. According to Aniceta,
she was with Rachel at the date of the incident since Rachel helped her in selling doormats. When
they finished at around 6pm, they headed to their respective homes. Aniceta testified that upon
reaching their vicinity, she witnessed the immediate aftermath of the purported fight between
Jesus and Wilfredo. Jesus was being embraced by his sister Marilou.
o Marilou told Aniceta that Jesus hit Wilfredo with an iron bar as a preemptive move because
Wilfredo was about to stab Jesus.
o While Marilou and Aniceta discussed the incident, Rachel was listening. Afraid to get involved,
Aniceta ran to her house and did not step out neither did she volunteer information to the police.
She only testified at the request of Edwin’s wife.

Ewin and Alfredo were convicted of murder by the trial court. The CA affirmed this decision in toto.Both lower
courts found the testimony of Rachel credible for:
“it flows from a person who was present in the place where the killing occurred. They are replete with
details sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to appellants…. Rachel’s testimony was delivered in a firm,
candid, and straightforward manner. There is no showing that Rachel wavered from the basic facts of her
testimony, even when she was subjected to a rigorous examination.”
“Rachel was only ten (10) years old when she witnessed the murder of the victim. She testified in open
court two (2) years later. Thus, she cannot be expected to give an error free narration of the events that
happened two years earlier. The alleged inconsistencies between her sworn statement and testimony
referred to by appellants do not affect her credibility. What is important is that in all her narrations she
consistently and clearly identified appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Inconsistencies between the
sworn statement and the testimony in court do not militate against witness’ credibility since sworn
statements are generally considered inferior to the testimony in open court.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Rachel is credible despite the claim of Aniceta that Rachel could not have
witnessed the crime as she was with her during that time

RULING:
Yes. The Court have scrutinized the testimony of lone eyewitness, Rachel. Throughout her testimony, in
her direct, cross and re-direct and re-cross examinations, she candidly recounted the events surrounding the killing
of her father. As the lower courts have done, the Supreme Court accords full faith and credence to Rachel’s
testimony. She was young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was categorical, without wavering. It
has no markings of a concocted story, impressed upon her by other people.

The defense tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a mere child who had
studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read and did not know how to tell time. The
Court cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident
and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of
testifying and of relating the incident truthfully.

With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the
ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to
tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a
child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no
weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.

It was likewise noted that the line of questioning of the defense during cross-examination on the
competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how her father was attacked by
accused-appellants. From her position underneath the house of her “KuyaUnyo,” she saw her father, Wilfredo,
attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was astonished as the happening unfolded, her ability to perceive,
remember, and make known her perception was not diminished.

As regards Aniceta’s version of the events that Jesus was the sole perpetrator of the crime who attacked
Wilfredo only in self-defense, there was fatal flaw: Aniceta arrived after the supposed fight between Wilfredo and
Jesus, and what transpired was merely relayed to her by Jesus’ sister, Marilou. Quite apparent from Aniceta’s
narration of events is that she has no personal knowledge of Wilfredo’s killing. Aniceta’s testimony is mainly
hearsay, specially on the purported fight between Wilfredo and Jesus that ended in Wilfredo’s death. Aniceta’s
testimony as such carries no probative weight. At best, Aniceta’s testimony is an independent relevant statement:
offered only as to the fact of its declaration and the substance of what had been relayed to Aniceta by Marilou, not as
to the truth thereof.

People of the Philppines vs. Alvin Esugon


G.R. No. 195244
June 22, 2015

FACTS:

Carl, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche,
and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw the accused entered their house
and stab her mother with a knife, while he peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor,
there was light upstairs. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one
who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s pocket. He
likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light Upon being asked by the
trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw
since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway. In turn the accused
denied the accusation.

ISSUE:

WON the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was credible and
competent

RULING:

Yes. Anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such
awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any
of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is
apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law are not grounds for disqualification.

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To
rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motuproprio or on motion of a party,
conduct a competency examination of a child.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court. All questions bearing
on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by virtue of its unique position to observe the
crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment while testifying, something which is
denied to the appellate court because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique
advantage of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the witnesses.
Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on
appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion,
like when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing
court is generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has
concurred with the trial court.

