1. League of Prov. vs. DENR, GR.
175368, April 11, 2013 Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry
2. Limbona vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
3. City of General Santos vs. COA, GR. 199439, April 22, 2014
4. Judge Dadole vs. COA, GR. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002
5. Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Judge Paredes, GR. 130775
6. Jose Miranda vs. Alexander Aguirre, GR. 133064, Sept. 16, 1999
7. Tan vs. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727
8. Gov. Aurelio Umali vs. COMELEC, GR. 203974, April 22, 2014
9. Griño vs. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 57
10. Lopez vs. COMELEC 136 SCRA 633
____________________________________________________
1. League of Prov. vs. DENR
GR. 175368, April 11, 2013
Petitioner: League of Provinces - a duly organized league of local governments incorporated
under the Local Government Code; it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the
Province of Bulacan
Respondent: DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes
Other parties:
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) – applicant for a Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); filed before Mines and Geosciences Bureau,
Regional Office No. III (MGB-RO); application was denied twice
Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) – applicants for Quarry Permit; filed before the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) – applicant for Exploration Permit; filed before
the PENRO of Bulacan
FACTS
Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29, 1998, MGB-RO denied Golden
Falcon’s application for FTAA on for failure to secure the required area clearances from the Forest
Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed
the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-CO).
On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed with the
PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of
Golden Falcon's FTAA application. MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal on July 16,
2004.
AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit covering the same
subject area on September 13, 2004. Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping
applications of AMTC and the persons applying for quarry permits – the contention was the date
the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to other permit applications from other
parties
On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos
stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen
days after Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of
Golden Falcon’s application became open to permit applications only on that date.
Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating
that the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the first denial on
April 29, 1998 (MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 16, 2004 was
a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April
29.
permit, now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the
Governor of Bulacan. PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said
applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits. AMTC appealed to
the DENR Secretary.
The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governor’s
issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area
was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence,
the applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these were filed when
the area was still closed to mining location. On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when
the area was already open to other mining applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-
scale mining permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the
authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed
to be under the small-scale mining program.
The petitioner League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this petition saying that that this is
not an action of one province alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the League,
as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces and all local governments.
ISSUES
1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control,
not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary
substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-
Scale Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has the power of
supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs
RULING
[The Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because it is tasked under
Section 504 of the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial
level; adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and
employees; and exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the
league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.]
DENR Sec’s act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of review under the RA
7076 and its IRR; Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality,
hence, are not unconstitutional.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three
statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's
Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
Supervision is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function
in accordance with law.
The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers
to the administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. It
does not make local governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve
devolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following national policies or standards
and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation
of powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials are placed by the
Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.
It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources, pursuant
to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control and review
of the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement
of the small-scale mining law.
RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by
the DENR Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076).
Section 24 of the law makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by the
same.
Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the
PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications outside the
mineral reservations.
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA 7076 likewise provides
that the DENR Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control over the People’s Small-
Scale Mining Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s (PMRB) powers
and functions shall be subject to review by the DENR Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No.
96-40 or the Revised IRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-
Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through their
respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that
the LGUs in coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-
scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.
Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and
DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the
Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit
because the DENR Secretary was granted the power of review in the PMRB’s resolution of
disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR
Secretary to nullify and cancel the Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its power
of review under RA 7076 ad its IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of the issuance
of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which
involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the contending parties
are, with respect to the matter in controversy and on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the
adjudication of their respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the
extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This
quasi-judicial power of the DENR can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment”
of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor “control” over the
said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the AMTC over
conflicting claims based on the law.
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In
this case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii)
of the LGC and Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said
provisions of the law.
Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
2. Limbona vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of
Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall
be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the
Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which
the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its
resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or
regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region
XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X,
Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on
the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it
comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first
place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in
the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal
as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is
true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,
since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he
could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called
his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves
behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his
side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
3. City of General Santos vs. COA
GR. 199439, April 22, 2014
FACTS
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was enacted by the city of General Santos on August 13,
2009. It is entitled An Ordinance Establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement for
Valued Employees Security (GenSan SERVES). Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B.
Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating management teams
pursuant to its organization development program. This was patterned after Executive Order No.
366 dated October 4, 2004 entitled Directing a Strategic Review of the Operations and
Organizations of the Executive Branch and Providing Options and Incentives for Government
Employees who may be Affected by the Rationalization of the Functions and Agencies of the
Executive Branch and its implementing rules and regulations.
Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing
rules and regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to
health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement
package. The ordinance, as amended, provides that qualified employees below sixty (60) years
of age but not less than fifty (50) years and sickly employees below fifty (50) years of age but not
less than forty (40) years may avail of the incentives under the program. In other words, the
ordinance "provides for separation benefits for sickly employees who have not yet reached
retirement age. The Ordinance provides that payment would be made in two tranches: 50% paid
in January 2010 and the remainder in July 2010.Petitioner city alleged that out of its 1,361
regular employees, 50 employees applied, from which 39 employees qualified to avail of the
incentives provided by the ordinance. The first tranche of benefits was released in January 2010.
In a letter dated February 10, 2010, the city’s audit team leader sent a query on the legality of
the ordinance.Respondent Commission’s regional director agreed that the grant lacked legal
basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act.
The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021 on March 25, 2010. The
opinion explained that Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of a supplementary retirement
benefit plan. In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended,
prohibits government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or pension plans
from the time the Government Service Insurance System charter took effect while those plans
already existing when the charter was enacted were declared abolished. Moreover, the same
opinion discusses that, according to jurisprudence, an early retirement program should be by
virtue of a valid reorganization pursuant to law in order to be valid.
