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Facts
Stevedore Rosano had a heated verbal argument with Valdez, another stevedore
engaged by petitioner corporation, over the possession of a platform used in the loading
and unloading of cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Later, informed that the
barge they were waiting for definitely was not arriving, Rosano, with two companions,
boarded a passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When he got off from the jeep near his
house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out a knife and stabbed him. Rosano died on
the same day after being brought to the hospital.
Issue
Whether or not the death of Rosano is compensable considering that it came after he
was outside the company premises and not at work.
Ruling
it is evident that the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin Valdez (who was thereafter
accused and convicted) can be traced to their disagreement over the possession of a
platform that was to be used in their work for petitioner that although the altercation
started in the morning the same was resumed when they returned in the afternoon and
carried on when Valdez left, lay in wait near Rosario's house, and there met and stabbed
the latter when he alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be said that the employer is
exempt from liability under the Workmen's Compensation law because the cause of
death arose outside of the company premises, whereas the quarrel happened at the
waterfront at Pier 9.
For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall
take place within the place of employment. If a workman is acting within the
scope of his employment, his protection "in the course of" the employment
usually continues, regard of the place of injury.
the ultimate test was whether "the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken to be
one" it should make no difference how widely separated the assault was from the
employment in time and space if it remained an inherent part of an employment
incident.
Facts:
Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public school teacher at the
Urdaneta National High School. A memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by the head
of the school's Science Department designated to prepare the MODEL DAM. Lopez
complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an improvised electric micro-
dam, which he took home to enable him to finish it before the deadline.
Around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in his project, he in contact with a live wire
was electrocuted. He was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but
was pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that he died of cardiac
arrest due to accidental electrocution.
Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the
ground that her husband's death did not arise out and in the course of employment.
Issue:
Respondent ECC argued that based on the certification issued by the school principal,
Lopez at the time of the accident was supposed to report for duty to help in the
enrollment of the 4th year class, but he opted to remain at his house to finish the
project. Hence, respondent ECC contends, that the claim for death benefits failed to
satisfy the conditions set forth under Sec. 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation.
1. The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;
2. The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
from its superior.
Held:
While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in his official work
station, which is the school, he was still discharging his function as the one in-charge of
the project. He was constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and
he could only do so if he worked overtime in his house.
The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by the employee at "the
place where his work requires him to be" and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the
employees "must have been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez
had to finish the project on the time for the contest scheduled on October 5 and 9, 1987,
it can be implied that Lopez was given permission, if not direction, to perform his work
at his house.
FACTS:
On June 28, 1967, some employees of Philex Mining Corporation died asa result of the
cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the copper mine (Tuba,Benguet) during
underground operations. Allegedly, Philex was in violation of government rules and
regulations for negligently and deliberately failing to takethe required precautions for
the protection of the lives of its men working underground.The Petitioners (Floresca et
al) are the heirs of the deceased employees of PhilexMining Corporation. Petitioners
moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’sCompensation Act before the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitionedbefore the regular courts
and sued Philex for additional damages.Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners havealready claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
HELD:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one . If they filedfor benefits under the
WCA then they will be prohibited from proceeding with a civil casebefore the regular
courts. On the contrary, if they sued before the civil courts then theywould also be
prohibited from claiming benefits under the WCA.
The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of
such a remedy. The SC ruled that the dismissal of the case in the lower court be
reversed and case is remanded for further proceedings.
However, if in case the petitioners win in the lower court, whatever award may be
granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC
emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of
the law may be defeated.
FACTS
1. On December 22, 1971, Rolando Lim, a licensed second mate, died when the
vessel
he was on board ran aground and sank near Sabtan, Batanes.
3. The parents of the deceased claiming that the untimely death of their son was
due to
the negligence of the petitioner, sued the petitioner in the CFI for
damages.
ISSUE
Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA),
and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an
employee, is exclusive of the other remedies under the Civil Code.
HELD
In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the Court was confronted with
three divergent opinion on the exclusivity rule.
One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an
action to recover damages (not compensation under the Workman’s Compensation Act)
with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil
Code.
Another view, is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident
is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of WCA.
The third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice
of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts
under the Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But
once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt
for the other remedy.
This latter view was adopted by the Court in Floresca v. Philex Mining Company. In
doing so, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies
granted by the WCA.
As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to
maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under
the Civil Code. In open court, respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim
for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them
under the WCA. It is therefore clear that thew respondents had not only opted to
recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair
play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election
and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the
second option. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, he is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the
Compensation Commission.
FACTS:
Petitioner Crystal Shipping, Inc., employed respondent Deo P. Natividad as Chief Mate of
M/V Steinfighter for a period of ten months. Within the contract period, respondent
complained of coughing and hoarseness and was brought to shore for examination. He
was diagnosed with swelling neck and declared unfit for duty, and advised to see an
ear-nose-throat specialist. He was repatriated to Manila.
Respondent was referred to ClinicoMed Inc., the company-designated clinic, for check-
up. His attending physician diagnosed him permanently disabled with a grade 9
impediment. A second opinion likewise concurred that respondent was disabled with a
grade 9 impediment. While his treatment was ongoing, respondent sought another
opinion who opined that he was totally and permanently disabled for labor. All
expenses incurred in respondents examination and treatments were shouldered by the
petitioners.
On appeal, the NLRC initially reversed the ruling of the RAB on the ground that findings
of the company-designated doctors were binding. However, upon respondents motion
for reconsideration, citing jurisprudence that findings of company-designated doctors
are self-serving, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the RAB with respect only to the award
of disability benefits.
HELD:
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Respondent
was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more
than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was
permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed
to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could
do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of ones earning capacity.
6. Vergara vs Hammonia Maritime Services Inc GR 172993 10-6-2008, 551 SCRA 611
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by respondent Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. Petitioner left
the Philippines to rendezvous with his ship and to carry out his work as a pumpman.
While attending to a defective hydraulic valve, he felt he was losing his vision. He
complained to the Ship Captain that he was seeing black dots and hairy figures floating
in front of his right eye. His condition developed into a gradual visual loss. The ships
medical log entered his condition as internal bleeding in the eye or glaucoma. He was
given eye drops to treat his condition.
The seafarer was repatriated due to eye problem. After undergoing the required
treatment, the COMPANY DOCTOR declared the seafarer fit to resume further sea duty.
The SEAFARER’S PRIVATE DOCTORS disagreed and gave the opinion that seafarer was
not fit to work as a pump man because the job could precipitate the resurgence of his
former condition.
ISSUE:
W/n the petitioners claim for permanent total disability benefits has a legal basis.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that a temporary total disability onlybecomes permanent
when so declared by the company physicianwithin the periods he is allowed to do so, or
upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without
adeclaration of either fitness to work or the existence of apermanent disability. In the
instant case, the company-designateddoctor duly made a declaration well within the
extended 240-dayperiod that the seafarer was fit to work.
7. Montierro vs Rickmers Marine Agency Phils Inc GR 210634 Jan 14 2015
FACTS:
Labor arbiter held that Montierro is entitled to permanent total disability benefits,
which relied on 120 days rule of inability of seafarers to perform work introduced by
2005 case Crystal Shipping Inc. Vs Natividad. One month sickness allowance and
attorney’s fees was also awarded.
NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. After the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration,
Rickmers elevated the case to CA.
CA partially granted the petition. Downgrading the claim to Grade 10 permanent partial
disability benefits because his disability is not deemed total and permanent under the
240-day rule established by case of Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.
promulgated on October 6, 2008.
Issues:
Whether 120 day rule or the 240 days rule should be applied.
Whether the opinion of the company doctor or the personal doctor of the
seafarer should prevail.
Whether Montierro is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Ruling:
If the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008, the
120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from 6
October 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies. Considering that the complaint
of Montierro was filed on December 3, 2010, 240-day rule should prevail.
The procedure for determining the liability for work related death, illness or
injury in the case of overseas Filipino seafarers is as follows: when the seafarer
sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness for
work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. The physician
has 120 days, or 240 days , if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the
physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the
company designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and
binding on them. Montierro, however, preempted the procedure when he filed
on December 3, 2010 a complaint based on his chosen physician’s assessment.
Hence, for failure of Montierro to observe the procedure provided by POEA-SEC,
the assessment of the company doctor should prevail.
The rule on labor law is that withholding of wages need not be coupled with
malice or bad faith to warant the grant of attorney’s fees under Article 111 of the
Labor Code. The premature filing of complaint by Montierro shows that there is
no unlawful withholding of benefits to speak of.
FACTS
Does the petitioner suffer “permanent total disability” as he claims or from “permanent
partial disability” as the respondent Commission would have the Court believe?
HELD
b. A disability is total and permanent if a result of the injury or sickness the employee
is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding
120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation.
In the case at bar, the petitioner’s permanent total disability is established beyond
doubt by several factors and circumstances. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner’s
application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailment has been approved.
Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled,
under good behaviour, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional
retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue his employment.
Further, the petitioner’s physician categorically classified the petitioner under
permanent total disability.
9. Austria vs CA GR 146636 Aug 12 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo Austria was employed as bag piler at Central Azucarera de Tarlac.
Petitioner began to feel severe back pain and underwent an MRI which revealed a small
disc protrusion. Petitioner underwent Laminectomy. The x-ray photographs taken
revealed osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine.
On account of his osteoarthritis, petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for compensation
benefits under PD 626 as amended. The claim was granted and petitioner was awarded
permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8) months. A second release for seven
(7) months and a third release for fifteen (15) months.
Petitioner thereafter requested the SSS for conversion of his permanent partial
disability benefit to permanent total disability benefit. The SSS denied the request. On
appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The ECC held that considering the
degree of his disability at the time he was separated from the service, petitioner has
already availed of the maximum benefits to which he is entitled on account of his
osteoarthritis.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA. It dismissed the petition, ruling that the law does
not allow the conversion of permanent partial disability to permanent total disability.
ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in not allowing the conversion of his (petitioner) permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability.
HELD:
There is nothing in the law that prohibits the conversion of permanent partial disability
benefit to permanent total disability benefit if it is shown that the employees ailment
qualifies as such. The grant of permanent total disability benefit to an employee who
was initially compensated for permanent partial disability but is found to be suffering
from permanent total disability would not be prejudicial to the government to give it
reason to deny the claim.
Petitioner has been employed as bag piler for twenty (20) years at the Central
Azucarera de Tarlac. His duties require him to carry heavy loads of refined sugar and to
perform other manual work. Since his work obviously taxes so much on his back, his
illness which affects his lumbar spine renders him incapable of doing his usual work as
bag piler. Hence, his disability to perform his regular duties may be considered total and
permanent.