LAW 171 | CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER not only at the final hearing, but also at the preliminary
Atty. Dan P. Calica | UP Law 1st Sem AY 18-19 investigation, if by confronting the witnesses for the
INTRODUCTION
A. Course Guidelines and Overview
B. Penological objectives
A.F. Tadiar, Philosophy of a Penal Code, 52
Phil.L.J. 165 (1977)
PART I: General Principles of Criminal Law
A. Definitions
1. Criminal law
“Criminal law is that branch or division of law which
defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for
their punishment.” [Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal
Code, Eighteenth Edition, 2012, at 1, citing 12 Cyc.
129]
It is that branch of public substantive law which defines
offenses and prescribes their penalties. It is
substantive because it defines the state’s right to inflict
punishment and the liability of the offenders. It is public
law because it deals with the relation of the individual
with the state.
Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 (1948)
SUMMARY: Pet. Bustos was the accused in a criminal
case. During preliminary investigation, Bustos pleaded
not guilty. Bustos' counsel moved for the complainant
to present her evidence so that she and her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined. The
prosecution objected to the motion, invoking Rule 108,
Sec. 11 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which made no
mention that the accused could examine the
complainant. Justice of the peace Court of Masantol
ruled that Bustos renounced his right to present
evidence. Bustos filed a motion with CFI Pampanga to
remand case back to Masantol. Resp. CFI Judge
Lucero denied Bustos' motion. A special civil action for
mandamus was filed by Bustos. SC ruled in favor of
Resp. Judge Lucero, stating that Judge Lucero did
NOT commit GADALEJ in denying Bustos' motion.
DOCTRINE: The constitutional right of an accused to
be confronted by the witnesses against him does not
apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a
preliminary examination be an infringement of his right
to confront witnesses.
DOCTRINES FROM THE DISSENTS:
1. [J. Feria] The right granted by law upon a defendant
to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses
for the prosecution in preliminary investigation as well
as in the trial of the case is a substantive right.
2. [J. Perfecto] The accused must be afforded the
opportunities to have the charges against him quashed,
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prosecution he can convince the court that the charges
are groundless. There is no justice in compelling him to
undergo the troubles of a final hearing if at the
preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in his
favor.
NOTES:
1. The case doesn't specifically define what criminal
law is, but it's under that topic in the syllabus. In Reyes
Book 1, I found this one sentence that can be
connected: "Court decisions are not sources of criminal
law, because they merely explain the meaning of, and
apply, the law as enacted by the legislative branch of
the government." In the present case, the SC cited the
case of Saling Buhay v. Arellano in interpreting the
provision of the Rules of Court, stating that "there is
nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of
action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
2. Another possible relation to the syllabus' topic is that
the syllabus also states that criminal law is
substantive because it defines the state’s right to
inflict punishment and the liability of the offenders. In
the present case, it was stated in the dissent of J. Feria
that the right of the defendant to cross-examine the
prosecution's witnesses against him/her is a
substantive right. J. Feria also said that since the rule
in question (Rule 108, Sec. 11 of the 1940 Rules of
Court) diminishes the said substantive right of the
accused, the said provision should be declared as
NULL AND VOID. J. Feria further stated that the
Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore
cannot enact or promulgate substantive laws or rules,
for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, are substantive and not
adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure.
2. Crime
Crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a
public law forbidding or commanding it. [Reyes, supra,
at 1, citing I Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s Third
Revision, 729]
B. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege
1. “Applicable here is a familiar maxim in criminal law:
Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime
where there is no law punishing it.” [Potenciana
Evangelista v. People, G.R. Nos. 108135-36, 14
August 2000]
-Case was about Tanduay's application for tax credit
with the BIR,claiming that it is only liable to pay specific
taxes, and not ad valorem taxes.
-In the information, it was stated that the Petitioner
caused undue injury to the Government and gave
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unwarranted benefits to Tanduay when they endorsed
approval of the claim for tax credit. Yet, she was
convicted of issuing the certification without identifying
the kinds of tax for which the TNCs stand and without
indicating whether Tanduay was really entitled to tax
credit or not. Petitioner further contends that she was
convicted of a supposed crime not punishable by law.
I: WON Evangelista was convicted due to an offense
NOT punishable by law? YES. Evangelista's MR is
granted.
- R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), as amended, provides as
one of its elements that the public officer should have
acted by causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or by giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his functions. The use of the
disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies
as a violation of Section 3(e), or as aptly held in
Santiago, as two different modes of committing the
offense. This does not however indicate that each
mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under
both.
• The certification can even be read as a
recommendation of denial of the application. It lists
down the confirmation receipts covering tax payments
by Tanduay for the covered period, during which
Tanduay alleges that it made erroneous ad valorem
tax payments, classified according to TNC numbers.
The tax payments therein are described only as falling
under TNC No. 3011-0001 (specific tax) and TNC No.
0000-0000 (unclassified taxes).
-There are no tax payments classified as falling under
TNC No. 3023-2001, the code for ad valorem taxes.
- Petitioner further argues that her conviction was
merely based on her alleged failure to identify with
certainty in her certification the kinds of taxes paid by
Tanduay and to indicate what the TNCs stand for,
which acts were different from those described in the
Information under which she was charged. Employees
of the BIR were expected to know what the TNCs
stand for. If they do not, there is a "Handbook of Tax
Numeric Code of Revenue Sources" which they can
consult. We find that petitioner’s omission to indicate
what kind of taxes TNC Nos. 3011-0001 and 0000-
0000 stand for was not a criminal act. Applicable here
is the familiar maxim in criminal law: Nullum crimen
nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is
no law punishing it.
2. The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has
its roots in history. It is in accordance with both
centuries of civil law and common law tradition.
Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to a regime
of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the
essence then that while anti-social acts should be
penalized, there must be a clear definition of the
punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be
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imposed - a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the
legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So
constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on
jurisdictio rather than guvernaculum. The judiciary as
the dispenser of justice through law must be aware of
the limitation on its own power. [Concurring Opinion,
Justice Fernando, People v. Cabural, G.R. No. 34105,
4 February 1983]
-Rape case of maid by Timoteo Cabural.
- Nothing more appropriately appertains to the
legislative branch than the definition of a crime and the
prescription of the penalty to be imposed. That is not a
doctrine of recent vintage. It is traceable to United
States v. Wiltberger, 9 an 1820 America. Supreme
Court opinion. No less than the eminent Chief Justice
Marshall spoke for the Court. To quote his exact
language: "The rule that penal laws are to be
construed strictly is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of
the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain
principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the
legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment."
-"Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No
person should be brought within their terms who is not
clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced
criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute."
13 The same year, Justice Carson in United States v.
Estapia 14 in rejecting the contention that the
application of a penal provision even if not covered by
its terms should be viewed by the judiciary as
commendable, conducive as it is to the repression of a
reprehensible practice" pointed out: "To this it should
be sufficient answer to say that neither the executive
nor the judicial authorities are authorized to impose
fines and prison sentences in cases wherein such fines
and prison sentences are not clearly authorized by law,
and this without regard to the end sought to be
attained by the enforcement of such unauthorized
penalties."
3. “Although courts must not remain indifferent to
public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still
bound to observe a fundamental principle in our
criminal justice system – ‘[N]o act constitutes a crime…
unless it is made so by law.’ Nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large
section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it
cannot be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law,
judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist
being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule
strictly based on the elements of the offense and the
facts allowed in evidence.” [Artemio Villareal v.
People, G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057
& 178080, 1 February 2012]
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-Hazing death of Lenny Villa (ALS Aquila Legis)
-Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
-Thus, once a person is found to have committed an
initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of
physical injuries that results in the death of the victim,
courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is
mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
-In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary
in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer only to
felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The
phrase coming to an agreement connotes the
existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to
another, an element present only in intentional
felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence,
the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the
wrong done being simply the result of an act performed
without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person
performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to
negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a
requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of
a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
-Based on the foregoing contextual background, and
absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we
are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the
specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other
modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily,
freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the
elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of
physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal
intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On
the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were
done pursuant to tradition.
-SENATOR LINA. x x x Another point, Mr. President, is
this, and this is a very telling difference: When a
person or group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the
intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present,
Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is
homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is
the result from the act of hazing. To me, that is the
basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter
the sororities or fraternities; that they should really
shun this activity called hazing. Because, initially,
these fraternities or sororities do not even consider
having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of
lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr.
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President. So, what we want to discourage is the
so-called initial innocent act.
-That is why there is need to institute this kind of
hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang
sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang
intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at
buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na
namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong
patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay
pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung
sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
-
4. Sources of Philippine criminal law
a. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and
amendments thereto
b. Special penal laws
c. Penal provisions in other laws
d. Local ordinances
5. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 5, 21
RPC Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with
acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the
court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of
the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of
a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.
RPC Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. -
No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.
United States v. Taylor (1914)
F:
1) Carson Taylor was the ACTING editor, proprietor,
manager, printer, and publisher of the Manila Daily
Bulletin. It has a large circulation in the PH and the US.
2) This case was brought against him because a
certain Ramon Sotelo, a lawyer and a private
individual, was allegedly defamed by Taylor in the
Sept. 25, 1913 issue of the Manila Daily Bulletin, which
imputed that Sotelo was involved in a conspiracy that
caused a house at Calle O'donnell street to be burned
to collect insurance on it.
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I: WON Taylor is guilty for libel? NO.
R:
-No act constitutes a crime in the PH unless it is made
so by law.
-Under Act. No. 277 of the US Phil. Commission, libel
is defined and the particular conditions necessary to
constitute it is stipulated, as well as the names of the
persons that are guilty of such crime.
-ITC: The complaint of Sotelo alleged that Taylor was
the acting editor etc. of the Manila Daily Bulletin.
-Sec. 6 of the Act states that "Every author, editor, or
proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication
is chargeable with the publication of any words
contained in any part of said book or # of each
newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of
the same."
-Since the Act only punished the enumerated persons,
unless Sotelo proves that Taylor was the actual
author, editor, or proprietor, then Taylor cannot be held
liable as the acting editor of the Manila Daily Bulletin.
-There is no proof that Taylor was the actual editor etc.
Hence, he must be acquitted of the crime of libel
unless it's shown that Taylor, as the "manager" of the
Bulletin, was directly responsible for the writing,
editing, or publishing of the matter in the libelous
article.
-We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions
here as holding that the "manager" or the "printer" may
not, under certain conditions and proper proof, he held
to be the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper.
He may nominate himself as "manager" or "printer"
simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor, or
proprietor" of the newspaper. He can not avoid
responsibility by using some other term or word,
indicating his relation to the newspaper or the
publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author,
the editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His real
relation to the said publication is a matter of proof.
-An examination into the character of the business and
the contract of his employment must be made for the
purpose of ascertaining definitely what his duties and
obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of
proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution is a case
like the present, to show that whatever title, name or
designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact,
the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the
newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or
proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling
the "manager" or "printer." It is the relation which he
bears to the publication and not the name or title he
has assumed, which is important in an investigation.
He can not wear the toga of author of editor and hide
his responsibility by giving himself some other name.
While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a
newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words
"author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or
important, further than that they are words which are
intended to show the relation of the responsible party
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to the publication. That relation may as well exist under
some other name or denomination.
Corpuz v. People (2014)
-3. Whether the Court may adjust penalties fixed by
law—NO. The Court here went into a long discussion
about the correct penalties to be imposed because
they were excessive, as based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money in 1932. It
decided that it could not modify the said range of
penalties as it would be judicial legislation. It would be
encroachment to remedy the legislature's failure in
amending penalties through judcicial decisions. Article
5 RPC provides that in case of excessive penalties, the
Court shall render the proper decision and report to the
Chief Executive reasons for legislative action
RA 10951 (2016)
-AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE
VALUE OF PROPERTY AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A
PENALTY IS BASED, AND THE FINES IMPOSED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS “THE REVISED PENAL CODE”, AS
AMENDED
-Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies, and light
felonies. = P40k or arresto menor
-Art. 26. Fine. - When afflictive, correctional, or light
penalty.
>Afflictive penalty if it exceends P1.2M
>Correctional penalty if it does NOT exceed
P1.2M, but not less than P40k
>Light penalty if less than P40k
-Art. 114. Treason. = P4M
~etc.
C. State authority to punish crimes
1. The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an
attribute of sovereignty “Each State has the authority,
under its police power, to define and punish crimes”
[People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120 (1922)]
“The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an
attribute of sovereignty” [People v. Santiago, 43 Phil.
120 (1922)]
-car accident case; Accused Santiago killed a 7yo boy.
“The right and prosecution for a crime is one of the
attributes that by a natural law belong to the sovereign
power instinctively charged by the common will of the
members of the society to look after, guard and defend
the interests of the community, the individual and
social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights.” [United States v.
Pablo, 35 Phil. 94 (1916)]
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- Policeman Andres Pablo raided a jueteng game. He
excluded from his testimony two other accused in
exchange for money (20PHP). This was discovered by
the provincial fiscal so he was charged with perjury in
violation of Arts. 318 – 324 of the Penal Code. His
defense was that such articles were already repealed
and so no crime of perjury existed when he committed
the assailed act. The court convicted him nonetheless,
saying that the repeal was merely implied and as such
the subsequent repeal of the repealing law, in effect,
reinstated the validity of the articles.
- DOCTRINE: An old law which is impliedly repealed
by a newer law, after such newer law is subsequently
repealed by another law (newest law), becomes re-
enacted and becomes effective again.
2. Police power
 People v. Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate
Sagarano, G.R. No. 169364, 18 September 2009
“Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It
has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The
power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive,
reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.”
-Re: Vagrancy provision in the RPC Art. 202 (2) and
WON it's Constitutional. (it is!)
b. CONST., art. II, sec. 5: The maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential
for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
3. Who exercises police power?
a. CONST., art. VI, sec. 1: The legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
b. CONST., art II, sec. 1: The Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
c. [SUPRA]  People v. Evangeline Siton and
Krystel Kate Sagarano, G.R. No. 169364, 18
September 2009
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“The power to define crimes and prescribe their
corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and
inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain
social order as an aspect of police power. The
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful provided that no
constitutional rights have been abridged.”
d. Delegated legislative power to LGUs
(i) Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991):
Sec. 16: General Welfare. - Every local government
unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Sec. 48. Local Legislative Power. - Local legislative
power shall be exercised by the sangguniang
panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang
panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the
municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the
barangay.
Sec. 447(a)(1)(ii): (Sangguniang Bayan) Powers,
Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The
sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the
municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the municipality as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1)
Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary
for an efficient and effective municipal government,
and in this connection shall:
(ii) Maintain peace and order by enacting measures to
prevent and suppress lawlessness, disorder, riot,
violence, rebellion or sedition and impose penalties for
the violation of said ordinances;
(iii) Approve ordinances imposing a fine not exceeding
Two thousand five hundred pesos (P2,500.00) or an
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six (6)
months, or both in the discretion of the court, for the
violation of a municipal ordinance;
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress
and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
5
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses
of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money
or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens,
drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of
the municipality;
(vi) Protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment,
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn
farming, and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes, or of ecological imbalance;
Sec. 458(a)(1)(ii): Sangguniang Panglungsod.-
Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions
necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
(ii) Maintain peace and order by enacting measures to
prevent and suppress lawlessness, disorder, riot,
violence, rebellion or sedition and impose penalties for
violation of said ordinances;
(iii) Approve ordinances imposing a fine not exceeding
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or an imprisonment
for a period not exceeding one (1) year, or both in the
discretion of the court, for the violation of a city
ordinance;
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress
and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses
of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money
or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens,
drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of
the city.
(vi) Protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment,
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn
farming, and such other activities which result in
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pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes, or of ecological imbalance;
Sec. 468(a)(1)(ii): (Sangguniang Panlalawigan)-
Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The
sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body of
the province, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the province as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions
necessary for an efficient and effective provincial
government and, in this connection, shall:
(ii) Maintain peace and order by enacting measures to
prevent and suppress lawlessness, disorder, riot,
violence, rebellion or sedition and impose penalties for
the violation of said ordinances;
(iii) Approve ordinances imposing a fine not exceeding
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) year, or both in the discretion of the
court, for the violation of a provincial ordinance;
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress
and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses
of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money
or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens,
drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and other activities inimical to
the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the
province;
(vi) Protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment,
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn
farming, and such other activities which result in
pollution acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes, or of ecological imbalance;
 (ii) Mayor Pablo Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994
-RE: PAGCOR Casinos in CDO being contested by the
LGU.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied
in Section 16 and Section 458 of the LGC. (see
provisions above)
6
- The only question we can and shall resolve in this
petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City.
And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law
and not by our own convictions on the propriety of
gambling. The tests of a valid ordinance are well
established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to
be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following
substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any
statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the
Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by
law.
The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that
the Code could have excluded such games of chance
but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section
is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a
sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in
relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with
which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that
since the word "gambling" is associated with "and
other prohibited games of chance," the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the
other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented
or suppressed.
- The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is
that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy
embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR
from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have
an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that
it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an
ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute.
Their theory is that the change has been made by the
Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted
by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the
decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but
merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR
cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the
local government unit concerned. This modification of
P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or repeal
another law.
- This basic relationship between the national
legislature and the local government units has not
been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Alex Austria | 2018
Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy,
we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the
power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the
power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain
notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power
to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature
is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
- We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on
land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not
been modified by the Local Government Code, which
empowers the local government units to prevent or
suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by
law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos.
-For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances
are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and
void.
4. Limitations on power to enact penal legislation
a. Due process and vageuness.
[SUPRA]  (i) People v. Evangeline Siton and
Krystel Kate Sagarano
- Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid
and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor
of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan,[ the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines have special application to free-speech
cases only and are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to
overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing
to prove that it was vague under the standards set out
by the Courts; and that the State may regulate
individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in
the exercise of its police power.
-On the other hand, respondents argue against the
limited application of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face
violates the constitutionally- guaranteed rights to due
process and the equal protection of the laws; that the
7
due process vagueness standard, as distinguished
from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate
to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on
its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality
was adequately overthrown. --The Court finds for
petitioner. The power to define crimes and prescribe
their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature
and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to
maintain social order as an aspect of police power.
The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that
no constitutional rights have been abridged.
-However, in exercising its power to declare what acts
constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the
citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to
prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable
rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to
avoid.
-This requirement has come to be known as the
void-for- vagueness doctrine which states that a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.
 (ii) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290
(2001)
-RE: Erap questioning RA 7659, Anti-Plunder Law
SUMMARY: In 2001, the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight separate Informations against
then President Joseph Estrada, including one for
violation of the Plunder Law. Estrada, who as a
senator voted for the passage of the law, posited that
the said penal law is unconstitutional because of three
reasons: (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the
RPC. The SC held that the Plunder Law is
constitutional because: (a) there is nothing vague or
ambiguous about the Plunder Law; (b) that the same
law does not in any manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder; and that (c)
plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent.
DOCTRINE: The test in determining whether a criminal
statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity,
is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
Alex Austria | 2018
invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it
would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes.
- We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to
proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and
the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an
intelligent defense.
- Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in
Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner,
render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
- Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law
does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
-The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but
is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense
with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited
by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction.
- A statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
- But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard
though defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain
types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as
against the second whenever directed against such
activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
8
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free
from ambiguity, as in this case.
-The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in
its provisions, especially where, because of the nature
of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.
- Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the
observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during
the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that
the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify
a facial review of its validity - The void-for-vagueness
doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth
doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms."
- A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making
the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."
- The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal
statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
-The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are
Alex Austria | 2018
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by
their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and,
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."
- As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in
all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others."
- In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional."
- As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."
- Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face
and in its entirety. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of
statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before
the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.
 (iii) Alfredo Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 152259, 29 July 2004
FACTS:
• An information was filed against Petitioner Alfredo
Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan for a violation of
RA 3019, Section 5.
Section 5 provides: Section 5. Prohibition on certain
relatives. – It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for
any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the
third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines,
the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of
the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
9
Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in
any business, transaction, contract or application with
the Government:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to any
person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of
the above officials to whom he is related, has been
already dealing with the Government along the same
line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
application already existing or pending at the time of
such assumption of public office, nor to any application
filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary
on the part of the official or officials concerned but
depends upon compliance with requisites provided by
law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor
to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or
in the exercise of a profession.
• Before the Supreme Court, petitioner argued that RA
3019, Section 5 was unconstitutional because its
vagueness violates the due process right of an
individual to be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation against him. ISSUE: • Whether RA
3019, Sec. 5 is unconstitutional for vagueness
RULING: Facial challenges allowed only in free
speech cases
• The overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines
apply only to free speech cases. It is because of the
potential chilling effect of vague statutes on protected
speech that a facial challenge is allowed.
• This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes generally have an in terrorem effect
on proscribed conduct and to allow facial challenges
will essentially prevent the State from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct.
• As conduct, not speech is the subject of RA 3019, the
constitutionality of the statute shall be based as
applied to the defendant (i.e. not facially). Vague
statutes, standard
• A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must
guess as its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instances, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions.
• A statute is utterly vague on its face when it cannot
be clarified by a saving clause or by construction. RA
3019 is not unconstitutional for vagueness • Petitioner
claims that the phrase “to intervene directly or
indirectly in any business [or] transaction […] with the
Government” is vague. Specifically, he harps on the
term intervene as the statute does not specify which
acts are punishable under the term.
• However, the SC, agreeing with the OSG, ruled that
the statute is not vague as a verba legis construction
clarifies the meaning. The term intervene should be
understood in its ordinary meaning, that is to come
between.
Alex Austria | 2018
• Thus, the Court held that the assailed provision is not
vague.
- Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It
penalizes certain presidential relatives who intervene,
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government. This
provision is not vague or impermissibly broad, because
it can easily be understood with the use of simple
statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality
of a criminal statute such as this be challenged on the
basis of the overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness
doctrines, which apply only to free-speech cases.
- It is best to stress at the outset that the
overbreadth[20] and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases. They are
not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason
as follows: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to
a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected
speech. The theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making
the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.
The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal
statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech. xx x x xx x x x In sum, the doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
tools developed for testing on their faces statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American
law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional. As has been
pointed out, vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] as applied to a particular
defendant.[22] (underscoring supplied) To this date,
the Court has not declared any penal law
10
unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity. [23] While
mentioned in passing in some cases, the
void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct
application in our jurisdiction.
 (iv) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. Nos. 178552,
178554, 178581, 178890, 179157 & 179461, October
5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146
FACTS:
 This case consists of 6 petitions challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.
 Petitioner-organizations assert locus standion
the basis of being suspected “communist
fronts” by the government, whereas individual
petitioners invoke the “transcendental
importance” doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers.
 KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos,
SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have
been subjected to “close security surveillance
by state security forces,” their members
followed by “suspicious persons” and “vehicles
with dark windshields,” and their offices
monitored by “men with military build.” They
likewise claim they have been branded as
“enemies of the State.”
DOCTRINE: The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case
since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases
and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
- Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and
the vagueness doctrines have special application only
to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for
testing the validity of penal statutes.
- Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the Court
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness
analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense under the Voter’s Registration Act of
1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged,
is couched in precise language.
- The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice
Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the Estrada case:
Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad
do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one, which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale
does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect. If facial challenge is
allowed, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
Alex Austria | 2018
special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
-Since a penal statute may only be assailed for
being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism”
in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual
or imminent chargeagainst them.
- The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
-A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness
when:
> It lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in 2 ways:
1) Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice
of conduct to avoid
2) Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.
3) The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
-A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an
“as applied” challenge.
> “As applied” challenge considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants.
> “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis
of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
> Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.
- There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372
regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis
of its validity.
>Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements
of the crime of terrorism:
> Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and
the enumerated special penal laws;
> Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates
a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace;
> The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
- Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful
demand” in the definition of terrorism must necessarily
be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause. The argument
does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech.
-Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is
entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
11
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words
on the part of offender. --
- Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental
to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither
the intent of the law to punish socially harmful
conduct nor the essence of the whole act as
conduct and not speech.
b. Effectivity of penal laws
(i) CIV. CODE, art. 2: Laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
(ii) Exec. Order No. 292 (Revised Admin Code)
 Sec. 18: When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise
provided.
 Sec. 24: Contents. - There shall be published in the
Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature; all executive and administrative
issuances of general application; decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as
may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and such documents or classes of documents as
the President shall determine from time to time to have
general application or which he may authorize so to be
published.
 C.A. No. 638 (1941)
(iii) REV. PEN. CODE
 Article 1. Time when Act takes effect. - This Code
shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen
hundred and thirty-two.
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony
shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by
law prior to its commission.
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal
Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Alex Austria | 2018
Art. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this
Code. — Without prejudice to the provisions contained
in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors,
committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this
Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code
or Acts in force at the time of their commission.
 (iv) Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)
Facts: In the evening of April 2, 1982, Anselmo
Pesigan and Marcelo Pesigan who were carabao
dealers transported 26 of the said animals and a calf
from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Batangas as the
destination using an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck. They had
the necessary certificates and permits to be allowed
the transport. However, they were stopped on the road
at Basud, Camarines Norte by town police station
commander Lieutenant Zenarosa and provincial
veterinarian Dr. Miranda who confiscated the carabaos
based on EO No. 626-A which bans the transport of
carabaos from one province to another. Dr. Miranda
distributed the carabos among farmers of Basud and
from the Vinzons municipal nursery. Petitioners filed an
action for replevin which was dismissed for lack of
cause of action. Petitioners appealed. Issue: Whether
or not EO No. 626-A is enforceable before its
publication in the Official Gazette
Held: No.
-EO No. 626-A, while issued on October 25, 1980
should not be enforced in this case as it was only
published June 14, 1982 in the Official Gazette, more
than two months later, and it only became effective 15
days thereafter as provided by Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
-Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The
carabaos were ordered to be returned to the Pesigans
but they are now bound to EO No. 292 and cannot
transport it to Batangas.
-Dr. Miranda and Lt. Zenarosa acted in good faith in
ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
- Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to
restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to
the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess
the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or
Sipocot, Camarines Sur.
 (v) Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
The case is a petition to review the decision of the
Executive Assistant to the President. The petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. The petitioners invoked the
people’s right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article VI of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution; as well as the
12
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated.
The respondents posit that the case should be
dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the petition. According
to respondents, there is absence of showing that the
petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question. Furthermore, they
argue, said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute the mandamus proceeding, they
not being “aggrieved parties” within the meaning of
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In addition, respondents contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates.
The clear object of publication is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he
had no notice whatsoever.
The publication of all presidential issuances “of public
nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden on the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons, such as administrative
and executive orders, need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned.
Petition is GRANTED. Court ordered respondents to
publish in the OG all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless
so published, shall have no legal binding force and
effect.
 (vi) Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
1) W/N publication is required for all laws to be
effective regardless of nature or applicability —
YES
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly.
• ONLY EXCEPTIONS: Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, or letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
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guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties
• “We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.”
• Publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
ON THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE “UNLESS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED”
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication.
2) W/N publication in the Official Gazette need not
be made considering its erratic releases and
limited readership — COURT CANNOT RULE
UPON THE WISDOM OF THE LAW.
• The Court’s task is merely to interpret and apply the
law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with
the prescribed procedure.
•
“Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce
that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication
of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.”
• “We also hold that the publication must be made
forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There
is that possibility, of course, although not suggested
by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive,
for whatever reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that we do not
need to examine at this time.”
 (vii) Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig,
Inc. V. Military Shrine Service Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office, G.R. No. 187587, 5 June 2013
13
Summary: [RE: CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS IN
BGC AND MCKINLEY HILL] President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, which declared barangays in
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan, and Signal Village open
for disposition. The Proclamation included a
handwritten addendum likewise declaring barangays
in Western Bicutan open for disposition, but this
addendum was not published in the Official Gazette.
Petitioners occupied lots in Western Bicutan and
sought to have them reclassified as alienable and
disposable, pursuant to PN 2476’s addendum. The
Court held that these lands could not be reclassified as
such, because the addendum was never published
and therefore never took effect.
Ratio: The requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the
law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase
“unless otherwise provided” refers to a different
effectivity date other than after 15 days following
the completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
All statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
 The requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase “unless otherwise
provided” refers to a different effectivity
date other than after 15 days following the
completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be
dispensed with.
 As held in Tañada v. Tuvera: Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended.
 We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
c. Ex-post facto law
(i) CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 22: No ex post facto
law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
(ii) REV. PEN. CODE, art. 1, 22 (supra)
 (iii) In re. Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429
(1970)
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Petitioner filed a petition to the SC questioning the
validity of RA 6132, Sec. 8(a) as to the prohibition of
allowing any political group to support a candidate to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Petitioner
contended that the Act was an ex post facto law. SC
denied the petition.
An ex post facto law is one which:.
(1) Makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed;
(3) Changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed;
(4) Alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
(5) Assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which
when done was lawful; and
(6) Deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
IN THIS CASE: Even if RA 6132's Sec. 18 penalizes a
violation of any provision of the said law, including Sec.
8(a), the penalty is imposed only for acts committed
after the approval of the law, and not those
perpetrated prior thereto.
4. There is nothing in the Act that indicates that Secs.
8(a) and 18, or any other provision, shall apply to acts
carried out prior to its approval.
5. Sec. 23 of the Act directs that the entire law shall be
effective upon its approval. (The Act was approved
on August 24, 1970.)
 (iv) People v. Villaraza, 81 SCRA 95 (1978)
Facts:
An assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with
estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for
having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing
checks. City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order
March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation and
directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the Court
of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court. The CFI
returned the case to the city court because in its
opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction
of the two courts and, the city court, as the first court
which took cognizance of the case, should try it.
Respondent city judge still directed the re-elevation of
the case, saying that the case falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
14
because estafa committed by the accused is
punishable by prision mayor medium under
Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on
October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not the CFI has exclusive
jurisdiction over the estafa case
Held/Ratio: No. CFI order affirmed.
 The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is
punishable under article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to
prision correccional minimum or four months
and one day to two years and four months.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight
years and one day to ten years, imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to
swindling by means of issuing bouncing
checks which was committed on or after
October 22, 1975. That increased penalty
does not apply to the estafa committed by
Puerto on October 16, 1974. To apply it to
Puerto would make the decree an ex post
facto law. Its retroactive application is
prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the
Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article
IV of the Constitution.
 Section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended
by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828,
provides that "judges of city courts shall have
like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to
try parties charged with an offense committed
within their respective jurisdictions, in which
the penalty provided by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not
more than six years or fine not exceeding six
thousand pesos or both."
 (v) U.S. v. Diaz-Conde, 42 Phil. 766 (1922)
-RE: Retroactivity of the Usury law
-A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or
disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be
construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an
elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the
time the contract was made must govern its
interpretation and application. Laws must be construed
prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is
legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by
any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted then
the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which
is prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine
Islands. (U.S. vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39
Phil., 552; Aguilar vs. Rubiato and Gonzales Vila, 40
Phil., 570.)
-Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the
defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law
that makes an action, done before the passage of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
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punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the
present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had
been done before the law was adopted, a criminal act,
and to make said Act applicable to the act complained
of would be to give it an ex post facto operation. The
Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will
make an act done before its adoption a crime. A law
may be given a retroactive effect in civil action,
providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto
laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive
effect is favorable to the defendant.
d. Bill of attainder
(i) CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 22 (SUPRA)
 (ii) People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Facts:
The Anti-Subversion Act outlaws the Communist Party
of the Philippines and other "subversive associations,"
and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and
by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or
remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar
"subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of
section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
the respondent Feliciano Co in CFI Tarlac for being an
officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines and
being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University. Co
moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on
May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed
with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo
Tayag and five others with subversion. On July 21,
1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of
the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it
denied him the equal protection of the laws.
The Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the CFI
as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the
Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country; its
existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the
security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the
trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the
judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the
forms or safeguards of judicial trial." According to the
trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is
whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary
member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it
has expressly created a presumption of organizational
guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow.
The trial court declared the statute void on the grounds
that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
15
overboard, and dismissed the informations against the
two accused. The Government appealed.
1) W/N The Anti-Subversion Act is a Bill of
Attainder — NO
- The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves
to implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent,
suffice to make a statute as a bill of attainder.
- ITC: When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it
will be seen that it does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to
declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in
the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party
of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional
purposes. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also
to "any other organization having the same purpose
and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals
but on conduct.
- Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to
secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that
their guilt still has to be judicially established.
As to the claim that under the statute organizational
guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of
proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to
say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which
has been referred to as a "dragnet device" whereby all
who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The
contention would be correct if the statute were
construed as punishing mere membership devoid of
any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the
Party. But the statute specifically required that
membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of
the Party. That is what section 4 means when it
requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be
shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and
by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to
pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown
by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of
"membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities,
while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
- Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough
to render it a bill of attainder. In the Philippines the
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validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace
Act, requiring labor unions to file with the Department
of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that
they are not members of the Communist Party and that
they are not members of any organization which
teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or
by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld
by this Court.
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members
of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder.
In the Philippines the character of the Communist
Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this
Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the
Philippines to be an illegal association. In 1969 we
again found that the objective of the Party was the
"overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed
struggle and to establish in the Philippines a
communist form of government similar to that of Soviet
Russia and Red China." In Lansang vs. Garcia, the
SC noted the growth of the CPP and the organization
of Communist fronts among youth organizations such
as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. The SC held:
"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the
existence of a sizeable group of men who have
publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and
have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion
against the Government of the Philippines.
Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or
groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach
past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature
of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.
As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex
post facto features. This is the historic explanation for
uniting the two mischiefs in one clause — 'No Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ...
Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is
also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post
facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not
are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder."
Section 4 thereof expressly states that the prohibition
therein applies only to acts committed "After the
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,
become or remain members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of
any subversive association “after June 20, 1957,
are punished. Those who were members of the Party
or of any other subversive association at the time of
the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of
16
purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing
and under oath their membership in the Party. The law
expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate
to exempt such persons from penal liability. The
penalties prescribed are therefore not inescapable.
5. Other Constitutional and statutory limitations
and the rights of the accused
a. CONST. (1987), art. III: BILL OF RIGHTS
Sec. 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 12:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violations of this section as well as compensation to
and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.
Sec. 13: All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
Sec. 14: (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
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Sec. 16: All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
Sec. 17: No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
Sec. 18: (1) No person shall be detained solely by
reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.
Sec. 19: (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed,
nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be
dealt with by law.
Sec. 20: No person shall be imprisoned for debt or
non-payment of a poll tax.
Sec. 21: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
b. RULES OF COURT, Rule 115: RIGHTS OF
ACCUSED SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the
trial.—In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment.
The accused may, however, waive his presence at the
trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his tail,
unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court
for purposes of identification. The absence of the
accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right
to be present thereat. When an accused under custody
escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right
to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody
over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may
be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
17
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject
to cross-examination on matters covered by direct
examination. His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness
against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part
of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, the adverse party having the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the
attendance of witnesses and production of other
evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner
prescribed by law.
D. Characteristics of criminal law
1. General
a. CONST. (1987), art. VI, sec. 1. The legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.
b. CIV. CODE, art. 14. Penal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.
c. Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of
the United States of America Regarding the
Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting
the Philippines, 10 February 1998 (Visiting Forces
Agreement)
d. REP. ACT NO. 75
AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD
IMPAIR THE PROPER OBSERVANCE BY THE
REPUBLIC AND INHABITANTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND
PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and
take upon himself to act as a diplomatic, consular, or
any other official of a foreign government duly
accredited as such to the Government of the Republic
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of the Philippines with intent to defraud such foreign
government or the Government of the Philippines, or
any person, or in such pretended character shall
demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from person or
from said foreign government or the Government of the
Philippines, or from any officer thereof, any money,
paper, document, or other thing, of value, shall be
fined not more than five thousand pesos, or shall be
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in
addition to the penalties that may be imposed under
the Revised Penal Code.
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or
consular officer or attaché, who shall act in the
Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign
government without prior notification to, and
registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall
be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both, aside
from other penalties that may be imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or
mislead, within the jurisdiction of the Republic, wear
any naval, military, police, or other official uniform,
decoration, or regalia of any foreign State, nation or
government with which the Republic of the Philippines
is at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so
nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to
deceive, unless such wearing thereof be authorized by
such State, nation, or government, shall upon
conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted
by any person in any court of the Republic of the
Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the
person of any ambassador or public minister of any
foreign State, authorized and received as such by the
President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any
such ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned,
or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or
attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by
whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as
party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in
executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine
of not exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion
of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall
not apply to any case where the person against whom
the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the
Republic of the Philippines, in the service of an
ambassador or a public minister, and the process is
founded upon a debt contracted before he entered
upon such service; nor shall the said section apply to
any case where the person against whom the process
18
is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a
public minister, unless the name of the servant has,
before the issuing thereof, been registered in the
Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of
the City of Manila, who shall upon receipt thereof post
the same in some public place in his office. All persons
shall have resort to the list of names so posted in the
office of the Chief of Police, and take copies without
fee.
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds,
imprisons or in any other manner offers violence to the
person of an ambassador or a public minister, in
violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not
more than three years, and fined not exceeding two
hundred pesos, in the discretion of the court, in
addition to the penalties that may be imposed under
the Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be
applicable only in case where the country of the
diplomatic or consular representative adversely
affected has provided for similar protection to duly
accredited diplomatic or consular representatives of
the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing like or
similar penalties for like or similar offenses herein
contained.itc-alf
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: October 21, 1946
e. REP. ACT NO. 7055 Cf. PRES. DECREE No. 1850
RA 7055:
June 20, 1991
AN ACT STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY
OVER THE MILITARY RETURNING TO THE CIVIL
COURTS THE JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN
OFFENSES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, OTHER
PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW, AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE
CERTAIN PRESIDENTIAL DECREES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
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penalized under the Revised Penal Code other special
penal laws, or local government ordinances regardless
of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties which may be natural or juridical
persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court except
when the offense, as determined before arraignment
by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case
the offense shall be tried by court-martial: provided,
that the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried
by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or
offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54
to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses,
the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed thereforee in the Revised Penal
Code, other special laws, or local government
ordinances.
Section 2. Subject to the provisions of Section 1
hereof, all cases filed or pending for filing with court-
martial or other similar bodies, except those where the
accused had already been arraigned, shall within thirty
(30) days following the effectivity of this Act transferred
to the proper civil courts: provided, that the Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall, upon petition
before commencement of trial and with the written
consent of the accused, order the transfer of such
excepted case or cases to the proper civil courts for
trial and resolution.
Section 3. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-A,
1850 and 1952, and all acts, general orders, executive
orders, and other presidential issuances, rules and
regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 20, 1991.
PD 1850
PROVIDING FOR THE TRIAL BY COURTS-MARTIAL
OF MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE AND FURTHER DEFINING THE
JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL OVER
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES
19
WHEREAS, under Section 12, Article XV of the
Constitution, the State shall establish and maintain an
integrated national police force whose organization,
administration, and operation shall be provided by law;
WHEREAS, under and pursuant to existing laws, the
various municipal/city police and fire departments and
jails have been integrated into law-enforcement units
under the operational control and organization set-up
of the Philippine Constabulary;
WHEREAS, in the interest of discipline and public
service, it is desirable that members of the Integrated
National Police be subject to trial by courts-martial
under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
otherwise known as the “Articles of War for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines,” for all crimes of offenses
which are heretofore cognizable by the civil courts;
WHEREAS, as a complementary measure, there is a
need to clarify existing provisions of law relating to
jurisdiction of courts-martial and the
Tanodbayan/Sandiganbayan and the regular civil
courts over crimes and offenses committed by
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E, MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and
decree:
SECTION 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated
National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. –
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding –
(a) uniformed members of the Integrated National
Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by
the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by
courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise
known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to
military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of
War who commit any crime or offense shall be
exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case
disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided,
that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the
case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or
judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over
the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or
court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the
accused military or Integrated National Police
personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their
separation from the active service without jurisdiction
having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen and jail guards.
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SECTION 2. Segregation of Criminal Cases of Armed
Forces and Integrated National Police from Civilian Co-
accused. – In cases where there are two or more
accused one or some of whom is or are civilian(s), the
case against the latter shall be segregated from
accused Armed Forces of Integrated National Police
member, and filed with the appropriate civil court for
trial in accordance with existing
laws; Provided, however, that should such civilian
accused waive in writing civil court jurisdiction and
submit himself to court-martial jurisdiction, then the
whole case involving members of the Armed Forces or
the Integrated National Police as well as the civilian(s)
shall be referred for trial to a court-martial.
SECTION 3. Appointing Authorities. –
(a) Where uniformed member(s) of the Integrated
National Police are charged. – The President of the
Philippines and the Chief of Constabulary/Director
General, Integrated National Police are hereby
empowered to appoint general, special and summary
courts-martial for the trial of uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police. The Constabulary Regional
Commanders/Directors, Integrated National Police
may appoint special and summary courts-martial, and
when empowered by the President, they may also
appoint general courts-martial. Other subordinate field
commanders of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated
National Police may appoint summary courts-martial
when empowered by the President.
(b) Where military personnel and Integrated National
Police members are commonly charged. – The court-
martial shall be appointed by the appointing authorities
specified in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Commonwealth
Act No. 408, as amended.
SECTION 4. Composition of Courts-Martial. –
Membership, whether military personnel or Integrated
National Police members, in a general or special court-
martial for the trial of a member of the Integrated
National Police shall be in a ratio as determined by the
appointing authority; Provided, however, that the
number of Integrated National Police personnel
detailed shall not be less than one-third of the total
membership of the court.
SECTION 5. Administrative Action. – Court-martial
action against uniformed personnel of the Integrated
National Police as herein provided shall not preclude
the taking of administrative action against said
personnel as may be warranted pursuant to the
provisions of existing law.
SECTION 6. Transitory Provisions. – All cases pending
before the civil courts against military personnel in the
active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or against Integrated National Police personnel where,
20
on the effective date of this Decree, the accused have
been arraigned, shall continue to be tried and decided
by said civil courts. All other cases against such
personnel shall be tried by courts-martial or disposed
of pursuant to this Decree.
SECTION 7. Promulgation of Rules. – The Chief of
Staff, AFP shall formulate rules and regulations
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Decree,
which shall, upon recommendation of the Minister of
National Defense, be subject to the approval of the
President.
SECTION 8. Appropriations. – The amount of two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00) is hereby authorized to
be appropriated out of the funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated to carry out the
purpose of this Decree and, thereafter, such amounts
as may be necessary for this purpose shall be included
in the annual appropriation of the Integrated National
Police.
SECTION 9. Repealing Clause. – All laws, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, which are contrary to,
or inconsistent with, the provisions of this Decree, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. – This Decree shall take
effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 4th day of October, the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-two.
f. CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 and art. XI, sec. 2
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
g. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(1961) and Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (1963)
h. Cases:
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 (i) United States v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901)
S: Sweet was employed by the United States military
who committed an offense against a POW. His case is
filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6
months is imposed. He is now contending that the
courts are without jurisdiction because he was “acting
in the line of duty.”
ISSUES AND RATIO
1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the
CFI.
Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the
CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
in which a penalty more than 6 months imprisonment
or a fine greater than $100 may be imposed.
Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders
charged with violation of the Penal Code within their
territorial limits, regardless of the military character of
the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the
jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that
he was indeed acting in the line of duty.
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or
military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an
offense under the penal code?
Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW
is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be
pressed under the RPC.
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal
code, whether or not the military character
sustained by the person charged with the offence
at the time of its commission exempts him from
the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?
No. The application of the general principle that the
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the
military or other special character brought before them
for trial (R.A. No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act
was servicebut this cannot affect the right of the Civil
Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.”
Dispositive: Judgment affirmed.
“An offense charged against a military officer in
consequence of an act done in obedience to an order
is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is
against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the Civil Government.” ––Per Cooper, J.,
concurring
 (ii) Liang v. People, 323 SCRA 692 (2000)
SUMMARY: Liang accused his co-worker of theft and
was charged with two counts of slander. The DFA sent
an “office of protocol” communication saying that Liang
was covered by immunity under the Headquarters
Agreement between the ADB and the PH government.
The MeTC judge dismissed the two charges, but the
RTC reversed the MeTC and ordered Liang’s arrest.
Liang appeals to the SC for his acquittal but the SC
dismissed, saying that the DFA communication was
not binding regarding his immunity.
21
DOCTRINE: Slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the Headquarters Agreement or even the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations because
the commission of a crime is not part of official
functions which are covered by relative immunity.
Read also Annotation on “Various Categories of
Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction” in
323 SCRA 699-715 (2000)
 (iii) Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249
(1936)
S: Petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of
Uruguay at Manila. He was subsequently charged with
the crime of falsification of private documents. He
questioned the jurisdiction of the court on the ground
that both under the Constitution of the US and the
Constitution of the Philippines, the Court of First
Instance (“CFI”) had no jurisdiction to try him.
D: A consul is not entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject
to the laws and regulations of the country to which he
is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country to
which he resides.
 (iv) Khosrow Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 142396, 11 February 2003
2. Territorial
a. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 2. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
b. CONST. (1987), art. I National Territory. The
national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial,
fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea,
the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless
of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines.
c. Visiting Forces Agreement, art. V
d. REP. ACT NO. 9372 (Human Security Act of
2007), sec. 58: Subject to the provision of an existing
treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any
contrary provision of any law of preferential application,
the provisions of this Act shall apply:
(1) to individual persons who commit any of the crimes
defined and punished in this Act within the terrestrial
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domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of
the Philippines:
(2) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit,
conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined
and punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of
the Philippines;
(3) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit
any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or
Philippine airship;
(4) to individual persons who commit any of said
crimes within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic
premiscs belonging to or occupied by the Philippine
government in an official capacity;
(5) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit
said crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of
Philippine descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity
was a factor in the commission of the crime; and
(6) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit
said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
e. REP. ACT NO. 10173 (Data Privacy Act of 2012),
sec. 6: Extraterritorial Application. – This Act applies to
an act done or practice engaged in and outside of the
Philippines by an entity if:
(a) The act, practice or processing relates to personal
information about a Philippine citizen or a resident;
(b) The entity has a link with the Philippines, and the
entity is processing personal information in the
Philippines or even if the processing is outside the
Philippines as long as it is about Philippine citizens or
residents such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) A contract is entered in the Philippines;
(2) A juridical entity unincorporated in the Philippines
but has central management and control in the
country; and
(3) An entity that has a branch, agency, office or
subsidiary in the Philippines and the parent or affiliate
of the Philippine entity has access to personal
information; and
(c) The entity has other links in the Philippines such as,
but not limited to:
(1) The entity carries on business in the Philippines;
and
(2) The personal information was collected or held by
an entity in the Philippines.
f. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), art. 2, 3, 27, 29-33, 46-49, 55
UNCLOS Article 2: Legal status of the territorial
sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its
bed and subsoil 1. The sovereignty of a coastal State
extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters
and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its
archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea,
described as the territorial sea. 2. This sovereignty
22
extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well
as to its bed and subsoil. 3. The sovereignty over the
territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention
and to other rules of international law.
UNCLOS Article: 3 Breadth of the territorial sea
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in
accordance with this Convention.
UNCLOS Article 27: Criminal jurisdiction on board a
foreign ship
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should
not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing
through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to
conduct any investigation in connection with any crime
committed on board the ship during its passage, save
only in the following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the
coastal State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea; (c) if the
assistance of the local authorities has been requested
by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or
consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression
of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances.
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the
coastal State to take any steps authorized by its laws
for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea after
leaving internal waters.
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the
coastal State shall, if the master so requests, notify a
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State
before taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact
between such agent or officer and the ship's crew. In
cases of emergency this notification may be
communicated while the measures are being taken.
4. In considering whether or in what manner an arrest
should be made, the local authorities shall have due
regard to the interests of navigation.
5. Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to
violations of laws and regulations adopted in
accordance with Part V, the coastal State may not take
any steps on board a foreign ship passing through the
territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any
investigation in connection with any crime committed
before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship,
proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through
the territorial sea without entering internal waters.
UNCLOS Article 29 Definition of warships For the
purposes of this Convention, "warship" means a ship
belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the
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external marks distinguishing such ships of its
nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government of the State and
whose name appears in the appropriate service list or
its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under
regular armed forces discipline.
UNCLOS Article 30 Non-compliance by warships
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State If any
warship does not comply with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal
State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.
UNCLOS Article 31 Responsibility of the flag State
for damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes The flag
State shall bear international responsibility for any loss
or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws
and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea or with the
provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
UNCLOS Article 32 Immunities of warships and
other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes With such exceptions as are contained in
subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and
other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes.
UNCLOS Article 33 Contiguous zone -
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described
as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may
exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and
regulations committed within its territory or territorial
sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24
nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
UNCLOS Article 46 Use of terms For the purposes
of this Convention:
(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include
other islands;
(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including
parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other
natural features which are so closely interrelated that
such islands, waters and other natural features form an
23
intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or
which historically have been regarded as such.
UNCLOS Article 47 Archipelagic baselines
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic
baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided
that within such baselines are included the main
islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the
water to the area of the land, including atolls, is
between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total
number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may
exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125
nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration
of the archipelago.
4. Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-
tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar
installations which are permanently above sea level
have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation
is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding
the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest
island.
5. The system of such baselines shall not be applied
by an archipelagic State in such a manner as to cut off
from the high seas or the exclusive economic zone the
territorial sea of another State.
6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State lies between two parts of an immediately
adjacent neighbouring State, existing rights and all
other legitimate interests which the latter State has
traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights
stipulated by agreement between those States shall
continue and be respected.
7. For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to
land under paragraph l, land areas may include waters
lying within the fringing reefs of islands and atolls,
including that part of a steep-sided oceanic plateau
which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of
limestone islands and drying reefs lying on the
perimeter of the plateau.
8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article
shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate
for ascertaining their position. Alternatively, lists of
geographical coordinates of points, specifying the
geodetic datum, may be substituted.
9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to
such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and
shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations
UNCLOS Article 48 Measurement of the breadth of
the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf The breadth
of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be
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measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47.
UNCLOS Article 49 Legal status of archipelagic
waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and
of their bed and subsoil
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to
the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47, described as
archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the
archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil,
and the resources contained therein.
3. This sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part.
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including
the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State
of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space,
bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
UNCLOS Article 55 Specific legal regime of the
exclusive economic zone The exclusive economic
zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in
this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the
coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other
States are governed by the relevant provisions of this
Convention.
g. Cases:
 (i) Miquiabas v. Commanding General, 80 Phil.
262 (1948)
 (ii) United States v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7 (1910)
 (iii) United States v. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573
(1910)
 (iv) United States v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917)
 (v) People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729 (1922)
 (vi) People v. Lo-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19 (1922)
3. Prospective
a. REV. PEN. CODE, arts. 1, 21, 22
 RPC 1. Time when Act takes effect. - This Code
shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen
hundred and thirty-two.
 RPC 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No
felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.
24
 RPC 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal publication of such laws a final sentence has been
Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of 4. Prescribed, but undeserved, penalties
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been REV. PEN. CODE, art. 5, 2nd par.
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts
b. CIV. CODE, art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive which should be repressed but which are not
effect, unless the contrary is provided. covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any
c. Cases:
act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
 (i) People v. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
 (ii) In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., supra through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act
 (iii) Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA should be made the subject of legislation.
420 (1971)
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
 (iv) People v. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998) Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without
E. Construction/Interpretation of Penal Laws suspending the execution of the sentence, when a
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
1. Strict construction against the State and liberally would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
in favor of the accused penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.
CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 14(2)
5. Effects of repeal/amendment of penal law
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
a. Tuates v. Bersamin, G.R. No. 138962, 4 October
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
2002
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
b. Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
4 September 2001
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
c. People v. Garcia, supra
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.

 People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950)

2. Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code prevails

over its English transaction

 People v. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665 (1933)

3. Retroactive application if favorable to the

accused

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 22

Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal

Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the

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