The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to
challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his
perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution
terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination.
All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge
his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court.
Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.

The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not disputed.
However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the
principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral
matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate
the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help upon
witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he could not
be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult. Although children have different levels of
intelligence and different degrees of perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to
communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and
should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the
trial court.

It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of the trial bare and open. Even so,
the finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.
This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court’s direct and personal access to the witnesses while
they testify in its presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during
intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or
sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC and the CA sharing the conviction on Carl’s credibility, his capacity to
perceive and his ability to communicate his perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover,
according credence to Carl’s testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v.
Mendiola, the Court considered a 6-y ear-old victim competent, and regarded her testimony against the accused
credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals,the testimony of the three-year-old victim was deemed acceptable. As such,
Carl’s testimony was entitled to full probative weight.

Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to
note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity
with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s family. Verily, the evidence on
record overwhelmingly showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE - A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, 20 July
2001

Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, Court of Appeals, vs.


Cielito M. Salud, Clerk IV, Court of Appeals
A.M. No. CA-05-20-P
September 9, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent Saludis charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence of official duty,
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the serviceand directly and indirectly having financial and material
interest in an official transaction considering his undue interest in the service of the order of release and actual
release of Melchor Lagua.

Lagua was found guilty of homicide. He filed a petition for bond whichwas approved in a Resolution where
the appellate court directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought to the
office of Atty. Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation. Thereafter, espondent served the resolution
and order of release of Lagua at the National Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for homicide.

Thereafter a relative of Lagua, Melissa Melchor, called Atty. Madarang asking how much more they had to
give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC
Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. Atty. Madarang was able to get the mobile number of respondent, he
represented himself as Lagua’s relative and exchanged text messages with said respondent for a possible pay-off for
the Lagua’s provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered that the respondent did not properly serve the
copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counselbut gave them to a certain
Art Baluran, allegedly Lagua’s relative.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a violation of right to privacy of the
accused?

RULING:

No. The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a
violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic
communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the
admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already
admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the
Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages
addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending
before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee
since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other electronic
forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”

ANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 182835
April 20, 2010.

FACTS:
Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan
courted Irish and they became “on-and-off” sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards
that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him,
saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take
on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan
somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. After receiving from the accused Rustan via
multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure,
Complainant filed an action against said accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.
RULING:
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit „A‰, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since
he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He
should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the
present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings,
and administrative proceedings.
RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE - A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, 15 October 2007

PEOPLE V. TEEHANKEE
G.R. No. 11206-08
October 6, 1995

FACTS;

In 1991, JussiOlaviLeino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas
Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored
Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped
on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me
your) I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why are you bothering us?”
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body,
staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt
beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his
ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step
backward.The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started
screaming for help. For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino.
Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another
shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. Three (3) separate Informationswere filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, JussiOlaviLeino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was
charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991,
during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to MURDER.

.Issue:

WONthe out-of-court identification conducted by the police is valid

Held:

It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of- court identification by the prosecution witnesses in his
first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate
andauthoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some
authors even describe eyewitness evidence as inherently suspect. The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander,
involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third,
the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony
arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information
accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
Andal vs. People
G.R. No. 138268
March 26, 1999

FACTS

The case before us is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jurry Andal, Ricardo Andal and Edwin
Mendoza, all convicted of rape with homicide by RTC Batangas and was affirmed by this Court in a decision en
banc. They are scheduled for execution on June 16, 17, and 18, 1999. Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the
basis of a claim of mistrial and or that the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery, was
void. They pray for a temporary restraining order to stay their execution and/or a preliminary injunction enjoining
their execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA testing proposed by the accused should be considered

RULING: No.

The issue of "DNA tests" as a more accurate and authoritative means of identification than eye-witness
identification need not be belabored. The accused were all properly and duly identified by the prosecution's principal
witness. Olimpio Corrales, a brother in law of accused Jurry and Ricardo Andal. DNA testing proposed by
petitioners to have an objective and scientific basis of identification of "semen samples to compare with those taken
from the vagina of the victim" are thus unnecessary or are forgotten evidence too late to consider now.

The trial court imposed and this Court affirmed the correct sentence. The death penalty is what the law
prescribes in cases involving rape with homicide. We agree with the accused that they should be afforded every
opportunity to prove their innocence, especially in cases involving the death penalty; in this case, the Court can state
categorically that every opportunity was provided the accused. However painful the decision may be in this case, we
have conscientiously reviewed the case. Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position as to the
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in so far as it prescribes the death penalty for certain heinous crimes;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty may be imposed in proper cases as the one at bar. We hereby resolve to DENY the petition for habeas
corpus, and declare valid the judgment rendered by the trial court and affirmed by this Court. This resolution is
final.

People vs. Penaso


G.R. No. 121980
February 23, 2000

Facts:

On November 16, 1989 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning at the house of the accused Gonzalo Penaso, the
complainant BasilisaLacar who was then fifteen years old knocked at the door of the house of the aforementioned
accused Gonzalo Penaso who opened the door and upon inquiry whether his daughter, who was a classmate of
complainant, was present which the latter told the complainant that his daughter was in the kitchen when in fact and
in truth his daughter was out. The accused Gonzalo Penaso forcibly pulled the complainant BasilisaLacar and
pushed her into the bamboo bed and boxed the abdomen of the complainant BasilisaLacar and subsequently took off
her panty and inserted his penis into the vagina of the complainant BasilisaLacar causing it to bleed.
On July 16, 1990, private complainant gave birth to a baby boy. On August 27,1990, the Provincial
Prosecutor filed an information for the rape complained of. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of
rape.

Issue:

Whether or not accused Penaso was guilty of the crime of rape

Ruling:

Appellant insists that he did not get private complainant pregnant. He cites the testimony of defense witness
Rafael Libres, a classmate of the victim, to the effect that complainant admitted to him that appellant had not caused
her pregnancy. According to Libres, complainant identified either one Willy Guitano or a certain man from
Sagumay, Candijay, Bohol as the possible father of her child. Appellant also points an accusing finger at private
complainant’s stepfather as a possible culprit. This attempt to impugn the victim’s moral character by the appellant
is self-serving and unsupported by the evidence. Furthermore, the question of who sired the victim’s child has no
bearing here, for in rape cases, the identity of the father of the victim’s child is not an issue, pregnancy not being an
element of the crime.

In a last-ditch effort to win an acquittal, appellant asked for a DNA test or blood test.We find the motion
futile. As held in one case:

“The issue of “DNA tests” as a more accurate and authoritative means of identification than eye-witness
identification need not be belabored. The accused were all properly and duly identified by the prosecution’s
principal witness . . . DNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an objective and scientific basis of
identification of “semen samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the victim” are thus
unnecessary or are forgotten evidence too late to consider now.”

Tijing vs Court Of Appeals and Angelita Diamante

FACTS:

 Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who who
was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana,
Manila. Petitioner BienvenidaTijingserved as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante
 According to Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also
left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of
the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
 When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
 Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back
later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another
place.
 Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, and they
looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
 Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelitain Hagonoy, Bulacan.
 Bienvenidawent to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after
four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the
boy despite her demand to do so.
 Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son.
 Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to
John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife ZosimaPanganiban in Singalong, Manila.
She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the
local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.

TC: in favor of sps.Tijing. TC concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children,
the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida
showed strong facial similarity.

Court of Appeals: reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its
doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

Who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother

RULING:

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

1. There is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after
the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with
Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as
she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten
years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log
book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
2. There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son.
Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that
Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his
legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez
had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
3. Third, the court find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under
the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such
birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The
certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the
birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October
31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a
"common-law wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
4. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had
strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial
court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
5. Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the
signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of
habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test 19 for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. 20 Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. 21 Eventually, as the appropriate
case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs VALLEJO


G.R. No. 144656
May 9, 2002

FACTS:
1. On July 10, 1999 (Saturday) in Rosario, Cavite, at about 1pm, a nine-year old Daisy Diolola went to her the
house of Aimee Vallejo, her tutor, to seek help in her assignment. Aimee’s house was about four to five
meters away from Daisy’s house.
2. An hour later, Daisy came back to her house with Gerrico Vallejo to get a book.
3. At 5:30pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her childwasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s
house and Daisy wasn’t there. It turned out that Aimee was not feeling well that day and was not able to
help Daisy with her lessons.
4. At 7pm, there was still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts.Gerrico told Daisy’s mom that Daisy went to her
classmate’s house to borrow a book.
5. Daisy’s mom was told that her daughter was seen playing in front of Mateverde’s house and even watched
television in the said house, but she later left with Gerrico.
6. Daisy’s family searched for her the whole evening but were not able to find her.
7. The next morning, at around 10am, Daisy’s body was found tied to the root of an aroma a tree by the river.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.
8. Since Gerrico was one of the last persons who was with Daisy, the police invited him for questioning.
9. Prior to that, some neighbors have already told the policethat Gerrico was acting strangely during the
afternoon of July 10. They also testified that Gerrico’s shorts and shirt were wet that afternoon.
10. The police recovered the clothes (white basketball shirt,with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at
theback,and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printedon it) whichGerrico wore the day Daisy
disappeared. The shirtand shorts, which were blood-stained, were turned over tothe NBI for laboratory
examination.
11. Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testifiedthat on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples
fromGerricofor laboratory examination todetermine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shortsand shirt
he worn on the day the victimwas missing and the victim’s clothing were turned over tothe Forensic
Chemistry Division for the purpose ofdetermining the presence of human blood and its groups. It was
found that the bloodstains in Gerrico’s clothing were positive for the presence of human blood similar to
Daisy’s blood type.
12. As he was bothered by his conscience, a handwritten confession was executed by Gerrico, admitting that he
raped and killed Daisy.
13. Pet Buan also took buccal swabs and hair samples from Daisy’s parents and DNA tests were conducted.
Buan testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken during the autopsy contained the profiles of
Gerrico and Daisy.
14. During the trial, Gerricocontends that the bloodstains found onhis garments were not proven to have been
that of thevictim as the victim’s blood type was not determined and that samples were already soaked in
smirch waters, hence contaminated and should not be admissible in evidence,

RTC: found Gerrico Vallejo guilty of the crime of rape and homicide of Daisy

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible in evidence

RULING:
Yes. The prosecution failed to show that all thesamples submitted for DNA testing were not
contaminated,considering that these specimens were already soaked insmirchy waters before they were submitted to
thelaboratory.

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cellswhich contains his or her genetic code. Except for
identicaltwins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is collected
fromthe scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for thesuspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The
evidencesample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether anassociation exists between the evidence sample and
thereference sample. The samples collected are subjected tovarious chemical processes to establish their
profile.Thetest may yield three possible results:
(1) The samples are different and therefore must haveoriginated from different sources (exclusion).
Thisconclusion is absolute and requires no furtheranalysis or discussion;
(2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results ofthe test, whether the samples have similar DNAtypes
(inconclusive). This might occur for a varietyof reasons including degradation, contamination,
orfailure of some aspect of the protocol. Various partsof the analysis might then be repeated with
thesame or different sample, to obtain a moreconclusive result; or
(3) The samples are similar, and could have originatedfrom the same source (inclusion). In such a case,the
samples are foundto be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine thestatisticalsignificance of the
similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,therefore, courts should consider, among others
things,thefollowing data: how the samples were collected, how theywere handled, the possibility of contamination of
thesamples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,whether the proper standards and procedures
werefollowed in conducting the tests, and the qualification ofthe analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from theclothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the
smearstaken from the victim as well as the strands of hair andnails taken from her tested negative for the presence
ofhuman DNA. It is because the specimens were soaked in smirch water before they were submitted to laboratory.
The state of thespecimens prior to the DNA analysis could havehampered the preservation of any DNA that could
have
been there before.

Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted forexamination, and not the possibility that the
samples hadbeen contaminated, which accounted for the negativeresults of their examination. But the vaginal swabs
takenfrom the victim yielded positive for the presence of humanDNA. Upon analysis by the experts, it showed that
DNA profile of Gerrico was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the victim.

The totality of the evidencepoints to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant isguilty of the crime
charged. Evidence is weighed notcounted. When facts or circumstances which are proved arenot only consistent
with the guilt of the accused but alsoinconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in itsweight and probative
force, may surpass direct evidence inits effect upon the court.

Lejano vs. People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 176389
14 December 2010

FACTS:

1. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their
home in Parañaque City. The police officers arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the
suspects of the crime became a mystery to the public since this case was sensationalized and commonly
known to as the “Vizconde Massacre”

2. Four years later, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, who
claimed that she witnessed the crime. She alleged Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez, and Joey
Filart as the culprits of the crime. She also pointed police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory.
Thereafter, the public prosecutors filed information for rape with homicide against all of the accused.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness along with the medico-legal officer who autopsied
the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of
the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s
husband.
3. While some of the accused denied being part of the crime, Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he
claimed that he was in the United States of America when the crime eventuated. He presented some
necessary documents and evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show
Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

4. The Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 274 found Alfaro a credible witness. It noted her
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-
examinations. Thus, on January 4, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused
guilty of the crime. This was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) when the decision of the trial
court was appealed. The CA said that they did not agree that the trial judge was biased on rendering a
decision co-sympathizing with the public. When motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, this
resorted the accused to appeal this before the Supreme Court

5. On April 20, 2010, the Court granted the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen
taken from Carmela’s cadaver. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on
DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence which could lead
to a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no
longer has custody of the specimen. Because of this, Webb filed an urgent motion to acquit on the
ground that the government failed to preserve such vital evidence which resulted a denial of his right to
due process.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the
semen specimen that the NBI found on CarmelaÊs cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would
prove his innocence.

RULING:
NO.

Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this
late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long been overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require
the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able
to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert
who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA
test. For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after
the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE – A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, 01 January 2013

NG MENG TAM vs CHINA BANKING CORPORATION


G.R. No. 214054
August5, 2015

Facts:
Before this Court is a direct recourse from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) via petition for review on the question of
whether Section 5 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR) applies to hostile or adverse witnesses.

This case stemmed from a collection suit filed by China Banking Corporation (China Bank) against Ever Electrical
Manufacturing Company Inc. (Ever), the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go and petitioner Ng Meng Tam
sometime in December 2008.

China Bank alleged that it granted Ever a loan amounting to P5,532,331.63. The loan was allegedly backed by two
surety agreements executed by Vicente, George and petitioner in its favor.

When Ever defaulted, China Bank sent demand letters collectively addressed to George, Vicente and petitioner. The
demands were unanswered. China Bank filed the complaint for collection of money.

When the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a witness, China Bank objected citing Section 5 of
the JAR. China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and
present George Yap’s judicial affidavit.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR) applies to hostile or adverse witnesses

Held:
SECTION 5 OF THE JAR DOES NOT APPLY TO ADVERSE PARTY’S WITNESSES.

The JAR primarily affects the manner by which evidence is presented in court. Section 2(a) of the JAR provides
that judicial affidavits are mandatorily filed by parties to a case except in small claims cases. These judicial
affidavits take the place ofdirect testimony in court.

Under Section 10 of JAR, parties are to be penalized if they do not conform to the provisions of the JAR. Parties are
however allowed to resort to the application of a subpoena pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of Court in Section 5 of
the JAR in certainsituations.

Sec. 5 Subpoena. – If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of
the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just
cause to make the... relevant books, documents, or other things under his control available for copying,
authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum or ducestecum under Rule 21 of the Rules ofCourt. The rules governing the issuance of a
subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a
judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.

We agree with the RTC that Section 5 has no application to Yap as he was presented as a hostile witness.

Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a (a) government employee or official or (b) requested
witness who is not the (1) adverse party’s witness nor (2) a hostile witness. If this person either (a) unjustifiably
declines to execute a judicial affidavit or (b) refuses without just cause to make the relevant documents available to
the other party and its presentation to court, Section 5 allows the requesting party to avail of issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum or ducestecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses, being excluded, they are not covered by Section 5.

Expressiouniusest exclusion alterius: the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others.

