[A.C. No. 5834. December 11, 2003] No. 97-275 was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
dismissed for failure to prosecute. Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider
TERESITA D. SANTECO, complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high
degree of fidelity and good faith.[1] The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
We are once again called upon to reiterate these dicta in the instant administrative
matter before us.
On July 31, 2001, Teresita D. Santeco filed a Verified Complaint[2] with the Committee
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines praying that appropriate sanctions
be meted on respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275.
Complainant averred that she was the defendant in an action for ejectment docketed as
Civil Case No. 50988 filed with Branch 62 of the Makati City Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC).
On March 3, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment against her. Thereafter, she filed
a supersedeas bond with the Clerk of Court of the Makati MTC.
Sometime in February 1997, during the pendency of the ejectment case, complainant
filed an action to Declare Deed of Absolute Sale Null and Void and for Reconveyance with
Damages with Branch 147 of the Makati City Regional Trial Court. The case was
entitled, Feliciana David Santeco, et al. v. Ramon Gutierrez, et al., and docketed as Civil
Case No. 97-275.
On or before March 1998, complainant terminated the services of her then counsel and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance as her counsel de parte in both
cases.Complainant agreed to and did pay respondent P12,000.00 as acceptance fee for her
services.[3]
In June 1997 and August 2000, complainant paid respondent the sums of P1,500.00
and P500.00 respectively in full satisfaction of their acceptance fee. However, respondent
refused to issue to complainant the corresponding receipts therefor, despite demands to do
so.
In an Order dated July 6, 1998 in Civil Case No. 97-275, the Presiding Judge of Branch
147 of the Makati City RTC expunged from the record the testimony of a witness for
complainant, who was one of the plaintiffs therein. [4] Respondent, as her counsel, filed a
Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order of July 6, 1998.[5] The motion was denied by
the trial court in an Order dated June 30, 1999.[6] Thereafter, on August 27, 1999,[7] Civil Case
and/or Set Aside Order of August 27, 1999.[8]
Subsequently, respondent made representations with complainant that she was going
to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 97-275. For the proposed service, respondent charged complainant the total sum of
P3,900.00, which the latter paid.[9] After waiting for some time without any word from
respondent, complainant personally verified with the docket section of the Court of Appeals
whether or not a petition for certiorari was filed. She was dismayed to discover that no such
petition had been filed.
Complainant also alleged that respondent took from her the official receipt and pictures
of the torn-down structures which were the subject of Civil Case No. 50988, issued by the
Clerk of Court of Branch 62 of the Makati City MTC, evidencing her deposit of
the supersedeas bond. Respondent obtained the same under the pretext that she needed
them in the motion for the withdrawal of complainants deposit.
Complainant further averred that respondent told her to go to the court to claim the check
for the supersedeas bond and have the same encashed with the Landbank. However, upon
verification with the MTC, she discovered that there was no such check and that she needs
to present the official receipt to withdraw said deposit. She tried to recover the official receipt
from respondent but the latter kept avoiding her.
Thus, complainant filed an action against respondent before the Barangay Office
of Barangay Nangka, Marikina City. Respondent, however, repeatedly failed to appear at the
conciliation proceedings, despite notice of the hearings, prompting
the Lupong Tagapayapa, to issue a certification to file action.[10] Since then, respondent
persistently avoided complainant and failed to represent her in Civil Cases Nos. 50988 and
97-275. According to complainant, respondent just stopped appearing as her counsel of
record without any justifiable reason.Hence, she prayed that appropriate sanctions be meted
on respondent.
After the filing of the administrative complaint, docketed as CBD Case No. 01-861, an
Order dated August 1, 2001[11] was issued by the Commission on Bar Discipline requiring
respondent to submit her Answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. A copy of said
Order was received by respondent on August 8, 2001. Respondent failed to file her Answer,
which compelled complainant to file a Motion To Declare Respondent In Default And To Set
Case For Hearing Ex Parte.[12] She furnished respondent copy of the motion by personal
service. The copy was received by one Kins Avance on October 3, 2001.[13]
Respondent still failed to file her Answer. Thus, the Commission on Bar Discipline
issued an Order dated October 30, 2001 setting the case for hearing on November 20, 2001.
This Order was received by respondent on November 8, 2001, as reflected in the Registry
Return Receipt thereof.
On the scheduled hearing on November 20, 2001, only the complainant appeared.[14] In
order to abbreviate proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued an
Order[15] requiring both parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days
from receipt, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for decision with or without
memoranda.Respondent received a copy of the Order on November 27, 2001, per the
Registry Return Receipt.
 Pursuant to the foregoing Order, complainant filed her Position Paper on December 13,
2001.[16] Again, respondent did not file her memorandum.
On March 14, 2002, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a Report
finding respondent culpable as charged and recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years. She found that:
As it is, respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having
failed to account to the complainant the official receipt of the supersedeas bond she got
from complainant to withdrew (sic) the same from the court relative to the ejectment case.
Respondent also violated Canon 18.03 for having failed to file the [petition for] certiorari
before the Court of Appeals as she promised the complainant and even got litigation
expenses relative to the same.
Likewise, respondent violated Canon 20 when she discontinued her legal services for
complainant without any notice of withdrawal and even ignored the issuances of the
Commission for her to answer the complaint filed against her.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-02-408, adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
While we agree that indeed respondent is liable, we find the recommended penalty not
commensurate to the degree of her malfeasance.
There can be no question that respondent was grossly remiss in the performance of her
duties as counsel for complainant. The records show that in engaging the services of
respondent, complainant agreed to and did pay respondent P12,000.00 as acceptance
fee.[17] It also appears that on April 20, 1998, a witness for complainant in Civil Case No. 97-
275 testified before the court on direct examination. For lack of material time, the cross-
examination was reset to June 1, 1998. However, the witness failed to attend the hearing on
the said date. Respondent, on the other hand, arrived late. Over the vehement objections of
defense counsel, the trial court reset the hearing to July 6, 1998, with the warning that in the
event the witness fails to appear on said date, her direct examination shall be expunged. The
witness again failed to appear at the next hearing because she went to Baguio. Respondent
was likewise not around when the case was called. Thus, on motion of adverse counsel, the
trial court ordered that the testimony of the witness be stricken off the record. [18]
These incidents show respondents lackadaisical manner in handling her clients cause.
Again, for respondents failure to appear during the hearings scheduled on August 23 and 27,
1999, Civil Case No. 97-275 was dismissed for failure to prosecute.[19] Her failure to appear
during those hearings constitutes inexcusable negligence as it proved fatal to the cause of
complainant.[20] She thereafter filed a Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order of August
27, 1999 on February 8, 2000[21] way beyond the reglementary period for the filing
thereof. She proffered the lame excuse that notices sent to her were returned to the trial court
with the notation: Moved.[22] However, it was her duty to notify the court of the change in her
address, if she had indeed moved.
Even as the aforesaid motion for reconsideration was pending, she made
representations with complainant that she would file a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the trial courts dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-275. For the filing and
preparation thereof, she charged and was paid the sum of P3,900.00 by
complainant.[23] Respondent, however, did notfile the petition without notifying the
complainant.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. Her negligence in connection therewith shall render
her liable. Verily
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.[24]
Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, respondent abruptly
stopped appearing as complainants counsel even as proceedings were still pending with
neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for doing so. This was in gross violation of the
following:
CANON 22. A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE
AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. (Italics supplied)
It must be remembered that while the right of the client to terminate the relation is
absolute, i.e., with or without cause,[25] the right of the attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. [26] Among the fundamental
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its termination.[27] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause.[28]
The grounds wherein a lawyer may withdraw his services are well-defined,[29] and the
abruptness of respondents withdrawal hardly fits into any of them. Be that as it may, whether
or not a lawyer has a valid cause for withdrawing from a case, he can not just do so and leave
the client out in the cold unprotected. [30] An attorney may only retire from a case either by
written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in
which event the lawyer should see to it that the name of the new counsel is recorded in the
case.[31]
 Respondents consistent refusal to comply with lawful orders in the proceedings before
the Commission on Bar Discipline, with no explanation offered to justify them, not only
underscores her utter lack of respect for authority, but also a defiance for law and order which
is at the very core of her profession. Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career
in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is
demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and
uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? The first and foremost
command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

The inevitable conclusion is that respondent gravely abused the confidence that
complainant reposed in her and with palpable bad faith. Her persistent refusal to comply with
lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so, is contumacious conduct
which merits no compassion.
A lawyer has the duty to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all
times and to faithfully perform her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her
clients.[32] We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an
honorable profession.
All told, respondent has dismally failed to do her duty to her client and has clearly
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents actions erode the public
perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct, and the sanctions for
such malfeasance is provided by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years recommended by the Board of
Governors of the IBP is too light and inadequate given the prevailing facts of this case. For
the deliberate violation and defiance of not merely one but several Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, coupled with palpable bad faith and dishonesty in her dealings
with complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty that of suspension for a period of
five (5) years from the practice of law.[33]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. She is directed to
return to complainant the amount of P3,900.00 within ten (10) days from notice.
This decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record. The Court
Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with copies of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
JOSEFINA M. ANION,
Complainant, A.C. No. 5098
- versus -
Promulgated:
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR.,
Respondent.
April 11, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged
of: (1) violating the lawyers duty to preserve confidential information received from his
client;[1] and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.[2]
In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that she previously
engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of
a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja,
Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case
against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife
of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential
information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of
the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty.
Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino
Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty.
Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003,
IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for
representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:
In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to
nullify a contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent
positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Caete, respondents present client in
Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the sale executed by
Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and information
divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of
the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his
current employment as counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of the rule
prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.
In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent
conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no
such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting
employment as Mrs. Caetes counsel-of-record. x x x
xxx
Complainant and respondents present client, being contending claimants
to the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is
said to be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the
attorneys duty to contend for that which his duty to another client requires
him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with
which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to
nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between
Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)[3]

The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year.[4]
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. [5] The IBP Board of
Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioners recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors
denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations
of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer
for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can
only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer
of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. [6] Part of the lawyers duty
in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action.[7] The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend
for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be
no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the
other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. [8] To be held accountable under this rule, it is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [9]
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the
above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or
claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for
the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be
 opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule. and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the prepared and executed for the complainant.
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another
the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment. [10] [emphasis client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend
ours]
and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been

On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to previously retained.

support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the following

circumstances on record: To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an

exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her Atty. Sabitsanas failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty.

interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Caete

Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Caete. The records likewise show that

complainants favor. although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes

adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also

over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Caete. [11] Moreover, the records show that Atty.

knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the complainants interests. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03,

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.

Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete. Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did Atty. Sabitsana guilty of

misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of

Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of

clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in

behalf of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case;
Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense of the action or ruling complained of.[15] These opportunities were all afforded to Atty.

of representing conflicting interests.[12] Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.

We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the

ground that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[16] In the exercise

information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his

liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal

designated charge. profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by

We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights. Although there was purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no

indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. [17] This is all

contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the

against representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint: powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have

Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.
CANEJA, now Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from Complainant,
including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client
[complainant] to execute the second sale[.]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and

Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.[13] He recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of

also averred in his Answer that: the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No.
B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Caete was his representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
former client (herein complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of
Mrs. Caete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex 4) Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of
to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but
complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents handling the law.
case in behalf of Mrs. Caete on the ground she is now invoking in her
instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint against
her.[14]
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so

that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity

to be informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied toadministrative
SO ORDERED.
proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
 TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014
DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint 1 filed by Daria
O. Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet
Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).
Antecedents
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased
from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where
she operated the bar.
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal 3 from Davis & Sabling Law Office
signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This
eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a
Retainer Agreement4 dated March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the
lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's
music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take
over the operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as
business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later
renamed Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis
& Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting
and in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case
and filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.5
In his Comment,6 respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business
partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole
proprietress of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who
initiated the proposal and was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to accept
the law office as her retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge
or information regarding the business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling.
Respondent admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied
that he took advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and
Sabling Law Office. Thus:
3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW
OFFICE as her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of the Clients of
Respondent in several cases;
3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May 2005, while Respondent was in
his office doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent informing
the latter that his assistance is needed for purposes of conducting an inventory of all
items at the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose of] the inventory [to which] the
latter x xx responded x xx that she entered into a lease contract with the present
administrator of the building, Benjie Pinlac;
3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie Balageo to go [to] the LAW
OFFICE for further clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was later
informed that the business of Complainant was taken over and operated by Mr.
Benjie Pinlac for seven days. Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said place
to Novie Balageo which the latter readily accepted;
3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one of his staff to assist Novie
Balageo in conducting an inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as
partner of Novie Balageo in operating the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;
3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment against Novie Balageo and
Benjie Pinlac, Respondent represented the former thereof without taking advantage
of the retainership contract between the DA VIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE [and]
Complainant as Respondent has no knowledge or information of any matters related
by complainant to Atty. Sabling regarding the former' s business;
3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was xx x informed by Novie
Balageo and Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent
[was unaware of];
3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x x x Respondent [deemed it
prudent] to xx x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent filed
his Motion to Withdraw As Counsel. x x x
3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
[Complaint's] subject matter. x x x7
On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and
Recommendation8 finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of
information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of
another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for
a period of one year.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9 Upon motion of the respondent, it
reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension considering that there is no proof that
respondent actually handled any previous legal matters involving complainant. 10
Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should
have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other
members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they
would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo
to instead engage the services of another lawyer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension from
the practice of law ranging from six months to two years.17 We thus adopt the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Our Ruling
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005 with
respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to the rollo
of this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent represented
and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case
complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of said
Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his
appearance for Balageo.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 It provides: Resolution.

Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all SO ORDERED.
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." 11 The prohibition against
representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted
in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. 12 In Quiambao v. Atty.
Bamba,13 this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.14

Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case
is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction
between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal
matter complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could
not have taken advantage of an information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer
Agreement. We are not impressed. In Hilado v. David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty.
Cabucana, Jr.,16 this Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the
party who has engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public
disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument
that he never took advantage of any information acquired by his law finn in the course of its
professional dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime
V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and
ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against
respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful” 3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15
days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as
to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued
the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It
was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be
reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The
Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in
the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions 9 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering
respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of
P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with
her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty,
which respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his
legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract.
Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation
to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and
asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car.
Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend
the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer
to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who
recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On
November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the
amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount,
respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and
accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65,
entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to
P22,410.00 per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that
respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she
filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating
counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the
documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the
deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method
of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she
complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters
could be brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him
the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling.
Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the
amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt, 17 stating that “it is understood that
the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda
Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by
complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking
for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00. 18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she
personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of
respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the
order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion
for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and
requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for
reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would
not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional
averment that the defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with
a message from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein.
Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so
included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s
directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a
present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the
following month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her
counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of
documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since
December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her
the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees.
Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the
practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from
1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of
complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He
likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received
P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of
P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband,
who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his
services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its
payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent
claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent
in covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that
the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations.
Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied
having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant.
He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would
rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by
the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would
personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty
in the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully
aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully
informed of the nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant
was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim,
respondent demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases
for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to
the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts
mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra
Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the
preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest
Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of
P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City,
finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with
modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and
ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance
of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a
motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-
BOG that an information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and
that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for
reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by
reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to
return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however,
modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting
interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not
confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.” 27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing
that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules,
due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses
to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00
as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was
complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would
propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the
complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her
complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing
fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due,
consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from his client.”28Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for
the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various
amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not
deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to
return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client. 30 When a lawyer receives
money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if
the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his
client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of
P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the
case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing
that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the
supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client,
purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an
abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in
the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of
the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice.
In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest
the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts.
The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not
excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used
as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the
public’s trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this
juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his
client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely,
respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal
that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer
shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not
just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her
home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored
her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were
evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned
by respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly
unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by
complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in
the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these
loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and
P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of
complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate
behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter
failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to
the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards
of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be
found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it
proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that
complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing
party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail
to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for
an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only
entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty
in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.” 33 Thus, even if lucrative fees
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment
if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only
exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant
against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The
Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale,
which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the
Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not
question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to
some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the
proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of
the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the
clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document.
Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the
parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when
he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the
very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a
collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that
respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More
significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of
attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of
the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest
confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused or violated the entire profession suffers.” 34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a
wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not
sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of
the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society
render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining
the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for
representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of
disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from
complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot
order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity
because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no
intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s
administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which
the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since
administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence
required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative
cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is
“a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial
evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period
applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule,
imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was
intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar to this is the
amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation
expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine
for the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant.
While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge
is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne
out of their professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already
adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small
claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper
and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from
the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of
P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
April 6, 2016
A.C. No. 6934
HELEN CHANG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. HIDALGO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
A lawyer cannot simply withdraw from a case without notice to the client and complying with
the requirements in Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the lawyer will be
held liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant Helen Chang (Chang) filed this administrative Complaint1 before the Office of
the Bar Confidant of this Court on November 7, 2005. Chang prayed that this Court discipline
respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo (Atty. Hidalgo) for being remiss in his duties as her counsel
and as an officer of the court. 2 She claimed that Atty. Hidalgo failed to "handle [her] cases to
the best of his ability and to deal with [her] in all honesty and candor."3
In her Complaint, Chang alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Hidalgo as legal
counsel to represent her in several collection cases pending in various courts. 4 Pursuant to
the contract they executed, Chang issued five (5) checks in favor of Atty. Hidalgo totaling
₱52,000.00.5 Atty. Hidalgo also collected ₱9,500.00 as "hearing fee." 6 Chang claimed that
despite receiving a total of ₱61,500.00, Atty. Hidalgo did not attend any of the hearings in the
collection cases and, instead, sent another lawyer without her consent. 7 The other lawyer
failed to attend all hearings, which resulted in the dismissal of the cases. 8 Chang prayed that
Atty. Hidalgo be administratively disciplined by this Court.9
On December 12, 2005, Atty. Hidalgo was required to comment on the Complaint in the
Resolution10. The Notice of Resolution sent to Atty. Hidalgo in the address provided by Chang
was returned unserved with the notation that Atty. Hidalgo had moved out from the address.11
Chang was then ordered to submit Atty. Hidalgo’s correct and present address. 12 She filed
her Compliance13 and attached a Certification14 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
stating Atty. Hidalgo’s known address. This Court also ordered the Office of the Bar Confidant
to provide Atty. Hidalgo’s address "as appearing in its files[.]"15
Still, notices of the Resolution dated December 12, 2005 sent to these addresses were
returned unserved with the notation that the addressee, Atty. Hildalgo, had already moved
out.16
Finally, on October 31, 2007, Atty. Hidalgo received the Notice of the Resolution requiring
him to comment.17However, he still failed to do so.18 Thus, in the Resolution19 dated June 2,
2008, this Court considered the submission of the comment as waived and referred the case
"to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report[,] and recommendation[.]" 20
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines then set a
Mandatory Conference/Hearing on September 30, 2008. 21 During the mandatory conference,
only Chang appeared.22 The Investigating Commissioner noted that the notice for Atty.
Hidalgo was returned and not served on him.23 In the Order24 dated September 30, 2008, the
Investigating Commissioner directed Atty. Hidalgo to file his Comment. 25This Order was
received by Atty. Hidalgo.26
On November 10, 2008, the Commission on Bar Discipline received a handwritten and
unverified Comment27 from Atty. Hidalgo.28 In his Comment, Atty. Hidalgo admitted that
Chang retained him as counsel but countered that he attended the hearings. 29 He denied
allowing another lawyer to appear on his behalf. 30 Although he denied waiving his appearance
fee, he claimed that he did not receive "such a sum [referring to the acceptance fee] from
[Chang] mainly because of the length of time [that] passed." 31 Atty. Hidalgo insisted that due
to the "transigient [sic] and uncooperative"32 attitude of Chang, he decided that he "could no
longer perform [his job as Chang’s counsel] adequately."33 He reasoned that he could not put
up an effective defense due to his illness and his impoverished state. 34 He prayed that the
administrative case against him be dismissed. 35
After receiving the Comment, the Investigating Commissioner noted that it was not verified,
in violation of the Rules of Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 36 Thus, the
Investigating Commissioner did not consider it. 37Instead, he set another mandatory
conference on January 13, 2009.38
This Order was again returned unserved.39 The notation in the returned Order stated "RTS
[Return To Sender], Refused to Accept[.]"40 The Investigating Commissioner set another
mandatory conference on February 11, 2009.41Chang appeared, but Atty. Hidalgo again
failed to appear.42
On August 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Hidalgo guilty of gross
misconduct and of violating Canons 17, 18, and 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.43 Investigating Commissioner Albert R. Sordan discussed:
While this Commission commiserates with the hard luck story and plight of the impecunious
respondent, the indubitable fact remains that his misconduct runs afoul with the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Further, it is incumbent upon respondent to meet the issue head-
on and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. These, respondent has
failed miserably to do. The record is bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has
presented any countervailing evidence to dispute the charges against him. In his unverified
and belated answer, he has not even denied complainant’s allegations. He has only prayed
that the complaint be dismissed out of pity for a man of straw.44
The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation45 reads:
WHEREFORE, premised [sic] considered, respondent Atty. Joel R. Hidalgo has been
found GUILTY of gross misconduct. Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that he
be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from the practice of law, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.46 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
passed the Resolution47adopting with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The Board of Governors recommended decreasing the penalty
to one (1) year suspension from the practice of law and "[o]rdering [him] to [r]eturn the amount
of Sixty One thousand (P61,000.00) [sic] Pesos to complainant [Chang] within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made." 48
On April 11, 2013, Atty. Hidalgo moved for reconsideration.49 This time, he admitted receiving
money from Chang as agreed attorney’s fees.50 He reiterated that he attended the hearings
set for the cases.51 However, he claimed that he filed a Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel due
to Chang’s stubbornness and uncooperative behavior in the handling of the cases. 52 Since
he transferred residence, he was not able to verify if the court granted his Notice of
Withdrawal.53 Nonetheless, Atty. Hidalgo alleged that he was entitled to the acceptance fees
for exerting time and effort in the preparation of the cases and in the collation of
evidence.54 He maintained that the return of the fees, as ordered by the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, was not possible because his only means of income
was the Social Security System pension he has been receiving, and even that was not enough
for his health maintenance.55
On February 11, 2014, the Board of Governors denied 56 Atty. Hidalgo’s Motion for
Reconsideration.1âwphi1
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo is guilty of gross misconduct for failing
to render legal services despite receipt of payment of legal fees.
In an administrative case against a lawyer, the complainant has the burden of proof to show
by preponderance of evidence that the respondent lawyer was remiss of his or her duties and
has violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 57
Here, it is established that respondent was engaged as counsel for complainant to represent
her in various collection cases and that he received ₱61,500.00 from her as attorney’s fees.
Respondent also admitted withdrawing from the cases allegedly due to complainant’s
uncooperative demeanor. However, there is no showing that complainant agreed to the
withdrawal, or that respondent filed the proper motion before the courts where the cases were
pending.
During the mandatory conferences before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant
appeared but respondent did not make any appearance despite receiving notice.
Respondent failed to present proof that he performed any act in relation to complainant’s
collection cases or attended the hearings for the collection cases. Instead, respondent merely
claimed:
Also, respondent [Atty. Hidalgo] devoted substantial time and energy in researching and
preparing the case for trial, and he even attended hearings to that effect. He exerted his best
efforts in collating their evidences [sic] and their defense. However, the complainant [Helen
Chang] would not listen to respondent. Complainant has other matters and line of defense on
her mind because she keeps on insisting they do things her way. Respondent felt that he
could no longer work for the complainant as [sic]. Left without any recourse, respondent
advised the complaint [sic] to seek the services of another lawyer as he could no longer
perform adequately and this was done in good faith. And the actuations of the complainant
apparently precipitated the respondent to file the withdrawal as counsel. The respondent is
entitled to the acceptance fees he collected from the complainant, or at least a portion of it. 58
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent failed to refute complainant’s
allegations. Thus:
Prescinding from the foregoing, Atty. Hidalgo acknowledged the special retainer he had with
Helen Chang. Atty. Hidalgo failed to debunk claims of Helen Chang that he failed to perform
his bounden duty despite receipt of the sixty-one thousand five hundred pesos (₱61,500.00).
Worse, the cases were dismissed summarily.59
We find respondent remiss of his duties as complainant’s counsel.
Respondent’s acts constitute violations of Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which state:
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
....
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
In Layos v. Villanueva,60 this Court reiterated that a "lawyer must constantly keep in mind that
his [or her] actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his [or her] client." 61
Due to respondent’s withdrawal as complainant’s counsel for the cases, he did not anymore
attend any of the hearings. Since the withdrawal was without the conformity of complainant,
new counsel was not engaged. This necessarily resulted in the summary dismissal of the We sustain the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ recommended penalty of suspension from
collection cases as alleged by complainant. the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

Complainant could have obtained the services of another lawyer to represent her and handle
her cases with the utmost zeal and diligence expected from officers of the court. However,
respondent simply opted to withdraw from the cases without complying with the requirements
under the Rules of Court and in complete disregard of his obligations towards his client.
Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court provides, in part:
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
....
SECTION 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any
time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court,
on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on
the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be
given to the adverse party.
Respondent admittedly withdrew from the cases but he failed to provide any evidence to show
that complainant, his client, agreed to the withdrawal or, at the very least, knew about it. The
offensive attitude of a client is not an excuse to just disappear and withdraw from a case
without notice to the court and to the client, especially when attorney’s fees have already been
paid.
In several cases, this Court has imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the
practice of law for violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.66
Further, restitution of acceptance fees to complainant is proper. Respondent failed to present
any evidence to show his alleged efforts for the cases. He failed to attend any of the hearings
before the Commission on Bar Discipline. There is no reason for respondent to retain the
professional fees paid by complainant for her collection cases when there was no showing
that respondent performed any act in furtherance of these cases.67
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo is found guilty of violating Canon 17 and
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Respondent is also ORDERED to return to
complainant Helen Chang the amount of P61,500.00, with interest at 6% per annum from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo:62

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and confidence."
Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing
cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also
to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either the
client or the court.63 (Citations omitted)

Similarly, in Nonato v. Fudolin, Jr.:64

A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. He should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and
provide the quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a
competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his client’s counsel, a lawyer
impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care
and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform
his obligations diligently. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.65 (Citations omitted)
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
April 6, 2016
A.C. No. 11128
PEDRO RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA NYMPHA C. MANDAGAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Pedro
Ramos (Ramos) against respondent Atty. Maria Nympha C. Mandagan (Atty. Mandagan) for
gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Complaint, Ramos alleged that Atty. Mandagan demanded from him the amount of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) in connection with the criminal case filed
against him for murder before the Sandiganbayan. According to Ramos, the P300,000.00
shall be used as bail bond in the event that his petition for bail in the said criminal case is
granted.2 Also, Atty. Mandagan collected an additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) for operating expenses. In both instances, an Acknowledgment Receipt was
issued in his favor as proof of payment.3
Contrary to the assurance, however, of Atty. Mandagan, Ramos’ petition for bail was denied
by the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, Atty. Mandagan withdrew as his counsel without returning
the amount of ₱300,000.00 despite the demand sent by Ramos’ counsel. 4
On December 19, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) issued an Order5 directing Atty. Mandagan to submit her Answer to Ramos’
complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.
In her Answer,6 Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount of ₱300,000.00 was not intended for
payment of bail, but as mobilization expenses for preparation of witnesses, defenses, and
other documentary exhibits for both Ramos and his co-accused Gary Silawon.7 Atty.
Mandagan likewise alleged that Ramos never paid her for acceptance, appearance fees, and
legal services rendered in the entire course of the proceedings until her withdrawal as
counsel.8
On April 26, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference9 directing the
parties to appear for a mandatory conference. During the mandatory conference, however,
only Atty. Joselito Frial appeared, as counsel for Ramos, while Atty. Mandagan was absent.
On August 29, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued an Order10 terminating the mandatory conference
and directed both parties to submit their respective position papers within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days upon receipt of the said order.
On December 18, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,11 finding Atty.
Mandagan liable for gross misconduct and for failure to render an accounting of funds, and
recommended that Atty. Mandagan be suspended for a period of one (1) year. Subsequently,
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in a Resolution12 dated October 11, 2014.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Atty. Mandagan, but the same was denied by the
IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution13 dated June 5, 2015.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, as adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors,
to be proper under the circumstances.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.1âwphi1 As
such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts, and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms
embodied in the Code. 14
In Cruz-Villanueva v. Atty. Rivera,15 this Court held that:
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer must render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money to the client. 16 (Citations omitted)
In the present case, Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the amount of ₱300,000.00 from
Ramos for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the latter’s provisional liberty. When the
petition for bail of Ramos, however, was denied by the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Mandagan failed
to return the amount to Ramos. Worse, she unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to
Ramos despite demand from Ramos’ counsel.
Clearly, Atty. Mandagan failed to act in accordance with the rule stated in Canon 16 of the
CPR, to wit:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
xxxx

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa,17 this Court stated that:

[A] lawyer has the duty to deliver his client’s funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand. His failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Indeed,
it may border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or
estafa.18 (Citations omitted)

This court cannot give credence to Atty. Mandagan’s defense that the amount she received
from Ramos was not for bail but merely for mobilization expenses. Records show that Atty.
Mandagan failed to substantiate her claim. At any rate, as correctly observed by the IBP-
CBD, "[Atty. Mandagan] should be forthright in stating what constitutes legal mobilization
expenses if only to dispel any doubt as to its intended

purpose."19

Atty. Mandagan’s failure to make an accounting or to return the money to Ramos is a violation
of the trust reposed on her. As a lawyer, Atty. Mandagan should be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to her in her professional capacity because the CPR exacts a high
degree of fidelity and trust from members of the bar.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Maria Nympha C. Mandagan GUILTY of
violating Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt
of this Resolution, with WARNING that a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of Atty. Maria Nympha C.
Mandagan as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016
ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on November 4, 2011 by Arnold Pacao
(complainant), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty. Limos) for conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
The Facts
Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of
BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by
BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos appeared as counsel for BHF. Thereafter,
the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a
possible settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty.
Limos, where the latter represented that she was duly authorized by BHF. After a series of
negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid
in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant
would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then
deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a
joint motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the
court.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty.
Limos, who in turn, signed an Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her undertakings as
counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the terms of their agreement.
Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to get from the complainant the next
installment amount of their purported agreement, but the latter
refused.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio, who
informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to
negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF. The complainant also
learned that BHF did not receive the P200,000.00 initial payment that he gave to Atty.
Limos.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter7to Atty. Limos to return the
P200,000.00 initial settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to do
so.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty.
Limos to file an answer but she did not file any responsive pleading. 9 A mandatory
conference was then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April 19, 2012, but Atty. Limos failed
to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD ordered the parties to submit their position paper, but
once again, Atty. Limos did not bother to submit her position paper.
On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Limos.10 The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove that
Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's prejudice
by concealing or omitting to disclose the material fact that she no longer had the authority to
negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to
receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to return to
the complainant the full amount of P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of her return of the full
amount.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to
the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As per verification
of the Court, neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review
thereafter.
The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty.
Limos from the practice of law?14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by
this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty.
Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus
miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her undertaking with her
client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise,
in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct
when she obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks
in the latter's favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover
the same. In both cases, the Court, gave Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same
or similar acts by her will merit a more severe penalty.
Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court
for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible
amicable settlement with her client BHF. However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel
and was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor
was she authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her blunder is compounded by
the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same to the the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
complainant, despite due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
knowing fully well that she was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
complainant as her engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased. dangerous elements of the body politic."21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. The foregoing
factual antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It
is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had
planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct
is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.
Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in
this case definitely establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance
with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member of
the bar.

Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges brought against
her. Similar with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother to answer the
complaint against her. She also failed to file her mandatory conference brief and her verified
position paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter appearance either personally or by
counsel, and she failed to appear at the scheduled date of the mandatory conferences
which she was duly notified.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter, to justify her
actions, Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality
demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming indifference to the complaint brought
against her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence from the proceedings before
the IBP. Her disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the
authority of the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination,
is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let
other copies be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again demonstrating to this
Court that not only is she unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is
also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has supervision over her. Atty.
Limos' unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court which cannot be tolerated.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27, 18 Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of
disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender. Considering the serious
nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior misconduct which grossly
degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is
warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed
with the Court's warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's authority over
members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated
desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal
profession. Worse, she remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On
DOLORES C. BELLEZA, A.C. No. 7815
all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
Complainant,

-versus- On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of

ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent

Respondent. Promulgated: did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out

July 23, 2009 that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.

x----------------------------------------------------x
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but

respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam: and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons

defense.

This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza against Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint [2] for disbarment against

respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in connection with respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

the handling of a criminal case involving complainants son. Attached to the verified complaint was the affidavit[3] of Chua which read:

On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend,
Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection with the
case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy.
Bata, Bacolod City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law,
hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to]
Atty. Alan Macasa when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in the
case that the latter is facing sometime [i]n [the] first week of November
2004;

that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. [1] Respondent agreed to handle the 2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am
the one who facilitated the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to
Atty. Alan Macasa;
case for P30,000.
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs.
Dolores Belleza as payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their
Date Amount
mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid
 November 11, 2004 P15,000.00
A week after 10,000.00 The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
November 18, 2004 5,000.00

4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Responsibility which provides:

Attorneys Fees were immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth immoral, or deceitful conduct.
of all the foregoing statements.

x x x x x x x x x[4] It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility:
In a letter dated May 23, 2005,[5] the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted the
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
complaint to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).[6] collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
In an order dated July 13, 2005,[7] the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within and apart from his own and those others kept by him.

15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an

answer dated August 10, 2005,[8] simply brushed aside the complaint for being baseless, The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit

groundless and malicious without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he and unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD

be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer. recommended a suspension of six months with a stern warning that repetition of similar acts

would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent be ordered to
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions[9] for second and third extensions of time
return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the complainants son
praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
and the P30,000 attorneys fees.

When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they were
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
ordered to submit their respective position papers.[10]
the CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to return to complainant only the

In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,[11] the CBD ruled that respondent amount of P30,000 which he received as attorneys fees.[12]

failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint despite several
We affirm the CBDs finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we modify
chances to do so.
the IBPs recommendation as to the liability of respondent.

RESPONDENT DISRESPECTED
LEGAL PROCESSES
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges against
him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and refute the
accusations of professional misconduct against him. In doing so, he failed to observe Rule
12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBDs directive for him to file his position paper. His
propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for the
proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal
profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities. He
displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to this Court which is the source of the CBDs
authority.
Respondents unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only
irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers.[13] His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders
and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an
officer of the court.[14] Respondent should have known that the orders of the CBD (as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers) were not mere
requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely. [15]
RESPONDENT GROSSLY NEGLECTED
THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such
undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxxxxxxx
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly
his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full
devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied. [16]

A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve
his client with competence and diligence.[17] He must conscientiously perform his duty arising
from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes
the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and
ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care
and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause;
and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest. [18]
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship
of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights
of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal
profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional
and unethical.[19]
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his
client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the
scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a
criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. [20] However,
this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his
lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic
rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions
and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial
of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. [21]
∞○∞
[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental
right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other
rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.[22]
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer
of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.[23] Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.[24]
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his
attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal
assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client.
Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek
the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the
case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it
also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the
amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of

respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail. posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money for its

intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably refused to
RESPONDENT FAILED TO RETURN
HIS CLIENTS MONEY turn over the amount to complainant despite the latters repeated demands.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the
the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for
client.[25]
his services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the client. [31] Thus, a lawyer who does not

(such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should render legal services is not entitled to attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he be unjustly

promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its enriched at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded for his negligence and

intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.[26] His failure either to render an irresponsibility.

accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) RESPONDENT FAILED TO UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [27]

For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall
respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
due or upon demand.[28] His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
supplied)
of the trust reposed in him by the client.[29] It is a gross violation of general morality as well as

of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of
punishment.[30] Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case
Professional Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so
of swindling or estafa.
doing, he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
 payment of the amount within ten days from payment. Failure to do so will subject him to
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as
criminal prosecution.
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers

may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. [32] Thus, Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into

every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote public the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the Court Administrator to

confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[33] be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money SO ORDERED.

for the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness

and loyalty in his dealings with his client. [34] He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By

keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release of

complainants son, respondent showed lack of moral principles. His transgression showed him

to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of

dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John Bellezas right to

counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, and for violating

Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and 18.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the practice of law effective

immediately.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the amounts

of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this

decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
MARITES E. FREEMAN, A.C. No. 6246
Complainant, Promulgated:
November 15, 2011
- versus –
ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E. Freeman,
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in
obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating the
proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks
recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which
was remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary damages.
In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated
April 7, 2000, filed on May 10, 2000, complainant
alleged that her husband Robert Keith Freeman, a British national, died in London on October
18, 1998. She and her son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas, to enable them to attend the
wake and funeral, but their visa applications were denied. Complainant engaged the services
of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help her secure the visas and obtain
the death benefits and other insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that she
had to personally go to London to facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that
the latter bear all expenses for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the
amount of P50,000.00. As acknowledgment for the receipt of P47,500.00 for service charge,
tax, and one round trip ticket to London, respondent gave her a Cash/Check
Voucher,[2] issued by Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right margin thereof, the notations in
the amount of P50,000.00 and the date 12-5-98 were written and duly initialled. On December
9, 1998, she acceded into giving respondent the amount of P20,000.00 for legal costs in
securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary Receipt [3] bearing said date, issued by Z.P.
Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18, 1998, she went to see
respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the latter asked for the additional amount
of P10,000.00 for travel expenses, per Temporary Receipt [4] bearing said date, issued by
respondents law firm. After several phone calls inquiring about the status of the visa
applications, respondent told her, Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa, kasi blacklisted at
banned ka sa Embassy. (It is difficult to railroad the process of securing visa, because you
are blacklisted and banned by the Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told
her that to lift the travel ban on her, she should shell out P18,000.00 as panlagay or grease
money to bribe some staff of the British Embassy. After a week, respondent informed her that
the ban was lifted, but the visas would be issued on a later date, as she had convinced the
British Embassy to issue resident visas instead of tourist visas. Respondent told her that to
expedite the release of the resident visas, she should again give P20,000.00 and a bottle of
wine, worth P5,000.00, as grease money to bribe the British Embassy personnel. After
several weeks, respondent told her that the period for visa applications had lapsed, and that
another amount of P18,000.00 was needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked
for P30,000.00 as legal costs, per Temporary Receipt, [5] dated April 19, 1999, to be used for
booking the former's flight to London, and P39,000.00 for legal costs, per Temporary
Receipt[6] dated May 13, 1999, to cover the expenses for the plane tickets. Both temporary
receipts were issued by respondents law firm.
Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came
out. Instead, she received a picture of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend
of the deceased. She later learned that respondent left for London alone, without informing
her about it. Respondent explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up the
insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with Grist who allegedly pocketed the
proceeds of her husband's insurance policy. She told respondent that she received a
letter[7] dated March 9, 1999 from one Martin Leigh, an Officer of H.M. Coroner's Court,
London, informing her about the arrangements for the funeral and that her late husband was
covered by three insurance policies, to wit: Nationwide Building Society (Account Number
0231/471 833 630), Lincoln Assurance Company (British National Life Policy No.
PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512). [8] Respondent offered
to help and assured her that representations with the insurance companies had earlier been
made, so that the latter would be receiving the insurance proceeds soon.
According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her signature in a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA),[9] dated November 6, 1998 [first SPA], which would authorize the
respondent to follow-up the insurance claims. However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA]
she signed was not notarized, but another SPA,[10] dated April 6, 1999, was notarized on April
30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she came across a
similar copy of the SPA,[11] dated April 6, 1999, also notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA],
but this time, additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses. She said that without her
knowledge and consent, respondent used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999, in her
correspondence with the insurance companies in London.
Complainant discovered that in an undated letter, [12] addressed to one Lynn O. Wilson of
Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512), respondent made representations that her
husband left no will and that she had no verified information as to the total value of her
husband's estate and the existence of any property in London that would be subjected to
Grant of Representation. Said letter requested that complainant be advised on the value for
probate in the amount of 5231.35 and the procedure for its entitlement. Respondent added
therein that As to the matter of the installments due, as guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy,
Mrs. Freeman requests that the remittance be sent directly to Account No. 0148-27377-7 Far
East Bank, Diliman Branch, with business address at Malakas St. Barangay Central District,
Quezon City, Philippines under the account name:Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her
temporary account until further notice.
Subsequently, in a letter[13] dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of Lincoln
Financial Group (PP/8500137851), respondent, declaring that she is the Counsel/Authorized
Representative [of the complainant], per SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999],
replied that she had appended the documents required (i.e., marriage certificate and birth
certificate), in her previous letter,[14] dated April 20, 1999, to the said insurance company; that
pursuant to an SPA[15] executed in her favor, all communications pertaining to complainant
should be forwarded to her law firm; that she sought clarification on whether complainant is
entitled to death benefits under the policy and, if so, the amount due and the requirements to
be complied with; and that in the absence of a Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having
left no will), she enclosed an alternative document [referring to the Extrajudicial
Settlement[16] dated June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in support of the claim of the
surviving spouse (Mrs. Freeman) and their sole child (Frank Lawrence Freeman). In the same
letter, respondent reiterated that complainant requests that any amount of monies due or
benefits accruing, be directly deposited to Account No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank,
Diliman Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines under Reyes/Mendiola, which serves
as her temporary account until further notice.
Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to
return her passport and the total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing
of the visa applications. Not heeding her demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting
with the Consul of the British Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the visa applications, but
she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with the turn of events. On the supposed
rescheduled appointment with the British Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech
Travel and Tours, and introduced her to one Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's owner,
who assured her that he would help her secure the visas within a week. Marquez made her
sign an application for visa and demanded the amount of P3,000.00. After a week, she talked
to one Marinez Patao, the office secretary of respondent's law firm, who advised her to ask
respondent to return the total amount of P200,000.00.
In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer[17] dated June 20, 2000, respondent countered that in 1998,
complainant, accompanied by former Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner
Josefina Bauzon and another woman whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice
regarding the inheritance of her deceased husband, a British national. [18] She told
complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased, birth certificate of their son, and
other documents to support her claim for the insurance proceeds. She averred that before
she accepted the case, she explained to complainant that she would be charging the following
amounts: acceptance fee of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional
amount of P50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said complainant agreed to these rates
and, in fact, readily paid her the said amounts. With an SPA,[19]dated April 6, 1999 and
notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], having been executed in her favor, she made
preliminary communications with the insurance companies in London regarding complainant's
claims. Having received communications from said insurance companies, she stated that
complainant offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her plane ticket and the hotel
accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She left for London in May
1999 and, upon her return, she updated the complainant about the status of her claims.
As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with complainant, she asked
her why she had not left for London, and the latter replied that her contacts with the embassy
had duped her. She explained to complainant that she could refer her to a travel consultant
who would handle the visa arrangements for a fee, to which the latter agreed.She stated that
when complainant acceded to such arrangement, she accompanied her, in December 1999,
to a travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who found out that complainant's previous
visa applications had been denied four times, on the ground of falsity of
information. Thereafter, complainant was able to secure a visa through the help of the travel
consultant, who charged her a professional fee of P50,000.00. She added that she had no
participation in the foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant to the said travel
consultant.
With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied knowledge about the
existence of the same, and declared that the SPA,[20] dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized
on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], was her basis for communications with the insurance
companies in London. She stated that in her absence, complainant, through wily
representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah Buama, her office secretary,
and never returned the same, despite repeated demands. She said that she was unaware of
the loss of the case folder as she then had no immediate need of it. She also said that her
secretary failed to immediately report about the missing case folder prior to taking a leave of
absence, so as to attend to the financial obligations brought about by her mother's lingering
ailment and consequent death.[21] Despite repeated requests, complainant failed to return the
case folder and, thus, the law firm was prevented from pursuing the complainant's insurance
claims. She maintained that through complainant's own criminal acts and machinations, her
law office was prevented from effectively pursuing her claims. Between January to February
2000, she sent complainant a billing statement which indicated the expenses incurred [22] by
the law firm, as of July 1999; however, instead of settling the amount, the latter filed a
malicious suit against her to evade payment of her obligations.
On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the Instant Case for Immediate
Resolution with Comments on Respondent's Answer, alleging, among others, that upon
seeing the letter[23] dated March 9, 1999 of the Coroner's Court, respondent began to show
interest and volunteered to arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was
agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned represented the legal
fees and expenses to be incurred attendant to the London trip; that the parties verbally agreed
to a 20% contingent fee out of the total amount to be recovered; that she obtained the visas
with the assistance of a travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon return from
abroad, respondent never informed her about the arrangements with the insurance
companies in London that remittances would be made directly to the respondent's personal
account at Far East Bank; that the reason why respondent went to London was primarily to
attend the International Law Conference, not solely for her insurance claims, which explained
why the receipt for the P50,000.00, which she gave, bore the letterhead of Broadway Travel,
Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she merely made a handwritten marginal note
regarding the receipt of the amount of P50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA [referring to
the second SPA] in favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount
of 10,546.7 [should be 10,960.63],[24] or approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, was
remitted to the personal bank account of respondent, but the same was never turned over to
her, nor was she ever informed about it; and that she clarified that she never executed any
SPA that would authorize respondent to receive any money or check due her, but that the
only SPA [first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing her in court
proceedings.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint[25] for malicious mischief, under Article 327
of the Revised Penal Code, against complainant and one Pacita Mamaril (a former client of
respondent), for allegedly barging into the law office of the former and, with the use of a pair
of scissors, cut-off the cords of two office computer keyboards and the line connections for
the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and electric fan, resulting in damage to office equipment
in an estimated amount of P200,000.00. In the Resolution,[26] dated July 31, 2000, the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended that the complaint be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. The case was subsequently dismissed due to lack of evidence and
for failure of respondent to appear during the preliminary investigation of the case. [27]
Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code, against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181,
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by
respondent, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the Resolution [28]dated October 21, 2002,
recommended that the information, dated February 8, 2002, for estafa be withdrawn, and that
the case be dismissed, for insufficiency of evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information.[29] Consequently, in the Order[30] dated
November 27, 2002, the trial court granted the withdrawal of the information, and dismissed
the case.
In the Report and Recommendation[31] dated August 28, 2003, Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline found respondent to have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client, for being
dishonest in her dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended for
complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite receipt of the
approximate amount of P200,000.00, respondent failed to secure the visas for complainant
and her son, and that through deceitful means, she was able to appropriate for herself the
proceeds of the insurance policies of complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the
maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be ordered to turn over to complainant
the amounts she received from the London insurance companies.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVI-2003-
166,[32] adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with
modification that respondent be disbarred.
The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant
had sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against respondent, for having
appropriated the insurance proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney
himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons
whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the
trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[33]
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, it does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct,
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.[34]
Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the determination of the
respondent's administrative liability. This does not include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such
as moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be
the subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's wrongful acts,
to be filed in the regular courts.
In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to
assist her in securing visa applications and claiming the insurance proceeds of her deceased
husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the scope of authority of respondent to
represent the complainant. A perusal of the [first] SPA,[35] dated November 6, 1998, which
was not notarized, showed that complainant merely authorized respondent to represent her
and her son, in order to protect their rights and interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial
proceeding and the possibility of any amicable settlement, relating to the estate of her
deceased husband, both in the Philippines and United Kingdom.The [second] SPA, [36] dated
April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged signature of
complainant, in addition to the foregoing representations, authorized respondent to appear
and represent the complainant, in connection with her insurance claims, and to receive
monies and/or encash treasury warrants, checks arising from said claims, deposit the same,
and dispose of such funds as may be necessary for the successful pursuit of the claims. The
[third] SPA,[37] also dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the
forged signature of complainant, but additionally bearing the signatures of two witnesses, was
a faithful reproduction of the second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The three SPAs,
attached to the pleadings of the parties and made integral parts of the records of the case,
were not certified true copies and no proof was adduced to verify their genuineness and
authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of respondent in her behalf with
regard to the insurance claims; however, the admission of respondent herself, as lawyer, that
she received payment from complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
a lawyer-client relationship.[38]
Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to
represent the complainant in pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate from
the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates
that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client, and Rule 16.03 thereof requires that a
lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of a client when due or upon demand.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client. [39] In the present case, the cash/check voucher
and the temporary receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her law firm, Z.P.
Reyes Law Office, indubitably showed that she received the total amount
of P167,000.00[40] from the complainant, in connection with the handling of the latter's
case. Respondent admitted having received money from the complainant, but claimed that
the total amount of P120,000.00[41] she received was in accordance with their
agreement. Nowhere was it shown that respondent rendered an accounting or, at least,
apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the
discrepancy in the actual amount that respondent should receive, supposedly pursuant to an
agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as there was absence of a formal
contract of legal services.
Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00 to the respondent for the
purpose of assisting her in claiming the insurance proceeds; however, per Application for
United Kingdom Entry Clearance,[42] dated December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's
primary purpose in traveling to London was to attend the International Law Conference in
Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had the gall to take advantage of the
benevolence of the complainant, then grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her
into believing that she needed to go to London to assist in recovering the proceeds of the
insurance policies. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that
she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving grease money or lagay, in the total amount
of P43,000.00,[43] to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the
normal course of conducting official business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa
applications. This runs afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was made to her personal
bank account, as shown by the monthly transaction report (covering January to December for
the years 2000-2001),[44] respondent never attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a
satisfactory explanation, as to why she failed to render an accounting, on the proceeds of the
insurance policies that should rightfully belong to the complainant vis--vis the correspondence
by the insurance companies based in London, pertaining to the remittance of the following
amounts to the respondent's personal bank account, to wit: Per letter[45] dated November 23,
2000, from one Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer Services Department of Lincoln
Financial Group, addressed to complainant, stating, among others, that An amount
of 10,489.57 was paid out under the Power of Attorney on 27 th September 2000), and per
letter,[46] dated April 28, 2000, from one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of
the Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of the
Lincoln Financial Group, The Quays, stating, among others, that I can confirm that a death
claim was made on the policy on 13 October 1999 when an amount of 471.06 was sent by
International Moneymover to the client's legal representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon
City, Philippines. Clearly, there is no doubt that the amounts of 10,489.57 and 471.06 were
remitted to respondent through other means of international transactions, such as the
International Moneymover, which explains why no direct remittance from the insurance
companies in London could be traced to the personal bank account of respondent, per
monthly transaction report, covering January to December for the years 2000-2001.
A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. [47] Section 5, in relation to Sections
1[48] and 2,[49] Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying
the rule to the present case, the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the
continuance of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of
evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. Respondent's
defense that the criminal complaint for estafa against her was already dismissed is of no
consequence. An administrative case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-
blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court
eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed
to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was
committed. More so, in the present administrative case, wherein the ground for the dismissal
of the criminal case was because the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw
the information and, a fortiori, dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence.
In Velez v. De Vera,[50] the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly
fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and
disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection
of the client. The Canon of Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should refrain from
any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client, or other
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer, should be reported and accounted
for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be
used by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his
client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Lawyers who
misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and
are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. [51] Indeed,
lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is
the primary consideration.[52]
In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice their profession for
breach of trust and confidence pertaining to their clients' moneys and properties. InManzano
v. Soriano,[53] therein respondent, found guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the
funds belonging to his client) and malpractice, represented therein complainant in a collection
suit, but failed to turn over the amount of P50,000.00 as stipulated in their agreement and, to
conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated deed of sale, with himself as the vendor and, at
the same time, the notary public. In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,[54] therein respondent, found guilty
of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, received the check corresponding to his client's
insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to himself, encashed the same, and
appropriated the proceeds.

Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are
simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed
with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. [55]Respondent's repeated
reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of
lies, to the extent of milking complainant's finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself
the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering
legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required in
the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of
exercising the noble legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross misconduct

and DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it duly
recorded in the personal file of the respondent.

Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the proceeds of

the insurance policies remitted to her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57,
and Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, 471.06, or in the total amount of 10,960.63,
which is approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant to the prevailing exchange rate
at the time of the subject transaction.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 5686 June 16, 2015
TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
1
Before us is a letter-complaint for disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) by Teodulo2Enriquez against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and
inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer.
On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint 3 for forcible entry against
complainant Teodulo Enriquez before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon,
Bohol. To defend his interests, Enriquez engaged4 the services of the law office of Attys.
Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the
assigned attorney.5
On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and
affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be
submitted for decision. However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the
defendants being declared in default. The MCTC rendered a decision 6in favor of the
plaintiffs.7 Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal8 with sufficient bond.
In its April 26, 2001 Order,9 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol dismissed the
appeal based on Section 7(b),10 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty.
Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia moved
for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 2001 Order 11 pointing
out that it had granted four motions for extension and still no appeal memorandum was filed.
On January 16, 2002, this disbarment complaint was received by the OBC. Enriquez alleged
that in failing to file the necessary pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them great
damage and prejudice. This constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance
of his professional duties as a lawyer.12 Enriquez thus prayed that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred.
On July 3, 2002, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment.13
On August 29, 2002, the Court received an ex parte manifestation from Atty. Lavadia stating
that he cannot file a comment because he did not receive a copy of the complaint. 14 The
Court, thus, required Enriquez to furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint within 10 days
and required the latter to file his comment within 10 days from receipt thereof. 15
On December 10, 2002, Enriquez informed16 the Court that he sent a copy of the complaint
and its annexes to Atty. Lavadia on December 6, 2002 as evinced by a receipt. 17
Atty. Lavadia filed two motions for extension18 citing his heavy case load and family problems
as reasons in both instances for not filing the comment. Said motions were granted by the
Court giving Atty. Lavadia another 60 days within which to file his comment. 19
On February 18, 2003, Atty. Lavadia again filed a motion to extend to file his comment due to
his wife’s continued illness.20 The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it would
be the last extension it would grant.21
Failing to submit his comment within the period granted, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt and to submit his comment within 10 days
from notice.22 Still, Atty. Lavadia failed to comply. The Court thus imposed on him a ₱1,000.00
fine or imprisonment of five days if he failed to pay the fine and ordered him to comply with
its previous resolutions.23
Atty. Lavadia paid the fine on June 2, 2005,24 and asked for additional time to file his comment
this time stating that he had moved from Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his wife’s illness
which was caused by "dark-beings." He claimed that a series of unfortunate events plagued
them, i.e., their house was razed by a fire, the hard drive of his computer crashing, and his
family members falling ill due to a "dark being." 25 The Court thus granted a 30-day
extension.26
Failing once again to file his comment, the Court in its September 19, 2007 Resolution
imposed a fine of ₱2,000.00 and required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment within five
days from notice.27 There is no record to show that he complied with the September 19, 2007
Resolution.
In its August 18, 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 28
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) scheduled a mandatory conference 29 on
January 14, 2011 but both parties failed to appear.30 Parties were then ordered to submit their
position papers within ten days from receipt of the Order.
On April 20, 2011, Atty. Lavadia requested that he be furnished a copy of the complaint having
lost his copy in a fire that razed his home.31 The IBP CBD resolved to furnish Atty. Lavadia a
copy of the complaint. It also directed the parties to file their position papers within 15 days
from August 1, 2011.32
In its Report and Recommendation,33 the IBP CBD recommended that Atty. Lavadia be
disbarred and his name be withdrawn from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP CBD found that not
only did Atty. Lavadia cause material prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as
counsel in failing to file the necessary pleadings to defend his client’s interest, he also
displayed a willful, defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying the resolutions of the
Court. By his actions the IBP CBD considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and
responsibilities as an attorney.
On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt the report and
recommendation of the IBP CBD.34
Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration35 but it was denied.36
After careful review and deliberation, we agree with the report of the IBP that Atty. Lavadia is
administratively liable.
We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and
obligations.37 Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession’s exacting standards. 38 A
lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer’s oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four general
categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client. 39 A
lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to the Court’s
disciplinary authority.40
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his
client and to the court. This Court notes Atty. Lavadia’s propensity for filing motions for
extension of time to file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the
CPR which states:
Rule 12.03. – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions precisely led to the filing
of this complaint. In the course of this administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this
Court his willful defiance and disregard for court orders.
LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03
A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence. 41 Lawyers are
reminded to note Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:
Rule 18.03. – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection there with shall render him liable.
In Solidon v. Macalalad,42 we stated that receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services
and failing to render the services is a violation of Canon 18 of the CPR. In that case, we also
stated that a lawyer’s failure to file the position paper is a per se violation of Rule 18.03 of the
CPR.43 We pointed to the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client. We stated:
x x x A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter’s interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the
law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of
law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and
due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.44 (Citations omitted)
In Mariveles v. Mallari,45 we disbarred Atty. Mallari for violating Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the
CPR. There, Atty. Mallari, after being granted a total of 245 days to file his client’s appellant’s
brief failed to file the same, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court considered
Atty. Mallari’s act a shameless disregard of his duties as a lawyer and found him to be unfit
for membership in the noble profession.46 In the recent case of Figueras v. Jimenez,47 Atty.
Jimenez was found administratively liable for failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of
his client.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of ₱29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the
preparation of pleadings for the case including the appeal.1âwphi1 Atty. Lavadia however
failed to discharge his duties. He failed to file his client’s position paper rendering his client in
default. While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the
appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to
file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in Solidon, Atty. Lavadia
has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him
administratively liable. As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions
of time to file the appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond.
The lower court granted him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to
file the appeal memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client.
In repeatedly asking for extensions of time without actually filing the appeal memorandum,
Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11
Under Canon 1148 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to
the court and its judicial officers. We read this provision in relation to Rules 10.03 49 and 12.03
of the CPR for this rule does not merely affect the client but the judicial process.
In Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto,50 this Court reiterated its previous ruling in Sebastian v.
Bajar51 where we stated that:
x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondent’s obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character;
it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof." Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not
only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts
and to show respect to their processes. (Citations omitted).

The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity
to file his comment to the complaint. We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty.
Lavadia to comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of ₱1,000.00 and ₱2,000.00 and
requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the Court’s resolutions.
In fine, we have granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to
his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of eight years,
this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion for
extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.

While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance
his act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the
Court. This reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to
discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa52 the Court’s
Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer’s blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the
Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave
Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him,
he continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits
disciplinary action.

We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez53 that the determination of whether an attorney should
be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. This Court has imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other
pleading.

In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia’s first infraction. However, given his
proven propensity for filing motions for extension of time and not filing the required pleading,
this Court finds that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing clien'ts
engage his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude.
Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent
attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT as recommended by the IBP
appropriate. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED
for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN.OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Court Administrator, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

A.C. No. 6672 Fe Marie L. Labiano

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, Paralegal

-versus 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821

Respondent. Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Promulgated: Back

September 4, 2009 SERVICES OFFERED:

x-----------------------------------------x CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

RESOLUTION TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

CORONA, J.: REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced ABROAD.
his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services,
he persistently called them and sent them text messages. (emphasis supplied)

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio Hence, this complaint.
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6] circulation of the said calling card.[7]

Front The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
LAW OFFFICE recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules
of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade
the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence [19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during
the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his
office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise
of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention
to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the
lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients
cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for the
exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on
lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based
on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from
their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 7649 December 14, 2011
SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and BENJAMIN DANDA,
Complainants, - versus -
ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO PEEWEE TRINIDAD,
and ANDRESITO FORNIER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban and
Benjamin Danda (complainants) against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao
Peewee Trinidad, and Andresito Fornier (respondents). Complainants claim that respondents
instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City
Prosecutors Office for Large Scale and Syndicated Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under I.S.
No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.1 Complainants pray for the imposition of the grave penalty
of disbarment upon respondents.2 Attached to complainants letter-complaint is the Joint
Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint3 allegedly submitted by complainants in the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints.
The Facts
Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court
Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in Cotabato City. 4 De Guzman allegedly
persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs.
Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.) against certain persons, in exchange for money. 5 De
Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his group, composed of Pasay City
Mayor Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito Fornier (Fornier), Everson Lim
Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers), were
untouchable.6
In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a
prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they were directed to
sign and file.7 The Joint Complaint-Affidavit and supporting documents were allegedly
fabricated and manufactured by De Guzman.8
During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office,
complainants allegedly received several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and
the Go Tian brothers, all of them continuously telling complainants to pursue the case.9 When
complainants asked De Guzman what would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued,
De Guzman allegedly replied, Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila.10
Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they told De
Guzman and his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-
C-31.11 Complainants were allegedly offered by respondents ₱200,000.00 to pursue the
case, but they refused.12 Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents
One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) to pursue the case until the end, but they refused
again.13 For this reason, respondents allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges
for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against
complainants in Iligan City.14 On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to have received a text
message from De Guzman, saying, Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan Warrant
of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo.15
In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants submitted the
allegedly fabricated complaint,16 supporting documents,17 letter of De Guzman to Cotabato
City Councilor Orlando Badoy,18 De Guzmans Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No.
2006-C-31,19 and other relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier, 20 and prayed that the complaint
be pursued against De Guzman.
Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court 21 and Position Paper filed
with the Commission on Bar Discipline,22 denied all the allegations in the complaint. Trinidad
vehemently declared that he has never communicated with any of the complainants and has
never been to Cotabato.23 He further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint does not
contain ultimate facts because it does not specify the times, dates, places and circumstances
of the meetings and conversations with him. 24 Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a
fabricated, politically motivated charge, spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros
(Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidads reputation as a lawyer and city mayor. 25Trinidad
claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly
believed that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay City. 26 Trinidad also
claims that he, his family members and close friends have been victims of fabricated criminal
charges committed by the syndicate headed by Montesclaros.27
Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court processes
by filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated
addresses of defendants.28 Since the defendants addresses are fabricated, the defendants
are not informed of the criminal complaint, and thus the information is filed with the
court.29 Consequently, a warrant of arrest is issued by the court, and only when the warrant
of arrest is served upon the defendant will the latter know of the criminal complaint. 30 At this
point, Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from the defendant in order for the
complainants to drop the criminal complaint. 31 To prove the existence of this syndicate,
Trinidad presented the letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to
the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these
institutions to investigate the syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a Canadian
citizen who was at that time jailed in Cebu City due to an extortion racket. 32 Trinidad also
presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City on the illegal
recruitment charge against his friend, Emmanuel Cinco, which charge was dismissed
because the charge was fabricated, as admitted by complainants themselves. 33
Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included some of
their members as respondents to divert suspicion.34 Trinidad pointed out that his wife was a
victim of this fabricated criminal charge of illegal recruitment filed in Marawi
City.35 Fortunately, when the warrant of arrest was being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidads
wife was not there.36 Lastly, Trinidad declared that Montesclaros has perfected the method of
filing fabricated cases in remote and dangerous places to harass his victims. 37
Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court 38 and Position Paper filed
with the Commission on Bar Discipline,39 claimed that in his 35 years as a member of the bar,
he has conducted himself professionally in accordance with the exacting standards of the
legal profession.40 Fornier denied knowing any of the complainants, and also denied having
any dealings or communication with any of them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed,
either for himself or on behalf of a client, any case, civil, criminal or otherwise, against
complainants.41 Fornier claimed that he was included in this case for acting as defense
counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment. 42 Fornier
claimed that the Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.43 For
coming to the legal aid of the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the plan of the
group of Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his clients. 44 Fornier claimed that the
filing of the complaint is apparently an attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who may
have exposed and thwarted their criminal designs at extortion. 45 Fornier prays that the Court
will not fall prey to the scheme and machinations of this syndicate that has made and
continues to make a mockery of the justice system by utilizing the courts, the Prosecutors
Offices, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration in carrying out their criminal activities. 46 Lastly, Fornier claimed that
complainants failed to establish the charges against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof, as complainants affidavits are replete with pure hearsay, speculations, conjectures and
sweeping conclusions, unsupported by specific, clear and convincing evidence. 47
De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint48 on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of
Complaint attached to the Letter-Complaint, which was made the basis of this administrative
complaint, are spurious.49 According to the Certification issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants Lauban, Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for
violation of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), which charge was subsequently
dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the Prosecutor, did not submit any Joint
Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of Complaint
against any person.50
In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,51 De Guzman stated he is
an 81-year old retired Regional Trial Court judge.52 He pointed out that there are no details
regarding the allegations of grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery,
falsification of documents, violation of lawyers oath and other administrative infractions. 53 De
Guzman invited the attention of the Investigating Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification
which he submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to deny any participation in the preparation of the
criminal complaint and to narrate in detail how he became involved in this case which was
masterminded by Montesclaros.54 In his Affidavit of Clarification,55De Guzman claimed that
he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and
he was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty.
Nicanor G. Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating
him in the preparation of the complaint.56 De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find his
and his clients names in the counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt under obligation to make
the Affidavit of Clarification.57 Lastly, De Guzman declared that he has no familiarity with the
complainants or Tesclaros Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other respondents
in the complaint, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez
are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business. 58
During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 200859 and 13 March
2009,60 none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to
substantiate the allegations in their complaint despite due notice. 61
Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline
The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline
reads:
In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier are
deemed to be without basis and consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of
the charges against them.
As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough basis to
hold him administratively liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months
is hereby recommended.62
he Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the
complaint as well as in the attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate their charges
against respondents Trinidad and Fornier.63 Other than bare allegations, complainants did
not adduce proof of Trinidad and Forniers supposed involvement or participation directly or
indirectly in the acts constituting the complaint.64 In addition, complainants, on their own
volition, admitted the non-participation and non-involvement of Trinidad and Fornier when
complainants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier
Only.65 For these reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charges
against Trinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to deny the
allegations in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same. 66 Moreover, De
Guzman failed to controvert the truly vicious evidence against him:
But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he sent to
Orlando D. Badoy, City Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006. This letter was
alleged in and attached to the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit of Complaint. The letter had
confirmed the allegation of his travel to Cotabato City to file charges against persons he did
not identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed
the complaint. Danda, incidentally, was one of those who executed the Letter of Complaint
along with Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis Lauban which was filed
before the Supreme Court.67
The Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the
charges against Fornier and Trinidad.68 In De Guzmans case, the Board of Governors
increased the penalty from a suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two (2) years
from the practice of law for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with
modification, and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering that the case against Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is
without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty. Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years for his attempt to file illegal
recruitment cases in order to extort money.69
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be administratively
disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint.
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the charges against Trinidad and Fornier.
We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzmans liability, and likewise dismiss the
charges against De Guzman.
Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence
Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of
crime or wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that
as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his
oath.70
Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party
to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 71
Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined
mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It
depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.72
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at
the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of
evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order. 73 Considering the serious
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has
consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.74
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. 75 It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.76 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance
of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
(d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily
with the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof,
according to the equipoise doctrine.77
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required
in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence
of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of
the respondent.
De Guzmans Liability
The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzmans liability for the
following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint
are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear in any of the mandatory conference
proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint; and (c) complainants were not
able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for
the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of extortion.
 The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants
submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their
allegations of misconduct against De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled
the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of
Complaint was submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal
recruitment charges against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of
Complaint purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After
inquiry by De Guzman, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a
Certification denying the submission of this document by complainants:
This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO
LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged with Violation
of Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676,
Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated
December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office.
This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint
Counter-Affidavit in connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did
they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person. 78 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint
Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of
misconduct, were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to
the credibility of the other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative
charges against respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified documents to the
Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this Court.
Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part of a syndicate
headed by Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given
this claim that complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by
fabricated documents, this Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents
submitted by complainants. Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the
documents they submitted in support of their allegations of misconduct against respondents
are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not even attend any mandatory conference
called by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the documents and substantiate or
narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by respondents. To make
matters worse, the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaintcomplainants attached to
their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of misconduct against
respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan, despite purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor.
Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with
De Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be
issued, what mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of the voluminous documents that
complainants submitted, where is the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or
profession? Who are these complainants? These questions are unanswered because
complainants did not even bother to attend any mandatory conference called by the
Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason, the allegations of De
Guzmans misconduct are really doubtful.
Lastly, the supposedly vicious evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly
sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states:
Dear Orly,
Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I learned much about the South
and the way of life there.
It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed
charges against us in Marawi City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your
man, Ben Danda, with instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same
before an assistant prosecutor and file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on
you to orchestrate the whole thing, from the prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the
warrants of arrest.
Thank you and best regards.79
The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have
material discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even explain how they were
able to get a copy of the purported letter. Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando
Badoy or Atty. Francis V. Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the
complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their
allegations or authenticate the supporting documents.
The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this
purported letter:
Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of
the letter or explain the import of the same differently from what is understood by the
Complainants. But even with that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the
undersigned cannot ignore the same and the message it conveys. 80
Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom
respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the
fabrication of evidence in support of their criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the
Investigating Commissioners observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the
preparation of complainants criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of
Clarification, De Guzman stated:
5. Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise,
he recently received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty.
Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c) Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr.
(his records at the Surpeme Court does not have any Daryll);
6. Undersigned counsels name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of
Atty. Nicanor G. Alcarez (Montesclaros lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge
Francisco Mendiola as against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of
Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this
reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation to make this affidavit of clarification for
the guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor;
xxx
4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency
nor with the complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other
respondents, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are
the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business. 81
For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support
of their complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the
charges against De Guzman.
De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing.
Complainants have the burden of proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De
Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge this burden because the documents they
submitted were not authenticated and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not
appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their
complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the administrative penalty is
preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher than substantial evidence in the
hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated
charges against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence
of the parties are evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to
the equipoise doctrine. For these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of
Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
accordingly dismisses the charges against De Guzman.
Trinidads and Forniers Liabilities
The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to Trinidads and Forniers liabilities:
A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter
Affidavit with Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate
their charges against Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the Complainants did
not adduce proof of Respondents supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly
in the acts complained of. For instance, they failed to prove though faintly that Respondents
had gone to Cotabato City to personally induce and persuade the complainants to file illegal
recruitment charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that they have
prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of communication. The supposed
telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made during the proceedings
before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office to the Complainants is unbelievable and absurd.
It is inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during
a serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint
before the City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly
militates against the reliabiity of Complainants charges against Respondents.
xxx
But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable
Respondents non-participation or non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they
wittingly filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.
The undersigned realizes only too well that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in
this Commission, however, any such pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A
clear reading of the same reveals that the Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have
erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the case. In particular,
they explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said lawyers
as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned
finds the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the import of the same
as a piece of evidence.82
At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated. Under Section
12(c) of Rule 139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as reprimand, admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition
with this Court within 15 days from notice:
c. If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction
imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine)
it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be
deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with
the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme
Court orders otherwise.
Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the
charges against Trinidad and Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and Fornier.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges against Attys. Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad and
Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the Decision of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the penalty in
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015
FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court’s disciplinary authority in resolving this disbarment
complaint against his former lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has
accused of gross misconduct.
Antecedents
Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his company,
CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC).1 Atty. Guico’s legal services included handling a
complaint for illegal dismissal brought against CVC (NLRC Case No. RAB-III-08-9261-05
entitled Kilusan ng Manggagawang Makabayan (KMM) Katipunan CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz
Chapter, Ladivico Adriano, et al. v. CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corp. and Fernando Chu).2 On
September 7, 2006, Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo rendered a decision adverse to
CVC.3 Atty. Guico filed a timely appeal in behalf of CVC.
According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty. Guico’s
residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial
amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a
favorable decision.4 On June 10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had
raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office at No. 48
Times Street, Quezon City, and to give the money to his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo)
Manahan. Chu complied, and later on called Atty. Guico to confirm that he had delivered the
money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007 at
the UCC Coffee Shop on T. Morato Street, Quezon City. At the UCC Coffee Shop, Atty.
Guico handed Chu a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. 5 The
draft decision6 was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper apparently emanating from
the office of Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00
to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only produce
P280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office on July 10, 2007 accompanied by his
son, Christopher Chu, and one Bonifacio Elipane. However, it was Nardo who received the
amount without issuing any receipt.
Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December 2007.
However, Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only know the
status after Christmas. On January 11, 2008, Chu again called Nardo, who invited him to
lunch at the Ihaw Balot Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu asked Nardo if the NLRC
Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the negative and simply told
Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with Atty. Guico who would return it
should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it.8
On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC. 9 Chu confronted
Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused the preparation and
filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal
counsel on May 25, 2009.10
In his position paper,11 Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with
lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for harassment. He
denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Nardo corroborated with his
own affidavit.12 He further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed on used paper
emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must have been among those
freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnesses in the criminal
complaint he had handled for Chu.13
Findings and Recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors
IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01
and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his act
of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt for the legal
profession.
On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of IBP
Commissioner Villanueva in its Resolution No. XX-2013-87,15 but modified the
recommended penalty of disbarment to three years suspension, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A,”
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with Warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely and Ordered to Return
the amount of Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P580,000.00) Pesos with legal interest
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
Atty. Guico moved for reconsideration,16 but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion
for reconsideration on March 23, 2014 in Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.17
Neither of the parties brought a petition for review vis-à-vis Resolution No. XX-2013-87 and
Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.
Issue

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to
guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?
Ruling of the Court
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish
respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this
Court has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the imposition of
either disbarment or suspension as penalty.18
Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses,19 and presented the draft decision that Atty.
Guico had represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly insisted that
the draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper emanating from Atty.
Guico’s office,20 inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed documents on used paper in his
law office. Despite denying being the source of the draft decision presented by Chu, Atty.
Guico’s participation in the generation of the draft decision was undeniable. For one, Atty.
Guico impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by conceding that the used paper had originated
from his office, claiming only that used paper was just “scattered around his office.” 21 In that
context, Atty.
Guico’s attempt to downplay the sourcing of used paper from his office was futile because
he did not expressly belie the forthright statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico stated by way
of deflecting the imputation was that the used paper containing the draft decision could have
been easily taken from his office by Chu’s witnesses in a criminal case that he had handled
for Chu,22 pointing out that everything in his office, except the filing cabinets and his desk,
was “open to the public xxx and just anybody has access to everything found therein.”23 In
our view, therefore, Atty. Guico made the implied admission because he was fully aware
that the used paper had unquestionably come from his office.
The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, especially
the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had been
printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, sufficed to confirm that he had
committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from
Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the
allegations in his defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of
Chu. We cannot but conclude that the production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was
intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable
result in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to
establish his complaint against Atty. Guico. In this administrative case, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?
In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:
x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for money or
malice x x x.
The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to
retain membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should
not render any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very
laws that he was bound to uphold and obey,25 for he or she was always bound as an
attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal
Profession.26 Verily, he or she must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner
that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. 27 Any lawyer
found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such membership in
the legal profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the
large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus
violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually
using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon
appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit,
and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay
any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as
well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the
law.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave
misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.”28 There is no question that any gross
misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to
manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension
or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission
of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege. 29
Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be
disbarred,30 for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal
profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte v. Abellana:31

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is

granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the
Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members
of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting
artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the
trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to
practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession.
It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.

Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be ordered to
return the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was exacted by Atty.
Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the latter’s interest as the client. Although the
purpose for the amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully
account for and to return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding is
administrative in character, for, as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v. Reyes:

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact
the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the
respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and
inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property
should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding
has already established as the respondent’s liability. x x x

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S. GUICO,
JR. GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. His name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to Atty. Guico’s personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
to all courts and quasi-judicial offices in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul
H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457,
were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office
of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965,
he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie
Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession
in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of
their marriage, which was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita
and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman.
At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie
Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When
Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended
Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733.
Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against
moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint
against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was
motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP
for investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for
disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law
despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite
the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged
that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in
the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the
directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging
basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the
phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued
that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the
term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude.
Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and
desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed
on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for
homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreño guilty of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court
downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreño was released from
confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10
July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor
Relations Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this
Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances
leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to
be a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher
shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and
time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the
earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v.
Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling of
self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a couple of
drunks who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics,
natural display of loud bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondent’s
inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at
respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent
was not only vindictive without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority. 2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was
disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that
Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño
alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged
that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his case.
He further alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to him;
and thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that
after his wife died in an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the
case for bigamy against Garcia and that he already advised his clients to settle their other
cases. He alleged that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31
denying Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the
case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was
redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the Court
consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-
2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of
the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by
final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. 4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society
in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by
this Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree
of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude
does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since
there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that
moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left
to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. 7
In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby
found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a
maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Luciano Amparado in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances
show the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house
when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his
rifle, and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more
or less, from the gate of Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and
when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and
Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes),
recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and
Amparado running away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house
in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot,
then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back
towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco
were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate
firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty.
Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon" 11 which restored his "full civil
and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of
Commutation13 did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory
penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of
Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only
states: By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL
SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court
and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4
months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay
an indemnity of ₱50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional
and restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can
grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate
prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on
Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially
extinguished criminal liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He
served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.
More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge 18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such
x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist."
Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted
pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon.
In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. 19 It is granted only to those
possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the
penalty of disbarment.21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his

receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAYWER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint 1 for disbarment dated February 1,
2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S.
Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to
keep his client informed of the status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis
Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property
against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the
engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before the Regional Trial Court
of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was
eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action
and insufficiency of evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as
August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited
the former’s office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of
₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not
produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount
of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal
before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to
respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal 9 before the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not
disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order 12 dated November 9, 2007
purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of the
results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt
of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant
proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It
was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by
the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations
of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. 14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant
administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was
complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that
resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also
claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant,
he was blamed for the court’s unfavorable decision. 16
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be
meted out against him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be
well-founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely,
particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent
sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at hand. 19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s accusation
that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it
was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought
about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it appear that there is still an available
relief left for Tan.20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation. 21
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to
the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly
updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence,
to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding
and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the
dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer
must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of
law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a
good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
client’s cause.23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the
dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered
to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24,
2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably
negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the
reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed
to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in such matters of professional employment. 24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating
the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that
complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been
denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that
caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly,
respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether
in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law. 26 A
lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests with utmost diligence and
competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to
conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme
to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a
falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct. 27 His acts should not just be
deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. 28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement
in Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s
relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness
and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature
of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that
any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his
moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue
in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of
the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months.
In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure
to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein,
in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed
to update his client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them.
In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of
attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also, in Embido v. Pe, 34 the penalty
of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for
a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to
his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality,
his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue
prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so reprehensible, and his violations
of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties
as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the
legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and
prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct
and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this
Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND CLIENT
A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in
existent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique
(RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional
Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The
letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael
O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request
for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.
It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein
Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had
decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter
dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. 4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the
October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to
apprise him of the situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the
situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification. 6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,
2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of ₱60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo,
in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to
remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the
latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be
prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that
disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent. 11 Then Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the
recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant. 12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby
he denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his
opinion on Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on
the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in
June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court
decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the
decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an
investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to
people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that
he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident
of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police
Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late
husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the
instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution 16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006, 17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations
of the Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had
forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings
No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with
Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as
the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received ₱60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the
falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel
Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn
statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the
first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuela’s branch except for the names
and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI
investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true,
he should have made this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have
been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister,
Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident. 19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
70921 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-
2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance
with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s comment/opposition
as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant’s reply as his comment
on the petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s
comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records
of the case within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that
he had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the
handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in
Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that
Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit
generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on
the respondent’s personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive
evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial, which by nature was
negative evidence.23
Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence.1âwphi1 It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-
affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required
him to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing
more than an after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that
declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged
decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was
rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the
sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately
exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times
the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions
can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. 25 Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration
of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing
that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity
and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for
them to:

x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct
themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always
a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or
deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons
of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for
dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected
with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune
from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and
punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. 28The test is
whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an
officer of the Court.29WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST.
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him
effective upon receipt of this decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated

against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
March 10, 2015
A.C. No. 5816
DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez
(Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A.
Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross
immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the
mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost
touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez
again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez. 2
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez),
having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila,
which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her
pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should
he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.4
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the
divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig
assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer
any impediment to their marriage.5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan
Jegar Josef Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the
divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is
not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter
allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to
legally adopt their son.7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by
filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have
to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.8
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later,
she came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April
25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry
her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty.
Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to
obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to
declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an
upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently
seen.12
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their
respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.14
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He
claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was
incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems;
and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then
consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to
separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt
a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to
obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and
comfort it may provide them.16
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing
an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted
that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12,
1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted
on June 23, 1984.17
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted,
Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
July 1984 in the USA.18
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous
marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved
her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of
legitimacy to their relationship.19
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their
home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship
with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his
law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not
reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from
his firm in January 2001.21
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that
Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected
Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings
since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned
down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. 23
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order 24 setting
the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset
to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already
submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the
IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from
notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17,
200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October
24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD
issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s
act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still
subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the
highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and
personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and
his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and
teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers
and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow
the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well
that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards
of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against
Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted
and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on
Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons
having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts. He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never
concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had
always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution 32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would
warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of
this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only
a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in
order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral
character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in
the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it
is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his
all."34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis ours)
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency
in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor." 35 Immoral conduct involves acts
that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of
the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is
not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist
Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first
marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already
falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez,
dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the
Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig
was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the
court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were
both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he
cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise,
his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The
foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral
values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the
USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the
logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez
knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal
strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez.
Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest
degree.1âwphi1
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he
resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their
son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first
marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty.
Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo,
in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern
showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding
of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to
Gomez.
"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.’"37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has
borne him a child.38
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required m
suspens10n or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. 39
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the
latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents;
it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if
at all, only provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It
does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT
the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected
by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process.
He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should
never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the
Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED for lack
of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings
that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still
subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render
disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of
evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the
evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the
purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A.C. No. 9226 (Formerly CBD 06-1749), June 14, 2016
MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C, ADVINCULA, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO C.
ADVINCULA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment dated June 16, 2006
brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula
(Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula (Dr.
Advincula).
In her complaint,1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed unlawful and
immoral acts;2that while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-marital sexual
relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga); 3 that the extra-marital relations
bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula (Alexandria); 4 that Atty.
Advincula failed to give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha
Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial
resources;5 that he admitted in the affidavit of late registration of birth of Alexandria that he
had contracted another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga;6 that even should Atty. Advincula prove
that his declaration in the affidavit of late registration of birth was motivated by some reason
other than the fact that he truly entered into a subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then
making such a declaration was in itself still unlawful;7 that siring a child with a woman other
than his lawful wife was conduct way below the standards of morality required of every
lawyer;8 that contracting a subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not been
dissolved was also an unlawful conduct;9 that making a false declaration before a notary
public was an unlawful conduct punishable under the Revised Penal Code;10 and that the
failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children showed his moral
character to be below the standards set by law for every lawyer. 11 Dr. Advincula prayed that
Atty. Advincula be disbarred.12chanrobleslaw
In his answer,13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that during the
subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of their youngest Jose
Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that they could not agree on various
matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective careers; that Dr. Advincula
abandoned the rented family home with the two children to live with her parents; that
despite their separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr. Advincula and their
children; that during their separation, he got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and
that he did not contract a second marriage with Ms. Gonzaga. 14chanrobleslaw
Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship with Ms. Gonzaga,
a child was bom and named Alexandra;15 that in consideration of his moral obligation as a
father, he gave support to Alexandra;16 that he only learned that the birth of Alexandra had
been subsequently registered after the child was already enrolled in school; 17 that it was Ms.
Gonzaga who informed him that she had the birth certificate of Alexandria altered by a fixer
in order to enroll the child;18 that he strived to reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a
reconciliation that begot their third child, Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once again
decided to live with her parents, bringing all of their children along; that nevertheless, he
continued to provide financial support to his family and visited the children regularly; that Dr.
Advincula intimated to him that she had planned to take up nursing in order to work as a
nurse abroad because her medical practice here was not lucrative; that he supported his
wife's nursing school expenses;19 that Dr. Advincula left for the United States of America
(USA) to work as a nurse;20 that the custody of their children was not entrusted to him but
he agreed to such arrangement to avoid further division of the family; 21 that during the same
period he was also busy with his law studies;22 that Dr. Advincula proposed that he and their
children migrate to the USA but he opposed the proposal because he would not be able to
practice his profession there;23 that Dr. Advincula stated that if he did not want to join her,
then she would just get the children to live with her; 24 that when Dr. Advincula came home
for a vacation he was not able to accompany her due to his extremely busy schedule as
Chief Legal Staff of the General Prosecution Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation;25cralawred and that when they finally met arguments flared out, during which
she threatened to file a disbarment suit against him in order to force him to allow her to
bring their children to the USA.26 Atty. Advincula prayed that the disbarment case be
dismissed for utter lack of merit.27chanrobleslaw
Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD
After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the following findings and observations, and recommended
the following sanctions, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers comes this
provisions (sic): "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral character. Remember we
must (sic) that the practice of law is a mere privilege. The moment that a lawyer no longer
has the required qualifications foremost of which is the presence of that character earlier
mentioned, the Honorable Supreme Court may revoke the said practice.
No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to the weakness of the
flesh, had a romance outside of marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga. This he
admitted.
From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported her as a moral
obligation.
How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he had committed an
adulterous and immoral act.
Was his conduct grossly immoral?
Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land defined as immoral
conduct: "that conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community."28chanrobleslaw
xxxx
It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to Respondent Leo
Palma's case earlier cited.
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma had made a mockery
of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But what respondent forgot is that
he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity: and render help and support."
Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he presented
evidencing the fact that he supported their children financially. Such conduct could not
illustrate him as having championed a grossly immoral conduct.
Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the blame why their
marriage soured. Their constant quarrels while together would indicate that harmony
between them was out of the question.
The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper that ignited the flame
of discord between them.
Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not recommend the supreme
penalty of disbarment for to deprive him of such honored station in life would result in
irreparable injury and must require proof of the highest degree pursuant to the Honorable
Supreme Court's ruling in Angeles vs. Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005), he must be
sanctioned.
And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent's own admission of
having committed an extra-marital affair and fathering a child, it is respectfully
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for at least one month with the
additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a more severe penalty would be
imposed.
It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of disbarment. What he did was
not grossly immoral.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Commissioner with slight modification of the penalty,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's admission of engaging in a simple
immorality and also taking into account the condonation of his extra-marital affair by his
wife, Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) months.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as final and
executory, and manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution
suspending the undersigned Attorney from the practice of law for two (2)
months under "A.C. No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No. 06-1749) (Ma.
Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula) x x x
2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the
undersigned attorney applied for Leave for two (2) months starting
November up to December thereby refraining himself from the practice of
law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x
3. That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of
his compliance with the above resolution/order so that he may be able to
practice his law profession again.31
Ruling of the Court
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the
practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be
in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from
adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their
lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.32chanrobleslaw
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as
to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To
be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous
or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 33chanrobleslaw
On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based on
the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,34 the
extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his
wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise, disbarment was the
penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the
judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void, while he himself was also
married.35 In another case we have suspended for two years, a married attorney who had
sired a child with a former client.36 In Samaniego v. Ferrer,37 suspension of six months from
the practice of law was meted on the philandering lawyer.
Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he can continue to receive his
salaries and other benefits by simply going on leave for the duration of his suspension from
the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA
GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of THREE
MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that a more
severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same offense or a similar
offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to report the date of his receipt of the Decision to
this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation to implement the suspension from office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to report
on his compliance in order to determine the date of commencement of his suspension from
the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent in the Office of the
Bar Confidant; and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Service
Commission for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the child
with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed the
immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct was not
as grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of the Philippine
Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the circumstances of this
case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law for three
months to be condign and appropriate.

As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013 that
he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspending him
from the practice of law for two months as final and executory; that he had then gone on
leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and lasting until the end of
December, 2012; and that such leave from work involved refraining from performing his
duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.

The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that it is
only the Court that wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did
not possess such power, rendering its recommendation against him incapable of finality. It
is the Court's final determination of his liability as a lawyer that is the reckoning point for the
service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed compliance with the
recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going on leave from his
work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his
suspension from the practice of law should include his suspension from office. A leave of
absence will not suffice. This is so considering that his position mandated him to be a
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will
not be a penalty if it does not negate his continuance in office for the period of the
suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A.C. No. 8010 June 16, 2009
KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON
P.L. ESGUERRA,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the
Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.
In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and
expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent
who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines.
Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic,
Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.
Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his
representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for
the preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and
received a ₱400,000 fee.
Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to
Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.
Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant,
represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the
property.1 Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa
sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for ₱3.8 million. 2 Respondent also
drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and Gonzales stating that it was
complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the property. 3 Complainant then gave
respondent the full amount of the purchase price (₱3.8 million) for which respondent issued
an acknowledgment receipt.4
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch
with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However,
respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainant’s calls and e-mail
messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of
the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the
status of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not
own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
in Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former
US Military Reservation.5 The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141. 6
Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,7 exerted diligent efforts to locate
respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the
Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent
was in arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in
Olongapo City.8 Search of court records of cases handled by respondent only yielded his
abandoned office address in Olongapo City.1avvphi1
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.9 He deplored respondent’s acts of serious misconduct. In
particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely
misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for
maliciously absconding with complainant’s ₱3.8 million. 10
Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last
known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this
connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after
his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against
him.11
The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the
matter of land ownership by a foreigner. 12 He even went through the motion of preparing
falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he
collected ₱400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the ₱3.8 million and absconded
with it.13
The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his
professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with
complainant’s money.14 Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and
confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of
respondent.15
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD
with the modification that respondent was further required to return the amount of ₱4.2 million
to respondent.16
We agree with the IBP.
Sufficiency Of Notice Of The Disbarment Proceedings
We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the
disbarment proceedings against him? Yes.
The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the
scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his
law office in Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement.
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat
this Court’s jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by
the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders
and processes on respondent’s office was sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice
requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does
not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.17 The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in
accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality. 18
In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP
National Office or their respective chapters19 of any change in office or residential address
and other contact details.20 In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the
office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute
sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.
Respondent’s Administrative Infractions And His Liability Therefor
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and
uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure
that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has
been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood.21 That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust
that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.22
Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their master. They should not simply obey
the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars
worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds,24 to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural
lands, including residential lands." The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional
policy.25
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,
showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared
spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de
Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of
complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.26
Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could
legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the
property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not
give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he
deceived complainant and misled him into parting with ₱400,000 for services that were both
illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the ₱3.8 million
given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act
that was criminal in nature.1avvphi1
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after
unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer’s oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL

HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND

HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
(emphasis supplied)

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal
knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and
present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image
of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays
everything that the legal profession stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick
the Butcher’s call, "Kill all lawyers!"27 A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be
purged from the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount
of ₱4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution
until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment
of the amount within ten days from payment.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the
appropriate criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report
the progress of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the
Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its
chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of
the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and
Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of
the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross
Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint
for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices
filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on
behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based
in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed
Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced
Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-
affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed
the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to
the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia
and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he
falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence
an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo,
that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s
instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for
falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo
and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and
Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019
and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated
further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for
other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo
were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only
were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to
Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted
that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before
the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases
were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the
assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings
and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against
them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary
Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties
were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference
scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25
September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice
of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to
have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated
23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice
of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in
their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing
in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon
9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for
him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not
just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and
undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored
the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy
and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in
1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm
designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder
to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers
in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry
the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his
law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this
task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion
for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment
Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation
of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing SO ORDERED.
of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively
for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he
may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature
serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional
trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not
take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his
signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty.
Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation
of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not
cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE COURTS
A.C. No. 10451 February 4, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera)
in his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of Mariecris Umaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections
for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. 3 Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of
₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount
of ₱30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to
prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when
the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of
the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these
attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and
Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that
the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were
unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-
Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of
Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and
Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen,
respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato
Manguiat (Atty. Manguiat).8 Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and
immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own
Affidavit,9declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf.
Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo
Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified.
Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e.,
an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of
Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since
Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants
but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were
falsified.11
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did
not appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007
hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.12
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his
non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De
Vera, Judge Belosillo received ₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera,
in order to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only
appear for the case if the complainants would give him ₱80,000.00, which he would in turn,
give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of
Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former
to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he
collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case. 14
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment. 15
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against
him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for
election protest based on the statements of his clients. 17 Atty. De Vera then explained that
the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated
that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding
criminal offense. He added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the
aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the
affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve
complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing incident,
Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18 To add, he pointed out that along with his Formal
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled "Release
Waiver & Discharge,"19 which, to him, discharges him and his law firm from all causes of
action that complainants may have against him, including the instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found
the administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De
Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera
participated in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely
with respectto the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately
omitted to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of
Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked
if she could sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during
its signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was
found to be credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore. 22 It was also observed
that the backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits
was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election
protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the
odious act of advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and
relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for
the filing of the election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that
the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified
document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 27 dated
February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution,
decreasing the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively
liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated
by the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6)
months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though
high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer
of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession,
thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not
only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court
or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best
of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.
Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well
as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore,
that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice."
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement
with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors,
in holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e., Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that
the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during
disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts– are given the opportunity to first-
hand observe their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized
the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De
Vera’s comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of
Governors’ Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty.
De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the
subject affidavits but another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his
entire life,31 and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents,
much less of the participation in using the same. 32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court
views the same to be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s
positive testimony that he indeed participated in the procurement of her signature and the
signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation
– is that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to
be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is
highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the
documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to
represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited
from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation 34 or allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.35
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release
Waiver & Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged
him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present
case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya
v. Gacott36 that:
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia
Umaguing the amount of ₱60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of
further administrative penalties.

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the complainant.1âwphi1 What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the respondent's personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer
is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for SO ORDERED.
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration
of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana 38 (Samonte),
suspended the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious
document in court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to
impose the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
₱60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses
intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only
thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any
resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one's misdeeds
committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a
member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions.43

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating

the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a stem warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will
be punished more severely.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE COURTS
A.C. No. 5859 November 23, 2010
(Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P.
MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For our review is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional
malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.
The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner, 2 are undisputed.
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado
in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative
case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office.3
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of
Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits
of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the
respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he
had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorney’s fees. Such
refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the
respondent.4
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the
respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s funds and recommending
to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law.5
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits
against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases
against the family corporation, the corporation’s accountant and the judge who ruled against
the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee
from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members
of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of
law for one year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum
shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed
several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family
members, their lawyers, and the family corporation. 6 They maintain that the primary purpose
of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice
of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be
disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, 7 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.
He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file
lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed
against the complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and
were based on strong facts.8
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was
merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek
relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could
justify his attorney’s fees.
Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his client’s family. He argues that
the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their
perception of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held
accountable for the public interest.
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On
the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar
language in accusing him of "extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorney’s
fees."9
After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties’ submissions, we find
ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege.10Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.11 In Maligsa v. Cabanting,12 we
explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the
legal profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP
Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent
filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of his former client,
the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said
Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client received a
favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of twelve (12) different
cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court. 13
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the
Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139;
and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing
of previously dismissed cases.14
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora,
as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive
or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find
that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to
her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold
easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with
a renegade member of the complainants’ family, the defendants named in the cases and the
foul language used in the pleadings and motions 15 all indicate that the respondent was acting
beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be
an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed
the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a client’s funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,16 the Court pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible
for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no
person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be
exercised in good faith.17
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice.They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload
of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its ends – the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only
help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that
impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of
assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 18 Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must
exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties
as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against
a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility19 provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 – A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information
acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosario’s counsel. Information
as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other
pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in
pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with
herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by
the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of
the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE COURTS
A.C. No. 6258 August 24, 2010
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant)
against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of
Donation of real property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica
(complainant’s father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead
at the time of execution of the said document.
In his Answer,1 the respondent admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and
Cornelia P. Rivero, considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The
respondent claimed, however, that he had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H.
Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the time he notarized the Deed of
Donation.2 He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the identities of the persons
who appeared before him and represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of
Donation.3
After the submission of the respondent’s Answer to the complaint, the Court referred the
matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline) for investigation, evaluation and recommendation. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline made the following findings:
The core issue is whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his oath
as a lawyer and his duties as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Donation
purportedly executed by Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero as the donors and
Cecilio R. Lustestica and Juliana Lustestica as the donees on 5 August 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2013, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:
x x x The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person
who executed it acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. x x x.
As correctly observed by Complainant, Respondent’s Acknowledgment is the best evidence
that NO RESIDENCE CERTIFICATES were presented by the alleged donors and the donees.
Had the parties presented their residence certificates to Respondent, it was his duty and
responsibility under the Notarial Law to enter, as part of his certification, the number, place of
issue and date of each residence certificate presented by the parties to the Deed of Donation.
Respondent, however, failed to make the required entries. Respondent’s claim that the
persons who allegedly appeared before him and represented themselves to be the parties to
the Deed of Donation showed their residence certificates and that he instructed his secretary
to indicate the details of the residence certificates of the parties is self-serving and not
supported by the evidence on record.
xxxx
The fact that Respondent notarized a forged/falsified document is also undisputed not only
by [the] strength of Complainant’s documentary evidence but more importantly, by
Respondent’s own judicial admission. x x x. In view of Respondent’s judicial admission that
the alleged donors, BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA and his first wife, CORNELIA P. RIVERO,
died on 7 September 1987 and 24 September 1984, respectively, it is beyond reasonable
doubt that said donors could not have personally appeared before him on 5 August 1994 to
[acknowledge] to him that they freely and voluntary executed the Deed of Donation. Moreover,
x x x quasi-judicial notice of the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court finding accused CECILIO
LUSTESTICA and JULIANA LUSTESTICA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as
principals of the crime of falsification of public document. 4
In his Report dated August 15, 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found the
respondent grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as notary public and
recommended that the respondent’s notarial commission be suspended for a period of one
(1) year. The IBP Commissioner also recommended that a penalty ranging from reprimand to
suspension be imposed against the respondent, with a warning that a similar conduct in the
future will warrant an imposition of a more severe penalty.5
By Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner.
The pertinent portion of this Resolution reads:
[C]onsidering Respondent’s gross negligence in the performance of his duties as Notary
Public, Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment
as Notary Public for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of one year must be
served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of one
year in CBD Case No. 04-1371.6
From these undisputed facts, supervening events occurred that must be taken into
consideration of the present case.
First, CBD Case No. 04-1371, entitled Victorina Bautista, complainant, v. Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe, respondent, which was the case referred to in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116, was
docketed as A.C. No. 69637 before the Court. In a decision dated February 9, 2006, the Court
revoked the respondent’s notarial commission and disqualified him from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, for his failure to properly perform his duties as
notary public when he notarized a document in the absence of one of the affiants. In addition,
the Court suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Second, on January 6, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution
No. XVII-2005-116 before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The respondent moved to
reconsider the IBP Resolution, claiming that the penalty imposed for the infraction committed
was too harsh. The motion was denied in Resolution No. XVII-2006-81, dated January 28,
2006,8 for lack of jurisdiction of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, since the
administrative matter had then been endorsed to the Court.
Third, on January 4, 2006, a motion for reconsideration (the same as the one filed with the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline) was filed by the respondent before the Court. In a Minute
Resolution dated March 22, 2006, the Court noted the findings and recommendations in
Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 and required the complainant to file her Comment to the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2006, the complainant filed her
Comment praying for the denial of the motion.
On July 5, 2006, the Court issued a Minute Resolution noting the denial of the respondent’s
motion for reconsideration, by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, and the complainant’s
Comment to the respondent’s motion before the Court.
Subsequently, on January 26, 2009, the Court declared the case closed and terminated after
considering that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review, assailing both IBP
resolutions, had been filed by the respondent.9
On October 8, 2009, the respondent, through a letter addressed to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, requested that he be given clearance to resume the practice of law and to allow
him to be commissioned as a notary public. In his letter, the respondent alleged that he has
already served the penalties imposed against him in A.C. No. 6963 and the present case. He
claimed that after the receipt of the IBP Resolutions in both cases, he did not practice his
profession and had not been appointed or commissioned as a notary public.
The Office of the Bar Confidant
Acting on the respondent’s letter, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a Report and
Recommendation, which states:
1. The EFFECTIVITY of the respondent’s suspension and disqualification should have been
COMMENCED on the date of receipt of the Decision of the Court and not from the date of
receipt of the Resolution of the IBP recommending the respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public, it being
recommendatory in nature;
2. The prayer of the respondent to resume his practice of law in Adm. Case No. 6963 be
denied;
3. The respondent be REQUIRED to submit certification from competent courts and IBP that
he has fully served the entire period of suspension and disqualification in Adm. Case No.
6963;
4. The Court may now FINALLY RESOLVE the findings and recommendation of the IBP in
its Resolution No. XVII-2005-16, dated October 2005, in Adm. Case No. 6258, for final
disposition of the case and for proper determination whether the order of suspension and
disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963 should be lifted after the respondent has satisfactorily
shown that he has fully served the suspension and disqualification. 10
The Court’s Ruling
The findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline are well-
taken. We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v.
Ramos,11 we stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one
invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity.12 A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.13 It
is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined.14
The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging
his duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and
failed to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the
parties’ presentation of their residence certificates or any other document to prove their
identities. Given the respondent’s admission in his pleading that the donors were already
dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to
ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of
Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103),
but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law)15 states:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized
by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if
not, his certificate shall so state.
In turn, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." At the same time, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits
a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this regard, a reading of the respondent’s Acknowledgment in the Deed of Donation shows
how these provisions were violated by the respondent:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public for and in Bulacan this AUG 05 1994 day of August, 1994,
personally appeared:
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA: C.T.C. # _______:________:________
CORNELIA RIVERO : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
CECILIO LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
JULIANA LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument
and acknowledged to me that the same are their free act and voluntary deed. 16
The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his
Acknowledgment that the persons who appeared before him were "known to him" to be the
same persons who executed the Deed of Donation, despite the fact that he did not know them
and did not ascertain their identities as he attested.17
Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the
requirements under Section 1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify
that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented, before the notaries public,
the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter the
residence certificate’s number, place, and date of issue as part of the certification. 18 The
unfilled spaces in the Acknowledgment where the residence certificate numbers should have
been clearly established that the respondent did not perform this legal duty.
With these considerations, we find that the imposition of administrative sanctions for the
above infractions committed is in order.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the penalty of suspension, for a period
of one (1) year, from the practice of law and disqualification from reappointment as Notary
Public for a period of two (2) years. Considering that this is already Atty. Bernabe’s second
infraction, we find the IBP’s recommendation to be very light; it is not commensurate with his
demonstrated predisposition to undertake the duties of a notary public and a lawyer lightly.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting,19 we disbarred a lawyer for failing to subscribe to the sacred duties
imposed upon a notary public. In imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court considered
the lawyer’s prior misconduct where he was suspended for a period of six (6) months and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. 20
In Flores v. Chua,21 we disbarred the lawyer after finding that he deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared before him when he notarized a forged deed of
sale. We took into account that he was previously found administratively liable for violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (for bribing a judge) and sternly warned
that a repetition of similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future would be dealt
with more severely.22
In Traya v. Villamor,23 we found the respondent notary public guilty of gross misconduct in his
notarial practice for failing to observe the proper procedure in determining that the person
appearing before him is the same person who executed the document presented for
notarization. Taking into account that it was his second offense, he was perpetually
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public. 24
In Social Security Commission v. Coral,25 we suspended indefinitely the notarial commission
of the respondent lawyer who was found to have prepared, notarized and filed two complaints
that were allegedly executed and verified by people who have long been dead. We also
directed him to show cause why he should not be disbarred.26
Considering these established rulings, read in light of the circumstances in the present case,
we find that Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public. We emphasize that this is
respondent’s second offense and while he does not appear to have any participation in the
falsification of the Deed of Donation, his contribution was his gross negligence for failing to
ascertain the identity of the persons who appeared before him as the donors. This is
highlighted by his admission27in his Answer that he did not personally know the parties and
was not acquainted with them. The blank spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he did
not even require these parties to produce documents that would prove that they are the same
persons they claim to be. As we emphasized in Maligsa:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar
should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain
from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. 28
In light of the above findings and penalties, the respondent’s request to be given clearance to
resume the practice of law and to apply for a notarial commission, after serving the
administrative sanctions in A.C. No. 6963, is now moot and academic. We, accordingly, deny
the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) NOTE the letter dated October 8, 2009 of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe to the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
(2) ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline with
MODIFICATION on the administrative penalty imposed.

(3) DECLARE respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe liable for gross negligence, in the
performance of his duties as notary public, and for his deceitful and dishonest attestation, in
the course of administering the oath taken before him. Respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. He is also PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned
as a notary public.

(4) DENY the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission of
respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe’s record, as a member of
the bar, and copies furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

In view of the notarization of a falsified deed whose purported parties were already dead at
the time of notarization, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Prosecutor
General, Department of Justice for whatever action, within its jurisdiction, it may deem
appropriate to bring against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE COURTS
January 26, 2016
A.C. No. 8723
[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2974]
GREGORY FABAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. REX A. RESUENA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment filed by Gregory Fabay (Fabay) against respondent
Atty. Rex A. Resuena (Atty. Resuena), docketed as A.C. No. 8723 for Gross Misconduct due
to the unauthorized notarization of documents relative to Civil Case No. 2001. 1
The facts are as follows:
On October 15, 2003, Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia
Perez and Valentino Perez (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against
Gregory Fabay before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur with respondent Atty.
Resuena as their counsel.
On the same date, October 15, 2003, Atty. Resuena notarized a special power of
attorney (SPA) with plaintiffs as grantors, in favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared
that it was only Remedios Perez who actually signed the SP A in behalf of Amador Perez,
Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez. Said SPA was recorded in Atty. Resuena's
notarial book as Doc. No. 126, Page 26, Book 1, Series of 2003. 2
The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the client of Atty. Resuena, however, on
appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, ordered the case to be
remanded to the court a quo to try the case on the merits.3 In its Decision4 dated August 4,
2005, the trial court noted that both Amador Perez and Valentino Perez have already died on
September 7, 1988 and April 26, 1976, respectively.
Complainant Fabay alleged that Atty. Resuena violated the provisions of the Notarial Law by
notarizing a special power of attorney notwithstanding the fact that two of the principals
therein, Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already dead long before the execution of
the SPA. Complainant added that Atty. Resuena likewise notarized a complaint for ejectment
in 2003 where Apolo Perez was made to appear as attomey-infact of Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez when again the latter could not have possibly authorized him as they were
already dead. Further, complainant averred that Atty. Resuena, as counsel of the plainfiffs,
participated in the barangay conciliations which is prohibited under the law.
Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for violation of the notarial law and for Atty.
Resuena's misconduct as a lawyer.
On October 18, 2010, the Court resolved to require Atty. Resuena to file his comment relative
to the complaint filed against him. 5
In compliance, Atty. Resuena submitted his Comment6 dated December 20, 2010 wherein he
denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that it was tainted with malice, considering
that it was only filed with the Supreme Court on August 20, 2010 when in fact it was allegedly
prepared last June 18, 2006.
Atty. Resuena explained that although it was just Remedios Perez who signed the SP A on
behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, there was no
misrepresentation since Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and she was
likewise previously authorized by the other co-owners, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, to
represent them.7 Atty. Resuena, thus, prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed for
lack of merit.
On January 19, 2011, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation/decision. 8
On June 16, 2011, a mandatory conference was conducted where complainant was assisted
by his counsel Atty. Crispo Borja, Jr., while Atty. Resuena appeared for himself.
Atty. Resuena denied that he participated in the barangay conciliations and presented the
certificate issued by the barangay captain showing that there was no record of his attendance
during the confrontations of the parties before the barangay. He, however, did not deny that
Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution and
notarization of the SP A, albeit, he argued that in the same SP A, Amador Perez and Valentino
Perez were signed by or represented by Remedios Perez. He further insisted that in the
acknowledgment portion of the SP A, the names of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez were
not included as among the parties who have personally appeared before him. Thus, Atty.
Resuena insisted that there was no misrepresentation done in the notarization of the SPA.
In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Resuena to have violated the
provisions of the notarial law. The pertinent portion thereof reads as thus:
A close scrutiny of the evidence submitted would show that respondent notarized a Special
Power of Attorney on October 15, 2003 wherein the supposed principals were Virginia Perez,
Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez, Valent.ino Perez, the purpose of
which, was to authorize Apolo D. Perez to represent them to sue and be sued in any
administrative or judicial tribunal in connection with any suit that may arise out of any and all
transactions in their properties covered by TCT No. RT-1118 (14380), 38735, 38737. In the
said document, the signatures of Amado Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez and
Valentino Perez were signed as "BY: REMEDIOS PEREZ". Remedios Perez is the spouse
of Amador Perez and the mother of [Apolo] Perez.
Evaluating the Special Power of Attorney, two of the parties, namely, Amador Perez
and Valentino Perez were already dead during the execution of the Special Power of
Attorney. Amador Perez died sometime in September 7, 1988, while Valentino Perez
died in April 26, 1976. Despite this fact, respondent allowed them to be represented by
Remedios Perez in the signing of the Special Power of Attorney without the proper
authority provided for by law.
On the other hand, the other parties in the Special Power of Attorney, GRACIA PEREZ and
GLORIA PEREZ were both residing in the United States of America. While the respondent
alleged that there was a previous authority to sign the Special Power of Attorney, no
proof was presented by the respondent to that effect. They also were signed as "BY
REMEDIOS PEREZ".9
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that his notarial commission be revoked and that he be
disqualified to be commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-591 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors
adopted and approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On September 9, 2013, complainant moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. XX-2013-
591 and prayed that the same be set aside and instead the penalty of suspension be imposed
against Atty. Resuena as an erring member of the bar and not merely as a notary public.
On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-293, 10 denied
complainant's motion for reconsideration, thus affirming Resolution No. XX-2013-591 but
modified the penalty imposed to two (2) years disqualification from notarial practice.
We concur with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.
Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.11
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's
free act and deed. 12
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the
affiant's personal appearance before the notary public:
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Resuena violated not only the notarial law but
also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SP A without all the affiant's personal
appearance. As found by the IBP-CBD, the purpose of the SP A was to authorize a certain
Apolo D. Perez to represent the principals "to sue and be sued in any administrative or judicial
tribunal in connection with any suit that may arise out of their properties." It is, thus, appalling
that Atty. Resuena permitted Remedios Perez to sign on behalf of Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez knowing fully well that the two were already dead at that time and more so
when he justified that the latter's names were nevertheless not included in the
acknowledgment albeit they are signatories of the SP A. Equally deplorable is the fact that
Remedios was likewise allowed to sign on behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were
said to be residing abroad. Worse, he deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an
ejectment case that was filed in court. In effect, Atty. Resuena, in notarizing the SPA,
contented himself with Remedios' representation of four of the six principals of the SPA, doing
away with the actual physical appearance of all the parties. There is no question then that
Atty. Resuena ignored the basics of notarial procedure and actually displayed his clear
ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the notarial
law, he also did so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-
observance.
We cannot overemphasize that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the
appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary public
would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed.
In Agbulos v. Atty. Viray, 13 this Court, citing Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan, 14 reiterated anew
the necessity of personal appearance of the affiants, to wit:
The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to
authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the
adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the
absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant
does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the
affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's
free act and deed.

Atty. Resuena's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to
those directly affected by the notarized document but also made a mockery of the integrity of
a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. Moreso, in this case, where Atty.
Resuena being the counsel of the plaintiffs-affiants can be assumed to have known the
circumstances of the subject case, as well as the fact that affiants Amador Perez and
Valentino Perez were already deceased at the time of the execution of the subject SP A.
Having appeared to have intentionally violated the notarial law, Atty. Resuena has, in fact,
allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud which this Court will not tolerate.

A graver responsibility is placed upon Atty. Resuena by reason of his solemn oath to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.1âwphi1 The Code of
Professional Responsibility also commands lawyers not to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. 15 It requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. 16 Moreover, the Notarial Law and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a duly-commissioned notary public to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or act
which constitutes good cause for the revocation of commission or imposition of administrative
sanction. 17 Unfortunately, Atty. Resuena failed in both respects.

Through his acts, Atty. Resuena committed a serious breach of the fundamental obligation
imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1. 01 of
Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice,
not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and
ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach
upon an honorable profession. 18 Atty. Resuena must now accept the consequences of his
unwarranted actions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rex A. Resuena is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and
of violating the lawyer's oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and
likewise PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Resuena's personal record. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE COURTS
A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint 1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by
Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary
public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the
registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters,
located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta,
Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for
Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor
of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that
Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared
before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainant’s husband died on July
29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo
City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 2005 4 and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the
name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's
reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's
rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming
of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation
executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as
represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary
in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located at
Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed
that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was
articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and
the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked
him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a
document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon
and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so
that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and
informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked
to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to
be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which
was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that
indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003. 7 Respondent,
likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed of donation, he,
however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after
Atty. Linco died.81avvphi1
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared
before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his
part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-
CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed of
donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet a public
instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day
after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where
respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco "personally came and appeared before me" is
false. This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and
"do no falsehood."
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified
from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied. 11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP
Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678
dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming
the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment. 12
In herCompliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in
his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the
IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being
commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now
ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty.
Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003.
Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized
the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse
of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of
donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put
him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to
accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared
before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering
the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally
came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have
appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly,
respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath
in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to
the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus,
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by
a notary public and appended to a private instrument. 16
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined.17Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties appertaining
to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in
damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his acts,
not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary
public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned
as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one
year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the
notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He
is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine
when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE COURTS
A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN
CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution 1 or the IBP Board of
Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his
notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED.
Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter, 2 dated June 11, 2008,
submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of
Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization
of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.
The notarized documents were as follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C.
Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret
L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to
Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa
Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and
sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia
Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita
Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona
Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad
Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18,
2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and
Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and
Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps.
Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18, 2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized
on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development
Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda
Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to
Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008;
and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and
Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March 14, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer
who had information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country
attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the
persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that
they did not see respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who
signed them or the documents cameout of the office already signed. Upon verification with
the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the
country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed
the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to
formalize the complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that
his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report on,
and endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country,"4 and
that any advice on how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on the said
letter. In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not aware that
those were documents notarized using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his
own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the
import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred
that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
When the case was called for mandatory conference on September 16, 2009, only
respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a manifestation reiterating his original position and
requesting that his attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and
the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent submitted
a position paper,9 to which he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he
acted as a notary public without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law
profession and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as
Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008,
was not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that
the comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that
respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in
most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office
secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was
abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import
of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing
an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially
pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up
to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his
office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s
commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period
of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its
Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 12 of the said resolution of the IBP. He
contended that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but without any wrongful
intention, he should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed
simple negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of
respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it
being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby
affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the
secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents
were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country.
This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of
his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public"
refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary
public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office
open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register
within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to
notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced
by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood
that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did. imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. 17

Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is
commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register.14 He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21
years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and
this was his first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on
guard and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer
negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was
deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the
penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary
public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also
undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He
should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a
lawyer.15Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his
shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to
the doing of any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to
directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that
allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized
person to practice law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with
his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any
restraint.
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into
a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub!
ic instruments would be undermined.18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take
lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED
with MODIFICATION.1âwphi1Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as
a notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from
being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that
the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer
to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came
into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being
conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public
documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere
sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession was eroded.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant

responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued
with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest
TOPIC: LAWYER AND THE COURTS 2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang;
Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili
A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011 na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay
sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at
sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants,
3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay
vs. pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang
pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan
siya ay naninirahan;
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent.
4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa
DECISION tuwing may pagkakataon;

CARPIO, J.: 5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang
kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;
The Case
6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga
kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and ako interesado dito;
Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).
7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga
The Antecedent Facts panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na
pinagsamahan o conjugal.
Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer,
malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997,
dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal
(Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and
(Sgd) (Sgd)
dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON sa Gumaca, Quezon

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, Gumaca, Quezon
dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy.
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-
sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga Doc. No. 482;
sumusunod: Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.
1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay
ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap
ng makakasama sa buhay; Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract
dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal
eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they
acquired during their union.
Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired
the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied
that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the
notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time
office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her
allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a
letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the
document without Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence
together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He
further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was notarized.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s
desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña
had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to
comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense
of Omaña who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later
claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:
Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby
revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of]
disciplinary sanction or disbarment.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law and
for two years as a notary public.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in
the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void. 2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3 which is exactly what Omaña did
in this case.1avvphi1
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was
sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a
document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed
the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document
entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually
and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each other; 6 preparing a document
authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing
the right of action which each may have against the other; 7 and preparing a document declaring
the conjugal partnership dissolved.8
We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the
contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were
true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence
in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the
entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the
blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully
well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.10
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR.
We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary
public for TWO YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED.