AZNAR VS.

GARCIA 7 S 95
Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence

Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and
consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in
this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision
rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen
claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the
law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of
successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in
as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts
must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and
consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:

Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect
that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is
governed by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that
partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Aznar v. Garcia
Facts

Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will executed in
the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the remainder of
his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows the testator to dispose of his
estate in any manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that the personal property of a person is
governed by the laws of his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in conformity with
the will. Helen opposed the project of partition arguing that Philippine laws govern the distribution of the estate
and manner proposed in the project deprived her of her legitime.

Issue

Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.

HelD

Yes. Philippine law governs.

Ratio

Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the
national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws of California giving a testator
absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to persons domiciled within the
said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating that personal property is governed by
the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said
state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled governs the succession and the
regime of legitimes must be respected.

CASE DIGEST: BELLIS VS. BELLIS

1 Reply

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his
first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three
illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties
to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants
argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of
two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view
of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed
by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children
of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is
the national law of the deceased.

Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce, Doctrine of Processual Presumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.

By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman

By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis
and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis

August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as follows:

1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen

2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis

3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives

July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A

September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on

People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed

Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case
is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed

Doctrine of Processual Presumption:

The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be
presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.

In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Apply
Philippine laws.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Cadalin vs. POEA

GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.

EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum will apply the
foreign statute of limitations.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
public policy.

FACTS:

Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign
principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in
several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when
their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where
some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of
employment is one year.

ISSUE:

Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine
law on prescription that shall be the governing law

HELD:

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of
process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum.
This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the
country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute
of limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute
of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,”
one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the
forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind.
Said Section provides:

“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippine Islands.”

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains
the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the
one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.

BANK OF AMERICA VS. AMERICAN REALTY

Facts: Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the
Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor
of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan. Subsequently,
it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages against the
petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil
suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue:

WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before
foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Held: Yes.

1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor
either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of
the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the
two remedies is complete in itself.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative.
Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage.
As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition
not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless,
alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of
two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before
foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the
properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions
and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.

2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with
regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for
sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal

law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO, GR No. 198587, 2015-01-14

Facts: Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing under the Royal Decree No. M/24 of
18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is located at 4/F Metro
House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue,... Makati City (Philippine Office).

Respondents... were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

after working as Temporary Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants.

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in
2006.

Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of
termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements.

if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment
contract as void and she... will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness.

Issues:

whether respondents' voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated

Ruling:

we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia's policy. As argued by respondents, Saudia's policy
entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the
obvious, pregnancy is an... occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia's policy excludes from and
restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.

We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render difficult the
performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity
to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent... and immutable that, it must entail the termination of one's
employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the
performance of functions. However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing... occurrence
that it leaves no other recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the illegal termination of respondents'
employment, this case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy. Consistent with clear
pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly... find application in and govern this case.

Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal, it is clear that respondents were
constructively dismissed. Hence, their termination was illegal.

The termination of respondents' employment happened when they were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on
account of child delivery and infant rearing.

It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia. All they did was avail of their maternity
leaves. Evidently, the very nature of a maternity leave means that a pregnant employee will not report for work
only temporarily and that she will resume the... performance of her duties as soon as the leave allowance expires.

It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with Saudia. Each of them repeatedly filed
appeal letters (as much as five [5] letters in the case of Rebesencio[109]) asking Saudia

to reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be... terminated along with the forfeiture of their benefits. Some of
them even went to Saudia's office to personally seek reconsideration
Respondents also adduced a copy of the "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants."[111] This
contract deemed void the employment of a flight attendant who becomes pregnant and threatened termination
due to lack of medical fitness.[112] The threat of termination (and the forfeiture of benefits that it entailed) is
enough to compel a reasonable person in respondents' position to give up his or her employment.

Stripped of all unnecessary complexities, respondents were dismissed for no other reason than simply that they
were pregnant. This is as wanton, oppressive, and tainted with bad faith as any reason for termination of...
employment can be. This is no ordinary case of illegal dismissal. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. It
is an affront not only to our statutes and policies on employees' security of tenure, but more so, to the
Constitution's dictum of fundamental equality between... men and women

Dacasin v. Dacasin
Herald Black Dacasin, petitioner vs. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin , respondent

I. FACTS:

On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines. The following year respondent got
pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In June of 1999 respondent sought and
obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the
marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction
over the case for enforcement purposes.

On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint
custody of Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the
complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.

I. ISSUE:

 Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case

 Whether the agreement or contract is valid

I. HELD:

 Case was dismissed dated March 1, 2005.

Court’s Rationale:

o It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois Court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent

o The divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction

 Agreement is void

o The agreement is void for contravening Article 2035 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise
agreements on jurisdiction.

II. FACTS:

Petitioner sought reconsideration his new argument is that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void.
Thus, the divorce is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case. In its order on June 23, 2005,
the trial court denied reconsideration because petitioner is under the laws of his nationality, which is American.
Hence, the petitioner filed alternative theories for the validity of the agreement:

> The agreement noted the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from the sole to joint

> The agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by respondents

II. ISSUE

 Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit

 Whether the trial curt can enforce the Agreement on joint custody

II. HELD

Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to settle Stephanie’s custody. (Article 213 of
the Family Code lost its coverage over Stephanie. Stephanie was already almost 15 during this time thus, she is
entitled to choose to whom she want to be)
 Instead of dismissing the case, court chose to remand the case in order to settle Stephanie’s custody.
Court decided to REVERSE the orders dated March 1, 2005 and June 23, 2005. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with its ruling.

***Guys kindly read the Articles mentioned na lang they are found in the Civil Code of the Phils.

Art. 213 of the Family Code, page 631

Art. 2035 of Compromises and Arbitrations, page 480