G.R. No.
L-41862 February 7, 1992 As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued
B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, in his capacity as
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, respondents.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction, to review the
Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R denying
petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the
Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 757-R. 1
On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the
other defendants. 2
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse
decision to the respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R. 3
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave
of the respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad,
Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present
petition.
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief
within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution
requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for
petitioner on 17 July 1974. 5
another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:
It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary
period which expired on April 5, 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the
resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was received by said counsel on July 17,
1974; . . . 6
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for
reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty.
Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said
firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the
latter having established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled
this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's
Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that:
Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant, praying, on the
grounds therein stated, that the resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the
appeal, be set aside, and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of time within
which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration
of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since counsel
received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not
be dismissed for failure to file brief; Motion Denied. 8
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for
review, the same became final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the court of
origin for execution.
The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial
Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued
on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock
in the morning, the auction sale thereof. 10
On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975, and containing the following
allegations:
1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and
set aside its processes, in the interest of justice, especially so in this case when the
case was dismissed on account of the untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas,
counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).
 2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely
death of the late Atty. Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its
(sic) day in court, and is, therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on
the part of BRSEI.
3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties, since all
that BRSEI is asking for, is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the
unfair, unjust and unlawful decision, set aside and reversed.
12
The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975:
. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas, Alberto &
Associates, and while Atty. Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law firm was not
dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on February 19, 1974, and the copy
of the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause
was shown; . . .
Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of
Appeals, Eulogio B. Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as
Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. 14
On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the
Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had
already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court
of Appeals.
In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10)
days from receipt of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment
is presented and admitted. 16
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition
to which it attached the said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B.
Reyes with his heirs.
This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten
(10) days from notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April 1976. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the
Comment on 29 April 1976. 20
21
In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit:
L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). — Considering
the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents' comment thereon,
as well as petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition
for lack of merit.
However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was
deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course.
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration.
On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required
both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice
thereof.
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22
November 1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision. 27
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant's Brief.
Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate
dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 28Indeed, in said case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals —
reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief, and after
entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment,
requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. Said
case, however, had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant
the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. As this Court, through Associate
Justice Ramon Aquino, said:
We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case
and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals
reinstating the appeal should be upheld.
That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they
had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money
needed for paying the cost of printing their brief.
But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been
practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the
record on appeal. In (sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations of
their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the appeal.
 Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for operating under the name and style "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates." Hence, the
extension of time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals Answer to the complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party
had been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and Complaint filed for petitioner in said case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas &
they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. Counsel could have Associates" represents petitioner in the action.
moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the
Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting
After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court, petitioner's counsel appears
their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs.
to have changed its firm name to "Baizas, Alberto & Associates." The appeal was thus
Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since counsel did none of those
pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates."
things, his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing
their appeal is difficult to believe.
On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. In
consequence (sic) of his death, the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was in a
If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in
terribly confused state of affairs. In effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby
reinstating an appeal, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and
Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms
the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968,
(sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of deceased
22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62 Phil. 275;
Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of why may have been left of his father's
Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).
office, it appearing that some, if not many, cases of the defunct office were taken over
by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution.
But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of
the record to the lower court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall
But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm
the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a
filed the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the
decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. Such a
respondent Court of Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the
right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been
surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for filing
remanded, the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur.
or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved
2nd 433 citingLovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; 84 ALR 595; State vs.
and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the
Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279).
appealed case of petitioner. . . .

In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's
The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and
counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause
that none of the associates took over petitioner's case, and no notice of such state of
to warrant a favorable action on its plea.
affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the services of another lawyer
to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the other hand, the non-
Appeals, 30We said: dissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's
claim for relief since, in such event, the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause,
which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is
of petitioner's day in court. In the abovementioned Yuseco case, this Honorable Court
included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such
had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief
power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in
to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their day (sic) in
extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would
court.
call for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be
upheld.
We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the
To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas
lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.
and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says: 31

In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged the services of Atty.
ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites
Crispin D. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears
that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law firm
enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding
Crispin Baizas. This Court held therein that: its case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate
friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must have been known to the former. 34 This
fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act with
The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for
prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process
not attending to Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely
cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. 35
entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney
Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling
Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would
justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the
Appellant's Brief. As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES
law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case
to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to is lifted.
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary
period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9
Costs against petitioner.
September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received. Then, on
28 September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which
respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until IT SO ORDERED.
after a year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of
execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid
justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and
his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in
the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case
for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was
designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since
others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have
re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided
by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:

The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor
(sic) is it unavoidable. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a
system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive
promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will always be informed
of the status of their cases. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence of
clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.

Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September
1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further appropriate action
after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is
presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such
appearance.

The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. 33

A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing
civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. 2 She gave respondent
₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only. 3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then
come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.4 This
happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about
the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that
respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO).5
Respondent's Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start.
In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance
Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's
daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he
declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a
private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to
come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.10Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant
allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the
cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty.
Ungson's acceptance fee.11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her
daughters asked her to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15,
1992.13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or in September 1994, the
complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a
private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as
he lost contact with the complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD
submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO.18 It
also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent
was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious
receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the
receipt to accommodate a friend's request.19 It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on
government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their
salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him
to immediately return to the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt. 21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated
Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's
recommendation with regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned
from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six
months.22
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. 23 More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason,
the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that
such practice will not conflict with their official function. 25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992
while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship.26Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt
confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the
receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer.
Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V
of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent
persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees
other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the observance of the above-
mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and
received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of
the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the
prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the
Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to
believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were
being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took place.
These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. 31
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers,
specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any
act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.321avvphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but
accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an
amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)33 nor was it
given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless,
respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and
not allowed to accept them.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned
from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006
that having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have
appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for
GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,
obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas
under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa
applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a
period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed required
by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the
total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the
amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her
demands. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured
her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World
Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the
immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the
amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent
another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999
explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank
checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because
respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated
25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five
postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant deposited the five
postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent made several
unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent
two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required3 respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the
latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of major
age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they have
been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they
could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related polic[i]es of the
government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which
they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota
Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of
which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son
Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same amount of show money
separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while her two minor children would
be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic),
complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application, which I
did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the
same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and
her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other
two were made as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of the papers and
becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between complainant and
their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was
coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount
of money given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very
reason why my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer
that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired
from him regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not
really her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious
violation of the Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was
confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned affiant
and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;
2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount
used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These
 acts of the complainant and her son could have been a ground for deportation and
likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the Revised Penal
Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was made to pay
for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and
surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer
around, he died sometime 1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount
of money is now being sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having
signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed
but up to the present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed that
the same would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been
released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid,
according to the complainant has now become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence on 25 August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled
hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country
to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28
September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her
report5 recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to
F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that
he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty.
Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence
submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World
Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really
intended that the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly
the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the
immediate release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January this year, that all the said
papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though some important papers were
already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We are just going through the normal standard
operating procedure and there is no day since January that I do not make any follow – ups on the progress
of the same."
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more
time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled
are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of
heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are
already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were
issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore
were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the
return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received
the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be noted that
respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really
exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant
and his family, and complainant has also testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by
respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the
Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it
has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has
violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report with
modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case
shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task
have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.7
It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by
his signatures in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that that
it was needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated
the said amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID. 11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated
as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not
present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to
someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When
the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.12 He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at bar,
respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to
answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without
any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence
despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently
a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise,
such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge.
Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:
1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which
is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my
personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on
that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal
money.
2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers
are still being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved
your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the
other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their
due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of
your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos to
cover the whole amount but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.
3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:
Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the early
return of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking.
When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is
not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to personally return the money out of my
own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me financially but it
would set me free from worries and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of
which are on the following:
May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be sufficiently
funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of
these checks, is returned, don’t call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I just had to
put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x
4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I
stopped all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference
to the check I issued to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I
requested for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very
big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to
from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment. 23 More importantly, possession of
your place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time. practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 24

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and
checks if said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct. the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter
disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them
as members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar considering
Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for
that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also
visas is violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the
that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such,
Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable
constitute a breach of Rule 6.0218 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting
conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.26
their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in
any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and
lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to high standards of the legal profession.
refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the
private practice.
lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority to do so.27
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by
issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,20 as approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also
the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the National
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.
but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high
and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals."21

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance
return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation
check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 22
of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.
SO ORDERED.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all
times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan
in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it
sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled
"Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of
Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from
1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10
for
violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the
former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well.
Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by
Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases
and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for
the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the
resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for
more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he
performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent
from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-
affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during
the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was
tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and
harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees
from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid
for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the
same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his
Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer
fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former
Taggat employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal
consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan
Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner
Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of
interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the
imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office,
Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having
the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with
and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and
personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231,
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a
former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters
relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the
conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if
Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-
240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S.
No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt
with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation
and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being
an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to
engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p.
20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant
is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the
legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the
application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201
SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government
prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-
B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove
that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his
previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal
complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does
not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment
with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and
the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to
impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled
for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent
is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46 "Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47 does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls
within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for
inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any
"Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a
prohibition in RA 6713.
lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the
of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also
non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer
transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in
his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended
or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on
the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings
with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty
appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995
"Affidavit"9 reads:
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment1 affirming his conviction for violation of the
"Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
February 9, 1994,2petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"3 setting forth, in relation to the motion
for new trial:
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and
excusible (sic) negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate
petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner
of Ultra Corporation (the Corporation that employed petitioner),
which actually exercised control over the affairs of Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time
and explain why he was unable to do so earlier.
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,4 among other things, granted the substitution but
denied the motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied
on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994.6 The
Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten
(10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, 8 the Solicitor General
himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a
certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which may
ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta Village,
Makati, Metro Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief Executive
Officer of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock of
CDCP.
3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies,
organized a number of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra
International Trading Corporation, whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs
of CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower value goods and using Ultra's financial
resources.
4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the
instructions directly from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.
5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed
President and Chief Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my
brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These
materials were received by CDCP and are covered by the trust receipts which are the
subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to
Ultra for the delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto
M. Cuenca merely acted as agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the
guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to issue the said trust receipts. On the
basis of such guarantees, along with informal assurances issued by CDCP to China
Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and
CDCP Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which
included the trust receipts subject of this case.
7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said trust
receipts because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms.
Nora Vinluan, acted under my control and I did not allow her to make the appropriate
payments.
8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the
materials covered by the trust receipts subject of this case.
 9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr. Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
Edilberto Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
possibly cause (sic) Ultra Corporation to pay. suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
and is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)
10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the trust
receipts subject of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal
charges which he has asked this Honorable Court to review. The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose
obligation to govern impartially is compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject
and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
trust receipts.
but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein,
published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis supplied.)10
(Sgd
.)
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled
that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly
ROD newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
OLF
O M.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be
CUE
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the
NCA
Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein.
Affia
nt
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like
"Helmuth, Jr. v. People"11 and "People v. Amparado".12
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial. General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or
affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to
reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances
interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor
culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of
confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court. impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and
execution of his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play. REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors SO ORDERED.
who represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to
seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of
Canon 6 states:

Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official tasks.
A.C. No. 4018 March 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty
of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae
Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.3
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he
has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is
respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit
and evidence.4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September
1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction
and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for
his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a result of this
finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in
toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal from government
service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the President did not have the
authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents 6 in that petition
violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of
the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the
administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
order."7Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our
Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had "proven
himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney"8 and that he poses a "serious threat to
the integrity of the legal profession."9
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-
2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law10 and jurisprudence support his stance
that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli
Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-
bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of
the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants.
Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces
tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved
in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was
based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he
influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP
commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of
this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence
vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP
Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for
Bar Discipline for appropriate action.12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez's
recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao
Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.13The IBP Resolution states:
 Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the
Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor
George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation,
report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated
23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting
the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as
directed by the IBP Board of Governors.14
duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did
nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper
when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter,
complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant
contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which
had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit
proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of
the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the
IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel's
order dated 4 August 1997.24Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local
post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A.
Bubong."

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter15 informed the IBP Commission on
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission
Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent
on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato
for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter
Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-
concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five
2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
years.

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records
of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation,
of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as
re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice. 25
well as Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment
in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and
on respondent's motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's
Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. 26
motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.18 On 25 September 1998,
Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of
respondent's evidence.19 This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the
its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides: Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur
Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case.27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S.
Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of
the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate
the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of
Governors.20 the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the
undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and
recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying
that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records. 21 Respondent insists
that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is
investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP
February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof.
that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby
depriving him of his right to due process.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP
Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
22
Complainant opposed this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant,
the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was
 The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President
in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found
guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the
Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the
issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint
for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondent's relatives.
Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the
undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the
Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of
respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a
very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.29
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained
solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent –
whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year
suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as
by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.30
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave
misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the
affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined
the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks."
Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification
as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal
profession.32
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting
the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared –
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him
his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the
grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration
of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his
every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has
given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase
Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor,
full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of
which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to disbar
respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal
Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case –
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his
office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of
the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of
this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be
"interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."37 As we have previously explained in the
case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38
 … A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of
the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. 39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as
a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010 The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
vs. Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent. direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
DECISION
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of
nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed
BRION, J.:
that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule
6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
interests.

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that
Factual Background
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant
averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to
Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee
on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members,
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed
in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s
against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he
district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.
was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with
the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and events.
as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales
application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the
these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his
latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the
also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money
conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand,
as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the
and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey
respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The
Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of
the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was
denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
 (1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the
respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this
allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the
subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel
Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an
inordinate interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit
where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the
truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his
rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his
daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a
form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20,
2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay
with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel
categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-
beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa
Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s
application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo
to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The
DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation
of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents
were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting
claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in
private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends,
former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of law. 8 In this regard, the respondent had
already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he
represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards
when he was still a member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this Court as
a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of
the standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member
of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer
who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we
resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to
be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of
conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is
obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service
is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are
subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden
of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should
not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. 11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties.
We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to
promote their private interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct
interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with
public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to
benefit relatives.15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a
serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion
in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation)
liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he
demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office. 18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he
demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or
force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent
helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also
showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996.
To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how
the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales
application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20,
2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record.
We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force
allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence -
of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca
Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo
were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25,
2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment
and hospitalization expenses.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According
manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid
by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of the
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the purchase price of the subject land.26
Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March
1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when
before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo,
the sums of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and
and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that
October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or on
the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the
October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the
respondent’s elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo
decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also,
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private to finance his continuing medical treatment.
interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought
before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to
Private practice of law after separation from public office
conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the
complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on
Awards. As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the
government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of
Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude
does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the
that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003, 20 categorically stating that
the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of
his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires
relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s favor. the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June
22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;22 and the
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to
engage in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during
their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by
the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. 30 The
last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the
government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who
has the power to influence the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a
matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings.1avvphi1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At
face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single
document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32we specifically described private practice of law as one that
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the
public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee
on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the
complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas
has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3,
2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this
point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the
Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No.
173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after
finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her
defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case
has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule
6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
Adm. Case No. 2984 August 31, 2007
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the
practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the
practice of law for fifteen years.
The antecedent facts that led to Mejia’s disbarment are as follows.
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the
following administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
a) part of the sum of ₱27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on
property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and
b) part of another sum of ₱40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and
expenses in connection with the registration of title of Bernardo to another property in
a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor
by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainant’s affidavit dates October 4, 1989);
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios
Pastor, in Bernardo’s favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained
from Bernardo in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.1
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges
against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment,
and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a
copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidant’s Office, and notice thereof furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the
Courts concerned of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On
July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a
plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.2
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest
in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s
reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will
take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the
time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. 3
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession.1avvphi1 Fifteen years had
already elapsed since Mejia’s name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he
is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he
has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem
the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social
writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on
Miracle of Heart and Mind."
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with
the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s
disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age
of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not
the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown
remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long
enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to
show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.4

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F.
Mejia is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
CONRADO QUE, A.C. No. 7054 rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard,
Complainant, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing
PUNO, C J., fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The
CARPIO, respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over
CORONA, the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO, (2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order
VELASCO, JR., to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own
NACHURA, personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
BRION,
PERALTA, (3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts
BERSAMIN, by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
DEL CASTILLO, administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
ABAD, and reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which
allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case.
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Promulgated: The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of
Respondent. preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in
December 4, 2009 supporting the above falsehood.[4]

(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed
the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico),
the previous counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in

the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already
deceased;
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for
annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being
DECISION
authorized to do so.
PER CURIAM:

In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on
Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development
the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless
Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the unlawful detainer case
and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled 48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the

by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of

Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping.

were the defendants. The respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition

for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity, sole representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The

honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to

of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid represent his clients in the case.[6]

grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case,
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or
the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the
immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his
complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not
dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and
really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his
the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment
resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final
case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against
judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
him.

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings [7] before the IBP that the present complaint
petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent
violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a
maintained that his allegations were based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the
complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on
proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.
Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and

defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to
of the KDC.
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-
 of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner which were untrue. [12]

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q- On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents explanation

03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan[8](Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already

all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated: deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority
rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally
true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty
of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The
defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may
not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum- Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his
shopping.[9]
misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the

Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the
this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of
unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the
the Republic.
MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.[10]
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No.

XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the
filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for
practice of law for two (2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the respondents
declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case
suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.[14]
and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.[11]

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence

showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment
 The Issue

The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with

imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final

carry. judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA

held:

The Courts Ruling Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper
remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the
ejectment case.[17]

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating

Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again

questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer

respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition

and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the practice on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18]

of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and

processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-

practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently 38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in

reduced the suspension to six (6) months.[16] the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal
Abuse of court procedures and processes
personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious

misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of

judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients: title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property
subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

complainants title because the property is a part of forest land.

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed

several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court

annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial

preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the procedure;[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. [23]

unlawful detainer case.

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a

Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions involving

allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client.These are already uncalled for the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using

measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions

respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for

obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the

justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20] falsehood before the courts

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
 First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City,
the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud
was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file
the proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants
therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by
a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them
when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at
his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) [24]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that
the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no
doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it
involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation
we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for
annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General
may commence reversion proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This
second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his
clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of
the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the
respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the plaintiffs. In this
underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on
an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients
what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after
both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding
Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the
plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO
DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS
COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING
PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the
respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys
motion to dismiss.[28] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents
application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse
party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of
stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the
allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and
legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or
iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the
Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the
respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all
squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are

transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30] consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or

For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of institute clearly groundless actions.[37] The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of

Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.

with the court. This provision states: Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice. (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate

neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[31] The respondent
against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously
failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the
assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition for annulment of
administration of justice,[32] and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.[33] His
judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the
duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any
MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the
manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be.[34] In case of conflict, his duties to his
said decisions were null and void ab initio.
client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[35]

In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his

the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads: professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
BOUNDS OF LAW

Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
objectives of his clients x x x
Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now

dead and unable to defend himself.

Unauthorized appearances
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he

undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented parties
without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave
without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second
of court.[40] The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes
petition for annulment of title.[38]
contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of
misconduct.[41]
judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did
The Respondents Defenses
not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of

the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have

been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of
for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the
another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest
University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of
associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of compliance
law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction
with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court
unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As both concepts are states

In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and

respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.

actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his
of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the
clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all
Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and
obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he
the Republic.
took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen
the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the
soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC
decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of
cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply
scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment
against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not
amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case. [44] As we explained
in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense
of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion
to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights,
as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the
bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the
law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the
lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and
common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his
client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because
the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument,
considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the
counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants
unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine
the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of
justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason,
disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged
wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or
a prosecutor.[46]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and
his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past

experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar.

We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December
imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two
17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
(2) years.
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable

for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns
and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP
for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is
imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.
to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the

administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
SO ORDERED.
profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can

save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the

orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate. REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of

the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E.

Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and

processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal

practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law on
the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-
shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning
the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar.
We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be
imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2)
years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these
violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly
administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the
respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of
justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves.
Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at
the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of
justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same
nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for
his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We
showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat
the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since
then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal
career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December
17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for
professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10;
Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the
penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion3 praying that his
license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Bancresolved
to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy4 asking
the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that Conrado N. Que
(complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed grossly immoral
conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another
individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free
himself from liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own
doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s compassion
and mercy.6He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson; but at the same time,
questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He appended to his appeal proofs of his updated
payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.9 His
appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc once
again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for more than
three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral
or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on the
subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor to
Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had
already served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance and
remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no longer
misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance and
implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he
has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all
times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the
legal profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the
respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his previousrequests for
reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3, 2012,
and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality.16 On July 18, 2014, the
respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the Court. He
stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most
frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing
dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of
law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a
regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made
whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere
repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his
disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he
submitted a Medical Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a
certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family
are dedicated parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
20
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral
character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present
moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the
practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal
profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a
matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the
Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. 24 The lawyer has to
demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in
the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent
to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an
active involvement and participation in community and church activities by joining Youth For Christ,
Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as
Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were
inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had
continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through the
Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to
1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to
have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal for judicial
clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he has long
expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on
his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his mistakes. After
his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time and effort in pursuing
civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his character reformation.He professed that during
his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage
Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the
ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal
Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his
conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty.
Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which gave him
sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that
Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also
notedthat he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his
religious and social writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on
Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other
transgressions since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred
lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of
three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that
case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated
pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in
falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering
the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s
disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian
and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the
testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members
of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his
disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more
importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to
enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross
misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds on which the
Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as
an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we are not
fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is
likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We
believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.1âwphi1 While
he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous
inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his
wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing
his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of
membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely
reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we
stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to
determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of
sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent
can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his
membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.