Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic Experience

Author(s): George Dickie
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 62, No. 5 (Mar. 4, 1965), pp. 129-136
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023490 .
Accessed: 24/03/2013 05:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal
of Philosophy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEARDSLEY'S PHANTOM AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 129

BEARDSLEY'S PHANTOM AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

HE title of this essay derives from I. A. Richards' well-known

remarks about "the phantom aesthetic state. " The main
target of Richards' remarks is Clive Bell's separation of life and
art-a view well worth attacking. However, my conclusions are
directed toward different objectives.
Almost all introductions to aesthetics begin with, or at least
contain, descriptions of aesthetic experience, along with the con-
tention that such experiences are the given data upon which
aesthetic theory rests in some important way. However, when one
attempts to sort out the elements involved in the appreciation of
paintings, music, plays, and so forth, when this appreciation is
conceived as aesthetic experience, one stumbles upon a variety of
diverse items. There seem to be two main kinds of things de-
scribed as aesthetic experience. Some theorists write in terms of
such notions as attitude and attention. In these cases 'aesthetic
experience' refers to the way in which certain objects are attended
to. This kind of aesthetic theory will not be discussed in this
essay.' The other theorists use 'aesthetic experience' to refer to
something (a certain kind of experience) that is produced by look-
ing at paintings, listening to music, and so on. I shall call this
latter kind of view "the causal conception of aesthetic experience."
Of course, these two distinct uses of the same term are not mutually
exclusive, and the same writer might speak of aesthetic attention
to an object which in turn produces an aesthetic experience.
Nevertheless, the two notions can be discussed independently. The
importance of a causal conception of aesthetic experience-if a
satisfactory one could be devised-is easy to see. If it could be
shown that certain objects produce a certain kind of experience
which is valuable, then a basis exists for evaluating the instru-
mental value of the objects.
At least three varieties of the causal conception can be dis-
tinguished: (1) the kind of view held by Clive Bell; 2 (2) the
kind of view put forth by I. A. Richards; 3 and (3) the kind of
view held by Monroe C. Beardsley.* Bell's theory involves the
causal conception because he maintains that some works of art
' See my "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude," IAmerican Philosophaical
Quarterly, 1, 1 (January, 1964) :56-65.
2 Art. New York: Putnam (Capricorn), 1958.
3 The Principles of Literary Criticism (New York: Harcourt Brace,
1950); and C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and James Wood, The Foundations
of Aesthetics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1922).
* Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Har-
court Brace, 1958), reviewed in this JOURNAL, 58, 10 (May 11, 1961): 274-277.

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
130 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

possess "significant form," which produces in sensitive spectators

an aesthetic emotion that is quite unlike the emotions of ordinary
life. There is no point, however, at this date, in pursuing the
problems that are involved in either Bell's or Richards' view. It
is worth while to point out, as is often done, that Bell's additions
to the mythology of aesthetics served a useful purpose in attacking
older dogmas involving the necessity of representation in painting.
The more recent theory of Beardsley, however, deserves close at-
tention. I shall try to show that Beardsley's theory is defective.
I think my argument establishes a presumption against the causal
conception, although it does not prove that all such views are
wrong.
I
Monroe C. Beardsley, following Richards and John Dewey, con-
ceives of aesthetic experience in a significant way as an effect of
an aesthetic object. Beardsley describes aesthetic experience as
having three common characteristics: (1) attention firmly fixed
on an object, (2) a considerable degree of intensity, and (3) unity
the experience is coherent and complete (527-528). I shall be
concerned here only with the third characteristic. As I have di-
vided the matter up, attention falls under "aesthetic attitude"
which is not treated in this paper, and it is unnecessary for my
purposes to discuss intensity.
The main problem, then, is to get clear about what it means
for an experience to be coherent and complete, i.e., unified. In
order to do this it will be helpful to set forth two quotations from
Beardsley's discussion of aesthetic experience.
It is all right, I think, to speak of the object as causing the [aesthetic] ex-
perience, but of course the connection is more intimate, for the object, which
is a perceptual object, also appears in the experience as its phenomenally
objective field (527).
First, note that I am now applying the terms "unity," "complexity," and
"'intensity" more broadly than before-not only to the phenomenally objective
presentations in the experience, but to the whole experience, which includes
affective and cognitive elements as well. The terms are still understandable,
even in this extended use, I judge, but of course less capable of sure and
exact application (529).
It is clear from these quotations that a perceived aesthetic object
is asserted to eause something, not to be identified as the object,
which is, among other things, coherent and complete. Thus, on
Beardsley 's view, there are two unified things: (1) the unified
aesthetic object that one sees or hears, and (2) the unified aesthetic
experience which is an effect of the first.
It is interesting that, when Beardsley explains the coherence

