Cases On Sexual Harrasment

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, G.R. No. 146053

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, Promulgated:

Respondent.
April 30, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Dioscoro F. Bacsin questions the
Decision[1] dated August 23, 2000 of the First Division of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900, which affirmed Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11,
1998 and Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999, both issued by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner from the service for Grave
Misconduct.
Facts of the Case
Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan,

Mambajao, Camiguin Province. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman
is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do
an errand.[2] Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the
floor near his table, and place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and
when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he
fondled her breast five times, and that she felt afraid.[3] A classmate of hers, one
Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified that the
fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.[4]
Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated February

12, 1996 by Regional Director Vivencio N. Muego, Jr. of the CSC.[5]
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident,
just as he was handing AAA a lesson book.[6] He further stated that the incident
happened in about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his office without any
complaint.[7]
Resolution of the CSC
In Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998, the CSC found petitioner guilty
of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed him from the
service.[8]Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have committed an act
constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7877,
the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in Resolution
No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999.
Decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51900.
Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:

1. Whether or not there were efforts by [AAA], her parents and the Honorable
Civil Service Commission to magnify the accidental touching incident
on August 16, 1995;
2. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was supported by the evidence on
record; and
3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the penalty of

removal.[9]
In resolving the case, the CA determined that the issue revolved around
petitioners right to due process, and based on its finding that petitioner had the
opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that right. The CA ruled
that, even if petitioner was formally charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct
and misconduct, the CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved
petitioners guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.
The Issues Before Us
The petitioner now raises the following issues in the present petition:
1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment,

grave misconduct, which was different from or an offense not alleged in the
formal charge filed against him at the inception of the administrative case.
2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and

misconduct as charged by complainant, whether or not the penalty of
dismissal from the service imposed by the Civil Service Commission and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23)
of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and applicable rulings.
3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the

offense of Grave Misconduct; a greater offense.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an
offense, such as Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), different from
that specified in the formal charge which was Misconduct. He further argues that
the offense of Misconduct does not include the graver offense of Grave Misconduct.
This argument is unavailing.
As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be

drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is
sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is
controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the
offense.[10]
It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge
against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus
informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate the
offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case.
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and
penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a
sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala,[11] it was held, It
is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor. But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned,
with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA,
that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast
of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3
(b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is
committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she felt
fear at the time petitioner touched her.[12] It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked
basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the
evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave
misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.
Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense in the formal
charge, it must be discussed whether or not petitioner is indeed guilty, as found by
the CA and CSC, of Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple
Misconduct. From the findings of fact of the CSC, it is clear that there is misconduct
on the part of petitioner. The term misconduct denotes intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.[13]
We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the

law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.[14] The act of
petitioner of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless
inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a
case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a revolting
act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave offense. Parents entrust the care and
molding of their children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians while
in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The charge of grave misconduct proven
against petitioner demonstrates his unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to
discharge the functions of his office.
Petitioners second argument need not be discussed further, as he was rightly
found guilty of grave misconduct. Under Rule IV, Section 52 of the CSC Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases, Grave Misconduct carries with it the penalty of
dismissal for the first offense. Thus, the penalty imposed on petitioner is in
accordance with the Rules.
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[15] These
elements are present in this case, where petitioner was properly informed of the
charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.
A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should

not be allowed, under any circumstance, to practice this noble profession. So it must
be here.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is
hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Salome A. Montoya
(retired) and Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now retired member of the Court).
[2]
Rollo, p. 86.
[3]
Id. at 89-90.
[4]
Id. at 87.
[5]
Id. at 46.
[6]
Id. at 70.
[7]
Id. at 87.
[8]
Id. at 92.
[9]
Id. at 29-30.
[10]
G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993, 223 SCRA 747, 754.
[11]
G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008.
[12]
Rollo, p. 90.
[13]
Civil Service Commission v. Manzano, G.R. No. 160195, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 113, 127.
[14]
Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 150870, December 11, 2002, 394 SCRA 21, 34-35.
[15]
Zacarias v. National Police Commission, G.R. No. 119847, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 387, 393.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132164. October 19, 2004]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON

BELAGAN, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation,

it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the
occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose,[1] or at the time of the
trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the
suit.[2] This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or
reform himself.
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals
Decision[3] dated January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and Resolution
No. 972423 dated April 11, 1997 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are
hereby set aside. The complaint against petitioner Allyson Belagan filed by
Magdalena Gapuz is hereby DISMISSED.
The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be

immediately reinstated to his position without loss of seniority, retirement, backwages
and other rights and benefits.
SO ORDERED.
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by
Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, and
Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual
indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various
malfeasances.
Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an
application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One
of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises
by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the inspection was not
present, respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in June 1994, respondent and
complainant visited the school. In the course of the inspection, while both were
descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed his arms around
her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir, is this part of the
inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values? Respondent merely
sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the area.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked
respondent, Sir, kumusta yung application ko? His reply was Mag-date muna tayo. She
declined, explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS
Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application.
However, she was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the
permit has not yet been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent.
He merely denied having a personal relationship with Magdalena.
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his
recommendation to approve Magdalenas application for a permit to operate a pre-school.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain
female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official
with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of
was respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment
to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate
occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part
of her back.
Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers
salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully
refusing to release the teachers uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay;
and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS
rules and regulations.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and
Ligaya. In his defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However,
he presented evidence to disprove Ligayas imputation of dereliction of duty.
On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision[4] finding
respondent guilty of four (4) counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed
against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual advances or indignities against Magdalena.
He was ordered dismissed from the service. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby rendered

in the two above-entitled cases, finding:
a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio City Schools
Division GUILTY of the four counts of sexual indignities or
harassments committed against the person and honor of complainant Miss Ligaya
Annawi, a Baguio City public school teacher, while in the performance of his official
duties and taking advantage of his office. He is, however, ABSOLVED of all the
other charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty.
b) Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belagan likewise GUILTY of
the two counts of sexual advances or indignities committed against the person
and honor of complainant Mrs. Magdalena Gapuz, a private school teacher of Baguio
City, while in the performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his office.
Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED

DISMISSED from the government service, with prejudice to reinstatement and all his
retirement benefits and other remunerations due him are HEREBY DECLARED
FORFEITED in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996,
promulgated Resolution No. 966213[6] affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in
the case filed by Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that
respondents transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus:
The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a
position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral
uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents an institution tasked to
mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that
teachers in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the proper
discipline. Any improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his moral
ascendancy over the teachers and students which can not be tolerated. Therefore, his
misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to operate a private pre-school
cannot be treated lightly and constitutes the offense of grave misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave

misconduct and imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with all the
accessory penalties. The decision of the DECS Secretary is modified accordingly.[7]
On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years
of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the
Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus:
1. Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (December 3, 1980)
2. Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)
3. Criminal Case No. 45630 for GRAVE THREATS (May 13, 1982)
4. Criminal Case No. 45914 for GRAVE THREATS (June 24, 1982)
5. Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)
6. Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS (January 25, 1985)
7. Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 30, 1985)
8. Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
9. Criminal Case No. 51819 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
10. Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)
11. Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST VEXATION (March 18, 1985)
12. Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST VEXATION (May 29, 1991)
13. Criminal Case No. 62172 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)
14. Criminal Case No. 62754 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
15. Criminal Case No. 55642 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
16. Criminal Case No. 55423 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (October 24, 1986)
17. Criminal Case No. 55846 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (November 4, 1986)
18. Criminal Case No. 55800 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 7, 1987)
19. Criminal Case No. 57312 for UNJUST VEXATION (November 29, 1987)
20. Criminal Case No. 55643 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13, 1985)
21. Criminal Case No. 53404 for UNJUST VEXATION (December 13, 1985)
22. Criminal Case No. 55422 for UNJUST VEXATION (October 24, 1986) [8]
In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena were filed with the Barangay
Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City:
1. Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A) for GRAVE THREATS, UNJUST
VEXATION, RUMOR MONGERING
2. Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE THREATS
& ORAL DEFAMATION
3. Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 029) for ORAL DEFAMATION
and FALSE ACCUSATION
4. Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 030) for HARASSMENT and THREATS
5. GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz (Case No. 031) for HABITUAL
TROUBLE MAKER
6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
8. Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27, 1978) for RUMOR MONGERING
9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
10. Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
11. WOMENS CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
12. Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)
Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against Barangay Captain and
Police Chief
13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)
Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an emergency meeting
and where she shouted invectives against the residents
14. Incident of June 13, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay Sanitary Inspector
15. Incident of August 25, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr. De Leon
16. Incident of August 26, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting
17. Incident of September 2, 1978
Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz
Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the council meeting
Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the early morning
Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los Santos with the latters
consent
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and hurling invectives scandalously around her
residence
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged poisoned sardines near
the premises of her residence which killed her hen.
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the neighborhood. She
did not like the actuations of a bayanihan group near the waiting shed.[9]
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on
her character, integrity, and credibility.
In its Resolution No. 972423[10] dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondents
motion for reconsideration, holding that:
The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor
significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused
of having committed the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a woman
of ill repute may become a victim of said offense.
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had cases
before the regular courts for various offenses and was condemned by her community
for wrongful behavior does not discount the possibility that she was in fact telling the
truth when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her by the respondent. x x
x
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated
earlier, it reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalenas complaint.
The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being
questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom
any male would attempt to steal a kiss. In fact, her record immediately raises an alarm in
any one who may cross her path.[11] In absolving respondent from the charges, the
Appellate Court considered his unblemished service record for 37 years.
Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition raising
the following assignments of error:
I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised on appeal where the Court
of Appeals misappreciated the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the Supreme
Court may review the record and evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in not
giving credence to the testimony of complainant Magdalena Gapuz despite
convincing and overwhelming signs of its truthfulness.
II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it failed to give due
weight to the findings of the DECS, which conducted the administrative
investigation, specifically with respect to the credibility of the witnesses
presented.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent should be penalized under
Sec. 22 (o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22 (e) of
said rules.[12]
In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalenas derogatory record
undermines the verity of her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing
it.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pivotal issue before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is
credible. This is a question of fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Courts
review.
It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported
by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court.[13] This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts. One of the exceptions, however,
is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or
a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.[14]
Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of
Magdalenas derogatory record. While the former considered it of vital and paramount
importance in determining the truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of minor
significance. This contrariety propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation
evidence.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy.[15] One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51
(a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxxxxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability
or improbability of the offense charged.
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not
to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be
applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondents posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under
this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the
offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.[16] Thus, on a charge of rape -
character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence,
and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.[17] In one rape case, where it
was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring about
her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.[18]
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer
evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are charges for
grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under
the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish
is Magdalenas lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge.
In this regard, a different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given.
It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. [19] A witness may
be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, [20] honesty[21] or
integrity.[22] Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he
has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by
evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense.
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf,
opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who
becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any
other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.[23]
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of
inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is Magdalenas derogatory record
sufficient to discredit her credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to
acts committed in the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints
filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts
complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense
was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs
of Magdalenas character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of ones
character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question.[24] In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation
of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit.[25] Hence, to say that Magdalenas credibility is
diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is
unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of
moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable
to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the
criminal cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of
jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that
he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for
the purpose of impairing his credibility.[26] This view has usually been based upon one or
more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the
witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often
arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached
or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.[27] Significantly, the same
Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not
be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because
of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the
witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts. [28] As it happened
in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges against her
listed by respondent.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC
is the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her
testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent
inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and
the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have
normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. We quote her
testimony during the cross-examination conducted by DECS Assistant Secretary Romeo
Capinpin and Undersecretary Antonio Nachura, thus:
Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the inspection on
the first floor and the second floor?
A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my family,
background, how the school came about, how I started with the project. That was
all, sir.
Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds?
A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs twice,
sir.
Q Why?
A I really dont know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second inspection, sir,
I told him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was making use of
the premises for transients because that was summer then, sir. And I already
started paying the place so I said, Sir, I have some transients with me in the
evening and he said, You know Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the
rooms as one your boarders. But I respectfully declined saying, Sir, I think
for delicadeza I cannot accept you. Not that I dont want you to be here but people
might think that I am keeping you here and that would prejudice my permit, sir.
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went
up with him or the second time?
A No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Q Second time?
A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.
Q And you were going down?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged
kissing?
A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Q Before you went down?
A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs
and it has 16 steps.
Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost?
A Yes sir.
Q Part of the floor of the building?
A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?
A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these
transients that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the
rooms and then I declined and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously.
On the last, the biggest room that I had, he said, No. Never mind, I am not
going to see that anymore. So he waited for me there and upon reaching the
place, as I was to step down on the first step going down, he placed his arm
and held me tightly and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir.
Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?
A Yes, sir, as a boarder.
Q Is that room used for transients?
A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get some
transients.
Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms?
A Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza.
Q At that time, there were no transients yet.
A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there.[29]
The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit,
DECS Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to him
that respondent kissed her and asked her for a date.
Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit A which is the affidavit of Mrs. Magdalena
B. Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information That the
Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office expecting to get
favorable recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of my
permit. That I proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, Sir, kumusta yung
application ko and he said, mag date muna tayo but I refused and explained that I
am married, after which I proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent Peter
Ngabit to relate the incident and then left the Division Office. Do you remember if
Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the particular day?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time was that?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q Was it morning, afternoon?
A I think it was in the morning, sir.
Q Morning.
A Yes, sir.
Q Early morning?
A About noon, sir.
Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office?
A When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even insulting
me saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I
cannot do anything with the processing of her paper or application.
Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any
incident?
A Yes, she did sir.
Q What was that incident all about?
A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a kiss
from her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for her
papers, she was asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that, she
left.[30]
With Magdalenas positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the
findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the
Court of Appeals outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation.
There are a number of cases where the triers of fact believe the testimony of a witness of
bad character[31]and refuse to believe one of good character.[32] As a matter of fact, even
a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief, when he testified
in a straightforward and convincing manner.[33]
At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS
investigating officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is
telling the truth considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment and
manner of testifying.[34]
In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is ample
evidence to show that Magdalena had a motive in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure
him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had
already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she had no
more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course to vindicate her
honor.
Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct
and not merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. [35] Misconduct means
intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,
especially by a government official.[36] To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions
and duties of a public officer.[37] In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest.[38]Corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.[39] This is apparently present in
respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a date, an
unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondents
act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.[40]
We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made
a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division
Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he
received numerous awards.[41]This is the first time he is being administratively charged.
He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 provides:
SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and

aggravating circumstances may be considered. x x x.
The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[42] which reads in part:
SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the

determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxxxxx
j. length of service
xxxxxx
l. and other analogous cases.
Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment,[43] and

respondents length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous
awards,[44] the penalty of suspension from office without pay for one (1) year is in order.
While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, however,
neither will we negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in the
government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos.
966213 and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent
ALLYSON BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with
full credit of his preventive suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
[1] 32 C.J.S. 434, citing In re Darrow, 92 N.E. 369, 175 Ind. 44.
[2] 81 Am Jur 897, citing Carter vs. State, 226 Ala 96, 145 So. 814; State vs. Potts, 78 Iowa 656, 43 NW
534; State vs. Crockett, 161 Wash 262, 296 P 1041.
[3] Rollo, pp. 42-56. Penned by former Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria and concurred in by Justices
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (retired Justice of this Court), and Ramon A. Barcelona, retired.
[4] Rollo at 52-59.
[5] CA Rollo at 39.
[6] Id. at 61-71.
[7] Id. at 71.
[8] Id. at 79-80.
[9] Id. at 80-81.
[10] Id. at 73-75.
[11] Rollo at 53.
[12] Id. at 24.
[13] Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Leobrera, G.R. No. 137147, January 29, 2002, 375 SCRA 81 and
cases cited therein.
[14] Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 520 (1998); Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 171 (1996).
[15] 29 Am Jur 2d 363.
[16] Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 168, citing 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 667(5).
[17] Id. at 168, citing Wigmore on Evidence (Student Text), 62.
[18] People vs. Tempongko, Jr., G.R. No. 69668, October 2, 1986, 144 SCRA 583.
[19] Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 502.
[20] Truth means conformity to fact or reality, exact accordance with that which is, or has been or shall be.
[21] Honesty signifies the quality or state of being straight, forwardness of conduct, thought, speech etc.
[22] Integrity has been defined as moral soundness; honesty; freedom from corrupting influence or practice,
especially strictness in the fulfillment of contracts, the discharge of agencies, trusts, and the like;
uprightness, rectitude. (Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 471, citing Section 11,
Rule 132, Rules of Court, as amended).
There is a distinction between evidence as to the character of a party to a litigation and evidence as to the
character of a witness; in the former case character is a fact in issue or an evidentiary fact affecting
a fact in issue, while the character of the witness is collateral matter which does not pertain to the
fact in issue but merely to the weight of the evidence of such witness. (Francisco, Basic Evidence,
Second Edition, 1999 at 474, citing 70 C.J.S. 821).
[23] 98 C.J.S. 494.
[24] Francisco, Basic Evidence, Second Edition, 1999 at 170, citing 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, 341; 22A C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, 677 (2); 32 C.J.S., Evidence, 434 (b).
[25] 81 Am Jur 2d 897, supra FN 2.
Evidence of the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity twelve years prior to the trial will be excluded
as too remote. (Hapton vs. State, 78 Tex. Crim. Rep. 639, 183 S.W. 887).
Section 41, Rule 130 reads:
SEC. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting
facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral
character, may be given in evidence. x x x.
[26] 81 Am Jur 2d 905, citing United States vs. Dilts, (CA7 Ill) 501 F2d 531; Stephens vs. State, 252 Ala 183,
40 So 2d 90; Woodard vs. State, (Ala App) 489 So 2d 1; State vs. Johnson, 106 Ariz 539, 479 P2d
424; Judy vs. Mcdaniel, 247 Ark 409, 445 SW2d 722.
[27] 81 Am Jur 2d 905.
[28] 81 Am Jur 2d, 901, citing Miller vs. Journal Co., 246 Mo 722, 152 SW 40; People vs. Brown, 72 NY 571.
[29] Rollo at 154-156.
[30] Id. at 161-162.
[31] 98 C.J.S. 496, citing People vs. Matson, 158 P 335, 30 C.A. 288; People vs. Strope, 272 N.Y. S. 268,
151 Misc. 580.
[32] Id., citing State vs. Little, 94 S.E. 1, 174 N.C. 800.
[33] People vs. Strope, supra.
[34] Chase vs. Buencamino, Sr., L-20395, May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 365.
[35] Section 22 (o), Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
[36] Maguad vs. De Guzman, A.M. No. P-94-1015, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 469.
[37] Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
[38] Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486 (1999).
[39] Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 345.
[40] Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides:
SEC. 22. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and
light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said acts on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties.
(c) Grave misconduct: 1st Offense Dismissal.
[41] CA Rollo at 78.
[42] Resolution No. 99-1936. This Resolution was published in the September 11, 1999 issue of the Manila
Standard.
[43] Vedaa vs. Judge Valencia, 356 Phil. 317 (1998).
[44] Judge Agcaoili vs. Judge Ramos, 311 Phil. 238 (1995).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 169449 March 26, 2010
TERESITA G. NARVASA, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ, JR.,1 Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
This is a petition for review on certiorari2 of the April 25, 2005 decision3 and August 4, 2005
resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81107.
The parties to this case are employees of the Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya (the LGU).
Petitioner Teresita G. Narvasa is a senior bookkeeper while respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. is
the municipal assessor.
The instant case stemmed from three cases of sexual harassment filed separately against
respondent by petitioner along with Mary Gay P. de la Cruz and Zenaida M. Gayaton, who are also
employees of the LGU.
In her affidavit-complaint, De la Cruz claimed5 that, sometime in February 2000, respondent handed
her a note saying, "Gay, I like you." Offended by respondent’s inappropriate remark, de la Cruz
admonished him for giving her such a note and told him that she would give the note to his wife.
Respondent then grabbed the note from her and tore it into pieces. However, this first incident was
followed by a message sent to De la Cruz sometime in March 2002 in which he said, "Ka date ko si
Mary Gay… ang tamis ng halik mo."
On the other hand, Gayaton narrated6 that, on April 5, 2002, respondent whispered to her during a
retirement program, "Oy flawless, pumanaw ka met ditan"7 while twice pinching her upper left arm
near the shoulder in a slow manner.
A few days later, Gayaton received a text message while she was passing respondent’s car in front
of the municipal hall. The message said, "Pauwi ka na ba sexy?" Gayaton later verified through
respondent’s clerk, Alona Agas, that the sender of the message was respondent.
On or about April 22 to 25, 2002, Gayaton received several messages from respondent stating: (1) "I
like you"; (2) "Have a date with me"; (3) "Don’t tell to (sic) others that I told that I like you
because nakakahiya"; (4) "Puso mo to pag bigay moto sakin, I would be very happy" and (5) "I slept
and dreamt nice things about you."
Finally, as far as petitioner’s complaint was concerned, she asserted8 that, on November 18, 2000,
during a field trip of officers and members of the St. Joseph Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the Grotto
Vista Resort in Bulacan, respondent pulled her towards him and attempted to kiss her. Petitioner
resisted and was able to escape the clutches of respondent to rejoin the group that they were
travelling with. Respondent apologized to petitioner thrice regarding that incident.1av vphi1
Based on the investigation conducted by the LGU’s Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(CODI), respondent was found guilty of all three charges by Municipal Mayor Marvic S. Padilla. For
the offenses committed against De la Cruz and Gayaton, respondent was meted the penalties of
reprimand for his first offense of light harassment and 30 days’ suspension for his first offense of
less grave sexual harassment. His transgression against petitioner, however, was deemed to be
grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed from the government service.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) passed only on the decision in the case filed by
petitioner since, under the CSC rules, the penalty of reprimand and/or suspension of not more than
30 days cannot be appealed. The CSC dismissed the appeal but modified Mayor Padilla’s order by
holding respondent guilty of grave misconduct instead of grave sexual harassment.9 The same
penalty of dismissal from the service, however, was meted out to respondent.
Respondent’s next recourse was to the CA which partially granted his appeal. The CA modified the
CSC resolution, finding respondent guilty only of simple misconduct.10 Accordingly, the penalty was
lowered to suspension for one month and one day.
Petitioner comes to this Court to appeal the downgrading of respondent’s offense to simple
misconduct.
The core issue for our resolution is whether the acts committed by respondent against petitioner
(since the CSC resolution only touched upon petitioner’s complaint) constitute simple misconduct or
grave misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of

behavior.11 To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.12 In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.13
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional.
Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz,
who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent
committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature
of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were
carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they
were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to
other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s
married state, and good character and reputation.
We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule attended the incident in question. RA14 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Respondent was charged with knowledge of the existence of
this law and its contents, more so because he was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner
and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of his intention to
violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work environment.
Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner
was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial – that intimate
physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s defiance of custom and
lack of respect for the opposite sex were more appalling because he was a married man.
Respondent’s act showed a low regard for women and disrespect for petitioner’s honor and dignity.
The CA, however, interpreted respondent’s repeated apologies to petitioner as an indication of the
absence of intention on his part to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. On the contrary,
such persistent attempts to make peace with petitioner indicated how well respondent was aware of
the gravity of the transgression he had committed. Respondent certainly knew of the heavy penalty
that awaited him if petitioner complained of his aggressive behavior, as she, in fact, did.
Section 53 of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases provides a list of the
circumstances which may be considered in the determination of penalties to be imposed.15 The CA
considered respondent’s more than ten years of government service and claim of being awarded
Most Outstanding Municipal Assessor of Region II for three years as mitigating circumstances.
Again, we disagree.
Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is a

double-edged sword.16 In fact, respondent’s long years of government service should be seen as a
factor which aggravated the wrong that he committed. Having been in the government service for so
long, he, more than anyone else, should have known that public service is a public trust;17 that public
service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline, and, as such, a public servant must exhibit
at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity.18Sadly, respondent’s actions did not reflect
the integrity and discipline that were expected of public servants. He failed to live up to the image of
the outstanding and exemplary public official that he was. He sullied government service instead.
Furthermore, we note that this is the third time that respondent is being penalized for acts of sexual
harassment. We are also alarmed by the increasing boldness in the way respondent displayed his
unwelcome affection for the women of his fancy. He is a perverted predator preying on his female
colleagues and subordinates. Respondent’s continued misbehavior cannot, therefore, be allowed to
go unchecked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 031176 issued by the Civil Service
Commission finding respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. guilty of grave misconduct
is REINSTATED. Respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. is ordered DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This is without prejudice to any criminal complaints that may be filed against
him.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(On Official Leave)

REYNATO S. PUNO*
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO** RENATO C. CORONA

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO J. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On official leave.
** Acting Chief Justice.
1The Court of Appeals was originally impleaded as public respondent; however, it was
excluded pursuant to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
2 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and concurred in by

Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente of the former Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 26-42.
4 Id., p. 43.
5 Rollo, p. 46.
6 Affidavit-Complaint of Zenaida M. Gayaton. Rollo, p. 48.
7 "Hey, flawless, get away from there."
8 Affidavit-Complaint of Teresita G. Narvasa. Rollo, p. 44.
9Respondent was held administratively liable under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19
series of 1994 which cites sexual harassment as a ground for administrative disciplinary
action under the offense of grave misconduct.
Sec. 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 19 states:
(a) Sexual harassment is one or a series of incidents involving unwelcome sexual

advances, requests for sexual favours, or other verbal or physical conduct of sexual
nature, made directly, indirectly and impliedly when
1) Such conduct might reasonable be expected to cause insecurity, discomfort,

offense or humiliation to another person or group; or
xxx
10 Also under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19 series of 1994.
11 Salazar v. Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, 19 April 2007, 521 SCRA 449, 453.
12 CSC v. Belagan, 483 Phil. 601, 623 (2004).
13 CSC v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486 (1999).
14 Republic Act.
15 Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. — In the

determination of the penalties imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxx
g. Habituality
xxx
j. Length of service in the government
16 Mariano v. Nacional, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1688, 10 February 2009, 578 SCRA 181, 188.
17Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA
589, 611.
18 Retazo v. Verdon, A.M. Nos. P-04-1807 and P-02-1653, 23 December 2008, 575 SCRA 1,
7.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015
ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. MAILA CLEMEN F. SERRANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Atty.
Jacinto C. Gonzales,2 assailing the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 16, 2006, and its
Resolution4 dated October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959. The CA reversed and set aside the
Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003 and the Order dated February 11, 2003 approved by then
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, and reinstated the Decision
dated March 19, 2002 of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau approved by then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-01-0162 (RAS-2001-0156).
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Maila Clemen F. Serrano (respondent)
against her direct superior, Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales (petitioner), Chief, Legal Division of the Philippine
Racing Commission (PHILRACOM), for grave misconduct, sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness.
In her Complaint-Affidavit5 dated January 12, 2001, respondent alleged that on November 23, 2000,
petitioner invited her, along with her officemates, Administrative Officer V Eva Bataller, Atty. III Eugene
Juanson, and Stenographer II Roman Vidal, to eat lunch at Buddy's Restaurant, at J.P. Rizal St., Makati City.
While seated at the table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner suddenly took hold of respondent's
face and forcefully kissed her lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene, Roman and other customers. Respondent
tried to ward off petitioner by pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on kissing her against her
will. She was so shocked, terrified, and humiliated that she could hardly talk and move. She wanted to cry,
but held her tears for fear of further embarrassment. After releasing her, petitioner said: “Ang sarap pala ng
labi ni Maila...” Then, he held her hand and said “Maila sige na...” But, she took away her hand from him.
Thereafter, she immediately reported the incident to PHILRACOM Executive Director Juan Lozano.
Respondent also alleged that prior to that “kissing” incident, petitioner had already degraded her person on
four (4) separate occasions, namely: (1) on the very first day she met him in the office, he offered to
purchase her a cell phone so that he can text her, which offer she straightforwardly refused; (2) on that
same day, he wanted her to join him in his car in going home, which she likewise refused; (3) a week later,
he asked her to eat out for lunch; again, she refused; and (4) on August 23, 2000, after her sick leave from
office, petitioner called her in his office and scolded her and uttered the following unsavory remarks: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Eh ayoko na sa iyo. Hindi mo sinabi sa akin na may anak ka! Nasaan na ang tatay ng anak mo? Wala na?
Ano pang hindi mo sinasabi sa akin, may boyfriend ka? Akala ko pa naman ok ka, kaya nga sinabihan kita
dati na sumabay ka sa akin! Ang daming nagrereklamo sa iyo dito. Hindi ka marunong makisama. Makisama
ka naman! Paano na kung alisin ka dito, makakabalik ka pa ba sa dati mong opisina? Eh ayoko talaga sa iyo
dito. Ano? Do you have a choice? Alam mo ba na ako ang nagrekomenda kay Eva diyan sa Admin. kay
Chairman. Kaya ka nakapasok dito dahil pakiusap ka lang [ni] Eva sa akin. Alam mo bang nakasalalay dito
and posisyon mo dito? Alam mo bang kung ano mo ako dito? Ha? Ano mo ako dito? xxx Ano ngayon ang
gagawin natin eh ayoko nga sa iyo? Anong gagawin natin ngayon? cralawlawlib rary
Respondent further alleged that she was constrained to elevate her complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman because the PHILRACOM Grievance Committee had not taken any concrete action on her
administrative case which had been pending for over a month, and also because of petitioner's relatively
high position in the office.
To support her complaint-affidavit and to corroborate her account, respondent submitted the Joint
Affidavit6 of her officemates Eva, Eugene and Roman, who witnessed the entire “kissing” incident on
November 23, 2000.
In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer dated March 22, 2001, petitioner alleged that at the prodding of his staff, he
agreed to treat them for lunch, as it was respondent's birthday, and she had no money for a
“blowout”.7 While their group were talking in the restaurant, he greeted respondent and planted an innocent
birthday greeting kiss on her left cheek, near her lips. He also alleged that he first met respondent when she
applied for Attorney III; that on July 1, 2000, he summoned her to explain the complaints forwarded by the
Personnel and Administrative Division as to her frequent absence and tardiness; and that his act of
reviewing her official functions was in accordance with his duties and responsibilities as a legal counsel of
PHILRACOM.
In her Reply-Affidavit,8 respondent stated that she never solicited any favor from petitioner, let alone
obliged him to spend money for her birthday “blowout”; that his birthday lunch treat was part of a
premeditated evil plan to have her submit to his sexual desire; that she never allowed him to kiss her on the
cheek, much less on the lips; that in the course of her employment with petitioner as her supervisor, he had
often made sexual advances and gestures towards her, but she still tried to keep their relationship on a
strictly professional level; that the alleged work-related incidents of tardiness, inefficiency and laziness were
all intended to harass her; and that because of the administrative case she filed against him, she lost her
job.
Meanwhile, records show that in an Order of Termination dated January 18, 2001, Executive Director Lozano
ordered the termination of respondent at the close of business hours of January 19, 2001.9Records also
show that the Commission on Human Rights issued a Resolution dated May 8, 2001 in CHR Case No. 2001-
037 which found petitioner to have committed acts of sexual harassment, abuse of authority, and illegal
dismissal against respondent.10 cralaw red
In an Order dated June 27, 2001, the parties were directed to appear for the preliminary conference of the
administrative case. Both parties appeared as directed and agreed to submit the case for decision based on
the evidence on record and pleadings filed.
A Resolution dated July 17, 2001 was approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio,
Jr. (Overall Deputy Ombudsman) in OMB-0-01-0039, the dispositive portion of which reads: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds sufficient evidence that supports the conclusion that
the crime of violation of Section 3(a), Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as “An Act Declaring Sexual
Harassment Unlawful in the Employment, Education, or Training Environment, and for other purposes,” was
committed probably by the herein respondent. Let therefore, the appropriate information be filed against
Jacinto C. Gonzales before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.
SO RESOLVED.11
cralawlawl ibra ry
cralawred
On March 19, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau, through Graft
Investigation Officer Marlon T. Molina, issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
Approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, among other officers, the Decision has the following
dispositive portion: c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial evidence that respondent JACINTO G.
GONZALES is guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Accordingly, the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service is hereby imposed upon him pursuant to Section 52
(A), par. 3, Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936 otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service.
The Honorable Chairman of the Philippine Racing Commission, Electra House Building, Esteban Street,
Legaspi Village, Makati City is hereby directed to implement this Decision in accordance with law and
promptly report to this Office compliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.12 cralawlawlib rary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau denied in
the Order dated September 9, 2002.13 cralawre d
However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the Memorandum issued by Graft
Investigation Officer II Julita M. Calderon, with a decretal portion that states: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we most respectfully recommend that the

herein ORDER dated September 9, 2002 prepared by GIO Molina be MODIFIED insofar as the infraction
and the penalty to be imposed upon the herein respondent is concerned, i.e., from GRAVE
MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and from DISMISSAL from the Service to a mere ONE (1)
MONTH SUSPENSION, without pay, pursuant to Section 52B (2) of Rule IV of the “Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.14 c ralawlawl ibra ry
Aggrieved, respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Overall Deputy Ombudsman. On August 16, 2006, the CA sustained respondent and rendered the herein
assailed decision. Thus: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The memorandum-order dated 03
January 2003 and the Order dated 11 February 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 19
March 2002 approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162 (RAS-2001-0156) is
hereby REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.15 cralawlawlib rary
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration,16 but
the CA denied it in a Resolution17 dated October 4, 2006 for being a prohibited motion.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioner raises the following issues: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE
MEMORANDUM-ORDER DATED 03 JANUARY 2003 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2003 APPROVED
BY THE THEN OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. IN OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, IT
APPEARING THAT THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS ONLY SIMPLE MISCONDUCT,
HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO HAVE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN
EXCESS OF DISCRETION [sic], UPON WHICH THE INSTANT PETITION IS BASED, IN GROSS
CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE GROSSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S URGENT
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE GROUNDS INVOKED THEREIN NOT BEING APPLICABLE TO THE CASE
AT BAR AND MOREOVER, THE DENIAL THEREOF HAS SACRIF[I]CED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
AND FAIR PLAY TO TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE.18 cralawlawlib rary
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that it is only in an appealed case, not in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, that the CA has authority to substitute its own findings and conclusions with that of the disciplining
authority. He points out that what is claimed as “grave abuse of discretion” on the part of the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman was his alleged erroneous approval of the Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003
which modified the infraction and the penalty from grave misconduct to simple misconduct, and from
dismissal to a mere one (1) month suspension without pay. But, he argues that such was merely an error in
the exercise of judgment or discretion which is not correctible by a writ of certiorari. He also argues that the
mere fact that the Overall Deputy Ombudsman made findings and conclusions contrary to or inconsistent
with those of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau cannot, by itself, be considered grave
abuse of discretion, as the findings of the disciplining authority is always subject to amendment, corrections
or reconsideration. He concedes that the Overall Deputy Ombudsman found him to have committed
misconduct amounting to sexual harassment. However, he points out that such finding of simple
misconduct, instead of grave misconduct, is supported by facts and circumstances, and such finding is within
sole discretion of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman over which the courts have no authority to interfere. At
any rate, he submits that his misconduct was not motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose; hence, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not warranted. Finally, he maintains that the issue of
sexual harassment is better addressed and resolved in the criminal case for violation of Section 3(a) of R.A.
No. 787719 (docketed as Crim. Case No. 311165) pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 64, for to do so in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and extremely
unreasonable.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the CA grossly erred in applying the two prohibitions laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Court of Appeals,20 which was reiterated in Ma. Imelda Argel, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,21i.e., the doctrine that the 15-day period for filing an appeal is non-extendible, and
the prohibition against the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in all
courts, except the Supreme Court. He insists that the denial of such motion for extension should be based
on the court's assessment of the grounds relied upon and not on purely procedural technicality. He seeks to
justify his urgent motion for extension on the fact that, as Presiding Judge and Pairing Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Olongapo City, he was beset with pressures of work attending to numerous court
trials, preparation of court orders and decisions, and large volume of case load. He prays for a liberal
construction of procedural rules in order to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.
There is no merit in the petition
The Court shall first delve on the procedural issue of the case. In Imperial v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court
ruled:c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
In a long line of cases starting with Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon, we have laid down the following
guideline:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such
a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may
in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed.
This rule is consistent with the rule in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that unless an appeal
or a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-day reglementary period, the CA’s decision
becomes final. Thus, a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the
running of the 15-day period for the computation of a decision’s finality. At the end of the period, a CA
judgment becomes final, immutable and beyond our power to review.23 c ralawlaw lib rary
This rule, however, admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the rule,24 so long as the petitioner is
able to prove the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance.25 No such reasons were shown
to obtain in this case. Petitioner's reasons of pressures of work attending to numerous court trials,
preparation of court orders and decisions, and large volume of case load, are foreseeable and perennial
problems of most trial court judges. Such reasons are inexcusable, as ordinary prudence should have
prompted him to secure the services of an independent counsel to defend his administrative case.
While the CA was correct in denying his Urgent Motion for Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration for
being a prohibited motion, the Court, in the interest of justice, looked into the merits of the case, and opted
to suspend the prohibition against such motion for extension after it found that a modification of the CA
Decision is warranted by the law and the jurisprudence on administrative cases involving sexual harassment.
The emerging trend of jurisprudence, after all, is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of
procedural rules.26 Rules of procedure exist to ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases; to
this end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. Thus, the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or
exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of
justice requires it.27 c ralaw red
The Court shall now delve on the substantive issue of whether the CA gravely erred in reversing the
Memorandum-Order of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman which downgraded petitioner's infraction from grave
misconduct to simple misconduct, and the penalty imposed on him from dismissal to a mere one (1) month
suspension without pay.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Amalio A. Mallari,28 the Court explained the difference between simple and
grave misconduct, as follows: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves
additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules,
which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an
element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
to duty and the rights of others. In other words, in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be evident. cralawlawli bra ry
In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner
used his position and authority as Head of the Legal Division of PHILRACOM, as well as his moral
ascendancy, to elicit sexual favors and to indulge in sexually malicious acts from his respondent, his female
subordinate.29 As to petitioner's sole defense that he merely gave respondent an innocent birthday greeting
kiss, the Court is unconvinced in view of the Joint Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly
kissed her on the lips and said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila. x x x”
In Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,30 the Court found the respondent public officer, who merely attempted to forcibly
kiss the complainant, guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment, thus: chanRoble svirt ual Lawlib rary
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the
incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to [complainant] De la Cruz, who
made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed
against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions
could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous
relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their
companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not
only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good character and
reputation.
We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of an established rule attended the incident in question. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Respondent was charged with knowledge of the
existence of this law and its contents, more so because he was a public servant. His act of grabbing
petitioner and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation of
his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work
environment. Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his
attempt to kiss petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since
time immemorial – that intimate physical contact between individuals must be consensual.
Respondent’s defiance of custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex were more appalling because he
was a married man. Respondent’s act showed a low regard for women and disrespect for petitioner’s honor
and dignity.31 (Emphasis added)
cralawlawl ibra ry
However, it bears emphasis that in Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,32 the Court ordered the respondent public
officer's dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
because it was the third time that he was penalized for acts of sexual harassment. In determining such
penalty, moreover, the Court considered the length of his service as an aggravating circumstance.
Apropos to this case is Civil Service Commission v. Nierras33 where the Court upheld the CA's decision
finding the respondent public officer guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment with a reduced
sentence of six (6) months suspension without pay, thus: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the case of Veloso v. Caminade in imposing the
proper penalty on Nierras since the facts of the case are different. Indeed, it should be noted that in the
instant case, Oña and Nierras are not co-employees while in the Caminade case, the complainants were the
subordinates of the offender. Also, in the Caminade case, there were several incidents of sexual harassment
by a judge from whom the expected standard of morality was more exacting. But here, there was only one
incident of sexual harassment. If a six-month suspension can be meted to a judge from whom the expected
standard of morality is more exacting, a fortiori, the same or lesser penalty should be meted to Nierras.
Moreover, in the Caminade case, the offender actually forcefully kissed and grabbed the complainants.
However, in this case, Oña was able to flee from the arms of Nierras even before he could cause more harm
to her. Under the circumstances of the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that suspension of
the offender for a period of six (6) months without pay is sufficient penalty.34
cralawlawl ibra ry
cralaw red
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner should be held liable for
grave misconduct, but holds that a reduction of the penalty from dismissal from service to a mere
suspension of six (6) months without pay, is in order. Like in Veloso v. Caminade,35 there is only one
incident of sexual harassment in this case where petitioner forcibly kissed respondent who was his
subordinate. If a six (6)-month suspension can be meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of
morality is more exacting, it is logical that a similar penalty should be meted to petitioner.
Moreover, the Court's reduced penalty of six (6)-months suspension without pay is in conformity with Civil
Service Commission Resolution (CSC) No. 01-0940 entitled the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual
Harassment Cases. Section 53, Rule X thereof classifies acts of sexual harassment as grave, less grave and
light offenses, while Sections 55 and 56, Rule XI provides the corresponding penalties therefor, to wit:
chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry
“RULE X
CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 53. Sexual harassment is classified as grave, less grave and light offenses.
A. Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:

1. unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia, buttocks and breast);
2. sexual assault;
3. malicious touching;
4. requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion, local or foreign travels, favorable
working conditions or assignments, a passing grade, the granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant of
benefits or payment of a stipend or allowance, and
5. other analogous cases.
B. Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
1. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body;
2. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex, or
one’s sexual orientation or used to describe a person;
4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and
5. other analogous cases.
C. The following shall be considered Light Offenses;

1. surreptitiously looking or staring a look of a person’s private part or worn undergarments;
2. telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail or other similar means, causing
embarrassment or offense and carried out after the offender has been advised that they are offensive or
embarrassing or, even without such advise, when they are by their nature clearly embarrassing, offensive or
vulgar;
3. malicious leering or ogling;
4. the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
5. unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person’s sex life;
6. unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
7. making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
8. persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;
9. unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing discomfort, embarrassment, offense or insult to the
receiver; and
10. other analogous cases. chanroblesv irt uallawlib ra ry
RULE XI
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITIES
xxx xxx xxx
Section 55. Any person who is found guilty of sexual harassment shall, after the investigation, be meted the
penalty corresponding to the gravity and seriousness of the offense.
Section 56. The penalties for light, less grave, and grave offenses are as follows:
A. For light offenses:
1st offense – Reprimand 2nd offense – Fine or suspension not exceeding thirty (30) days 3rd offense –
Dismissal
B. For less grave offenses:
1st offense – Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days and not exceeding six (6)
months 2nd offense – Dismissal
C. For grave offenses: Dismissal” (Emphasis added) cralawlawl ib rary
Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds that the sexual harassment offense petitioner committed
falls under less grave offenses which is analogous to “unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s
body”, and to “derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex”,
with the corresponding maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay.36 cralaw red
Section 53 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS),37 states that in the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered. The following
circumstances shall be appreciated: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
a. Physical Illness
b. Good faith
c. Taking undue advantage of official position
d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e. Undue disclosure of confidential information
f. Use of government property in the commission of the offense
g. Habituality
h. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building;
i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense
j. Length of service in the government
k. Education
l. Other analogous circumstances.
Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the proper party,
otherwise, said circumstances shall not be considered in the imposition of proper penalty. The Commission,
however, in the interest of substantial justice may take and consider these circumstances. cralawlawlib rary
The Court notes that the Deputy Overall Ombudsman was correct in appreciating the following mitigating
circumstances in determining the imposable penalty, to wit: (1) petitioner's weak physical condition and (2)
commission of the offense in a public place and in the presence of their office mates. However, the said
Ombudsman gravely erred in failing to consider the following aggravating circumstances: (1) taking undue
advantage of official position; (2) taking undue advantage of subordinate; and (3) education. As the Head of
the Legal Department of PHILRACOM and the direct superior of respondent, petitioner's act of forcibly
kissing her lips and saying “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila x x x” in front of their office mates, smacks of
bad faith, abuse of official position, flagrant disregard of the anti-sexual harassment law,38 and willful
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Under Section 54 (d) of the URACCS,40 where more
aggravating circumstances are present than mitigating ones, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Hence, the Court imposes the penalty of suspension of six (6) months without pay.
Given that the Ombudsman is vested with plenary and unqualified power41 to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof,42 the settled rule is that courts will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reason to
indicate otherwise.43 As discussed above, the Court finds such good and compelling reasons based on law
and jurisprudence as would warrant the modification of the CA decision, as well as the Memorandum-Order
of Overall Deputy Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the Court disagrees on petitioner's contention that the issue of sexual harassment is better
addressed in the pending criminal case for sexual harassment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
for to do so in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and extremely unreasonable. It bears
to stress that administrative and criminal charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and the trial
court, respectively, are separate and distinct from each other even if they arise from the same act or
omission. This is because the quantum of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt,
while in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required. Moreover, the purpose of the
administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that
a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment
of crime.44 Thus, even the dismissal of a criminal case does not necessarily foreclose the administrative
action against the respondent.45 cralawre d
Finally, considering that the Court is reducing the penalty imposed on him from dismissal from service to a
mere 6-month suspension without pay, and that he is no longer connected with PHILRACOM, petitioner
should refund the salaries and all other monetary benefits he had received equivalent to six (6) months with
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from finality of this Decision until fully paid.46 His earned
leave credits for the duration of such suspension are likewise deemed forfeited.47 The Court stresses that his
appointment48 as a trial court judge should not be viewed as a sort of exoneration from such suspension
that he should have served while he was then PHILRACOM's Legal Department Head. Thus, in addition to the
refund of salaries and benefits, and forfeiture of earned leave credits during such suspension, the Court
sternly warns petitioner not to commit similar acts, otherwise, his conduct may be construed as tainted with
impropriety which shall merit the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Moreover, in view of Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council which disqualifies from
being nominated for appointment to any judicial post those with pending criminal or regular administrative
cases, the Court finds it necessary to investigate whether petitioner declared in his application for
appointment his pending administrative case for grave misconduct and criminal cases for sexual
harassment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 16, 2006, and its
Resolution dated October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, reducing
the penalty for grave misconduct through sexual harassment from dismissal from service to suspension of
six (6) months without pay, and with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be punished
with dismissal from the service. Considering, however, that petitioner Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales is no longer
connected with Philippine Racing Commission, he is ORDERED to REFUND the salaries and other monetary
benefits he could have received during the period of such suspension with legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid. Further, his earned leave credits during such
period of suspension are also deemed FORFEITED.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to form part of
petitioner’s service record. The OCA is hereby DIRECTED to investigate, report and recommend the
necessary action on whether petitioner declared in his application for appointment his pending
administrative and criminal cases.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Brion,* Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*
Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Raffle dated March 5,
2015.
Rollo, pp. 10-31.

1
2
Appointed on August 23, 2005 as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Olongapo City,
Branch 2, per Master List of Incumbent Judges as of January 20, 2015;
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index/judiciary-book/lower court/municipal-trial-courts-in-cities; accessed on
February 26, 2015 at 9:20 a.m.
3
Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices, now Supreme Court
Associate Justices, Lucas P. Bersamin and Martin S. Villarama Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 33-59.
Rollo, pp. 62-63.

4
5
CA rollo, pp. 41-45.
6
Id. at 46-47.
Rollo, pp. 41-42.

7
8
CA rollo, pp. 48-52.
Id. at 53.
9
10
Id. at 54-58.
11
Id. at 81.
12
Rollo, pp. 83-84.
13
Id. at 46.
14
Id. at 87-88.
15
Id. at 58.
16
Id. at 110-111.
17
Id. at 62-63.
18
Rollo, p. 18. (Citation omitted)
19
An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment, Education or Training Environment, and
for other purposes.
20
226 Phil. 144 ( 1986).
21
374 Phil. 867 (1999).
22
Alberto Imperial v. Hon. Court of Appeals and the Republic of the Philippines, 606 Phil. 391 (2009).
(Citations omitted)
23
Id. at 396-397.
24
Id. at 397.
25
V.C. Ponce, Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Parañaque and Sampaguita Hills Homeowner's Association,
Inc., G.R. No. 178431, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 117, 130.
Hon. Orlando C. Casimiro, in his capacity as Acting Ombudsman; Hon. Rogelio L. Singson, in his capacity
26
as Department of Public Works and Highways Secretary v. Josefino N. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, December
10, 2014.
27
Id.
28
G.R. No. 183161, December 3, 2014.
29
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
30
630 Phil. 577 (2010).
31
Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr., supra, at 582.
32
Supra note 30.
33
569 Phil. 37 (2008).
34
Civil Service Commission v. Nierras, supra, at 43.
35
478 Phil. 1 (2004).
36
Section 56 of the URACCS states that during the period of suspension, respondent shall not be entitled to
all money benefits including leave credits. Now Section 51 (c) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (RRACCS).
37
Now Section 48 of the RRACCS.
38
R.A. No. 7877.
39
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
40
Now Section 49 (d) of the RRACCS.
Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Office of the Ombudsman, 430 Phil. 223, 232 (2002).
41
Laurel v. Desierto, 430 Phil. 658, 671 (2002).

42
Esquivel v. Ombudsman, 437 Phil. 702, 711 (2002).

43
Caña v. Gebusion, 385 Phil. 773 (2000).

44
Barillo v. Gervacio, 532 Phil. 267, 279 (2006).

45
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 459.
46
47
Section 56 (d) of the URACCS; Now Section 51 (c) of the RRACCS.
48
See note 2; Appointed August 23, 2005.

Cases On Sexual Harrasment

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Republic of the Philippines

DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, G.R. No. 146053

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, Promulgated:

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts of the Case

Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan,

Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated February

Resolution of the CSC

Decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:

3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the penalty of

The Issues Before Us

1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment,

2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and

3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the

The petition is without merit.

As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:

The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be

We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the

A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should

Costs against petitioner.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

[G.R. No. 132164. October 19, 2004]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON

When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation,

The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be

WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby rendered

Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED

WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave

SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.

(a) In Criminal Cases:

SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and

SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the

The following circumstances shall be appreciated:

l. and other analogous cases.

Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment,[43] and

G.R. No. 169449 March 26, 2010

TERESITA G. NARVASA, Petitioner,

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of

Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is a

(On Official Leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO** RENATO C. CORONA

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO J. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

** Acting Chief Justice.

2 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

3Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and concurred in by

7 "Hey, flawless, get away from there."

8 Affidavit-Complaint of Teresita G. Narvasa. Rollo, p. 44.

Sec. 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 19 states:

(a) Sexual harassment is one or a series of incidents involving unwelcome sexual

1) Such conduct might reasonable be expected to cause insecurity, discomfort,

10 Also under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19 series of 1994.

12 CSC v. Belagan, 483 Phil. 601, 623 (2004).

13 CSC v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486 (1999).

15 Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. — In the

The following circumstances shall be appreciated: