case digests

^^

PSPCA VS. COA DIGEST

DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COA. G.R. No.
169752 September 25, 2007

FACTS:

The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No.
1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was
created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as
stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the
protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may
tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.

At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in
existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.

For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the
protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend
violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and
collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.

Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines
collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel
treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the
Government is duty bound to enforce;

When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a
private entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities.
On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING:

YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be applied. Essentially, the
“charter test” provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public
function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the
CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.

And since the “charter test” had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that
the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on
January 19, 1905. Se led is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective
effect.
 Second, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any
agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and
solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally
accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a
common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be
managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its by-laws in force.”

Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at the la er’s
initiative, and not through the GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered
government employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.

Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic” because its primary purpose
is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This
argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does
not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be
private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the public
good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private
corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives.
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge
functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse,
telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that
a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of
service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public
corporation.

Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide, for
the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or
convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public
benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they are rendering
public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with
all common carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with
gifts or donations from private individuals.

The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the
totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the
la er’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered
cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the State as its own
device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.

Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the la er to render
periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President, the
petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality.

This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence
and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature,
whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations—as creatures of the State, there is a
reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it
acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the
State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it.

POSTED IN SPECIAL COMMERCIAL LAWS

G.R. No. 157856 - Concepcion C. Anillo v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems etc, et al.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 157856 : September 27, 2007]

CONCEPCION C. ANILLO of Barangay San Nicolas (formerly Molino), Bacoor, Cavite Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS represented by Commissioner ERNESTO A. CARDIÑO; OIC-Associate
Commissioner NOEL GALAROSA, DEMETRIO T. VILLANUEVA, JR., Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Bacoor, Cavite; Provincial Director, PNP, Province of Cavite; National Police Task Force on
Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates, Hon. Mayor JESSIE B. Promulgated: CASTILLO of the Municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite; Hon. Barangay Chairman GAUDENCIO PAREDES; GREENVALLEY HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION
INC.; and SOUTHRICH ACRES, INC. Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a special civil action under Rule 65 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order, praying for the nullification of the Resolution1 dated 30 July 2001, including the writ of
execution2 and demolition3 in connection therewith, for having been issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The instant controversy stemmed from a letter4 dated 29 May 2001 of Jessie B. Castillo, Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, to
COSLAP Commissioner Ernesto A. Cardiño, seeking immediate assistance in the settlement of a land dispute brewing in Green
Valley Subdivision, San Nicolas, Bacoor, Cavite. The letter averred that squatters, claiming to have bought portions of the
subdivision land from the estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, had invaded the subdivision and turned vacant lots
therein into a squatter colony. A certain Henry Rodriguez had been purportedly representing the estate and claiming ownership
over a big portion of the Municipality of Bacoor including the subdivision land by virtue of a Spanish title, and selling small lots to
clueless victims. Armed security guards were allegedly preventing registered owners and legitimate residents of the subdivision
from entering their own property and exacting money from them in exchange for the peaceful occupation thereof. The complaint
was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46.

Acting on the complaint, COSLAP directed the parties to participate in a series of mediation conferences. On 29 June 2001, Atty.
Larry Pernito appeared on behalf of the Estate of Rodriguez. He questioned the jurisdiction of COSLAP and argued that the matter
had already been settled in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the Estate of Rodriguez. The representatives of Green
Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. and Southrich Acres, Inc., registered owners of lots within the subdivision, prayed that their
Torrens titles be respected. At the next conference, only complainants appeared. COSLAP directed the parties to submit position
papers, but only complainants complied.

On 30 July 2001, COSLAP issued a Resolution5 in COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Accordingly, this Commission rules in favor of complainants and against respondents. This body upholds the contention of
complainants that any person desiring to contest their titles must do so in a proper proceeding in accordance with law and not
thru force, intimidation and acts of harassment. This Commission further rules that respondents and all persons claiming rights
over the subject properties are hereby ordered to vacate the premises and return possession thereof to complainants. Finally, this
Commission resolves to order respondents to cease and desist from:

A. Deploying of armed security guards;

B. Constructing of fences and putting of signboards in the area; and

C. Collecting fees from persons for "rights" to occupy said lots and selling lots to innocent purchasers.
SO ORDERED.6

COSLAP affirmed its jurisdiction over the land dispute on the ground that the dispute would fall under the all-inclusive proviso of
Paragraph 2, Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561,7 which created the commission.

Upon motion, COSLAP issued a Writ of Execution8 on 23 October 2001, directing the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacoor, with the assistance of the Cavite Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police, to implement its Resolution dated 30
July 2001. Edwin A. San Miguel, Sheriff IV of the RTC-Bacoor, filed a Sheriff's Report stating that he served copies of the writ and
a ten-day notice to vacate9 to the squatters but the latter refused to leave and remove the structures.

On 21 January 2002, a Rule 47 petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68640, was filed with the Court of Appeals by a certain
Eduardo Cabesa Abear and 106 others included as petitioners. Named respondents in said petition, which sought to nullify the
COSLAP Resolution dated 30 July 2001, were Green Valley Homeowners Association, Inc., South Rich Acres Inc. and COSLAP.

On 4 February 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution10 in the said case, denying the petition on grounds of improper
remedy and lack of jurisdiction.

Because the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied and in view of the finality of the Court of Appeals' resolution, COSLAP
issued a Writ of Demolition11 on 29 January 2003 directing Sheriff San Miguel to remove the structures and improvements illegally
constructed within Green Valley.

On 21 April 2003, through a caretaker, petitioner received the notice to vacate issued by Sheriff San Miguel. Petitioner Concepcion
C. Anillo, identifying herself as the owner of Lot No. 5825 of the Imus Estate measuring approximately 553,853 square meters,
immediately wrote COSLAP, requesting, among others, for copy of the Resolution dated 30 July 2001, the writ of execution and
the writ of demolition.12

On 30 April 2003, petitioner filed the instant petition13 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Named respondents are the COSLAP, represented by
Commissioners Ernesto A. Cardiño and Noel Galarosa, the Sheriff of the RTC of Bacoor, the PNP Provincial Director of Cavite, the
National Police Task Force on Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates, Bacoor Mayor Jessie B. Castillo, Barangay
Chairman Gaudencio Paredes, Green Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. and South Rich Acres Inc.

The instant petition is anchored on the following arguments:

A. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COSLAP, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER ERNESTO A. CARDIÑO AND OIC-ASSOCIATE

COMMISSIONER NOEL A. GALAROSA, HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER COSLAP CASE NO. 2001-05-46 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED
JULY 30, 2001 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN [sic] EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
AND EXTRINSIC FRAUD.

B. PETITIONER WERE [sic] DENIED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND SHE WAS NEVER MADE PARTY TO COSLAP CASE NO. 2001-
05-46 AND WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD TO REFUTE AND CHALLENGE THE ALLEGATIONS STIPULATED IN
THE COMPLAINT.

C. PETITIONER, HER TENANTS AND CARETAKERS ARE IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES UNDER
A VALID CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND BY VIRTUE OF A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE ESTATE OF HERMOGENES AND
ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER DULY APPROVED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF PROBATE JURISDICTION. 14

In a Resolution15 dated 15 May 2003, the Court granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order conditioned upon the posting
of a bond and enjoined COSLAP from enforcing the Resolution dated 30 July 2001, the writ of execution as well as the writ of
demolition. The Court also directed respondents to file their comment or opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction on 29 September 2003.16 On even date, the temporary restraining order was issued.17

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the established policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.18 While we have concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the
application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. 19 This
Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition.20 A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Petitioner failed
to show that such special and important reasons obtain in this case.21
In Sy v. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems22 and subsequently in Republic of the Philippines v. Damayan ng Purok 14,
Inc.,23 the Court expressly ruled that orders, decisions or resolutions of COSLAP cannot be brought directly to this Court, whether
on appeal or on certiorari . The Court stated, thus:

It is readily apparent that appeals from the COSLAP may not be brought directly before us in view of Rule 45, Section 1. Likewise,
if a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy, the Court of Appeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul
of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot be doubted that the COSLAP is among those quasi-judicial
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. No convincing reason exists why appeals from the COSLAP should be treated
differently from other quasi-judicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or decisions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive.
In that sense, Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 declaring that the COSLAP's orders, resolutions or decision are appealable exclusively
to this Court is erroneous in the light of Section 1, Rule 45 and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, x x x x24

Petitioner insists that COSLAP did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because she was not made party to the case before the
said commission.

The records belie petitioner's claim.

Even before COSLAP conducted the series of mediation conferences, it sent through registered mail notices to persons, including
herein petitioner, claiming ownership rights derived from the Estate of Rodriguez, directing them to appear at the mediation
conference. At the first scheduled mediation conference, a certain Atty. Larry Pernito appeared on behalf of the Estate of
Rodriguez, questioning the jurisdiction of COSLAP. He was the same counsel who represented the petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No.
68640 who eventually sought, albeit unsuccessfully, the nullification of the COSLAP resolution being assailed in the instant
petition. COSLAP likewise gave both parties the opportunity to present their claims when it directed them to submit their
respective position papers. Respondents therein and Atty. Pernito, however, failed to appear in subsequent proceedings or to
submit any position paper.

Petitioner cannot disavow and in fact does not even disown the authority of Atty. Pernito to represent the Estate of Rodriguez or
deny knowledge that said lawyer was representing the Estate of Rodriguez. The records show that in the various notarized
documents purportedly authorizing their holders to occupy portions of the disputed property, petitioner was a signatory therein as
one of the witnesses whereas Atty. Pernito, described therein as "Chief Legal Counsel of the Rodriguez Estate," attested to the
execution. These documents were executed between January and October 2001, or exactly during the pendency of the COSLAP
proceedings. Petitioner's claim that she was totally uninformed about the proceedings before the COSLAP is not worthy of belief.
On the contrary, petitioner is deemed constructively notified of the said proceedings.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual
or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.25

Another formidable stumbling block to a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of COSLAP is the principle of res
judicata or bar by prior judgment. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res judicataprovides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.26 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαr ÿ

The Court of Appeals' resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68640 amounts to res judicata in this case. The petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
68640 also sought the annulment of COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46, the same proceedings being assailed in this petition by parties
claiming ownership rights derived from the Estate of Rodriguez. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the dismissal of said petition
effectively foreclosed the right of petitioner or any person claiming ownership rights under the Estate of Rodriguez to institute a
subsequent action to nullify the proceedings in COSLAP Case No. 2001-05-46.

All told, the procedural lapses of the instant petition cannot be ignored. The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and res judicata are not
meaningless procedural rules because they are grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.27 Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure
the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.28
It bears emphasis that the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. The Court
has often reminded members of the bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 29

It is no longer necessary to resolve the question of jurisdiction of COSLAP.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated 29 September 2003 issued by the Court is
LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 63-69.

2
Id. at 70-71.

3
Id. at 72-84.

4
Id. at 86-87.

5
Supra note 1.

6
Id. at 68-69.

7
SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government offices and agencies involved in the
settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and
members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to
the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or
disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessioners;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.(Emphasis supplied.)

8
Supra note 2.

9
Id. at 85.

10
Id. at 91-92.

11
Supra note 3.

12
Id. at 89.

13
Rollo, pp. 3-60.
14
Id. at 16.

15
Id. at 100-104.

16
Id. at 355-356.

17
Id. at 357-359.

18
Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil. 28, 34 (2002).

19
Paradero v. Abrogan, G.R. No. 158917, 1 March 2004, 424 SCRA 155, 163.

20
Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., supra.

21
Paradero v. Abragan. supra.

22
417 Phil. 378 (2001).

23
448 Phil. 823 (2003).

24
Supra note 13 at 393-394.

25
Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 624, 631.

26
Lanuza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131394, 28 March 2005, 454 SCRA 54, 61.

27
Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000).

28
Balindong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159962, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 200, 212.

29
Heirs of Lourdes Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147205, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 236, 242.