Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 65, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

ESSENTIAL REQUISITE FOR FILLING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65

1. The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
2. There is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA v. PEOPLE [ GR No. 195248, Nov 22, 2017 ]

Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges
grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the
respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. In Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, the Court explained:

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a

court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use
of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void."
From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done
with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross x x x.
DEUTSCHE BANK MANILA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES CHUA YOK
SEE and REBECCA SEE, JOMIRA CORPORATION, F.E.E.
INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC., JOSEFINA LIM, LUCITA
L. KHO, and LILY L. CO,

Petitioner, in imputing grave abuse of its discretion to the trial court

in its ruling on the admissibility of its documentary exhibits, relies
on such court's previous order rejecting some of its exhibits.
However, it should be noted that the trial court has subsequently
admitted all the documentary exhibits of the petitioner although
merely as part of the testimonies of the witnesses.

We rule that neither of these rulings could be a basis for a certiorari

proceeding. The trial court, in so ruling, did not commit grave abuse
of discretion. Not every error in proceeding, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is abuse of
discretion.35 If at all there was any mistake in said decisions, such
mistake can only be characterized as an error of judgment. A ruling
on the admission of evidence, even if wrong, is not an abuse of
discretion but simply an erroneous ruling.36 As long as the trial
court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged error committed
in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more
than mere errors of judgments, correctible by an appeal and
not by a petition for certiorari

Instances when RULE 65 may availed of; when abuse of discretion amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

1. Manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
(MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
BONDSMAN, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 224974, July 03,
2017
2. Court’s order denying the withdrawal of the Information despite of no sufficient basis for a
finding of probable cause against respondents amounts grave abuse of discretion.

HAROLD V. TAMARGO, Petitioner, vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and

LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., Respondents G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010
 3. A judge gravely abused his discretion when he extended by twenty days the 72-hour
restraining order he initially issued. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that "in no case shall the total period of effectivity of
the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two
hours provided herein.

(VITO BESO, petitioner, vs. RITA ABALLE and HON. ROBERTO A. NAVIDAD, Acting Presiding
Judge, Branch 31, Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, respondents. G.R. No. 134932
February 18, 2000)

1. MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

BONDSMAN, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
An Information filed against Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with
Robbery. Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in the amount of P12,000.00.

Later on, the private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of
Desistance stating that he was no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Cruz. On
October 2014, Assistant City Prosecutor Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by
Regional Trial court.

Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond. In an Order dated
January 7, 2015, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion on the ground that the case was
dismissed through desistance and not through acquittal. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Francisco was likewise denied in an Order dated April 6, 2015.
The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal was
only due to the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was acquitted or that
the crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court decision denying the motion to release the cash bond
amounts to grave abused of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Regional Trial court has no legal basis in denying the
motion to release cash bond based on that the case was dismissed due to desistance not through
acquittal or that the crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, the provision of
Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation
of the bail bond.
This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as inexcusable
abuse of authority the trial judge's "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or
procedure." Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law," or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial
competence requires no less.32

2. HAROLD V. TAMARGO, Petitioner, vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and

LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., Respondents G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010
Facts:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail... shot and killed
The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him
during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that
he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. After conducting a preliminary
investigation and on the strength of Geron's affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued a
resolution against Columna and three John Does. Columna was arrested, Columna
executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting
and implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate also tagged as
masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son Lloyd Antipord. Pursuant to this affidavit,
petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those
implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his
affidavit before the investigating prosecutor who subjected him to clarificatory questions.
Respondents denied any involvement. Licerio presented Columna's unsolicited handwritten
letter disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. Licerio also submitted an affidavit of
Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his
handwritten letter. Due to the submission of Columna's letter and affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory
affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna
categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed
the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or
extract the affidavit from him. Investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor in another handwritten letter. Columna
said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents because of
the threat against his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another
detention center.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of
Justice (DOJ)
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the
Informations for murder.
He opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by
the subsequent recantation and that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt
of respondents.
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas' motion for
reconsideration (MR) and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. This time, he
declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against...
respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence.
Trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations.
RTC granted the motion to withdraw the case and judge inhibit himself on the case. The
case were re-raffled to the new presiding Judge Daguna.
Judge Daguna granted the MR and ruled that, based on Columna's investigating
prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial
CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of
her assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully
taken into account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused.
It also held that Columna's extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the
respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of
evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the
confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Issues:
whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents.

Ruling:
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to Columna's affidavit.
wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; DOJ resolution upholding the
prosecutor's recommended the dismissal of the charges. Judge Daguna failed to consider
that Columna's extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as
evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the
respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved
from the pain of going through a full blown court case
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy
herself whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial
as co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause
against respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Information for murder
against them were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

3.