G.R. No.

168932 October 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE BUTIONG, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of age, was a
mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

The man, Charlie Butiong, seeks the review and reversal of the judgment promulgated on May 18,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for rape handed down by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 258, in Parañaque City, for which he was imposed reclusion perpetua. He insists that the
State did not duly establish that the woman had been a mental retardate.

The records show that Butiong had been arraigned and tried under an information that alleged:

xxxx

That on or about the 7th day of October 1998, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant [AAA], a mental retardate, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Antecedents

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA,3 then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her long-
time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door
as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to
the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her. AAA remembered that she then felt pain in her abdomen and
became angry at him for what he had done.4

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the
police station,5 and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where AAA underwent a medico-
legal examination by Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil. The medico-legal examination revealed that AAA’s hymen was
intact but "distensible and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury."6 Noticing AAA’s
disorientation and incoherence, Dr. Soreta-Umil endorsed her to the NBI Psychiatric Section for
evaluation.7 AAA also underwent a series of psychological tests at the National Mental Hospital. The tests
included the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test, Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, and Draw a Person Test. A
Rorschach Psycho-Diagnostic Test was not used because AAA was not able to answer.8 Another test, the
Sack’s Sentence Completion Test, was not used because of AAA’s inability to comply with the
instructions.9 The results of the psychological tests showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation, and
that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years; she was unaware of what went on around
her and was interested only in gratifying her own needs.10
The Defense presented only one witness in the person of Dr. Natividad Dayan, whom it offered as an expert
psychologist. She concluded that the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test and the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt
Test administered on AAA were unreliable for determining the existence of mental retardation. She based her
conclusion on James Morizon’s DSM-4 Made Easy: The Clinician’s Guide for Diagnosis, and Jay Siskin’s
Coping With Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony.11 According to her, an individually administered
intelligence test, like the Stamp Intelligence Scale or the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, as well as
projective techniques, like the Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test and the Thematic Perception Test, should
have been instead administered to appropriately determine AAA’s mental age.12

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of rape, viz:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having been able to prove the guilt of the accused CHARLIE BUTIONG
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple RAPE defined and punishable under Art. 266-A par. 1 in
relation to Art. 266-B par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 8353, accused CHARLIE
BUTIONG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Pursuant to the existing jurisprudence, accused CHARLIE BUTIONG is further ordered to indemnify the private
complainant, AAA, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.13

The RTC noted that nothing in Dr. Dayan’s testimony on the unreliability of the tests administered on AAA
would invalidate the findings of psychologist Nimia de Guzman and Dr. Diana de Castro, both of the National
Center for Mental Health, to the effect that AAA had mild level retardation with a mental age of a six- to seven-
year old person; and that such findings were admissible and had more than sufficiently complied with the
required historical and physical examination for determining AAA’s mental condition. The trial judge himself
held,14 based on his personal observation of AAA as a witness in court, that she was a retardate who could
narrate what had transpired albeit with some difficulty about how she had been sexually abused. He
considered AAA as a competent witness whose behavior and appearance manifested no possibility for her to
concoct a story of her defloration at the hands of the accused.

Ruling of the CA

Butiong appealed, but the CA affirmed the conviction on May 18, 2005,15 to wit:

In sum, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the well-entrenched doctrine that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect because of its opportunity to hear their
testimonies and observe their demeanor and manner of testifying. Absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the
result of the case, the Court sees no reason to alter the findings of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 24, 2003 is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.
The CA considered the State’s evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that AAA was mentally retarded. It
concluded that the State’s expert witness psychologist de Guzman had not only interviewed AAA and a relative
of AAA but had also administered a series of tests on AAA upon which to base her findings about AAA’s
mental condition; that the results of the psychiatric examination done by Dr. de Castro, as well as the trial
judge’s personal observation that AAA was a mental retardate supported the findings of psychologist de
Guzman; and that AAA could not legally give her consent to the sexual act, as held in People v.
Asturias,16 because the clinical findings showed her mentality to be at par with that of a six- or seven-year-old.

The CA rejected Butiong’s argument that rape was not established because no semen had been taken from
AAA, stressing that the fact of rape depended not on the presence of spermatozoa but on the fact of unlawful
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ, which the State amply proved.

Issues

In this appeal, Butiong submits that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PROOF OF THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE IS NOT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY IS A MENTAL
RETARDATE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A MENTAL RETARDATE IS IN THE SAME CLASS AS
A WOMAN DEPRIVED OF REASON OR OTHERWISE UNCONSCIOUS.

Anent the first assigned error, Butiong contends that the State did not establish rape because there was no
evidence showing the exact date when the rape occurred. Under the second assigned error, he disputes the
RTC’s conclusion that AAA was a mental retardate by focusing on the inconclusiveness of the findings of
psychologist de Guzman brought about by her failure to ascertain AAA’s personal history and by her
computing AAA’s mental age upon inaccurate and unverified information. He notes that two other physicians
who had examined AAA, one from the NBI and the other from the National Center for Mental Health, were not
presented as witnesses. He insists on his innocence, and emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Dayan on the
unreliability of the tests administered on AAA. He maintains that the unreliability of the tests administered on
AAA for determining the presence of mental retardation should be appreciated in his favor in accordance with
People v. Cartuano, Jr.,17 which required that a diagnosis of mental retardation should be made after a
thorough evaluation based on history, and physical and laboratory examinations by a clinician. Lastly, he posits
that the State did not establish the elements of rape, considering that a mental retardate qualified neither as a
"woman deprived of reason" nor as "a woman under twelve years of age" as provided under Article 266-A par.
1(b) nor of par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction.

I

Exact date of rape and absence of spermatozoa

from victim’s genitalia are not elements of rape

Butiong argues that the State did not duly establish the fact of rape because the exact date of the incident was
indeterminate, and because no spermatozoa was found in AAA’s genital organ.

The argument deserves no consideration.

The CA fully debunked the argument on the exact date of the rape not being established by simply quoting
from AAA’s testimony that the rape had occurred on October 7, 1998.18 We need to emphasize, however, that
the date of the rape need not be precisely proved considering that date is not an element of rape.19

Nor did the absence of spermatozoa from the genitalia of AAA negate or disprove the rape. 20 The basic
element of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse, not ejaculation.21 Carnal knowledge is defined as
"the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman."22 This explains why the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia
by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape.23 People v.
Campuhan24 has aimed to remove any confusion as to the extent of "touching" in rape:

[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis,
as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid
into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree
of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area,
e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is
the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next
layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the
inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the
inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the
labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted
rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.25 [emphasis supplied]

That AAA’s recollection on the rape was corroborated by the results of the medico-legal examination was
sufficient proof of the consummation of rape. We have ruled that rape can be established by the sole testimony
of the victim that is credible and untainted with serious uncertainty.26 With more reason is this true when the
medical findings supported the testimony of the victim,27 like herein.

II
Rape was committed because AAA
was a mental retardate

One of Butiong’s contentions is that having sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental retardate, did not amount to
a rape, because it could not be considered as carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason or of a female
under twelve years of age as provided under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The contention cannot be sustained.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is
also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be
without her consent. This understanding of the commission of rape has been prevalent in both the common law
and the statutory law systems. As Corpus Juris Secundum has summed up:28

At common law rape could be committed only where the unlawful carnal knowledge of a female was had
without her consent or against her will; lack of consent was an essential element of the offense; and there can
be no rape in the common-law sense without the element of lack of consent. Under the statutes punishing the
offense, an essential element of the crime of rape is that the act was committed without the consent of the
female, or, as it is otherwise expressed, against her will. The act of sexual intercourse is against the female’s
will or without her consent when, for any cause, she is not in a position to exercise any judgment about the
matter.

Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is
capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent. Thus, mere copulation, with the woman passively
acquiescent, does not constitute rape. The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time
prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals,
prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion. Thus, where a man
takes hold of a woman against her will and she afterward consents to intercourse before the act is committed,
his act is not rape. However, where the female consents, but then withdraws her consent before penetration,
and the act is accomplished by force, it is rape; and where a woman offers to allow a man to have intercourse
with her on certain conditions and he refuses to comply with the conditions, but accomplishes the act without
her consent, he is guilty of rape. [emphasis supplied]

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code,29 Justice Aquino discusses the concept of committing rape
against the female’s will or without her consent, to wit:

In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity of
proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act was committed against
her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will.
The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim
is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing
her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant
resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of
legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot,
sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was
incapable of giving any rational consent.

The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with
a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a
deafmute is not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a
deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada
says that the rape under par. 2 may be committed when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any
cause such as when she is asleep, or due to lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her by
the accused. xxx [emphasis supplied]

Butiong was arraigned, tried and convicted of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1,
Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 1, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under an
amended information that plainly averred that AAA was a "mental retardate." The insertion of the phrase in the
amended information was significant, because the phrase put him on sufficient notice that the victim "was not
in full possession of her normal reasoning faculty."30 The phrase further specifically indicated which of the four
modes of committing the crime of rape as provided in paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, applied in his case, namely:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances first mentioned is present.

Yet, Butiong’s contention is that his case did not come under any of the four modes due to carnal knowledge of
a mental retardate not being either carnal knowledge of a female deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or of a female under 12 years of age or demented.

The contention is unwarranted.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. ̶ Rape is committed –

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a
sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. 31 It should
no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra,
because the provision refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental
abnormality, deficiency or retardation.32

Who, then, is a mental retardate within the context of the phrase "deprived of reason" used in the Revised
Penal Code?

In People v. Dalandas,33 the Court renders the following exposition on mental retardation and its various levels,
viz:

Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired
intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of
maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.

Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter term is usually
reserved for those without recognizable brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their
level of intellectual function are illustrated, thus:

Mental Retardation
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT

(IQ RANGE)

I Profound Below 20

II Severe 20-35

III Moderate 36-52

IV Mild 53-68

xxxx

The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot, having
an IQ of 0 to 19, and a maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old
child; (b) imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the
average seven-year old child; moron or feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual
function in adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and psychologists
apply the term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. In People vs. Palma, we ruled that a
person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a "borderline
mental deficiency." [emphasis supplied]

Considering the findings of psychologist de Guzman to the effect that AAA had the mental age of a six- to
seven-year old, an age equated with imbecility under the previous classification, her mental age was even
lower than that of a borderline mental deficiency within the context of that term as characterized in People v.
Dalandas, supra.34 As such, Butiong’s carnal knowledge of AAA amounted to rape of a person deprived of
reason.
The ability of the female to given rational consent to carnal intercourse determines if carnal knowledge of a
mental retardate like AAA is rape. Indeed, the Court has consistently considered carnal knowledge of a female
mental retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age as rape of a woman deprived of reason. 35 As the
Court aptly stated in People v. Manlapaz,36 where the victim was a 13-year old girl with the mentality of a five-
year-old, that ability to give rational consent was not present, viz:

Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or with a girl who is below twelve years of age is
rape because she is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal intercourse. "Las mujeres privadas de
razon, enajenadas, idiotas, imbeciles, son incapaces por su estado mental de apreciar la ofensa que el
culpable infiere a su honestidad y, por tanto, incapaces de consentir. Pero no es condicion precisa que la
carencia de razon sea completa, basta la abnormalidad o deficiencia mental que solo la disminuye, sin
embargo, la jurisprudence es discordante" (II Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 14th Ed., 1975, pp. 538-9).

"Comete violacion el que yace mujer que no tiene normalmente desarrolladas sus facultades mentales (19
nov. 1930); aqui esta comprendido el yacimiento con debiles o retrasados mentales (11 mayo 1932, 25 feb.
1948, 27 sept. 1951); constituye este delito el coito con una niña de 15 años enferma de epilepsia genuina que
carece de capacidad para conocer el valor de sus actos (2 marzo 1953); el yacimiento con oligofrenicas
(mentally deficient persons) 28 abril, 24 octubre, 1956, 19 feb. 1958); xxx" (ibid., note 3).

The same rule prevails in American jurisprudence. "There can be no question but that a copulation with a
woman known to be mentally incapable of giving even an imperfect consent is rape" (State vs. Jewett, 192 At.
7).

"An accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had sexual intercourse with a female
who was mentally incapable of validly consenting to or opposing the carnal act" (65 Am Jur 2nd 766 citing
State vs. Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86, 187 NW 971; Cokeley vs. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 256, 220 SW 1099; 31 ALR
3rd 1227, sec. 3).

"In this species of rape neither force upon the part of a man nor resistance upon the part of a woman forms an
element of the crime. If, by reason of any mental weakness, she is incapable of legally consenting, resistance
is not expected any more than it is in the case of one who has been drugged to unconsciousness, or robbed of
judgment by intoxicants. Nor will an apparent consent in such a case avail any more than in the case of a child
who may actually consent, but who by law is conclusively held incapable of legal consent. Whether the woman
possessed mental capacity sufficient to give legal consent must, saving in exceptional cases, remain a
question of fact xxx. It need but be said that legal consent presupposes an intelligence capable of
understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences. This degree of intelligence may exist with an
impaired and weakened intellect, or it may not" (People vs. Boggs, 290 Pac. 618 citing People vs. Griffin, 49
Pac. 711 and People vs. Peery, 146 Pac. 44). [emphasis supplied]

III

People v. Cartuano was not applicable

To boost his challenge to the finding that AAA was a mental retardate, Butiong cites People v. Cartuano,37 a
case where the Court ruled that a diagnosis of mental retardation required a thorough evaluation of the history
of the victim, and held that a physical and laboratory examination by a clinician was necessary. He insists that
the findings of the psychologist and the physicians who had examined AAA fell short of the requirements set in
People v. Cartuano, considering that psychologist de Guzman did not try to locate the biological parents of
AAA for the purpose of ascertaining her personal history, and did not base her findings on reliable data.
Butiong’s reliance on People v. Cartuano does not advance his cause.

People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of
mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos,38 declaring that the records in
People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain a finding that the
victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld
the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had been able to
identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain the results of the tests to the trial court. 39

In direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the
victim.1awphi1

Moreover, as clarified in People v. Dalandas,40 People v. Cartuano does not preclude the presentation by the
State of proof other than clinical evidence to establish the mental retardation of the victim. For sure, the courts
are not entirely dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing mental retardation. In People
v. Almacin,41for instance, the Court took into consideration the fact that the victim was illiterate and unschooled
in concluding that she was mentally incapable of assenting to or dissenting from the sexual intercourse.42 Also,
in People v. Dumanon,43 the Court concurred in the trial court’s observation and conclusion that the victim was
a mental retardate based on her physical appearance and on her difficulty to understand and answer the
questions during her testimony.44

Here, the State’s witnesses sufficiently explained the psychological tests conducted to establish AAA’s mental
retardation with the mentality of a six- or seven-year-old. The trial judge himself reached a conclusion on AAA’s
mentality from his close personal observation of her as a witness in court, noting that she manifested a
difficulty in responding to the questions, especially those bearing on her being sexually abused.45 The trial
judge’s observation to the effect that she had no notion of the wrong that had been done to her was validated
by the clinical findings. As such, the totality of the evidence presented by the State established beyond
reasonable doubt AAA’s deficient mental condition.

IV

Presumption of innocence was overcome

by sufficient evidence of guilt

Notable is that Butiong did not testify. He offered neither alibi nor denial despite the strong charge of rape
brought against him. His defense was purposely limited to his submission, through Dr. Dayan, that AAA had
not been established to be a mental retardate. Thereby, he did not refute that he had carnal knowledge of
AAA. Having earlier demonstrated the futility of Dr. Dayan’s discounting of the State’s evidence of AAA’s
mental retardation, we can justifiably consider the presumption of innocence in favor of Butiong as overcome.

Still, even if he had asserted alibi and denial, his guilt for the rape of AAA would not be reversed in the face of
AAA’s unwavering testimony and of her very positive and firm identification of him as the man who had
undressed her and sexually gratified himself off her.46 He could no longer hide behind the protective shield of
his presumed innocence, but should have come forward with credible and strong evidence of his lack of
authorship of the crime. Considering that the burden of the evidence had shifted to him but he did not
discharge his burden at all, there is no other outcome except to affirm his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 18, 2005 in CA-GR CR HC No. 00862.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 198954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
RODRIGO MACASPAC y ISIP, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

When the victim was alerted to the impending lethal attack due to the preceding heated argument between him
and the accused, with the latter even uttering threats against the former, treachery cannot be appreciated as
an attendant circumstance. When the resolve to commit the crime was immediately followed its execution,
evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the crime is homicide, not murder.

The Case

Rodrigo Macaspac y Isip (Macaspac) hereby seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on April 7,
2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03262, affirmed with modification the
decision rendered in Criminal Case No. C-31494 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 129, in Caloocan
City declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the killing of Robert Jebulan y Pelaez
(Jebulan).2

Antecedents

The information charging Macaspac with murder filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City
reads as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of July 1988, at Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, and
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with a kitchen knife on the vital part of his body one ROBERT JEBULAN Y PELAEZ, thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious physical injuries, which injuries directly caused the victim's death.

Contrary to law.3

The case was archived for more than 15 years because Macaspac had gone into hiding and remained at large
until his arrest on July 28, 2004. Upon his arraignment on August 31, 2004, he pleaded not guilty to the
foregoing information.4

The Prosecution's evidence revealed that at around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac was having
drinks with Ricardo Surban, Dionisio Barcomo alias Boy, Jimmy Reyes, and Jebulan on Pangako Street,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the course of their drinking, an argument ensued between .Macaspac and
Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the group: Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko
kayo, and then left.5After around three minutes Macaspac retun1ed wielding a kitchen knife. He confronted and
taunted Jebulan, saying: Ano? Jebulan simply replied: Tama na. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed
Jebulan on the lower right area of his chest, and ran away. Surban and the others witnessed the stabbing of
Jebulan. The badly wounded Jebulan was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.6

Macaspac initially invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the possession of the
lmife, and that he had then stabbed Jebulan once he seized control of the knife, viz.:7

Atty. Sanchez

Q - And it was alleged here in the information that on July 7, 1988 at around 8 o'clock in the evening, in the
City of Caloocan you stabbed the victim Robert Julian (Jebulan). What can you say about this?

A - We scuffled for possession for a sharp instrument and when l was able to grab that sharp instrument, I
was able to stab Roberto Jebulan, sir.8

However, Macaspac later on claimed that Jebulan had been stabbed by accident when he fell on the knife.
Macaspac denied being the person with whom Jebulan had the argument, which he insisted had been
between Barcomo and one Danny. According to him, he tried to pacify their argument, but his effort angered
Jebu1an, who drew out the knife and tried to stab him. He fortunately evaded the stab thrust of Jebulan, whom
he struck with a wooden chair to defend himself. The blow caused Jebulan to fall on the knife, puncturing his
chest.9

On February 19, 2008, the RTC found Macaspac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,10 disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the killing of Robert Jebulan is qualified by treachery. In the absence of
mitigating and aggravating· circumstances, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as charged, and hereby sentences him to suffer the imprisonment of reclusion perpertua.

The accused is ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED. 11

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conv1ct1on but modified the civil liability by imposing civil indemnity of
₱50,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00, and temperate damages of ₱25,000.00, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, the appealed 19 February 2008 Decision of Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that appellant, aside from the moral damages
awarded by the trial court in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), is further ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim, Robert Jebulan, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Twei1ty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00) as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.12

Macaspac is now before the Court arguing that the CA erred in affirming his conviction for murder on the
ground that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for murder beyond reasonable doubt.13
Ruling of the Court

It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by
the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its
personal observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine whose
testimonies to accept and which witnesses to believe. Accordingly, the findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted as to materially affect the disposition of the case.14

The Court sees no misreading by the RTC and the CA of the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence of
the parties. On the contrary, the CA correctly observed that inconsistencies had rendered Macaspac 's
testimony doubtful as to shatter his credibility.15 In so saying, we do not shift the burden of proof to Macaspac
but are only stressing that his initial invocation of self-defense, being in the nature of a forthright admission of
committing the killing itself, placed on him the entire burden of proving such defense by clear and convincing
evidence.

Alas, Macaspac did not discharge his burden. It is noteworthy that the CA rejected his claim of self-defense by
highlighting the fact that Jebulan had not engaged in any unlawful aggression against him. Instead, the CA
observed that Jebulan was already running away from the scene when Macaspac stabbed him. The CA
expressed the following apt impressions of the incident based on Macaspac's own declarations in court, viz.:

ACP Azarcon

x x xx

Q - How could you (appellant) hit him (Jebulan) at his back when you were facing him?

A - When I picked up the chair, when I was about to hit him with the chair, Obet turned his back to ran (sic)
from me, sir.

Q - To ran (sic) away from you?

A - Yes, sir, because he saw me, I was already holding the chair, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

Self-defense, requires three (3) elements, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

From the above-quoted testimony of appellant, it is clear that even before he stabbed Jebulan, the latter was
already running away from him. Hence, granting that Jebulan was initially the aggressor, appellant's testimoriy
shows that said unlawful aggression already ceased when appellant stabbed him. Clearly, appellant's act of
stabbing said victim would no longer be justified as an act of self-defense.16

Macaspac's initial claim that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the possession of the knife, and that he had
stabbed Jebulan only after grabbing the knife from the latter became incompatible with his subsequent
statement of only striking Jebulan with the wooden chair, causing the latter to fall on the knife. The
incompatibility, let alone the implausibility of the recantation, manifested the lack of credibility of Macaspac as a
witness.
Both the RTC17 and the CA18 concluded that Macaspac had suddenly attacked the completely unarmed and
defenseless Jebulan; and that Macaspac did not thereby give Jebulan the opportunity to retaliate, or to defend
himself, or to take flight, or to avoid the deadly assault.

Did the lower cou1is properly appreciate the attendance of alevosia, or treachery?

This is where we differ from the lower courts. We cannot uphold their conclusion on the attendance of
treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.19 Two conditions must concur in
order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the
execution of the criminal act which ·give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant.20 Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the
killing and raises it to the category of murder.21

Based on the records, Macaspac and Jebulan were out drinking along with others when they had an argument
that soon became heated, causing the former to leave the group and punctuating his leaving with the warning
that he would be back "to sweep them," the vernacular for killing the others Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan, wawalisin
ko kayo). His utterance was a threat of an impending attack. Shortly thereafter, Macaspac returned to the
group wielding the knife, immediately confronted and directly taunted Jebulan (Ano?), and quickly stabbed the
latter on the chest, and then fled. The attack, even if it was sudden, did not constitute treachery. He did not
mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument between him and the victim and his angry threat
of going back "to sweep them" had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault.

Nonetheless, the information also alleged the attendance of evident premeditation. We now determine if the
records sufficiently established this circumstance.1âwphi1

The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit
the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.22

Macaspac 's having suddenly left the group and his utterance of Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko
kayo marked the time of his resolve to commit the crime. His returning to the group with the knife manifested
his clinging to his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others. The first and second elements of evident
premeditation were thereby established. But it is the essence of this circumstance that the execution of the
criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent during
the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.23 Was the lapse of time between the determination
and execution - a matter of three minutes, based on the records - sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act? By quickly returning to the group with the knife, he let no appreciable time pass to
allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately
followed the resolve to commit the crime. As such, the third requisite was absent.

Accordingly, we cannot appreciate the attendance of evident premeditation in the killing, for, as explained
in People v. Gonzales:24
x x x The qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be satisfactorily established only if it could be
proved that the defendant had ample and sufficient time to allow his conscience to overcome the
determination of his will, if he had so desired, after meditation and reflection, following his plan to
commit the crime. (United States v. Abaigar, 2 Phil., 417; United States v. Gil, 13 Phil., 530.) In other words,
the qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be taken into account only when there had been a
cold and deep meditation, and a tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal
act. (United States v. Cunanan, 37 Phil. 777.) But when the determination to commit the crime was
immediately followed by execution, the circumstance of premeditation cannot be legally
considered. (United States v. Blanco, 18 Phil. 206.) x x x (Bold underscoring is supplied for emphasis)

Without the Prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or evident premeditation,
Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of Jebulan. The penalty for homicide, based on Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,25 the
court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that" prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense. In the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four
months. This is pursuant to A1iicle 64 of the Revised Penal Code.26 It is such period that the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence is reckoned from. On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence is taken from the degree next lower to reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. Accordingly,
Macaspac shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal.

Anent the civil liabilities, we deem a modification to be necessary to align with prevailing
jurisprudence.27 Hence, Macaspac shall pay to the heirs of Jebulan the following amounts, namely: (a)
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.
The temperate damages are awarded because no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses was
presented during the trial.28 Moreover, Macaspac is liable for interest on all the items of damages at the rate of
6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until fully paid.29

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES accused-appellant

RODRIGO MACASPAC y ISIP guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of EIGHT YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to 14 YEARS, EIGHT
MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum; to pay to the heirs of the late Robert
Jebulan: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages, plus interest on all damages hereby awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality
of the decision until fully paid.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit

G.R. No. 200793 June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16,
2011, which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of Branch 94, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
dated December 11, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971 finding accused-appellant Milan
Roxas y Aguiluz guilty of five counts of rape against AAA,3 a minor who was 9 years old at the time of the first
rape and 10 years old at the time of the succeeding four rapes.

Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant Roxas, charging him as follows:

1. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967: That on or about the 9th day of August 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a
minor 10 years of age by then and there blindfolding her, then removed her shorts and underwear then
accused inserted his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her
will and without her consent.4

2. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968:

That on or about the 28th day of July 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10
years of age by then and there blindfolding her and removing her shorts and underwear and
inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will
and without her consent.5

3. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 9
years of age by then and there laying her on the chairs inside the bathroom, then blindfolded
her and then removed her shorts and underwear then accused inserted his penis inside her
vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.6

4. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970:

That on or about the 20th day of March 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10
years of age by then and there laying her down on a bed inside his grandparents’ room then
blindfolded her, then removed her shorts and underwear, then accused inserted his penis inside
her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent. 7
 5. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971:

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10
years of age by then and there removing her shorts and underwear and inserting his penis
inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.8 Accused-appellant Roxas entered a plea of Not Guilty to all the crimes charged.9

The prosecution’s factual account based on the testimony of AAA was concisely stated by the Office of the
Solicitor General in its Appellee’s Brief, as follows:

On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of age, was at her grandmother [CCC]’s house located
on [XXX], Quezon City. In the morning of said date, she was at the dirty kitchen with her aunt [ZZZ] who was
then washing clothes. Her aunt asked her if she had already taken a bath, she replied in the negative.

Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation so he volunteered to give [AAA] a bath.
Subsequently, he brought her upstairs to the bathroom.

While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to turn around. After she complied with his directive,
he blindfolded her. [AAA] started to wonder what the accused-appellant was doing so she told him that he was
supposed to give her a bath. Accused-appellant told her that they would play first for a while.

He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her shorts and underwear. After that, he sat on a
chair, which was inside the bathroom, and raised both of her legs.

Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt accused-appellant’s penis enter her vagina which she found
painful.

She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-appellant got angry and poked a sharp instrument
on her neck. [AAA] did not report the incident because accused-appellant threatened to cut her tongue and to
kill her and her mother.

[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at the same house of her paternal grandparents. She
was on the terrace on the second floor of the house when accused-appellant, who was in her grandparents’
bedroom at that time, called her. She hesitated to go near him because she was afraid that he might rape her
again.

Accused-appellant then went to the terrace and dragged her to the bedroom of her grandparents. She could
not run anymore nor shout for help because aside from the fact that there was nobody else in the room,
accused-appellant was holding a pointed weapon.

While [AAA] and accused-appellant were inside the room, he blindfolded her, removed her shorts and
underwear, and then laid her down the bed. Thereafter, he moved on top of her and inserted his penis in her
vagina. Again, she did not report the incident because of accused-appellant’s threats should she report the
incident to anybody.

Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998while [AAA] was again at her paternal grandparents’
house. On the said date, she was alone in the living room on the second floor of the house when accused-
appellant called her. She did not accede to his bidding because she was scared of him. Thereafter, he shouted
at her and demanded that she come near him, so she went to him.

He brought her inside her grandmother’s bedroom and upon reaching the room, he immediately blindfolded her
and poked a bladed weapon on her neck. He turned her around three (3) times, removed her shorts and
underwear, laid her down the bed, moved on top of her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, the
accused-appellant threatened her so she did not report what had happened.

[AAA]’s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the fourth time on 28 July 1998 at her paternal
grandparents’ house.1âwphi1 She and the accused were incidentally alone in the living room on the second
floor of the house. He asked her to go with him inside the bedroom of her grandparents, but she did not get up
from her seat. So accused-appellant pulled her toward the bedroom. She tried to free herself, but he poked a
pointed instrument at her.

Accused-appellant committed the same acts he had perpetrated on [AAA] during her three [previous] rape
incidents: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed, moved on top of her and thereafter,
inserted his penis in her vagina. She was again threatened by the accused-appellant not to tell anybody about
the incident or else he would cut her tongue and kill her and her mother.

The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August 1998. At that time, [AAA] was at the terrace on the
second floor of her paternal grandparents’ house; and accused-appellant also happened to be there. He pulled
her and brought her inside the room, blindfolded her, and turned her around three (3) times. He employed the
same method in raping her: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed and moved on top of
her. She tried to push him and raise her shorts and panty, but she did not succeed because he poked a
pointed instrument on her neck. Thereafter, he inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report the
incident to anyone because she was scared of his threats.10 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

In contrast, the defense presented four witnesses: AAA’s mother (BBB), AAA’s two brothers (DDD and EEE),
and Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. The defense’s
statement of the antecedent facts as contained in the Appellant’s Brief is reproduced here:

Accused Milan Roxas denied having raped [AAA] on all the five (5) counts of rape.

[DDD], brother of herein private complainant, testified that his aunt in the maternal side, [Tita YYY], induced
him by giving toys if he would tell his father that the accused was raping his sister, [AAA]. Upon prodding of his
maternal aunt, [DDD],who was only eight (8) years old then, told his father that he saw the accused rape his
sister. His father ran amuck which led to the filing of the instant case.

On subsequent days, while [DDD]and [AAA] were in a grocery store buying something, their [Tito XXX], [Tito
WWW] and [Tita YYY] arrived on board an FX vehicle. [Tita YYY] told [DDD] that they will be going to buy toys.
[DDD] said that he will first ask permission from his grandfather, but [Tita YYY] said that it would only take a
few minutes and they will bring them home afterwards. [AAA] was brought to SSDD, a place under the
administration of the DSWD, while [DDD] was brought to Caloocan. On the following day, he was brought to
Muñoz, in a rented house of his [Tita YYY] and her husband. [DDD] stayed there for almost a year. He was
forbidden to go outside as the door was always locked. When [his Tita VVV] arrived from Japan they went to
Tarlac where his paternal grandmother fetched him.

[EEE], brother of herein private complainant, likewise testified that when [his Tita VVV] arrived, they went to
North Olympus, Quezon City where [his] maternal relatives reside. On one occasion, he saw his sister, [AAA]
and his maternal uncle [Tito XXX] entered one of the bedrooms. He tried to open the door to see what the duo
were doing, but it was locked. [EEE] looked for a wire and was able to open the door. He saw private
complainant on top of his [TitoXXX], both naked. When the duo saw him, private complainant and his [Tito
XXX] stood up. The latter threatened him not to tell anybody or he will cut off his tongue.

On November 26, 1999, [BBB], mother of the private complainant testified that her two (2) children, [AAA] and
[DDD], were missing. She looked for them, but to no avail. So she went to the police station to have it
blottered. Later did she know when she called her sister who resides in Project 6, Quezon City that [DDD] was
brought to Ilocos and [AAA] at the SSDD in Kamuning by her 3 brothers and sister. She filed a case of
kidnapping against his brother [Tito WWW]. [Tito WWW], however, promised to return her children if she will
have the said case dismissed which she did.

She denied the allegations that[her] brother-in-law, herein accused, raped her daughter, [AAA]. In fact, before
the filing of the present rape cases there was one rape case filed on September 22, 1999 which was dismissed
because [AAA] retracted her statements. As told to [BBB] by her daughter [AAA], she was not raped by herein
accused. She told a lie and made the false accusation against the accused, because she does not want to put
the blame on any of her maternal relatives. [AAA] was greatly indebted to her maternal grandmother and her
maternal uncles and aunts because they had taken care of her since she was three (3) years old.

Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology testified that based
on her examination of the accused, she concluded that he is suffering from a mild mental retardation with a
mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old. She observed that the subject was aware that he was being
accused of rape, but he had consistently denied the allegations against him.11 (Citations omitted.)

The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on December 11, 2007, finding accused-appellant Roxas
guilty as charged in each of the five Informations filed against him. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in all five (5) counts of rape as recited in the information[s] and sentences accused MILAN
ROXAS:

1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00,
and to pay the costs;

2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00,
and to pay the costs;

3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00,
and to pay the costs;

4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00,
and to pay the costs; and

5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971 – to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00,
and to pay the costs.
To credit in favor of the herein accused the full period of his detention in accordance with law. Resultantly, all
pending incidents are deemed moot and academic.12

The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on the ground that he
cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely testified that he was
an eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to that of children between nine to ten years old.
The RTC found the testimony of AAA credible, and found the testimonies of the defense witnesses to be
"flimsy."

Accused-appellant Roxas elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03473. Accused-appellant Roxas submitted the following Assignment of Errors in the appellate
court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.13

On August 16, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, modifying the Judgment of the RTC
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated 11 December 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 94, in the case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Milan Roxas y Aguiluz", docketed
therein as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971, is AFFIRMED with modification that accused-
appellant is ordered to pay private complainant on each count civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, for each
count of rape.14 Hence, accused-appellant Roxas interposed this appeal, where he, in his Supplemental Brief,
presented an Additional Assignment of Error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY. 15

Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete with inconsistencies and narrations that
are contrary to common experience, human nature and the natural course of things.16 Accused-appellant
Roxas likewise points out that under Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
minors fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from criminal responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas
claims that since he has a mental age of nine years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal liability
although his chronological age at the time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen years old."17

In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 934418 is explicit in providing
that:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as
determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by accused-appellant
Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its
true intent.19

On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA’s testimony and found ourselves in
agreement with the assessment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As observed by the appellate court:

We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, without
any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of her testimony. She recalled the tragic
experience and positively identified accused-appellant as the one who ravished her on five occasions. Her
testimony was unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and there is no impression whatsoever that the same
is a mere fabrication. For her to come out in the open and publicly describe her harrowing experience at a trial
can only be taken as a badge of her sincerity and the truth of her claims.20

We further underscore that AAA was merely 14 years old at the time she testified.21 We have repeatedly held
that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is
a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact
been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to
her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.22

It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great
respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial
expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth.23 As the
trial court further observed, the defense witnesses were not eyewitnesses. A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
provided in the Rules of Court.24 AAA’s mother and brothers were not present when the five rapes allegedly
occurred, and therefore any testimony on their part as to whether or not the complained acts actually
happened is hearsay.

We shall now discuss the criminal liability of accused-appellant Roxas. As stated above, the trial court imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

The first rape incident was committed in July 1997, and therefore the law applicable is Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 which provides:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
 1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

The succeeding counts of rape were committed after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8353 on October
22,1997, which transported the rape provision of the Revised Penal Code to Title 8 under Crimes against
Persons, and amended the same to its present wording:

Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim[.]
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article 335 (old rape provision) and Article 266-B was
sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship between AAA and accused-appellant Roxas is considered
insufficient under present jurisprudence. This Court has thus held:

However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or
affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his niece. In the same manner, it is irrelevant
that "AAA" testified that appellant is her uncle. We held in People v. Velasquez:

However, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant, applying Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659.1âwphi1 We have consistently held that the circumstances under the amendatory
provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the attendance of which could mandate the imposition of the single
indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which cannot be proved as such
unless alleged in the information. Even in cases where such circumstances are proved, the death penalty
cannot be imposed where the information failed to allege them. To impose the death penalty on the basis of a
qualifying circumstance which has not been alleged in the information would violate the accused's
constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

While the informations in this case alleged that accused-appellant is the uncle of the two victims, they did not
state that he is their relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The testimonial evidence
that accused-appellant's wife and Luisa de Guzman are sisters is immaterial. The circumstance that accused-
appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree must be alleged in
the information. In the case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainants
was not sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was necessary to specifically
allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant can only be convicted
of simple rape on two counts, for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.25

In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s "niece" in each Information is
therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. Instead, the
applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information and proven
during the trial, the imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even as
we overturn the lower courts’ appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

For consistency with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages to
₱50,000.00 each, for each count of rape. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 for
each count, on the other hand, is in line with recent jurisprudence.26 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the complainant are
reduced to ₱50,000.00 each, for each count of rape, plus legal interest upon the amounts of indemnity and
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014

ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to
protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection,1 and to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies
and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law.2 The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not
hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.

Antecedents

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide under the
following information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
in Naga City, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and
without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab
one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife , inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus,
directly causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and made an integral part
hereof, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

Acts Contrary to Law.3

The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows: Alejandro Dequito
testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he, together with his compadre Nicasio,
was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony if the high school students.
While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the
victim and stabbed the latter. When asked to demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed the victim,
this witness demonstrated that with the appellant’s left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the
victim using a bladed weapon.

He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the hospital.

Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito’s companion at the time of the incident, corroborated the testimony of Dequito
on all material points.

Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front of the [elementary]
school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for more than a month in
the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later, however, when her son went back to the hospital for a
check-up, it was discovered that her son’s stab wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to another
operation, but died the day after. She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police
authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the wake and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara,
his co-admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that the underlined
cause of death was a stab wound.

The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:

He testified that around seven inthe evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High School
campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of
Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not able
to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the campus,
however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who ganged up on him. He stabbed the
person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in possession of a knife, he stated that
he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that day. He went home
after the incident.

While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay hall, and later to
the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed was Jason
Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it.4

Judgment of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and sentenced
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim
₱81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.5

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty and the civil
liability through the decision promulgated on July 19, 2006,6 disposing thus: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-
0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby,
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six
years of prision correccionalas minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as
maximum.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php
81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil
indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. Weaffirm
in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its amended decision on December 7,
2006, decreeing as follows:7
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision promulgated
on July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED such that the judgment shall
now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in
Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php
81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil
indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. We
affirm in all other respects.

The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for appropriate action on the
application for probation of, herein, appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing the penalty, and
for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act
No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the lower courts as well as his conviction, and
limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1) whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty
imposable on him taking into consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised
Penal Codeand Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he was entitled to the benefits
of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the
penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international
agreements.

Ruling of the Court

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporalfor homicide. Considering
that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months
and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,8 such minority was a privileged
mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.9

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the
penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and
one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period –
eight years and one day to 10 years – was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months
and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of
prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation
under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344,
nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to
deliberately violate the law.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the
trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in
conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum.11Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of
the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No.
9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even
for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies from probation an offender
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for
probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court to determine if
he was qualified for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with
the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of
age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.– If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC
on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child inconflict
with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.1avvphi1 A review of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is
by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the
law the rightnot to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a
case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the
detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the
shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of
Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty
was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of
his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortestduration permitted by the law.

A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action taken herein. The United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines),14 the United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for
the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form
of disposition, provided it is imposed asa last resort and for the minimum necessary period.

Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence,
may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child’s best interest. Such service of sentence will be in
lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision
promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to remand the
judgment to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner
for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control, supervision
and management, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

G.R. No. 171222 February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG.
GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 174786

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, and the
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members for hazing, this case
presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school authorities under Republic Act No.
8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.

The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been characterized by law
and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and responsibility.1 This responsibility has been
amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school authorities to take any action to
prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal
acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed
within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by
the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy
(PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing
Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed2 the Information against them on the basis of
the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the
material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.

Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the
Information.

THE CASE BACKGROUND

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA.3 In order to
reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and
Orientation Period,"4 which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001.5 Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.6

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of investigation, it
forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary investigation and possible
criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of
2005.8 Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution9 finding probable
cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius
C.Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) – collectively, Alvarez
et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC–
Zambales).

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of
probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM)
Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant SeniorGrade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior
Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang
(Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS.
Dominador Operio (Operio) – collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings
of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered re-docketed for the purpose of conducting
the proper administrative proceedings against respondents for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. 10 The
Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents
as accomplices to the crime of hazing.11

Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal accused,
Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino,
Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the Information.13 They argued that
the Information did not contain all the essential elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was
no allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially
considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they stressed that there was
no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also underscored
was the absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical,
mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical,
mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members." Furthermore, they emphasized that there
was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the
activity.
As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already been dismissed
with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the
execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.

The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the Information alleged the
material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime of
accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the principals must be
prosecuted first before a case could be filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the Special
Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the
supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the academy was
considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution
(SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against them. According to the
court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality favorably
carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was
subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal
by direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as there were no
principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they could have cooperated in
the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the case against the principals, the court ruled
that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no longer stand on its own.

In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the allegations
therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment that the alleged hazing was
not part of the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine
and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members" of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the law.16 It
must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical determination that the PMMA
was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against Bayabos et al.,
the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to Quash,17 adopting the grounds raised by
that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August 2006.18 However, on 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan
issued another Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According to the court, since
Velasco was similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against him must likewise be quashed in light
of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ex proprio motu
dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et al.), explaining that they, too, had
been charged under the same Information for the same offense.19 It is unclear from the records20 whether the
accused Aris and Mabborang surrendered or were arrested, or whether the Order of Arrest 21 was recalled prior
to the dismissal of the case.

Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court on 13 March
2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another Petition challenging SB Resolution
II.

THE ISSUES

The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough evaluation of the
Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by this Court as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the
dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused

II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution of
the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law

OUR RULING

With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright
the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already
been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto
dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or
even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.22 In
People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: "The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense
can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal." Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be
duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed
independently of that of the alleged principal.24 We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely
presented the Order of Entry of Judgment25 dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned
in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed.
In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed
an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for
the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.

Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against respondents.

Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires
that the information charging persons with an offense be "sufficient." One of the key components of a
"sufficient information" is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the
complaint.26 The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough to enable
persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged against them.27 This approach is
intended to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed.28 The information need not be
in the same kind of language used in the law relied upon.29

At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court based on the
grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed on that ground,
the basic test30 is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential elements of
the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the
claims therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of the
information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.

We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:

Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National
Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's
Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of National
Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered as hazing for the
purposes of this Act.

Sec. 4. x x x x.

The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge
thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for
the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied)

The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a person is
placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or
injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an
organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons
defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological
suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements,
occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.

First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization. Under the
Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams,
fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives,
companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.31 Attached to the Department of Transportation
and Communications,32 the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution33 established for the primary
purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the term
organization within the meaning of the law.

We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was warranted for failure
to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly recommended and
approved "testing and training procedure and practices" for prospective regular members of the AFP and the
PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to
hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason for
this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they
have satisfied the requirements thereof.35 Thus, the prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the
exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. The
Information charging respondents reads as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM]
VIRGINIO R. ARIS, [LTSG.] DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS,[LTJG.] MANNY G. FERRER, [LTJG.] RONALD G.
MAGSINO,[LTJG.] KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, [LTJG.] GERRY P.DOCTOR, [ENS.] DOMINADOR B.
OPERIO, JR., and [ENS.] DENNIS S. VELASCO, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law),
committed as follows:

That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the campus of the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso, Province of Zambales,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, President of
PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.)
MANNY G. FERRER, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, Security Officer; LTJG. KRUZALDO
G. MABBORANG, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG.GERRY P. DOCTOR, Batl. Mast.; ENS. DOMINADOR B.
OPERIO, JR., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, Mess Officer, all public
officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, committing the offense in relation to office
and while in the performance of their duties as such public officers being the school authorities and/or faculty
members did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge of the hazing
perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary midshipman
FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. during the school’s Indoctrination and Orientation; and, fail to take any action to
prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of psychological and physical injuries against said
FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR.36

As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for
admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of
hazing. Plain reference to a technical term37 – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both "the designation of the
offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense." The
Special Prosecutor’s belated argument38 in his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the
indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy –
i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the
Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to
hazing. Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the
filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case
outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to
correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his
Comment on the Motion to Quash40 that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new
information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was
correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information.1âwphi1 Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash would
not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.

Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27
January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED

G.R. No. 139250 August 15, 2000

GABRIEL CAPILI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA G.R.
CR No. 19336 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gabriel Capili, et. al." affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court2of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 34, finding Gabriel Capili guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Presidential Decree 1612.

Gabriel Capili y Recto (GABRIEL) together with his wife Ferma Capili y Inot were charged with violation of
Presidential Decree 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information that reads:

"That on or about November 5, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other. With intent to gain for themselves or for another, did
then and there willfully and knowingly receive, possess, keep, acquire and sell or dispose of the following, to
wit:

Assorted pieces of jewelry

Several pieces of old coins (U.S. dollar)

all valued at ₱3,000,000.00, which they knew or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of
a (sic) crime of theft.

Contrary to law."3

On December 3, 1993, both accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged with the assistance of
counsel.4 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:

"x x x xxx xxx

Christine Diokno testified that at 4:00 P.M. on November 4, 1993, when she went home from her office, she
discovered that some of her (sic) items at (sic) her closet and the jewelries (sic) and money at (sic) her
mother’s room were taken. Upon call, two Makati police responded and surveyed the room where the robbery
took place. The police officer took her statement (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-2") and then investigated the theft
case. Police prepared the police report and concluded that Michael Manzo, her former houseboy, committed
the offense so a case against Manzo was filed. She described all the properties that were taken as those
reflected in the police report because according to her she gave the police a list of the items and is part of her
statement (tsn, p. 11, May 11, 1994). Allegedly the value is about 3 Million pesos, some were of 20 years and
some were of 30 years vintage, acquired by her parents since their wedding in 1945. Some from abroad,
States or Hongkong acquired during trips.

On November 27, 1993, Quiapo sub-station informed her that Michael Manzo was there. She talked to Michael
Manzo who admitted the commission of the stealing and that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili and his wife for
₱50,000.00. Likewise Michael Manzo admitted that on two occasions Gabriel Capili returned some of the
items. The first was before he went to Isabela. That Capili returned to him (Manzo) the memorabilia taken from
her room consisting of (sic) school ring, bracelets, key chain and some custom jewelries (sic) and some other
items. That three days before the apprehension Gabriel returned the Raymond Wiel watch and two cast rings
with diamonds. The first ring is valued at ₱3,000.00 the second watch was (sic) cost ₱20,000.00 to ₱60,000.00
and the two cast rings about P80,000.00. Then Manzo informed her that he sold those items returned to other
buyers, near Claro M. Recto, who paid ₱1,500.00 and ₱1,000.00 for the ring which police officer (sic) failed to
recover because the stand was no longer there. She was shown by the police officer the items recovered from
Gabriel Capili and his wife which she identified as her property. Shown with Exhs. "A", "B", "C", she said those
are her properties and that the coins (sic) were acquired during the trips to the States. She kept John F.
Kennedy dollar coins contained in a small box. She further relayed that the coins, Exh. "A" came from a brooch
owned by her mother. The chain with medal of our Lady was bought by her mother and was given to her
together with other belongings.

That before the discovery of the incident her mother had the list of all the items by counting them physically
because her mother used to check the jewelry every week in her presence. That all is worth three (3) Million
Pesos because the jewelries (sic) were sometimes brought to a jeweler for a change or for removal of stones
or replacement that is why she considered that all the jewelries (sic) were appraised. She does not know,
however, what exactly were brought by her mother. That she was present during the last inventory of the items
and the land titles by her mother, presenting the alleged inventory on August 1, 1993 (Exh. "S"), after her
father died on July 15, 1993. While her mother was checking them, she was in the room writing the description
of the jewelries (sic), the cost and date when bought. That the corresponding value stated came from her
mother kept inside the vault.

That on November 2, 1993, she took out all the items because November 9 was her mother’s birthday and
would like to select the items she and her mother were going to wear for the occasion then check the jewelries
(sic) against the prepared list. The list included the items lost but did not include the box of memorabilia which
was taken from her room. She claimed that the records including the receipts from where the list was taken
were lost together with the jewelries (sic) that were taken.

xxx xxx xxx

To support the allegation in the Information Michael Manzo testified that after he asked his friend Emilio
Benitez where he can sell his jewelries (sic) he was brought to Boy Recto’s (accused) house at 1260 Carola
St., Sampaloc, Manila, to whom he gave one bag of jewelries (sic) with the information that he stole them while
he was a house boy. Recto agreed to pay him ₱50,000.00 (p. 3, tsn, March 3, 1994). He left and went back
after a week or on November 5, as he needed the money. He was paid ₱1,500.00. He left again and went back
after two weeks and was paid again ₱6,000.00. He left again but in his return he was not paid anymore.

When he visited his friend Emilio Benitez at the precinct, having been charged with vagrancy, he was caught
by the police asking him where he brought the jewelries (sic), so he pointed to Boy Recto, who was picked-up
and brought to the station and investigated. During the frisking and searching at the station, police officers
found pearls and old coins from Gabriel Capili. The following day, Mrs. Ferma Capili was investigated at sub-
station 3, Quiapo, WPD.

He identified the pearl earring with copper (sic) with diamond (Exh. "A"). He likewise identified the old coin 4
pieces of dollars marked as Exhs. "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"; "B-1", "B-2" dimes, "B-3" and "B-4" quarter
cents; pendant with inscription Boy Recto, Exh. "C". He admitted that the statement marked as Exh. "D" and
sub-markings is his.

Describing the contents of the bag, he said that there were more or less 20 pieces of rings, some with pearls
and some with diamonds and birthstones; more or less 20 pairs of earrings, diamond with pearls; more or less
10 pieces of necklaces of plain gold with pendant with the replica of God and cast with diamond. There were
Quartz watches; 3 pieces Bulova watches; 5 pieces of Seiko watches, Raymond Wiel. That per complainant’s
information, all of them costs (sic) 3 Million Pesos which he merely gave to the accused without counting them.
He however, claims that they will cost only one to two million pesos. Despite which value, he entrusted them to
Boy Recto without counting the pieces.

Defense adopted Exhibit "B" as Exhibit "1" and sub-markings, Exhibit "D" as their Exhibit "2" and "2-a".

That during the investigation, when he was given another lawyer, he stated that he told the accused to sell the
jewelries (sic) he stole. (p. 6, tsn, March 16, 1994)

That witness explained that only the fancy ones were returned to him.

That three days after he left the jewelries (sic) to (sic) Recto, they had drinking session somewhere at Recto,
on which occasion, he did not ask for the jewelries (sic).

That the ₱1,500.00 was given to him near the bus terminal at Sampaloc near UST and when the fancies (sic)
were returned, which he came to know as such because he had it appraised in a pawnshop when they arrived
from Roxas, Isabela. When the jewelries (sic) were returned contained in the bag, he accepted, opened (sic)
for a couple of minutes without counting. That Emilio Benitez glanced on (sic) them because the bus was about
leave. Recto gave the instruction that he can come back within two weeks because Boy Recto will pay.

The witness admitted that he is facing a charge of Qualified Theft in Makati pending before a court where he
posted his bail. That he is testifying before this Court out of his own volition. He explained that they went to
Isabela per instruction of Gabriel Capili that they should lie low because the police were hunting for them and
that Emilio Benitez is from Roxas, Isabela.

After more or less two weeks when (sic) they arrived from Isabela, he was requested by Boy Recto (Gabriel
Capili) to sign a blank document somewhere at Espana (Document Exh. "3" to "3-A"). He was not, however,
forced. That upon arrival from Isabela, they went to the house of the accused then proceeded to wait at a hotel
in Sta. Cruz. After three hours of waiting, the accused arrived and gave him ₱6,000.00 in the presence of
Emilio Benitez without receipt. He declared that he himself is not sure whether all the jewelries (sic) inside the
bag are (sic) genuine or not.

Having admitted to the police that he is Michael Manzo, he was asked where he brought the jewelries (sic) so
he pointed to Boy Recto. He admitted to have signed a blank document, Exhibit "4" and "3", his signature, Exh.
"4-1" and Exh."3-A", but do (sic) not know where the originals were, but later said that the originals are in the
hands of the police officers.

SPO3 Ernesto Ramirez testified that as police officer of Station 3, on November 27, 1993 he investigated
Michael Manzo who was accused of Qualified Theft at Makati and who admitted to him having committed said
offense and pointed to the house of Gabriel Capili at Sampaloc, Manila where he sold the jewelries (sic).
Thereafter, he and his companions SPO2 Reyes, SPO3 Salalia and SPO3 Fuentes with Michael Manzo went
to the place and saw the wife of Gabriel Capili wearing the pair of earrings, one of the jewelries (sic) stolen.
They were allowed by Gabriel Capili to get (sic) inside the residence where Gabriel Capili showed him the
signed document of Michael Manzo, Exh. "4" and said he returned the jewelries (sic). It was however, denied
by Manzo although he admitted the signature. Gabriel Capili went with them to the police precinct where he
(Gabriel Capili) was referred to the investigator and found (sic) from his pockets 4 pieces of coins. Allegedly
while the wife was then being investigated, Manzo pointed to the earrings worn by the (sic) wife as part of
those stolen properties. The same was taken by the investigator. He pointed to both accused inside the
courtroom.

SPO1 Eduardo San Diego also from Station 3, Quiapo, Manila, investigator, investigated the case of Qualified
Theft that happened at the house of Cristine Diokno. Both accused were positively identified by Michael Manzo
so he took the latter’s statement. That during his investigation he recovered a necklace with pendant, US dollar
coins with different denominations and one pair of earrings (Exh. "A", "B" and "C"). In their investigation they
tried to recover the other items but failed because the establishment of the other buyer pointed to them by
Michael Manzo was no longer existing. He prepared the booking sheet and arrest report Exhs. "D" and "E" and
sub-markings.

xxx xxx xxx

Gabriel Capili denied any knowledge about the charge against him and declared that what Michael Manzo
stated in court that he agreed to pay ₱50,000.00 but paid only ₱1,800.00 is not true. He was at home on
November 10, 1993 selling junk foods (sic) when he was called by Emil, companion of Michael Manzo, through
the phone which number he gave to Emil when the latter bought something on credit from him a week before
that date. Emil asked him if he would like to buy jewelry to whom he relayed if he will see the jewelry. Emil
arrived at 2:00 o’clock P.M. together with Michael Manzo, the first time he saw the latter and showed him two
(2) pieces of jewelry, one birthstone and an old coin with a price of ₱2,000.00. He inquired from (sic) where the
jewelries (sic) came from and was answered by Michael Manzo that it came from and (sic) being sold by his
mother. He declined because he cannot pay for it. Michael Manzo handed to Emil something wrapped of which
he was asked to appraise. Michael Manzo asked him if he knew somebody who can buy. He said he has but
hard to see because he seldom see the man already but was invited to see the person at Recto. After boarding
the taxi they did not proceed immediately to the place. Michael Manzo ordered the taxi cab to go back to Sta.
Mesa Love Hotel where he was told to wait. Michael Manzo went up the hotel while Emil went towards Aurora
Boulevard walking carrying some items but did not know what happened. After one hour of waiting at the
taxicab and worried about the taxi fare, he went inside the hotel and after inquiring from the counter where his
companion was, Michael Manzo went down with two women companions. Fifteen minutes after the two women
left, Emil arrived and said he went to Cubao selling the jewelries (sic). Thereafter, they went to Recto at (sic) a
business establishment near the Galaxy Theater. He was offered to drink from almost dark until dawn asking
him if he had already find (sic) his friend buyer. They parted ways and went home.

On November 15, Manzo and Emil called him up again asking if it was possible to see him which he positively
answered. He went to UST somewhere near Mambusco station where he saw Emil with Michael Manzo about
5 meters from Emil standing talking to someone. He asked Emil if he was able to sell the jewelries (sic) and
was answered "not yet". Emil was borrowing ₱700.00 but he has no such amount, so Emil gave him the
jewelries (sic) formerly offered to him, the birthstone and watch allegedly as a gift from Michael Manzo. Emil
informed him that he and Michael Manzo together with two others were going to Isabela so he gave the
₱700.00. After they (Emil and his friend) boarded the bus he went home.

On November 21, he was fetched by Emil, brought to a place near the UST along Dapitan Street where he
found Michael Manzo retrieving the gift given to him. Because of Manzo’s insistence, he returned them but
asked Manzo to sign Exh. "3". They failed to return his ₱700.00 so he asked Manzo to sign another documents
(sic), Exhs. "4" and "4-A", the original of which was given to the policeman and which was not returned to him.

After several days Pat. Ramirez arrived informing him that Michael Manzo sold him jewelries (sic). Invited (sic)
he went to the police at the Hidalgo sub-station 3. Michael Manzo was not immediately investigated but
Michael Manzo and Emil were incarcerated. After fifteen (15) minutes from the second floor he was brought to
the ground floor inside the cell and detained for several days. He alleged that on the same day he was brought
in a room at the second floor where he was mauled by Pat. Ramirez (sic) not convinced with what he said
about the paper (Exh. "4"), he gave them then brought back to the cell. He told the police that the jewelries
(sic) they are looking for are in the possession of Michael Manzo. He further claimed that Michael Manzo
talked to a certain Go and pointed to some other buyers who were brought to the precinct. He, however, did
not know if they were released. On November 27 when his wife visited him at 7:00 P.M. she was likewise
incarcerated because Michael Manzo pointed to the earrings of his wife.

He further declared that prior to his wife’s arrival, policeman and Michael planned that when his wife arrived,
Michael will point to her earrings, allegedly because Emil gave ₱500.00 to the police officer while planning to
include his wife. His wife was then brought to the second floor but did not know what happened, thereafter was
incarcerated.

He testified that the earrings of his wife was given by her brother and that the old coin, Exh. "B" is his acquired
when he helped, per order of Pat. Nick Golahan, in carrying dead body (sic) when MV Nucnucan sank in Cebu
where the son of one he carried gave him coin. The other coin belongs to him which he picked up in Cebu.
That the necklace with print Boy Recto on the pendant belongs to him and which was taken at the precinct
from the dancer to whom he gave it. Further stating that the same came from Pat. Alex Aguirre when he was
still single.

That upon inquest, the Fiscal told the police that they should be released but were not and (sic) brought back
to the cell. The following morning they were brought to the City Hall. There again, the Fiscal ordered that they
be released but were not and (sic) brought back to the cell once more. On the third time when he was brought
to the Fiscal, the latter allegedly told him that San Diego altered the testimony that is why they will be
incarcerated.

He denied that Manzo signed Exh. "3" without any writing and pointed to the typewritten statement therein as
his relaying that the same was thru Michael’s suggestion at the time when they were already quarreling while
accusing Manzo to have stolen the properties subject matter of this case and even questioned that there is
something wrongly written, the giving as a gift.
That although they did not know the accused Michael Manzo and did not know of any reason why he pointed
to him and his wife as buyers of the jewelries (sic) worth 3 Million Pesos, he believed that it was because of the
quarrel when he started accusing Manzo of stealing of which he was being blamed.

He now claims that the he came to know Emilio Benitez only on November 5, the same time he came to know
Michael. (tsn, p. 22, Aug. 8, 1994), hence, there is no reason why Benitez will approach him selling the
property. There is no quarrel with the police officers and so he has no knowledge why these people would like
to implicate him and his wife. He likewise did not know of any reason why the police officer stated in their
affidavit of arrest that the items "US Dollars" were recovered from him at the time of the investigation. He
admitted that only one of the coins belongs to him, picked-up from Cebu (Exh. "B-4") and his two (2) LRT coins
are still missing so with P20.00 and two more Abraham Lincoln coins. Although he claimed that San Diego did
not release them after the Fiscal’s order he did not file any action against San Diego. That on December 1,
1993, the Prosecutor ordered the police to release them and was present asking the Fiscal if he can be
allowed to go home but since they did not have any document, the Fiscal said the policemen will take care of
them. They did not execute any statement because according to him he was not given any chance.

SPO1 Beinvenido Inot testified that he is a member of the National Police Force of Precinct 1, Olongapo City
and that the accused Ferma Capili, wife of Gabriel, is his sister. He was asked by his sister to testify about the
pair of earring (sic) that he gave Ferma on June 24, 1990, a U. S. Fancy jewel which was given by her sister
from abroad. It has brillantitos which is the same as a base of the glass. The same was confiscated from
Ferma by the police.

The last time he saw the pair of earring was on the date his sister celebrated her birthday. Showing all the
exhibits of the prosecution to the witness, at first he answered "There are no brillantitos pair of earrings, sir.".
And later witness answered: "Ay ito pala." (holding the pair of earrings marked as Exh. "A-1", tsn p. 5, Oct. 14,
1994). He later claimed that the pair of earrings is actually for his wife sent by her sister abroad to Olongapo.
He cannot remember having seen Ferma Capili on December 1993 to September 9, 1994, they saw each
other two times and that they talked about those jewelries (sic) thru the phone at that time when the accused
was apprehended and incarcerated. However, despite the information of Ferma Capili that she was
apprehended because of the pair of earrings he did not do anything because allegedly he was too busy and
they have operation. He admitted that this is the first time he declared that the earrings came from him without
executing any written statement. (Defense marked Exh. "A-1" pair of earring (sic) as their Exh. "8") (Decision,
pp. 1-15; Rollo, pp. 31-45)."5

On August 17, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting Ferma Capili but finding the accused,
Gabriel Capili, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged the dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the prosecution’s evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction beyond moral
certainty, for violation of P.D. 1612 in relation to Sec. 3 par. A of the same law which required that the penalty
to be imposed shall be in the maximum period if the value of the property is more than ₱22,000.00, adding one
(1) year for its additional ₱10,000.00, the total penalty of which shall not exceed twenty (20) years, further
considering that the consideration of the purchase is ₱50,000.00, accused Gabriel Capili is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of said law. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attendant to its commission, but granting the accused with the benefit of the indeterminate sentence law, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium and to
suffer the additional penalty of three years (one for every ₱10,000.00) and to further suffer the accessory
penalty thereof.
The accused shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Since the claim of P3 Million has not been sufficiently proven but the agreed price between the seller and
herein accused is only ₱50,000.00, the accused is hereby directed to indemnify the complainant Christined
Diokno the sum of ₱50,000.00, less the value of the jewelries (sic) presented in Court, Exhibits "A". "B" and "C"
and its sub-markings, to be returned to the owner upon proper receipt and photograph.

The bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.

The body of the accused is hereby committed to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, through the City Warden of Manila.

Considering that there is no evidence to show complicity and/or that Ferma Capili conspired and confederated
with her husband Gabriel Capili, she is hereby acquitted from the offense charged in the Information.

The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.

SO ORDERED."6

GABRIEL appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC the dispositive portion of its
decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated August 17, 1995 convicting the appellant for violation of
P.D. 1612 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED."7

Motion for reconsideration was denied8 , hence this appeal where the accused assigns the following error:

"THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
REMANDING THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DESPITE OF (SIC) THE
FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL CONSIDERING
THAT THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FENCED ARTICLES WERE NOT CORRECTLY ESTABLISHED BY
THE PROSECUTION."9

The petitioner maintains that even for the sake of argument that the prosecution has established that the
petitioner committed the crime of fencing (violation of P.D. 1612) beyond reasonable doubt, there is no legal
basis for him to suffer the entire penalty imposed by the trial court. Petitioner claims that the Office of the
Solicitor General, in its appellee’s brief filed with the Court of Appeals, agrees that basis of the penalty for the
offense of fencing is the value of the property actually involved and not the agreed selling price of the stolen
item. The petitioner also maintains that since the prosecution failed to prove the value of the stolen goods, the
guilt of the petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner therefore prays that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and a new one be issued either acquitting the petitioner or
remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.10

The respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that on April 25, 1997, it filed a
Manifestation/Clarification modifying the recommendation it made in its appellee’s brief to the effect that a
remand of the case would unduly delay the disposition of the case. Therefore, to expedite the final resolution of
the case, the OSG recommended that as an alternative to a remand that the assessment and findings of the
trial court on the value of the subject articles, which is ₱50,000.00 be adopted and used instead.11 It is
therefore the contention of the OSG that there is no merit in the petitioner’s claim that the OSG agreed to the
remand of the case for further reception of evidence to determine the value of the stolen goods inasmuch as
this would be prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. The OSG also opines that the petitioner is not entitled to
an acquittal since the value of the stolen property is not determinative of the guilt of the accused and is not an
element of the crime but is only determinative of the penalty therefor.

The petition is partly meritorious.

Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.12 The essential elements of the crime of fencing are:

"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another."13

All these elements are present in the case at bench.

The first element or the fact of theft was proved by prosecution witness, Christine Diokno (DIOKNO) who
testified that several pieces of jewelry, watches and money were stolen from her mother’s bedroom. She
reported the theft to the police who after conducting an investigation, concluded that her houseboy, Michael
Manzo (MANZO), committed the offense. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against MANZO. In her
testimony, DIOKNO stated that the major items that were taken consisted of two diamond rings each having a
diamond solitaire of three (3) carats each, a pair of diamond earrings each having a diamond solitaire of two
point five (2.5) carats, a diamond cross with twelve (12) half (1/2) carat diamond, her mother’s wedding band,
an emerald set consisting of an emerald ring set with diamonds with a pair of matching earrings, a sapphire set
consisting of two sapphire rings set with diamonds and matching earrings, a South Sea pearl set consisting of
a ring and two pairs of matching earrings also set with diamonds, three cultured pearl necklaces with matching
cultured pearl earrings set with diamonds, a topaz set consisting of two rings with diamonds and one with
rubies with a set of matching earrings, a cameo set consisting of a ring, matching earrings and a brooch all set
with diamonds and four solid gold watches, a Rolex, Piaget, Universal Geneve and a Gabriel Peregaux. She
alleged that the total value of the items amounted to approximately three million (₱3,000,000.00) pesos. In
court, DIOKNO identified some of the recovered stolen items consisting of a set of pearl earrings with two
small diamonds (Exhibit "A"), a gold chain with pendant (Exhibit "B") and old United States dollar coins (Exhibit
"C").14

DIOKNO’s testimony is corroborated by MANZO, who admitted that he stole the jewelry from DIOKNO. And
that after stealing the jewelry, he delivered them to the petitioner, GABRIEL with the information that the
jewelry was stolen and for the purpose of selling the same. He identified GABRIEL in court as the person to
whom he delivered the stolen jewelry.15 MANZO testified that GABRIEL was not a participant in the theft of the
jewelry and that he told GABRIEL that the jewelry was stolen. He also established the fact that the petitioner
agreed to pay fifty thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos for the stolen jewelry which clearly manifests intent to gain on
the part of the petitioner. Consequently, MANZO’s testimony proves the second, third and fourth elements of
the crime of fencing.

At any rate, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by the accused as mere
possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing.16 GABRIEL, who was in possession of at
least two of the stolen items, has not rebutted this presumption.

We also disagree with the petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the value of the stolen items.

Although DIOKNO’s testimony is hearsay and is inadmissible for purposes of determining the value of the
stolen items inasmuch as her testimony was not based on her own personal knowledge but on the appraisals
made by jewelers and what her mother told her, MANZO’s testimony remains unrebutted. MANZO established
that he sold the stolen items to GABRIEL for ₱50,000.00 and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
said amount is presumed to be the value thereof as it is the only value established by the prosecution.
Besides, the valuation of the stolen items made by the trial court is a factual issue and factual findings of the
trial court especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and generally should
not be disturbed on appeal.17

We note however that the trial court was mistaken in imposing the penalty. A person found guilty of fencing
property the value of which exceeds ₱22,000.00 is punished under Presidential Decree 1612 as follows:

"Sec. 3. Penalties – Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:

a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not
exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided for in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos, but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be
termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code
shall also be imposed."

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law18 , the court shall sentence an accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence an accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.19

Applying the foregoing, the petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor maximum.
The fact that the value of the fenced items exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not, like in cases of estafa, be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty.20 In the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, this should be imposed in its medium period which ranges from ten (10) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to eleven (11) years and four (4) months. Adding the additional two (2) year
sentence, one for each ₱10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is
anywhere within ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal21 . On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should
be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower which is prision correcional maximum22 which ranges
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioner,
Gabriel Capili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Presidential Decree 1612 otherwise known as the
Anti-fencing law is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correcional as minimum to
thirteen (13) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum

G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC
had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.)
1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of gain for
himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown
person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and
thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also
known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1
day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s finding of guilt
was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Facts

The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:

Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14.
He acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's
acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List
acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked
the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta.
Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose
Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires
sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck
tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together
with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.

Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an
attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing,
a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant
was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative.
Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires
stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant
asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private
complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern
Police District.

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on
appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero
and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as
the poseur-buyer.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District,
proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon.
Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the
street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter
immediately produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if
he had any more in stock.

Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was located
beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store,
inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial
numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires
in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store.
However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by
representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening
when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and inventory.
Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by
poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.5

For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business of
buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling
stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered
to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong
bought all the tires for ₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the
letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).6

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-
buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen
went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires. 7

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the
possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption
by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9

OUR RULING

The Petition has no merit.

Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the
part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.10

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving
that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated
by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen – testified that the
crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires
through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the
prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at
the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong
Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact
that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither
a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were
found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in
Ong’s possession.15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total
amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another
or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and
sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in
purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires
and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy
until the delivery of tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given him
doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the
manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale
may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place
of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition
of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may
likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the
presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything
of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a
presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from
the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx. 22

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.1âwphi1 Section 6 of P.D. 1612
requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or
anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that
store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced
the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this
particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised
prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.1âwphi1 Logically, and for all
practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be
raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of
the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address
were fictitious.24Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy
of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was
actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from evidence of
possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject
of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the 25 property.

The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on ₱5,075 for each tire recovered, or in
the total amount of ₱65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the
total amount of ₱223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable
presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the
ordinary course of business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the
transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find sufficient
basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and
modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL
COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND
ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion
complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another
information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having
reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed
a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede,
frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring
or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of
arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and
expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin,
denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the
accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on
the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as
alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude
the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack
of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following
grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting
on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of
the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No.
1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities
resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD
No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case
filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the
rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge
Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate
the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of
rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different
offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan
by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive
from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because
of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD
No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three
(3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the
evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m.,
1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his
house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred
 that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis
supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very
incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the
Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of
component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no
other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated
by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of
rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80
Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a
special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law
will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All
crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and
charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
 This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These
common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under
special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too
intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two
separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with
Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as
absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
(People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of
the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is
already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the
same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty
and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present
case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place
him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had
the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his
arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The
Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH
 THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and
Rodriguez find no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because
no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind
whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation
of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can
not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged
with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social
motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being
prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues
raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ
of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777,
Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting
further proceedings therein is made permanent

G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between
his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner
Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the request,
respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on
December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro
Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two
suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma
Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor,
counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.
Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their
intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day.1 However, criminal charges
were filed later against the two student suspects.2

Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu,
Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation
of P.D. 1829,3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders.

On May 18, 1995, an information4 was filed against them, alleging that:

That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, namely: ROGER
POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU — Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO — Asst. Legal
Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN — Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of their respective official
functions, taking advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to their office,
conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there
wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO
TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS
VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student
Council, and delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and
concealing said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another
principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the above-named
accused public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal
slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But the
recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the
Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the
Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the
Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.

Petitioners contend that:

I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE

RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION;
2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE
REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE
DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE
REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS
SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO
BASIS.

II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.5

Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI
could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners
for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.

First. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when an
arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, §5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this
case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners
who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just
been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were
probably guilty.

Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of
their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. 6 They
invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Jr. 7 in which it was held:

It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended Accused-
appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
"when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of
Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation
indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.

In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the presence of
blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off
his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the admissibility of
the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused
in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood
stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed
the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the
crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, §5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and the arresting
officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission
of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were
probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.

We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.8

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime.
When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a
crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On
the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk
called to put an end to the violence on the campus.

To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the
courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the
crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest
criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave
to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is
evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, §2 of
the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their
attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.

Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c), the Office of the
Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:

From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ
members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to
the latter's demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively identified by two
eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive identification. In fact,
respondents do not dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of Dennis
Venturina.
 Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the SJ
members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest. While
this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had
reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous crime
of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on
the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct,
frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members
positively identified.

To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests. It is in this
forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the
warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasi-judicial authority to rule on this matter. Of
course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have likewise availed of or
resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested, without
prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting NBI
agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that obstructed and
delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency like the NBI. They facilitated
the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death
Dennis Venturina.9

The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty. The
question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court,
considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule
113, §5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without
warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the question of
probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As the Special Prosecutor
stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal of the case against
petitioners:

All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994, the accused
knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police headquarters had
committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus that night, legal.
The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on
campus.

Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge Posadas,
Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is
defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule
12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the
part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing
refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused
with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in safeguarding the
rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.10

Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:
 SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;

The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined.11 But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely more
important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to
be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution."12 As we held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto:13

Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through a
preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled exceptions to this
rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:

a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun
vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty,
33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil.
1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.
Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf.
Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
 j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
438); and

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953) cited in Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)

In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No.
1829, §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and
Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the
prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in
investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had asked for assistance from
the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.

The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape of the
student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender the students
the following day.14 Hence, the information against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the
apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students and
another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta.15 The student suspect mentioned by both the
resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students
whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not
petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial. In the
first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their undertaking. In the second place, the
fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station
as they did not have a warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their
inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them by the supposed
eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of taking
the law into their own hands. That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a
warrant is their responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.

We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to bring to justice
those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures faced by law enforcement agencies to effect
immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered that the need to
enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable cause for the
filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot be indicted because they
dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners.

Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners' challenge to
P.D. No. 1829, §1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other
ground such as the application of a statute or general law.16

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 §1(c) as a result of the incident complained of in Criminal
Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801
against petitioners.
[G.R. Nos. 144261-62. May 9, 2001.]

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B.

MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and ROMMEL M. LUARCA, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises the issue of the propriety of the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan 1 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario
Matining and Rommel Luarca" wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under P. D. No. 1829. The grounds for petitioners’
Motion to Quash the Informations against them are that only petitioner Prudente D. Soller occupied a position
classified as Grade 27 and higher and because the offenses charged were not committed by him in violation of
his office as Municipal Mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed along
the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with petitioner Soller’s
son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente
Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. The incident
was reported to and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was conducted on the same
night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo
Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.

On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry
Macabael with the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the
fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police
report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy
report that there was no blackening around his wound when in truth there was.

Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among
others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it was there where he was
rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely
requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy
considering that the procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabael’s
consent was obtained before the autopsy. The two (2) police officers denied having planted three (3) shells at
the place where the shooting took place.

The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Obstruction of Justice (Violation of
P. D. 1829), and two (2) Informations 2 were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2) informations respectively read as follows:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
"Criminal Case No. 25521

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses
PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO,
and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P. D. 1829, committed as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the
Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPOII, PO1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of JERRY MACABAEL with intent to
impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of criminal case for murder
against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.

CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Criminal Case No. 25522

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses
PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO,
and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P. D. 1829, committed as
follows:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the
Municipal Mayor, Municipal health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of
said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
criminal give false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead or prevent the
law enforcement agency, from apprehending the offender by reporting that there are several gunshot wounds
in the body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and that there is no tattooing (blackening) around the wound of
the said victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one gunshot wound and there is tattooing (blackening)
around the wound which would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the herein
respondents spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.

CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
offenses charged; this motion was opposed by respondent People. In its assailed Order dated April 14, 2000,
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the
performance of the duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly
charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all
the co-accused. The Order stated that "the accused is the Mayor of the municipality where the alleged incident
took place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal
offense committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in which the accused
Mayor would be probably held accountable before this Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the premise that it is not among the functions of the
mayor to conduct autopsies so that any misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not be an offense which would
put him under the jurisdiction of the court. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbayan ruling
that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly that he is the primary executive and,
therefore, necessarily the primary peace officer of the municipality, for which reason, any action on his part
which deviates from that function is an office-related offense. In this particular instance, the accused is charged
for having cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower rank in the same municipality in the
supposed falsification of the results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy were totally
unrelated to any of the administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may have supervision and,
more specially, control, the fact of the matter is that the jurisdiction of the Court covers not only the offenses
committed by the officials of Grade Level 27 or higher as the principal accused but even where such officials
are also accused together with some other public officials who may be at a level below Grade Level 27 in
connection with the performance of their duties.

In this instance, Accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a position at Grade Level 27, is co-
accused with his wife, the Municipal Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that,
necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer elevates the entire case to this Court primarily
because somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with the lower
ranking officer." 3

Hence, this petition alleging that —

"RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 25521 and 25522."
4

Citing Section 4 of P. D. 1606 as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners
claim that for an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been
committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) "in relation to their office", i.e. it should be intimately
connected with the office of the offender, and should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the
performance of his official functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the information.
Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the Informations do not contain factual averments showing
that they committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts charged are intimately connected
with their respective offices and were perpetrated by them while they were in the performance of their duties
and functions.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, posits that even if the offense charged was not committed by the
accused while in the performance of his official functions, the same could still be considered done in relation to
his office if the acts were committed in line of duty. Respondent’s position is that an offense may be considered
committed in relation to office if it arose from misuse or abuse of public office or from non-performance of an
official duty or function; thus the offense of falsifying autopsy and police reports is office-related considering
that among the duties and functions of the municipal mayor in the exercise of general supervision and control
over all programs, projects, services and activities of the municipal government, is that he shall ensure that all
executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions. The fact
that the informations do not allege that the acts charged were committed by petitioner Prudente Soller while he
was in the performance of his official functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of law that his
acts are in violation of his duties as municipal mayor could necessarily be deduced from the informations.

Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the Information were fatally defective in view
of the absence of any specific allegation that would indicate that the crimes charged were committed by the
defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official functions.

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be
inquired into. 5 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not
be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied... For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. 6

The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with
the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized
under Section 1, Paragraph b of P. D. 1829. The applicable statutory provisions are those of P. D. No. 1606 as
last amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P. D. No. 1606 as amended provides insofar as
pertinent:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"SECTION 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

x x x

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

x x x

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

x x x

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdiction as provided by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
x x x

In Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 7 this Court held that the Municipal Mayor, who occupies Salary Grade 27 in the
hierarchy of positions in the government under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services.
Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be considered as committed "in relation to
their office" as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted Section 4.

