CASE DIGEST : ROSAL VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 168253 March 16, 2007

MAYOR NOEL E. ROSAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Second Division, and MICHAEL VICTOR IMPERIAL, Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 172741 March 16, 2007
MAYOR NOEL E. ROSAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MICHAEL VICTOR IMPERIAL, Respondents.

FACTS : etitioner Noel E. Rosal and private respondent Michael Victor C. Imperial were candidates for
mayor of Legaspi City in the May 10, 2004 elections. After the counting and canvassing of votes,
petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Legaspi City, having received 44,792 votes over
private respondents 33,747 and thereby winning by a margin of 11,045 votes.

On May 24, 2004, private respondent instituted a petition to annul the proclamation,[1] assailing the
canvass of election returns in the 520 precincts that had functioned during the election. On July 6, 2004,
the case was superseded by an election protest filed by private respondent with the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) contesting the results of the election in all 520 precincts on the grounds of
miscounting, misreading and misappreciation of votes, substitute voting, disenfranchisement of voters,
substitution and padding of votes, and other alleged irregularities

After an initial hearing on private respondents protest and petitioners answer, the Second Division issued
on November 17, 2004 an order directing the collection of the ballot boxes from the contested precincts
and their delivery to the Comelec.

Revision of the contested ballots commenced in mid-January of 2005[3] and concluded on February 2,
2005. The revision report indicated a reduction in petitioners vote count from 44,792 votes to 39,752 and
an increase in that of private respondent from 22,474 to 39,184 votes. Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a
motion for technical examination of contested ballots on the ground that thousands of ballots revised by
the revision committees were actually spurious ballots that had been stuffed inside the ballot boxes
sometime after the counting of votes but before the revision proceedings. The Second Division denied the
motion.

On March 17, 2005, the first hearing set for the presentation of his evidence, petitioner was directed to
pre-mark his exhibits and formalize his intention to have his witnesses subpoenaed.

In an order dated April 25, 2005,[4] the Second Division ruled that the testimonies of the proposed
witnesses were unnecessary inasmuch as the Comelec had the authority and wherewithal to determine
by itself the ballots authenticity and, for that reason, denied the motion and directed petitioner to file
forthwith his formal offer of evidence.

Asserting his right to present evidence in his defense, petitioner filed on May 6, 2005 a motion for
reconsideration of the April 25, 2005 order. In an order dated May 12, 2005, the Second Division denied
the motion.

On June 15, 2005, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari[7] under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (docketed as G.R. No. 1628253) assailing the April 25 and May 12, 2005 orders of the Comelecs
Second Division for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

Meanwhile, the Second Division continued with the proceedings and, following the submission of the
parties memoranda, considered EPC No. 2004-61 submitted for resolution.
In a resolution[8] dated January 23, 2006, the Second Division then composed of only two sitting
members, namely, Presiding Commissioner Mehol Sadain (now retired) and Commissioner Florentino
Tuason, Jr. declared private respondent Imperial the winning candidate for mayor of Legaspi City and
ordered petitioner Rosal to vacate said office and turn it over peacefully to private respondent.

On January 30, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Second Divisions resolution. The
motion was denied by the Comelec en banc in a resolution dated May 29, 2006.[10] In due time,
petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Comelec en banc
resolution. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 172741 and consolidated with G.R. No. 168253

ISSUE :

HELD : an interlocutory order rendered by a division of the Comelec, cannot be assailed by means of a
special civil action for certiorari, as only final orders of the Comelec en banc can be brought to the
Supreme Court by that mode.
We disagree. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
In fine, Kho tells us that an interlocutory order of a Comelec division should be challenged at the first
instance through a proper motion, such as a motion for reconsideration, filed with the division that
rendered the order. If that fails and no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy (such as recourse to the
Comelec en banc) is available, the party aggrieved by the interlocutory order may elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court by means of a petition for certiorari on the ground that the order was issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

As made abundantly clear by the foregoing provisions, the mode of preserving the ballots in this
jurisdiction is for these to be stored safely in sealed and padlocked ballot boxes which, once closed, shall
remain unopened unless otherwise ordered by the Comelec in cases allowed by law.

We summarize the foregoing doctrines: (1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as
reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved
with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change, abstraction or
substitution; (2) the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a
manner is on the protestant; (3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be
made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance that
the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of achieving
that end; (4) it is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on
the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof shifts to
the protestee and (5) only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court or Comelec that the integrity of the
ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the
election returns.

The procedure adopted by the Second Division was a complete inverse of the one outlined above and
was contrary to reason. There was complete arbitrariness on its part.

First, there was no indication at all that it ever considered the condition of the ballot boxes at the time they
were delivered to the Comelec for revision

Second, it placed the burden of proving actual tampering of the ballots on petitioner herein (the protestee
below) notwithstanding private respondents previous manifestation that most of the ballot boxes bore
overt signs of tampering[28] and only 79 ballot boxes were found intact.

Third, instead of diligently examining whether the ballot boxes were preserved with such care as to
preclude any reasonable opportunity for tampering with their contents, the Second Division made the
probative value of the revised ballots dependent solely on whether spurious ballots were found among
them.
Jainal vs Comelec
FACTS:

Petitioner Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and private respondent Julhatab J. Talib
werecandidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. On May 20, 2010,
the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Jainal as the winningcandidate.

On 23 May 2004, Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC praying for
the annulment of election returns pertaining to twenty-one (21) precincts, and for his
proclamation as the Mayor. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the
precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the
election returns for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board
of Election Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers, a fact which indicates that said
election returns were manufactured. Talib also noted that the number of votes cast
exceeded the number of voters in Precinct Nos. 33A and 34A.

Jainal prayed for the dismissal of Talib’s petition, contending that the latter’s allegations
were the proper subject of an election protest in the proper trial court.

On March 22, 2005, the COMELEC (2nd Division) issued a Resolution, granting the petition
in part, annulling the election returns from nine precincts. The proclamation of Jainal was
likewise annulled. Jainal filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On September 18, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration but modified the
resolution of its 2nd Division by declaring the election return pertaining to Precinct 9A of
Barangay Adjid as valid.

Talib filed the instant petition, including Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as
Vice-Mayor, who, under the provisions of the Local Government Code, will fill up the
vacancy created by the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation.

Vice-Mayor Hussi Ahajan Ahajan took his oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor pursuant
to the COMELEC resolutions of 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006.
Jainal likewise filed Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation before the COMELEC EN BANC
praying for an order suspending the implementation and execution of the 22 March 2005
and 18 September 2006 COMELEC resolutions.

On 5 October 2006, the COMELEC granted the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation of
Jainal and ordered Hussi Ahajan (Vice Mayor) to cease and desist from assuming
the position of Acting Mayor.

Ahajan questions the validity of the 5 October 2006 Order of the COMELEC which directed
him, as Vice-Mayor, or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming
the position of Acting Mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC rightfully issued the 5 October 2006 Order directing the Vice
Mayor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.
HELD: No.

Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. The effects of the
22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 resolutions can no longer be suspended not only
because the resolutions are already final and executory but also because the power to
suspend enforcement lies only with this Court. Thus, in granting the motion and ordering
the Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of
Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a usurpation of this Courts
prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs sought in the
present petition. It behooved the COMELEC en banc to deny or at least refuse to take action
on the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation.
With the nullification of petitioners proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan,
Sulu is vacant. The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession.
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and
Vice Mayor. ─ If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or
vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be
filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined
herein:

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office.

Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioner’s proclamation is in the nature
of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a permanent incapacity to discharge the
functions of his office. Ahajans assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as
subject to the result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the
COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true
will of the electorate in the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were nullified. (G.R.
No. 174551, March 7, 2007)
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 134657. December 15, 1999]

WENCESLAO P. TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PASAY

CITY BOARD OF ELECTION CANVASSERS and JOVITO CLAUDIO, respondents.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections En
Banc dated July 29, 1998 dismissing the petition for annulment of proclamation of Jovito O. Claudio and
the supplemental petition for correction of the statement of votes as well as affirming the proclamation of
Claudio in SPC No. 98-144 entitled Wenceslao Trinidad, et al. vs. Pasay City Board of Canvassers, et al.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Wenceslao Trinidad and private respondent Jovito Claudio both ran for the position of
mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 18, 1998 private respondent Claudio was proclaimed by the Pasay City Board of Canvassers
as the elected mayor with 55,325 votes[1] over petitioner Trinidads 55,097 votes.
On May 23, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for correction of manifest errors and annulment of
proclamation.[2] Alleged as grounds, among others, were the double canvassing of five election returns
and the inclusion of a bogus election return in the canvass. Petitioner claimed that, after the questioned
errors have been corrected, he would obtain a plurality of 54,916 votes as against private respondents
54,857.
On June 8, 1998, petitioner filed a supplemental petition averring an error in the Summary of
Statement of Votes for District II of Pasay City (No. 094338). It was alleged that in the said summary of
statement of votes Trinidad gathered 1009 votes per Statement of Vote (SOV) No. 094284. But in SOV
No. 094284 it was reflected therein that he obtained 1099 votes.[3]
On June 9, 1998, an order was issued by the COMELEC requiring the parties to file their
simultaneous memoranda within five days after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution
with or without memoranda.[4]
The Pasay City Board of Canvassers filed its Answer on even date.[5]
Thereafter, or on June 15, 1998, private respondent Claudio filed his answer/memorandum (with counter-
petition for correction).[6]
In the counter-petition it was stated that some statements of votes contained errors which, if
corrected, would entitle Claudio to an additional forty (40) votes but would result in petitioners being
deducted thirteen (13) votes.
Petitioner contested the filing of private respondents answer/memorandum (with counter-petition for
correction) in his Manifestation and Comments dated July 18, 1998.[7] In the said pleading, petitioner
reiterated his plea for the addition of 90 votes to his total and manifested two (2) new errors, namely: (1)
the election returns from five precincts were not canvassed and (2) there were some discrepancies in the
election returns of nine precincts. These errors as well as the uncanvassed returns, if corrected and
accounted for in the total number of votes, would allegedly give petitioner an edge of eighteen (18) votes
over private respondent: 55,229 votes to Claudios 55,211 votes.
The COMELEC rendered its decision on July 29, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Commission authorizes the Pasay City Board of Canvassers to re-convene and re-
canvass the Election Returns correcting the manifest clerical errors therein and also correcting the
discrepancy between SOV 094284 and SOV 094338, as above indicated.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission hereby DISMISSES the petition for annulment of proclamation of
respondents Jovito O. Claudio and Reynaldo Mateo and the Supplemental Petition for correction of the
Summary of the Statement of Votes. We AFFIRM the proclamation of respondents Claudio and Mateo
with the margin of votes indicated above.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Hence this petition.

The sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTION EN BANC COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING
THE PROCLAMATION OF RESPONDENT JOVITO CLAUDIO AS ELECTED MAYOR OF PASAY
CITY

The petition must fail.

In support of the ground raised above, petitioner contends that there was an incomplete canvassing of
votes because five (5) precincts of Pasay City were never canvassed. These precincts were 448-A/448-A-
2, 688-A-5, 725-A-4, 95-A/96-A, and 351-A. Canvassing of these precincts was overlooked when five
precincts were doubly canvassed.
The issue on incomplete canvassing was raised for the first time in the Manifestation and Comments
filed by petitioner.
We take pains to emphasize that the same was filed only on July 18, 1998, thirty-four (34) days after
the case had been submitted for resolution on June 14, 1998.[9] When a case is already deemed submitted
for decision or resolution, the court can only consider the evidence presented prior to this period. It can
not and must not take into account evidence presented thereafter without obtaining prior leave of
court. For as held in the case of Arroyo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[10]

(t)he rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counter protestant must stand or fall upon the
issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for
filing of protest or counter protest.

A pre-proclamation controversy praying for the correction of manifest errors must be filed not later
than five (5) days following the date of proclamation[11] while an election protest must be filed within ten
(10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election.[12]
 At this juncture, we have to point out that the said Manifestation and Comments, whether it be
considered a pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest, was filed beyond the reglementary
period to do so.
The COMELEC has not ruled on the matter of the five uncanvassed election returns. It was alleged
in the memorandum filed by the Solicitor General that the eight (8) precincts [for the five uncanvassed
election returns and the three erroneous statements of votes] were not raised before the Commission en
banc.[13] The Commission on Elections may suspend its rules of procedure so as not to defeat the will of
the electorate.
Petitioner contends that there was no need to suspend the COMELEC rules of procedure in order to
resolve the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition.
We find that there was a need to do so.
Contrary to what the COMELEC perceived, the Supplemental Petition is a petition for correction of
manifest errors, not a petition for declaration of nullity. It squarely falls within the definition provided in
the case of Mentang vs. Commission on Elections,[14]

(c)orrection of manifest errors has reference to errors in the election returns, in the entries of the statement
of votes by precinct/per municipality, or in the certificate of canvass.

Section 5 (2), Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure likewise provides:

Sec. 5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly with the Commission. - (a) The
following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:

xxx

2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the
results during the canvassing as where xxx (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of
the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass xxx

The Supplemental Petition prayed for the correction of the erroneous copying of figures into the
summary statement of votes from the statement of votes thus it is a petition for correction of manifest
errors.
Some of the definitions given for the word manifest are that it is evident to the eye and
understanding; visible to the eye; that which is open, palpable, uncontrovertible; needing no evidence to
make it more clear; not obscure or hidden.[15] (citations omitted)

A manifest clerical error is

... one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, and is apparent from the papers to the eye
of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be
shown to have been committed.[16] (citations omitted)

Section 5 (b) of the same Rules also enunciates that:

If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of
proclamation xxx
 Note should be made that the Supplemental Petition was filed on June 8, 1998 or exactly 21 days
from the date of proclamation on May 18, 1998. It was therefore filed beyond the reglementary period to
do so.
The Supplemental Petition which was meant to be suppletory to the original petition involving a pre-
proclamation controversy, is a prohibited pleading. Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
states:

Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed:

xxx

(g) supplemental pleadings in special actions and in special cases.

A pre-proclamation controversy is a special case in accordance with Section 5 (h), Rule 1, 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:

Sec. 5. Meaning of Words. Whenever used in these Rules, the following words or terms shall mean:

xxx

(h) Special Cases shall refer to Pre-proclamation cases

Finally, Section 3, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides thus:

Sec. 3. Matters Subject of Supplemental Pleadings. -- Upon motion of a party the Commission or a
Division, as the case may be, may, upon notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. xxx

The subject of the supplemental pleading filed by petitioner was not in accordance with the
prescribed rule.
As the name connotes, a supplemental petition merely supplies deficiencies in aid of the original
petition. It cannot be used to introduce a new matter or a new cause of action or defense which is
precisely what the petitioner had done in the instant case.

A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading a substitute for the original one. It does not
supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand, and the issues joined under the
original pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action."[17]

The issue raised in the Supplemental Petition is a new one, not even advanced in the original
Petition. It sought the correction of Summary Statement of Votes No. 094338 which credited petitioner
with only 1009 votes when Statement of Votes No. 094284 upon which the former was based listed 1099
votes for him.
The original petition only asked for the correction of the double canvassing of five election returns
and the exclusion of an election return of an inexistent precinct. It did not raise the issue of the incorrect
total of the summary statement of votes and its correction.
We quote some portions of the questioned resolution of the COMELEC, thus:
However, this Commission cannot countenance an injustice that will be done to petitioner if his allegation
of error if proven would result into a loser becoming a winner. The Commission in order to fulfill its
mandate in faithfully determining the will of the electorate may brush aside its rules if it stands in the way
of finding the truth. The Supreme Court recognized the Commissions paramount role when it pronounced
that, While election controversies should be speedily settled, so as not to frustrate the expression of the
peoples will, this laudable objective does not free the Commission from compliance with established
principles of fairness and justice and the adjudication of cases not on technicality but on their substantive
merits (Rodriguez versus Comelec, 119 SCRA 465). If the rules are obstacles in the way of doing justice,
then it can be said that it is a mere technicality that should not stand in the way of determining as to who
between the contending parties have the mandate of the electorate.[18]

xxx

xxx (T)he Commission in order to do justice and truly determine the rightful winner in the elections may
suspend its rules provided the right of the parties are equally protected and act thereon pro hac vice.xxx[19]

From the above, we could glean why there was a need to suspend the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Without its suspension, the Supplemental Petition would have been dismissed.
The allegation that it was Republic Act 7166 that was suspended and not the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure is not correct. Both R.A. 7166 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cover the same
subject on which the suspension was made, to wit: Sections 17 and 20 of R.A. 7166 (now found under
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines) and Sections 2 and 9, Rule 27 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner alleges that the suspension of the rules should have been applied equally.
We hold that the COMELEC did so.
In his petition, Trinidad alleges that there is no provision or concept in the Omnibus Election Code
or the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that mentions a counter-petition in pre-proclamation cases because
a petition is an original action, a separate formal petition, or one that can stand alone. He further contends
that there are some antecedents or jurisdictional requirements that must be met, such as payment of filing
fees, mandatory compliance with the period within which to appeal or file action, the service of summons,
setting of the case for hearing, the reception of evidence for both parties, etc.
The Answer/Memorandum (with Counter-Petition for Correction) filed by private respondent is akin
to a counterprotest.
A counterprotest is not a prohibited pleading under Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Such pleading is provided for under Ordinary Actions (Section 3, Rule 20, 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure) and is equivalent to an answer with a counterclaim under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which applies suppletorily to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[20]
It is the contention of the petitioner that there was no need for the COMELEC to suspend its rules of
procedure because even without the Supplemental Petition the COMELEC would have basis to order the
correction of errors since the petition itself clearly states the number of votes garnered by petitioner and
private respondent based on a summation of the statement of votes by precinct.
The COMELEC, in its resolution of July 29, 1998,[21] raised the following points:

1. The Supplemental Petition is an entirely separate petition as it raised a new issue distinct and
different in substance to the original petition.
 2. It was filed on June 8, 1998 or exactly 21 days from date of proclamation on May 18, 1998 and
clearly filed out of time and is a prohibited pleading in the instant case.

Despite these infirmities, the Supplemental Petition was considered and the allegations therein given due
consideration. The COMELEC, in fact, credited petitioner with the additional ninety (90) votes claimed in
his Supplemental Petition.[22]

Petitioner thus benefited from the suspension of the rules of procedure when his Supplemental Petition
was resolved in his favor. He should not be heard to say that the COMELEC did not give him the same
treatment accorded the private respondent.

In the instant case, however, we do not find the COMELEC to have exceeded nor abused its
jurisdiction. Unless it is shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with
its decisions and rulings.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Nolasco v COMELEC

FACTS

A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged
performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code – giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is
allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided
against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as
intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him.
The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s motions thus this
petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to
prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blanco’s contention that the minimum
quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require
is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s
proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case
of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer
would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be
assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the
disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.
JUAN DOMINO v. COMELEC, GR No. 134015, 1999-07-19
Facts:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in
item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected for... one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani
for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the... cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at
Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent
clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member
of... the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend
the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate
had not yet become... final and executory.
The result of the election,... shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over
his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of
Sarangani.
Issues:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring
petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding
upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
Ruling:
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election
Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the
exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine
whether false... representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy,
that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in
the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the
determination of
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the
residency requirement.
the authority to... order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries
with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said
authority
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's
political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to... be registered as a voter in
any other election... the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani,
approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of
Barangay Old
Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not
within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over
exclusion... cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of
voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which
he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO
August 16, 1999

Facts:

This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier
Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.

Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the
marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having
been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days
later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage
certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of
mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their
respective certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the
cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false
representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private
respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private
respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.

In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married
Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she
encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had
abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which
was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since
1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public
transactions.

Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and
Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently,
the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a
ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.

However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private
respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review
such promulgation.

Issue:

1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes
material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held:

Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in
her certificate of candidacy.

A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide
a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to
mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is
absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by
private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for
when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for
someone else by the use of such name.

The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel
private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

FACTS:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in
Buguias Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng
argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor
when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of
lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was
denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment
of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly
elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second
placer.

ISSUE:
WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and
executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the
duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two
conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May
2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2)
the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.
CASE DIGEST : LOONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 93986 December 22, 1992

BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM and ALIM BASHIR
EDRIS, respondents.

FACTS : On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17
February 1990 (15 January 1990 being the last day for filing said certificate); herein two (2) private
respondents (Ututalum and Edris) were also candidates for the same position.

On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent
Commission (Second Division) a petition (docketed as SPA Case No. 90-006) seeking to disqualify
petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.

On 15 May 1990, the respondent Commission (Second Division) rendered the now assailed Resolution 3
(with two (2) Commissioners — Yorac and Flores concurring, and one Commissioner — Dimaampao
dissenting), holding that:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Commission on Elections (Second Division) holds that it
has jurisdiction to try the instant petition and the respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is hereby denied.

Denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution, the respondent Commission
issued Resolution dated 3 July 1990, 7 stating among others that —

While the Frivaldo case referred to the questioned of respondent's citizenship, we hold that the principle
applies to discovery of violation of requirements for eligibility, such as for instance the fact that a
candidate is a holder of a green card or other certificates of permanent residence in another country, or,
as in this case, that the candidate does not possess the age qualification for the office.

On 3 July 1990, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region. 8 Hence, this special civil action of certiorari filed by petitioner on 9 July 1990 to
annul the aforesaid resolutions of respondent Commission dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July 1990, issued in
SPA No. 90-006.

ISSUE : SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed
within the period prescribed by law.

HELD : The undisputed facts are as follows: petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy on 15
January 1990 (The last day for filing the same), the election for officials of the Muslim Mindanao
Autonomous Region being on 17 February 1990; but private respondent Ututalum filed the petition (SPA
90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49) days from the date
Loong's certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990), and sixteen (16) days after the election
itself.

Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6734 (entitled, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao") requires that the age of a person running for the office of Vice Governor for
the autonomous region shall be at least thirty-five (35) years on the day of the election
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code ("Code" for brevity) provides that the certificate of candidacy of
the person filing it shall state, among others, the date of birth of said person. Section 78 of the same
Code states that is case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a
petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the
time the certificate was filed.

Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for disqualification, as in
the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later
than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures.

The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to disqualify petitioner
Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his
age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly
covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of
candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at nay time after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a
procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no
legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a
legislative enactment.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on
grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also
makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the
Code. Nowhere in Section 6 and 7 Rep. Act. No 6646 is mentioned made of the period within which these
disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the
periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78,
already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate fails to file the petition
within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do
not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate
by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the
election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of
procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official
on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo
warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten
(10)days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

In sum, SPA No. 90-006 was filed by private respondent Ututalum beyond the 25-day period (from the
filing by petitioner Loong of the questioned certificate of candidacy) prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code. It follows that the dismissal of said petition for disqualification is warranted. Further it would
appear that we can not treat SPA NO. 90-006 as a petition for quo warranto (Section 253 of the Code)
for when it was filed with the respondent Commission, no proclamation of election results had as yet
been made, it was premature.