People v.
Estomaca Parazo, a natural born deaf-mute, was convicted with rape and
April 22, 1996; Regalado, J:
Issue:
W/N proper arraignment was conducted against Estomaca despite it
being read in Ilonggo/local dialect
Facts:
5 counts of rape represented in five separate criminal cases were
charged against Estomaca, an illiterate laborer (finished only Grade 1).
The accused was assisted by a counsel de officio during arraignment
and entered a plea of guilty to all criminal charges, but the CoC
recorded that he pleaded guilty to 2 after the accused said that maybe
it was her daughter’s boyfriend who raped her in the other 3 instances
of the charge. He was then waived his right to present evidence and
required the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RTC then found him guilty of the crime.
Ruling:
NO. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based
on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the
trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and
(2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. There was
no statement of record that appellant fully understood that medium
of expression. Within a province or major geographical area using a
basic regional language, there may be other local dialects spoken in
certain parts thereof. It is either of public knowledge or readily
capable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the place where
the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family
are natives, the local dialect is known as "kinaray-a." There is no
showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was
furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses against
him, in order that the latter may duly prepare and comply with his
responsibilities. Appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea
of guilty, he would definitely and in any event be given the death
penalty under the "New Law," as the trial court calls Republic Act No.
7659. He was also not categorically advised that his plea of guilty
would not under any circumstance affect or reduce the death
sentence as he may have believed or may have been erroneously
advised. Such an erroneous notion on the part of appellant which may
have impelled him to plead guilty is not improbable or conjectural,
especially when we consider his mental state and the environmental
situation.
A mere warning to him that he could possibly face extreme retribution
in the form of death or face a life sentence in jail is not even enough.
The trial judge should ascertain and be totally convinced that, for all
intents and purposes, the plea recorded has all the earmarks of a valid
and acceptable confession upon which an eventual judgment of
conviction can stand. Although there is no definite and concrete rule
as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching
inquiry," it would be well for the court, for instance, to require the
accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him, or by making him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated
the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing
details of significance.
People v. Parazo
July 8, 1999; Purisima, J:
Issue:
W/N Parazo was properly informed of the charges against him
Facts:
frustrated homicide. He was assisted by a sign language expert, but
merely by a person who knows him since 1993. The medical
examination report stated that Parazo had a mental age of 7 years old.
His thought content, thought process and flow of ideas could not be
determined because of his inability to speak be determined because
of his inability to speak. He is unable to understand both written and
spoken language, needs repetitive sign language instructions and
demonstration to understand the task he was being asked to do.
Ruling:
NO. The absence of a qualied interpreter in sign language and of any
other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused
of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right
to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process
by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was
not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings
where his life and liberty were at stake.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
November 21, 1991; Narvasa, J:
Issue:
W/N the motion for production and inspection of documents filed by
the private respondents be granted
Facts:
Private respondents Tantoco, Santiago, and Marcos were charged by
the PCGG pursuant to EO14. They filed a motion for leave to file
interrogatories seeking to know who were the commissioners in the
PCGG who authorized the inclusions of Tantoco and Santiago in the
case. The PCGG opposed stating that the motion by the respondents
were procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is
improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise. SB denied the
motion by the respondents. It also opined that service of
interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court is
premature absent any special or extraordinary circumstances which
would justify the same. Respondents then filed in the SB
“Interrogatories to Plaintiff” as well as a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents. They seek to know which properties the
plaintiff claims to recover for being ill-gotten, the specific acts
committed by Tantoco and Santiago in concert with Marcos, and to
clarify the theory of the plaintiff regarding dummies. They also prayed
for the examination of the official records and other evidence which
were the basis of the verification, the documents listed in PCGG’s pre-
trial brief, and the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which
concluded in the filing of the present complaint. SB granted these
motions. PCGG filed an MR stating that the interrogatories are not
specific as they do not name the person propounded, they delve into
factual matters which have been already decreed, that they are the
same things they used to seek in the respondent’s denied Bill of
Particulars, and that the interrogatories are in the nature of a
deposition which is prematurely filed. They also contested the motion
for production and inspection of documents since the respondents
failed to show good cause, the said documents would be marked as
exhibits in the pre-trial anyway, and that the documents sought are
privileged in character and non-existent. SB denied the PCGG MR.
Ruling:
YES. There is good cause for the production and inspection of the
documents. Some of the documents are, according to the verification
of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material
allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in
evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry
is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the
parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other
documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the
allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their
disclosure may not be opposed. The various modes or instruments of
discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between
the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to
those issues. The evident purpose is to enable the parties, consistent
with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials
are carried on in the dark. No longer can the time-honored cry of
'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the
facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.
To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever
facts he has ill his possession.
People v. Palacio
May 25, 1960; Padilla, J:
Issue:
W/N the prosecution’s witnesses is not allowed to testify since they
failed to provide the defense a list of their witnesses
Facts:
Private respondents were charged with murder. Counsel for the
defense asked the court to order the prosecution to furnish them with
a list of all the names of the witnesses for the prosecution. This
motion was granted. Since the prosecution failed to produce them the
list of their witnesses, the defense prayed that the witnesses be
limited to those names in the Information. The court granted. During
trial, the prosecution presented people whose names were not listed
in the Information. The defense opposed, to which the court granted
by not allowing said witnesses to give their testimony.
Ruling:
NO. The fact that some of the witnesses for the prosecution who are
not listed in the information were present in the courtroom and heard
the testimony of the other witnesses does not disqualify them from
being witnesses. Counsel for the defense should have asked for the
exclusion of all witnesses who have not testified under and pursuant
to section 14, Rule 115. The defendant is entitled as a matter of right
to be furnished by the prosecution with a list of the witnesses to be
presented against him during the trial. But the prosecution may call
at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information. Therefore, the prosecution need not furnish the
defendant with a list of all its witnesses. The time for the accused to
know all the witnesses against him is when they take the witness
stand.
People v. Molina
December 14, 2001; Bellosillo, J:
Issue:
W/N the plea of guilt committed by the accused which was the basis
of his conviction was improvidently made
Facts:
Molina convicted of rape committed against his own daughter. He
was then sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He was arraigned
on the four Informations for incestuous rape and pleaded not guilty
to all four. One information was for attempted rape, which he also
peleaded not guilty. The first hearing was cut short when the
prosecution "asked for a deferment to determine whether the
proposal of the accused to withdraw his plea of not guilty and change
same to guilty could have the effect of lowering the penalty attached
to the offense charged to reclusion perpetua. The hearing was then
rescheduled, in which the defense manifested the desire of the
accused to change his plea to guilty as regards to all the crimes
because he was being bothered by his conscience and wanted to
make amends. Thus, he was immediately re-arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty “after," as the trial court noted, "the consequences
of the change of plea had been duly explained to him by his counsel
and by the prosecution”. Despite this observation of the trial court,
there is nothing on record to determine what this explanation
consisted of. By way of concession, after accused-appellant was
arraigned, the defense counsel prayed for liberality from the trial
court "even only by recommending the accused for executive
clemency.'' The prosecution then proceeded to present its evidence
to determine the degree of culpability. While the defense cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses, he did not introduce any
evidence in behalf of the accused. The court then convicted the
accused based on his plea, the testimonies of the witnesses, and the
corroborating evidence presented. The trial court however strongly
recommended executive clemency in light of his plea of guilt and his
alleged letter that ambiguously expressed his remorse for some
unidentified acts. On appeal, the defense forwards that the plea of
guilt was improvidently made.
Ruling:
YES. Record of the re-arraignment merely noted that the accused was
re-arraigned and he entered a plea of guilty separately in the entitled
cases after the consequences of the change of plea have been duly
explained to him, but it does not state that copies of the Informations
and the list of witnesses were given to him and the Informations read
in a language that he knows. Moreover, the trial court did not conduct
a searching inquiry to establish that the plea of guilty was done
voluntarily with full awareness of its consequences. Under
established principles, a searching inquiry must not only comply with
the requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound
on the events that actually took place during the arraignment, the
words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the
age of the accused, his educational attainment and socioeconomic
status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision
of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary
investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel to confer
with him. These matters are relevant since they serve as trustworthy
indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. Our
jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per se rule that once a plea of
guilty is deemed improvidently made that the accused is at once
entitled to a remand. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, it
must also be proved that as a result of such irregularity there was
inadequate representation of facts by either the prosecution or the
defense during the trial. Verily the relevant matter that justifies the
remand of the criminal case to the trial court is the procedural
unfairness or complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea of guilty.
Daan v. Sandiganbayan
March 28, 2008; Austria-Martinez, J:
Issue:
W/N the plea-bargain of the accused be granted
Facts:
Daan and Mayor Kuizon were charged with malversation of public
funds and falsification of public documents by a public officer or
employee by falsifying time books and payrolls by making it look like
the laborers were working when they were in fact not working, and
collected their salaries. During arraignment in the falsification case,
the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and
substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender
will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal
is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to plea on the lesser
crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. In