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEARDSLEY'S PHANTOM AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 131

and completeness of experience, he talks about the two in quite

different ways. To explain coherence of experience, he cites sev-
eral examples: an experience is coherent if "One thing leads to
another; continuity of development, without gaps or dead spaces,
a sense of overall providential pattern of guidance, an orderly
cumulation of energy toward a climax, are present to an unusual
degree" (528). Note that everything referred to here is a per-
ceptual characteristic (what Beardsley calls "the phenomenally
objective presentation in experience") and not an effect of the
perceived characteristics. Thus, no ground is furnished for con-
cluding that experience can be unified in the sense of being co-
herent. What is actually argued for is that aesthetic objects are
coherent, a conclusion which must be granted, but not the one
which is relevant. I shall briefly discuss the coherence of experi-
ence again later.
On the other hand, where completeness is concerned, Beardsley
does talk about effects: "The impulses and expectations aroused by
elements within the experience are felt to be counterbalanced or
resolved by other elements within the experience, so that some de-
gree of equilibrium or finality is achieved and enjoyed" (528). The
effects here are impulses, which are counterbalanced and reach an
equilibrium, and expectations, which are resolved and reach a
finality of closure. Beardsley does not explain equilibrium other
than to cite, in one of his "Notes and Queries" sections: (1) I. A.
Richards' famous contention that tragedy produces a balance of
pity and terror; (2) "the 'ironic' complexity of attitude" in such
lines as "I do believe her though I know she lies"; and (3) "the
unearthly stability and rightness attained sometimes through the
tensions of a painting or the resolutions of music " (552). First,
let us briefly consider Richards' position. Richards maintains that
such things as pity necessarily involve an impulse to action. Thus,
when pity is aroused by, say, Lear, an opposite impulse or force
is needed to neutralize it, or the spectator will find himself on the
stage trying to help Lear. So Richards concludes that pity and
terror, which are both aroused by Lear's situation, pull in opposite
directions, and, hence, the spectator remains in his seat. But, of
course, the situation as described by Richards never (or almost
never) arises. It is simply against the rules of the theater situa-
tion to try to help Lear, and no sane person would try. Two
points are in order about Richards' view: (1) no such balance
of pity and terror arises, and (2) there is no theoretical need for
such a balance, as the spectator remains in his seat for other
reasons. But to come to Beardsley's second example of equi-
librium-what impulses are aroused by the paradoxical poetic line,

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
132 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

" I do believe her though I know she lies " ? We might be

momentarily puzzled by the line before coming to understand it,
but it will scarcely do to describe the puzzlement as arousal of
impulses and the understanding of the line as an equilibrium of
impulses. To so describe the situation would be to misapply con-
cepts of behavior (action and inaction) to comprehension-its
failure (puzzlement) and subsequent success (understanding).
Coming to see the irony in "I do believe her though I know she
lies" is a feat of understanding, not a balancing of forces. What
of the "stability" attained from the tensions of the painting?
What impulses are aroused and counterbalanced? One can speak
of elements being counterbalanced in the painting and say that the
painting is stable, balanced, and so on, but what does it mean to
say that the experience of the spectator of the painting is stable
or balanced? Perhaps it means that the spectator feels stable
or balanced as a result of looking at the painting which is balanced.
But looking at a stable or balanced painting does not cause us to
feel stable. The only occasions on which we can be said to feel
stable or balanced are occasions when we have calmed down after
being upset or nervous. Ordinarily we do not feel stable, although
it is correct to say that ordinarily we do not feel unstable. Looking
at a painting in some cases might aid some persons in coming to
feel stable because it might distract them from whatever is un-
settling them, but such cases are atypical of aesthetic appreciation
and not relevant to aesthetic theory. Aren't characteristics at-
tributable to the painting simply being mistakenly shifted to the
spectator? To sum up concerning impulse, on rare occasions an
impulse to act may be aroused in a spectator by a work of art, but
it is not counterbalanced by other impulses aroused by the work of
art. Such an impulse is controlled by the recognition of the
spectator that he is in a theater or concert situation.
But Beardsley speaks not only of impulses being counterbal-
anced; he also speaks of expectations that are resolved, and they
must now be considered. Expectations, perhaps some of them un-
conscious, are aroused by music, plays, novels-in short, works of
art that are temporal-and they are resolved by the work of art.
I think such expectations must be described as effects-they are
caused by the apprehension of an incomplete set of elements in the
work of art: tones, behavior (acted in plays and described in
novels), and so forth. These expectations are generally fulfilled
by the occurrence of a tone or whatever. But the fulfillment of
the expectation is not an effect, as the expectation itself is. What
happens is that the spectator hears a tone that he comprehends
("sees," understands, recognizes) to complete the previously ap-

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEARDSLEY'S PHANTOM AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 133

prehended incomplete set of elements. He now "sees" the unity

of the art object. In turn, the spectator may feel satisfied "at
achieving closure." But note that the achieving of closure is a
comprehension of unity in the work or art, not an effect caused
by it. Thus, the only things that can be called effects are feelings
of expectancy and satisfaction. Now when an expectancy is satis-
fied a process is completed, i.e., over with; but is the process (the
expectation and the satisfaction) complete in the sense of being
unified? In listening to a piece of music one may have a number
of the expectations and satisfactions under discussion, but such a
set of processes of expectation and satisfaction does not constitute
a complete set (neither does it constitute an incomplete set). We
could say that a set of processes of expectation and satisfaction
has completeness in the sense in which paintings, music, and so on
are unified, only if it could be ordered in some such way as tones,
words, areas, and so on, are ordered, and such sets do not seem to
be so ordered. The only thing that is complete in such a situation
is the music, play, and so forth. Thus, when Beardsley writes of
completeness that "the experience detaches itself, and even in-
sulates itself, from the intrusion of alien elements" (528), it is
the experience of completeness of the work of art which fixes at-
tention so firmly as to exclude alien elements, not the completeness
of experience. Again he writes that aesthetic experience "tends
to mark itself out from the general stream of experience, and
stand in memory as a single experience" (loc. cit.). But what
stands in memory is the singleness of the work of art, not the
singleness of an experience.
The question may be posed: Under what circumstances do we
say that our experience is coherent or complete? I suppose that
the only time we would say our experience or someone else's was
coherent is when we contrast it with experience which is deluded
in some way. However, in this sense all normal experience is
coherent. The use of 'coherent' by Beardsley (and Richards)
suggests that some normal experiences are more coherent than
others-those experiences which are controlled by good works of
art. But, as has been shown in the discussion of completeness,
the effects that are complete (and coherent) are elusive. It seems
plausible to say that it is a work of art which is more or less co-
herent, not its effects. Of course, an incoherent work of art may
induce bewilderment, but we would not say the bewilderment was a
case of incoherence. We must be coherent in order to be be-
wildered by the confused work of art. I am not sure that there
are circumstances under which we would say our experience was
complete, except in cases in which we are elliptically referring to

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
134 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

works of art, well-cooked meals with all the usual courses, and the
like.
II
I cannot claim to have shown decisively that there is no effect
of an aesthetic object which is an equilibrium or is coherent and
complete, but only that the existence of such an effect has not been
established by Beardsley. This conclusion, if correct, at least
establishes a presumption against the causal view. A look at the
possible ancestry of the causal conception might be enlightening.
If a plausible pedigree can be constructed, it may be useful in
seeing the difficulties in the view and how they were generated.
I suspect that the causal view has its roots in the philosophy of
idealism which makes the concept of experience a central doctrine.
No doubt quite a number of routes could be traced from the con-
ception back to idealism, but perhaps one will suffice, namely, the
way back through John Dewey's Art as Experience.4 Beardsley's
account of aesthetic experience explicitly relies on Dewey, Rich-
ards, Bullough, and Kant (527). No attempt will be made here
to give a complete picture of Dewey's aesthetic theory; only those
aspects directly related to the subject at hand will be noted.
Consider the following passage from Art as Experience, in
which Dewey compares aesthetic perception to academic, pedantic,
and sentimental perception: "But if he [the spectator] perceives
aesthetically, he will create an experience of which the intrinsic
subject matter, the substance, is new" (108). Dewey's writing
suggests that reading a poem or looking at a painting is similar to
creating (producing, causing, and so on) an artifact. Dewey tries
to explain further:
A new poem is created by every one who reads poetically-not that its raw
material is original for, after all, we live in the same old world, but that
every individual brings with him, when he exercises his individuality, a way
of seeing and feeling that in its interaction with old material creates some-
thing new, something previously not existing in experience (loc. cit.).
Now it seems to me what Dewey is saying, restated in simple lan-
guage, is that Jones's reading of the poem is Jones's and Smith's
reading is Smith's and, thus, that Jones may understand or notice
some feature of the poem that Smith misses because Smith lacks
Jones's training, sensitivity, or intelligence. On viewing the same
painting Jones may notice the composition and appreciate it, while
Smith merely notices that it is a portrait of a king. Dewey talks
about cases of understanding and noticing as if they were cases of
causing, and uses the term 'experience' as if it designated an effect.
Dewey's notion of aesthetic experience as "an experiencee"
4 New York: Minton Balch, 1934; Putnam (Capricorn), 1958.

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEARDSLEY'S PHANTOM AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 135

which is unified and marked off from the rest of experience is too
familiar to require a more detailed statement. The phrase 'the
unity of experienace' abounds in Art as Experience. I suspect
that it is through the persistence in the language of aesthetics of
such expressions as 'the unity of experience' that idealistic con-
ceptions persist in present-day aesthetic theory. "Experience lan-
guage," trailing its idealistic implications, ensnarls our theories.
No one should conclude that 'experience' is a forbidden word
or that its use necessarily leads to confusion. 'Experience' has
ordinary uses which are easy enough to understand and which do
not lead to confusion. "It was a great experience" simply means
"It (the game) was thrilling" or "It (the play) was exciting or
moving," and so forth. "It was an experience that I shall never
forget" simply means "I shall always remember the game (paint-
ing, play, or whatever) " and so on. But Dewey, caught up in
his idealistic vocabulary, italicizes the 'an' of the ordinary ex-
pression 'an experience' and gives the expression a metaphysical
twist. The harmless expression 'the experience of unity', which
is used as a general way of referring to the seeing of the unified
design, the hearing of the sound pattern, and so on, is somehow
inverted and becomes 'the unity of experience'.
In a Kantian context or in the context of a complete idealism,
the, unity of experience has a meaning. In such contexts every-
thing is ideal or experiential in nature: thus, the unity of a
perceived object is an experiential unity, i.e., a unity of experience.
Of course, the unity of the perceived object is not the unity of
experience of which Dewey and Beardsley write. They are talking
about a unity which is an effect of perceived unity. But how one
is to construe the unified effect is a mystery. I shall not attempt
to draw any conclusions as to whether Dewey holds that works of
art produce unified effects in the sense discussed. His terminology
does seem to commit him to such a view. It is clear, however, that
Beardsley holds a version of the theory.
One might pose the question: Do critics ever talk about the
kinds of effect that are under discussion in this essay? They talk
about the features of works of art ("It is a whole," "It was
confused," and so on), about the effects of works of art on us
("It is moving," "It brought tears to my eyes," and so forth),
but I do not think they speak of unified effects. Remember that
the design of the causal conception of aesthetic experience is to
enable us to evaluate a work of art by reference to its unified
effects. But it seems to me that the theory of unified effects is
subject to a charge that Max Black brought against Richards'
theory of impulses in equilibrium-it is not clear how one gets at

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
136 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

this touchstone of criticism.5 While it is easy enough to know

unity in experience, it is difficult to discover the unity of experi-
ence.
I suspect that the causal conception of aesthetic experience is a
roundabout and misleading way of talking about some of the
features of works of art (their coherence and completeness) as
effects of work of art. The view is misleading in a way similar
to the way sense-datum language is; that is, it tempts us to be-
lieve that there is a special kind of experiential effect in the way
that talk about sense-data tempts us to believe that there are
sense-data which are causally related to physical objects.
If the foregoing argument is correct, then some other basis for
the critical evaluation of works of art will have to be found than
the production of a unified experience. Perhaps we should look
to the features of works of art themselves rather than to the
effects they produce on us.
DIUKIE GEORGE
UNIVERSITY OF HIousToN

NOTES AND NEWS

The editors of the JOURNAL report with deep regret the death
of Arnold Isenberg, professor of philosophy at Michigan State
University, and formerly of Stanford and Queens. A memorial
meeting will be held at the Men's Faculty Club at Columbia on
Saturday, March 13, at 11 A.M.

The sixty-second annual meeting of the American Philosophi-

cal Association, Eastern Division, will be held Dec. 27-29, 1965,
at the Statler-Hilton Hotel in New York.
The deadline for contributed papers is April 1, 1965. Papers
should be submitted in abstract form (at most 300 words), typed,
double-spaced, and in triplicate, to Professor E. M. Adamss, 109B
Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 27515.

The Kentucky Philosophy Association will hold its Spring Meet-

ing at the Student Center of the University of Kentucky, in Lexing-
ton, on April 3, 1965. Speakers will be Thomas H. Birch, Uni-
versity of Kentucky, on "The Theoretical Poverty of the Concept
of the Speech Act"; James E. Quill, Seminary of St. Pius X, on
"The Morality of Nuclear Warfare"; and Frank Mangrum, More-
head State College, on "Whitehead 's Ontology."
5 Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1949),
p. 210.

This content downloaded from 137.140.1.131 on Sun, 24 Mar 2013 05:11:18 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions