Book Reviews

Douglas N. Walton, A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy. London/Tuscaloosa:

the University of Alabama Press (1995). ISBN 35487-0380 (324 pp).

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy is to present a new theory

of fallacy and indeed a new theory of fallacy-theory. Fallacy-theory has
been under scrutiny since 1970 when Hamblin castigated what he called
‘The Standard Treatment’ of fallacies and threw down the gauntlet. In the
1970s and 80s, Douglas Walton and John Woods together co-authored a
series of papers (now available under one cover, Woods and Walton, 1989)
in which they showed that the fallacies could be the subject of serious
theoretical inquiry. Walton has continued in the 80s and 90s to make the
fallacies a focus of inquiry and those who have followed his research will
know several things that are in the background of the volume under
discussion here.
Walton’s research tends to focus on studies of particular fallacies. Walton
has written monographs on the ad hominem (1985), begging the question
(1991), slippery slope arguments (1992), and the argument from ignorance
(1994). (Walton writes books while the rest of us write articles.) In addition
he has also dealt with the subject of fallacy theory generally in Logical
Dialogue Games and Fallacies (1984) and Informal Fallacies (1987).
Finally, those who have followed Walton’s research know as well that a
shift occurred in the 80s. Walton turns to dialogical approaches to logic
and argumentation and this interest in most evident in his 1995 monograph,
co-authored with Erik Krabbe, Commitment in Dialogue. Now, finally,
Walton has drawn most of these threads together in one work focused on
presenting a revised conception of fallacy and indeed a new approach to
fallacy theory.
Walton calls it a pragmatic theory, and its relationship to and differences
from the traditional approaches to fallacy (both formal and informal) and
newer approaches (pragma-dialectics) is one of the sub-themes of this book.
At the same time, Walton is concerned to fend off the charge that this
new approach is relativistic in a pernicious sense (p. 32). Even this brief
description will indicate that there’s a lot happening in this book. My
purpose here is to call attention to the main features of this new theory
and what appear to be some of its virtues, a well as some potential
problems.
I will begin by briefly summarizing the contents of PTF because they
are wider than the title might indicate. After that I zero in on the new

Argumentation 12: 115–123, 1998.

116 BOOK REVIEWS

approach to fallacy and the theory of fallacy into which it is imbedded

and then finally look at the virtues and problems of this new pragmatic
approach.

OVERVIEW

Chapter One details the history of the notion of fallacy and outlines this
new approach to fallacies which is situated within a dialogical setting.
Chapter Two is an overview of the traditional informal fallacies (the ad
fallacies, straw man, faulty analogy, etc.) more or less as these are under-
stood by the traditional approach. Chapter Three surveys formal fallacies,
both deductive and inductive. Chapter Four is a wide-ranging discussion
of various types of dialogue, and Chapter Five is a discussion of 10 dif-
ferent argumentation schemes which many readers will find quite inter-
esting but which I will not be able to discuss within the confines of this
short review. Chapter Six focuses on the notion of relevance and defends
relevance as a pragmatic concept, while also enlarging on the idea of global
relevance that Walton has introduced elsewhere (1987). The next two
chapters are the core of the book. In Chapter Seven Walton presents his
new approach to fallacy, and in Chapter Eight we get the theory of fallacy.
Chapter Nine shows how the new theory applies to selected fallacies: the
ad ignorantium, the ad verecundiam. Here is where we expect to see the
payoff from the elaborate architecture that Walton has put in place.

THE NEW APPROCH TO FALLACY

Walton begins with the traditional notion according to which a fallacy is

an argument that seems to be correct but is not. Walton does not reject
this view out of hand but wants to move us toward the view that the best
way to understand fallacies is as breakdowns that occur in the various forms
of dialogue. The inspiration for this approach goes back to Aristotle, though
Walton’s normative foundation is to be found in the Grice’s Co-Operative
Principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at
the stage of the discussion at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (p. 99). The root
idea of fallacy PTF presents is that a fallacy is a conversational move that
is supposed to be an argument which contributes to the purpose of the
conversation but instead somehow interferes with it. Further, Walton wants
us to see fallacy as a serious breakdown rather than a minor one and in
fact has developed a hierarchy of problematic moves, ranging form fallacy
as perhaps the most serious breakdown through to other less serious forms
of blunder.
Crucial to this new approach is the context. To properly understand
 BOOK REVIEWS 117

fallacy, we must see it in the context of dialogue. Walton’s approach to

dialogue is broader than that of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, including
in its scope not only the critical discussion but also such forms of dialogue
as the negotiation and the quarrel. Walton believes that to understand fallacy
we must not only see it as a violation of the rules of one type of dialogue
but sometimes as a shift from one type of dialogue to another.
In these dialogical exchanges, according to Walton’s theory, arguers will
employ argumentation schemes. Walton has catalogued some 25 of them
in Chapter 6 and singled out 10 for extended discussion: Presumptive
Reasoning, Case-Based Reasoning, Verbal Classification, Causal Reasoning,
Commitment-Based Reasoning, Rule-Based Reasoning, Position-to-Know
Reasoning, Source Indicators Reasoning, Practical Reasoning, Gradualistic
Reasoning. Time and space do not permit extensive discussion of this aspect
of Walton’s work. I would like to note that the notion of argumentation
schemes has emerged as a crucial ingredient in the study of argumentation
and that it is still largely undeveloped. In addition to the seminal work of
Perelman and Kienpointer mentioned by Walton, one thinks of the work by
Freeman (1991) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992). It is no surprise that
Walton himself has written about this in Argument structure: A Pragmatic
Theory (1996). ( It is perhaps a bit strange to note that Walton 1996 does
not pick up on the work done in Chapter 5 of PTF.) I make just two
observations here. First, it is not clear how Walton comes upon these
schemes. My suspicion is that in the background of Walton’s list of these
schemes is the intuition that fallacies are degenerate argumentation schemes
and so wherever you have a fallacy, you will find a potentially legitimate
argumentation scheme underneath it. Thus the slippery slope fallacy plays
off of Gradualistic Reasoning. Second, Walton refers to these as both
argumentation schemes and reasoning schemes (and also as patterns and
techniques) and I confess to some concern about this. Reasoning and argu-
mentation are, as Walton himself reminds us (p. 199), not the same thing.
Given the burden that Walton has placed on the various forms of
dialogue and the argumentation schemes, it may be something of a shock
to read Walton’s claim that “The key to understanding what a fallacy is lies
in the idea of presumption” (p. 266). How, we wonder, can this be? The
answer is that these argumentation schemes are presumptive in character.
Since Walton regards the notion of presumption as crucial to the very idea
of fallacy, let’s focus on that idea very briefly.
Presumptive reasoning is to be distinguished from both deductive and
inductive reasoning. Walton writes:

A presumptive argument is judged by whether it shifts a weight to presumption to the

side of the other party in the dialogue. Presumptive reasoning is always tentative or
provisional in nature. In presumptive reasoning, an argument advanced by a proponent
shifts a weight of presumption by fulfilling the requirements for the use of that argu-
mentation scheme in the context of a dialogue, placing an obligation on the respondent
to reply by raising critical doubts appropriate for the argumentation scheme. Presump-
118 BOOK REVIEWS

tive reasoning is inherently defeasible in nature, meaning that it is suppositional and is

subject to defeat by exceptional cases. (p. 132).

If I read this right, Walton is suggesting that the key to understanding the
fallacies is to see them as failed efforts to shift the burden of proof.
The reader will have noted the amount of stage setting needed for this
new approach. We are now ready for Walton’s proposed new definition:
A fallacy is (1) an argument (or at least something that purports to be an argument);
(2) that falls short of some standard of correctness; (3) as used in a context of dialogue;
(4) but that, for various reasons, has a semblance of correctness about it in context; and
(5) poses a serious obstacle to the realization of the goal of that dialogue. (p. 255)

PROPERTIES OF THE NEW CONCEPT OF FALLACY

Walton lists six characteristics of this new concept of fallacy which are
(1) dialectical (2) pragmatic (3) commitment-based (4) presumptive (5)
pluralistic and (6) functional. I take it that the force of dialectical is clear
enough. This approach is called pragmatic because of its heavy reliance on
the notions of context and purpose: when people argue they do so in the
context of a dialogue, a conventional normative framework that is goal
directed. This framework is crucial in deciding whether or not a fallacy has
occurred. ‘Whether the argument is or is not fallacious, according to this
approach, always depends on what the purpose of the discussion is
supposed to be’ (p. 254). It is commitment-based in that it envisages these
dialogues in which the participants have a more or less clear sense of their
commitments. It is presumptive in that is sees default reasoning as crucial
in understanding how fallacies work in everyday discussion. ‘The major
fallacies involve weak, fallible kinds of argumentation, like the argument
from authority, . . . that are successful if they shift a burden of proof in
dialogue.’ It is pluralistic in that no one model of dialogue will be suffi-
cient to help us understand all fallacies. It is functional in that it requires
reference to the use of argumentation schemes. A fallacy is more than just
a rule violation; it must be seen as a technique of argumentation that is
used inappropriately by one party against another in a dialogue.
This new approach to fallacy is itself imbedded in a new theory of fallacy
which I shall now discuss.

THE NEW APPROACH TO FALLACY THEORY

It is clear that Walton is offering us here not only a new conception of

fallacy but a revised theory of fallacy. It includes the following compo-
nents:
(i) a new definition of fallacy
 BOOK REVIEWS 119

I have already discussed this.

(ii) a new way of classifying fallacy
This new approach to the classification of fallacy is based on two corner-
stones: Walton’s classification of the various forms of dialogue (Chapter
4) and Walton’s treatment of argumentation schemes (Chapter 5). I discuss
this further below.
(iii) a graduated theory of the strength of criticism
One aspect of Walton’s approach that I find particularly interesting is his
idea that criticisms or flaws in argumentation are not all on the same
plateau. Some are more serious that others and Walton provides us with
some more or less systematic reflection on this idea.
Walton claims that there is a spectrum in the use of argument techniques.
There are first satisfactory uses. The second category is a weak execution.
The third category is misuse or abuse of a technique and it is here that the
fallacy is located.
In this theory of fallacy both the categories of weak argument and fallacy come under
the category of error in argument use. But a fallacy is a very special and serious kind of
error, not an intentional error or deliberate abuse of a technique necessarily. Instead it is
defined as a misdirected execution – the use of a tactic to block or prevent legitimate
goals of reasonable dialogue from being implemented. (pp. 259–260)

Walton has also begun to develop a typology of fallacy. He distinguishes

at least two kinds: paralogism and sophism. A paralogism is ‘an argu-
mentation scheme used in such a way that it systematically fails to answer
a critical question appropriate for that scheme’ (p. 3). A sophism is ‘a more
extended misuse of a scheme or sequence of them’ (pp. 33–34).
The paralogism type of fallacy is a systematic, underlying type of error or reasoning in
an argument. The sophism type of fallacy occurs where a scheme is used as a deceptive
tactic to try to get the best of the other party. (p. 34)

(iv) a new approach to evaluating an argument

I discuss this below.

APPLICATION OF THE THEORY

With all this machinery Walton claims to be able to handle three problems:
(1) the problem of the identification of fallacies;
(2) the problem of the classification of fallacies;
(3) the problem of the evaluation of fallacies.
To some degree the pragmatic theory will be judged with respect to how
well it contributes to the solution of these problems. So let me say a word
about each of them.
120 BOOK REVIEWS

Identifying fallacies
It seems reasonable to expect that PTF should yield dividends in terms of
our understanding of the nature of specific fallacies. In some ways then
how the reader evaluated the treatments of particular fallacies in Chapter
7 and 9 will be crucial here. Obviously I can only touch on that matter here.
The fallacies analyzed in Chapter 9 are: ad ignorantium, ad verecun-
diam, argument from consequences, slippery slope, secundum quid, straw
man, equivocation, amphiboly and accent. I have chosen to focus on two
fallacies that I deem most central. For it does not really matter to me
whether Walton’s new theory does a better job on accent and amphiboly,
because I do not foresee their inclusion in FT, at least as I do it.
Consider first then Walton’s treatment of the ad verecundiam, which
involves a lengthy replay of the Locke’s discussion of this technique.
Walton writes:
It is the contention here that the ad verecundiam fallacy generally comes under the heading
of the sophism type of fallacy over and above the specific paralogisms inherent in the
use of the argumentation scheme for the argument from expert opinion. For example,
citing a source who is no expert or is not an expert in the appropriate field. (p. 284)
With the argumentum ad verecundiam, then, the argumentation scheme is fundamental
in evaluating the appeal to expert opinion as correct or incorrect, strong or weak instance
of presumptive argumentation. But the most severe, misleading and dangerous types of
the case of the ad verecundiam fallacy are more than just violations of , and failures to
meet, the requirements of the argumentation scheme for the argument from expert opinion.
They also involve a profile of dialogue giving evidence of use of a systematic tactic of
browbeating the other party in a dialogue by pressing ahead too aggressively with the
argument in a way that actually impedes the goal of the dialogue they are engaged in.
(p. 284)

Now all this is quite well said but it does not seem to differ, in substance,
from what one would expect from any traditional account of the fallacy.
I turn then to Walton’s treatment of straw man to see whether it may
help to provide some sense of what the dividends are from this new
approach. Walton sees this fallacy as one that occurs within the persua-
sion dialogue. In this dialogue the premises of a proponent’s argument must
be commitments of the respondent. As noted in Chapter 5, section 5, argu-
mentation from commitment is a type of presumptive reasoning that can
correctly and appropriately be used to shift a burden of proof. Here Walton
cites Hurley’s description and then comments:
This excellent description of the straw man fallacy shows that it is basically a sophis-
tical refutation of the Aristotelian type – a sophistical tactic used by one party in a dialogue
to give the appearance of having refuted the other party without the reality of it. But the
fallacy is also partly an error-of-reasoning type of fault that consists in the misapplica-
tion of the argumentative scheme of the argument from commitment (p. 291).
We need to distinguish between an incorrect or insufficiently supported allegation by one
party that another party is committed to some proposition, and the straw man fallacy,
 BOOK REVIEWS 121

where such an allegation is used as a tactic to attack and demolish the misinterpreted
position of the other party as a deceptive technique of refutation in a dialogue. (p. 291)

This distinction is certainly worth making, but once again it is not evident
that our ability to make it is in any way of consequence of our having
accepted Walton’s new approach.

Classifing fallacies
Here it seems to me that the chief outcome is that any simple classifica-
tion is not going to be successful if Walton is right. We will need to advert
both to argumentation schemes and to the various types of dialogue. In
some ways this could be real advantage for it would allow Walton both to
explain why traditional accounts failed and also why it is legitimate to hope
for such in spite of the cliché that the ways of going wrong are infinite.
A more concrete illustration of how this new theory might pay dividends
occurs in Chapter 7 where Walton provides a detailed analysis of how ad
hominem arguments are to be classified (pp. 212–218). I do not have the
time or space here to track that discussion but do think it worthy of atten-
tion as it at least shows the promise of answering a very difficult question
for FT: how are we to understand these varieties of ad hominem? Walton’s
approach promises at least a respectable theoretical answer to that question.
Here then is one virtue of this new approach.

Evaluating fallacies
In PTF, whether a particular argument is fallacious or not depends on a
number of inter-related evaluative questions (p. 261):
(1) How far has the actual discussion moved toward the goal of the
dialogue, as far we can tell from the text of discourse of the discus-
sion, as it has been completed?
(2) Is the actual discussion moving toward a goal?
(3) Or is the discussion proceeding in such a wrong direction, due to some
distortion, misdirection, or blockage that it will never reach the goal
if it keeps proceeding along these same lines?
(4) How bad is the problem? Is it a fallacy, or just a low level of argu-
mentation that is going along very well?
Answering these questions will require a great deal more reflection and
inquiry than the traditional theory requires and should serve to short-circuit
premature and undeveloped charges of fallacy.
122 BOOK REVIEWS

VIRTUE OF THE THEORY

I have already alluded to several aspects of PTF which strike me as virtues.

The turn toward presumptive reasoning; the discussion of argumentation
schemes; the stratified theory of error; the potential of providing a better
way of classifying fallacy – all of these seem to me to be virtues of the
theory.
Another virtue of PTF is that Walton can provide a reliable theoretical
account which captures the intuition that may have expressed in what had
now come to be almost a clichÈ (among those who accept it) - the fal-
lacies are not always fallacious.

PROBLEMS FOR THE THEORY

What are the problems with the theory developed in PTF?

The most serious problem, in my view, is that while this approach
promises dividends when it comes to our understanding of the individual
fallacies, I myself haven’t seen them yet. Perhaps I just have not worked
enough with this new approach to see them.
The discussion of argumentation schemes is interesting but raises ques-
tions which need answers, such as: How to do we come by the inconsis-
tency in the language Walton uses to discuss them: sometimes they are
schemes, sometimes techniques and sometimes patterns; sometimes of
argumentation, sometimes of reasoning.
Walton’s new approach to fallacy and fallacy theory offers us a more
complex and sophisticated approach at the theoretical level and does appear
to pay some dividends both in extending our conception of fallacy and in
sorting out some problems at the level of classification. The crucial question
is, and it is a fair one for any theory that lays claim to the title ‘prag-
matic’, what difference does it make whether we adopt this approach, or
pragma-dialectical approach, or some other approach? Here I have to say
that I am not persuaded that the new pragmatic approach provides sub-
stantially richer understandings of the individual fallacies.

REFERENCES

Freeman, James B.: 1991, Dialectics and the Macrostructure of Arguments, Foris, Berlin.
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F.: 1992, Analyzing Complex Argumentation. The Reconstruction of
Multiple and Coordinatively Compound Argumentation in a Critical Discussion. Sic Sat,
Amsterdam.
Walton, Douglas N.: 1984, Logical Dialogue Games and Fallacies. University Press of
America, Lanham, MD.
Walton, Douglas N.: 1985, Arguer’s Position: A Pragmatic Study of ‘Ad Hominem’ Attack.
Criticism, Refutation and Fallacy, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT.
 BOOK REVIEWS 123

Walton, Douglas N.: 1987, Informal Fallacies: Towards a Theory of Argument Criticisms,
John Benjamins, Amsterdam.
Walton, Douglas N.: 1989, Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Walton, Douglas N.: 1989, Question-Reply Argumentation, Greenwood Press, New York.
Walton, Douglas N.: 1991, Begging the Question: Circular Reasoning as a Tactic of
Argumentation, Greenwood, New York.
Walton, Douglas N.: 1992, Slippery Slope Arguments, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Walton, Douglas N. and Erik C. W. Krabbe: 1995, Commitment in Dialogue. Basic Concepts
of Interpersonal Reasoning, State University of New York Press, Albany.
Walton, Douglas N.: 1996, Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory, University of Toronto
Press, Toronto.
Woods, John and Douglas N. Walton: 1989, Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972–82, Foris,
Dordecht.

RALPH H. JOHNSON
University of Windsor
Ontario
Canada

Sebastian McEvoy (ed.), L’invention défensive. Poétique, linguistique, droit.

Paris: Editions Métailié (1995). ISBN 2-86424-203-6 (382 pp).

The inventio of ancient rhetorics seemed to be obsolete, even if one can

find it again in the contemporary rhetorics under the debased form of
typologies of arguments which enumerate the ‘argumentative techniques’
(Ch. Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’argumentation, 3rd part).
It was blamed for its categorial distinctions proliferating in an uncontrolled
and uncontrollable way. Since the expert orators do not seem to rely
formally on the guides proposed by inventio in order to elaborate the
material of their argumentations, its didactic powers were denied for pupils,
apprentice orators for whom it was nevertheless intended (cf. A. Arnaud
& P. Nicole, La logique ou l’art de penser, II, XVII: ‘Des lieux, ou de la
méthode de trouver des arguments. Combien cette méthode est de peu
d’usage.’). Yet, as a matter of fact, it is by revisiting inventio, or more
precisely judicial inventio and its specialized loci, that McEvoy roots and
justifies his defensivity theory, which is not a judicial but a generalized
one, and so confers a new and theoretical existence on what did not surpass
the level of reasoned empirical techniques.
The work of McEvoy is rich, sometimes teeming, learned or even
erudite, and it is impossible to account for it exhaustively. It bears the marks
of the author’s intellectual route, of what he calls a ‘disciplinary drift or
drama’, which leads him from poetics (the study of stereotypy in the
dialogue of Shakespeare’s comedies, the original utterances of which could
be reduced to a small number of type-utterances), to (English) law and
social sciences (McEvoy now works in the Group of Political and Moral

Argumentation 12: 123–127, 1998.