P.D. NO. 532 a. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075, 5 September part of the act of seizing the boat.
he boat. - The accused insists that they had
1997
FACTS ​- Emilio Catantan and Jose Macven Ursal were convicted of
violating PD 232 Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law. Only
Catantan appealed. - June 27 1993, The Pilapil brothers were fishing
some 3km away from the shores of Tabogon Cebu. - Suddenly,
another boat caught up to them. Catantan borded the pumpboat of the
Pilapils, leveled a revolver at Eugene, and ordered them to lie down -
Then, Ursal boarded the pumpboat and they hogetied Eugene. The
accused left behind their pumpboat with its passengers one of whom
was also tied. - While travelling to Daan Tabogon as compelled by the
accused , the engine stalled twice and the brothers were ordered to
row the boat. - As they passed by the shoreline of Nipa, They saw
another boat operated by a certain Juanito. The Pilapils told the
accused that the engine was new. - Catantan ordered the Pilapils to
approach the boat cautioning them not to speak or move - On the
pretext that they were buying fish, Catantan boarded the new
pumpboat and ordered them to bring them to Mungaz, Cebu. - As
Ursal was transferring to Juanito’s pumpboat, he kicked the front part
of the Pilapil’s boat. - The jolt threw Eugene off, Juan Jr untied his
brother’s leg and they swam together clinging to their boat. - Another
pumpboat passed, they were towed ashore and reported to the
authorities - The accused were caught when Juanito’s pumpboat ran
out of gas, but the revolver was
not found.
Issue: - W/N the accused was guilty of piracy 1as defined by PD 532
or grave coercion as defined by RPC 286.
Held: - Despite the accused argument that he and his companions did
not attach or seize the fishing boat, nor had any intention of
permanently taking possession or depriving the complainants of their
boat, they are guilty of piracy. The act of compelling the Pilapils to
take them elsewhere other than their original place of destination was
no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of
which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, the
P.D. 532 defines piracy as: any attack upon or seizure of any vessel,
or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment,
or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided RPC Art. 286 defines graver coercion as: imposing upon any
person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence
threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong. accused abandoned the Pilapils only
because the engine broke down and they needed another mean to
return to their lair.
b. ​People v. Tulin,
G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001
FACTS​: On March 2, 1991 the accused-appellants, then manning a
motor launch and armed with high powered guns, fired upon, boarded
and seized M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation sailing off the coast of Mindoro
near Silonay Island loaded with petroleum products, together with the
complement and crew members. The name "M/T Tabangao" on the
front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the
chimney of the vessel were paint over with black paint,. The vessel
was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San
Lorenzo, Honduras. The accused-appellants then directed the vessel
to proceed to Singapore all the while sending misleading radio
messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs. In
Singapore, the cargoes were unloaded and transferred to "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, Port Captain employed
1
by Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd., supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The vessel then returned to the
Philippines on April 10, 1991. A series of arrests was thereafter
effected and an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed
against accused- appellants. CHEONG SAN HIONG’s
CONTENTIONS: The trial court erred in finding him guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of
1974). He explained that he was charged under the information with
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. The acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters
and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him
for trial, to convict, and sentence. For the State to have criminal
jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.
Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by
him. He can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as
defined and penalized in PD No.532 because RA No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of the RPC, has
impliedly superseded PD No. 532. PD No. 532 has been rendered
"superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of RPC, as
amended, and PD No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine
waters. To reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in
Section 1 [d] of PD No. 532 must be omitted such that PD No. 532
shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or
to passengers of the vessel. RA No. 7659, on the other hand, shall
apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or
passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of
the law.
He also maintained that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source
of the cargo. The trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice
when he was charged as a principal by direct participation, thus
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. The other accused-appellants alleged
that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 so the
crew could have overpowered the alleged pirates. They also claimed
that their constitutional rights were violated. LAW / TREATY
INVOKED: Article 122 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 January 1, 1994 Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
ISSUES: ​Whether or not Cheong can be convicted as accomplice
when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside Philippine waters and territory.
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7659 obliterated the crime committed
by accused-appellant Cheong.
RULING​:
On Issue 1: ​YES Although PD No. 532 requires that the attack and
seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the attack on and
seizure of the vessel and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. Such
transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Hence, he was party of the piracy. Piracy falls under Title One of Book
Two of the RPC. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality
in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong were
charged under a special law, PD No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, PD No. 532 should be applied with more
force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against
the whole world.
On Issue 2: NO RA No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
2
provisions on piracy under PD No. 532. There is no contradiction
between the two laws. All the PD did was to widen the coverage of the
law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As
expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of PD No. 532, piracy is
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122,
as amended, and piracy under PD No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.Article 122 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas or in
Philippine waters by any person not a member of its complement nor
a passenger thereof. Under PD No. 532, the coverage of the law on
piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." As to Hiong’s liability:
Section 4 of PD No 532 presumes that any person who does any of
the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly,
unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly
abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken
by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom. The record discloses
that accused-appellant Hiong indeed aided the pirates in disposing of
the stolen cargo by several act (personally directing the transfer,
buying the hijacked, falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List
to ensure that the illegal transfer went through undetected, supplying
the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions). Hiong cannot deny
knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he himself
received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he
is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious
circumstances under which it was acquired. " An individual is justified
in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if
such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by
the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
c. People v. Puno,
G.R. No. 97471, 17 February 1993
Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo
Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who
was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election
there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC He
told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga
on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place When it
was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she
got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving After the
car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he
needs to "get money" from her Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag
which she handed to the accused But the accused said that they
wanted P100,000 more The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check
for P100,000 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks
and one P40,000 check Isabelo then turned the car around towards
Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again
towards Pampanga According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of
the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and was
able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when
she jumped out of the car The defense does not dispute the above
narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he
stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento
to step out of the car He said he even slowed the car down as he
drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride He
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running
across the highway
3
Issue: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for d. People v. Mendoza,
ransom as charged NO Whether or not the said robbery can be G.R. No. 104461, 23 February 1996
classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti- Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)NO Holding: There is no showing
whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than
the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation. For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended
party of her liberty In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action
was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the offenders This does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention Jurisprudence reveals that during the early
part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law
against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law
on highway robbery) PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only
acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim The mere
fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually
operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the
case This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4
years and 2 months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years
of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

4
R.A. 10883 excluding those that are inadmissible, show that the circumstantial
evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of
a. People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, 14 September 2011
Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS:

Renato Lagat and James Palalay were charged with the crime of
Carnapping for stealing Jose Biag’s motorcycle and killing him in the
process.
During custody, both of them voluntarily answered where they dumped
Biag's body.
After the prosecution rested its case, appellants filed a demurrer to
evidence on the ground that they are not guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
citing that their rights during the custodial investigation were impaired
when no counsel arrived for them, making all the testimonial evidence
inadmissible.
Only circumstantial evidence were gathered by the prosecution like
appellants were caught in the possession of Biag's motorcycle, they ran
after police came after them, bloodstains of Big on his motorcycle. The CA
ruled in favor of the prosecution.

ISSUE: ​Whether appellants are guilty.

RULING:

The SC affirmed the lower court's decision.

Based on Rule 133, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
can be sufficient for conviction based on aforementioned conditions. To
justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented,

5
b. ​People v. Luisito Bustinera (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle;
G. R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004
(4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
FACTS:
plantation;
ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that
(5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fish pond or fishery; and
appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which he
would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on disturbance.
the same day as he was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended
taxi stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
recovered. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The
qualified theft. elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which
belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force
HELD:
upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is
essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of
Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping being the same. From
Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a
vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping law and not the provisions of
vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as qualified theft which would apply.
"AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When
statutes are in pari materia or when they relate to the same person or
thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same
specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or object,
the rule dictates that they should be construed together. The elements of
the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any
of the following circumstances is present:
(1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant;
(2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence;

6
c. ​People v. Paramil,
G.R. No. 128056-57, 31 March 2000
d. ​People v. Asamuddin,
G.R. No. 213913, 2 September 2015
FACTS​: Sometime in 2006, Emelina Gloria hired appellant
Asamuddin as a messenger in E. Gloria Money Changer located at
Mandaluyong City, and assigned him a blue Honda XRM motorcycle
with plate number UU-9142 for be used for work purposes. On July
11, 2007, at 12:30pm, Emelina handed to appellant the cash amount
of P800,000.00 and various foreign denominations with a peso value
of P277, 995.00 and instructed him to bring them to her friend Rina
Rosalial, also a money changer, in Mabini, Manila. Thereafter,
appellant left aboard his service motorcycle. Said instruction and
handing of the currencies was seen by Imee, a domestic helper of
Emelina, who was then inside the E. Gloria Money Changer.
After an hour, Rosalial called Emelina and told her that
appellant has yet to arrive in her shop. Emelina called appellant and
his wife through their cellular phones, but to no avail. This prompted
Emelina to file a complaint against appellant at the PNP-CIDG, Camp
Crame.
A month later, appellant’s service motorcycle was found
abandoned in Silang, Cavite, and was returned to Emelina.
On January 16, 2008, an Information was filed charging
Asamuddin of violation of RA 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
and the crime of Qualified Theft. The cases were temporarily
archived, but were revived when appellant was arrested in
Zamboanga City in 2009. Asamuddin pleaded not guilty to both
charges and denied the accusation, saying that he resigned from his
job on July 10, 2007 and that the amount handed to him by Emelina
was his last salary.
On October 15, 2012, the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch
212 found Regaspi guilty of the crime of Carnapping and Qualified
Theft. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. Hence,
this present petition.
7
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not there was no consent of Emelina when
appellant took the subject service motorcycle, in order to convict him
of the crime of Carnapping.
2.) Whether or not appellant’s employment as messenger created a
fiduciary relationship between him and Emelina, that will qualify him
for the crime of Qualified Theft.
HELD: 1.) AFFIRMATIVE. Although it is true that Emelina herself
tasked the appellant to proceed to Mabini, Manila and permitted him
to use the service motorcycle, it cannot be denied that appellant’s
failure to return the motorcycle to Emelina after his working hours
constitutes “unlawful taking.” If indeed appellant’s taking of the service
motorcycle was consented by Emelina, she should not have filed a
complaint against the appellant for the loss of the subject personal
property. This just proves that appellant’s possession of the subject
property after his work hours was not authorized nor consented by
Emelina.
2.) AFFIRMATIVE. One of the elements of the crime of Qualified Theft
is that the crime must be done with grave abuse of confidence. In the
present case, there exists a fiduciary relationship between appellant
and Emelina, as his function of delivering amounts of money to the
clients or other money changers involves a total trust and high degree
of confidence from his employer, Emelina. Emelina routinely entrusts
to appellant, on a daily basis, various amounts of money from
P50,000.00 to P500,000.00 without even requiring the latter to
acknowledge receipt thereof. Emelina even testified that she does not
have proof that she handed to appellant P800,000.00 and various
foreign currency on July 11, 2007 because she has total trust and
high degree of confidence on appellant. “Tiwalaan lang po.” This
exhibits the trust and confidence of Emelina to the appellant which he
exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the former.
Therefore, the present appeal is dismissed, affirming the
conviction of Asamuddin of the crime of Carnapping and Qualified
Theft.

8
d. People v. Ellasos, G.R. No. 139323, 6 June 2001 apply the original provision prescribing the penalty of "life
Facts: imprisonment to death" where the "owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the
Miguel de Belen, who is the registered owner of the tricycle subject of carnapping". “Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the
this carnapping case, was last seen by his brother Fernando at the crime of carnapping, is an internal act and hence presumed from the
Caltex station at 9:00 p.m. on April 2, 1992, he (Miguel) was seated unlawful taking of the vehicle. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
beside the accused Sonny Obillo inside the sidecar of his tricycle the taking of the vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
which was being driven by the other accused Carlo Ellasos. - Three means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
(3) hours later, Fernando again saw the two accused with the tricycle, upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender
but this time without his brother. When Fernando finally asked the gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
accused about the whereabouts of his brother, Ellasos answered that dispose of the same.”
Miguel was in a drinking session with his (Ellasos') father in Malasin.-
The following morning, the lifeless body of Miguel de Belen, with a
gunshot wound on the head, was found in Tayabo. In the same
morning, the two accused were found sleeping at the gate of the
Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in Muñoz, and in possession of a gun and the
wheel of Miguel's tricycle. The rest of the tricycle was later recovered
in a culvert.
Held: ​- The chain of proven circumstances leads to the logical
conclusion that the tricycle was unlawfully taken by the two accused
from its owner, Miguel de Belen, and the latter was killed on the
occasion thereof. Miguel was last seen with the two accused; three
hours later, the two were again spotted riding the tricycle without
Miguel. The following morning, the two accused were found in
possession of a wheel of the tricycle. Such possession, which
remained without any satisfactory explanation, raises the presumption
that the two accused authored the carnapping. This presumption
remains unrebutted.
- That only the wheel was found in possession of the accused and
was intended to be appropriated by the latter is of no moment. The
unlawful taking of the tricycle from the owner was already completed.
Besides, the accused may be held liable for the unlawful taking of the
whole vehicle even if only a part thereof is ultimately taken and/or
appropriated while the rest of it is abandoned. - The crime was
committed before the effectivity of R.A. 7659. Therefore, we have to

9
f. People v. Donio, G.R. No. 212815, 1 March 2017
FACTS: ​Accused-Appellant Donio together with his two co-accused
were charged of carnapping with homicide.
Donio assisted by counsel de officio pleaded not guilty when
arraigned while his two co-accused were at-large. Trial on the merits
proceeded.
One of the witnesses for the prosecution is a police officer who in
line with their duties and functions, conducting a checkpoint on
November 26,2003 were implementing their campaign against
hijacking, carnapping and kidnapping along McArthur Highway.
When a speeding tricycle abruptly stop near the check point which
caught the attention of the police officers. They approached the
vehicle and asked the identity of the driver, and the driver handed
over to the Police Officer a temporary license bearing the name Raul
Layug which he likewise identified himself as Raul Layug but later
identified as Enrile Donio. When asked by the Police Officers, Donio
and his two companions to produce the Certificate of Legislation and
official receipt of the vehicle, they failed to do so and were asked to
bring the tricycle to the checkpoint.
Upon visual search, the police officers discovered a bloodstained
mini jungle bolo inside. The motorcycle and the bolo were seized by
the policeman and brought the three to the police station.
While in the police station, Donio was allowed to leave when he
asked permission to get the OR and CR of the vehicle,but never
returned.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same date, November 26, 2003,
Rodrigo, the brother of Raul Layug was searching for him, the victim ,
who have not returned home since last night and was driving the
tricycle owned by Rodrigo. Rodrigo accompanied by his cousin went
to a certain barangay where they found the remains of Raul Layug.
Another tricycle driver informed Rodrigo that he saw a similar tricycle
that of Rodrigo's at the Conception Police Station. Rodrigo and his
other brother went to the police station and found out that the two
other companion of Donio were released.
When on December 2003, the Layug brothers returned to the
police station learning that Donio was apprehended.
The police officer who brought Donio and his companions at the
police station on November 26, 2003 when summoned to identify
Donio as the person who asked permission from him to get the
document is the same person who was apprehend by him on
November 2003.
Another prosecution witness was a doctor who conducted the
Post Mortem Investigation regarding the cause of death of the victim
Raul Layug and determined that he sustained stab wounds using a
sharp instrument.
On the other hand, the defense has its lone witness, the accused ,
who testified on the defense of alibi. That he is a grass cutter in a
sugar cane plantation and seldom go home being a stay in plantation
worker and never leave his place of work for six months, instead his
wife visited him. That in one occasion, on the night of November 25,
2003 until the next day he was in their house after his wife fetched
him in his place of work and went home to tend their sick child.
Donio in a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court was
found guilty and case was elevated to the Court of Appeals but the
decision was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the Prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the guilt of the accused of the crime of car napping with
homicide.
RULING:
Yes. The prosecution has proven that the accused committed the
crime of carnapping considering that all of the elements of the crime
were existent and homicide was produced in the course of the
commission of the carnapping.
10
11
g. People v. Urzais, G.R. No. 207662, 13 April 2016
Facts
Accused Fabian Urzais is charged with violating the anti-carnapping
law of 1972 wherein he allegedly with 2 other co-accused Alex
Bautista and Ricky Bautista, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, stole the Green Isuzu Highlander of the victim Mario
Magdato. The victim was likewise shot in the head which caused the
death of Magdato. The prosecution presented as witness the widow of
the victim, SPO2 Figueroa of the PNP and Dr. Concepcion. The
widow testified as to disappearance and discovery of the death of her
husband. The police officer testified that the arrest of the accused was
conducted due to a checkpoint that was conducted based on a flash
alarm that was broadcasted based on an alleged carnapping of an
Isuzu highlander. Dr. Concepcion on the other hand testified as to the
gunshot wound and abrasions found on the body of the victim
Magdato. The accused in his defense interposed the defense of
denial. He testified that he bought such Isuzu highlander from alex
and ricky bautista for the price of 60,000. He was allegedly hesitant
due to the low price of the vehicle and he tried to sell such vehicle to
recover the amount he paid. After a week in his possession, he was
the arrested by the CIDG in his home. The defense likewise
presented as witness Oscar Angeles who testified that such vehicle
was purchased by accused and that he was allegedly hesitant as to
the srcins of the vehicle.
RTC: F​ound the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on
the weight of the testimonies presented by the prosecution and the
diputable presumption, under Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court that states that a person found in possession of thing taken in
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act. CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE ​Whether or not the accused can be found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-carnapping law?
HELD: Eve​ry criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove
two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the
elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2)
the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court
finds the prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with
no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt. R.A. No. 6539, or the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation against persons, or by using force upon thing In the
instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated
for failure of the prosecution to prove all its elements. For one, the trial
court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct evidence
indicating the guilt of accused-appellant. Indeed, the CA confirmed the
lack of such direct evidence. Both lower courts solely based accused-
appellant's conviction of the special complex crime on one
circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his possession of the
allegedly carnapped vehicle. The Court notes that the prosecution's
evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's disappearance, the
discovery of his death and the details surrounding accused-appellant's
arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped.
There’s is absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's theory
that the victim's vehicle had been carnapped, much less that the
accused- appellant is the author of the same. Certainly, it is not only
by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the
guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination
of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, notably there is only one
circumstantial evidence. And this sole circumstantial evidence of
possession of the vehicle does not lead to an inference exclusively
consistent with guilt. Fundamentally, prosecution did not offer any iota
of evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less with
accused-appellant's participation. The application of disputable
presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case
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the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is
limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that
the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of
independent evidence inconsistent thereto. In the instant case,
accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and
adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had
been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista The
carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be
treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the
provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code,
the Court finds the guilt of accused- appellant was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. The equipoise rule states that where the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support
a conviction.
The equipoise rule ​provides that where the evidence in a criminal
case is evenly balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence
tilts the scales in favor of the accused. WHEREFORE , in view of the
foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 November
2012 in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS alias Michael Tapayan y
Baguio is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping with homicide, without prejudice to investigation for the
crime of fencing penalized under Presidential Decree 1612. His
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless he is
being held for some other lawful cause.

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