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APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL)

(2010) 3 SCC 439
151. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the
defence. This is trite law and no decision has taken a contrary view.
What some cases have held is only this: where various links in a
chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence
may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court. In other
words, before using the additional link it must be proved that all the
links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity.
It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the
prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false
defence or a plea which is not accepted by a court.
152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we
would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and
essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on
circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic
decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh1. This
case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a
large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of
Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh17 and Ramgopal v. State of
Maharashtra18. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid
down in Hanumant case1:
“It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established,
and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be
such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be
proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to
show that within all human probability the act must have been done
by the accused.”
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following
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conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be

said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances
concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is
not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be
proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this
Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra19 where the
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not
merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the
panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.
155. 156. It may be interesting to note that as regards the mode of
proof in a criminal case depending on circumstantial evidence, in the
absence of a corpus delicti, the statement of law as to proof of the
same was laid down by Gresson, J. (and concurred by 3 more Judges)
in King v. Horry20 thus:
“Before he can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by
such circumstances as render the commission of the crime morally
certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt: the circumstantial
evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince a jury
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that upon no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be
accounted for.”
156. Lord Goddard slightly modified the expression “morally
certain” by “such circumstances as render the commission of the
crime certain”.
157. This indicates the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence
that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and
explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral
conviction. Horry case20 was approved by this Court in Anant
Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay21. Lagu case21 as also the principles
enunciated by this Court in Hanumant case1 have been uniformly and
consistently followed in all later decisions of this Court without any
single exception. To quote a few cases — Tufail case17, Ramgopal
case18, Chandrakant Nyalchand Seth v. State of Bombay22, Dharambir
Singh v. State of Punjab2. There are a number of other cases where
although Hanumant case1 has not been expressly noticed but the same
principles have been expounded and reiterated, as in Naseem Ahmed
v. Delhi Administration23, Mohan Lal Pangasa v. State of U.P.24,
Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra25 and M.G. Agarwal
v. State of Maharashtra26 — a five-Judge Bench decision.
161. This Court, therefore, has in no way departed from the five
conditions laid down in Hanumant case1.
............................................................... There is a vital difference
between an incomplete chain of circumstances and a circumstance
which, after the chain is complete, is added to it merely to reinforce
the conclusion of the court. Where the prosecution is unable to prove
any of the essential principles laid down in Hanumant case1, the High
Court cannot supply the weakness or the lacuna by taking aid of or
recourse to a false defence or a false plea. ..........................................
162. Moreover, in M.G. Agarwal case26 this Court while reiterating the
principles enunciated in Hanumant case1 observed thus:
“If the circumstances proved in the case are consistent either with the
innocence of the accused or with his guilt, then the accused is entitled
to the benefit of doubt.”
In Shankarlal25 this Court reiterated the same view thus: [SCC para
31, p. 44: SCC (Cri) p. 322]
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“Legal principles are not magic incantations and their importance lies
more in their application to a given set of facts than in their recital in
the judgment.”
163. W............................................................ It is well settled that where
on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which
goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an
accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.
In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh28 this Court made the
following observations: [SCC para 25, p. 820: SCC (Cri) p. 1060]
“Another golden thread which runs through the web of the
administration of justice in criminal cases, is that if two views are
possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a
special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought
to be established by circumstantial evidence.”

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116

22*. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a
very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be
unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness
should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the
witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the
truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be
more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from
the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness
makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should
be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the
accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such
a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-
examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and
under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the
factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the
sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and
every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made,
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the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific

evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should
consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can
even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of
circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link
in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence
alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies
the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can
it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness”
whose version can be accepted by the court without any
corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be
more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of
the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials,
namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the
said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying
the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting
materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.
Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi),(2012) 8 SCC 21

17. In Govindaraju v. State the Court inter alia discussed the law
related to dying declaration with some elaboration: (SCC pp.
739-41, paras 23-31)
“23. Now, we come to the second submission raised on behalf of the
appellant that the material witness has not been examined and the
reliance cannot be placed upon the sole testimony of the police
witness (eyewitness).
24. It is a settled proposition of law of evidence that it is not the
number of witnesses that matters but it is the substance. It is also not
necessary to examine a large number of witnesses if the prosecution
can bring home the guilt of the accused even with a limited number
of witnesses. In Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand10 (SCC p. 405,
para 10), this Court had classified the oral testimony of the witnesses
into three categories:
(a) wholly reliable;
(b) wholly unreliable; and
(c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
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In the third category of witnesses, the court has to be cautious and

see if the statement of such witness is corroborated, either by the
other witnesses or by other documentary or expert evidence.
25. Equally well settled is the proposition of law that where there is a
sole witness to the incident, his evidence has to be accepted with
caution and after testing it on the touchstone of evidence tendered by
other witnesses or evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a
sole witness should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit into
the chain of events that have been stated by the prosecution. When
the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a sole eyewitness, then
such evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Presence of
such witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the
evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other witnesses, it
may not be safe to make such a statement as a foundation of the
conviction of the accused. These are the few principles which the
Court has stated consistently and with certainty.
26. Reference in this regard can be made to Joseph v. State of Kerala11
and Tika Ram v. State of M.P.12 Even in Jhapsa Kabari v. State of
Bihar13, this Court took the view that if the presence of a witness is
doubtful, it becomes a case of conviction based on the testimony of a
solitary witness. There is, however, no bar in basing the conviction on
the testimony of a solitary witness so long as the said witness is
reliable and trustworthy.
27. In Jhapsa Kabari13, this Court noted the fact that simply because
one of the witnesses (a fourteen-year-old boy) did not name the wife
of the deceased in the fardbeyan, it would not in any way affect the
testimony of the eyewitness i.e. the wife of the deceased, who had
given a graphic account of the attack on her husband and her
brother-in-law by the accused persons. Where the statement of an
eyewitness is found to be reliable, trustworthy and consistent with
the course of events, the conviction can be based on her sole
testimony. There is no bar in basing the conviction of an accused on
the testimony of a solitary witness as long as the said witness is
reliable and trustworthy.
28. In the present case, the sole eyewitness is stated to be a police
officer i.e. PW 1. The entire case hinges upon the trustworthiness,
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reliability or otherwise of the testimony of this witness. The

contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the police officer,
being the sole eyewitness, would be an interested witness, and in that
situation, the possibility of a police officer falsely implicating
innocent persons cannot be ruled out.
29. Therefore, the first question that arises for consideration is
whether a police officer can be a sole witness. If so, then with
particular reference to the facts of the present case, where he alone
had witnessed the occurrence as per the case of the prosecution.
30. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a
sole eyewitness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the
facts of a given case. If the testimony of such a witness is reliable,
trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other witnesses or
admissible evidence, then the statement of such witness cannot be
discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and may have
some interest in success of the case. It is only when his interest in the
success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his
involving innocent people; in that event, no credibility can be
attached to the statement of such witness.
31. This Court in Girja Prasad14 while particularly referring to the
evidence of a police officer said that it is not the law that police
witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be
accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other
independent evidence. The presumption applies as much in favour of
a police officer as any other person. There is also no rule of law which
lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a
police officer even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and
trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny
of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police
officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither
do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring
down the prestige of the police administration.”
M. Sarvana v. State of Karnataka,(2012) 7 SCC 636
25. Equally well settled is the proposition of law that where there is a
sole witness to the incident, his evidence has to be accepted with
caution and after testing it on the touchstone of evidence tendered by
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other witnesses or evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a

sole witness should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit into
the chain of events that have been stated by the prosecution. When
the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a sole eyewitness, then
such evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Presence of
such witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the
evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other witnesses, it
may not be safe to make such a statement as a foundation of the
conviction of the accused. These are the few principles which the
court has stated consistently and with certainty.
26. Reference in this regard can be made to Joseph v. State of Kerala10
and Tika Ram v. State of M.P.11 Even in Jhapsa Kabari v. State of
Bihar12, this Court took the view that if the presence of a witness is
doubtful, it becomes a case of conviction based on the testimony of a
solitary witness. There is, however, no bar in basing the conviction on
the testimony of a solitary witness so long as the said witness is
reliable and trustworthy.
Govindaraju v. State.,(2012) 4 SCC 722

71. In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202 this Court has held that
where a criminal court has to deal with the evidence pertaining to the
commission of offence involving large number of offenders and large
number of victims, it is usual to adopt a test that the conviction could
be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses
who give a consistent account of the incident.
69. This Court has held in Jainul Haque v. State of Bihar (1974) 3 SCC
543 that evidence of exhortation is in the very nature of things a weak
piece of evidence and there is often quite a tendency to implicate
some person in addition to the actual assailant by attributing to that
person an exhortation to the assailant to assault the victim and unless
the evidence in this respect is clear, cogent and reliable, no conviction
for abetment can be recorded against the person alleged to have
exhorted the actual assailant.
Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar,(2012) 7 SCC 225

Prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable

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doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an

accused is “preponderance of probabilities”. Inference of
preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the
materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to
the circumstances upon which he relies. (34)
Krishna JanardhanBhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54
27. The principles of law governing proof of a criminal charge by
circumstantial evidence need hardly any reiteration. From the several
decisions of this Court available on the issue the said principles can
be summed up by stating that not only the prosecution must prove
and establish the incriminating circumstance(s) against the accused
beyond all reasonable doubt but the said circumstance(s) must give
rise to only one conclusion to the exclusion of all others, namely, that
it is the accused and nobody else who had committed the crime.
The above principle is deducible from the five propositions laid
down by this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
(1984) 4 SCC 116 which principles have been consistently followed in
Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 156,
Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 3 SCC 156, Aftab Ahmad Anasari
v. State of Uttaranchal (2010) 2 SCC 583, Sanatan Naskar v. State of
W.B.(2010) 8 SCC 249 and Mohd. Arif v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 13
SCC 621.
Brijesh Mavi v. State (NCT of Delhi),(2012) 7 SCC 45
64. Even in the cases of circumstantial evidence, the court has to take
caution that it does not rely upon conjectures or suspicion and the
same should not be permitted to take the place of legal proof. The
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of
the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but
the one proposed to be proved. (Ref. Mousam Singha Roy v. State of
W.B. (2003) 12 SCC 377)
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B.,(2012) 7 SCC 646
 But though the guilt of the accused in cases which involve the
assessment of these facts has to be established beyond a
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reasonable doubt, these various facts are not required to be

proved by the same rigorous standard.
 The same standard of proof as in a civil case applies to proof of incidental
issues involved in a criminal trial like the cancellation of bail of an
accused. The prosecution, therefore, can establish its case in an
application for cancellation of bail by showing on a preponderance of
probabilities that the accused has attempted to tamper or has tampered
with its witnesses.
State (Delhi Admn.) v. Sanjay Gandhi, (1978) 2 SCC 411
The rules of appreciation of evidence require that court should not
draw conclusions by picking up an isolated sentence of a witness
without adverting to the statement as a whole.
Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra,
(2010) 13 SCC 657
Material contradictions
30. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into
consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been
of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial.
Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or
improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of
the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the
evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the
entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of
the witnesses and the appellate court in normal course would
not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable
reasons. (Vide State v. Saravanan1.)
31. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating
a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and the
other witness also makes material improvements before the
court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be
safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide State of Rajasthan v.
Rajendra Singh2.)
32. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found
to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving
and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances,
witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is
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found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence

or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it
cannot be held that the prosecution proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. (Vide Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of
U.P.3)
33. In case, the complainant in the FIR or the witness in his
statement under Section 161 CrPC, has not disclosed certain
facts but meets the prosecution case first time before the court,
such version lacks credence and is liable to be discarded. (Vide
State v. Sait4.)
34. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki5, while dealing with this issue,
this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 754, para 8)
“8. … In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal
discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be. These
discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal
errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental
disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the
occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those
which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person.”
35. The courts have to label the category to which a
discrepancy belongs. While normal discrepancies do not
corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies
do so. (See Syed Ibrahim v. State of A.P.6 and Arumugam v.
State7.)
36. In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh8 this Court
examined the issue and held: (SCC p. 192, para 9)
“9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But
it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the
prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a
crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.”
37. While deciding such a case, the court has to apply the
aforesaid tests. Mere marginal variations in the statements
cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be
elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The
omissions which amount to contradictions in material
particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the
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trial or core of the prosecution case, render the testimony of

the witness liable to be discredited.
Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of
Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657
26. In Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab18, this Court considered a similar
issue, placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Zwinglee Ariel v.
State of M.P.19 and held as under: (Balaka Singh case18, SCC p.
517, para 8)
“8. … the court must make an attempt to separate grain from the
chaff, the truth from the falsehood, yet this could only be possible
when the truth is separable from the falsehood. Where the grain
cannot be separated from the chaff because the grain and the chaff
are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of separation, the
court would have to reconstruct an absolutely new case for the
prosecution by divorcing the essential details presented by the
prosecution completely from the context and the background against
which they are made, then this principle will not apply.”
27. In Sukhdev Yadav v. State of Bihar20 this Court held as under: (SCC
p. 90, para 3)
“3. It is indeed necessary, however, to note that there would hardly
be a witness whose evidence does not contain some amount of
exaggeration or embellishment—sometimes there would be a
deliberate attempt to offer the same and sometimes the witnesses in
their over anxiety to do better from the witness box detail out an
exaggerated account.”
28. A similar view has been reiterated in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat21
(SCC pp. 246-47, para 13) wherein this Court has cautioned the
courts below not to give undue importance to minor discrepancies
which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case. The
court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in
different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by
excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness for the
reason that witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to
their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by
the court. However, the courts should not disbelieve the evidence of
such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy.
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29. In Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab22 (SCC pp. 113-14, para 51) this
Court had taken note of its various earlier judgments and held that
even if major portion of the evidence is found to be deficient, in case
residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, it is the duty of the
court to separate grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material
witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to
end. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in
India and the witness cannot be branded as a liar. In case this maxim
is applied in all the cases it is to be feared that administration of
criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot
help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main.
Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the
evidence is worthy of credence, and merely because in some respects
the court considers the same to be insufficient or unworthy of
reliance, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must
be disregarded in all respects as well.
30. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra23 this Court held:
(SCC pp. 799-800, para 6)
“6. … Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a
ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the
guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon,
that ‘a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty
no less than from the conviction of the innocent….’ In short, our
jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be
moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent
and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance
possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping
the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.
We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and
appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the
courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must
operate to the advantage of the appellant.”
[See also Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.24, Gangadhar Behera v. State of
Orissa25 (SCC p. 395, para 18), Sucha Singh222 (SCC p. 654,
para 21), and S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman26 (SCC p. 92, para
23).]
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Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P.,(2012) 5 SCC 777

(2007) 9 SCC 1

RELATIONSHIP WITH VICTIM OR ACCUSED

Mere relationship does not discredit the testimony of a witness.
What is required is careful scrutiny of the evidence. If after careful
scrutiny the evidence is found to be credible and cogent, it can be
acted upon.
Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585, at page 600

CROSS EXAMINAITON
16. We may, in this connection, refer to the following passage from
the decision of this Court in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 1
SCC 240: (SCC p. 247, para 9)
“9. … It is a rule of essential justice that whenever the opponent has
declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his case in cross-
examination it must follow that the evidence tendered on that issue
ought to be accepted.”
P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., (2012) 7 SCC 56
18. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into
consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such
magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions,
inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial
matters, which do not affect the core of the case of the prosecution,
must not be made a ground for rejection of evidence in its entirety.
The trial court, after going through the entire evidence available,
must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses, and the
appellate court in the normal course of action, would not be justified
in reviewing the same again without providing justifiable reasons for
the same. (Vide State v. Saravanan5.)
19. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a
serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other
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witness also makes material improvements before the court, in order

to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon
such evidence. The discrepancies in the evidence of the eyewitnesses,
if found not to be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving
and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses
may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in
conflict and contradiction with other evidence available or with a
statement that has already been recorded, then, in such a case it
cannot be held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt.

Pudhu Raja v. State,(2012) 11 SCC 196

29. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra2 it was held by
this Court that the onus is on the prosecution to prove that the chain
is complete and that falsity or untenability of the defence set up by
the accused cannot be made the basis for ignoring any serious
infirmity or lacuna in the case of the prosecution. The Court then
proceeded to indicate the conditions which must be fully established
before a conviction can be made on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. These are: (SCC p. 185, para 153)
“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
… the circumstances concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘may be’
established. …
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.”
Thus, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must
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establish each instance of incriminating circumstance, by way of

reliable and clinching evidence, and the circumstances so proved
must form a complete chain of events, on the basis of which, no
conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused can be reached.
Undoubtedly, suspicion however grave it may be, can never be
treated as a substitute for proof. While dealing with a case of
circumstantial evidence, the court must take utmost precaution
whilst finding an accused guilty, solely on the basis of the
circumstances proved before it.

Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab,(2012) 11 SCC 205

1. Prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all

reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a
defence on the part of an accused is “preponderance of
probabilities”. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can
be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the
parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which
he relies.
2. Where there is a sole witness to the incident, his evidence has
to be accepted with caution and after testing it on the
touchstone of evidence tendered by other witnesses or
evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a sole witness
should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit into the
chain of events that have been stated by the prosecution. When
the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a sole eyewitness,
then such evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy.
Presence of such witness at the occurrence should not be
doubtful. If the evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with
the other witnesses, it may not be safe to make such a
statement as a foundation of the conviction of the accused.
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LIST OF JUDGMENTS
1. Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar (2012) 7 SCC 225
2. Brijesh Mavi v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 7 SCC 45
3. Esher Singh v. State of A.P. (2004) 11 SCC 585
4. Govindaraju v. State. (2012) 4 SCC 722
5. Krishna JanardhanBhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54
6. M. Sarvana v. State of Karnataka (2012) 7 SCC 636
7. P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P. (2012) 7 SCC 56
8. Pudhu Raja v. State (2012) 11 SCC 196
9. Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21
10. Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. (2012) 5 SCC 777
11. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116
12. Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. (2012) 7 SCC 646
13. State (Delhi Admn.) v. Sanjay Gandhi (1978) 2 SCC 411
14. Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab (2012) 11 SCC 205
15. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of (2010) 13 SCC 657
Maharashtra
16.
17.
18.
19.

GROUNDS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY LITIGANTS

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REPLY TO GROUNDS PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY LITIGANTS