1st Batch Crim Rev - Cases 1 To 45 (Complete)

1st BATCH: CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW – Atty Roland Atienza
A. People of the Philippines vs. Juan Richard Tionloc

G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017
TOPIC: Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code - Rape; Lack of Resistance
Facts: Appellant Tionloc was found by the RTC of Manila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC committed against "AAA".
"AAA" testified that she was having a drinking session with appellant and one Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time,
she felt dizzy so she took a nap but she was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into
her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to cut hotdog and now lying on top of a
table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering,
appellant approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and raped her.
Appellant stopped only when "AAA" tried to reposition her body.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be acquitted of the crime charged for lack of resistance of "AAA" when she was
raped by the former.
Ruling: Resistance should be made before the rape is consummated.
Three things are thus clear from the testimony of "AAA":
1. Appellant never employed the slightest force, threat or intimidation against her;
2. "AAA" never gave the slightest hint of rejection when appellant asked her to have sex with him; and,
3. Appellant did not act with force since he readily desisted when "AAA" felt the slightest pain and tried to move during their
sexual congress.
"AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection of
appellant's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual congress when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be
considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's sexual advances.
Resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman
defending her virtue, honor and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment
appellant's evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman
who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with
her, changed her mind in the middle and charge him with rape.
It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution
to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal.
B. JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172716; November 17, 2010; CARPIO, J.:
TOPIC: Article 365
FACTS: A vehicular collision occurred, petitioner was charged before the METC with 2 separate offenses:
(1) Reckless imprudence resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce.
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information charging Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
METC: refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

RTC: affirmed METC
ISSUE: whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the criminal case
charging reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
HELD: YES, reckless imprudence is a single crime; its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished;
in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, and lack of care or foresight, the imprudence is punishable.
Prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense. Reason and
precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not
be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable
as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. Nor, does Article 48 apply to acts penalized under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of
all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts
are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense
is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
C. VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194390; August 13, 2014; REYES, J.:
TOPIC: Art. 365
FACTC: Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with falsification of public document under Article 171(4), RPC
before the Sandiganbayan (SB) when he, as then the councilor, made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). That in
answer to the question of whether there is a pending criminal case against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in authority before the MTC.
Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint was likewise filed against Sevilla before the Office of the
Ombudsman where the latter found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and dismissed
him from the service. (The OBM decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court)
In the present criminal, Sevilla averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza, a
member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS. He instructed Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which
he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza at his house as he had no office yet,
he claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein and failed to notice the error made. The
SB found petitioner guilty of Falsification of Public Documents through Reckless Imprudence pursuant to Art. 365, RPC as Sevilla’s
PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein. The reckless signing of the PDS without verifying
the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a government officer, who prior to his election as councilor in
2001, had already served as a councilor of the same city. Thus, he should have been more mindful of the importance of the PDS and
should have treated the said public document with due respect.
(The marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal case against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by
the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman in its Resolution, in answer to question 29 in the PDS, accused answered that he had not been a candidate in any local
election (except barangay election), when in fact he ran and served as councilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in question
29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless
shows that the preparation of the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.)
ISSUE:
1. WON the designation of the felony committed by Sevilla was proper/accurate.
2. WON Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence
notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of
public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
RULING:
1. The Court ruled in the negative.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the
falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a
modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime. In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, citing Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga, the Court rejected the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x
x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative
intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent)
and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property.
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, the Court clarified that: Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless
imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple
imprudence causing damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of
bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent. Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.
2. The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the
offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved. There is no dispute that a variance exists between the
offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification ofpublic
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is
necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act
committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely
exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order that no
prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise offensive. What is penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might
have produced several effects or consequences.
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the
Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable.
The petition was dismissed.

1. PEOPLE vs. GATUDAN BALAG-EY
TOPIC: Sale of Prohibited Drugs; Elements
FACTS: There are 3 versions of facts here. Prosecution’s version is that Gatudan Balag-ey together with Edwin Aliong ware arrested
in a buy-bust operation conducted by the team of SPO1 Natividad as poseur buyer, and SPO1 Rabago and SPO2 Lingbawan as back-
up. They were arrested in front of Jollibee Session Road, where the suspects, on board a Tamaraw FX, intended to deliver 20kilos of
Marijuana to the buyers. Police officers aver that Gatudan alighted the Tamaraw FX taxi parked in from of Jollibee Session Road and
went to the him to inform him that the drugs were in the compartment of the FX. Upon checking the contents of the box (Phillip
Morris box), and confirming that the marijuana was inside, Natividad gave the signal and arrested Gatudan and Aliong. They boarded
the same FX taxi and went to the NARCOM office. The FX taxi was driven by Vicente Garbo. The RTC found both Gatudan and Aliong
guilty of illegal possession and attempted sale of prohibited drugs.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the prosecution witnesses are credible.
2. Whether the charge of illegal possession and attempt to sell are proper.
RULING:
1. RTC committed glaring errors in not considering testimony of other witness, such as when Gatudan Balag-ey was seen by other
witnesses in handcuffs coming from the Universal Martial Arts Gym, which is of a considerable distance from Jollibee Session Road,
as well as the testimony of the taxi driver of the Tamaraw FX who said that he did not see Balag-ey ride the taxi with Aliong on the
way to the NARCOM office. Such testimonies are material in determination of whether there was possession, attempt to sell, and
conspiracy between the accused.
2. Balag-ey and Aliong were charged violation of Section 4 in relation to Section 21 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659 – an
offense they allegedly committed by conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, without any authority of law and by
having in their possession and attempting to sell dried marijuana.
Section 21 punishes an attempt or a conspiracy among others, in the sale administration delivery distribution and transportation of
dangerous drugs. Based on the testimony of the FX driver, there is no evidence that Aliong conspired with Balag-ey and attempted
to sell the prohibited drugs. The rule is settled that, without any other evidence, mere presence at the scene of the crime is not by
itself sufficient to establish conspiracy.
Elements: Prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs it is material and indispensable (1) to prove that the accused sold and
delivered the prohibited drug to another, as well as to present in court the corpus delicti as evidence, and (2) to prove that the
accused knew that what was sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. The attempt to sell the drugs may be established by overt
acts showing that the accused knowingly commenced the commission of the crime.
Even the charge of illegal possession of prohibited drugs was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of this offense
are the following: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. The third requisite was not
convincingly established by the prosecution.
2. People of the Philippines v. Simpresueta M. Seraspe
G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013.
TOPIC: Exculpatory Causes-Sale of Illicit Drugs
Facts: Appellant questions the lower courts’ finding of conspiracy between her and co-accused. She claims that she merely
accompanied Espiritu in going to the RFC Food Court and had nothing to do with the transaction. As a matter of fact, the shabu was
not even found in or recovered from her possession. It just so happened that she was in the area during the delivery of the drugs.
Issue: Is the judgement of conspiracy, considered as exculpatory cause in the sale of illicit drugs?
Held: Yes, The argument did not persuade the Supreme Court. There is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of the
parties. Conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. The existence of
conspiracy in this case was clearly established not only by the prosecution’s evidence but also by appellant’s very own testimony. As
can be gleaned from appellant’s testimony as well as from the testimony of Carla as to what transpired during the actual buy-bust
operation, appellant acted in common concert with her co-accused in the illegal sale of shabu. She cannot therefore isolate her act of
merely accompanying Espiritu to the RFC Food Court or carrying the shabu since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know
the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
3. People vs Clarite
TOPIC: Sale of Prohibited Drug
Facts:
An entrapment operation was conducted out of an information given by cedeo an asset about Arnel who allegedly is interested to find
buyers of Shabu. Cedeo then contacted Arnel, nbi officer Romano acted as a poseur buyer. The transaction transpired in Naga city,
where Arnel was apprehended by the nbi officers with 45 grams of white substance inside small sachets upon the receipt of marked
money with fluorescent powder on it. He contented that although he was involved in sale of prohibited drugs, the nbi officers
arrested him not in flagrante delicto but while he was on board a tricycle on the way to his mother in laws house.
Issue: Whether he can be held liable for sale of drugs despite the supposed Inadmissibility of evidence obtained
through an illegal search
Ruling: The testimonies of Romano, corroborated by his fellow NBI investigators Jimenez and Dizon and informant Cedeo
established the sale and delivery by accused-appellant Clarite to Romano of what was initially believed to be 50 grams of shabu in
four plastic sachets, in exchange for what Clarite thought was P50,000.00. Romano positively identified accused-appellant Clarite as
the person who sold the plastic sachets of shabu to him. As for the sale itself, Romanos account was simple and clear. T was also
proven that the sachets of white substance are Shabu and his contention that he never held the marked money was not true because
he was positive for the fluorescent powder present in the marked money.
4. People v. Zheng Bai Hui
GR No. 127580, August 22, 2000; Kapunan, J:
TOPIC: Presentation of Informant
Facts: Appellants were charged in an information stating:
That on or about the 24th day of October 1994 at Kalookan City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, conspiring together and mutually helping with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to SPOI GILBERT G. SANTOS who posed as
buyer, One (1) blue plastic bag labelled "SM Shoemart" containing one (1) piece of newsprint with one (1) transparent
plastic bag containing yellowish crystalline substance "METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCLORIDE" (Shabu) and having a weight
of 992.30 grams, a regulated drugs, knowing the same to be such.
They were sentenced by the Caloocan RTC to suffer death penalty. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the trial judge to allow disclosure of the identity of the informer deprived appellants of
their right to confront and cross-examine said witness.
Ruling: No. As a rule, informers are not presented in court because of the need to preserve their cover so they can continue their
invaluable service to the police. Equally strong reasons include the maintenance of the informant’s health and safety and the
encouragement of others to report wrongdoing to police authorities. The rule against disclosure is not absolute, however. In Roviaro
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court declared:
What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity
of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. [Citations omitted.] The
purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes
the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by
preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will not
tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been
disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of
an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to
a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the
Government withholds the information, dismiss the action.
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in
protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders
nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the
possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.
Before disclosure of the informer’s identity may be allowed, however, the defense must, before or during the trial, request the
production of the confidential informant or his identification. (Thus, in Roviaro the accused repeatedly demanded disclosure.) In
addition, the defendants must show how the identity of the informer is essential to their defense.
Appellants nevertheless failed to show at the time of their request how the identity of the informer or her production was essential to
their defense.
The burden of showing need for disclosure is upon defendants. The necessity for disclosure depends upon "the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors." Appellants did not develop any such criteria with reference to the merits of the
case. A mere request during a witness’ examination indicates speculation on the relevancy of his testimony; and mere speculation
an informer may be helpful is not enough to carry the burden and overcome the public interest in the protection of the informer.
Hence, the trial court did not err in sustaining the refusal of the witness to reveal the identity of Stardust.
5. People v. Bartolome
TOPIC: COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
Facts: On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to report an illicit drug dealing of the accused Bartolome in
Caloocan City. The police immediately instructed some of his men to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. During the
pre-operation briefing, the buy-bust team designated PO1 Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a ₱100.00 bill that he
marked with his initials BP. It was agreed that the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify him to
Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust team that the transaction with the suspect had been
consummated. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. The accused was apprehended just as
planned.
On his part, the accused claimed that the arresting officers had framed him up because they wanted to extort a substantial amount
from him in exchange for his release.
RTC convicted him guilty of violation of Sec. 5 RA 9165. On appeal to the CA, the accused argued that the operation mounted
against him was not an entrapment but an instigation, contending that without the proposal and instigation made by poseur buyer
Paras no transaction would have transpired between them; that the police team did not show that its members had conducted any
prior surveillance of him; and that the Prosecution should have presented the informant as a witness against him.
Issue: Whether the informant must be presented as witness in the court?
Ruling: No. The presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a
drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the
informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant’s identity is
protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered
absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded. Here, however,
the informant’s testimony as a witness against the accused would only be corroborative of the sufficient testimony of Paras as the
poseur-buyer; hence, such testimony was unnecessary.
6. PEOPLE vs. SALVADOR SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 175832, October 15 2008
TOPIC: Buy-bust/seizure and custody/chain of custody/inventory under RA 9165
FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for selling
zero point zero two (0.02) grams of shabu . The prosecution presented its lone witness - SPO2 Levi Sevilla . The appellant and his
witness, Nida Detera (Nida), took the stand for the defense.
According to SPO2 Sevilla: Om April 6, 2003, they received a confidential information that there is a person who has been
selling shabu. An entrapment team was formed consisting of himself as poseur buyer, the team was dispatched to a squatter’s
colony at the far end Lualhati Street, Manotok Subd., Baesa, Quezon City. PO2 Sevilla put his initial LS on the money given to him to
be used at the entrapment. In the said place , SPO2 Sevilla met the pusher and told him that he badly needs shabu para pumayat. x
x x PO Sevilla then gave the pusher P100.00 (the marked money) and in return the pusher gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. After
receiving the plastic sachet, SPO2 Sevilla scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal to his colleagues who were deployed nearby.
Thereafter, the accused was arrested and frisked. SPO2 Sevilla recovered the P100.00 marked money bill in the right side pants
pocket of the accused who was later brought to Station 3. PO Sevilla identified the transparent plastic sachet on which he placed his
initial LS and the initial SS of the accused.
The appellant gave a different version of the events in his testimony of January 30, 2005. He narrated that in the afternoon
of April 6, 2003, he was in his house putting his children to sleep when three (3) police officers suddenly barged into his house,
searched the premises, frisked him, and forced him to come with them. The police officers then handcuffed him and asked him to get
into a police vehicle. He begged them and shouted, Sir you already frisked me in the house and you did not find anything, you might
just plant evidence in my pocket, please do not do so. The police brought him to Police Station 3, Talipapa, Quezon City, and placed
him in a detention cell without an investigation being conducted. While inside his cell, the police showed him a plastic sachet and said
that it was the shabu taken from him. SPO2 Sevilla asked him to call his uncle, but he refused to do so; he feared that his uncle
would think that the confiscated shabu was really taken from him.
The RTC primarily considered the reputation of SPO2 Sevilla in giving weight to his testimony, and held that SPO2 Sevilla
has been a frequent witness in drugs cases and he has already established his credibility before this court. RTC found the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted for violation of RA 9165.
RULING: NO. The prosecution failed to prove accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court pointed three mistakes by the
authorities. First is their non-observance of the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. There
was no photograph of the seized items during the buy-bust operation and no representative of the media or public officer to sign the
inventory of the seized items. The non-observance of the rule creates doubt on the integrity of the seized items whether real or
framed. The marking of Sevilla was not essential as he could have done it anytime after the arrest was made.
Second, the “chain of custody” over the confiscated items was not proven. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed. In a long line of cases, we have considered it fatal for the prosecution to fail to prove that the specimen submitted for
laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused. There was doubt on the authenticity of the items on
who handled it between the arrest and the court hearing. The testimony of Sevilla showed that the handler of the items were
unknown.
7. PEOPLE vs JESUSA FIGUEROA
TOPIC: Attempted Sale of Drugs, non-coordination with PDEA
FACTS: In the evening of June 20, 2004, an informant came to the office of P/Supt. Yabut), Chief of the Special Operation Unit 1 of
PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (PNP AIDSOTF) at Camp Crame and informed him of the drug pushing activities
of a certain Baby, later identified as accused-appellant FIGUEROA. PO3 CALLORA, together with the informant, met with accused-
appellant FIGUEROA at the parking area of SM Bicutan in Taguig, Metro Manila. The informant introduced PO3 CALLORA to accused-
appellant FIGUEROA as the one who was willing to regularly buy shabu from her should her sample be of good quality.Accused-
appellant FIGUEROA, however, told them that she had no stock of shabu at that time, but she promised to inform PO3 CALLORA
through the informant once she already has supply of good quality shabu. called the Desk Officer of the Special Operation Unit 1 of
PNP AIDSOTF, who in turn relayed to P/SUPT. YABUT that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had informed him that she already had a
stock of good quality shabu and asked how much shabu would be bought by PO3 CALLORA. P/SUPT YABUT instructed the informant
to tell accused-appellant FIGUEROA that P10,000.00 worth of shabu would be bought from her.
Later on the same day, the informant made another telephone call and relayed the information that accused-appellant FIGUEROA
had agreed to deliver the shabu worth [P10,000.00] in front of the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at the corner of M. Almeda and M.
Conception Avenues, San Joaquin, Pasig City at about 4:00 p.m. of that day. They all then proceeded to the said place. Seeing the
two, accused-appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and drove towards them. Stopping near them, accused-appellant FIGUEROA rolled
down the window of her car and asked where the money was. On the other hand, PO3 CALLORA asked for the shabu. At that
juncture, accused-appellant FIGUEROA opened a Chowking plastic bag and showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance.
When PO3 CALLORA was about to hand over the buy-bust money to accused-appellant FIGUEROA, the latter sensed the presence of
police officers in the area, so she sped away towards the direction of Kalayaan Avenue and C-5 road. Accused-appellant FIGUEROAs
vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue near the intersection of C-5 road. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA denied that she met
and transacted with PO3 CALLORA regarding the sale of shabu. She likewise denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu that
were recovered under the floor matting of the car she was driving as well as the plastic sachet of shabu inside a Chowking plastic
bag found on the pavement of Kalayaan Avenue corner C-5 road. She contended that she and her companions were made to stay at
the sidewalk for about thirty minutes. They were asked to turn their backs and were told not to do anything while the search was
going on. P/SUPT. YABUT later said, Aantayin muna natin sila. For another thirty minutes, they stayed at the sidewalk until other
persons referred to by P/SUPT. YABUT arrived at the scene. After the search, accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were
ordered to board the same Toyota Revo, which was driven to Camp Crame by one of the persons who arrived at the scene. The RTC
thus held:
1. In Criminal Case No. 04-2432[,] the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado is ACQUITTED of the charge for violation of Sec. 11, Art.
II RA No. 9165 for lack of evidence. The two plastic sachets of containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a
combined weight of 9.42 grams are forfeited in favor of the Government. Let the custody thereof be turned over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its appropriate disposition.
2. In Criminal Case No. 04-2433, the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado alias Baby is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA 9165 and is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00).
Let the one plastic bag labeled Chowking containing one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet with 4.60 grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for its appropriate disposition.
The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUES: 1. Does lack of prior coordination with the PDEA affect the legality of buy bust operations?
2. Is the testimony of a police officer as regards the attempted sale of shabu between the informant and the
accused, hearsay?
3. Is the accused guilty of attempted sale of illegal drugs under RA 9165?
HELD
1. No. Accused-appellants contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate
operations on account of the the law enforcers failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. Thus, in People v. Berdadero,
[13] the Court noted that Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the
consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust
operation. This Court consequently held that this silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without
the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible
2. No. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, we have held that the hearsay rule does not apply where only the
fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.[19] In the case at bar, the
testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the conversations between the informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it
established that said information led the police officers to prepare for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The conversation
between the informant and the accused-appellant was not necessary to prove the attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to sell
was already clear from accused-appellants actuations on July 2, 2004, which were all within the personal knowledge of PO3 Callora
and testified to by him, to wit: (1) when accused-appellant arrived at the scene, she waived at the informant and PO3 Callora and
approached them while driving her Toyota Revo;[20] (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and the informant, accused-appellant asked
PO3 Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for the shabu;[21] (3) accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a
Chowking plastic bag containing a sachet of white crystalline substance;[22] (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give her the
money, accused-appellant sensed that there were police officers around the area, and drove away;[23] (5) PO3 Callora and the
informant boarded the car of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5 Road corner Kalayaan Avenue.
3. YES. Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences its commission directly
by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. Here, The identity of the white crystalline substance was established by the testimony
of PS/Insp. Garcia, who likewise testified as to the following matters based on his own personal knowledge:
(1) after the chase, PS/Insp. Garcia saw a boy (later identified as Christian Salceda) alight from the vehicle and threw a
Chowking plastic bag two to three meters from the vehicle;[27]
(2) PS/Insp. Garcia picked up the Chowking plastic bag from the sidewalk ad found a sachet of shabu inside the same;[28]
(3) PS/Insp. Garcia later proceeded with the other police officers to their office, where they requested for a laboratory
examination of the white crystalline substance;[29] PS/Insp. Garcia identified the Chowking plastic bag and the sachet
containing white crystalline substance in court. He identified the mark PEG-1 on the sachet as his initial and testified that he
was the one who marked the same. The latter specimen was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.[31]
In light of the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, which were found credible by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, the crime of attempt to sell a dangerous drug under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165 was sufficiently
proven beyond reasonable doubt
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 131592-93; February 15, 2000; PUNO, J.:
TOPIC: RA 10591; Elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms
FACTS: Accused CASTILLO, a lead man in a construction site, was charged with the separate crimes of Murder and Illegal Possession
of Firearms in 2 separate Information. The scene of the crime was the then on-going construction site of Gaisano Building in Lapaz,
Iloilo City. At around 8:00 in the morning, one of the construction workers saw his co-worker ROGELIO ABAWAG being closely
pursued by accused. During the chase, the accused pointed a gun at Abawag and shot him. Abawag fell on his knees beside a pile of
hollow blocks. Acaso, another co-worker saw the accused in front of Abawag pointing a .38 caliber revolver at the latter. Abawag was
then leaning on a pile of hollow blocks, pleading for mercy. The accused shot Abawag a third time despite the latter's imploration.
The accused then fled, leaving Abawag lifeless. Through the help and positive identification of Akoy, brother-in-law and co-worker of
accused, the police officers were able to apprehend the accused who was about to escape by boarding a vessel bound for Cebu. Upon
inquiry, the accused denied complicity in the killing of Abawag. The police found in his possession a .38 caliber handmade revolver,
three (3) empty shells and (3) live ammunitions. Further inquiry revealed that the accused owned the gun but had no license to
possess it. Thus, the charges. The trial court convicted the accused of Homicide, as the prosecution failed to prove the alleged
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and of Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide. The
accused anchors his present appeal on the assertion that his conviction was unwarranted as no proof was adduced by the
prosecution that he was not licensed to possess the subject firearm.
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearm.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.
Two requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm,
and second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it
outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.
The first element was indubitably established by the prosecution based on the testimony of eyewitness Acaso. However, no proof
was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the accused was not licensed to possess the
firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a
license or permit should have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm or that the type of firearm involved can be lawfully
possessed only by certain military personnel. As the Information alleged that the accused possessed an unlicensed gun, the
prosecution is duty-bound to prove this allegation. Hence, in the case at bar, although the accused himself admitted that he had no
license for the gun recovered from his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to possess the gun. In People vs. Solayao, we expounded on this
doctrine, thus:
. . . (b)y its very nature, an "admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be
inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." In other words, it is a
"statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or
circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." From the above principles, this
Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond doubt the commission of the crime
charged. Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court which states: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case does not require proof. Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant
does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish a
prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of
a license.
Additionally, as pointed out by both the accused and the Solicitor General, the extrajudicial admission was made without the benefit
of counsel. Thus, we hold that the accused may only be held liable for the crime of simple homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.
9. People vs. Felicisimo Narvasa
G.R. No. 128618 November 16, 1998
Law: Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunitions Law
TOPIC: Proof of firearm; presentation not necessary; with reference to People vs. Arsenio Ferrera
Doctrines: -“the Court held that the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the
said firearm”;
- take note that the existence of the firearm must be duly proven, if there is doubt, even if a firearm was presented but it
was not sufficiently proven that it was the firearm at subject, no conviction under this law should be promulgated. (People vs.
Navarro)
Facts: Councilmen of Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan, namely Vilamor Laderas and Ernesto Nagal went to the towns of Bani and its
adjoining town Agno in Pangasinan, acting upon the report of missing carabaos, pigs and sheep. In the course of their journey they
chanced upon the gang of herein accused, there were 5 of them and three of them were armed as stated “Jimmy Orania was holding
a caliber .30 U.S. carbine, Mateo Narvasa was armed with [an] M-16 and Felicisimo Narvasa was carrying an M-14.” The gang of
Narvasa simply stared at the councilmen but gave no physical violence, the gang simply went home, the councilmen subsequently
met with PO3 Primo Camba and PO2 Simeon Navora who were on patrol and they reported what they saw.
The policemen suggested that they track down the armed goons, the 4 of them travelled towards the known house of
Felicisimo, upon nearing the house they were met with gunfire. In this instance the policemen and councilmen sought cover. Laderas
saw Felicisimo Narvasa and Mateo Naravasa firing their guns with Jimmy Orania guiding the latter at his targets.
Ladera’s group retreated but PO3 Camba was hit causing him to bleed to death, and forcing his companions to leave his
body at the crime scene. The assailants were later apprehended, pieces of evidence were seized such as empty M-16, M-14 and .30
caliber shells. Felicisimo Narvasa, Glicerio Narvasa, Rederio Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were found positive of gunpowder burns.
Mateo Narvasa was not found.
Ruling of the Trial Court:
It ruled for the conviction of the accused for the crime of illegal possession of firearms aggravated by homicide using the
doctrine in the case of People v. Barros, in which the ruling in said case was based on an outdated provision of the Comprehensive
Firearms and Ammunitions Law, which the SC will later correct.
It also stated that the ruling is justified, even though the subject firearms were not actually presented, but their existence
were sufficiently proven by testimonies, and hard evidence such as the shell casings and the positive gunpowder burns, in
consonance with the case of People v. Ferrera, where the ruled that actual presentation of the firearms need not be done so long
as their existence is duly proven by evidence.
Accused appealed to the SC stating the impropriety of the decision for lack of sufficient evidence, the firearms were never
really presented in court.
Issue Related to the Syllabus:
1. Can, the trial court convict the appellants for illegal possession of firearms despite the non-presentation of such in court?
Other Issues
2. Was the conviction of illegal possession of firearms proper despite the death of Camba by the hands of the appellants?
3. Were the testimonies credible despite inconsistencies in their narration?
Ruling:
1. Yes it can pursuant to the case of People v. Ferrera, People vs. Lualhati and People vs Navarro. The elements of
illegal possession of firearms are: “the existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.” The existence of the
firearms may be proven by testimony or other hard evidence.
In this case these were the testimonies of Laderas and Nagal, the shell casings and that the appellants tested positive
for gunpowder burns as stated by the SC.
In the case of People vs. Navarro, there was a firearm presented but it was not sufficiently proven that it was the
firearm at subject. This reveals that evidence of the existence of the firearm must be sufficiently proven and connected with the
accused.
Further the second element was proven by the testimony of the PNP showing their master list of license holders
whereby the names of the accused were nowhere to be found.
2. No it was not, for the law was amended by RA 8294 no longer making illegal possession of firearm a separate offense
from murder or homicide but merely an aggravating circumstance to murder and homicide, the death is no longer absorbed in illegal
possession of firearms but makes the crime murder or homicide aggravated by the possession.
3. Yes they were, the inconsistencies were minor in character coupled with the fact that at the time of the incident they
were being fired upon by the appellants.
Nota Bene:
- In the case of People v. Ferrera, the accused with his companions, tortured and killed one Pascual Macaraig a tanod
bayan of Barangay Mabuhay, Valencia, Bukidnon. His corpse was found on its back, neck slashed, stomach cut open,
and the liver missing. Deep wounds indicative of attempts to tear portions of the flesh from the body were also noted
on the victim's thighs. He was eventually killed by a carbine rifle. He was prosectured and held guilty for murder
o Upon appeal accused invoked that the knife and the carbine were not presented and thus the corpus delicti
was not established.
o The SC did not agree corpus delicti means the fact that the crime or a crime has been commiited and not the
actual products or tools used in said crime, this may be established by testimony as done in this case, where
three witnesses saw appellants manhandle, stab, chase and shoot the victim and one tricycle driver who saw
the accused delivering a jar containing a human ear to soldiers wearing civilian clothes stating that it was the
ear of the victim Macaraig.
10. People of the Philippines vs. Julian Castillo
G.R. No. 131592-93, February 15, 2000
TOPIC: Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Law - Elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms
Facts: Accused-appellant Julian Castillo was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms in two (2) separate
Informations, for shooting his co-worker Rogelio Abawag with the use of a homemade .38 caliber revolver without serial number and
three (3) live ammunitions without the authority and permit to possess or carry the same, which caused his instantaneous death. He
was convicted by the trial court of Homicide as the prosecution failed to prove the alleged qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, and of Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide.
On automatic review by the Supreme Court, appellant impugns solely his conviction for illegal possession of firearm for which he was
sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not the elements of illegal possession of firearms were established by the prosecution warranting the conviction
of accused-appellant.
Ruling: Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms:
1. The existence of the subject firearm; and,
2. The fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his
residence.
The first element, the existence of the firearm, was indubitably established by the prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness saw appellant
shoot the victim thrice with a .38 caliber revolver. Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the security
guards in the building after the shooting. The same gun was recovered from the appellant and offered in evidence by the
prosecution.
However, no proof was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not
licensed to possess the firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not
an offense. The lack of a license or permit should have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the subject firearm or that the type of firearm involved can
be lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel. Indeed, if the means of proving a negative fact is equally within the control
of each party, the burden of proof is on the party averring said negative fact. It is the prosecution who has the burden of establishing
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged, consistent with the basic principle that an accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty. Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is a constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State
to prove this negative allegation of non-existence.
Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for the gun recovered from his possession,
his admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit
to possess the gun.
Thus, we hold that the appellant may only be held liable for the crime of simple homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
as the extrajudicial admission was made without the benefit of counsel.
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. REYNALDO CRUZ alias Rene Hapon, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 76728 ;August 30, 1988; PADILLA, J.:
TOPIC: OWNERSHIP NOT NECESSARY IN ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
FACTS: Reynaldo Cruz aka RENE HAPON was charged with the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Lt. Noel Manabat, along
with the elements of CRIG stationed at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila, acting on an intelligence information of a reliable
informant that about noon of that day a stolen car, coming from Quezon City, was to be sold somewhere in MagaIlanes, Makati,
nabbed Romeo Fernandez and Joey Flores at the intersection of EDSA and Timog Street and brought them to headquarters. After
some questioning, these 2 carnap suspects led the eight man-CRIG team to 61 Mabituan Street, Masambong, Quezon City where
they alleged the other members of the carnap gang were waiting for their shares of the proceeds from the sale of a vehicle. At said
address, a sister of appellant, who owned the apartment, opened the door to the CRIG team. Inside the apartment, the team found
RENE HAPON, sleeping on the floor, and gangmates Herminio Rivera and Lolito Timcang The team recognized appellant because he
was pointed to by Romeo Fernandez and Joey Flores. These two also informed the team that appellant was armed and, sure enough,
the team found a clutch bag containing a caliber .38 paltik revolver, 1 live ammunition and a hand grenade. Rene Hapon, in
the presence of all the eight-man CRIG team and gangmates admitted ownership of the bag, firearm, bullet and grenade. The team
arrested appellant and the rest of his group, as well as confiscated the items of the crime.
Defense: denied ownership or possession of the firearm and hand grenade, as well as the bag which contained the same.
According to the accused, the bag and its contents belonged to Joey Flores and was "planted" by PC operatives. The appellant
maintains that the revolver and hand grenade in question did not belong to him; nor was he in actual possession thereof at the time
he was arrested.
ISSUE: Whether ownership of the firearm is necessary in this case.
HELD: NO, Ownership is not an essential element of the offense charged. What the law requires is merely possession which includes
not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management.
The appellant also claims that the firearm and explosive in question cannot be used as evidence against him since the PC
officers had no warrant of arrest when they entered the apartment, in violation of his constitutional rights.
It should be noted that the unlicensed firearm and explosive were found when they arrested the accused and his
companions for "carnapping" and not for illegal possession of firearm ammunition. In Magoncia vs. Palacio, the Court ruled that an
unlicensed firearm may be seized without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant.
12. EUGENE C. FIRAZA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179319; September 18, 2009; CARPIO MORALES, J.:
TOPIC: Mission Order
FACTS: Petitioner, appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI, Caraga Regional Office in 1999, was issued a firearm and a mission
to gather and report to the NBI such information as may be relevant to investigations undertaken by it. In his private capacity,
petitioner served as manager for RF Communications in connection with which he dealt with Christopher Rivas, Provincial Auditor of
Surigao del Sur, for the establishment of a Public Calling Office in the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. In the course of a
meeting between petitioner and Rivas at the latter’s restaurant regarding the delivery of a defective machine for the Public Calling
Office, a heated exchange ensued during which petitioner is alleged to have pointed a gun (Pistol Caliber 45 with serial number
670320) at Rivas. Petitioner was thereupon accosted by P/Insp. Alberto A. Mullanida, Acting Chief of Police of Lianga, Surigao del Sur
and PO2 Nilo Ronquillo, who discovered that his permit to carry firearm outside residence had expired more than a month earlier or
on July 5, 2000.
Hence, a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner before the MCTC of Barobo-Lianga, Barobo, Surigao del Sur for
"UNATHORIZED CARRYING OF LICENCE FIREARM OUTSIDE RESIDENCE." Petitioner denied the allegation and claimed that while he
was explaining to Rivas the defect in the machine subject of their meeting, P/Insp. Mullaneda and PO2 Ronquillo apprehended him
and seized his firearm tucked inside his shirt, even as he identified himself as an NBI agent; and that he was prevented from
presenting a Mission Order dated July 26, 2000 issued to him by the NBI, to prove his authority to carry firearms outside of his
residence, due to the coercive manner by which the two approached him. The MCTC, as upheld by the RTC and CA, found petitioner
guilty of the crime charged, as penalized under Sec. 1, RA 8294. In convicting petitioner, the trial court noted the following facts:
1. That accused’s permit to carry firearms outside residence, has already expired when he was apprehended on August 11,
2000;
2. That the "Mission Order" was not presented or shown to the apprehending policemen on August 11, 2000;
3. That accused’s "Mission Order" was not issued by the NBI Director or Assistant/Deputy Director or by Regional Director of
Caraga Region;
4. That accused is only a confidential agent and as such is not included in the regular plantilla of the NBI, nor is receiving
regular compensation for the services he is rendering;
5. When apprehended, accused was not in actual performance of alleged mission but on business trip.
Hence, the petition. It bears noting that petitioner does not challenge his having been found guilty of violating Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 (Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition) However, petitioner argues, among others, and justifies, his
carrying of the firearm outside his residence with the July 26, 2000 Mission Order issued to him by the NBI which such order was
good for 60 days and which such order allowed him to carry his firearm.
ISSUE: WON the Mission Order issued to petitioner permitted him to carry his duly licensed firearm outside of his
residence.
Petitioner is mistaken. Permit to carry firearm is not the same as permit to carry licensed firearm outside one’s residence.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, a Mission Order is defined as "a written directive or order issued by
government authority as enumerated in Section 5 hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a definite purpose
or objective during a specified period and to such place or places as therein mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry
his duly issued or licensed firearms outside of residence when so specified therein." The Mission Order issued to petitioner
authorized him to carry firearms "in connection with confidential (illegible) cases assigned to [him]." Admittedly, petitioner was at
Rivas’ restaurant in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to
carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.
13. People v. Luisito Bustinera
G. R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004
TOPIC: RA 6593; Felonious taking; animus lucrandi
FACTS: ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to
11:00 p.m., after which he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day.
On December 25,1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he
was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and
revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to recover the taxi. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified theft.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court was correct in convicting accused of qualified theft.
HELD: Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of
a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When statutes are in pari materia or when they relate to
the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or have
the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they should be construed together.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a
domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is
fish taken from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the
taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things;
and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of
unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping being the same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the
unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply it is the
anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall
within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its
coverage certain vehicles such as road rollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not
used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively
14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 DANILO LOBITANIA
G.R. No. 142380. September 5, 2002
TOPIC: Qualified Carnapping
Facts: SPO1 Lobitania is found guilty of qualified carnapping and sentence with death penalty. On December 6, 1998, in
the City or Urdaneta accused SPO1 Danilo Lobitania with grave abuse of authority being a member of the Navotas PNP-NPD
Command, Navotas, Metro Manila, together with three still unidentified companions, armed with firearms by means of force and
intimidation with intent to gain, conspiring with one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and
carry away one Yamaha motorized tricycle with Plate No. 2N-7910 owned by David Sarto and driven at the time by Alexander de
Guzman against the latters will and without his consent, and on the occasion of the carnapping or by reason thereof, accused with
intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength conspiring with one another, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously box, hogtie, shoot and push out of the moving tricycle which caused the instantaneous death of said
Alexander de Guzman, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Issue: Can carnapping be qualified?
Held: Section 2 of R. A. 6536 as amended, defines the crime of carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. It becomes qualified when in the course of the commission or on occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped. When the carnapping is qualified, the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. In
the case at bar, all the elements were duly proven by the prosecution. Based on the testimony of Sanchez, accused-appellant and his
companions shot the driver of the tricycle, abandoned him and took possession of the vehicle. The testimony of Sanchez that the
driver was unknown to the group clearly establishes the fact that the motive of accused-appellant was to steal the tricycle and that
the killing of the driver was incidental thereto.
15. People vs Nocum
TOPIC: Carnapping with Homicide
Facts: Mahilac together with mallari and two others are part of a syndicate engaged in the carnapping of fx Toyota. One time, when
their Mindanao counterpart pangandag went to Manila to meet them, after their meeting they went to board a fx Toyota driven by
model. Days after, they went to lanao with said fx Toyota but Medel can no longer be found. Mallari said that mahilac should not
board the back part of the vehicle because there is dried blood from killing Medel which the body of said driver was thrown in zigzag
road in atimonan quezon.
Issue: Whether may be held liable for carnapping with homicide despite the absence of direct evidence linking him to
the crime charged.
Ruling: Mahilac testified that he was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the "FX Gang," gathered in
Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous buyers in Mindanao. Immediately after said
meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board it together with two other conspirators, and head
south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days later, Mallari and his companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on
board the same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa City. All these show that Mallari’s original criminal design was to carnap the taxi and
that he accomplished his purpose without the consent of its owner. In addition, when the vehicle was brought to Cagayan de Oro
City, its driver, Medel, was no longer with them. The vehicle also reeked of dried human blood. Upon inquiry by Mahilac, Mallari
admitted that the dried blood belonged to Medel who had to be killed for resisting the group. Mallari also told him that Medel’s body
was dumped along Zigzag Road in Atimonan, Quezon. Mallari and his co-accused received ₱250,000.00 upon delivery of the FX taxi
to its final destination. These prove that Medel was killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping
16. People v. Cerbito
GR No. 126397, February 1, 2000; Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:
TOPIC: PD 532; No specific victim in Brigandage
Facts: On September 3, 1992 at around 2:20 p.m. the passengers of a Philippine Rabbit Bus travelling on the North Expressway on
its way to Manila were victimized in a hold-up committed by four men who boarded the bus as it was approaching the Tabang
tollgate. A policeman who was a passenger in the bus shot one of the holduppers. The policeman was shot in turn by another
holdupper; the policeman died.
An information was filed against Daniel Mendoza Cerbito alias "Daniel", Vicente Mendoza Acedera, Jimboy Cerbito Morales alias
"Emboy", and John Doe, all of Laoang, Northern Samar, for violation of P.D. 532 (otherwise known as the Anti-Highway Robbery
Act).
The testimonies of the two passengers who witnessed the robbery and the homicide, namely Concordia Pagdanganan and Amor
Magsakay who identified all three accused-appellants in court are of vital if not decisive value.
Concordia Pagdanganan was on board the Philippine Rabbit Bus Number 1271 on her way home from Calumpit, Bulacan to her home
in Manila. She was seated at the back of the driver in the same row as Patrolman Edgar Ponce. The three accused-appellants,
together with a 16-year old boy boarded the bus as it was approaching the Tabang tollgate. She saw the four men because there
was a big mirror in front of the bus, through which one can see everyone who will board the bus from head to foot. At Tabang Plaza,
Daniel Cerbito, who had seated himself in the last row of the bus, announced a hold-up. Policeman Ponce stood up and shot Vicente
Acedera hitting him in the stomach. Vicente Acedera could not stand up anymore. Jimboy Morales, who was seated beside Ponce
whether Ponce was hit or not. Ponce slumped beside her legs, and as he was lying down, Daniel Cerbito approached and shot Ponce
in the head after getting the latter's revolver, wallet and police "chapa". Jimboy Morales together with the 16-year old boy, divested
the other passengers of their cash and belongings; there were almost fifty passengers in the bus. Among the victims were Magsakay,
a student of PMI and his friend. Magsakay was divested of his watch and P40.00 by Daniel Cerbito. Nothing was taken from
Concordia because Jimboy asked her if she had any money and she answered she had none. Cerbito took the jacket of one of the
passengers, who was a security guard from San Fernando, and put it on Vicente Acedera. Afterwards, the accused-appellants
ordered the driver to stop the bus at Malinta exit where they disembarked.9 On cross-examination, Concordia testified that when the
four persons boarded the bus they spread themselves inside the bus. She noted that one of the four, Vicente Acedera, wore flesh-
colored rubbers shoes, the other two accused-appellants wore white rubber shoes, and the 16-year old companion wore slippers.
Another eyewitness, Amor Magsakay, was presented by the prosecution. He testified that the accused-appellants ware armed.
Cerbito carried a paltik; pointed the gun at him and took his Seiko 5 watch and money (P40.00). Acedera was also carrying a
revolver, and was in front of the bus getting the money of the passengers. Jimboy Morales was holding a balisong knife. He did not
know what happened to the fourth hold-upper. He stated that it was Cerbito who shot Policeman Ponce; he put his head down
towards the floor after hearing the first shot but after hearing two shots, he put his head up and witnessed the shooting of Ponce by
one of the robbers.11
All the accused-appellants claimed they were somewhere else at the time of the incident. Jimboy Morales testified that he was in
Barangay Candawit, Laoang, Northern Samar, his home province, where he farms copra for a livelihood. 12 A neighbor, Adelaida
Balang, corroborated his alibi that he was in Barangay Candawit on September 3, 1992 and that he never left their place; she was
sure because almost everyday (she) sends him to run errands for (her).
The trial court found that the evidence of the prosecution has established the guilt of the three accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants for violation of Anti-Highway Robbery Law
Ruling: Yes. After a careful examination of the entire evidence, we resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction. We agree with the
trial court's rejection of the defense of alibi for the reason that said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
the two eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution. Confronted with contradictory declarations and statements, the trial court
cannot be faulted for giving greater weight to the positive testimonies of the witnesses who have not been shown to have any motive
to falsely implicate the accused-appellants, and whose credibility has not been placed in doubt. Alibi has generally been regarded
with disfavor by the court because it is easily fabricated and we have no reason to deviate from this rule.
Highway robbery/brigandage is defined in Section 2(e) of P.D. 532 entitled "Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law" as "(t)he
seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway." The robbery must be directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all
prospective victims. All the above elements were established.
17. People v. Mendoza
TOPIC: ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY
Facts: On May 1991 in San Juan, Grace and her sister Ramilyn were on their way home from their grandparents' house in Altura
Ext., Sta. Mesa. They boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Cubao via Aurora Blvd. The jeepney was fully loaded. When the
jeepney reached the dark portion of Aurora Blvd. near St. Paul's College, someone announced a hold-up. Both Mendoza and Rejali
had guns while Jack was armed with a knife. It was Rejali who fired his gun. However, a male passenger jumped off the jeepney and
a commotion ensued. Perplexed ("naguluhan") by this turn of events, the accused held Ramilyn who started kicking, trying to
extricate herself from their grasp. This prompted Mendoza to hit her on the head with his gun. He boxed and kicked her, causing
Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney into the street where she rolled. Ramilyn died.
Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. One of the accused hit Grace on the head with a gun causing her to lose consciousness.
From Glory, the accused were able to get the amount of P30.00. She handed it to the holdupper seated in front of her.
Issue: Whether the accused should be convicted of highway robbery with homicide punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532, or of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: The crime committed is the special complex crime of Robber with Homicide.
In People vs. Puno, this Court, speaking through the learned Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, explained the purpose of brigandage as
follows: “In fine, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery,
the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. (citing U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422
[1904]) x x x “x x x Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, x x x” Consistent with the above, to obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution should have proven that the accused, in the instant case, were organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. There, however, was a total absence of such proof. There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar
robberies by the accused—to show the “indiscriminate” commission thereof.
Hence, in charging a crime under P.D. No. 532, it is important to consider whether or not the very purpose for which the law was
promulgated has been transgressed. Citing the "whereas clauses" of P.D. No. 532 51 in Puno, the Court said:
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people"
as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would
accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people," such that
said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would
be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
Petty robbery in public transport vehicles (with or without personal violence and death) committed against the middle and lower
economic classes of society is as reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale robbery committed against the economically well-
heeled. Nonetheless, the law must be interpreted not only to bring forth its aim and spirit but also in light of the basic principle that
all doubts are to be resolved liberally in favor of the accused. As such, appellants may not be held liable under P.D. No. 532 but only
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the designation but the description of the offense charged. Considering
the allegations of the aforequoted Information, appellants herein should be liable for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery having been duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the
asportation of thirty pesos from Glory Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn Zulueta's death was accidental because it was produced
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta during the commission of the crime
are absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide.
18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO REANZARES* also known as ARMANDO RIANZARES
G.R. No. 130656. June 29, 2000
TOPIC: Purpose of Highway Robbery Law
FACTS: On 10 May 1994 at around 8:10 in the evening, the Spouses Gregorio Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan (Tactacan spouses) closed
their store and left for home in Barangay San Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their passenger-type jeepney. As Gregorio was
maneuvering his jeep backwards from where it was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on board. After negotiating
some 500 meters, one of the hitchhikers pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck
and ordered Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later identified as accused Armando Reanzares,
were seen waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused and his companion approached the vehicle.
Gregorio was gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also took his Seiko wristwatch worth P2,500.00 and
Lilia’s bag containing P1,200.00. Lilia was killed and sustained eight (8) stab wounds on the chest and abdominal region of the body.
The jeepney was not taken by the perpetrators.
Subsequently, two (2) Informations were filed against accused Armando Reanzares and three (3) John Does in relation to
the incident. The first was for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for
allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and armed with bladed weapons and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1)
Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan and P1,000.00 cash of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed her. The
second was for violation of RA 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and
intimidation of persons one (1) passenger-type jeepney with Plate No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan and valued
at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was arrested. The other three (3) have remained unidentified and at large.
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have perpetrated the crimes imputed to him with three
(3) others as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his daughter Jessica when the incident
happened. On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecutions evidence credible and ruled that the alibi of the accused could not
prevail over his positive identification by complaining witness Gregorio Tactacan. The court a quo declared him guilty of Highway
Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 and sentenced him to death. But the trial court exonerated the accused from the charge of
carnapping under RA 6539 for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Highway Robbery under PD 532.
RULING: NO. The accused was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 was erroneous. As held in a number of
cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused were organized for the purpose of committing it
indiscriminately. There is no proof in the instant case that the accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway
robbery. Neither is there proof that they attempted to commit similar robberies to show the "indiscriminate" perpetration thereof. On
the other hand, what the prosecution established was only a single act of robbery against the particular persons of the Tactacan
spouses. Clearly, this single act of depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to deter and punish
lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of
the people.
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 as the allegations in the Information are enough to convict him therefor. In the interpretation of
an information, what controls is the description of the offense charged and not merely its designation.
19. EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 140937. February 28, 2001
TOPIC: Elements of Cattle Rustling
P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation of any person or force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is
done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without
intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.[20]
FACTS: Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case, upon its birth on March 10,
1984. The cow remained under the care of Erlinda Monter for sometime.Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody of the
animal, first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October 24, 1984 to March 17, 1985; then to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March 2,
1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until March 14, 1986 when it was lost. [4] It appears that at 5 oclock in the
afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters
from his hut. However, when he came back for it at past 9 oclock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the cow gone. He
found hoof prints which led to the house ofFilomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.[5]
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the animal from petitioners wife, but they were
informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta, who was at that time barangay captain of Laca, Padre
Burgos, Southern Leyte.Accordingly, the two went to Florentinos house.On their way, they met petitioner who told them that if
Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself. Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his fathers house, where
Maria recognized the cow. As petitioners father was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next
day so that they could talk the matter over with his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern
Leyte.[6] As a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but
claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17,
1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim (Exh. B).[7]
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was
described as two years old and female. On the reverse side of the certificate is the drawing of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of
the forehead, between the ears, on the right and left back, and at the base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to 4).[8] All four
caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one they had taken care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its
color.Gardenio described the cow as black in color, with a small portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in
the middle of the forehead, another at the back portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks located near the base of its forelegs
and the hindlegs.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an agreement which he had with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva,
that petitioner take care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in consideration for which petitioner would get a calf if the cow produced
two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the cow in question was his share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This cow,
however, was lost on December 2, 1985. Petitioner said he reported the loss to the police of Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog,
on December 3, 1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1).[10]
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he had seen the cow at Pilipogan, under the care of
Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore, went to Pilipogan with the mother cow on March 14, 1986 to see whether the cow would suckle the
mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took it with him and brought it, together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino
Canta.[11]Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but Florentino refused to give it to her and instead told her to call Narciso so that they
could determine the ownership of the cow.[12] As Narciso did not come the following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he told
his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told. Three days later, Florentino and
Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation.[13]
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985[14] and a statement executed by
Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurers office of the municipality of Padre Burgos, to the effect that he issued a Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of petitioner Exuperancio Canta on February 27, 1985 (Exh. 5). [15] The statement was
executed at the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by petitioner against Narciso.[16]
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal treasurer, who stated that petitioner Exuperancio
Canta had no Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos (Exhs. E, E-1 and 2).[17] On the other hand,
Telen testified that he issued the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance of
petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985.[18]
On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. It is contended that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his criminal intent in taking the disputed cow.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of taking the disputed cow under Anti Cattle Rustling Law.
2. Whether or not the defense of good faith by the petitioner is meritorious.
HELD:
1. Yes. P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as . . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of
the owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without
violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1)
a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by
any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without
violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.[20]
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioners only
defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second,
petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that
he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership
of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth,
petitioner adopted means, methods, or schemes to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to
gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission of the crime.
2. No. Petitioners Certificate of Ownership is not only not in order. It is fraudulent, having been antedated to make it appear it had
been issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in question. That he obtained such fraudulent certificate and made use of it
negates his claim of good faith and honest mistake. That he took the cow despite the fact that he knew it was in the custody of its
caretaker cannot save him from the consequences of his act.[23] As the Solicitor General states in his Comment: If petitioner had
been responsible and careful he would have first verified the identity and/or ownership of the cow from either Narciso Gabriel or
Gardenio Agapay, who is petitioners cousin (TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26). Petitioner, however, did not do so despite the opportunity and
instead rushed to take the cow. Thus, even if petitioner had committed a mistake of fact he is not exempted from criminal liability
due to his negligence.[24] In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge and permission of its
owner. If he thought it was the cow he had allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his claim. Art.
433 of the Civil Code provides that The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. What petitioner
did in this case was to take the law in his own hands.[25] He surreptitiously took the cow from the custody of the caretaker,
Gardenio Agapay, which act belies his claim of good faith.
Manuel V. Baviera filed several complaints[2] against officers or directors of the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine
Branch, including Sridhar Raman, an Indian national who was the Chief Finance Officer of the bank, as respondents with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Baviera claimed that he was a former employee of the
bank, and at the same time, an investor who was victimized by the officers or directors of SCB, all of whom conspired with one
another in defrauding him as well as the investing public by soliciting funds in unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and
securities.
On September 18, 2003, Baviera requested the Secretary of Justice for the issuance of a hold departure order against some
officers and directors of the SCB, including Raman. Said HDO was granted by the DOJ. Meanwhile, Secretary Datumanong went to
Vienna Austria to attend a conference. Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez was designated as the acting Secretary of the DOJ.
When Raman arrived at the airport for his trip to Singapore, he was apprehended by the BI authorities and NAIA officials based on
the hold departure order of the Secretary of Justice. However, the next day, RAMAN was able to leave the country. It turned out that
acting secretary Merceditas Guttierez had verbally allowed the departure of Raman. On the same day, Raman wrote Secretary
Datumanong for the lifting of the HDO.
20. CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 112170; April 10, 1996; BELLOSILLO, J.:p
TOPIC: Anti-Alias Law, as amended; Use of Alias/fictitious name
FACTS: Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a DENR officer, was a subject of a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving
of unwarranted benefits regarding illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in Cotabato. Atty. Francis
Palmones, counsel for petitioner, asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to be
furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner as his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters.
Before proceeding to the OMB, petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document
since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his
(Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When petitioner arrived at the OBM in Davao
City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote
the name "Oscar Perez". Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by
writing the name "Oscar Perez." Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who
also worked in the same office. When Loida learned the true identity of petitioner, she reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No.
142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085.
ISSUE: WON petitioner had violated the Anti-Alias Law, as amended.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by
a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by
which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the
use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the
user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained
in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of
petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his
real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally
required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the OBM, petitioner would still be able to get a
copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the OBM could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence
open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted.
The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present
here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.
Petitioner was acquitted.

21. People vs. Joseph Estrada
G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009
Law: Anti Alias Law (CA 124)
Topic: Exemption to CA 124; intent
Doctrine: “the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.”
Facts:
The accused, former president Joseph Estrada, was charged with having violated the anti-alias law. According to the
information Estrada used the alias “JOSE VELARDE”, “on or about 04 February 2000”, take note of the phrase on or about for this
was used by the SC, he used such alias in opening a numbered (aka. Anonymous) trust account with Equitable PCI Bank. He used
such name in several transactions involving said account, such as deposits. He used, the name in front of the branch manager of the
bank’s greenhills branch, his lawyer (Chua), chief of staff (Lacquian), Ortiza the person who deposited the check to the trust account
on behalf of Estrada and Dichavez an associate of Estrada. All of the aforementioned individuals were the only ones who saw and
knew about Estrada’s use of the alleged alias.
Subsequently, he was indicted for having violated the anti-alias law and plunder, which was later on consolidated. Estrada
was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for lack of the prosecution to prove that the accused committed all of the elements of the illegal
use of alias as pronounced in the case of Ursua vs. CA that is the use of a name(s) other than his real name, intentionally,
publicly and habitually. SB acquitted Estrada due to the evidence showing the latter’s lack of intent to use such name publicly and
the phrase used in the info on or about Feb. 4, 2000, indicates that all of the subject transactions were done in one day eliminating
the so called habitual use of the alias. The People appealed to the SC stating that the Ursua doctrine was not applicable due to
factual dissimilarities of the cases.
Issue: Can Estrada be convicted for using an illegal alias despite the fact that he only used such in one day and in front of a few
people?
Ruling: No, he cannot be convicted. The element of habitual use is missing for the information states on or about Feb 4, 2000,
indicating that he only used said name in several transactions for that day or a day near that date only this cannot be regarded as
habitual use.
The People’s argument that the liberal interpretation of the phrase on or about is uncalled for, as to interpret such as all
transactions happening in one day, is not tenable, for if the SC were to rule otherwise such would violate the accused’s right to
know the nature of the charges against him, the People are bound by their faulty Information.
Further, Estrada did not reveal any intent to use his alias publicly for it was only known by several people such as, the bank
manager and personnel who are bound by the Bank Secrecy Law, his lawyer who is bound by lawyer client confidentiality, his chief of
staff who is a subordinate of a confidential nature, his associates Ortiza and Dichavez who were all parties to a secret transaction. He
clearly did not intend to use such name publicly.
According to the Ursua doctrine “the required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third
person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become
generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person
who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.” Thus, his
acquittal is proper.
Additional Notes:
- Trust accounts are covered by the bank secrecy law because it states that it covers all deposits of whatever nature, thus
Estrada’s trust account is covered by said law despite the failure of the account to create a creditor-debtor relationship
between Estrada and PCI bank.
- The application of the law prohibiting the use of numbered/anonymous bank accounts cannot retroact to the case of Estrada
for his act of opening said account was done before the effectivity of R.A. No.9160.
22. Spouses Luis Ermitaño vs. Court of Appeals and BPI Express Card Corp.,
G.R. No. 127246, April 21, 1999
TOPIC: Access Device Regulation Act (RA No. 8484) – Notice in case of loss of access device
Facts: BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC) issued a credit card to Luis Ermitaño and his wife, Manuelita Ermitaño, as extension
cardholder. On August 29, 1989, Manuelita’s bag which contained the credit card was snatched in Greenbelt, Makati. She
immediately reported the loss of such card and thereafter sent a written notice to BECC, stating that she shall not be responsible for
any and all charges incurred through the use of the lost card after August 29, 1989. However, when Luis received his monthly billing
statement from BECC, the charges included amounts for purchases made on August 30, 1989 through Manuelita’s lost card
amounting to P2,350.05 and P607.50. Manuelita received a billing statement which required her to pay immediately the total amount
of P3,197.70 covering the same unauthorized purchases. Manuelita again wrote BECC disclaiming responsibility for those charges,
which were made after she had served BECC with notice of the loss of her card. To justify the billing, BECC cited the stipulation in
their contract: “...the cardholder continues to be liable for the purchases made through the use of the lost/stolen BPI Express Card
until after such notice has been given to BECC and the latter has communicated such loss/theft to its member establishments.”
BECC cancelled the spouses’ credit cards and advised them to settle the account immediately or risk being sued for collection of said
account. Constrained, petitioners sued BECC for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses stating that the condition in
the contract, which states that liability for purchases made after a card is lost or stolen shall be for the account of the cardholder
until after notice of the loss or theft has been given to BECC and after the latter has informed its member establishments, is void for
being contrary to public policy and for being dependent upon the sole will of the debtor. On appeal, the Court of Appels reversed this
decision.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Ermitaño is still liable to pay for purchases made after notice of loss of the credit card
was given to BECC.
Ruling: The cardholder was no longer in control of the procedure after it has notified BECC of the card’s loss or theft. It was already
BECCs responsibility to inform its member-establishments of the loss or theft of the card at the soonest possible time. We note that
BECC is not a neophyte financial institution, unaware of the intricacies and risks of providing credit privileges to a large number of
people. It should have anticipated an occurrence such as the one in this case and devised effective ways and means to prevent it, or
otherwise insure itself against such risk.
Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of his card should be enough to relieve the former of
any liability occasioned by the unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card. The questioned stipulation in this case, which still requires
the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified all its member-establishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of
the credit card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if not to eliminate the possibility of
incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly
notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases
after he has given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and unjust. The
Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly run against public policy.
23. CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner, v.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 87416; April 8, 1991; PARAS, J.:
TOPIC: FOREIGN CHECKS COVERED- BP 22
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22.
That the “accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable
to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at
the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment which check when presented to the drawee bank within 90 days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay
said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within 5 banking days after receiving said notice.
Defense: no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). Petitioner argues that the check
in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing
Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22)
ISSUE: Whether foreign checks are covered by BP 22.
HELD: Yes. Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn or issued in
the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and
issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against current
accounts in foreign currency. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts
should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something
unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to
whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this
view:
MR. TUPAY: Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be
involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our
currency, and many others.
THE SPEAKER: The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
MR. MENDOZA.: The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a check in whatever currency. This would
not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. If drawn, then this
bill will apply.
MR TUPAY: So it includes U.S. dollar checks.
MR. MENDOZA. : Yes, Mr. Speaker.
24. PAULINO CHANG, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FIRST CRIM. CASES DIVISION) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68589-90; December 29, 1986; MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
TOPIC: Prima Facie Evidence of Bounced Checks
FACTS: Petitioner Chang was charged with and convicted of, violation of BP 22 and Estafa in 2 separate information based on the
complaint filed by Reaport. Chang was introduced to complainant Kiat Reaport as a very rich businessman by Johnson Sy. Flaunting
a Mercedes Benz 450 and bodyguard, Chang told Reaport and others with them that he was importing handtractors from China
which he then sells to the government. Chang learned that Reaport owns business that supplies peanuts to candy factories. That
business, according to Chang, is too small. He invited Reaport to invest P200K in his importation business with the assurance of a
30% profit in 3 months. Reaport was told that the proposed venture was to be kept from the knowledge of others. If he did not have
P200K, Chang told him a lesser amount will do. Chang disclosed to Reaport that he personally know high ranking officials in the
government, among them the First Lady, Gen. Ver and Deputy Minister Barbero. Once, in Reaports presence, Chang appeared to
have talked to Minister Barbero by telephone. Though hesitant at first, Reaport agreed to make an investment of P68K.
When Reaport handed the money, Chang in turn gave the former a Check drawn against his (Chang’s) Current Account with
BPI and postdated October 2, 1980 for the sum of P88,350, payable to the order of "cash." This amount represents the amount
invested by Reaport (P68,000) plus the 30% profit. Reaport was told he could deposit the check on October 2, 1982, the date
appearing thereon. However, Reaport did not deposit the check on October 2, 1980 on request of Chang due to financial problems.
Reaport informed Chang that he was himself in bad need of cash and will deposit the check on October 29, 1980 in his account with
Philippine Bank of Communications. After three days, the check was returned to Reaport by the drawee bank unpaid and stamped
"payment stopped". Reaport personally informed Chang of the dishonor of the check and demanded that he replace it with cash but
to no avail.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s conviction was proper.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
There is no question that the check issued by CHANG bounced for insufficiency of funds, so that he should be held guilty of
violation of BP 22. Section 1 (Checks without sufficient fund) of BP 22 states that —
any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but more than one (1) year or by fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the Court."
Hence, by mere drawing or issuing of any check by a person to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, such person shall be liable under
the law.
As both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had found: “The defense that "the check was issued as a gambling check for
money lost at gambling," hence, illegal and void from the very beginning, lacks credence. CHANG issued the check in payment of an
obligation to return the money he got from REAPORT, including a 30% profit, it was not by way of guaranteeing Reaports
investment. It was the inducement to convince Reaport of a sure return of his money plus the profit promised.” As the Appellate
Court had observed, the "gambling debt" theory is "characterized with circumstances doubly hard to believe." In essence, that
matter is one of credibility, which the Trial Court and the Appellate Court are better fitted to pass upon.
xxxxxxxxxx
As to the charge of Estafa (The present case only discussed petitioner’s motion challenging his conviction for the crime of Estafa, not
of BP 22): The evidence on record equally support's CHANG's conviction for Estafa. Complainant testified on the facts constitutive of the fraud, and both the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court extended credibility to him. The disquisition by the Trial Court regarding the fraudulent scheme, quoted with approval by the Appellate Court, suffices to rest
the issue:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the Court finds that Reaport handed P68,000.00 to the accused upon the prior and/or simultaneous
representations of the accused that he is in the impartation of the hand tractors from RPC; that in therewith, he even guaranteed a profit of 30% in three months, that he
is a rich businessman with a 450 Mercedes Benz car, with bodyguard, and influential with the Government higher-ups with whom he sells the tractors; that Reaport
believed such representations to be true; that as a matter of fact, the accused to assure a fruitfull return of his investment in favor of Reaport issued a check for P88,350
for the purpose. This should be the most efficient cause for the defraudation. Indeed, when the check was delivered to Reaport the accused knew and should be expected
to know that he had no funds in the bank then or on the date of the check, on the strength of which the accused was able to obtain P68,000.00 in exchange of a
worthless check.
It is true that if the amount were invested as capital in a business, an accused would not be liable for Estafa as his liability would be civil. However, we find as established that
CHANG had employed deceit to induce REAPORT to deliver the sum for investment not only through his acts of misrepresentation that led REAPORT to believe that CHANG was
moneyed and had influence and connections in high places, but also in that simultaneously with the delivery of the sum by REAPORT, CHANG resorted to the deceitful practice of
issuing an unfunded check for P88,350.00, ostensibly with a profitable return on investment, to perpetrate the fraud. It turned out that he never had this money in the bank. He
was never able to make good the dishonored check despite notice.
CHANG had presented no evidence to overcome the proof by the prosecution that he had employed false pretenses in defrauding REAPORT, nor did he adduce any evidence
whatsoever that he had invested REAPORT's money as he (CHANG) had represented to him (REAPORT). He even disowned knowing REAPORT and having had any transaction
with him, indicating thereby that everything he made REAPORT believe was false and fabricated. In fine, the conjunto of the facts narrated by the Complainant has established
fraud, deceit and damage, essential elements of the crime of Estafa. Moreover, the fraud can be deemed to have been confirmed by CHANG's defense that there was never a
deal between him and REAPORT, and the claim that he had given the cash check to a gambling creditor.
25. Varca vs. CA
GR 131714
TOPIC: Preference in the imposition of Penalties, BP 22
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International, Inc. (Ervine), which is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment, while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is the firm's purchasing manager.
On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security,
Inc. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Banking
Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. GARDS wrote Ervine a letter which it demanded payment in cash
but petitioners did not pay within the time given. Subsequently, Petitioners issued another check for P19, 860.16 to GARDS which
was drawn on Associated Bank. In the voucher accompanying it, it was stated therein that it is for replacement for the dishonored
check and remaining was for outstanding balance. GARD did not return the dishonored check.
Thereafter, GARDS operation manager filed a complaint against petitioners for violations of BP 22 but it was dismissed on ground
that Ervine paid the amount of check. Subsequently, GARDS filed another complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 against petitioners.
This resulted in the filing of an information against petitioners in the RTC, Q.C. After trial, petitioners were found guilty of the charge
and each was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and the costs. On appeal it affirmed
RTC’s decision. It subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners pray that the case
against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the decision of the trial court be modified by sentencing each to an increased
fine but without imprisonment.
Issue: Whether penalty prayed by petitioners may be modified.
Ruling: YES. B.P. Blg. 22, §1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court." Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are
Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all
good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted
the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice
if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social
order. In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty
to impose on each of the petitioners.
SC AFFIRMED the CA’s decision with modification hat the sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check.
26. DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
TOPIC: Hazing
Facts: On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy
with more or less twenty other members and officers conducted initiation rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte was
subjected to physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called co-
accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There,
he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.
Issue: Whether or not herein accused were guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Ruling: Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such
as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or
injury.
Classes of direct participants are: the first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected
to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the
fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. The second
class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually
planned the hazing. The third class of principals would be the officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority who
knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat due to their indispensable cooperation
in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing. The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser. The
last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie
evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless t
27. Bayobos vs People
TOPIC: Accomplice; Hazing
Facts: Balidoy a probationary Midshipman at PMMA died when Alvarez et. Al the principals charged for hazing subjected him to
orientation and indoctrination procedure where they undergone certain physical beatings before their status shall become active.
Together with the principals, school authorities and members of the faculty were also charged as accomplices for the hazing
conducted that resulted to the death of balidoy. Thereafter, the prosecutor filed before the sandiganbayan charging the said school
authorities led by dominador bayobos. Sandiganbayan issued the resolution quashing the information and dismissal of the case
against respondents.
Issue: Whether the respondents may be held liable for hazing
Ruling: The court ruled that although it disagreed with the findings of sandiganbayan it nonetheless sustained the quash all of the
information charging the respondents of hazing. As the court reiterated, Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of
Judgment dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the
alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case.
However, Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. the indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is
no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver
this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
28. Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council
GR No. 178552, October 5, 2010; Carpio-Morales, J.:
TOPIC: RA 9372 – Human Security Act
Facts: Six petitions challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our
People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007. Impleaded as
respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau
of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
Issue: Whether RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
Ruling: No. From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be
culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
unlawful demand in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the
free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to
accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the
communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an
element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring
to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race
will require an employer to take down a sign reading White Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one
regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to
punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present
case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or
writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such
an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce
laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society. (italics
and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.
Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as
applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness
grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged
on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor
allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

29. Roma Drug vs. Glaxo Smith Kline
TOPIC: LAW ON COUNTERFEIT DRUGS
Facts: On August 2000 a team composed of the NBI and BFAD conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug, a duly registered sole
proprietorship of petitioner Rodriguez operating a drug store located at Pampanga. The raiding team seized several imported
medicines, including Augmentin (375mg.) tablets, Orbenin (500mg.) capsules, Amoxil (250mg.) capsules and Ampiclox (500mg.). It
appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same time upon the request of SmithKline
Beecham Research Limited (SmithKline), a duly registered corporation which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products
manufactured by its parent London-based corporation. The local SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo Wellcome Phil. Inc to form
Glaxo SmithKline, private respondent in this case. The seized medicines, which were manufactured by SmithKline, were imported
directly from abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline, the authorized Philippine distributor of these products. A
complaint was filed against Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 (in relation to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known
as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD).The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs, which under Section 3(b)(3),
includes an unregistered imported drug product. The term unregistered signifies the lack of registration with the Bureau of Patent,
Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark, trade name or other identification mark of a drug in the name of a natural or
juridical person, the process of which is governed under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code. In this case, there is no doubt that
the subject seized drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-registered counterparts. There is no claim that they were
adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. Their classification as counterfeit is based solely on the fact that they were imported
from abroad and not purchased from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs. Rodriguez challenged
the constitutionality of the SLCD. Rodriguez asserts that the challenged provisions contravene three provisions of the Constitution.
The first is the equal protection clause, the two other provisions are Section 11, Article XIII, which mandates that the State make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost; and Section 15, Article II, which states
that it is the policy of the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Ruling:
The fact that the law is not content with simply banning, at civil costs, the importation of unregistered drugs. It equates the
importers of such drugs, many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism or basic human love, with the malevolents who would
alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. Note that the SLCD is a special law,
and the traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is that of malum prohibitum—or punishable regardless of motive or
criminal intent. For a law that is intended to help save lives, the SLCD has revealed itself as a heartless, soulless legislative piece.
30. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, et. al vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et. al
G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
TOPIC: Cybercrime; Double Jeopardy
FACTS: The Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 or the cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and
use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet a system that links him to other computers
and enable him to access information, interact thru social networking, conduct business thru e-commerce and so on.
Petitioners seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, unconstitutional and void. But petitioners claim
that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional
rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353,
354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel in relation to Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law. Petitioners lament that libel
provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed
malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.
Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal
code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 is constitutional.
2. Whether or not charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.
RULING: 1. YES. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of
the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it. When the
"Comment" to the original post does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story against
a person then that should be considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law
clearly punish authors of defamatory publications.
2. YES. In online libel there should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted
online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and
are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is
one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.
Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.
31. Baviera vs Zoleta et. Al
TOPIC: RA 3019; Sec. 3 (a)
FACTS: Baviera claimed that he was a former employee of the bank, and at the same time, an investor who was victimized by the
officers or directors of SCB, all of whom conspired with one another in defrauding him as well as the investing public by soliciting
funds in unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities. A hold departure order was subsequently issued against
petitioner. Petitioner who was bount to Singapore was apprehended by authorities in NAIA. However, the next, he was able to leave
the country. Allegedly, acting DOJ Secretary Guttierez allowed him to travel to Singapore for a conference. The permission was made
orally hence, in violation with the hold departure order. A complaint is subsequently filed for violation of Act. 3019 before the
Ombudsman. The complainant alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that upon verbal instruction of respondent Gutierrez to the BI
agents and NAIA officials, Raman was allowed to leave the country despite the HDO issued by Secretary Simeon Datumanong. He
averred that the actuations of respondent Gutierrez were illegal, highly irregular and questionable.
The Ombudsman however dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Thus:
a) With respect to the charge of violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019, there is no evidence, documentary or testimonial, to
show that respondent GUTIERREZ has received material remuneration as a consideration for her alleged use of influence on her
decision to allow Mr. RAMAN to travel abroad.
In the resolution, the Ombudsman based its discussion on the senate deliberation with regard to RA3019 specifically on the issue of
penalizing influence peddling in circumstances were in does not result in remuneration or that such remuneration cannot be proved.
Here, Senator Tolentino’s comment id authoritative. Thusly:
Senator TOLENTINO. No, the mere fact of having used ones influence so long as it is not to induce the commission of a criminal act
would not be punished if there is no consideration. It would not be graft. (
Senator MARCOS. But it is immoral.
Senator TOLENTINO. It may be so, but it depends on the circumstances. But our idea, the main idea of the bill is to punish graft and
corrupt practices. Not every act maybe, that is improper would fall under the provision of the bill. (p. 227)
Henceforth, following the logic and intention of the sponsor (Senator TOLENTINO) of the aforecited provision, respondent GUTIERREZ
did not commit a violation of the same as there is no proof that she received consideration in exchange for her decision to allow Mr.
Raman to travel abroad.
As to the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, no actual or real damage was suffered by any party, including the
government as Mr. Raman immediately returned to the Philippines, the truth of which was not rebutted by the herein complainant in
his Reply-Affidavit. Thus, the herein complainant also did not suffer undue injury as an element required by the law. By the same
token, the essential ingredient of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence required for the commission
of such offense has not been proven in the instant case. The respondent has satisfactorily explicated that as Acting Secretary of
Justice, she has the power and authority to perform such act. In fact, she could have even lifted the Hold Departure Order since
there is no ground for its continued enforcement but did not do so in deference to Secretary DATUMANONG who consequently lifted
such order. As correctly pointed out by the respondent, it was as if the Secretary ratified her act of allowing Mr. RAMAN to travel
abroad despite the Hold Departure Order against the latter and there is no question that she can do or perform such act being the
Acting Secretary at that time.
At any rate, it can not be denied that even the court (or the Sandiganbayan in the case of IMELDA MARCOS) that requested or
issued a Hold Departure Order on a person already charged in court allows under certain conditions the accused to travel for a
specific purpose and for a certain period. There is no reason why Mr. RAMAN, who is just a subject of a preliminary investigation by a
prosecutor, should not be granted the same benefit as he continues to enjoy not only the constitutional presumption of innocence
but the constitutional right to travel or liberty of abode; and,
c) With regard to the charge of Violation of Section 3(j) of Republic Act 3019, as above discussed, the respondent, as Acting
Secretary of Justice, is authorized or empowered not only to allow the travel abroad of Mr. RAMAN under specific conditions but also
to order the lifting of such Hold Departure Order. In the same way, respondent GUTIERREZ has not granted any privilege or benefit
in favor of any person (or Mr. RAMAN for that matter) not qualified or not legally entitled to such privilege or benefit when she
allowed the former to travel abroad under specific condition and for certain period of time as Mr. RAMAN still enjoys the
constitutionally guaranteed right to travel or liberty of abode even if a preliminary investigation involving him is still pending at the
office of the concerned DOJ Prosecutor.[14]
PETITIONER FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORAI UNDER R65 before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by reason of the respondents resolution.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the CA was the proper remedy to assail the resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman; and
(2) whether respondent officials committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing the criminal complaint of petitioner against respondent Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez for lack of
probable cause.
HELD:
1. NO. In dismissing petitioners petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The
appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated
that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present
petition should have been filed with the Supreme Court.
2. NO.. On the merits of the petition, the Court finds that petitioner failed to establish that the respondent officials committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsmans exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[34] The Court has reviewed the assailed
resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, and finds that petitioner likewise failed to establish probable cause for violation
of Sections 3(a), (e) and (j) of RA No. 3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsmans discretion, who, based on his own findings and deliberate consideration of
the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.
RESOLUTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS AFFIRMED.

32. BUENCAMINO CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
G.R. No. 134493; August 16, 2005; GARCIA, J.:
TOPIC: Sec. 3(e), RA 3019 – Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
FACTS: Following the May 1992 local elections and his proclamation as mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor
Miranda sought an audit investigation of the municipality’s 1991-1992 financial transactions. Petitioner Buencamino Cruz served as
municipal mayor of the town in 1991 until his term ended in the middle of 1992. Upon the investigation of the COA, the Special Audit
Team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular transactions transpired during the covered period, the most serious being the
purchase of construction materials evidenced by 2 Sales Invoices in the aggregate amount of ₱54,542.56, for which payment out of
municipal funds was effected twice. The double payments were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply and were
accomplished through the issuance of 2 disbursement vouchers (DVs). Petitioner signed the vouchers and encashed the 2
corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable to his order, notwithstanding the fact that the DVs attached thereto were in
the name of Kelly Lumber. Petitioner was then charged in information with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 before the SB as a
public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, in the performance of his official function. The SB found petitioner
guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE: WON the Information filed against petitioner was fatally defective as it was not alleged therein that “he is an
officer charged with the grant or licenses or permits or other concessions”.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 covers only public officers vested with the power of granting licenses, permits or similar
privileges. Petitioner has obviously lost sight, if not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, where we
held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public
officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions". Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada:
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful.
Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We
agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make
clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of
"public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
At any rate, the Local Government Code, particularly Section 444 (b)(3)(iv and v), Chapter 3, Title II, Book III thereof, empowers
municipal mayors to issue licenses and permits. Any suggestion that a reference to such power in the information is a condition sine
qua non for a successful prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has to be rejected. As the Solicitor General aptly
observed, matters of law are deemed incorporated or read into the information.
33. Edgardo H. Catinding VS. The People of the Philippines and Atty. Fadino
(G.R. No. 183141 September 18, 2009)
Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Topic: Good Faith
Doctrines:
- There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another.
- "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
- "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference
to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
Facts:
In the year 2001, a COA audit team was tasked to inspect the reasonableness of the water rate increase of the CALAMBA
WATER DISTRICT (CWD). It found that the Board of CWD to which private respondent Fadino was the chairman, issued resolutions
giving bonuses and allowances to the members of CWD amounting to ₱15, 455,49.14, according to the COA team this was without
legal basis and beyond the allowable limit, for the board can only create policies and be compensated by way of per diems. Petitioner
Catinding, who was a City Councilor of Calamba, filed a complaint with the ombudsman accusing Fabino of violation Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019. The ombudsman found probable cause and filed two informations against the CWD board including Fabino for violating said
provision of RA 3019.
The RTC issued warrants of arrest after finding probable cause, the accused files a motion to quash stating that the
information does not present prima facie probable cause for it did not show that they were, partial, in bad faith or grossly negligent
in the issuance of the bonuses and allowances. The RTC denied the motion, Fabino filed a certiorari under rule 65 stating that the
denial of the motion was with grave abuse with the CA.
The CA agreed, for the information did not show the accused were partial, in bad faith or grossly negligent. Petitioner
Catining filed an MR, Denied, elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Can a motion to quash be a subject of certiorari?
(2) Is there probable cause against the accused? (Syllabus Topic)
Ruling:
(1) As a general rule no for such is an interlocutory order which cannot be a subject of appeal. This case falls under the
exception due to its exceptional character. The SC did not expound on this part but through inference one can realize that this
involves the non-application of a new doctrine, to be stated later, and politics.
(2) The CA, is correct, there is no prima facie probable cause for there is no showing that the accused acted with manifest
partiality, in bad faith or with gross negligence.
“There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected.”
It is true that in Baybay Water District vs. COA, the SC ruled that Water District Boards can only be given compensations by
way of per diems and not bonuses or allowances, but the case of Catinding started before the birth of this Baybay doctrine thus the
accused could not have known about this limitation. They instead relied in a Local Water Utilities Administration Resolution
No. 313 Series 1995 which allowed such bonuses and allowances. This resolution was later declared not in accord with
the law specifically Sec. 13 of PD 198 in the said Baybay case. Since this Baybay doctrine was promulgated after the
erring acts of the accused, the accused then were in good faith for having relied on the LWUA Resolution.
34. GRACIANO P. DELA CHICA, Municipal Mayor, and EVAN C. ACEVEDA, Municipal Engineer, Baco, Oriental Mindoro,
petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4TH Division, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 144823. December 8, 2003]
TOPIC: RA 3019; Sec.3(e) – two ways to commit: MP/EBF/GIN
FACTS: Petitioners are challenging two resolutions issued by the 4thDivision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25188, in
which petitioners stand charged for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by making revisions in the completion of the municipal building without prior approval by the
proper authorities resulting to cost deficiency of P375,682.32.
Petitioners contend that respondent court wrongly ordered their suspension despite the patent defect of the information.
They posit that the failure to allege the essential element of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence as
defined by R.A. 3019 renders the information invalid, as it fails to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge was sufficiently alleged.
RULING: The Court has ruled that in order that one may be held criminally liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act of the
accused which caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. This draws
more significance considering that good faith and regularity are always presumed in the performance of official duties by public
officers. Therefore, manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence must be alleged with particularity in the
information sufficiently to inform the accused of the charge against him and to enable the court properly to render a decision.
The elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, have been broken down as follows:
(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
(2) That said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to
their public positions;
(3) That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;
(4) That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
35. ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72; June 30, 1987; CORTES, J.:
TOPIC: ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019, AS AMENDED)
FACTS: Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan.
Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works, and
then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty
was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of compensating them for
the damages incurred by said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road.
2nd IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la
Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
Petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the
values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada required the claimants
to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish,
Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the
documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment of damages.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants were
made to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the
value of the improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value declared by the owners
in their sworn statements. The value as per assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of
the claimants containing an assessed value exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish "as per assessor", except
the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out, however, that
said Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names of other
persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them to his car which was parked
nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to
whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were
helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion. The claimants filed their complaints against
the petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that the 8 informations filed against him before the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it
failed to allege the essential ingredients or elements constituting the offense.
The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by
making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations
of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of
the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.
There is no variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to
establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage
to the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties of the compensation they
received was part of' the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could
work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-
Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly established a violation of Section 3(e).
Another issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals 56 years and 8 days
of imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties
should not exceed 40 years.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article
is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed. Article 70
speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned
about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most
severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing 8 penalties for the eight informations filed against the
accused-petitioner. As we pointed out in the case of People v. Peralta, “Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can
still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a
corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of
justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanction”. In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the
penalty imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and unusual.
36. G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989. AMADO C. ARIAS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989. CRESENCIO D. DATA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
TOPIC: RA 3019; Reasonable Reliance Doctrine; Sec. 3 (e)
FACTS/ISSUE: The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error
in convicting petitioners Arias and Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project
in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Cresencio Data was the District Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the
acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government.
Accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer, who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan
Floodway Project.
Accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior Engineer, who was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway
Project.
Accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman, who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project.
Accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I, who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to private lands
acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project.
Accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as
well as the payment of lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project.
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods affecting the towns of
Marikina and Pasig.
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by accused Engineer
Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of accused Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as over-all in charge,
and accused Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys. The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the project of the
impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for payment.
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland registered in the name of Benjamin
Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097. The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez,
parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3) lots. Lot 1, with an area of
19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government for the Mangahan Floodway
Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared for taxation under
Tax Declaration No. 28246. Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter. On February 27, 1978, another Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was issued for the same “ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value
was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax Declaration No. A018- 00911 wherein the market
value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690 (P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description
and value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the
property (riceland) not on its potential use.
Among those who filed an application for payment at the District Engineer's Office was the accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was
armed with a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by Benjamin Agleham in her favor. She submitted a falsified xerox copy
of Tax Declaration No. 47895 bearing a false date: December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's
30,169-square-meter property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter
(instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of P60,340).
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio Arcaya, who, after
initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz. A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004 square meters valued at
P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting documents and transmitted them to accused District
Engr. Data.
Later, the Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the
papers to Director Desiderio Anolin who recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale.
Afterwards, the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer of title to the Government. The sale was registered and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G.
Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District Engineer II, among others.
The voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by the accused Amado C. Arias, as auditor of
the Engineering District. The next day, sixteen (16) PNB checks, for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as
payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.
Later, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of Agleham's property.
It was shown that Amado Arias approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the
purchase price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and
figures", nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the General Voucher.
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been replaced by Julito
Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over the documents to Pesayco. It was
only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to
Pesayco.
After a trial, the Sandiganbayan found accused Natividad G. Gutierrez, Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H.
Arcaya and Amado C. Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the court's findings that
he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and
conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Prescillo Fernando which he
did not take an active part, and that the price which the government paid for it was reasonable.
RULING:
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or negligent subordinates,
overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence- is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because
he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every
person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. But were the petitioners
guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned
persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his
signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason
why he should examine each voucher in such detail.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and
conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977. The deed of sale
was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already
been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of
October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the voucher, there is no evidence
transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none approached him to follow up
the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate the smallest details of the transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a square meter at
the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now
worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was
done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias explained that the rules of the
Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these documents and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons.
Arias was auditor of the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of
custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as auditor and who took over
the custody of records in that office.
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the then District Engineer of the Pasig
Engineering District he created a committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao
Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway
Project; he did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which
determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding
deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting documents to petitioner Data for
signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as
head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale as the approval thereof
was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting
documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public
Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-examination thereof at that level;
after the approval of the deed of sale by the higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which
petitioner Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during the processing and payment of her
claims.
On the alleged conspiracy, that petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office who signed
the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption
or inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. There was no undue
injury caused to the Government as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable price of
P80.00 per square meter.
37. MARQUEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 182020-24, September 2 2009
TOPIC: Sec. 3 (g), RA 3019
FACTS: Marquez and Caunan, along with four (4) other local government officials of Paraaque City and private individual Antonio
Razo (Razo, owner and proprietor of ZARO Trading), were charged under five (5) Informations, for the purchase of numerous walis
ting-ting (142, 612) which were grossly overpriced (P1, 302, 878.00) and without complying with the Commission on Audit Rules
and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, causing damage and prejudice to the government.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other local government officials of Paraaque City for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, based on the report of the COA Special Audit Team. Thus, the filing of the above 5 informations.
Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and Marquez, et. al. guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019?
RULING: YES. Petitioner Marquez points out that the finding of overpricing was not shown to a reliable degree of certainty as
required by COA Memorandum No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997. In all, petitioners asseverate that, as the overpricing was not
sufficiently established, necessarily, the last criminal element of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 a contract or transaction grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government was not proven.
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. The question is only whether the walis tingting purchase
contracts were grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the government.
The fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this
case, the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced
procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion
of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. Thus, we grant the petitions.
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the
Sandiganbayan relied on the COA’s finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit
teams conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object
evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting
accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4)
price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City.
Notably, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City.
In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis
tingting actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest
minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been
identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were
disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so
manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The audit team reached a conclusion of gross overpricing based on documents which, at best, would merely indicate the present
market price of walis tingting of a different specification, purchased from a non-supplier of Paraaque City, and the price of walis
tingting purchases in Las Pias City. Effectively, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt, in order to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners.
The lack of public bidding alone does not automatically equate to a manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. As we had
occasion to declare in Nava v. Sandiganbayan, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to
secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. However, this does not satisfy the third
element of the offense charged, because the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross.
38. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE and BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 130191. April 27, 1998]
TOPIC: RA 3019, Sec.3 (g) – effect of invalidated contract
FACTS: In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the city government of Davao. To implement the
project, a Computerization Program Committee was formed. Following the guidelines, the Committee recommended the acquisition
of Goldstar computers exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI). The Committee proceeded to negotiate
with SPI for the acquisition and installation of the computer hardware and the training of personnel for the Electronic Data-
Processing Center. The total contract cost amounted to P11,656,810.00
On 5 November 1990, the City Council of Davao unanimously passed a resolution and an ordinance approving the proposed
contract for computerization between Davao City and SPI.
Given the go-signal, the contract was duly signed by the parties thereto and on 8 November 1990, petitioner City Administrator de
Guzman released to SPI PNB Check No. 65521 in the amount of P1,748,521.58 as downpayment.
On 27 November 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao received a letter-complaint from a concerned citizen,
stating that some city officials are going to make a killing in the transaction. On 22 February 1991, Goldstar sent a proposal to
petitioner Duterte for the cancellation of the computerization contract.
Consequently, on 8 April 1991, the Sanggunian accepted Goldstar’s offer to cancel the computerization contract provided
the latter return the advance payment of P1,748,521.58 to the City Treasurers Office within a period of one month. Davao City,
through petitioner Duterte, and SPI mutually rescinded the contract and the downpayment was duly refunded.
Subsequently, on 1 August 1991, the Anti-Graft League-Davao City Chapter filed an unverified complaint with the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioners, the whole city government of Davao and SPI. On 22 February 1996, Prosecutor De
Guzman recommended that petitioners be charged under Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for having entered into a contract manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government, the elements of profit, unwarranted benefits or loss to government being
immaterial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge will prosper.
RULING: Under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No.
3019. To establish probable cause against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government;
(3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The second element of the
crime that the accused public officers entered into a contract in behalf of the government is absent. The computerization contract
was rescinded on 6 May 1991 before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991. Hence, at that
time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its Order on 12 November 1991, there was no
longer any contract to speak of. The contract, after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation of the law, non-existent, as if no contract
was ever executed.
39. Carabeo vs CA
TOPIC: Purpose of SALN
Facts: Carabeo is the city treasurer of paranaaue city. He was charged for violation of anti graft and corrupt practices act as well as
grave misconduct and dishonesty when he allegedly amassed various types of property ranging from real properties in tagaytay,
vehicles, and shares of stock in the palms county club. Aside from these, he and his spouse were also able to travel abroad fifteen
times. Their net worth ballooned from thousands of pesos to millions of pesos. All of these wealth were not declared in his saln or if
declared only a portion of which, or mostly falsely declared.
Issue: Whether his nondisclosure constitutes a violation of RA3019.
Ruling: Yes. Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA 3019 that prior notice of the non-completion of the SALN and its
correction precede the filing of charges for violation of its provisions. Neither are these measures needed for the charges of
dishonesty and grave misconduct, which Carabeo presently faces.
By the SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to
verify undisclosed properties and wealth.
40. Gov. Antonio Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 110503, August 4, 1994; Mendoza, J.:
TOPIC: Maximum Period of Preventive Suspension/Purpose
Facts: Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed against him and two others
for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019). On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for petitioner's suspension, citing sec. 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in part:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing inter alia that:
2. Upon a bare invocation of the foregoing provision, the prosecution would have this Honorable Court issue an Order
suspending the accused, as if suspension of a public officer is a mindless and meaningless exercise, and is imposed without regard to
the spirit and intent of the law upon which it is based.
3. Indeed, it cannot be simply assumed that laws are enacted and followed without a particular purpose to be served,
especially when a mechanical application shall injure not only the public official concerned, but the entire electorate as well.
The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's argument and ordered the suspension of petitioner from office for a period of 90
days. It held that preventive suspension is mandatory under sec. 13, of Rep. Act No. 3019, pursuant to which all that is required is
for the court to make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information "for any of the above-described
crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension." Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the order of preventive suspension
Ruling: Yes. To the Solicitor General's contention that upon the filing of a valid information suspension pendente lite is mandatory
as held in several decisions of this Court,3 petitioner replies that, while the Sandiganbayan has the power to order preventive
suspension, there is a "need [for the Sandiganbayan] to go further, beyond the filing of the information, to a determination of the
necessity of the preventive suspension in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Anti-Graft Law." Petitioner explains:
In other words, when the Anti-Graft Law gave the courts the authority to order the preventive suspension of the accused, it
never intended to impose a mindless and meaningless exercise. The exercise of such authority must always be within the confines of
the legislative intent, for to go beyond it would be to exceed the bounds of the law. Preventive suspension should therefore be
ordered only when the legislative purpose is achieved, that is, when "the suspension order . . . prevent(s) the accused from using his
office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him."
Corollarily, when the legislative purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should not be decreed."
The petitioner's contention has no merit. It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the
Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has
neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to
intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the
accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon
a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the
law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the
accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
It is indeed true that in some of our decisions the expression "the maximum period of ninety (90) days" is used. But that is only for
the purpose of emphasizing that the preventive suspension therein involved, which were for more than ninety (90) days, were
excessive and unreasonable. It is to be noted that the ninety-day period of preventive suspension is not found in sec. 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807),7 which is now sec. 52 of the Administrative
Code of 1987. This latter provision states:
Sec. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case
against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the
period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided.
The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the
case is decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety
days, then the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under Republic
Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will
continue for ninety days.
The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is contingent on the time it takes the court to decide
the case but not on account of any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that the accused may use his
office to hamper his prosecution.
Indeed, were the Sandiganbayan given the discretion to impose a shorter period of suspension, say, 80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner
asserts, it would lie in its power not to suspend the accused at all. That, of course, would be contrary to the command of sec. 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019.
Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised
Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the duty of the court to place the accused under preventive
suspension disposes of petitioner's other contention that since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner would intimidate prosecution's witnesses.
The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the
grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, as already stated, to prevent the accused from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office.
41. DINDO C. RIOS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 129913. September 26, 1997]
TOPIC: RA 3019; period of preventive suspension under LGU
FACTS: On March 6, 1996, an information was filed against petitioner who is the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of San
Fernando, Romblon for alleged unauthorized disposition of confiscated tanguile lumber (1,319 pieces), in violation of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, without proper authority therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the
Government.
On September 16, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Suspend Accused (herein petitioner) Pendente Lite, to
which petitioner filed an Opposition, on the ground that there was no probable cause to hold him liable under the law.
Later, Sandiganbayan granted the OSP’s motion to suspend petitioner from his position as Mayor and from any other public position
he may be holding for a period of ninety (90) days counted from receipt of the Resolution.
Petitioner filed a MR which was subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the suspension?
RULING: NO. The suspension pendente lite meted out by the Sandiganbayan is a proper and commensurate sanction against
petitioner. Having ruled that the information filed against petitioner is valid, there can be no impediment to the application of Section
13 of R.A. No. 3019 which states, inter alia:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation,
is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
It is settled jurisprudence that the aforequoted provision makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer
who has been validly charged with a violation of R.A. No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property.
The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. This is
based on the presumption that unless the public officer is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or both.
On the other hand, Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day suspension upon petitioner for the single case filed against him.
Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days.
42. Go vs. Sandiganbayan
TOPIC: ANTI-GRAFT and CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Facts: The OMBUDSMAN filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information charging Vicente C. Rivera, as then DOTC Secretary, and
petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violation of Section 3(g)4 of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., DOTC Secretary committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the
same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), enter into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the Ninoy
Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III providing that the government shall assume
the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06
of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic
of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether only a public officer in this case the DOTC Secretary can be held criminally liable for violation RA 3019?
Ruling: As a general rule only a public officer can be held criminally liable under RA 3019 except when there is conspiracy. The act
of the public officer in violating RA 3019 is imputable to the private individual although they are not similarly situated in relation to
the object of the crime. Moreover, Sec. 9 provides penalty for public officer or private person for crime under Sec. 3. Hence, a
private individual can be prosecuted for violation of RA 3019.
43. Dr. Posadas and Dayco vs SANDIGANBAYAN
TOPIC: RA 6713; Public Office – public trust; private practice of profession
FACTS: Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman when on September 19, 1994 he formed a Task
Force on Science and Technology Assessment Management and Policy. The Task Force was to prepare the needed curricula for
masteral and doctoral programs in "technology management, innovation studies, science and technology and related areas." On June
6, 1995, acting on the Task Force's proposal, UP established the U Technology Management Center (UP TMC) the members of which
nominated Dr. Posadas for the post of Center Director. He declined the nomination, however, resulting in the designation of
Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP TMC Director.
Posadas together with his companions were permitted to attend to China for a University foundation day. In the meantime, doctor
Cayco was appointed as the OIC chancellor during his absence. On the last day of doctor caycos term as OIC, he appointed Posadas
as "Project Director of the TMC Project from September 18, 1995 to September 17, 1996." In an undated letter, Dr. Dayco also
appointed Dr. Posadas consultant to the project. The appointments were to retroact to September 18, 1995 when the project began.
The two were subsequently charged for violation of Anti Graft Law and found guilty by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Are the petitioners actuations in the said appointments connote bad faith warranting their conviction under RA
3019?
HELD: No.
1. Petitioners are in good faith
The bad faith that Section 3(e) of Republic 3019 requires, said this Court, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It
imputes a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, and a conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it partakes of the nature of fraud.2
Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken advantage of his brief designation as OIC Chancellor to appoint the absent
Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the TMC Project. But it cannot be said that Dr. Dayco made those
appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted them, fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as OIC
Chancellor.
All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were scientists, not lawyers, hence unfamiliar with Civil Service rules and
regulations. The world of the academe is usually preoccupied with studies, researches, and lectures. Thus, those appointments
appear to have been taken for granted at UP. It did not invite any immediate protest from those who could have had an interest in
the positions. It was only after about a year that the COA Resident Auditor issued a notice of suspension covering payments out of
the Project to all UP personnel involved, including Dr. Posadas.
2. The next question is whether Dr. Dayco, believing in good faith that he had the authority to make the questioned
designations, acted with "manifest partiality" in choosing Dr. Posadas among all possible candidates as TMC Director and
Consultant. The answer is no.
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather
than another.3 Here, the prosecution presented no evidence whatsoever that others, more qualified than Dr. Posadas, deserve the
two related appointments. The fact is that he was the best qualified for the work. Here Dr. Posadas appears to be qualified in the
position as he was the one who initiated the idea of such project and wanted it to succeed.
3. The misstep was essentially of the administrative kind
The worst that could be said of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas is they showed no sensitivity to the fact that, although Dr. Dayco may
have honestly believed that he had the authority to make those appointments, he was actually appointing his own superior, the
person who made him OIC Chancellor, however qualified he might be, to those enviable positions. But this should have been treated
as a mere administrative offense for: First. No evidence was adduced to show that UP academic officials were prohibited from
receiving compensation for work they render outside the scope of their normal duties as administrators or faculty professors.
Second. COA disallowances of benefits given to government personnel for extra services rendered are normal occurrences in
government offices. They can hardly be regarded as cause for the filing of criminal charges of corruption against the authorities that
granted them and those who got paid.
Section 4 of the COA Revised Rules of Procedure merely provides for an order to return what was improperly paid. And, only if the
responsible parties refuse to do so, may the auditor then (a) recommend to COA that they be cited for contempt; (b) refer the
matter to the Solicitor General for the filing of the appropriate civil action; and (c) refer it to the Ombudsman for the appropriate
administrative or criminal action.4 Here, Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas were not given the chance, before they were administratively
charged, to restore what amounts were paid since the Resident Director withdrew his notice of disallowance after considering the
view of the UP Diliman Legal Office. If the Court does not grant petitioners’ motions for reconsideration, the common disallowances
of benefits paid to government personnel will heretofore be considered equivalent to criminal giving of "unwarranted advantage to a
private party," an element of graft and corruption. This is too sweeping, unfair, and unwise, making the denial of most benefits that
government employees deserve the safer and better option.
Third. In other government offices, the case against Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas would have been treated as purely of an
administrative character. The problem in their case, however, is that other factors have muddled it. The evidence shows that prior to
the incident Dr. Posadas caused the administrative investigation of UP Library Administrative Officer Ofelia del Mundo for grave
abuse of authority, neglect of duty, and other wrong-doings. This prompted Professor Tabbada, the Acting UP TMC Director, to resign
his post in protest. In turn, Ms. Del Mundo instigated the UP President to go after Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco. Apparently, the Office
of the Ombudsman played into the intense mutual hatred and rivalry that enlarged what was a simple administrative misstep.
Fourth. The fault of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas, who spent the best parts of their lives serving UP, does not warrant their going to jail
for nine to twelve years for what they did. They did not act with manifest partiality or evident bad faith. Indeed, the UP Board of
Regents, the highest governing body of that institution and the most sensitive to any attack upon its revered portals, did not believe
that Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas committed outright corruption. Indeed, it did not dismiss them from the service; it merely ordered
their forced resignation and the accessory penalties that went with it.
The Board did not also believe that the two deserved to be permanently expelled from UP.1âwphi1 It meted out to them what in
effect amounts to mere suspension for one year since the Board practically invited them to come back and teach again after one year
provided they render a public apology for their actions. The Board of Regents did not regard their offense so morally detestable as to
totally take away from them the privilege of teaching the young.
4. The prosecution did not prove unwarranted benefit or undue injury

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas caused "undue injury" to
the government or gave him "unwarranted benefits."
This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual damage" must not only be capable
of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based on flimsy and
non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork.5 The Court held in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan6 that the
element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the
elements of the crime. Here, the majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of ₱30 000.00 monthly as TMC Project Director
caused actual injury to the Government. The record shows, however, that the ₱247 500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident
Auditor disallowed was deducted from his terminal leave benefits. The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr.
Posadas "unwarranted advantage" as a result of the appointments in question. The honoraria he received cannot be considered
"unwarranted" since there is no evidence that he did not discharge the additional responsibilities that such appointments entailed.
44. RODOMIEL J. DOMINGO, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, KATHRYN JOY B. PAGUIO, ALLAN JAY M. ESGUERRA,
and NEIL PATRICK H. CELIS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176127; January 30, 2009; Tinga, J.:
TOPIC: No penalty under Sec.4, RA 6713 – Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
FACTS: A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) by herein respondent SK officials against
petitioner Domingo as Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer Fe T. Lao, both of Barangay 686, Zone 75, District V, Manila, for
malversation, falsification of public document, dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondents alleged that petitioner and Lao
misappropriated the cash advance taken by respondents from the SK funds amounting to ₱16,784.00 in the year 2002. They added
that petitioner gave a false statement in his Justification supporting the 2003 Barangay Budget and Expenditures by declaring that
his barangay had no incumbent SK officials at that time contrary to the fact that respondents are duly elected and incumbent SK
officials of the barangay. The OMB rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and
rendered a penalty of suspension from office for a period of 6 months pursuant to Section 11 of the same Act. Hence, the petition
alleging, among others, that the imposition of the penalty of 6-month suspension is excessive.
ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed to petitioner was proper.
Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with
the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an
ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy and simple living. Following this
perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of
incentives and rewards to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their observance of the
norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and
employees who comply with the high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same
favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be sanctioned for failure to observe
these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts
"declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty-three (23) acts or omissions as grounds
for administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of
them.
Furthermore, there is obviously a denial of due process in this case. The due process requirement mandates that every
accused or respondent be apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and the evidence in support thereof be shown
or made available to him so that he can meet the charge with traversing or exculpatory evidence.28 A cursory reading of the
complaint-affidavit does not reveal that petitioner was charged with violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713. Likewise, in the OMB’s
Evaluation Report, the charges indicated were for malversation, falsification, dishonesty and grave misconduct.
45. ATTY. GIL A. VALERA, CPA-LCB, Deputy Commissioner, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group, Bureau of Customs, Petitioner,
vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, rep. by Hon. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), in his capacity as Acting Ombudsman; PNP-CIDG, rep. by Director General Eduardo S. Matillano
(public complainant); ATTY. ADOLFO CASARENO (private complainant); Hon. CESAR V. PURISIMA, Secretary of Finance,
Department of Finance; Hon. ALBERTO D. LINA, Commissioner of Customs, Bureau of Customs; Hon. ROBERTO D. GEOTINA,
Deputy Commissioner for Internal Administration Group, Bureau of Customs; and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167278, February 27, 2008
TOPIC: RA 6713, Sec. 5 – recommending relative to a private enterprise
FACTS: Petitioner Gil A. Valera was appointed by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Deputy Commissioner of Customs in charge
of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of office on August 3, 2001, and assumed his post on
August 7 of the same year.
On August 20, 2003, the Director of the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group of the Philippine National Police,
Eduardo Matillano, filed a letter-complaint against petitioner with the Ombudsman, part three of which reads:
xx Valera while being a Bureau of Customs official directly and indirectly had financial or pecuniary interest in the CACTUS
CARGOES SYSTEMS a brokerage whose line of business or transaction, in connection with which, he intervenes or takes part
in his official capacity by way of causing the employment of his brother-in-law, Ariel Manongdo, thus, violating 3(h) of RA
3019 and RA 6713 and Section 4, RA 3019 as against Ariel Manongdo.
Petitioner contends that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019, a brother-in-law is not included within the scope of the word family and
therefore, he cannot be found liable under the said law. In arguing so, petitioner refers to the definition of the word family found
under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 6713, which states:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the term:
xxx
(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years
of age.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contention is correct.
RULING: Section 3 of R.A. No. 6713 is unequivocal in that its definition of terms is limited to as used in the Act. Under R.A. No.
6713, the term family was used only once under Section 4, par. (h), which implores public officials and employees and their families
to observe simple living. The restrictive definition accorded to the word family under the law is logical since children of public
officials and employees who are above eighteen and already emancipated by law and freed from parental authority should not be
bound by this standard where their emancipation may lead them to an otherwise private lifestyle or one which is not beholden to the
public trust.
This otherwise perfect logic would result in irrationality if we follow the contention of petitioner that the definition of family
under R.A. No. 6713 should also apply to R.A. No. 3019. It makes no rhyme nor reason to suppose that public officials and
employees are prohibited from having their children under eighteen years accept employment in a private enterprise having pending
official business before their office, and yet are allowed to have their children over eighteen years, which is the employable age, to
do so.
What petitioner fails to mention is that R.A. No. 6713 itself prohibits the act of public officials and employees during their
incumbency to recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official transaction
with their office. Certainly, the definition of the word family under said law would unduly limit and render meaningless Section 3(d)
of R.A. No. 3019 if applied to the latter. In fact, family relation is defined under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 which, according to the
said section, shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. Thus, we need not look beyond
the provisions of R.A. No. 3019 to hold that a brother-in-law falls within the definition of family under Section 3(d) thereof.

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1st BATCH: CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW – Atty Roland Atienza

A. People of the Philippines vs. Juan Richard Tionloc

METC: refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petition was dismissed.

Petitioner was acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

RESOLUTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS AFFIRMED.

4. The prosecution did not prove unwarranted benefit or undue injury

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