the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea
of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime
of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts. The
prosecution agreed to both changes as it will be beneficial to the case
against Mayor Kuizon and of the fact that Daan has already restituted
the amounts alleged to be appropriated. The SB denied petitioner's
Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was
presented to justify its approval. Petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
plea-bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not
an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the
payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that
the amount involved is only P18,860. which he already restituted
SB believes that approving the proposal would only serve to trivialize
the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong
signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are
likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive
from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the
laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government.
Ruling:
YES. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves
the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge. Ordinarily, plea bargaining
is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. But it may also
be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court
has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made
during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the
prosecution already presented several witnesses. SB has proffered
valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent
events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made: (1) that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, and; (2) that the plea of guilt
should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged.
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which
petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property
involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented
to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by
another person of such funds or property. Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to
plead guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender
is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable officer for
public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or
regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor;
and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two
months after such accounts should be rendered.
Estipona Jr v. Judge Lobrigo
August 15, 2017; Peralta, J:
Issue:
W/N Sec. 23 of RA 9165 is constitutional as it states: Plea Bargaining
Provision — Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of
the provision on plea-bargaining
Facts:
An Information for possession of shabu under Sec. 11 of the said law
was filed against Estipona. He filed a Motion praying to withdraw his
not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Sec. 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs), with a penalty of rehabilitation
in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of
the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Sec. 23
violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle
of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government. RTC denied the motion as it is expressly prohibited in
Sec. 23. The intent of the law is to rehabilitate an accused of a drug
offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal
drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, the SC allowed
rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia
with traces of dangerous drugs. RTC ruled that it was beyond their
powers to decide on the constitutionality of the said law. OSG
contends that the petition should be dismissed because: (1) the
Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2)
the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked
collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition
for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari
before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks
legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Sec. 23 is
not the lis mota the case.
Ruling:
NO. It is for unconstitutional for being contrary to the rulemaking
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution. Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. In this
jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-
take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system
— speed, economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the
offended party, the prosecution, and the court. Considering the
presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining
neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates
as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole People v. Gambao
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this October 1, 2013; Perez, J:
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Issue:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the
first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was Facts:
also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress Ruling:
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure.
Bayas v. Sandiganbayan
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or November 12, 2002; Panganiban, J:
even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case. As
regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's Issue:
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. If
the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a
bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow Facts:
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on
which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing Ruling:
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and
nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it Fule v. CA
behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's June 22, 1988; Melencio-Herrera, J:
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of Issue:
the public will be served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any
finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance Facts:
of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.The plea
is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which
may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is Ruling:
necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denote an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is
not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise
for the convenience of the accused.

People v. Padernal
September 5, 1967; Bengzon, JP. J:

Issue:

Facts:

Ruling:

People v. Mendoza
March 14, 1994; Bellosillo, J:

Issue:

Facts:

Ruling: