Module 4

Sources of Philippine Law

Common Law vs Civil Law

Lost in Translation
DeFabritiis

I. Common Law Origins

A. Common Law
- the law that is expressed in judicial opinions
- has accumulated over centuries in hundreds of thousands of cases decided by the courts
- body of court decisions
- developed over centuries
- spans many traditional legal topics
- England common law
- evolves, defined by continous motion, fluid
B. Precedent
- most basic form in the common law is a body of law comprised of precedent
- a prior decisions that functions as models for later decisions
- consistent group of decisions which represent a model to be followed by subsequent
decisions
- the binding decisions of higher courts of the same jurisdiction
C. Common-law Court
- bound by prior reported rulings on specific disputes
- doctrine of “stare decisis et quieta non movere” (to stand by things decided and not
disturb settled law)
D. Stare decisis
- commands judges to apply the law as it has been set out in a prior case when a higher or
equal court made the prior decision
- requires that the new case be the same or substantially the same as the precedent
II. Civil Law Origins
A. Civil Law
- sourced from written constitutions, codes, specific statutes or decrees, and international
treaties
- highly systemized and structured
- five basic codes
1. Civil Code
2. Commercial Code
3. Code of Civil Procedure
4. Penal Code
5. Code of Criminal Procedure
- state principles in broad, general phrases, stated concisely so that they may be
exhaustive
B. Legal Scholars
- creative force behind the law
- publish commentaries and how it should be interpreted and applied
- doctrinally definitive and indispensable to the systematic and comprehensive
understanding of the code
- molds the civil law tradition through using formal sources to create a model of the legal
system
 C. Judges
- operators of the legal system
- apply the applicable Code provisions to the case before them
- adhere to existing Code principles, legal science and scholarly developed doctrine
- far less emphasis that the common law is placed on discretion and interpretation
- sometimes resorts to a rulemaking methods in order to perform his duty to decide the
case
- express delegation/judicial discretion (using indeterminate words that emand appraisal
of values)
- sometimes relies exclusively in his own independent evaluation, render the decision he
would propose if he were a legislator
- “creates” law only to the extent that the judge makes concrete what was a general and
abstract rule in the code
- judicial decisions are not a source of law
- no concept of precedent, but may have persuasive value
D. Jurisprudence Constant
- series of decisions forming a constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings that
have the same reasoning
- long and continuous use and influence of cases indicated the current decision is in
harmony with the code
III. Advocacy
A. Advocacy
- process of try to convince your audience through the technique of persuasion
- Oral advocacy - interactive effort that requires a well-organized presentation of an
advocate’s case as well as spontaneous responses to the judge’s questions
- should have a mantra that reduces their case to the bare essence, central theme that she
will approach in diff angles:
1. Facts
2. Law
3. Intent
4. Policy
- Traditional structure:
1. Opening Statement
* greet judges
* introduce oneself
* briefly set the procedural posture
* affirm, reverse or remand?
* ask if the court would like a brief statement of facts
2. Road Map
* concise outline of the issues to support position
* organized order of issues
* present strongest points first
3. Body of the Argument
* anticipate questions, directly respond to questions
* reserve not more than 2-3 mins for rebuttal
* do not raise new points during rebuttal
4. Conclusion
* briefly summarize
* can as the court to grant time to conclude
* ask if the court has any further questions
* thank the judges
B. Oral Advocacy in Common Law Jurisdiction – The Body of the
Argument
- Inductive reasoning is the dominant style
- focus on fact patterns
- analyze cases presenting similar but not identical facts
1. extract specific rules
2. determine the often narrow scope of each rule through deduction
3. sometimes propose new rules to cover facts that have not yet presented
themselves
- body of argument must be organized with appropriate attention to the facts and the law
- For common law:
* fashion the body from a close study of prior cases
* make a connection with the two as much as possible
* reference a particular case to make a general statement of what the case holds
and why the court should apply or decline its reasoning to the present case
* show how close their facts are to those of the case presently before the court
- Steps in judicial reasoning:
1. recognition of a similarity between cases
2. interpretation of a rule fashioned from the material facts of the first case
3. application of the rule to the 2nd case
- often a court will be required to determine which of two competing precedential lines
will govern the case before it —> the advocate’s argument must persuade the court to
select one line over the other
- Appeal to Precedent
* form of justification that is often as persuasive as it is pervasive
* like cases must be treated alike if a legal system is to be even minimally fair
* reasoning by analogy
* a court may decide to overrule its precedent but only for good reasons that
outweigh the policies of certiainty, predictability and fairness underlying stare
decisis
- Success of an advocate depends on persuading the court of the accuracy of the analogies
the advocate suggests between his client’s situation and that of the precedent he cites
- Demonstrate why unfavorable precedent is not relevant
C. Civil Law Jurisdiction
- deductive style of reasoning – when the courts apply general legal principles to specific
situations by reasoning with guidance from scholars
- advocate must build argument around legal principles
*tracing their history
*identifying their function
*determining their domain of application and explaining their effects in terms of
rights and obligations
- In deciding a case, civil law requires a judge to search for legal concepts in the Civil
Code, delineating a pattern of competing interests closely resembling the interests
pressing for recognition in the instant case
- Where an advocate, arguing in a civil law jurisdiction, argues in the form of an appeal
to precedent, she is asking the civil law judge to do the exact opposite of what he is
bound to do – adhere as closely as possible to the code.
D. Create an effective civil law argument by transferring common law advocacy skills:
- primary goal of an advocate – convince the court that his client should prevail
- to achieve this goal – the advocate must understand and appreciate the main goals of
an oral argument –> persuasion and education
- Transferring common law advocacy skills to create an effective civil law argument
requires:
1. An understanding of the purpose of the oral argument, as well as the governing
rules of the court or tribunal hearing the argument
*Advocate must clarify the issues the parties have submitted and
persuasively frame those issues so that a judge is convinced to rule in her
favor.
*Common-law Court: Court is formally bound by prior reported rulings
on specific disputes, decided by the Supreme Court or higher courts
within the state or federal jurisdiction.
*Civil Law Jurisdiction: The doctrine of stare decisis DOES NOT apply
in the civil law system and, therefore, DOES NOT bind lower courts to
follow decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction. The body of
the argument cannot solely rely upon and make reference to earlier
decision. Rather, her argument must also find support in scholarly
doctrines and notions of customary international law, consisting “of rules
of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the
belief that the law required them to act that way." Judicial decisions, not
a source of law so a civil law advocate should not be as concerned with
the impact of the court’s decision on future cases.
2. An appreciation for the role of the judge hearing the argument
*Common-law judges’ role: to make laws. A legal system grounded in
judge made law has an impact on the way the advocate structures her
argument.
*Civil-law judges’ role: to apply the law. An advocate appearing before a
civil law judge must present an argument that requires the application of
the law. As a result, the civil law advocate must build the body of her
argument around legal principles tracing their history, identify their
function, determining their domain of application, and explaining their
effects in terms of rights and obligations
3. A broader grasp of what the common law considers secondary authority
*Common law: Scholarship is only considered secondary source such as
legal encyclopedias, treatises, legal periodicals, and law reviews are not
binding on courts. Cited with less frequency than primary authority, the
use of secondary sources is generally limited to providing background,
explanation, and grounding in the law
*Civil law: must appreciate the role scholarship. Although scholarly texts
are not a primary source of law, they are doctrinally definitive and
indispensable to the systematic and comprehensive understanding of the
code. not merely as research tools, but as sources which provide support
for her argument.
4. An awareness of the applicability of non-binding precedent
*The common law corner stone of stare decisis and theory of precedent,
are incompatible with the Code-based method applied by civil lawcourts.
*Cicero’s advice:
An advocate must be clear so that the court understands her
argument. An advocate must be interesting so that the court pays
attention to her argument. And, an advocate must be persuasive so that
the court rules in favor of her argument. In order to properly achieve this
trifecta, the advocate must first fully comprehend the legal system that
governs the court or tribunal to which she is presenting her argument.
 Common Law
Sources of Law Stare Decisis
- precedents or prior decisions
of higher courts of the same
jurisdiction are binding on
subsequent cases with
essentially the same facts
Civil Law
Written Constitutions
Codes
- Civil Code
- Commercial Code
- Code of Civil Procedure
- Penal Code
- Code of Criminal Procedure
Specific Statutes or Decrees
International Treaties

Judge A common law judge MAKES
laws. A legal system grounded
in judge-made law has an
impact on the way the advocate
structures her argument.
Dominant Style of Reasoning Inductive Reasoning
(Specific to General)
The rational of the argument is
that like cases must be treated
alike if a legal system is to be
even minimally fair. An
argument using precedent is
essentially reasoning by
analogy.
A civil law judge APPLIES the
law, he does not create it due to
the function of a civil law
servant
Deductive Reasoning
(General to Specific)
The civil law advocate must
build the body of her argument
around legal principles tracing
their history, identify their
function, determining their
domain of application, and
explaining their effects in terms
of rights and obligations.

Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs Civil Law

William Tetley
I. Introduction
The European Union is a mixed jurisdiction which is a convergence between two major legal
traditions
• Civil law of the continental countries
• Common law of England, Wales and Ireland
Mixed Jurisdiction defined
• Political units with mixed legal systems
• Definition of common law/civil law mixed legal systems:
o Classic definition by F.P. Walton (codified system): legal systems in which the
Romano-Germanic tradition has become suffused to some degree by Anglo-
American law.
o Modern definition by Robin Evans-Jones (uncodified system): legal system
which, to an extensive degree, exhibits characteristics of both the civilian and the
English common law traditions.
• Examples of countries with mixed jurisdictions: Scotland, Algeria, Zimbabwe
II. Related Legal Entitles and their Definitions
Legal Systems
• Nature and content of the law generally, and the structures and methods whereby it is
legislated upon, adjudicated upon and administered, within a given jurisdiction.
 • A legal system may govern a specific group of persons. Thus, a person belonging to
various groups could be subject to as many legal systems.
o Example: McGill University in Montreal would be subject to the rules and
judicial institutions of: (1) Canada; (2) the university; and (3) the Moslem faith
Legal Traditions or Legal Families
• The general culture underlying a family of similar legal systems. Since most legal
systems duplicated the law administered in another jurisdiction. major legal traditions
tend to be associated with the original legal system as it then existed rather than as it
exists today.
• Relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal
system into a cultural perspective.
• The grouping of laws into families establishes a limited number of types, simplifies the
presentation and facilitates and understanding of the world’s contemporary laws.
• Three (3) highly influential legal traditions in the contemporary world:
o Civil law
o Common law
o Socialist law
Civil Law
• Origin from Roman Law as codified in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinan, and as
subsequently developed in Continental Europe and around the world.
Eventually civil law was divided into two streams:
o Codified Roman law (as seen in the French Civil Code of 1804)
o Uncodified Roman law (As see in Scotland and South Africa)
• Highly systematized and structured.
• Relies on declarations of broad, general principles, often ignoring the details.
Common Law
• Evolved in England from the 11th century onwards.
• Its principles appear for the most part in reported judgments, usually of the higher
courts, in relation to specific fact situations arising in disputes which courts have
adjudicated. (AKA common law looks at the jurisprudence as ruled by the higher courts)
• Usually more detailed in its prescriptions than civil law.
Statutory Law
• Law found in legislation other than civil codes. Basic to both civil and common law.
• Common law jurisdictions: most rules are found in the jurisprudence and statutes
complete them.
• Civil law jurisdiction: important principles are stated in the code, while the statutes
complete them.
Mixed Legal Systems
• Meaning the law in force is derived from more than one legal tradition or legal family.
• Example: Egyptian legal system is derived partly from civil law and partly from
Moslem or other religiously-based legal traditions.
Mixed Jurisdictions
• A country or political subdivision of a country in which a mixed legal system prevails.
Maritime Law
• Substantive maritime law is in itself a legal system.
• It is a mixed legal system in its own right, found in all jurisdictions, including those
belonging to only one major legal tradition.
• Civilian in its origin and benefited from the infusion of certain English common law
principles and innovations. It also consists of modern international Conventions.
III. Forms of Civil Law Jurisdictions and How the Developed
France
• Intended to be a revolutionary code, its content (e.g. principles such as freedom and
equality) was balanced with more conservative notions reflected especially in the pre-
existing customary law of France’s northern provinces.
• Napoleon’s victorious armies imposed the French Civil Code on various territories such
as the Netherlands. After the downfall of the Emperor, the Code’s prestige caused the
adoption of similar codifications, in the form of either direct translation of the French
Code or national codes based on the French model but with local modifications.
• The movement towards codification which the French Civil Code set in motion also
gave birth to the German Civil Code of 1896. In the Philippines, its civil code largely
copied the Spanish Code of 1889.
Scotland
• Has an Uncodified civil law.
• Scots Law has been divided into four periods:
o Feudal period
* Introduction of feudalism from England, and the influence of Roman
Catholic Canon Law administered by Church courts.
* Establishment of sheriffdoms under King David I, where the sheriffs
administered civil and criminal justice in the name of the king and heard
appeals against rulings of the baronial courts.
Other main source of law in and after this initial period was custom
o The “dark age” until 1532
* Started after the death of King ROber the Bruce in 1329. This was the
age of ongoing political strife, economic difficulty and weak
government.
* Adoption of French institutions in Scotland and the training of many
Scottish lawyers in France.
* The Scottish legal system took on its character as fundamentally
civilIan system differing from what emerged
as the “common law” tradition.
* Creation of the Scottish parliament, and the Church courts consolidated
their hold on marriage and family law
o The Roman period from 1532 until the Napoleonic Wars
* Civilian rules and principles were incorporated into the corpus of Scots
law to supply rules and principles which the old customary law could not
provide.
* The Scottish Reformation culminated in the removal of the Roman
Catholic Church courts and their jurisdiction over marriage, annulment,
and legitimacy.
* Establishment of the General Register of Sasines, and the High Court
of Justiciary.
* English law replaced Roman law as the most influential external
influence on the legal system.
o Modern period: influence of English law
* Scots law was increasingly affected by English Common Law and
statutory law.
* Mixed legal system of feudal law, roman law, canon law, English
common law, and statutes
 South Africa
• Mixed jurisdiction of both civil and common law, as well as African tribal customary
law.
• In the new Republic of South Africa, where South African legislation and precedents
are lacking, Roman-Dutch and English sources are given approximately equal weight
Quebec
• Before the Treaty of Paris, Quebec had a private law primarily governed by the Custom
of Paris.
• Following the Treaty of Paris, there was an initial confusion as to the applicable law.
This was clarified by the enactment of the Quebec Act of 1774 which preserved the laws
of Canada in respect of Property and Civil Rights while imposes English Criminal Law
• Under the Act of Union of 1840, reuniting Upper and Lower Canada, a land
registration system was established and legislation was adopted confirming that the civil
law applied in territories where land had been granted in free and common soccage since
1774.
• The Civil Cofe of Lower Canada reflected the conservative, family-oriented values of
the largely rural society of Quebec. This was drafted both in French and English.
Louisiana
• Was first subjected to French Edicts, Ordinances and the Custom of Paris.
• After Louisiana’s cession to Span in 1763, French laws remained in force until 1769
when they were replaced by Spanish laws and institutions.
• When the US took possession of Louisiana, there was pressure to impose
common law.
• In 1825, the Louisiana Code was enacted. This was modelled closely to the
French Civil Code and was published in both French and English. However, because the
translation was known to have errors, the French version came to regarded as controlling.
(this was the 2nd Civil Code of Louisiana).
• A third Civil Code was promulgated in 1870 and was printed only in English. However,
the unamended provisions were still controlled by its French translation in the event of
ambiguity.
IV. Civil Law and Common Law: Differences in Sources, Concepts and Style
Order of Priority
• Civil law: Doctrine over jurisprudence.
• Common law: Jurisprudence over doctrine.
Doctrine Function:
• Civil Law: doctrine’s function is to draw from its disorganized mass [cases,
books and legal dictionaries] the rules and the principles which will clarify and purge the
subject of impure elements, and thus provide both the practice and the courts with a guide
for the solution of particular cases in the future.
• Common law: doctrine’s function is more modest. Authors are encouraged to
distinguish cases that would appeal incompatible to a civilist, and to extract from these
specific rules.
Doctrine Style:
• Civil Law: author focuses on the legal principles. He or she traces their
history, identifies their function, determines their domain of application, and explains
their effects in terms of rights and obligations. At this stage, general and exceptional
effects are deduced.
• Common Law: author focuses on fact patters, analyzing cases presenting similar but not
identical facts. He or she extracts from the specific rules, and through deduction,
determines the often very narrow scope of each rule.
Jurisprudence: Function
 • Civil Law: jurisprudence applies general principles, and is only a secondary source of
law.
• Common Law: sets out a new specific rule to a new specific set of facts and provides
the principle source of law. Stare Decisis
• Civil law: stare decisis is unknown to civil law, where judgments rendered by judges
only enjoy the “authority of reason”
• Common law: Stare decisis compels lower courts to follow decisions rendered in higher
courts, hence establishing an order of priority of sources by “reason of authority”
Jurisprudence: Style
• Civil law: written in a more formalistic style. They are shorter and separated into two
parts: motifs (reasons) and the dispositive (order). Firstly, identify the legal principles
that might be relevant, then verify if the facts support their application.
• Common law: Longer. extensively exposes the facts, compare or distinguish them from
the facts of the previous case, and decide (if not create) the specific legal rule relevant to
the present facts.
Statutes: Functions
• Note: they have the same paramountcy in both legal traditions.
• Civil law: civil law codes provide the core of the law and particular statutes complete
them. Finally follows the jurisprudence.
• Common law: common law statutes complete the case law. The latter contains the core
of the law expressed through specific rules applying to specific facts.
Style of Drafting of Laws
• Civil law: codes and statutes are concise, Statutes provide no definitions, and state
principles in broad, general phrases.
• Common law: statutes are precise. They provide detailed definitions, and each specific
rule sets out lengthy enumerations of specific applications or exceptions
Interpretations of Laws
• Civil law
o The first step in interpreting an ambiguous law is to discover the inetion of the
legislator by examining the legislation as a whole, including the travaux
preparatoires, as well as the provisions more immediately surrounding the
obscure text.
o Civil law codes and statutes are the primary source of law.
o Civil law judges are influenced by Rosseau’s theory that the state is
the source of all rights under the social contract. • Common law
o Statutes are to be objectively construed according to certain rules standing by
themselves, such as that an enactment must be read as a whole, and that special
provisions will control general provisions.
o Common law statutes have to be read against a case law background.
o English judges favor Hobbes’ theory that the individual agreed to forfeit to the
State only certain rights
Appointment of Judges
• Civil law: appointed fresh from specialized schools. Their main function isadjudicating.
• Common Law: appointed from experienced practicing lawyers. They play an important
role in decided what the law is. Consequences –Evolution of the Law
• Civil law: principles are frozen into codes and often rigid doctrine. They are imposed on
courts.
• Common law: rules can be changed from time to time, subject to the doctrine of stare
decisis.
 Concept of the Legal Rule
• Civil law
o "closed" in the sense that every possible situation is governed by a limited
number of general principles.
o Allows for wider rules than common law in private matters
o Civil law rules are suppletive.
• Common law
o “open” in the sense that new rules may be created or imported for new facts.
o Common law rules are presumptive of the intention of the parties when
relevant facts are present.
Categories of Laws
• Civil law: categories were based on the rules themselves.
• Common law: categories were founded on the law that was administered by different
courts.
Rights versus Remedies
• Civil law: focuses on rights and obligations. Civil law does not have a clearly defined
system of remedies, but relies on the courts to choose or even create the appropriate
remedy.
• Common law: oriented toward the jurisdiction of particular courts to grant the sought-
after remedy (remedies precede rights). Common law does not have a unitary system of
rights and obligations. Courts with jurisdiction to hear a matter set the rights and
obligations au fur et a mesure. It is only through precedents that specific rights can be
found.
V. Civil Law and Common Law: resulting Differences in Law
Economic Loss
• Civil law: provides for the same means of enforcement whatever the obligation,
including performance by equivalence.
• Common law: while allowing consequential damages in contract, used to be
unwilling to award pure economic loss. This attitude has softened recently
Pre-judgment Interests
• Civil law: recoverable
• Common law: awarded only in relatively recent times
Lex Mercatoria
• Civil law: strongest advocates are from civil law traditions.
• Common law: most critics are from the common law traditions.
Conflicts of Laws
• Definition: includes choice of law, choice of jurisdiction and recognition of foreign
judgment. In civil law, the appropriate translation is “private international law” which
dates back to Roman times. Meanwhile common law conflict of laws rules are relatively
new.
• Emphasis:
o Civil law: choice of law rules. (essentially substantive)
o Common law: rules of jurisdiction. (essentially procedural)
Forum Non Conveniens
• Definition: is the common law principle whereby a court, which has jurisdiction to hear
a claim, refuses to do so, because it believes another court of another state also has
jurisdiction to hear the claim and can better render justice in the circumstances.
• Civil law: principle is not acceptable
• Common law: widespread and accepted.
Forum Conveniens
• Definition: common law principle whereby a court, which does not have
 jurisdiction over a claim, nevertheless accepts jurisdiction because there is no other
appropriate jurisdiction to hear the claim and justice would not otherwise be done.
• Civil law: principle is not known although it has been placed in the new Quebec Civil
Code 1994
• Common law: accepted
Arbitration
• Civil law: called amiable compositeur clauses and are generally permitted and are found
in civilan codes.
• Common law: strict equity clauses are suspect in England.
Arbitration and Interpretation/Construction of Contracts
• Civil law: based on the autonomy of free will. This requires actual consent, but
presumotions of fact are available to the trial judge.
• Common law: contractual promises should be interpreted according to the reasonable
expectation of the promise.
VI. Civilian Principles Now in the Common Law
Restitution
• Must of the modern law of restitution resembles the civil law principles of quasi-
contract.
• Terminology
o Common law: the principle of unjust enrichment now unites restitutionary
claims.
o Civil law: the principle of unjust enrichment is but one of the quasi- contracts
which triggers restitution.
• Today the three basic requirements of unjustified enrichment under both civil and
common laws are:
o Enrichment by the receipt of a benefit;
o That this benefit be gained at the plaintiff’s expense; and o A lack of legal
cause.
Negligence: Delict –The General Tort of Negligence
• Civil law always recognized the general obligation not to act unreasonably in
situations not governed by contract. While for common law, there was no general duty of
care, but it is now taught in common law schools. Foreseeable Contractual Damages
• In civil law, consequential damages are the following:
o Not just contractual damages that are the immediate and direct consequence of
the non-performance, but must have been foreseen or foreseeable at the time that
the obligation was contracted unless there is intentional or gross fault.
o Damage as "may reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it”.
Pre-judgment Interests
• In civil law, the general principle of restitutio in integrum entails that pre-judgment
interests be granted as a loss of profit.
• Pre-judgment interests were gradually awarded in common law.
Proof of Foreign Law
• Proving the substance of a foreign law
o Civil law: adversarial. Usually proven only by the production of a certificate,
prepared by a diplomat of the relevant state or an expert in the foreign law
concerned who was not called to testify as a witness at trial.
o Common law: inquisitorial. Proven by the testimony of qualified expert
witnesses who were summoned to court and subject to examination as to both
 their qualifications as experts and their knowledge and interpretation of the
foreign law in question.
Contributory Negligence
• Civil law: dealt as a mere question of causation. Liability is apportioned according to
the gravity of the concurrent faults.
• Common law:
o A complete bar to an action in tort.
o Developed the “last opportunity rule”
o Most common law jurisdictions have now limited, if not abolished, the
contributory negligence rule and adopted the more equitable “proportionate
fault” rule.
Marine Insurance
• Civil law: risks in respect of a maritime operation.
• Common law: losses incident to marine adventure. Common law policies cover risk
interests as well as property rights.
VII. The Lex Mercatoria
Influence of the Lex Mercatoria
• A transnational custom applied by merchant courts in commercial disputes. It has also
incorporated a body of customary private maritime law, the lex maritima or “Ley
Maryne”.
• The three most important principles of lex maritima were: Roles of Oleron, Consolato
del Mare, and Laws of Wisbuy.
• Lex mercatoria and its maritime component, lex maritima were administred by local
courts, often by the piepowder courts at medieval fairs, which typically heard the disputes
and rendered judgments so as not to delay the merchants unduly on their voyages.
• there is what has been called the "new" Law Merchant, the modern lex mercatoria,
which many scholars believe is gradually beginning to take shape in international
commerce. These include:
o The publication of the 1993 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits
o The 1990 Incoterms of the International Chamber of Commerce which provide
a transnational set of continions on rice and delivery in international sale of
goods contracts
o The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention 1980
• Most visible area of growth can be found in the international commercial arbitration.
• The existence of a modern lex mercatoria remains a controversial one, especially in
common law countries.
The 1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
• The adoption of the “Principles of International Commercial Contacts” by the
Governing Council of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) was a major step forward in the development of a modern lex mercatoria.
Its drafters took account of both common law and civilan compilations and codifications.
• These Principles set forth general rules of international commercial contracts.
• The great importance of the UNIDROIT Principles is that the volume exists. It can be
taken to court, it can be referred to page and article number, and persons who are referred
to its provisions can locate and review them without difficulty. This alone is a great
contribution towards making lex mercatoria definitive and provable."
VIII. Statues to Unify of Reconcil the Two Systems
IX. Survival of Mix Jurisdiction
Municipal Law
Civil Code
CHAPTER I
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of
the Philippines." (n)
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication. (1a)
Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. (2)
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. (3)
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory
or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. (4a)
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. (4a)
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. (5a)
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines. (n)
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws. (6)
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. (n)
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence. (n)
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or
nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be
computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and
the last day included. (7a)
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have, for their object, public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a
Phil Constitution
Art II Sec 2
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Art VI
Section 26.

1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Section 27.

1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider
it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if
he had signed it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

Module 5

Essential Legal Concepts

Doctrine of Stare Decisis

CRISTINELLI FERMIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Nachura, J

Facts:
Spouses Annabelle Rama and Eduardo Gutierrez filed a libel suit against Cristinelli Fermin and Bogs
Tugas. Fermin and Tugas, the publisher and editor-in-chief, respectively, of Gossip tabloid, printed and
circulated an article that depicts Rama as a swindler and fugitive from justice.
Petitoner ran an article imputing the crime of malversation against spouses Annaballe Rama and Eduardo
Gutierrez; of vices or defects from being fugitives from the law by allegedly returning to the Philippines
to evade prosecution in the States; and of being a wastrel by alleging that Annabelle Rama lost the
earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos.
After being found guilty of libel by the RTC, Fermin and Tugas appealed to the CA. On appeal, Tugas
was acquitted on account of non-participation, but Fermin’s conviction was affirmed.
Issue:
Whether Fermin, as publisher, is criminally liable for the libelous articles published.
Whether the questioned article is libelous and/or is protected by the mantle of the freedom of the press
and is within the realm of fair and honest comment.

Held:

 Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the article is not required if the
accused is identified as an author, editor, or proprietor, or publisher/printer, and should not be
used a defense
o Either way, Fermin is identified as not just a publisher, but also the president and
chairperson, meaning she has full control over the publication of articles
o Fermin argued that the decision of the CA in People vs. Beltran and Soliven provides the
acquittal of the publisher (Soliven) for lack of evidence that he knew and approved the
article of the writer (Beltran) --> petitioner wants the SC to follow CA's decision and
adopt it as judicial precedent under the principle of stare decisis
 Doctrine of stare decisis - requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof
 Once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument
o BUT, People vs. Beltran and Soliven was a CA decision, and is not binding to the SC
o CA in this case erred in acquitting Tugas in the first place
o his conviction in the trial court cannot be reinstated after his acquittal by the CA as this
would go against his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

 The questioned article offers evident imputation of crimes, was made publicly, as was the victims
were identified. The article itself reeks of malice
o The respondents confirm that the alleged crimes pinned on them are false
 Motive was found for the petitioner to perform acts of libel towards the respondent
o Fermin supports candidates Cong. Golez and Joey Marquez and is known to write articles
to support them, and the opponent of which is Eddie Guttierez
o Not only there is malice in law (libel), there is also malice in fact (there is malice)
 The article cannot be protected by the freedom of the press as the utterances are false, malicious,
and unrelated to the public officer's performance of duties (in this case, as celebrities), and are
irrelevant to matters of public interest
o There must also be freedom from the press, and the press is also subject to regulations
that would not curtail the rights of other individuals

Doctrine of Stare Decisis

CHINESE YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v.
REMINGTON STEEL CORPORATION
Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

 Remington leased ground floor units 964, 966, and second floor unit 963 of a building owned by
YMCA in Binondo, Manila
o Ground floor units 964 and 966 are used for hardware store, offices, and display shop,
and as a passageway going to the second floor unit 963, as a staff room
 YMCA terminated the lease of second floor unit 963 and gave Remington until March 31, 1997
to vacate the premises
 March 24, 1997, Remington filed with MTC Manila a case for the Fixing of Lease Period over
963
 April 8, 1997, YMCA filed with MTC Manila an action for Unlawful Detainer involving
963 against Remington
o The two cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of MTC Manila
 While that was happening, Remington filed a Formal Surrender of the Leased Premises at 964
and 966 and YMCA did not object to it
o BUT, Remington continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966 as a passageway to
second floor unit 963
o They kept the premises of 964 and 966 padlocked and failed to give YMCA the key
 Finally, MTC rendered a decision on the Fixing of Lease Period case and Unlawful Detainer
case, extending for 3 years the lease period on second floor unit 963, and dismissed YMCA's
complaint
 After, Remington filed with MTC a Motion to Constitute Passageway - they had no means to
go the second floor unit 963
o Remington was still in possession of the keys to 964 and 966 because YMCA failed
to provide an adequate passageway to second floor unit 963
o Not resolved by MTC so the case was forwarded to RTC
 RTC rendered a Decision granting Remington 5 years extension for second floor unit 963 and
ordered YMCA to provide a two-meter passageway between units 964 and 966
 YMCA filed an appeal with the CA, and CA held that the trial court had authority to fix an
extension because Remington continued to occupy the unit (although the lease contract expired,
this resulted to a new lease on a month-to-month basis) so they're entitled to lengthen the period
o CA ordered Remington to vacate the premises, there is no more lease contract
 Remington also transferred to its own building - no more reason to continue the
lease
o Remington filed for Motion for Reconsideration
 CA declared it as moot bc Remington already vacated the premises
 While the CA case was pending, YMCA filed with MTC 2 separate complaints for unlawful
detainer to evict Remington from ground floor units 964 and 966
o Remington motioned for it to be consolidated
o YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration and the consolidation was reversed and
cancelled
o The cases were tried separately
 YMCA said in both cases that Remington did not surrender the ground floor units but padlocked
the doors, refused to surrender the keys and failed to pay rent
 Remington said that it vacated and surrendered the ground floor units on July 1, 1998
o The doors were locked for self-preservation since it had a valid lease in 963 and YMCA
didn't want to provide a passageway in the ground floor anyway
o The surrendering of the premises was complete because YMCA did not reject
 Both MTC branches ordered Remington to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rent and
attorney's fees to YMCA
 Remington appealed both decisions to the RTC Manila
o Both ruled in favor of Remington
 YMCA filed separate petitions for review in the CA
 CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for review for the case involving unit 964
o Because William Golangco, signatory to the Verification and Certification on Non-
Forum Shopping, failed to show his proof of authority to file the petition of review
  February 10, 2003, YMCA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, appended Secretary's Certificate
done by YMCA's Secretary attesting to a December 26, 2002 Resolution authorizing William
Golangco to file a petition for review
 July 29, 2003, CA issued a Resolution to deny YMCA's motion for reconsideration
o Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is mandatory, filed alongside the petition -
compliance after cannot excuse to comply in the first instance
 YMCA filed a petition to the Supreme Court for denying its motion for reconsideration
o Rules do not require that the certificate of non-form shopping should require an
authorization
o Melo case does not apply because that one totally failed to append a certificate of non-
form shopping
o Late submission of the authority should not be fatal
 Remington insists that YMCA is required to show that the person singing it has proper authority

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in dismissing YMCA’s petition for failure to attach a proof of
authority of the signatory to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. (YES)

Rationale:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court require that a petition for review filed with the CA should
be verified and should contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.
These requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply therewith is sufficient ground for dismissal of
the petition. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the
petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
The rule against forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party- litigant shall not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial
procedure.
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for Verification vis-a-vis
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
Non-compliance with the Verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, hence,
the court may order its correction, or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends
of justice may be better served. On the other hand, the lack of certification of non-forum shopping is
generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.
However, jurisprudence instructs that the rule on certification against forum shopping may be relaxed on
the grounds of “substantial compliance” or “special circumstance or compelling reasons.”
As with previous jurisprudence, YMCA rectified its failure to submit proof of Golangco’s authority to
sign the Verification and Certification on Non- Forum Shopping on its behalf when it attached in its
Motion for Reconsideration a Secretary’s Certificate issued by its Corporate Secretary stating that
Golangco had been authorized by YMCA’s Board of Directors.
CA’s reliance on Melo was misplaced because in Melo there no rectification made as compared with this
case.
Due to a favorable decision obtained by YMCA in the case involving unit 966, the present case is also
ruled in YMCA’s favor due to stare decisis et non quieta movere which means “to adhere to precedents,
and not to unsettle things which are established.”
Under the doctrine, when the SC has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the
same.
Stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved, as compared with res judicata which is
based upon the judgment. Since the facts of the case at hand are substantially the same with the facts of
the case involving unit 966, the petition is granted.

Doctrine of Stare Decisis

PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS v. PAGDANGANAN

Facts:
Petitioner Pepsi launched a DTI-approved and supervised under-the-crown promotional campaign entitled
“Number Fever” in 1992. With this, it undertook to give away cash prizes to holders of specially marked
crowns and resealable caps of Pepsi softdrink products. As for the mechanics, Pepsi will announce a
randomly pre-selected winning 3-digit number and the crowns/caps that contain such will win. Pepsi then
added matching security codes to the caps as an additional requirement for winning the prizes.

Pepsi announced “349” as the winning combination. Pepsi then received reports that people were trying to
redeem “349 bearing crowns but with the incorrect security codes. Pepsi then issued a statement saying
349 crowns which have security codes L-2560-FQ and L-3560-FQ are not winning crowns.

Despite the aforementioned statement, respondent Pagdanganan demanded from Pepsi the cash prizes of
this 349 bearing crowns. Pepsi refused to take heed of the demands.

Respondent filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC, but such was dismissed.
On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was reversed and set aside. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
Whether petitioners can raise stare decisis

Held:

Yes. There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De Mesa, including the case at
bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning the Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI
and PEPSICO. Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and Lumahan are among those holding
supposedly winning 349 Pepsi/7- Up/Mirinda/Mountain Dew soft drink crowns and/or resealable caps.
Said crowns and/or resealable caps were not honored or allowed to be cashed in by petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO for failing to contain the correct security code assigned to such winning combination. As a
result, the rejected crown and/or resealable cap holders filed separate complaints for specific
performance/ sum of money/ breach of contract, with damages, all against petitioners PCPPI and
PEPSICO.

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit;

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

With the above provision of law, in tandem with the foregoing judicial pronouncements, it is quite
evident that the appellate court committed reversible error in failing to take heed of our final, and
executory decisions those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far
as the Pepsi/349 cases are concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In the case at bar, therefore, we have no alternative
but to uphold the ruling that the correct security code is an essential, nay, critical, requirement in order to
become entitled to the amount printed on a 349 bearing crown and/or resealable cap.

The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving
a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does
not require identity of or privity of parties. This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the
Civil Code. It is even said that such decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which
must control the actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound
to enforce obedience thereto.

Doctrine of Res Judicata

FACURA v. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation. De
Jesus was the deputy administrator of LWUA. De Jesus was dismissed from the service and he was
prohibited from acting on any matter as head of administrative services. He then filed a petition for
reinstatement and he was then granted with authority to sign/approve and issue appointment papers of
appointees which have been previously cleared or approved in writing by the administrator or board.

LWUA requested the DBM for authority to hire confidential staff for their board of trustees, which was
then granted. In an Office Order issued by De Jesus, it was stated that 9 personnel were appointed
retroactively. Upon knowing that there were additional requirements from the CSC, De Jesus re-issued
the appointments of the board’s 9 confidential staff.

Facura and Tuason filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against De Jesus, charging him with
dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, falsification of documents, among others.

Issue:
Whether the present case is bound by the decision in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan under the doctrine of res
judicata.

Held:
Yes. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and/or res judicata, the present case is bound by
the decision of the Court in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.

The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a
bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal;
and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination
of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same.
As what is involved in this case is a proceeding for the determination of probable cause and an
administrative case, necessarily involving different causes of action, the applicable principle is
conclusiveness of judgment.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues
in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the proceeding for probable
cause are grounded on the same set of facts, involve the same issue of falsification of official documents,
and require the same quantum of evidence substantial evidence, as was similarly found in Borlongan, and
correctly relied upon by De Jesus.

Thus, given all the foregoing, the factual finding in De Jesus that there was no false statement of facts in
both sets of appointment papers, is binding in this case.

Doctrine of Res Judicata

REPUBLIC v. YU

Facts:
This petition relates to this Courts decision in Valdehueza v. Republic and the final judgment of the Court
of Appeals in Yu v. Republic.

In Valdehueza v. Republic, the court affirmed the judgment of expropriation of a lot in Lahug, Cebu City,
and ruled that Valdehueza were not entitled to recover possession of the lot but only to demand its fair
market value. In Yu v. Republic, the CA annulled the subsequent sale of the lot by Valdehueza to Yu and
held that the latter was not a purchaser in good faith. The judgment became final and executory.

Yu filed a complaint for reversion of the expropriated property. The Republic then denied respondents
right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot on the ground of res judicata, lack of cause of action and
forum-shopping

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata and remanded the case to the trial
court. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
Whether the action is barred by res judicata and respondents are entitled to reversion of the expropriated
property.

Held:
No. Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within
its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the
same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first
suit.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first
and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

In the present case, the first three elements are present. Only the presence of the identity of causes of
action is at issue.

Where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes
of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein, there is conclusiveness of judgment.

Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case, because respondents again seek to enforce a
right based on a sale which has been nullified by a final and executory judgment. Recall that the question
of validity of the sale had long been settled. The same question, therefore, cannot be raised again even in
a different proceeding involving the same parties.

Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to reversion has long been nullified, they
have not an iota of right over the property and thus, have no legal personality to bring forth the action for
reversion of expropriated property.

Law of the Case

PEOPLE v. OLARTE

Facts:
Asuncion Olarte is charged with libel by Visitacion Meris after the former wrote certain letters which
were libelous and derogatory to the latter. Meris lodged the corresponding charge of libel against Olarte
with the provincial fiscal, then with the Peace Court. Olarte then moved to quash the information upon the
ground of prescription of the offense.

The Court then decided that the filing of Meris with the justice of the peace of court did not extinguish the
crime committed by Olarte. This ruling became final and executory.

Olarte then filed her brief, hence the present case.

Issue:
Whether the court’s ruling in the previous appeal constitute law of the case in the present petition.

Held:
Yes. The Court’s ruling in the previous appeal constitutes the law of the case, and if even erroneous, it
may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago. A subsequent reinterpretation
of the law may be applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively
determined.

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.
The court’s recent interpretations of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one
finally and conclusively determined. As already stated, the majority opinion in that appeal is now the law
of the case.

Posterior changes in the doctrine of the court cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling
in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal
in nature.

And it having been finally decided in the previous appeal that the criminal action here was not barred, the
issue of prescription is utterly foreclosed, and all that remains is to try and decide the case on the merits.

Landmark Case
SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
t was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first
met Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before a MTC judge, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents in Iloilo City. They
eventually gave birth to a boy, named Leouel Santos, Jr.

However, the marriage did not last, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses' family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever
Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Julia promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, but he failed.

Returning to the Philippines without Julia, Leouel filed with the RTC, a complaint for "Voiding of
Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code".

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter
into married life.

Issue:
Whether or not Julia was psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

Held:

NO. Although, the Family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity," the deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee provides an insight on the import of the
provision. Indeed, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision
with less specificity than expected, has, in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application.

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly,
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.

Thus, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If such psychoses should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending
on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Landmark Case
OCHOSA v. ALANO

Facts:

Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a
seventeen-year-old first year college drop- out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated
into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge
Cesar S. Principe in Basilan.

The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced
no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year -old baby girl
whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.

During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as
an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her
hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1)
occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.

In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat.
He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.

It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was
assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently
did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors
in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.

When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and
confronted Bona. During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal
Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living
quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.

In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the
needs of Ramona.

Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97 -2903
with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground
of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.

The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that after
conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition on the ground
that "the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])."

In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the parties’
marriage on the finding that the evidence presented Gravity, Antecedence, and Incurability.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of Appeals
which sided with the OSG’s contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite
Jose’s abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its assailed Decision
dated October 11, 2000.

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of
merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.

Issue:
Whether Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Held:

No. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges on Article
36 of the Family Code, to wit: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, we observed that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be

grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos,
we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non- complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9 (Citations omitted.)

In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity
and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not
to the inception of the said marriage.

We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.

While we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the truly appalling and shocking behavior
of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.

Petition Denied.
 Leading Case and Abandonment of Doctrine
CARPIO-MORALES v. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Binay JR. and other public employees and officers of Makati were accused of Plunder and RA 3019 in
connection with the Procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The
Ombudsman then conducted fact-finding, submitted an investigation report and filed a complaint
charging Binay JR. with six Administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and six criminal cases for violation of Section e of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds and Falsification of Public Documents. The Ombudsman then placed Binay
under preventive suspension for not more than six months.

Proceedings before the CA

Binay Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking a nullification of the preventive
suspension order and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. He also
alleged that he could not be held administratively liable for various reasons including his opinion that his
re-election as Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability. The
TRO was eventually granted. A petition for contempt was also filed by Binay against the Ombudsman
and various other officials for deliberately refusing to obey the CA and the CA then gave due to course to
the petition for contempt and directed the Ombudsman to file her comment.

Both parties filed their respective comments and the Ombudsman pleaded that the Court abandon the
Condon action doctrine, the case was then submitted to the Court for resolution.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the present petition and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA
issuance , is the Ombudsman plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (NO)

(2) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari.
(YES)

(3) Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoin in
the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. (YES)

(4) Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually WPI
enjoin in the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine. (NO)

(5) Whether or not the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay Jr. petition for
contempt is improper and illegal. (Premature Issue)

Held:
FIRST ISSUE:
A direct resort to certiorari is allowed in in this case. As a general rule a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to certiorari since a motion for reconsideration can still
be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule:
Where the order is a patent nudity such as when the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
k) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court.
l) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable.
m) Whereunderthecircumstancesamotionforreconsiderationwould be useless.
n) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief.
o) Where in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable
p) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullify for lack of due process.
q) Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object.
r) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
In this case, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and the public interest is
involved. The cases involves both constitutional and statutory limits of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature and the Judiciary and the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine
thus it involves an issue of transcendental public importance. Thus the Ombudsman direct resort to
certiorari and prohibition is justified even though no motion for reconsideration was filed.

SECOND ISSUE:
The CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Ombudsman argument that the CA lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter is based on Section 14, RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act. The same states: Section
14. Restrictions.- No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima face evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure questions of law.

The general rule is that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies
against issuance of the Ombudsman by prohibiting both an appeal against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman and any application of remedy against the same except for decisions or findings taken to the
Supreme Court on pure questions of law, in other words a Rule 45 petition. A rule 45 appeal can only be
taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts and not against “findings” of quasi judicial agencies
including the Office of the Ombudsman. The case of Fabian v. Desert provides that increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence is in violation of Section 30, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. Section 14 of RA 6770 attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court
Appellate Jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, therefore it is concluded that the second
paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional.
In this case a rule 65 petition for certiorari was filed by Binay Jr before the CA to nullify the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. Daan v. Office of the Ombudsman stated that while a special
civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the CA in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Several cases also ruled that a Rule 65 petition is the remedy against final and unappealable
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman. Since Section 14 of RA 6770 was declared unconstitutional it is
concluded that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

THIRD ISSUE:
The CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoin in the implementation of the a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman argued that the first paragraph
of Section 14 of RA 6770 in conjunction with the offices independence under the 1987 Constitution
insulated the said Office from judicial intervention. The constitution envisions the Ombudsman as an
authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses, of the bureaucracy.
From the case of Gonzales III the concept of the Ombudsman independence covers three things:
4. Creation by the Constitution which means that the Office cannot be abolished nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges be removed, altered or modified by law unless the Constitution itself
allows, or an amendment thereto is made
5. Fiscal Autonomy which entails freedom to use and dispose its funds for purposes germane to its
function.
6. Insulation from executive supervision and control which means that those within the ranks of the
Office can only be disciplined by internal authority.

However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. This is because the courts are apolitical bodies
which may apply justice to all. Thus the Ombudsman is not exempt from judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the duty of the courts of justice is to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This provision vests in the Judiciary particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislative and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because of grave abuse of
discretion.
Also, the Constitution gave the Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. An example of this is the promulgation of the Rules of Court where
the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and writs of preliminary injunction (WPI)
were provided.
In this particular case, the Court ruled that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14 of RA
6770, it took away the courts’ power to issue a TRO or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, the Congress encroached upon the courts’ constitutional rule-making authority. This same
act does not allow a court to exercise its full functions.
However, the Court considered the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14 of RA
6770. Thus pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, The Court under its sole authority
over all matters of procedure, deemed it ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme
Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Thus with Congress interfering with matters of procedure without the consent of the Court,
the CA had the authority to issue the injunctive writs.

FOURTH ISSUE:
In this case the condonation doctrine was deemed abandoned thus the TRO and the WPI of the CA was
given no effect. The purpose of a preventive suspension order is to prevent the official who is being
suspended from using the powers of his office to influence witnesses or tamper with records which may
be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. In this case, the CA issued a injunctive writ to nullify
the preventive suspension order because in its opinion, Binay Jr re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of
Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati
Parking Building Project. The CA found it sufficient that the application of the condonation doctrine was
enough to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order.
The condonation doctrine originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nevada
Ecija. The ratio decidendi of the condonation doctrine has 3 parts:
4. The penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct, also offenses committed or acts
done during the previous term are held not to furnish cause for removal.
5. An elective officials re-election serves as a condonation of previous Misconduct, cutting the right to
remove him for these aforesaid acts.
6. The courts may not deprive the electorate who are assumed to know the life and character of their
candidates of their right to elect officers.
The Court then concluded that condonation was adopted because the legality of the doctrine was never
tested against existing legal norms. The 1987 Constitution provides that all public officers and employees
must be accountable to the people at all times and that public office is a public trust. The LGC provides
that an elective official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office for disloyalty, culpable
violation of the Constitution, Dishonesty, oppression, Misconduct in office etc. The LGC also provides
that those officials removed from office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running
for any elective local office.

Through a reading of the 1987 Constitution and other laws including the ones cited above, the Çourt
concluded that the doctrine of condonation is bereft of legal basis. Accountability is inconsistent with the
idea that an elective local officials administrative liability for a Misconduct committed during a prior term
can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term or another elective post. There is no
support to the statement in the case of Pascual that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their
right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned, in other words there is no legal basis
that election implied condonation. There is also no presumption in any rule of law that the electorate upon
re-election an official, have disregarded or forgave the officials faults. The electorate rarely has full
knowledge of a officials misdeeds since plenty of corrupt acts are shrouded in secrecy. Condonation
cannot be subscribed to because it implied forgiveness, which requires knowledge of the acts being
forgiven for and in the absence of knowledge of these acts there can be no condonation.
In conclusion the Court found no legal basis to continue to adopt the condonation doctrine in our
jurisdiction yet this abandonment was deemed prospective in its application which means that only cases
after this one would be affected by the abandonment. This was also done for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution until reversed shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
FIFTH ISSUE:
It is still premature for the Court to rule on this issue. The Ombudsman’s contention is that as an
impeachable officer she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt since this penalty is
criminal in nature and will result in her effective removal from office. However, her being subjected to
contempt proceedings in the resolution, makes it clear that even thought she is still ordered to comment,
the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay Jr contempt petition. Thus in this comment, the
Ombudsman may raise her objections to the contempt proceedings and the CA may still opt to not give
due course to the same contempt proceedings. Absent any indication that the contempt petition has been
given due course by the CA it would then be premature for the Court to rule on the issue.

Dura Lex, Sed Lex/Cruel and Unusual Punishment

CORPUZ v. PEOPLE PF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner Lito Corpuz met with complainant Danilo Tangcoy at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olangapo
City. Corpuz approached Tangcoy and offered for him to sell his jewelry on a commission basis. Tangcoy
agreed.

Tangcoy gave Corpuz a diamond ring, 2 bracelets and a necklace, collectively amounting to P98,000.00
for the latter to sell. It was agreed that Corpuz would have to return the items if unsold within 60 days.
The period expired, however Corpuz neither paid Tangcoy nor returned to jewelry.

Tangcoy then filed a case for estafa against Corpuz.

The RTC found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt; the CA affirmed such decision. The case was
thus elevated to the SC.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the CA erred when they accepted as evidence mere machine copies, as violation of the
Best Evidence Rule. (NO)

(2) Whether or not CA erred in accepting the information even though the date of occurrence written was
different from the date of occurrence testified. (NO)

(3) WhetherornottheCAerredinfindingthedemandforthereturnof the jewelry was proved. (NO)

(4) Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
applying the penalty stated by the RTC. (NO)

Held:
FIRST ISSUE:
The petitioner is right in stating that the receipt presented as evidence of the transfer of the jewelry was
not the best evidence as such were merely photocopies. However, the petitioner was not able to timely
object to the admissibility of the photocopied receipt during both the marking of the evidence as well as
the formal offer of such evidence. Such non-objection renders the evidence admissible.
SECOND ISSUE:
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in
the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. Moreover, the said date (July 5, 1991) is also
near the due date within which petitioner should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said jewelry
as testified upon by Tangcoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules.
The elements of estafa are as follows: The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a)
that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. Such elements do
not render the date of occurrence/time as material to the consummation of the crime.
THIRD ISSUE:
During the testimony of Tangcoy, the court inferred that Tangcoy was able to demand from Corpuz twice
the jewelry albeit orally. This is allowed since there is no need for a written demand for the return of the
objects in question.
When the law does not qualify, we should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law
would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal.
FOURTH ISSUE:
The issue in question relates more to the penalty to be adjudged to Corpuz than the finding of guilt. The
penalty was discussed as it was raised that the values stated in the law under the crime of estafa was
pegged based on the values during the creation of the law in 1930. Thus, there is a difference in the
application due to the change in the purchasing of the power since then. Some justices would not want to
dwell in the issue as they justified that such may be tantamount to judicial legislation and would therefore
violate the separation of powers in the government.
The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not
make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court
should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law
is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the
primary function of a co- equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable
breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
It was further discussed that any acceptable solution could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There
are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon
before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. It is up to the legislative branch to
correct the values indicated in the laws but for now, the courts would only interpret and provide the
penalty as indicated in the current writing of the law.