DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE

ART 2231 CC

1. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN’S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO MAMADOR and
GERONIMO MA. COLL, Respondents.

FACTS: ACCIDENT: “that on August 23, 1951, at 6:OOAM in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog,
Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Respondent-
corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter,
which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and
on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake
another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the
death of said Mamador and injury to the others.”
CONVICTED: Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to the latter.
MARINDUQUE denied its liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.
PROHIBITION: The most important aspect of this appeal, is the effect of the deceased’s
having violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage
trucks. Petitioner claims such violation was the laborer’s “notorious negligence”
which, under the law, precludes recovery.
The Commission has not declared that the prohibition was known to Mamador. Yet the
employer does not point out in the record evidence to that effect. Supposing Mamador
knew the prohibition, said the referee, “can we truthfully say that he boarded the fatal truck
with full apprehension of the existence of the danger, if any at all, that an ordinary prudent
man would try to avoid? I do not believe so, and even in the presence of doubt, the same
must be resolved in his favor. Unless of course, we can attribute to him a desire to end his
life. Nowhere in the records of this case can we find the slightest insinuation of that desire.”
ISSUE: WON MERE RIDING IN HAULAGE TRUCK IS GROS NEGLIGENE WHICH WOULD
PRECLUDE RECOVEERY.
HELD: NO. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride
thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is
not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this
particular instance because there was the employer’s prohibition. Does violation of
this order constitute negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a statute or
ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated
by a Commission or board is not negligence per se;
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not “notorious”
negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross” negligence
3 — implying “conscious indifference to consequences” “pursuing a course of conduct
which would naturally and probably result in injury” “utter disregard of
consequences.” (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s
haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee found, “no danger or risk
was apparent.”

RES IPSA LOQUITUR

1.LAYUGAN VS IAC isidro and travelers and seranno=parked right side of natl
highway
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-
INDEMNITY CORPORATION,
FACTS: Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging
that on May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck parked along the right side of the
National Highway; that defendant's truck bearing Plate No. PW-583, driven recklessly by
Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized
at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital;
ISIDRO: countered that the LAYUGAN was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a
brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was
parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after
the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the
parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the driver of the parked car
should be liable for damages sustained by the truck of the herein defendant in the amount
of more than P20,000.00; that plaintiff being a mere bystander and hitchhiker must suffer
all the damages he incurred
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT: On May 29, 1981, a third-party complaint was filed by the
defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the
third-party plaintiff, without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-
party defendant is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by
virtue of their contract under Insurance Policy No. 11723 which covers the insurer's
liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to property.
that the accident in question was approximately caused by the carelessness and
gross negligence of the plaintiff-, that by reason of the third-party complaint, third-party
defendant was constrained to engage the services of counsel for a fee of P3,000.00.
CA FOUND LAYUGAN NGLIGENT BASED RES IPSA LOQUITOR
ISSUE . WHETHER THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF "RES IPSA LOQUITUR" WITH PROPER JURIS- PRUDENTIAL
(sic) BASIS.
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care. 33 Or as Black's Law Dictionary 34 puts it:
 Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that
the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened
provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred
and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management
and control of alleged wrongdoer. . Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the
happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff
produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under reasonable care had been used.
ISSUE: WON RES IPSA LOQUITOR APPLIES IMPLYING NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF LAYAG.
NO.
HELD: We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is
clear that SERANO did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check
his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that
the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the
accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the ISIDRO used
to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact
that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient
to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at
the trial 47 The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have
conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that
the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which
would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if
we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the
supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by
Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who
would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck.
But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of
his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent
damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article
2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

RAMOS VS CA

ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON
RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.
FACTS:
 whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the
unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.[2]

FACTS: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, a 47-year old
(Exh. A) robust woman (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 10). Except for occasional complaints of
discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder
(TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 4-5), she was as normal as any other woman. Married to
Rogelio E. Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, she has
three children whose names are Rommel Ramos, Roy Roderick Ramos and Ron Raymond
Ramos (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 5-6).

OPERATION: Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she
sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a
stone in her gall bladder (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 5). She underwent a series of
examinations which included blood and urine tests (Exhs. A and C) which indicated she was
fit for surgery.

DR. HOSAKA-CHOLECYSTECTOMY: Through the intercession of a mutual friend, Dr.

Buenviaje (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 7), she and her husband Rogelio met for the first
time Dr. Orlino Hozaka one of the defendants in this case, on June 10, 1985. A day before
the scheduled date of operation, she was admitted at one of the rooms of the DLSMC,
located along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City

At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her room, she was prepared for the
operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of
the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also there for moral support. She
reiterated her previous request for Herminda to be with her even during the operation. ).

At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos was already dying [and] waiting for the arrival of
the doctor even as he did his best to find somebody who will allow him to pull out his wife
from the operating room. He also thought of the feeling of his wife, who was inside the
operating room waiting for the doctor to arrive (ibid.). At almost 12:00 noon, he met Dr.
Garcia who remarked that he (Dr. Garcia) was also tired of waiting for Dr. Hosaka to arrive
(id., p. 21). While talking to Dr. Garcia at around 12:10 P.M., he came to know that Dr.
Hosaka arrived as a nurse remarked, Nandiyan na si Dr. Hosaka, dumating na raw. Upon
hearing those words, he went down to the lobby and waited for the operation to be
completed (id., pp. 16, 29-30).

INTUBATION: At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating room
with the patient, heard somebody say that Dr. Hosaka is already here. She then saw people
inside the operating room moving, doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the
operation (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 16). As she held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then
saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan (id., p.
17). Because of the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr.
Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the
left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr.
Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist (id., p.
19). After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying
to intubate the patient. The patients nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a
trendelenburg position - a position where the head of the patient is placed in a
position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood
supply to the patients brain (Id., pp. 19-20). Immediately thereafter, she went out of the
operating room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos that something wrong was x x x happening
(Ibid.). Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient (TSN, July 25, 1991, p. 9).

Meanwhile, Rogelio, who was outside the operating room, saw a respiratory machine being
rushed towards the door of the operating room. He also saw several doctors rushing
towards the operating room.When informed by Herminda Cruz that something wrong was
happening, he told her (Herminda) to be back with the patient inside the operating room (

Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw that the patient was still in
trendelenburg position (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 20). At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful
day, she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).

About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The latter
informed the former that something went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what
was told to him, Rogelio reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have
happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked for a good anesthesiologist (TSN, October 19, 1989,
p. 31).

Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to
the patient. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm

RELEASED AFTER 4 MOS: Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month. About four months
thereafter or on November 15, 1985, the patient was released from the hospital.

During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hospital bills amounting
to P93,542.25 which is the subject of a promissory note and affidavit of undertaking
executed by Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC. Since that fateful afternoon of June 17,
1985, she has been in a comatose condition. She cannot do anything. She cannot move any
part of her body. She cannot see or hear. She is living on mechanical means. She suffered
brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes (TSN,
November 9, 1989, pp. 21-22). After being discharged from the hospital, she has been
staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her husband
Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 (TSN, October
19, 1989, pp. 32-34). She was also diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage (Exh. G; see also TSN, December 21, 1989, p. 6).[5]
CIVIL CASE: petitioners filed a civil case [6] for damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and
care of Erlinda Ramos.
RTC: RAMOS
CA: RESPONDENTS
RES IPSA LOQUITOR:
The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. [13] Where the thing which
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or
his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused
by the defendants want of care.[14]
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someones negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant
or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.[21]
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will
hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled
gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a
routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she
delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who
exercised complete and exclusive control over her.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents were
not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation and, if in
the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlindas
comatose condition.

HELD: We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause
of her piteous condition.
We do not agree with the above reasoning of the appellate court. Although witness
Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on which she is
capable of observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon,
external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one.
[48]
This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the
testimony of expert witnesses is not required. It is the accepted rule that expert
testimony is not necessary for the proof of negligence in non-technical matters or those of
which an ordinary person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or
want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony unnecessary. We take judicial
notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures have become so common, that even an
ordinary person can tell if it was administered properly. As such, it would not be too
difficult to tell if the tube was properly inserted. This kind of observation, we believe, does
not require a medical degree to be acceptable.
t Dra. Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the
scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and
professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing
with human lives lie at the core of the physicians centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure
to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
PROXIMATE CAUSE: Having established that respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to perform
pre-operative evaluation of the patient which, in turn, resulted to a wrongful intubation, we
now determine if the faulty intubation is truly the proximate cause of Erlindas comatose
condition.
In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe petitioners stand that
it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlindas comatose
condition.
Instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what actually took place was an
esophageal intubation.
HOSPITAL: Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the
proper authority (as the captain of the operative team) in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the
latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it
exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar
nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last
paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is
consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlindas condition.

BATIQUIN vs CA=RUBBER GLOVES

DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN BATIQUIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS, respondents.

FACTS: Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital,.
Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as
the latter's private patient sometime before September 21, 1988.
GIVE BIRTH: In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr.
Doris Teresita Sy who was also a Resident Physician at the same Hospital, C.I. and O.R.
Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed a simple cesarean section on Mrs.
Villegas at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas
delivered her first child, Rachel Acogido, at about 11:45 that morning. Thereafter,
Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital until September 27, 1988 during which period
of confinement she was regularly visited by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28, 1988, Mrs.
Villegas checked out of the Hospital . . . and on the same day she paid Dr. Batiquin, thru
the latter's secretary, the amount of P1,500.00 as "professional fee" . . . .
AFTER HOSPITAL: Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer
abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her
appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her
certain medicines . . . which she had been taking up to December, 1988.
CERTIFICATE OF FITNESS TO RETURN TO WORK. In the meantime, Mrs. Villegas was
given a Medical Certificate by Dr. Batiquin on October 31, 1988 . . . certifying to her physical
fitness to return to her work on November 7, 1988. So, on the second week of November,
1988 Mrs. Villegas returned to her work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon, Negros
Oriental
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs. Villegas no end and
despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When the pains become unbearable
and she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's
Hospital in Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989.
TUMOR:. Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus
which she suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which
could be cancerous. She had an x-ray taken of Mrs. Villegas' chest, abdomen and kidney. She
also took blood tests of Plaintiff. A blood count showed that Mrs. Villegas had [an] infection
inside her abdominal cavity. The result of all those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to
suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed.
ANOTHER SURGER=PIECE OF RUBBER MATERIAL: When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen
of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the
left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of
rubber materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on [sic] the ovarian cyst, 2
inches by 3/4 inch in size. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a
"foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber glove" . . . and which is [sic] also "rubber-
drain like . . . . It could have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come
from other sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries
and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery on
September 21, 1988.[7]
RTC: BATIQUIN
CA: REVERSED
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.
The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule,
when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.[36]
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First,
the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr.
Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the
actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent
Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas
underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber
to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product
of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed
to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of
rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects
thereof.
DMCI VS CA AND JUEGO
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J.
JUEGO, respondents.
FELL 14 FLOORS:At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction
worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed
a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:

DEAD:x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila
where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de
Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s]
at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a
[p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with
pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5
ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the
chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly
and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building
under construction thereby crushing the victim to death, save his two (2) companions who
luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then
on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal
or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.[1]
RTC DAMAGES VS DMCI: in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:
CA: DMCI
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa
loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that
the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the
instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
[20]

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

HELD: There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building
to the basement while he was working with appellants construction project, resulting to his
death. The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of
appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others
who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident
that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its
employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the
accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent
or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while
performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first
requisite for the application of the rule ofres ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier,
the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the
injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second
requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees
deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or
inference of appellants negligence arises. x x x.[24]
DEFENSES
ART 2179 CC

MANILA ELECTRIC VS REMONQUILLO AND MAGNO

FACTS:
MAGNO TO REPAIR MEDIA AGUA: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story
house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila,
to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was just
below the window of the third story.
ELECTROCUTED: Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru that
window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in
doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the
Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of
the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and
children fled suit to recover damages from the company.
RTC AND CA: WIDOW MAGNO
“The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched
between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there
some two years before Penñ aloza’s house was constructed. The record shows that during
the construction of said house a similar incident took place, although fortunate]y
with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter was holding
happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the
house forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and
as a result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a
brace, but left the other end where it was.
DISTANCE OF ELECTRIC WIRE TO MEDIA AGUA WAS 2.5 FEET:“At any rate, as revealed
by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance from the
electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’ on which the deceased was making repairs was
only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires
be kept three feet from the building.’ Appellant contends that in applying said
regulations to the case at bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the ‘media agua’
but from the side of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or
more then the minimum prescribed. This contention is manifestly groundless, for not only
is a ‘media agua’ an integral part of the building to which it is attached but to exclude it in
measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of the regulation. Appellant points out,
nevertheless, that even assuming that the distance, within the meaning of the city
regulations, should be measured from the edge of the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case
of the house involved herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault
of the owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to construct a
‘media agua’ only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one having a width
of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby
reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
“It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit given to him by
the city authorities for the construction of the ‘media agua’, and that if he had not done
so Appellantswire would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of three
feet from the edge of the ‘media agua’. It is also a fact, however, that after the ‘media agua’
was constructed the owner was given a final permit of occupancy of the house cralaw .
ISSUE: WON MANILA ELECTRIC IS LIABLE
HELD: Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” or
rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the
original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of the “media agua”.
We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any
building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the
side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet as
referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as a
“media agua”, had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the
city for the construction of his “media agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches
wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3
feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the “media agua” the city
authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires
and any portion of a building.
Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter
fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the
“Media agua” as illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of
the permit by the house owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an
inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at
the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or regulation.
The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction
which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and after finding that
said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires
so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty,
to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house
owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present
case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the “media agua” was not the
direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said “media agua” been only
one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have
stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the
edge of the “media agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and
possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet
and the wires.
2.BERNARDO VS LEGASPI
JUAN BERNARDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
M. B. LEGASPI, defendant-appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained by plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a
collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also
dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages against the
plaintiff on the ground that the injuries sustained by the defendant's automobile in the
collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's machine, were caused by the negligence
of the plaintiff in handling his automobile.
ISSUE: WHO IS LIABLE?
HELD: The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a
character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from
recovering.1awphil.net
Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to the principal
occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot
recover. This is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their negligent acts,
contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can recover.
BERNAL VS JV HOUSE=PROCESSION
OMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT, LTD., defendants-appellee.
FACTS:
PROCESSION: On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in
Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from
another municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the procession was over, the
woman and her daughter, accompanied by two other persons by the names of Fausto and
Elias, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed to
get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile appeared from the
opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the
result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter
or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her
companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her
clothes were immediately removed and, then covered with a garment, the girl was
taken to the provincial hospital. There she was attended by the resident physician, Dr.
Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at 11:40
o'clock.
DR BENITEZ "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were
"Congestion of the Brain and isceras of the chest & abdomen".
JV HOUSE: The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the
street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of
death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by
their own fault and negligence. The trial judge, however, after examination of the
evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the case, except as to
the last mentioned special defense.
HELD: We are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion of the trial
judge to the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due
principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the extensive
burns from the hot water.
"The danger from burns is proportional rather to the extent of surface involved than to the
depth of the burn Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined,
he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. I
It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial
judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal
in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and
falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrines announced in the much debated case
of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages
PLDT VS CA AND SPS ESTEBAN-PLDT NOT LIABLE
FACTS: an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses ESTEBAN against petitioner Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the
evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an
open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system.
The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning
light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained
injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was
shattered. 2
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which
should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an
independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system.
Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms
of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries
arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. 4
Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent
spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the
necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at
both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn
the traveling public of the presence of excavations. 5
RTC: SPOUSES
CA: PLDT
ISSUE: WHO IS NEGLIGENT? ESTEBAN
the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the
part of petitioner PLDT. Such findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment and
evaluation of the evidence on record, as evidenced by the respondent court's resolution of
January 24, 1980 which we quote with approval:
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it
had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT
MOUND.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit
the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing
Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as
plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle
the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have
climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks in
Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had been
braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have been thrown
against the windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast
on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to
the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-
husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but
should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see
the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25
kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT
MOUND in time to brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT
MOUND was relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet
wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen
any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location of the
ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With ordinary
precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of the accident
so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND. 29
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not
only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages. 30
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
2179, 2214 CC
 1. GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, --RITA CABRERA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: GENOBIAGON BUMPED AN OLD WOMAN: On December 31,1959, at about 7:30
o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped an old woman who was crossing T.
Padilla St., Cebu City, at the right side of T. Padilla Market.
The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old woman
started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going
so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying
to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a
consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-
stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store in market in order to celebrate
the coming of the New Year, and who saw the incident right before him, shouted at the
appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the
appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it
was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the
old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and the food and viands
she was carrying were scattered on her body.
DIED: The victim RITA CABRERA was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital
where she died three hours later
RTC: Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Crim. Case No. V7855).
CA: AFFIRMED
1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate
cause of the accident which led to her death;
ISSUE: WON RITA WAS NEGLIGNT. YES
HELD: The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the
accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his Own negligence
M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one
hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two
immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured
to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According
to the testimony of the plaintiff, hich was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened through the
negligence of the ATLANTIC GULF.
Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that
there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise
seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them
from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear
of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the mh RAKES is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of RAKES, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact
and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the
boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that
not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by
the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the
starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order
being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself
in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its
primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or
the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
PBCOM VS CA-RMC, ROMEO LIPANA-YABUT-MABAYAD-COTAS
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA
PASCUAL, et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO
LIPANA, its President & General Manager, respondents.
FACTS: RMC RECOVEER FROM PBCOM: complaint filed by the private respondent
Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its President and
General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of
Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International
Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current
account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead
deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and
inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.
RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos. 53-01980-3 and
53-01748-7, with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling
appliances.
LIPANA TO YABUT: From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims
to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his
secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current
accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions,
were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-
01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with
the same bank. D
during this period, petitioner bank had, however, been regularly furnishing private
respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately,
it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of
account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of
its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160.
RTC AND CA FOUND PBC NEGLIGENT
PBCOM: 1) The proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent Rommel
Marketing Corporation and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. 2)
The failure of respondent Rommel Marketing Corporation to cross-check the bank's
statements of account with its own records during the entire period of more than one (1)
year is the proximate cause of the commission of subsequent frauds and misappropriation
committed by Ms. Irene Yabut. 3) The duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by
respondent Rommel Marketing Corporation are falsified and are not proof that the
amounts appearing thereon were deposited to respondent Rommel Marketing
Corporation's account with the bank, 4) The duplicate copies of the deposit slips were
used by Ms. Irene Yabut to cover up her fraudulent acts against respondent Rommel
Marketing Corporation, and not as records of deposits she made with the bank. 4
ISSUE: WON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF LOSS IS RMC’S NEGLIGENCE. NO.
HELD. NO.
it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating,
officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms.
Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the
proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms.
Mabayad herself, thus:
Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The fact that the
duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not
relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such
duplicate copy lacked one vital information — that of the name of the account holder
— should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the
incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more
probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was
left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in
accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that
since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the
blank space later on. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have
given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank
be filled up as a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller
Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank
itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the
petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the
proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act
of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Petitioners nevertheless aver that the failure of respondent RMC to cross-check the
bank's statements of account with its own records during the entire period of more
than one (1) year is the proximate cause of the commission of subsequent frauds and
misappropriation committed by Ms. Irene Yabut.
HELD: We do not agree. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: The foregoing notwithstanding,
it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have
been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary.
The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC,
particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial
affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall
mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent 23 under Article
2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
. . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the
respondent appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be
borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the
petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners.
FORTUITOUS EVENT ART 1174
1. JUNTILLA VS FUNTANAR
ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL CAMORO, respondents.
FACTS: JUNTILLA was a passenger of the public utility jeepney bearing plate No. PUJ-71-7
on the course of the trip from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by
defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered under the franchise of defendant Clemente
Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney
reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle.
In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to
his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he
suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back. Because of his shock and
injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist
watch was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City
Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed
immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch. In spite of the efforts of his
father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for P 852.70 (Exh. "B") could no longer be
found.
Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed Civil Case No. R-17378 for breach of contract with damages
before the City Court of Cebu City, Branch I against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon
and Berfol Camoro.
DEFENSE FORTUITOUS EVENT. TIRE BLOWOUT.The respondents filed their answer,
alleging inter alia that the accident that caused losses to the petitioner was beyond the
control of the respondents taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly
bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.
CITY COURT: LIABLE
CFI REVERSED: FORTUITOUS EVENT
ISSUE: WON THE ACCIDENT WAS FORTUITIOUS. NO.
In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The
records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately
after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was
running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the
petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a
ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger
jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were
three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the
tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous
event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road
conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have
been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the
jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
a caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must
be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of
the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach
their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits,
and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety
of passengers at all times.
HERNANDEZ VS CA-ROBBERY
TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
FACTS: Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer
of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. As such, he
went to the main office of the Authority in Manila on July 1, 1983, to encash two
checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the
Project. He estimated that the money would be available by ten o'clock in the morning and
that he would be back in Ternate by about two o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. For
some reason, however, the processing of the checks was delayed and was completed
only at three o'clock that afternoon. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them
because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay the following day. He thought
he had to do this for their benefit as otherwise they would have to wait until the following
Tuesday at the earliest when the main office would reopen. And so, on that afternoon of July
1, 1983, he collected the cash value of the checks and left the main office with not an
insubstantial amount of money in his hands. 1
What would he do with the money in the meantime? The petitioner had two choices, to wit:
(1) return to Ternate, Cavite, that same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2)
take the money with him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for
Ternate the following morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. And so, on
that afternoon of July 1, 1983, at a little past three o'clock, he took a passenger jeep bound for
his house in Bulacan.
ROBBERY: It was while the vehicle was along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue that two
persons boarded with knives in hand and robbery in mind. One pointed his weapon at the
petitioner's side while the other slit his pocket and forcibly took the money he was
carrying. The two then jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the initial shock,
immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and
overcame him after a scuffle. The petitioner sustained injuries in the lip arms and knees.
Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper
who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with him has not been
recovered. 2
REQUEST FOR RELIEF FROM MONEY ACCOUNTABILITY: DENIED BY COA, P10,175
HERNANDEZ: avers he has done only what any reasonable man would have done and
should not be held accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no control.
The petitioner stresses that he decided to encash the checks in the afternoon of July 1,
1983, which was a Friday, out of concern for the employees of the Project, who were
depending on him to make it possible for them to collect their pay the following day. July 2
and 3 being non-working days and July 4 being a holiday, they could receive such payment
only on the following Tuesday unless he brought the encashed checks on July 1, 1983, and
took it to Ternate the following day.
SECTION 638 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty —
Notice to Auditor. — When a loss of government funds or property occurs
while the same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other casualty, the
officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately
notify the Auditor General, or the provincial auditor, according as a
matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the other, and
within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or provincial
auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application for
relief, with the available evidence in support thereof. An officer who fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed
credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.
ISSUE: whether these acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the
denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money.
It seems to us that the petitioner was moved only by the best of motives when he
encashed the checks on July 1, 1983, so his co-employees in Ternate could collect their
salaries and wages the following day
For such an attitude, Hernandez should be commended rather than faulted.
As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily
agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the
comparative hazards in the trips to the two places. It is true that the petitioner
miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made
seemed logical at that time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and
prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in broad daylight in
the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it cannot
be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly
a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been
reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did.We find, in sum, that under
the circumstances as above narrated, the petitioner is entitled to be relieved from
accountability for the money forcibly taken from him in the afternoon of July 1, 1983. To
impose such liability upon him would be to read the law too sternly when it should be
softened by the proven facts.
GOTTESCO VS CHATTO-MOVIE
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents.
 FACTS: MOVIE: plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina
Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by
defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then
were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie.
COLLAPSED CEILING: Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its
balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued.
Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were
able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day.
UST HOSPITAL: The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto
was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from
June 5 to 11.
WENT TO ILLINOIS USA: Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness,
plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment (Exh "E"). She was treated
at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3)
months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6)
times.
GOTTESCO: Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of
its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from
any structural or construction defect.
RTC: CHATTO
Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force
majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted
that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COLLAPSED CEILING WAS CAUSED BY FORCE MAJEURE
HELD: Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were
due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause
or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the
respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who
had not even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-incident investigation
cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the
finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to
construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building
was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown
that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the
time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only
petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.
But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the
premises before the date of the accident. It is settled that:
The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly
warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe
for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to
no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. 14
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
 Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and
the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its
occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant. 15
That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the
cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was
guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's
definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any
liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of
negligence.
SERVANDO VS PHIL STEAM-FIRE
AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., defendant-appellant.
FACTS: On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on
board the appellant's vessel, FS-176, for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, the following cargoes
ARRIVAL T PULUPANDAN: Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of
November 18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto
the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs.
CARGOES BURNED: At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was
razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire,
however, appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice 2 Appellees'
claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant.
RTC: SERVANDO
It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in
question, the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or
damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein
--Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's
risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be
responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or
other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
SERVANDO: Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them
because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not
sign the same. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs.
Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979, 3 where the same issue was resolved in this
wise:
ISSUE: WON PHIL STEAM IS NEGLIGENT. NO.
Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the
basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code:
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
 requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.
In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which
happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the
event.
There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in delay in the
performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of
the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact,
pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before
the burning of the warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the
goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was
undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and
was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the
appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.
NATIONAL POWER VS CA
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: plaintiffs therein, now private respondents RAYO ET AL, sought to recover actual
and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by the
inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978.
The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of
water through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said
complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that: 1) defendant NPC operated and
maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray,
Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident
in question; 3) despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the
impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring
the water level at the dam; 4) when the said water level went beyond the maximum
allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and
recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of
water which inundated the banks of the Angat River; and 5) as a consequence, members of
the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their properties
were washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of 27 October 1978. 3
NPC: 1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and
maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father
in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release
of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take
the necessary precautions; 4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to
prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property; 5) in
spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain
or control the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages incurred by the private respondents
were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character
of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred
that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function. 4
RTC NPC CHARTER DOES NOT ALLOW IT TO BE SUED BASED ON TORT
CA DAMAGES FOR RAYA ET AL hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused
not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released
from the Angat Dam by defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26,
1978 up to the morning hours of October 27,
1978. 9
ISSUE: WON THE FLOODING WAS FORTUITOUS EVENT. NO.
HELD: petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape
liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners,
were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of
God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened.
The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only
partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was
thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
6. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE VS CA-TYPHOON SALIN, DIMAANO NEIGHBORS
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS
VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION
DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondents DIMAANO are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay
City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road.
TYPHOON SALIN: On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon
Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building
was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the
roofing of private respondents house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection
of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city
building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.

5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the
buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot
is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong winds having a
westerly direction, the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure,
the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence,
there are portions of the roofing, those located on both ends of the building, which remained
intact after the storm.

6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings
structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2
diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are
not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even bent
to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.
FOURTH FLR STRUCTURAL HAZARD: It then recommended that to avoid any further loss
and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of
subject school building be declared as astructural hazard.
SOUTHEASTERN: FORTUITOUS: averred that subject school building had withstood
several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any
portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that
said school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is in
tip-top condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond
human control such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby,
absent any negligence on its part.
RTC: damage to private respondents house could have been avoided if the construction
of the roof of [petitioners] building was not faulty. The dispositive portion of the lower
courts decision[7] reads thus:
CA AFFIRMED:

ISSUES: whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting
from the impact of the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off by the strong
winds of typhoon Saling, was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event? If so,
petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents.

HELD: NO. Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable. In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial
unroofing of petitioners school building. Private respondents did not even show that the
plans, specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither
did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and
specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building
was basically flawed.[21]
hen part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon Saling, the same
city official gave the go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original
design and subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same
building. These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect,
contrary to the report that its U-shaped form was structurally defective. Having given
his unqualified imprimatur, the city building official is presumed to have properly
performed his duties[23] in connection therewith.
Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government service since
1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure
has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a
matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject
school buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have
withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than Saling.
 In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the
judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent
or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question
and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private
respondents house.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK

1. AFIALDA VS HISOLE-GORED BY CARABAOS/LABOR LAW

MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-appellees.

FACTS: This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The
complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the
defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that
while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later
died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own
fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending
upon him for support.

AFIALDA- seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which
reads:

=The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages
it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

=This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.

The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code,
the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and
that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if
he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming
that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the article 1905 does
not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable
whether or not he has been negligent or at fault.

ISSUE: whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker.

HELD: NO. In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business
to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself.
And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks
of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences.=

The present action, however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
there being no allegation that, among other things, defendant's business, whatever that
might be, had a gross income of P20,000. As already stated, defendant's liability is
made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable
for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be based on article
1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the
defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint
contains no allegation on those points.

2. ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC CO VS CA AND NANA BELEN, TYPHOON GENING

THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE
JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA
JUAN, respondents.

FACTS: TYPHOON GENING: in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June
29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos
Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake.

after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the
deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of
her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and
proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which
she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might
have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was
followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the
deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was
partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of
between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased,

NANA BELEN SANK INTO FLOOD WATER: Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay"
and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded
them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.

Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes.
Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help
from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been
electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and
one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask
the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the
electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater
was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current
had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the
deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

In another place, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power
Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their
electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines.
Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection.
On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from
the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go
to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As he
turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30
meters long strung across the street "and the other end was seeming to play with
the current of the water. Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no
lineman therein, he returned to the NPC Compound.

TRIED TO REVIVE NANA BELEN: His efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was
setting in.

CFI IN FAVOR OF INELCO

CA: RESPONDENTS

ISSUE: (1) whether or not the deceased died of electrocution. YES; (2) whether or not
petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death;

=In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of
June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a
supplier of electricity to be inconstant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable
incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant
did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or
otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office.

Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it
that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies
must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger

Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no
application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances
which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept. 1972) and Aida
Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept. 1972), the deceased, accompanied by the former two,
were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not
flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her
property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that
she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a
person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to
exist or if the life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p.
301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper and James,
"The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency
was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced
with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident
occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's
consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of
the death caused by petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).

DUE DILIGENCE

RAMOS VS PEPSI

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS (SON), petitioners,

vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.

FACTS: Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. 1 and
Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a
collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck
and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision driven by
Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was
then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.

CFI: PEPSI AND BONIFACIO LIABLE

CA: BONIFACIO LIABLE, PEPSI ABSOLVED

ISSUE: WON PEPSI COLA EXERCISED DUE DILIGECNCE.:

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant

company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the
bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had
size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous
experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take
the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second,
the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we are of the sense
that defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the choice or selection of defendant driver'.

HELD: Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the
required due diligence in the selection of its driver.." It should perhaps be stated that in
the instant case no question is raised as to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-
COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia:... The owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.

2.METRO MANILA VS CA and NENITA CUSTODIA

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, petitioner, =AGUDO CALEBAG OWNED

BY VICTORINO LAMAYO
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND NENITA CUSTODIA, respondents.

FACTS: At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant
Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney driven by
defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo,
bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day.

COLLISSION MMTC BUS BY GODOFREDO LEONARDO AND JEEP BY LAMAYO-

While the passenger jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC,
for short) bus driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo bound for its terminal at
Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew
Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their
horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them
occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus.

NENITA CUSTODIA HOSPITALIZED FOR A WEEK: The collision impact caused

plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney
and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious
physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained
consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twenty-four (24)
days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half months
(31/2). 1
A complaint for damages 2 was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a
minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein named defendants
following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the
collision.

MMTC: petitioner Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC), a government-owned

corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo, along with its driver,
Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and
counterclaim 3 that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver
Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly
considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was
defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag, who
failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus
through the fault and negligence of its employees.

Defendant Victorino Lamayo, damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by

defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter's
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC
failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

PROCESS OF HIRING OF MMTC

RTC:, both drivers of the colliding vehicles concurrently negligent for non-observance
of appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure to take the usual
precautions when approaching an intersection.

CA SOLIDARILY LIABLE

HELD: Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by
petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not
been clearly established.

Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job
applicants and supervising its employees in the field, through the testimonies of
Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transport
supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC.

These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio

principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost
their verity. As earlier observed, respondent court could not but express surprise,
and thereby its incredulity, that witness Garbo neither testified nor presented any
evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had undergone all the
clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate. The supposed
clearances, results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted
and complied with were never presented in court despite the fact that, if true, then
they were obviously in the possession and control of petitioner. 42

The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in relation
to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements
thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. 43 It is to be noted that
petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180,
the pertinent parts of which provides that:

-The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a presumption juris

tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the
article, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Negligence is imputed to them by
law, unless they prove the contrary.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "(t)he

mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that
they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability
arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show
that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." 54 Paying lip-service to
these injunctions or merely going through the motions of compliance therewith
will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.

PRESCRIPTION

1.KRAMER VS CA

ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.

ISSUE: whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the
private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of
limitations.

FACTS: the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer,
Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.

COLLISSION MARJOLEA AND ASIA PH: NEAR MARICABON AND CAPE

SANTIAGO =Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured
in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the
private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the
collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.

MARINE PROTESTS: After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their
respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast
Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the
proximate cause of the maritime collision.

On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish
catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private
respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision.

DAMAGES VS TRANSASIA. the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against

the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay
City. 2 The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 2907-P.

TRANSASIA: prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, 3 the
prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-
delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners
should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their
cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took
place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted
beyond the four-year prescriptive period.

KRAMER: The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was
tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued
only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the
crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive
period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. The
petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the
same was seasonably filed.

RTC: the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should
begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of
the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained.

CA PRESCRIBED

ISSUE: WON THE ACTION OF KRAMER HAS PRESCRIBED. YES.

HELD: Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must
be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-
delict is committed. InPaulan vs. Sarabia, 16 this Court ruled that in an action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-
delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
 17
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held as
follows-

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can
be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .

From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when
the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or
omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action
arises.

Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has
prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages
was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive
period.

ALLIED BANKING VS CA

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSELITO Z. YUJUICO, respondents.

FACTS

YUJUICO LOAN FROM GENBANK: On April 1, 1976, private respondent Joselito Z.

Yujuico obtained a loan from the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00), payable on or before April 1,
1977. As evidence thereof, private respondent issued a corresponding promissory
note in favor of GENBANK. At the time private respondent incurred the obligation, he
was then a ranking officer of GENBANK and a member of the family owning the
controlling interest in the said bank.

RESOLUTION 675 AND 677 FORBID BUSINESS AND LIQUIDATION: the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 675 forbidding GENBANK from doing
business in the Philippines. This was followed by Resolution No. 677 issued by the
Monetary Board on March 29, 1977 ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.

ALLIED BANK AND AURELLANO: It appears that in a Memorandum of Agreement

dated May 9, 1977 executed by and between Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED) and
Arnulfo Aurellano as Liquidator of GENBANK, ALLIED acquired all the assets and
assumed the liabilities of GENBANK, which includes the receivable due from
private respondent under the promissory note.

ALLIED VS YUJUICO: Upon failing to comply with the obligation under the promissory
note, petitioner ALLIED, on filed a complaint against private respondent for the
collection of a sum of money.

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT: Sometime in 1987 and in the course of the proceedings in
the court below, private respondent, then defendant in the court below, filed a Motion to
Admit Amended/Supplemental Answer and Third-Party Complaint. Private respondent
sought to implead the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as third-party
defendants. It was alleged in the third-party complaint that by reason of the
tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, private
respondent was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan such
that he should not now be held liable thereon.

TRANSASIA:: As to the issue of prescription, it is the position of petitioner that the

cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already
prescribed. 14 Being founded on what was termed as tortious interference," petitioner
asserts that under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict 15 the
action against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from
the date the cause of action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action
accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to
desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains that the claim
should have been filed at the latest on March 25, 1981. 16

YUJUICO: relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine" 17 to

support his claim that the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant
accrued only on December 12,1986 when the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642
became final and executory. Thus, it is contended that while the third party complaint
was filed only on June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on
February 7, 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed.

ISSUES: Is there a proper ground to admit the third-party complaint?; and (b) assuming
that there is, has the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed?

Court ruled that it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party
when the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must
be reckoned.KThus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be
admitted as above discussed, however, since the cause of action accrued on March
25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the General Bank to desist from doing
business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June
17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint
should not be admitted.