Fairland vs Po
G.R. No. 217694

FACTS:
- In a complaintfor unlawful detainerfiled before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of
Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
- The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month.
- From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the
lease agreement anymore.
- Despite receipt of the demand letter sent by Fairland demanding for payment of rental arrears and to
vacatewithin 15 days, Po neither tendered payment nor vacated the premises.
- Thus, on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer before
the MeTC.

METC: The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to prove its claim by
preponderance of evidence. Although the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove
that it was entitled to the possession of the subject property. There was no evidence presented to support its claim
against Po either.
RTC: affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed that Fairland failed to establish its case by preponderance of evidence.
Though it had been consistently ruled that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case was the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party-litigants,
the court may go beyond the question of physical possession provisionally. The RTC concluded that even assuming
that Po was not the lawful owner, his actual physical possession of the subject property created the presumption that
he was entitled to its possession thereof.
CA: dismissed Fairland’s petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would not lie against Po. In order
for an action for recovery of possession to prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the action should prove
not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed. The CA concluded, however, that Fairland
failed to discharge such bounden duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judicial Affidavit Rule is applicable in this case

HELD: NO
The Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where
documentary or object evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not applicable because such
evidence are required to be attached to a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only
on January 1, 2013, it cannot be required in this case because this was earlier filed on December 12, 2012.Granting
that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this
Court.

In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object evidence to the affidavits is required when
there would be a pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier, where a
defendant fails to file an answer, the court shall render judgment, either motuproprio or upon plaintiff’s motion,
based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. Thus, where there is no answer,
there is no need for a pre-trial, preliminary conference or hearing. Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with
the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before
pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct
testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits
and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1,
2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant. xxx

LARA’S GIFT & DECORS vs. PNB GENERAL INSURERS & UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE
G.R. No. 230429
January 24, 2018

FACTS:
The handicraft products, raw materials, and machineries and equipment of petitioner LGDI were insured against
fire and other allied risks with respondents PNB General Insurers Co., Inc. (PNB Gen) and (UCPB), as co
insurer.Approximately four hours before the policy was about to expire, a fire broke out and razed Buildings Y2,
Y3, and Y4 of the JY & Sons Compound. Petitioner immediately claimed from the respondents for the loss and
damage of its insured properties.

Respondents engaged the services of 2 independent adjusters to assess and evaluate the amount of loss.
However, petitioner’s documents are found to be insufficient to properly evaluate and assess the amount of loss
claimed. Thus the claim was denied by the respondent insurers.Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages against respondentsIn its Notice of Pre-Trial Conference,the RTC directed the parties to submit their
respective pre-trial briefs, accompanied by the documents or exhibits intended to be presented, at least three days
before the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. It also contained a stern warning that "no evidence shall be allowed to be
presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier
identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the Court for good cause shown."

The RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order in which the parties were given the opportunity to amend or correct any
errors found therein within five days from receipt thereof. In the same Order, all the parties made a reservation for
the presentation of additional documentary exhibits in the course of the trial.Trial on the merits ensued on
November 7, 2013. Among the witnesses presented by petitioner are Gina Servita (Servita) and Luis Raymond
Villafuerte (Mr. Villafuerte). Mr. Villafuerte’s participation in the business was reduced to a mere advisor of his
wife, Mrs. Lara Maria Villafuerte (Mrs. Villafuerte), petitioner corporation's president, who is likewise slated to
testify.

During the continuation of Mr. Villafuerte's cross-examination on July 10, 2014, petitioner furnished
respondents with a copy of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit8 of Mrs. Villafuerte dated July 9, 2014 (the 1st
Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte was filed during the Pre-Trial for the re-marking of exhibits).
PNB Gen, through a Motion to Expunge,9 sought to strike from the records the said 2ndSupplemental Judicial
Affidavit of Mrs. Villauferte and all documents attached thereto for alleged violation of Administrative Matter No.
12-8-8-SC, otherwise known as the "Judicial Affidavit Rule" (JA Rule) and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,10 or the
Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures (Guidelines on Pre-Trial).

During the trial, petitioner's counsel produced the Questioned Documents in open court and asked Mr.
Villafuerte to identify those documents, seeking to introduce and mark them as exhibits. Respondents immediately
objected in open court to the introduction and presentation of the Questioned Documents on the grounds that they
were neither touched upon nor covered by the witness' cross-examination, and that the same were being introduced
for the first time at this late stage of proceeding, without giving the parties opportunity to verify their relevance and
authenticity. They argued that since these documents were not presented, identified, marked, and even compared
with the originals during the Pre-Trial Conference, they should be excluded pursuant to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial
and JA Rule.

The RTC allowed petitioner to propound questions relating to the Questioned Documents, without prejudice to
the hearing on the motions to expunge the 2 nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte.It also allowed
Mr. Villafuerte to testify on the contested documentary exhibits, on the ground that both the trial court and the
parties are bound by the reservations made for the presentation of additional evidence, and in keeping with the
interest of justice that evidence should be liberally allowed to be heard than to be suppressed, subject to the final
appreciation of its weight and credence. The Omnibus Order likewise denied UCPB's Motion seeking to expunge
from the records the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte and its accompanying exhibits.

The CA affirmed RTC’s ruling. Anent the admission of the 2 nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs.
Villafuerte, the CA noted that the records show that "all the parties made reservations" to present "additional
documentary exhibits" in the course of the trial, as embodied in the Pre-Trial Order.

On MR, the CA reversed its previous ruling and granted respondents’ motion. RTC order was annulled. CA
ruled that the RTC erred in allowing the introduction of the 2 nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit in evidence,
including the attached Questioned Documents, since petitioner failed to comply with Sections 2 and 10 of the JA
Rule which prohibit the presentation, marking and identification of additional exhibits during trial that were not
promptly submitted during pre-trial.

Petitioner argues that the introduction of additional documentary evidence during re-direct examination of a
witness is not absolutely proscribed by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,17 or the Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court
Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures (Guidelines in
the Conduct of Pre-Trial), and the JA Rule.Anent the submission of the 2 nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs.
Villafuerte, petitioner asserts that the JA Rule allows for the belated submission of judicial affidavits, subject only to
applicable penalties.

Respondent Insurersinsist that the allowance of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit and its attachments to be
introduced into evidence violates the express provisions of the JA Rule, Rule 10, Section 6 of the Rules of Court and
other procedural rules. They further maintain that the provisions of the Guidelines on Pre-Trial and JA Rule—
prohibiting the submission, presentation, and identification of evidence which were not identified, compared, and
marked during pre-trial—are mandatory, and thus, should not have been disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary exhibits during trial
and;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs.
Villafuerte.

RULING:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred:

In disallowing the introduction of additional documentary exhibits during trial

The JA Rule, which took effect on January 1, 2013, was promulgated to address congestion and delays in
courts. Designed to expedite court proceedings, it primarily affects the manner by which evidence is presented in
court, particularly with regard to the taking of the witnesses' testimonies. Nevertheless, the JA Rule was not devised
to supplant or amend existing procedural rules; rather, it is designed to supplement and augment them. In this regard,
reference must be made to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial in relation to the Rules on Pre-Trial, which, interestingly,
both parties invoke in support of their respective arguments.

The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of additional evidence
even after trial had already commenced. Certainly, the parties are mandated under Sec. 2 of the JA Rule to file and
serve the judicial affidavits of their witnesses, together with their documentary or object evidence, not later than five
days before pre-trial or preliminary conference.

The documentary and testimonial evidence submitted will then be specified by the trial judge in the Pre-Trial
Order. Concomitant thereto, Sec. 10 of the same Rule contains a caveat that the failure to timely submit the
affidavits and documentary evidence shall be deemed to be a waiver of their submission, thus:

Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the Judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who fails to submit the
required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission. The court
may, however, allow only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason,
would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P
1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.

It bears to note that Sec. 10 does not contain a blanket prohibition on the submission of additional evidence.
However, the submission of evidence beyond the mandated period in the JA Rule is strictly subject to the conditions
that: a) the court may allow the late submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the evidence proffers
a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced thereby. Corollary thereto, the
Guidelines on Pre-Trial instructs the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three (3) days before
the pre-trial, containing, inter alia, the documents or exhibits to be presented and to state the purposes thereof,
because No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-
chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the
court for good cause shown.

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural prescription, the same rule confers upon the trial court the
discretion to allow the introduction of additional evidence during trial other than those that had been previously
marked and identified during the pre-trial, provided there are valid grounds. The trial court precisely exercised this
discretion. It allowed the introduction of the Questioned Documents during the re-direct examination of Mr.
Villafuerte upon petitioner's manifestation that the same are being presented in response to the questions
propounded by PNB Gen's counsel, Atty. Mejia, during the cross-examination:

In disallowing the filing of 2nd supplemental judicial affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte

The 2nd supplemental JA of Mrs. Villafuerte was properly admitted by the RTC. With regard to the
admission of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit, We reiterate the requirements laid down in Sec. 2 of the JA
Rule that the parties must file with the court and serve on the adverse party the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses
not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference. While the belated submission of evidence is not
totally disallowed, it is still, to reiterate, subject to several conditions, which petitioner failed to comply with.
Specifically, the records are bereft of any justification, or "good cause," for the filing of the 2nd Supplemental
Judicial Affidavit during trial instead of during the pre-trial. Petitioner merely filed and served the affidavit during
the hearing on July 10, 2014, without any accompanying motion setting forth any explanation and valid reason for
the delay. Further, whether denominated as merely "supplemental," the fact that the affidavit introduces evidence not
previously marked and identified during pre-trial qualifies it as new evidence.

Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to rule that the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit was properly
admitted in evidence by the trial court. As can be gleaned from Page 64 of the Pre-Trial Order, both parties reserved
the right to present additional evidence.Clearly, the foregoing reservation is tantamount to a waiver of the
application of Secs. 2 and 10 of the JA Rule.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 –ANTI WIRETAPPING ACT

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 93833
September 28, 1995

FACTS:
A complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that
Ester S. Garcia allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner
offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of
her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event culled from a tape recording.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of R.A.
4200.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of R.A. 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of
the parties to the conversation.

RULING: No.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of
R.A. 4200.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations
from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does
not distinguish.
FRANCISO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. 160261 November, 10, 2003

FACTS:
1 On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved
by the 11th Congress.
2 On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3 On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4 The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5 Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution. (guys kahit pag balibaliktarin wala RELATED SA TOPIC. UNLESS YUNG
PRINCIPLES YUNG GUSTO NYA. )

HELD: NO.It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental
act should be avoided whenever possible.—The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude
a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than
by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
People of the Philippines vs. Navarro
G.R. No. 121087
26 August 1999

FACTS: At around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were
reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City
following reports that it was showing the nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered
beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres,
Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policeman on
duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his
companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a
while, Liquin andSioco arrived on a motorcycle.

Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen
minutes. Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putangina,
kinakalabanmosiKaboLiquin, anakyanniKaboLiquin, hindimobakilala?" Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his
firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasinnakita?"

At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwagnamangganyanpumarito kami
paramagpa-blotter, I am here to mediate."Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." He
then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.

This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagaymodiyan" Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagangilalagayko."
The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: "Masyadokangabusado, alisinmo yang barilmo at
magsuntukannalangtayo." Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?”

As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left
eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a
fist blow on the forehead which floored him.

Navarro was charged with homicide with the RTC. The trial court convicted him of the crime charged. The
court admitted in evidence the recorded tape allegedly containing the heated exchange between Navarro and the
deceased Lingan in the police station. The exchange in the voice recording was confirmed by the testimony of
Jalbuena, one who took the recording and witness for the prosecution.

ISSUE: WON the tape is admissible in evidence under RA No. 4200.

RULING: Yes. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not
prohibited. RA No. 4200 prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony
of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case,
Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in the court was the one he
recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus
laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.The voice recording made by Jalbuena
established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police
blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner
Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS


FACTS:

Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner.Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits. Among the
exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons.Petitioner submitted her Objection to private respondent's oral offer of evidence
but the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.

ISSUE:Whether or not the cassette tapes be admitted as evidence

RULING:

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private
respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape
recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his
home telephone.

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in
evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in
admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.