As early as Montilla v. Hilario, 8 this Court has interpreted the requirement that an offense be committed in
relation to the office to mean that "the offense cannot exist without the office "or" that the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised
Penal Code (referring to the crimes committed by the public officers). People v. Montejo 9 enunciated the
principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the crime of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his official functions. The Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Concepcion said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in (the)
abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that —

". . . the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the accused’s) respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed
(the accused) had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not
held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown obeyed his instructions because
he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City." 10

The cited rulings in Montilla v. Hilario and in People v. Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez v. Demetriou, 11
Republic v. Asuncion, 12 and Cunanan v. Arceo. 13 The case of Republic v. Asuncion categorically
pronounced that the fact that offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the
information:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office, must, however, be alleged
in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a) (2). This
allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information." 14

For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase "committed in violation to public office" appears
in the information; what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific factual allegation in the
information that would indicate close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the
commission of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public
office. 15

In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege that
petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their offices. Neither are there specific allegations
of facts to show the intimate relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged and the
discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenders was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is
included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P. D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners were
described as being "all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I,
Sanitary Inspector and Midwife", there was no allegation that the offense of altering and suppressing the
gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the
investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated
information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the
apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function.
Indeed the offenses defined in P. D. 1829 may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a
private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the Information in
Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy report "would
indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein petitioners spouses Prudente and
Preciosa Soller." Thus there is a categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal
motive to commit the offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not
respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.

A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated in Section 444 of the
Local Government Code will readily show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports and the
presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not among such duties and
functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for construing that the
criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under his functions as Municipal Mayor. 16 What is obvious is that
petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by
personal reasons rather than official duty.

Consequently, for failure to show in the information that the charges were intimately connected with the
discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases
fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and
VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.

G.R. No. 176596 March 23, 2011

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL E. GAITE, Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President; HON. RAUL
GONZALES, Secretary, and HON. JOVENCITO ZUÑO, Chief State Prosecutor, both of the Department of
Justice (DOJ); HON. RAMON R. GARCIA (Substituted by Hon. JOSEPH LOPEZ), City Prosecutor, ACP
MARLINA N. MANUEL, and ACP ADELIZA H. MAGNO-GUINGOYON, all of the Manila Prosecution Service;
and SSP EMMANUEL VELASCO, Department of Justice, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Adoracion G. Angeles, former Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City, assailing the Decision1 dated August 30, 2006
and the Resolution2 dated February 8, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87003. The
antecedent facts are as follows:
It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her grandniece Maria
Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel
Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution dated June 20, 1999,
respondent Velasco filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No.
7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary who, in a Resolution dated April
4, 2000, ordered the withdrawal of the Information against petitioner.

On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed with the DOJ an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ
subsequently dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied in a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review3 with the Office of the President
(OP) assailing the DOJ’s Resolutions dismissing the administrative complaint she filed against respondent
Velasco. The OP asked respondent Velasco to file his comment thereto. In his Comment,4 respondent Velasco
stated among others:

xxxx

Herein respondent-appellee hereby manifests his challenge to petitioner-appellant to finally agree to the
conduct of such investigation in order to determine the veracity of the following information which were
provided very recently by unimpeachable sources from the judiciary, schoolmates and close friends of Judge
ANGELES, to wit:

(a) That Judge ANGELES is still single because she belongs to the third sex (and there is nothing
wrong for being so frankly.)

(b) In fact, Judge ANGELES is carrying an affair with a lady lawyer (still there is nothing wrong with this,
everybody has the freedom whom to love.);

(c) But this lady lawyer is often seen with Judge ANGELES even in her courtroom. Said lawyer is the
conduit or connection of those who has pending cases in her sala (now there’s something terribly
wrong with this.);

(d) That Judge Angeles was so insecure and jealous at the time her grandniece MARIA MERCEDES
VISTAN was allegedly flirting with boys (there is something wrong here also because there is a
manifestation of perversity and in fact said jealousy led to the abuse of the child.)5

On the basis of the above statements which petitioner claimed to be a direct attack on her character and
reputation as a public servant, she filed a Complaint6 for four counts of libel against respondent Velasco before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.

In a Resolution7 dated August 13, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Adeliza Magno-Gingoyon
recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for Libel due to insufficiency of evidence and/or lack of
merit. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:

A charge for libel will only be sufficient if the words uttered or stated are calculated to induce the hearers or
readers to suppose and understand that the persons against whom they are uttered were guilty of certain
offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold the persons up to public
ridicule.
Such calculation does not and will not arise in this case since complainant herself has not clearly manifested if
being single and/or member of the third sex; or carrying an affair with a lady lawyer; or being seen in her
courtroom with the said lawyer; or feeling insecure and jealous of her grandniece Ma. Mercedes Vistan, is on
her own view, a crime, vice or defect or an act of omission which tends to cause her dishonor, discredit or
contempt.

Beyond the omission of the complainant to elaborate on the defamatory character of the statements she
quoted, a reading of the portion of the reply/comment of the respondent where the questioned statements were
lifted, particularly in paragraph 55 of the said reply/comment, reveals that respondent did not categorically
declare therein that Judge Angeles is really single and belongs to the third sex; is carrying an affair with a lady
lawyer who is often seen in her courtroom; and was so insecure and jealous of her grandniece.

Quite vividly, respondent premised his disclosures with a challenge to the complainant to agree to the conduct
of an investigation to determine the veracity of the information he cited therein, thereby conveying that his
disclosures are more of questions begging for answers rather than a direct imputation of any wrongdoing.

Even assuming arguendo that complainant was defamed or maligned by the subject statements, we cannot,
nonetheless, find any presumptive malice therein because the said statements can be considered as privileged
communication for they were made in the course of official proceedings before the Office of the President.

Although the said proceedings may not be strictly considered as judicial in nature, they are akin thereto as they
involve litigation or hearing of contentious issues, albeit in a purely administrative matter.

The subject statements are relevant to the issues in the said administrative proceedings for they revolve
around the moral fitness of the complainant to be an accuser of the respondent for acts done while the latter is
in the public service and they are intended to further prove the incredibility of her accusations by making the
impression that complainant herself may not be "coming to court with clean hands."

While it may be argued that the subject statements are not really germane to the issues raised in the
complainant’s petition for review, suffice it to state that "it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be
liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with the microscopic intensity."

Malice does not exist in this case. It is only in every defamatory imputation where malice can be presumed
(see Article 354, 1st par., Revised Penal Code). Considering that, as afore-discussed, the subject statements
have not been amply shown to be defamatory to the complainant, malice cannot, therefore, be presumed in the
execution thereof, conformably to the above-stated provisions of the penal code. Neither can we attribute
malice in fact on the part of the respondent when he wrote the subject statements considering that:

(1) He did not volunteer to provide that information to the reviewing officials in the Office of the President out of
a single desire to malign the complainant since, apart from making the alleged derogatory statements in only a
portion of his reply/comment, he has submitted his said reply/comment to the Office of the President primarily
in compliance with the Order dated June 10, 2002 of Deputy Executive secretary Arthur P. Autea in O.P. Case
No. 02-D-187.

The subject statements are just, therefore, incidental to the litany of defenses in his reply/comment.

It has been held that if the matter charged as libelous is only an incident in act which has another objective,
there is no libel; and
(2) In the questioned statements, respondent himself opined that there is nothing wrong if Judge Angeles
belongs to the third sex or has an affair with a lady lawyer, clearly signifying that he has not treated such
information as impugning complainant’s honor.

While he may have stated therein that there’s something wrong with the alleged connection of a lady lawyer
with those who have pending cases in complainant’s sala or in the latter’s insecurity at her grandniece, he has
not, nevertheless, averred, or even implied, just for the sake of maligning Judge Angeles, that she has, indeed,
granted favors to the lady lawyer often seen in her courtroom or that she has actually manifested perversity in
her relation with her grandniece mentioned.8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution9 dated December 12, 2003. In
denying the motion, ACP Marlina N. Manuel found that there was no concrete showing that respondent made a
categorical or direct malicious accusation or imputation of any crime or vice against petitioner; that apparently,
respondent entertaining uncertainty of the informations gathered called for an investigation to determine the
veracity or truth thereof.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the DOJ Secretary a Petition for Review10 assailing the dismissal of her
complaint for Libel as well as her motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution11 dated March 17, 2004, the Petition for Review was dismissed by Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño (CSP Zuño), ruling as follows:

We have carefully examined the record, but found no cogent reason to justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution. The statements alleged to be libelous are privileged, since they were made by respondent in
legitimate defense of his own interest, not to mention that the said statements bear some reasonable relation
or reference to the subject matter of the inquiry or may be possibly relevant to it. Neither may it be said that
respondent acted with malice or ill-will against petitioner when he informed the President of matters of public
concern like the conduct or character of the latter which need imperative remedial actions.12

xxxx

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with a motion for inhibition of CSP Zuño, which the DOJ in a
Resolution13 dated June 25, 2004 denied the motion with finality. In so ruling, DOJ Acting Secretary Merceditas
N. Gutierrez said:

The Reply/Comment in OP Case No. 02-D-187 motivated solely by a desire of respondent to defend himself
against pending charges, is privileged for being an exercise of the natural right of a person accused of a crime
in order to bring to the attention of the President who is to pass upon his guilt all such considerations he thinks
may influence her judgment in his behalf, even though he may in so doing incidentally disparage private
character.

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged, the test
should be the good faith of respondent. Since under the circumstances, respondent believed that the language
used by him in the paragraph in question would have a tendency to move the discretion of the President to
grant the relief asked, it must be deemed relevant to the issues raised in the pleadings that it may become the
subject of inquiry in the course of the hearing.

Thus, as the Comment sent by him to the President in the performance of a legal duty, as an explanation of the
matter contained in the order sent to him by the President, although employing a language somewhat harsh
and uncalled for, is excusable in the interest of public policy, respondent, rather is not guilty of libel. 14
On July 15, 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Review15 before the OP questioning the DOJ Resolutions
dismissing her petition.

On July 29, 2004, the OP issued an Order16 dismissing the Petition for Review filed by petitioner saying:

Under Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 dated 29 May 2003, no appeal from or petition for review of the
decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. An appeal or petition not clearly falling within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth
above, shall be dismissed outright.

The basic complaint of petitioner and the appealed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice involve the offense of
Libel defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). By whatever means committed, libel carries only
the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or fine or both. (Art. 355, RPC).

Upon the foregoing perspective, the case at hand does not fall under the exception contemplated in MC No.
58.17

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order18 dated September 30, 2004.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 4319 assailing the OP orders, entitled Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles, petitioner v. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite, Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office
of the President, Hon. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, Acting Secretary (now substituted by Hon. Raul Gonzales,
the incumbent DOJ Secretary as nominal party), and Hon. Jovencito Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor, both of the
Department of Justice, Hon. Ramon R. Garcia, City Prosecutor, ACP Marlina N. Manuel, and ACP Adeliza H.
Magno-Guingoyon, all of the Manila Prosecution Service; and SP Emmanuel Y. Velasco, DOJ, Manila,
respondents.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the case was then submitted for resolution.

On August 30, 2006, the CA issued its assailed Decision which denied the petition.

In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio v. Executive Secretary20 regarding the
power of control of the President over all executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of
qualified political agency. We said that under the doctrine, the official acts of a Department Secretary are
deemed to be the acts directly of the President herself unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter; that it
was the OP’s prerogative to determine whether or not it shall consent to exercise its general appellate
jurisdiction in any given case emanating from the Chief Executive’s power of control over all executive officers
from Cabinet secretaries to the lowliest ranks. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed
petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or overturn the DOJ Secretary’s
resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ Secretary, being her alter ego. The CA held that
petitioner cannot question the validity of MC No. 58, since it is said to be valid until annulled in proper
proceedings and not in the petition filed with it.

The CA also held that the OP's outright dismissal of petitioner's Petition for Review was valid and binding, and
was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It found that the DOJ resolutions dismissing petitioner's petition
for review became final and executory after petitioner failed to elevate the said DOJ resolutions directly with
the CA in a petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period provided for under Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court. This was so because under MC No. 58, the filing of a petition for review of the
decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases to the OP,
except those offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, is prohibited. As the dismissal by the DOJ of
petitioner's petition for review became final and executory, the CA said that the hands of the Court were tied up
and cannot alter, modify or reverse such dismissal.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated February 8, 2007.

Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in its application of the doctrine of qualified political agency.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 58 cannot be
collaterally attacked.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the assailed Resolutions dated March 17, 2004 and June
25, 2004 of the DOJ became final and executory when petitioner failed to elevate said Resolutions
directly to the Court of Appeals within sixty (60) days.

4. The Honorable Office of the President erred in not taking cognizance of the position because of
Memorandum Circular No. 58.

5. The DOJ erred in not finding probable cause for libel against respondent SP Velasco.21

Anent the 1st, 2nd and 4th assigned errors, petitioner argues that the refusal of the OP to act on her petition
could not be justified as falling within the ambit of the doctrine of qualified political agency; that while the DOJ
Secretary is the President's alter ego, the President's absolute abandonment of her power of control delegating
exclusively to the DOJ Secretary the power to determine the existence of probable cause in complaints where
the imposable penalty is less than reclusion perpetua is not justified. Petitioner claims that MC No. 58 ties the
hands of the Chief Executive in the exercise of her constitutional power of control over all the executive
departments as mandated by the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987; hence, an invalid issuance
of the OP. She claims that since the validity of MC No. 58 is the principal reason why the OP dismissed her
petition, the validity of the circular is a key issue in this petition which must be resolved.

We are not persuaded.

In Angeles v. Gaite,22 wherein petitioner raised the same arguments, we find the same unmeritorious and ruled
in this wise:

x x x Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it
diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate
officer, almost unfettered power. This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to the
Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of
qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.

Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in
upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and
applied the law as it should be.

As early as 1939, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior, this Court has recognized and adopted from American
jurisprudence this doctrine of qualified political agency, to wit:

x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-
clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political
positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the
President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing
(7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of
the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of
the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).

Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:

In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No.
1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by
the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified.

No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary
investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.

Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the
President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.

It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases.
Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to
the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may
commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second-guess
the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to
delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is
upon a cabinet secretary - his own alter ego.

Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the Constitution provides
for restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:

xxxx
x x x There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised,
would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by
the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the
preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which
cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum
Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be
unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the
Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to
scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter's expertise in said
matter.

xxxx

Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's position asking this Court to
allow her to appeal to the Office of the President, notwithstanding that the crimes for which she charges
respondent are not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292), the Department of Justice,
under the leadership of the Secretary of Justice, is the government's principal law agency. As such, the
Department serves as the government's prosecution arm and administers the government's criminal justice
system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the correctional system, which are deep
within the realm of its expertise. These are known functions of the Department of Justice, which is under the
executive branch and, thus, within the Chief Executive's power of control.

Petitioner's contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter
1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive departments
deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office
of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the
President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the approval of the
President.23

Petitioner next contends that the CA erred in holding that the DOJ resolutions became final and executory
when she failed to elevate said resolutions directly to the CA within the 60-day reglementary period.

We do not agree.

After petitioner's receipt of the DOJ Secretary's resolution denying her motion for reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing her petition for review of the prosecutors' resolutions dismissing her complaint for libel,
she filed a petition for review before the OP on the pretext that she should first exhaust administrative
remedies. Unfortunately, such action was fatal to her case, since MC No. 58 prohibits the filing of such petition
with the OP. As provided under MC No. 58, no appeal from or petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Clearly, there was no need for petitioner to file her petition with the OP.

Notably, in the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, the executive branch of
government has full discretionary authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
against the private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating
Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.24 The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is
subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
ruling of such prosecutor.25

Indeed, petitioner filed her appeal with the DOJ Secretary, but her appeal was dismissed. Petitioner filed her
motion for reconsideration which was also dismissed. As there was no more appeal or other remedy available
in the ordinary course of law, her remedy was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.26 However, petitioner failed to file a petition for certiorari within 60
days from receipt of the DOJ resolution denying her motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner's filing of the petition for review with the OP, which is prohibited as discussed above, did not toll the
running of the reglementary period for filing a petition with the CA. Accordingly, the DOJ resolutions became
final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the same in the CA. Thus, we find no reversible
error committed by the CA in dismissing the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period.1avvphi1

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies
must become final on some definite date fixed by law.27 The only exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution
unjust and inequitable.28 None of the exceptions is present to warrant a review.

In Peña v. Government Service Insurance System,29 we held that:

x x x it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of
the resolution of the case.30

xxxx

The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is "not a
question of technicality but of substance and merit," the underlying consideration therefore, being the
protection of the substantive rights of the winning party. Nothing is more settled in law than that a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.31

In light of the above discussion, we find no need to discuss petitioner's other arguments.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 30, 2006 and the
Resolution dated February 8, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED

G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015

JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND ROLANDO MESINA Y

JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Jackson Padieraos y Quejada
(Padiernos), Jackie Roxas y German (Roxas) and Rolando Mesina y Javate (Mesina). The petitioners seek the
reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision1 dated May 10, 2007 and resolution2 dated December 20, 2007
in CA-G.R. CR No. 28920. The assailed CA rulings affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 66, Baler, Aurora in Criminal Case No. 3122.

The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. According to the
Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as evidence
and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The Information specifically states as follows:

That at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in their possession and control 818
pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and valued at P133,289.00 loaded on a ten-wheeler
truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the accused Santiago Castillo y Cruz without any permit, license or
documents from the proper authority and that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the following day,
November 16, 2002, the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the
aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid
confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime, [emphasis and
italics supplied]

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico Castillo (Frederico), and Roger Mostera (Mostera) remain at
large; accused Eddie Gatdula (Gatdula) pleaded not guilty as principal to the crime; while petitioners
Padiernos, Mesina, and Roxas pleaded not guilty as accessories to the crime.

Prosecution's evidence

The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 15, 2002, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO) Felimon Balico (Balico) approached a truck loaded with lumber,
which was parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora (Dingalan)3 The truck bore the name "JEROME"
with Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera, the
lumber's supporting documents but they failed to produce any.
Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit. Thereafter, he
proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident. Some of the DENROs represented that the transportation
of the seized lumber had the required permit but they, too, failed to produce any supporting document.

The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan (Tumagan) - and the
policemen, Gamboa and Romulo Derit, guarded the truck loaded with lumber.4

The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They
transferred the lumber first from November 15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national highway
in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police officers.5

On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at
the place where the truck was being held in custody.6

Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck,7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers to bring the
truck to the police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who volunteered to drive the truck; while
Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumbers were.8

Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the front of the
truck. The DENRO group also got on board at the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato Mendoza (Mendoza) and
his companion, PO1 John Fajardo (Fajardo) follow on a motorcycle.

Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that Mesina would
maneuver the truck so that they could proceed to the police station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the
truck's speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their two policemen
escorts9 who chased the truck and fired three warning shots.10

As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled "Saklolo! Saklolo!" but the truck maintained its speed. SPO2 Mendoza
corroborated this testimony; he and Fajardo saw the three DENROs waving but could not hear what they were
saying.

When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided not to pursue the truck anymore
and simply reported the incident to the Philippine Army stationed at Brgy. Tanawan.

The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy.
Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.11

As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that they had no right
to apprehend the truck and the lumber.12

Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza13 immediately proceeded to
Brgy. Bagting where they found the DENRO group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen
proceeded back to Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the truck to the police station compound.

Evidence for the defense

Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife and children when his
former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the latter's truck to Cabanatuan City. He refused
Santiago's request because he knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal activities; particularly, the truck
had been previously loaded with lumber that were confiscated.14

Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there was really no problem
with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode in Santiago's car. Santiago asked him to fetch Roxas to
accompany them.15

Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he could drive his
truck to Cabanatuan City.16 Roxas refused because he had already heard of the truck's apprehension,17 but he
finally relented after Santiago assured him that there was no problem with the truck. They proceeded to
Caragsacan, Dingalan where the truck was parked.18 On cross-examination, Roxas testified that he knew very
well that the vehicle was a "hot" truck but he relied on Santiago's claim that the problem already been settled. 19

On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki,
Dingalan.20 According to Padiernos, he had been waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m.
but only Santiago's group came by.21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning that they would bring
Santiago's truck to Cabanatuan City.22

Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck was parked when they reached Caragsacan.23

On reaching the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the car and walked towards the back
of the truck; Padiernos crossed the street. Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and several other
persons for about 25 to 30 minutes.24

Thereafter, Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina.25 Padiernos seated himself in the front cab of the truck
with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took the driver's seat.26 Mesina drove the car towards Cabanatuan City
upon Santiago's instruction.27

The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the truck to stop
them.28 They also did not notice any motorcycle following them as the truck's side mirrors were broken. They
did not reach Cabanatuan City because the Philippine Army flagged them down.29

After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City while Roxas and Mesina boarded
a jeepney bound for Dingalan.30

The RTC's ruling

The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D.
705.31

The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in
violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code.32

The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were categorical, straightforward, and
consistent; they had no improper motive to testify falsely against the petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC disregarded
the petitioners' defense that they did not intentionally take away the truck.34

The RTC also found that the petitioners' testimonies and admissions established their prior knowledge that the
truck had been previously confiscated for illegal transport of forest products. This explains the reluctance of
Mesina and Roxas to go with Santiago in getting the truck.35

The RTC further ruled that Padiernos' defense of denial fails in view of Balico's testimony that Padiernos
gave the DENROs a "tongue-lashing" as they had no right to apprehend the truck and its
cargo.36 Padiernos' knowledge of the status of the truck is also undeniable as he admitted his familiarity with
the townsfolk of Dingalan and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest products. The RTC concluded
that the incident and the personalities involved could not have escaped Padiernos' notice, yet he still went with
them to get the truck.37

Finally, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' claim that they did not hear the policemen's warning shots and the
DENROs' shouts because of the noisy engine and the defective windows of the truck. The RTC had observed
during its ocular inspection of the truck that both windows were in order and sounds outside could be clearly
heard even with a running engine.38

The CA's ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and adopted its factual findings, but modified the penalty imposed on the
petitioners.39

The CA considered the subject truck as an "instrument" in the commission of the offense, within the meaning
of Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had already been unloaded and
placed in police custody, the truck still served as the essential link to the discovery of the loaded
undocumented lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is material in proving the commission of the
offense of violation of P.D. 705, as amended.40

The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, their intent, motive, or
knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their defense of denial must fail in view of the evidence on
record and their own admissions that they were aware of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity at the time
that they drove it towards Nueva Ecija.41

The prosecution had also clearly established Padiernos's close association with Santiago, Roxas, and Mesina.
Padiernos previously facilitated Santiago's application for mayor's permit as a lumber dealer; Roxas is a family
friend of Padiernos and his father is Padiernos's driver, while Mesina and Padiernos' are long-time
acquaintances.42

The Parties' Arguments

The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705 because the
DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the crime and had, in fact, control over the truck
when the petitioners drove it towards Nueva Ecija.43 Article 19 of the RPC only punishes accessories who
prevent the discovery of the crime.44

On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at preventing the discovery
of the crime. The respondent alleges that without the truck, the accused in the present case could easily
produce the necessary transportation documents to account for the entire volume of the confiscated
lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan who tried to make it
appear that the seized lumber had the proper transportation permit for 8,254 board feet and 261 pieces of
lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however, with the actual volume of the confiscated lumber of
10,253 board feet, totaling 818 pieces.46
The Court's Ruling

We emphasize at the outset the well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for
review. An appeal therefore empowers, and even obligates, the appellate court to correct errors as may be
found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. It is likewise settled that when an
accused appeals, he opens the whole case for a new trial.47

The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the appealing accused,
and from imposing the corresponding punishment in accordance with the charges in the Information and the
crime proved during trial.

Thus, in People v. Manalili et al.,48 the Court held that since the Information in that case contained a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting both the crimes of illegal possession of
firearms and of murder, the separate crime of multiple murder may be validly taken into account49 in the
resolution of the appeal before the Court, although the appellants have been acquitted of illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled that the appellants in that case were fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of
multiple murder and granted a fair opportunity to defend themselves.

Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts alleged in the
Information and the crime proved in the present case do not make the petitioners liable as accessories
for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.

The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime

The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the offense, and not
the technical name that the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of
view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned with the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention should be directed and his
interest should be on the facts alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law
with some technical and specific name," but "did he perform the actsalleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth."50

In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate
No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the
government as tool or instrument of the crime.
Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were
accessories to the crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical
name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual charges against
them. In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they should stand trial.

These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take and carry away the
subject truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the
government as tool or instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been sufficiently apprised of these
factual allegations, against which they should defend themselves.

Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal definition of
"accessories" under Article 19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused as
accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.

Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the commission of the crime
and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to
prevent its discovery.

Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the
discovery of the crime.52

In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already
been discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck
and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its
confiscation.

In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information as the legal
definition of the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information
that serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners.

The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section
1(b) of P.D. 1829

The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information, while not
constituting an offense committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead
the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled
"Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."

P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or
frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to
impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or
official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in
criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis supplied]
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners' acts
actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b) above.

First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under Section
1(b).

The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck
so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the
government as a tool or instrument of the crime.

In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is
indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an
indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the
permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber. According to DENR
forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents that
should be in the possession of the transporter.

Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The term
"suppress" means to subdue or end by force.54

Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its
availability and prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for violation of
P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial.

It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport of the
seized lumber. Santiago had every reason and motive to take his truck after its confiscation. Without the truck,
Santiago could be exculpated and the forthcoming criminal investigation or proceedings for violation of P.D.
705 would be frustrated.

The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of the status of the
truck and their commission of the crime at Santiago's prompting.

Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the petitioners'
admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew that the truck had been involved in the illegal
transportation/possession of the seized lumber.

Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had beenpreviously loaded
with lumber that was confiscated.

According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already heard the news
of the truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted that he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after being
assured that there was no problem with the truck.

Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck's involvement
with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad words at the DENROs, saying they had no right to apprehend
the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close association with the other petitioners, destroys
his flimsy defense of denial.

The RTC's findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners deliberately drove the
truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident knowledge of the policemen's warning shots, tapping, and the DENROs
shouting for help from the back of the truck.

Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court negate the petitioners'
defense of denial of their intent to take the truck and their knowledge of the truck's involvement in an illegal
activity.
The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such as the petitioners' close association with each
other, their flimsy defense of denial of their intent to take away the truck, and the totality of their acts showing
their common design to take the truck - lead us to conclude that the petitioners had indeed mutually conspired
with one another to take away the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation
or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.

Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved during trial point to the petitioners' violation of
P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA's findings and find the petitioners guilty of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.

Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of justice is prision correccionalin its
maximum period, or a fine ranging from P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 pesos, or both. 55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals' decision dated May 10, 2007,
and its resolution dated December 20, 2007. We find petitioners Jackson Padiernos y Quejada, Jackie Roxas y
German, and Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. They are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months,
and 20 days.