In its opinion, respondent Commission on Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based
on a law passed by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor. Moreover, nowhere in
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does it
provide a specific power for local government units to establish an early retirement program.
Mayor Acharon, Jr. submitted that other local government units such as Cebu in 2005 and 2008
have adopted their own early retirement programs. The resolutions of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu invoked Republic Act No. 6683 dated December 2, 1988, which provided
for early retirement and voluntary separation.
ISSUE(S) & RATIO
Whether or not the creation of a retirement benefit plan (Ordinance No. 08) is valid pursuant to
GenSan’s organization development program? NO
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner city’s issuance of Executive
Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its
organization development masterplan.
Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize. This
power is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on organizational structure and
staffing pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known as the general welfare clause:
Section 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. - Every local government unit shall
design and implement its own organizational structure and staffing pattern taking into
consideration its service requirements and financial capability, subject to the minimum standards
and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that "any provision on a power of
a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any
question thereon shall be resolved in favor or devolution of powers x x x."
Section 5, paragraph (c) also provides that
"the general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community."
These rules of interpretation emphasize the policy of local autonomy and the devolution of
powers to the local government units. Designing and implementing a local government unit’s
own "organizational structure and staffing pattern" also Implies the power to revise and
reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of
its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government
level require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to
time.
This was implied in Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners, Commission on Audit. In
that case, this court declared as valid the ordinance passed by the province granting and
releasing hospitalization and health care insurance benefits to its officials and employees. This
court held that Section 2 of Administrative Order No. 103 requiring the President’s prior approval
before the grant of any allowance or benefit is applicable only to offices under the executive
branch. Section 2 does not mention local government units, thus, the prohibition does not apply
to them. This court then referred to the policy of local autonomy as follows:

“Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution,
under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the Local Government Code of 1991,
we declare that the grant and release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits
given to petitioner’s officials and employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed
by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.”
Local autonomy allows an interpretation of Sections 76 and 16 as granting petitioner city the
authority to create its organization development program.
Petitioner city’s vision in 2005 of "Total Quality Service" for "the improvement of the quality of
services delivered by the city to the delight of its internal and external customers" is a matter
within its discretion. It then conducted a process and practice review for each and every unit
within the city, resulting in Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, was later passed requesting for
the mayor’s support for GenSan SERVES. The third preambular clause states that in order "to
transform the bureaucracy into [an] effective and result[s]-oriented structure, redounding to
improved governance, there is a need to entice employees aged 50-59 years old, to retire earlier
than [age] 65 for them to enjoy their retirement while they are still healthy." Consequently,
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed creating the GenSan SERVES program.
In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, NAPOCOR, this court explained that a streamlining of
organization for a more efficient system must pass the test of good faith in order to be valid:
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one's position
through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good
faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio.(Emphasis supplied)
There are indicia of bad faith, none of which are present in this case.
Republic Act No. 6656 invoked by petitioner city as authority for the creation of GenSan
SERVES, for example, enumerates situations considered as bad faith when employees are
removed as a result of any reorganization:
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid
cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a
bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or
other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the
following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a
result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an
aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions in
created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
None of these badges of bad faith exist in this case.
Petitioner city followed the order of priority under Section 4 of its ordinance. It required
applicants to undergo medical examination with the local hospital and considered the hospital
chief’s recommendations.
Unfortunately, these allegations showing good faith is not enough to declare the program
created by petitioner city as a reorganization that justifies the creation of a retirement benefit
plan.
Petitioner city alleged that the positions occupied by those who qualified for GenSan SERVES
remained vacant, and it would neither hire replacements nor promote employees earlier than
June 30, 2011. This means the positions left by those who availed of the program will eventually
be filled up by others. Their positions were not abolished or merged with other positions for
streamlining in the service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Commission on Audit
decision dated January 20, 2011 and resolution dated October 17, 2011 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION insofar as Section 6 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as amended by
Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is declared as VALID.
4. Judge Dadole vs. COA,
GR. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002
SUMMARY: Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaue City enacted an ordinance that granted
additional monthly allowance of 1500 for judges assigned in their locality. However, DBM issued
LBC 55 imposing 1000 as the maximum limit for such allowances. The City Auditor subsequently
disallowed the allowances for the judges and asked them to reimburse the amount in excess of
1000. The Judges filed an MR but was denied by COA. SC reversed and ruled that DBM exceeded
its supervisory power in imposing a limit not existing on the LGC provision it claimed to interpret.
The budget circular is void for not being published.
DOCTRINE: Administrative circulars cannot go beyond the law they seek to implement. A limit
cannot be imposed through an administrative circular when the law it is seeking to implement does
not provide for such (own words)
The DBM has 90 days from the receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance of cities to
review the same. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and
deemed to have taken effect. After such period, the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance
can no longer be questioned.
FACTS:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of
P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
provided that the additional allowances granted by LGUs to national government officials and
employees assigned in their locality in the form of honorarium at rates shall not exceed P1,000.00
in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities. The said circular likewise provided for its
immediate effectivity without need of publication:
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein
petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Cañete, Agustin R.
Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A.
Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional
monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked
to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994.
The petitioner judges filed with the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. This
was treated as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed to the COA Regional Office which in
turn referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied. COA
denied this MR ruling that the appropriation ordinance of LGUs is subject to the organizational,
budgetary and compensation policies of budgetary authorities like the DBM who has the authority
to (a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government positions and on the specific
rates of pay therefore; and (b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and
additional forms of compensation to local government employees (Sec 1, AO 42). Executive Judge
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for
reconsideration but was again denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Arguments of Judge Dadole, et al: LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of
Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as
additional allowances to judges stationed therein. It is not supported by any law and therefore
goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. Also, said circular is void for lack of
publication. The yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is
allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of the LGC1.
Solicitor General filed a manifestation supporting the position of the petitioner judges. The
Solicitor General argues that (1) DBM only enjoys the power to review and determine whether the
disbursements of funds were made in accordance with the ordinance passed by a local
government unit while (2) the COA has no more than auditorial visitation powers over local
government units pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which provides for the power to inspect at
any time the financial accounts of local government units. Moreover, the Solicitor General opines
that “the DBM and the respondent are only authorized under RA 7160 to promulgate a Budget
Operations Manual for local government units, to improve and systematize methods, techniques
and procedures employed in budget preparation, authorization, execution and accountability”
pursuant to Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General points out that LBC 55 was not
exercised under any of the aforementioned provisions.
Arguments of COA: The constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide
allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on the
exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to check whether these legislative
limitations are being followed by the local government units. The disbursement of additional
allowances and other benefits to judges subject to the condition that the finances of the city
government should allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely enforcing the condition of the law when
it sets a uniform maximum amount for the additional allowances that a city government can release
to judges stationed therein. Also, publication is not required for LBC 55 inasmuch as it is merely
an interpretative regulation applicable to the personnel of an LGU. Assuming arguendo that LBC
55 is void, the provisions of the yearly approved ordinance granting additional allowances to
judges are still prohibited by the appropriation laws passed by Congress every year because
Mandaue City gets the funds for the said additional allowances of judges from the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) and the General Appropriations Acts of 1994 and 1995 do not mention
the disbursement of additional allowances to judges as one of the allowable uses of the IRA.
Hence, the provisions of said ordinance granting additional allowances, taken from the IRA, to
herein petitioner judges are void for being contrary to law.
ISSUES and RULING
(1) Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President
and for not having been published? YES, IT IS VOID.
(2) Whether or not the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed
allowances for judges contravenes any law and should therefore be struck down as null and
void? NO
1
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
RATIO:
1. LBC 55 is null and void.
Although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by
the President. The supervisory power of the President has been interpreted to exclude the power
of control. The Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and
by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of
their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight
over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. (Taule v.
Santos)
Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. On the other
hand, supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may
not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter
except to see to it that the rules are followed. (Drilon v. Lim)
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads
of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority
or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit
if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s
supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter
egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within
the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of
his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of
a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations.
LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the
law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances
to judges “when the finances of the city government allow.” The said provision does not authorize
setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, the finances
of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the
revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city
government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and expenditures of P35 million
can afford to grant additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch
as the finances of the city can afford it. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional
allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi),
of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by
xxx xxx xxx
(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges,
prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or
assigned to the city.
imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words,
the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation. (Tañada vs. Tuvera). At the very least, before an administrative circular
reducing income of government officials and employees should be effective, the concerned
officials and employees should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines – to the end that they
be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate
their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and
rudiments of fairness and transparency. (De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit). Subsequent
publication will not cure the defect because the publication is required as a condition precedent
to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations
before their rights and interests are affected by the same. (Philippine International Trading
Corporation vs. Commission on Audit)
2. The yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for
judges is VALID.
Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional
allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of
the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented
were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA
received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to show that
Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because
Mandaue City’s locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, did not
mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the
city’s own revenues.
Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue
City’s appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 3262 and
3273 of the LGC. Thus, within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance,
the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been
properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM
did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and
allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the
said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the
Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.
5. Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Judge Paredes
GR. 130775, September 27, 2004 / Tinga, J.
SUMMARY: David, representing Liga ng mga Barangay, filed a case to assail the decision of
Judge Paredes appointing DILG as an interim caretaker of the Liga. The problem started when
Rayos contested the Presidency of David in the Liga, alleging irregularities in the election.
Because of the chaos in the affairs of the Liga, DILG through its Secretary deemed it wise to take
over the management of the Liga. DILG asked the court under Judge Paredes to appoint it as an
interim caretaker of the Liga. Judge Paredes’ decision appointing DILG as such and various acts
and memorandum circulars issued by DILG is being assailed in this case. SC ruled that Liga ng
2 3
Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and
Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances
authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized cities, independent component cities, and
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately succeeding Section.
mga barangay is under the supervision of the President. Hence, also of the DILG Secretary as the
alter ego of the President. However, DILG, in this case, went beyond supervision and exercised
control in its actions and issuance of memorandum circulars.
DOCTRINE: The President’s power of the general supervision, as exercised by the DILG
Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
FACTS:
1. June 11, 1997, Manuel Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, Caloocan City, filed
a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that Alex
David, president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay
National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of
the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997.
2. The irregularities allegedly consisted of the following:
a. the publication of the notice in theManila Bulletin without notifying in writing the
individual punong barangays of Caloocan City;
b. the Notice of Meeting for the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City did not specify whether
the meeting scheduled was to be held at 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and the meeting
was to be held in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and
c. the deadline for the filing of the Certificates of Candidacy was set at 5p.m. of the
third “day prior to the above election day”.
3. Rayos failed to meet said deadline since he was not able to obtain a certified true copy
of the COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which
were needed to be a delegate, to vote and be voted for in the Liga election.
4. The Executive Judge issued a TRO enjoining the holding of the general membership
and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City. However, the TRO was allegedly
not properly served on David, so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was
held as scheduled.
5. David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan
6. Rayos filed a second petition, for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition against
Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and
Secretary Barbers. Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan
Chapter in the elections held by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their
Resolution. 2) hours.
7. The 2 aforesaid cases were consolidated. But before the consolidation, DILG through
Secretary Barbers, filed an Urgent Motion, invoking the President’s power of general
supervision over all local government units and asking that the DILG be appointed as
the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until the
new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected;
8. David opposed the DILG’s Urgent Motion. He alleged, among others, that the DILG’s
request to be appointed interim caretaker constitutes undue interference in the internal
affairs of the Liga, since the Liga is not subject to DILG control and supervision.
9. 3 days after filing its Urgent Motion, DILG through Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez
issued a Memorandum Circular which cited the reported violations of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David and “widespread chaos and confusion”
among local government officials as to who were the qualified ex-officio Liga members
in their respective sangunians.
Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component Cities and Municipalities.- The sangguninang panlalawigan shall
review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner
and within the same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances.
If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the
same shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and shall continue to be in full force and effect.
 10. Pending the appointment of the DILG “as the Interim Caretaker of the Liga ng mga
Barangay, the Memorandum Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors,
city mayors, city vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
panlungsod, DILG regional directors and other concerned officers,
a. not to recognize and/or honor any Liga Presidents of the Provincial and
Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned until
further notice from the Courts or this Department;
b. to disregard any pronouncement and/or directive issued by David on any issue or
matter relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay until further notice from
the Courts or this Department.
11. Judge Victoria Paredes issued the assailed order appointing DILG as interim
caretaker of the Liga to manage and administer the affairs of the National Liga
Board, until such time that the regularly elected National Liga Board of Directors
shall have qualified and assumed office.
12. DILG issued a Memorandum Circular providing supplemental guidelines for the 1997
synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election
of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
13. Then, DILG issued a Certificate of Appointment[ in favor of Rayos as president of the
Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan City. The appointment purportedly served as
Rayos’s “legal basis for ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Caloocan City” and “to qualify and participate in the forthcoming National Chapter
Election of the Liga ng mga Barangay.”
14. DILG conducted the synchronized elections of Provincial and Metropolitan Liga
Chapters.
15. Petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari . They claim that Judge Paredes’
designation of the DILG as interim caretaker and the acts which the DILG sought to
implement pursuant to its designation as such are beyond the scope of the Chief
Executive’s power of supervision.
David: The power of general supervision of the President over local government units does not
apply to the Liga and its various chapters because the Liga is not a local government unit. Section
507 of the LGC provides that the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and By-laws.
There is no legal or constitutional basis for the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker. The
actions contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker go beyond supervision, but one of control.
In Taule v. Santos, which already passed upon the “extent of authority of the then Secretary of
Local Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils,” ruled that the
“Secretary [of Local Government] has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
election of officers of the katipunan.”
Rayos: Since the Secretary of the DILG supervises the acts of local officials by ensuring that they
act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions and since members of the various
leagues, such as the Liga, are themselves officials of local government units, it follows that the
Liga members are subject to the power of supervision of the DILG. The DILG’s management and
administration of the Liga affairs was limited only to the conduct of the elections, its actions were
consistent with its rule-making power and power of supervision under existing laws.
Solicitor General: DILG’s act of managing and administering the affairs of the National Liga
Board are not merely acts of supervision but of control and direct takeover of the functions of the
National Liga Board, going beyond the limits of the power of general supervision of the President
over local governments. While the Liga may be deemed a government organization, it is not strictly
a local government unit over which the DILG has supervisory power.
ISSUES:
1. [Main issue] WON Judge Paredes acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing the DILG as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of
the National Liga Board? YES!
Issues to be answered:
1. WON the issue has been rendered moot and academic? NO!
a. Notwithstanding the fact that the new set of officers and directors had assumed their
positions; and that supervening events the DILG had turned-over the management and
administration of the Liga to new Liga officers and directors, these supervening events
have not rendered the instant petition moot, nor removed it from the jurisdiction of this
Court. At the core of the petition is the validity of the DILG’s “caretakership” of the Liga
and the official acts of the DILG as such caretaker which exceeded the bounds of
supervision.
b. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition,
yet evading review.” Whether the DILG may validly be appointed as interim caretaker,
or assume a similar position and perform acts pursuant thereto, is likely to resurrect
again, and yet the question may not be decided before the actual assumption, or the
termination of said assumption even. Also, dismissing the petition on the ground of
mootness could lead to the wrong impression that the challenged order and issuances
are valid. Applying opposite precedents to the issues points to the invalidation of the
assailed order and memorandum circulars.
Conceptof Barangay and Liga ng mga Barangay:
[As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of
government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community, and as a forum
wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and
where disputes may be amicably settled.
The Liga ng mga Barangay is the organization of all barangays, the primary purpose of which is
the determination of the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians, and the ventilation,
articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration and
securing solutions thereto, through proper and legal means. The Liga ng mga Barangay shall have
chapters at the municipal, city and provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The
municipal and city chapters of the Liga are composed of the barangay representatives from the
municipality or city concerned. The presidents of the municipal and city chapters of the Liga form
the provincial or metropolitan political subdivision chapters of the Liga. The presidents of the
chapters of the Liga in highly urbanized cities, provinces and the Metro Manila area and other
metropolitan political subdivisions constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
In the Local Government Code, the barangay is positioned to influence and direct the development
of the entire country. This was heralded by the adoption of the bottom-to-top approach process of
development which requires the development plans of the barangay to be considered in the
development plans of the municipality, city or province, whose plans in turn are to be taken into
account by the central government in its plans for the development of the entire country. The Liga
is the vehicle assigned to make this new development approach materialize and produce results.
The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels, automatically become ex-
officio members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents
of the Liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian
concerned.
The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal aim: to promote the development of barangays and
secure the general welfare of their inhabitants. In line with this, the Liga is granted the following
functions and duties:
a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the barangays and in
consonance with the policies, programs and projects of the national government;
b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for people’s participation in local government
administration in order to promote untied and concerted action to achieve country-wide
development goals;
c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment within the barangay;
d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials;
e) Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with government and non-
governmental organizations and thereby promote the social, economic and political well-being of
the barangays; and
f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions which will bring about
stronger ties between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay inhabitants.
The Ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code. However, they
are empowered to make their own constitution and by-laws to govern their operations. Sec. 507
of the Code provides:
Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All other matters not
herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government
units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws which are hereby made
suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided, That said Constitution and By-laws shall
always conform to the provision of the Constitution and existing laws.
Local Government Code provides that the corporate powers of the Liga, expressed or implied,
shall be vested in the board of directors of each level of the Liga which shall:
a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the said Liga; including the power
of appointment, assignment and delegation;
b) Have general management of the business, property, and funds of said Liga;
c) Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and expenditures for the year,
including the plans or schemes for funding purposes; and
d) Have the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or member of the said board on
grounds cited and in the manner provided in hereinunder provisions.]
2. WON the Liga ng mga Barangay is a government organization that is subject to
the DILG Secretary’s power of supervision over local governments as the alter
ego of the President? YES!
Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, reads in part:
Sec.4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
a. In Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, the Court ruled that the President’s power of the general
supervision, as exercised by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the
Liga ng mga Barangay.
b. In an Opinion, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a
government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by
law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government
officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an
organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation
of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues
affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal
means, solutions thereto.
c. The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether
from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of
barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong
barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the
municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers
and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors
or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle
through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and
formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the
sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the
bottom-to-top approach of development.
[In the case at bar], even before Judge Paredes designated the DILG as interim caretaker of the
Liga it issued Memorandum Circular directing local government officials not to recognize David as
the National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of the Liga. Not only
was this action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness and injudiciousness. DILG should
be forthright, circumspect and supportive in its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga
Barangay.
3. WON Judge Paredes’ designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga has
invested the DILG with control over the Liga? YES!
When judge Paredes appointed DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs
of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested
control of the Liga on the DILG. DILG’s prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga “to
manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga
officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office” reveals that what the DILG wanted was
to take control over the Liga. Even if said “caretakership” was contemplated to last for a limited
time, or only until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of
control in derogation of the Constitution.
4. Whether the DILG Memorandum Circulars and other acts which the DILG made in
its capacity as interim caretaker of the Liga, involve supervision or control of the
Liga? Control!
a. DILG being appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary Barbers nullified the
results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular where he
laid down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the
provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the
Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and
national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-
Caloocan Chapter.
b. These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted
direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly, of
the barangay as an institution. The election of Liga officers is part of the Liga’s internal
organization, for which the latter has already provided guidelines. The DILG assumed
stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for
the election, and nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what DILG
wielded was the power of control.
c. DILG assumed control when it appointed Rayos as president of the Liga-Caloocan
Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general Liga elections, although David’s term had
not yet expired. It was bad enough that the DILG assumed the power of control, it was
worse when it made use of the power with evident bias and partiality.
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILG’s authority
over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down
such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them.
The most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the
conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Liga’s Constitution and
By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga
rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the
Liga’s own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the
authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with
unelected Liga officers.
Cases showing examples of control:
In the Bito-Onon case, SC held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar as it
authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of Election Supervisors
(BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral protest, involved the exercise of
control as it in effect amended the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga.
In Taule, a protest was lodged before the Secretary of Local Government regarding several
irregularities in, and seeking the nullification of, the election of officers of the Federation of
Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local Government Secretary
Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of officers and ordered a new one to be
conducted. The SC ruled that the Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity
of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power
than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government
officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at
strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal
of fullest autonomy may be achieved. His order that the new elections to be conducted be presided
by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political
affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general
supervision over local governments.
Dispositive: The assailed order was issued with grave abuse of discretion while the acts of the
respondent Secretary, including DILG Memorandum Circulars are unconstitutional and ultra vires,
as they all entailed the conferment or exercise of control — a power which is denied by the
Constitution even to the President.
6. Jose Miranda vs. Alexander Aguirre,
GR. 133064, Sept. 16, 1999
TOPIC: Justiciable and political question
Petitioners: JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V.
BABARAN AND ANDRES R. CABUYADAO
Respondents: HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
BUDGET, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HON.
BENJAMIN G. DY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF ISABELA, THE HONORABLE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATOR, AND MR. ANTONIO CHUA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PROVINCIAL TREASURER
Pon: Puno
FACTS
- writ of prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of
Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city.
- May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into
an independent component city was signed into law. Ratified by plebiscite on July 4, 1994
- RA 8525 amended RA 7720 on Feb 14, 1998 - changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city
- petitioner Miranda is mayor of Santiago
- petitioners say that the amendment should have been subject to a plebiscite
- respondent provincial officials counter that the issue is a political one
- OSG the reclassification did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units,” hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago
is unnecessary.
- Intervenor Aggabao said both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not
require a plebiscite “to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in
provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a
plebiscite.
ISSUES
 Whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a
mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a
plebiscite.
 Whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion
of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city
HELD
YES. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to
desist from implementing said law.
RATIO
- LOCUS STANDI - the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.
- Petitioner Mayor Miranda filed the present petition in his own right as mayor, so he did not
need the consent of the city council of Santiago City.
- the change from independent component city to component city will affect his powers as mayor
- other petitioner are residents and voters of Santiago – have the right to be heard through a
plebiscite
- JURISDICTION - NOT a political question
- Political question - a question of policy; to those questions which under the Constitution are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.’ It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure –
Tanada v. Cuenco
- justiciable issue - implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of
right. – Casibang v. Aquino
- the issue is a legal one – whether petitioners have the right to a plebiscite
- Section 10, Article X
“No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.”
- Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
“Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
- The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local
government units belongs to Congress.
- The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
- material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein – needs approval of the people
- Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government
units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not
of the welfare of the people.
- a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of local government units.
- It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects
them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people’s
representatives.
- this is also in accord with the constitution’s aim to grant more autonomy to LGUs
- downgrading is substantial
= The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial
governor, not the Office of the President anymore
= resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago for review by Provincial
board of Isabela
= taxes will be shared with the province
= the territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising
the province of Isabela.
= will benefit the province = increase of its share from the internal revenue allotment
= diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of
reduced shares of the IRA
- There is more reason to consult the people when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their
city.
- LGC IRR
“(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. …
- The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they
result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in
the political and economic rights of its people.
- Congress’ power to amend the charter of Santiago City is limited by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution
2 conditions of the constitution
1) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local
government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the LGC on income, population and land area
2) the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."
- requirements on income, population and land area are imposed to help assure the economic
viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the
necessity for a plebiscite of the people.
- the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as
a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering (manipulate the boundaries of
(an electoral constituency) so as to favor one party or class.)
- The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of
its people.
- Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago
City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-political status. The only
reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership
of the province.
- it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or
be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware
that they gave up that privilege when they voted to be independent
- There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the
downgrading for plebiscite when a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the
Committee announced the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening conversation
with the elders of the Body."
- sponsorship speech and interpellation
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they
are no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city. The
power and authority is now being exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from
the City of Santiago. … there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in the
provincial elections.
- senator roco - I thought it should be put on record that we have supported originally the
proposal to make it an independent city. But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation
of the Chairman, let it be so.
-Senator Drilon - on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago City, there is a
resolution passed by the Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of Santiago
from an independent city.
- senator alvarez, who hails from this town - the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of
Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children
will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why
this amendment is being put forward. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district
who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.
- Senator Drilon wanted to do another plebiscite but Mr alavarez said §10 of Article X that the
downgrading is not part of “created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered”
- Sotto now wanted to withdraw his amendment of downgrading, but Maceda said “senatorial
courtesy demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from
Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the district of other senators” since the matter
affects only his city
- Sen Alvarez: I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to be
a city but because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the
leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the town
from the province?
- two other downgrades without plebiscite: City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental,[16] and the
City of San Carlos, Pangasinan - charters were amended to allow their people to vote and be
voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without
submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. The two cities were chartered but were not
independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were
considered independent cities at that time.
7. Tan vs. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727
142 SCRA 727 (1996)
FACTS:
BP 885 – Act creating a new province known as Negros del Norte
Petitioners – residents of Negros Occidental
Prompted by the enactment of BP 885, petitioners filed with the SC a case for Prohibition to stop
the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite pursuant to and in the implementation of the said
law, which was scheduled on Jan. 3, 1986.
 Petitioners’ contention:
 o BP 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution
Due to the constraints brought about by the Christmas holidays during which the Court was in
recess and unable to timely consider the petition, the petitioners on Jan. 4, 19886, filed a
supplemental pleading averring that the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held on Jan. 3, as
scheduled, but there are still issues raised affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of
such exercise which should be resolved by the SC, such as the plebiscite was confined only to
the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte.
 Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of the Negros
Occidental, petitioners changed their petition’s prayer to the end that COMELEC hold
in abeyance the issuance of any official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite.
The Court ordered required the respondent to file a Comment.
Respondent’s comment, represented by the OSG:
 The remaining cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental not included in the area of
the (new) Negros del Norte, do not fall with the meaning and scope of the term “unit or
units affected” as referred to in Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Consti., thus, it did not violate it.
 Respondents cited the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary, wherein the Court said:
o “this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed
considerable leeway, as there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of
‘unit or units affected’
o “it is more persuasive to contend as respondents do that the acceptable
construction is for those voters, who are from the barangays to be separated,
should be excluded in the plebiscite
 Sec. 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that the
territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square
kilometers, more or less.
 Moot and academic – plebiscite has already been conducted and out of 95,134 total
votes cast 164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were
against it
ISSUE: W/N the BP 885 is constitutional
SC: NO, because it excluded the voters of the mother province from participating in the plebiscite
The more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation
and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution:
“SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected.”

It can be plainly seen that there be first obtained “the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected” whenever a province is created, divided or merged and
there is substantial alteration of the boundaries.
 It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of
Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of
its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte.
 Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected:
o first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered
o second would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte
 The Court found no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to
said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two
component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the
parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors
and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate
to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units.
o (It should be noted the unexplained changes made when Parliamentary Bill
No. 3644 was enacted into BP 885):
“Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 provided, “…plebiscite shall be
conducted in the areas affected”, which was changed into “…
plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which
are the areas affected”, in BP 885.”
The Court further said that it is now time to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive
pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary. It should
not be taken as doctrinal or compelling precedent as it failed to resolve the question of how the
pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
It is a well-accepted rule that “in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give
rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in
pari materia.”
 Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros
del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that “the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas
affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.”
o As this draft legislation speaks of “areas,” what was contemplated
evidently is plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite.
o Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people
living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the
parent province.
o This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the
Constitution.
8. Gov. Aurelio Umali vs. COMELEC,
GR. 203974, April 22, 2014
FACTS:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to
the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012,
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the
qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of
1991."Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution
No.12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component
city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City
should participate in the said plebiscite. In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of
Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed
conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva
Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve
the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision
calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite
whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified
voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified
voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various
adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change
not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as
a whole. To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city
mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply
to conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the
LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the
plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in
1994from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted
from a component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion
will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be created, merged
with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered. The
conversion would merely reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the
city, with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance
with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entire
province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebiscite not only those in Cabanatuan
City.
RULING:
Yes. "Political units directly affected" defined In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed
to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or
units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. Petitioner Umali
asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for determining the
qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec.10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Petitioner Umali
elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not
only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in
the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of
Cabanatuan City. On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their
claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor
and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. Respondents take the phrase
"registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the registered voters in the city
being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities
of Nueva Ecija. In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a
determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are complied
with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a
component city as highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are base on
certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory
language "shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion. In so doing,
4
Iloilo Provincial Chairman of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino; official candidate of the party for the position of governor of Iloilo
Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of conversions
once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to be
converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for the delegation
of the legislative authority is the very LGC. The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional
provision should equally apply to conversions as well. While conversion to an HUC is not
explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the
conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
9. Griño vs. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 57
September 4, 1992 / Medialdea, J.
SUMMARY: Pursuant to the LGC which called for the conversion of sub-provinces into provinces
upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected,
a plebiscite was conducted by the Comelec for the conversion of the sub-province of Guimaras
which formed part of the 2nd district of Guimaras. The ballot did not contain any space or provision
for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
representing the second district of Iloilo. It only contained yes or no question on whether to convert
the sub-province to a province. The petitioners seek to assail this for disenfranchising them to vote
for provincial officials in case the conversion is rejected in the plebiscite. The Court ruled that the
issue is moot and academic because the conversion was approved by majority in the plebiscite
and the President shall appoint, as he already did, provincial officials in the newly created province
pursuant to the LGC.
DOCTRINE: In a plebiscite for the conversion of a sub-province to a province simultaneous with
the elections, in case of a negative vote, the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be
appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint provincial
officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province ( sub-
province of Guimaras) shall continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the original
province (Iloilo) elected at large by registered voters the province including the sub-province.ch
Note: The law (LGC) is really silent about the matter on what will happen if the conversion was
rejected in the plebiscite
FACTS:
The sub-province of Guimaras composing of 3 municipalities with a combined voting population
of 50,000, more or less, constitutes a part of the 2nd district of Iloilo, along with other 8
municipalities. In the previous elections, the voters from the municipalities comprising the sub-
province of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of the entire province of Iloilo.
On January 1, 1992, the 1991 Local Government Code (RA 7160) came into effect. Section 462
thereof called for the conversion of existing subprovinces into regular provinces upon approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected by such
conversion. Said section likewise directed the holding of the said plebiscite simultaneously with
the national elections following the effectivity of RA 7160.
Pursuant to Section 462 of R.A. 7160, the Comelec conducted a plebiscite for the conversion of
Guimaras into a regular province simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. Section 3 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2410 provided that all registered voters of Iloilo, except Iloilo City, and
in the sub-province of Guimaras, who are qualified to vote for the provincial officials thereof in the
May 11, 1992 elections, were qualified to vote in the plebiscite. The ballots distributed by the
Comelec for use in the three (3) municipalities of Guimaras did not contain any space or provision
for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
representing the second district of Iloilo, of which the sub-province of Guimaras was a part. (It only
contained yes or no question on whether to convert the sub-province to a province)
On May 13, 1992, or two (2) days after the election was conducted, Simplicio Griño4 and Arturo
Gadian5 filed the instant petition for certiorari. Petitioners alleged in substance that respondent
Comelec acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed
the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the governor and vice governor
of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second
district of Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed providing specifically
for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a full-fledged province, it do not specifically provide
that the voters of the subprovince shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who,
in case of a vote against its conversion into a regular province, would continue to represent said
sub-province. Furthermore, Comelec failed to inform the candidates and the voters of such
disenfranchisement.
[Not relevant] TRO was initially issued but was subsequently lifted. Two motions for intervention
were filed. The first was filed by Perla S. Zulueta, who claimed to be the official candidate of the
Nacionalista Party for the office of the governor of the Province of Iloilo and who allegedly ranked
number two behind the frontrunner Arthur Defensor and claimed that she has an interest in the
matter of the main petition because the same is crucial and determinative of whether or not she
would win for the office of governor. This was granted. The second was filed by other candidates
for members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the first, third, fourth and fifth districts
of Iloilo. This was not granted because the principal issue in the main petition (involved only the
positions of governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
second district of Iloilo.
ISSUE: Did the ComElec gravely abuse its discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-
province of Guimaras, to vote for the governor, vice-governor of the province of Iloilo and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the second district of the province, in the recently
conducted May 11, 1992 local and national elections?
RULING: It is now moot and academic.
Section 462 of the 1991 LGC is incomplete and inadequate to govern all or any eventuality. It
should be remembered that the law should take into consideration the decision of the populace to
be affected by a change in its political set-up. As it is worded, Section 462 completely addresses
an eventuality where the people of both the original district and the people of the new district to
be created agree to the proposed creation of the latter. The law provides that, "After the effectivity
of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province
through appointment, if none has yet been appointed to the same (as hereinafter provided), and
shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan . . ."
But suppose the proposed-conversion of a subprovince is rejected by those affected by such
conversion, what does the law say? The law states only the following in case of a negative vote:
"The incumbent elected officials of said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall
continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said
incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case a negative
vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall
hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following
the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. . . ." Whatever incumbent elective positions exist
under the present set-up, it appears that in case of a negative vote, these sub-provincial positions
shall be filled by appointment of the President.
The makers of the law however, failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails
naturally, the sub-province shall continue to be a part of the original province and continue to be
represented by the provincial officials of the original province. The law is silent on whether the
voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regular province shall no longer be
allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the election held simultaneously with the plebiscite. If
the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo and the "Yes" vote
in the plebiscite prevailed, these votes shall not be considered. If however, the "No" vote prevailed
5
a registered voter of the municipality of Buenavista, sub-province of Guimaras, Iloilo
and the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, their votes
shall be taken into consideration.
The Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the plebiscite decided not to
let the voters of Guimaras vote for the provincial officials. The Commission was under mistaken
presumption that under Section 462 of the 1991 Local Government Code, whether or not the
conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the
President will fill up the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors
shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote,
the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law
did not provide that the President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province
because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to
be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by
registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras.ch
However, it would serve no useful purpose if the Court undo all that the Comelec had done in that
plebiscite. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the subprovince of Iloilo
overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. The
total "Yes" votes was 283,224 as against 42,524 "No" votes. In this event, the President shall
appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to newspaper reports, the governor for the
newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A.
6170. The then sub-province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from
the province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a special election for the
municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia for the purpose of electing the governor
and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second
district thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
10. Lopez vs. COMELEC 136 SCRA 633
May 31, 1985 / Fernando, J.
Facts: - PD 824 or an act creating the Metropolitan Manila, was enacted to establish and
administer program and provide services common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and
Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area. This is in response to the
sharp growth in the population of Manila and the proliferation of commercial firms and industries,
which resulted to the ever-increasing inability of the separate local governments to cope with the
ensuing serious problems. Metro Manila shall be administered by the Commission.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 824. They rely on this provision: "No
province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected." The Local Government Code was not enacted until 1983.
Issue: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional as it was enacted prior to the creation of a local
government code
Held: No
Ratio: The challenge does not suffice to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality. The last
vestige of doubt has been removed by the present constitutional provision regarding the
Batasang Pambansa. That provision clearly recognizes the existence of the Metropolitan Manila.
Justification as to PD 824. In PD 824, reference was made to "the referendum held on
February 27, 1975 wherein the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to
restructure the local governments into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of
government.” It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and the corresponding
increase of social and economic requirements in the contiguous communities has brought into
being a large area that calls for development both simultaneous and unified. It "is vital to the
survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a workable and effective
system be established for the coordination, integration and unified management of such local
government services or functions" therein. There is necessity for "the unified metropolitan
services or functions to be planned, administered, and operated [based on] the highest
professional technical standards." 15 The foregoing constitutes the justification for and the
objective of such Presidential Decree.
Application of Paredes vs Executive Secretary. In Paredes vs Executive Secretary, the Court
did came to the conclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those voters
who are not from the barangay to be separated were excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot be
argued therefore that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila in
the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen municipalities, now composing
Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by
petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in
February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.
Presidential Authority to Issue the PD. At that time there was no interim Batasang
Pambansa. It was the President who was entrusted with such responsibility. The legality of the
law making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law was already established
in Aquino vs Comelec.
Sangguniang Bayan. The point has been raised, however, that unless Presidential Decree No.
824 be construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other cities and municipalities,
there should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then there is a denial of the equal
protection provision of the Constitution. The point is not well-taken. It is clear that under the
equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden. But classification on a reasonable basis,
and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. . . . The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class." All such elements are present. There is no need to
set forth anew the compelling reasons that called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is
quite obvious that under the conditions then existing - still present and, with the continued
growth of population, attended with more complexity - what was done was a response to a great
public need. The government was called upon to act. PD 824 was the result. It is not a condition
for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and thirteen
municipalities that the membership be identical with those of other cities or municipalities. There
is ample justification for such a distinction
President shall have the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of
the Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It may give rise to doubts as to its
validity insofar as it confers the power of control on the President. That control he certainly
exercises under the present Constitution over the ministries. His power over local governments
does not go that far. It extends no further than general supervision. These doubts, however, do
not suffice to nullify such a provision. Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be
preferred as against one that will destroy.
To show fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the
equally basic doctrine that the constitution enters into and forms part of every statute.
Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is
limited to those that may be considered national in character. There can be no valid objection to
such exercise of authority. That is a clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a
national character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be
considered as properly appertaining to local government functions, the power of the President is
confined to general supervision. As thus construed, Section 13 clearly appears to be free from
any constitutional infirmity.
Abad Santos, dissenting
1. The referendum of February 27, 1975, did not satisfy the prohibition contained in Art. XI,
Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. For one thing the provision speaks of "the criteria established in
the local government code." There was then no local government code so there were no criteria.
Also the grant of power to restructure the 4 cities and 13 municipalities in the Greater Manila
area "under such terms and conditions as the President may decide" was so broad that it was in
fact not an intelligent decision on the part of the people. I submit that a grant of power must be
definite to be valid; it must not be nebulous and uncircumscribed so as to amount to a total
abdication thereof. Finally, the referendum did not include all of the peoples of Bulacan and Rizal
to ascertain if they were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. The
referendum suffers from the same infirmity present in the case of Paredes vs. Executive
Secretary, cited in the main opinion, where I dissented.
2. The January 27, 1984, amendment to the Constitution providing for representation in the
Batasang Pambansa and which allocates representatives to "districts in Metropolitan Manila"
cannot be construed to constitutionally validate P.D. No. 824 for the simple reason that the issue
before the people when the amendment was submitted for ratification was not the creation of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.

Basis in the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly recognized the
juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such express constitutional affirmation of its
existence in the fundamental law calls for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal
justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it
the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of Metropolitan Manila.
(Election Code of 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human
Settlements, Presidential Decree No. 824, creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission,
Amendments to the Constitution, Ordinance)

Control of the President. It is undeniable that the creation of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission is free from any constitutional objection. There is, however, a question that may
arise in connection with the powers of the President over the Commission. According to PD 824:
"The Commission, the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the
direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the