Minority

29. Llave v.People (G.R. No. 166040)

Facts: On Sept. 24, 2002, on an errand from her mother, the victim, who was only 7 years old at that time,
proceeded to their house, where the accused waited for her, and accosted her; he proceeded to sexually abuse
her, while the victim cried for help. A barbecue vendor nearby heard her cries and came to the scene; the
accused fled, and the vendor told the victim to tell her parents what happened. Together with her parents, the
victim went to the police and reported the incident; the vendor also testified to what he saw during that time.

The medical examiner found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge
between the labia minora; there was also fresh abrasion of the perennial skin at 1 o’clock position near the anal
opening. The trial court found the victim guilty, declaring that he acted with discernment, but crediting him with
the special mitigating circumstance of minority.

Issue: W/N accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and if yes, whether he acted with discernment, being a
minor of age more than 9 years old but less than 15?

Ruling: YES. Penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the private
complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion that the rape was consummated.

While it is true that medical examiner did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private complainant’s
genitalia, such fact does not negate the latter’s testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The
absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl
as in this case. The court have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from the age of
thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what transpired, considering not only
their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter
to which they testified is not true.

Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The accused, with
methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure
that passers-by would not be able to discover his dastardly acts.

30. Jose v. People (G.R. No. 162052)

Facts: Accused was arrested in a drug buy-bust operation conducted by the police; accused was a passenger in
the car of Zarraga, whom allegedly made the deal with the undercover in the said operation. They claimed that
they were kidnapped by the police and asked ransom for their release from one of the accused’s wife. The trial
court found them guilty, and credited in their favour the preventive imprisonment they had undergone.CA
reduced the penalty on petitioner since he was 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.

Issue: W/N petitioner acted with discernment and that prosecution failed to allege in the information that he
acted with discernment?

Ruling: NO. For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor;
his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon
used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding
the corpus delicti.

The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused,
when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, if he could afford to buy shabu. There is no evidence that the
petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over the same
to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that
pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between
two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties
to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the
petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused.

31. Declarador v. Judge Gubaton (G.R. No. 159208)

Facts: The accused, a 17-year old, minor, stabbed a teacher, wife of the complainant, 15 times; he was charged
with murder aggravated by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, to which the accused plead
guilty to the crime charged. In view of the accused’s plea, RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty, but
the sentence was suspended by the judge automatically because the accused was a minor at that time; he was
ordered to be committed to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth.

The husband of the victim, herein petitioner, claimed that in Art. 192 of P.D. No. 603, the benefit of a suspended
sentence does not apply to a juvenile who was convicted of a crime punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.

Issues: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess in
jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of the accused?

Ruling: YES. The benefits of P.D. No. 603 shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. Furthermore, it shall not apply
to a juvenile in conflict with law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence or, when at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, the juvenile is already 18 yrs. old.

The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on
the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which
determines the disqualification of a juvenile. Rep. Act No. 9344 only amended the disqualification of those
juveniles in conflict with law, who at the time of the promulgation of judgment, was already 18 years old, and
allowed the benefits to apply to them. The other disqualification in P.D. No. 603 remains unchanged. Hence, the
accused is still disqualified under law to benefit from such suspension of sentence. Case law has it that statutes in
pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to
the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislations on the subject and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto.

Accident
32. Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94)

Facts: The accused Toledo was charged with homicide for the killing of one Ricky Duarte. Toledo insisted that
when he killed the victim, the same was purely accidental. He claimed that the victim was so drunk that the same
charged at the door of his house. This prompted the accused to get his bolo and when he tried to prevent Ricky
from entering, he accidentally hit the latter whereby killing him. But still the RTC and the Ca found him guilty.
And so, the accused goes to the SC wherein this time, he claims that his actions were purely on self-defense. It
was done when the victim attacked him and in trying to defend himself, he accidentally killed Duarte.

Issue: Should the Court find his actions exempting and/or justifying?

Ruling: The Sc ruled that there is no such thing as accidental self-defense. The accused cannot claim the death
purely accidental and when the findings of the lower courts were unfavorable, later on change his defense by
alleging that what happened was purely self-defense. The two defenses perpetuated by the accused are totally
inconsistent with each other. Although in the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused is excused
because of DELIBERATELY trying to repel an unlawful aggression which could have killed or injure him. And so,
such acts are not in tune with ACCIDENT which presupposes an act which was not even contemplated or planned
but purely accidental.

33. People v. Concepcion (386 SCRA 74)

Facts: The accused Concepcion is a police officer charged with murder for the killing of one Lorenzo Galang.
According to testimonies of both parties’ witnesses, Lorenzo Galang was brought to the barangay hall because he
was so drunk and unruly at the town plaza and was continually disturbing the peace. The accused then came to
the barangay hall apparently to question Galang. But herein lies the differences in the testimonies. The
prosecution witnesses (2 of them) testified that while interrogating Galang, Concepcion suddenly fired two shots
past the ear of the victim without injuring him. But later on, he hit the victim in the abdomen and fired a shot
which wounded Galang in the thigh and then Concepcion fired three more shots which hit the victim in the chest
and killed him.

But according to the accused, he was merely pacifying Galang when the victim became so unruly that the
accused fired two warning shots. But instead of scaring Galang, the latter tried to grab the gun from the accused.
Two shots were accidentally fired which hit Galang thus causing his death. The accused claims that he should be
exempted because he was just performing his lawful duty as a police officer and that the shooting was purely
accidental. The trial court found Concepcion guilty.

Issue: Should the accused be exempted from criminal liability due to accident?

Ruling: NO. Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish
the guilt of the accused. However, once the defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises
an exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a
defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article
12 (4) of the Code.

Unfortunately for the accused, his testimony was too full of inconsistencies which failed to discharge the burden .
For one, Concepcion claims that when the victim tried to grab his gun, said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a
swivel. But then he claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the BARREL OF THE GUN”. This
was very inconceivable. Furthermore, it was not believable that a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle
from a police officer who also had a handgun tucked by his waist.

Lastly, the prosecution witness categorically testified that he saw Concepcion shoot the victim with the M-16
rifle. And so, the finding of guilt by the lower court was proper.

Irresistible Force/Uncontrollable Fear

34. Ty v. People (G.R. No. 149275)

Facts: This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of
Manila. The said accused drew and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L.
Vecino several post-dated checks. The said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such checks in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for “Account Closed” and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to
pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the checks or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of “an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.” She claims that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release of
her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated, and would not discharge unless the hospital bills
are paid.

The trial court rendered judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appeal with the CA and reiterated her defense
that she issued the checks “under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury.” The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set
aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos P 60,000.00
equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.

Issue: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal
liability?

Ruling: No. Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3)
the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. It must
appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man
would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A
mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument
acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape.

The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks, a
condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her
mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother
might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

Entrapment v. Instigation

35. People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019)

Facts: On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the
Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan
received an intelligence report about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael,
Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed
a surveillance team to look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of November
29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team
had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of P200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latter’s house
at No. 123 Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of
November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as
team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the
appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to appellant’s house and
knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1 Ventura as
a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked P100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him
a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged
signal to the other members of the buy-bust team that the sale was consummated. Appellant was arrested and
the two marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was
allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellant’s house and from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon
laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine
hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.
The accused was charged of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged. The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision denying the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not instigation was the act which preceded Sta. Maria’s arrest?

Ruling: NO. In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while
executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into
committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind
of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into
execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in
his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or
that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is
this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.

The solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence
of the course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in
illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with the appellant. There
was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

36. People v. Pacis (G.R. No. 146309)

Facts: On April 6, 1998, Atty. Yap supervising agent of the Dangeroud Drugs Division of the NBI, received an
information that certain Roberto Pacis was offering to sell ½ kilo of shabu for the amount of P950 per gram or a
total of P475,000.00. The NBI Chief of Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and
Sr. Agent Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case. The two officer and an informant went to the house of
the appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. They negotiated the sale of ½ kilo of
shabu. The total price was reduced to P450,000.00. It was agreed that the payment and delivery of shabu would
be made the next day at same place.

On April 17, 1998, NBI agents and the informant went to appellant’s house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a
paper bag, the latter saw a transparent plastic with white crystalline substance inside. Appellant asked for the
payment. Atty. Yap introduced Congzon to get the money from the car. When Congzon returned, he gave the
“boodle money” to Atty. Yap who handed to the appellant. Upon receipt of payment, the officers identified
themselves as NBI agents and arrested him. The trial gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the “buy-bust” operation that led to the appellant’s arrest was valid?

Ruling: YES. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce
the would- be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co- principals themselves. It has been
held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as legitimate method of apprehending
criminal elements engage in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs.

The records show that the operation that led to the arrest of the appellant was indeed an entrapment, not
instigation. Courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in the regular manner. In entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an
incident by the prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law.

Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1)
the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold was a
dangerous drug. The elements were duly proven in the case herein. The record shows that the appellant sold and
delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers.