Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA;

Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality
of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining

the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the
ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right
of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.

Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court

of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo
Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc.
No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed
the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of
the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as
“public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to
section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically

deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration

is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.

In keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership

are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

REPUBLIC V. CA

FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was
approved and issued an original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title
specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5
years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The District Land Officer, acting
upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon finding that the subject
land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for
cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC
dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting

encumbering the land within the 5-year period?

2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD

1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date
of approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant…The contracts of lease and mortgage executed by
Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land
Act because such contracts impair the use of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it,
the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public
domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration of land
subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land.
In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that
said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity.
The subject land in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to the
public domain.

Legarda vs. Saleeby

March 25, 2011 ~ vbdiaz
Legarda vs. Saleeby

G.R. No. 8936

October 2, 1915

FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of years
a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens
system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.

Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25, 1912,
the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition
of the defendant also included said wall.

On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including
said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.

The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon
the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the
defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot,
including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

HELD: The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for
the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it

Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to the
defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name,
more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it
by simply including it in a petition for registration?

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the
registration of titles under the Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There
is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been
registered in the name of two different persons.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act,
that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or
the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate
to an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater
right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had,
only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as
against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and
exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to
make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore
made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the
predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.