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L-48006 July 8, 1942 damages was instituded not only against the
driver but the operator of the taxi.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs. Issue: Wether or not the operator could be
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA charged in a separate case regarding the
ALMARIO, respondents. negligence of the taxi driver?
RULING:
(Article 1162, Quasi-delict)
Authorities support the proposition that
FACTS: a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a
At about half past one in the morning of May separate legal institution under the Civil Code
3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and with a substantivity all its own, and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head- individuality that is entirely apart and
on collision between a taxi of the Malate independent from delict or crime. Upon this
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a principle and on the wording and spirit article
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
carretela was overturned, and one of its responsibility of employers may be safely
passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, anchored
suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against ART 1902. Any person who by an act or
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of omission causes damage to another by his
Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to fault or negligence shall be liable for the
an indeterminate sentence of one year and damage so done.
one day to two years of prision
correccional.The Court of Appeals affirmed ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal next preceding article is enforcible, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for
case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
those of persons for whom another is
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939,
responsible
brought an action in the Court of First Instance
of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
Owners or directors of an establishment or
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer business are equally liable for any damages
of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the caused by their employees while engaged in
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded the branch of the service in which employed,
damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 or on occasion of the performance of their
plus legal interest from the date of the duties.
complaint. This decision was modified by the
Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to At this juncture, it should be said that the
P1,000 with legal interest from the time the primary and direct responsibility of employers
action was instituted. It is undisputed that and their presumed negligence are principles
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the calculated to protect society. Workmen and
mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side employees should be carefully chosen and
of the road, and at high speed. . It is admitted supervised in order to avoid injury to the
that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There public. It is the masters or employers who
is proof that he exercised the diligence of a principally reap the profits resulting from the
good father of a family to prevent damage. In services of these servants and employees. It
fact it is shown he was careless in employing is but right that they should guarantee the
latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
Fontanilla who had been caught several times
patrimonial safety of others. Hence making
for violation of the Automobile Law and
Barredo liable.
speeding violation. Public Works available to
be public and to himself. Hence a civil case for
the trip was nonetheless ratified by the
company's board of directors, and that in any
G.R. No. L-25172 May 24, 1974 event under the by-laws he had the discretion,
as general manager, to authorize the trip
LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner, which was for the company's benefit..
vs.
ANTONIO R. DE JOYA, respondent. A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the
respondent against Vicente Araneta, the
(Article 1162, Quasi-delict) petitioner and Ricardo Taylor. The respondent
proved that Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of
the firm, signed a check representing the
FACTS:
company's share of the transportation
expense of Taylor to the United States, and
Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, that a series of payroll checks from
then general manager of the Ace Advertising, September 15, 1953 to December 31, 1953,
proposed to the board of directors that an
1
inclusive, which included the salaries of
employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the Taylor, was signed by Vicente Araneta and the
United States to take up special studies in petitioner who is a vice-president of the
television. The board, however, failed to act company. Both Aranetas disowned any
on the proposal. Nevertheless, in September personal liability, claiming that they signed the
1953 the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J. checks in good faith as they were approved
Antonio Araneta, a company director, inquired by the respondent
about the trip and was assured by the
respondent that Taylor's expenses would be
Issue: Whether or not the two other officials
defrayed not by the company but by other
who signed the checks be jointly liable with De
parties. This was thereafter confirmed by the
Joya?
respondent in a memorandum.
RULING:
While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to
March 15, 1954, Taylor continued to receive
his salaries. The items corresponding to his The basic legal issue is whether the petitioner
salaries appeared in vouchers prepared upon is guilty of a quasi-delict as held below.
the orders of, and approved by, the
respondent and were included in the semi- The petitioner's assertion that he signed the
monthly payroll checks for the employees of questioned payroll checks in good faith has
the corporation. The petitioner signed three of not been substantiated, he in particular not
these checks on November 27, December 15 having testified or offered testimony to prove
and December 29, 1953. The others were such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his
signed by either the respondent, or Vicente being a vice-president and director of the Ace
Araneta (company treasurer) who put up part Advertising, the petitioner remained passive,
of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad,
handed him letters for delivery in the United concerning the unauthorized disbursements of
States. The Ace Advertising disbursed corporate funds for the latter. This plus the
P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's fact that he even approved thrice payroll
travel and studies. checks for the payment of Taylor's salary,
demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner
On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a neglected to perform his duties properly, to the
complaint with the court of first instance of damage of the firm of which he was an
Manila against the respondent for recovery of officer.The existence of a contract between
the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the parties, as has been repeatedly held by
the trip was made without its knowledge, this Court, constitutes no bar to the
authority or ratification. The respondent, in his commission of a tort by one against the other
answer, denied the charge and claimed that and the consequent recovery of damages. 2
G.R. No. L-49852 October 19, 1989
ISSUE:
FACTS: RULING:
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) NPC staunchly asserts that the damages, if
is a government-owned and controlled any, were due to a fortuitous event. Again, we
corporation created under Commonwealth Act cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead
No. 120, as amended.It is tasked to undertake to the findings and opinions expressed by the
the development of hydroelectric generations Court of Appeals that NPC cannot escape
of power and the production of electricity from liability on the mere excuse that the rise of
nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as water was due to heavy rains that were acts of
well as the transmission of electric power on a God. The rainy season is an expected
nationwide basis. On 15 November 1973, the occurrence and the NPC cannot stop doing its
Office of the President of the Philippines duty when the rains fall. In fact, it is during
issued Memorandum Order No. 398 - these critical times that the NPC needs to be
"Prescribing Measures to Preserve the Lake vigilant to make sure that the lake level does
Lanao Watershed, To Enforce the Reservation not exceed the maximum level. Indeed,
of Areas Around the Lake Below Seven negligence or imprudence is human factor
Hundred And Two Meters Elevation, and for which makes the whole occurrence
Other Purposes." Said decree instructed the humanized, as it were, and removed from the
NPC to build the Agus Regulation Dam at the rules applicable to acts of God. Furthermore
mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur, at a the Regulation dam was established for the
normal maximum water level of Lake Lanao NPC to regulate the amount of waterflow in
at 702 meters elevation. Pursuant thereto, the river. Also the provisions of the
petitioner built and operated the said dam in Presidential decree has made mention that
1978. Private respondents Hadji Abdul Carim the purpose of such “regulation dam” are as
Abdullah and Caris Abdullah were owners of follows: (1) to maintain the normal maximum
fishponds in Barangay Bacong, Municipality of lake elevation at 702 meters, and (2) to build
Marantao, Lanao del Sur. All of these benchmarks to warn the inhabitants in the
fishponds were sited along the Lake Lanao area that cultivation of land below said
shore. In October and November of 1986, all elevation is forbidden. We should take note
the improvements were washed away when that the constructed dam is under the
the water level of the lake escalated and the jurisdiction and control of the NPC thus
subject lakeshore area was flooded. Private making them liable for such short comings.
respondents blamed the inundation on the
Agus Regulation Dam built and operated by
the NPC in 1978. They theorized that NPC
failed to increase the outflow of water even as
the water level of the lake rose due to the
heavy rains. Hence urging the constitutients to
file a case for damages and compensation
against the NPC. NPC insist that such
damage was due to a fortuitious event which
CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC., 6,164 pairs, were defective and that she was
liable to the [petitioner] for the amount
vs. of P49,925.51 which was the value of the
damaged pairs of denim pants and demanded
COURT OF APPEAL AND NORMA SIAPNO refund of the aforesaid amount. Filed a case
against the petitioner for the collection of the
principal amount of P76,410.00-CA
(Article 1175, Usurious Transactions)
promulgated a decision awarding her the
sum of P76,140.00 with interest thereon at
FACTS: 12%per annum, to be counted from the filing
of this complaint on January 8, 1981, until fully
During the period from February 1979 to April paid
1979, the [herein petitioner], which was
engaged in the export of girls denim pants, ISSUE:
contracted the services of the [respondent],
the sole proprietress of the DWilmar Whether or not the 12% interest as awarded
Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of by the Court of Appeals was proper?
assorted girls[] denims supplied by the
[petitioner] under Purchase Orders Nos. 1404, RULING:
dated February 15, 1979, 0430 dated
February 1, 1979, 1453 dated April 30,
The rate of interest shall be six percent (6%)
1979. The [petitioner] was obliged to pay the
per annum, computed from the time of the
[respondent], for her services, in the total
filing of the Complaint in the trial court until
amount of P76,410.00. The [respondent]
the finality of the judgment. If the adjudged
sew[ed] the materials and delivered the same
principal and the interest (or any parts
to the [petitioner] which acknowledged the
thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the
same per Delivery Receipt Nos. 0030, dated
interest rate shall be twelve percent
February 9, 1979; 0032, dated February 15,
(12%) per annum computed from the time
1979; 0033 dated February 21, 1979; 0034,
the judgment becomes final and executory
dated February 24, 1979; 0036, dated
until it is fully satisfied. Interest shall be
February 20, 1979; 0038, dated March 11,
computed in accordance with the stipulation
1979[;] 0039, dated March 24, 1979; 0040
of the parties. In the absence of such
dated March 27, 1979; 0041, dated March 29,
agreement, the rate shall be twelve percent
1979; 0044, dated Marc[h] 25, 1979; 0101
(12%) per annum when the obligation arises
dated May 18, 1979[;] 0037, dated March 10,
out of a loan or a forbearance of money, goods
1979 and 0042 dated March 10, 1979, in good
or credits. In other cases, it shall be six
order condition. At first, the [respondent] was
percent (6%). In this case, because the
told that the sewing of some of the pants was
amount due arose from a contract for a
defective. She offered to take delivery of the
piece of work, not from a loan or
defective pants. However, she was later told
forbearance of money, the legal interest of
by [petitioner]s representative that the goods
six percent (6%) per annum should be
were already good. She was told to just return
applied. Furthermore, since the amount
for her check of P76,410.00. However, the
of the demand could be established with
[petitioner] failed to pay her the aforesaid
certainty when the Complaint was filed, the
amount. This prompted her to hire the
six percent (6%) interest should be computed
services of counsel who, on November 12,
from the filing of the said Complaint. But after
1979, wrote a letter to the [petitioner]
the judgment becomes final and executory
demanding payment of the aforesaid amount
until the obligation is satisfied, the interest
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. On
should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%)
February 7, 1990, the [petitioner]s [v]ice-
per year. - Thus, the rate of interest shall be
[p]resident-[c]omptroller, wrote a letter to
six percent (6%) per annum, computed
[respondent]s counsel, averring, inter alia, that
from the time of the filing of the
the pairs of jeans sewn by her, numbering
Complaint in the trial court until the
finality of the judgment. If the adjudged
principal and the interest (or any parts
thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest
rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time the
judgment becomes final and executory
until it is fully satisfied. The appeal is granted