THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
QUE various presidential decrees, letters of
PO LAY
FACTS:
Appellant who was in possession of foreign
exchange failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following
the receipt of such foreign exchange as required
by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the
claim that said circular No. 20 was not published
in the Official Gazette prior to the act or
omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and
effect.
ISSUE:
WON said circular had no force and effect
HELD:
Yes, said had no force and effect and bound no
one until its publication in the Official Gazzette
or after November 1951.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No.
386) equally provides that laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No.
20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but
being issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and
effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations
especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for
its violation should be published before
becoming effective, this, on the general principle
and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specifically informed of
said contents and its penalties.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of
the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it
was not published until November 1951, that is,
about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly
its penal provision, did not have any legal effect
and bound no one until its publication in the
Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In
other words, appellant could not be held liable
for its violation, for it was not binding at the time
he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession thereof.
TAÑADA ET.AL. vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
(DECISION 1985)
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.
ISSUE:
WON there is a need for publication of the said
PDs.
HELD:
The clear object of the provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means
of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees.
The Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.
TAÑADA ET.AL. vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
(RESOLUTION 1986)
FACTS:
Petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
WON laws of general application should only be
published.
HELD:
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but
the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened
or extended. The term "laws" should refer to all
laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directly
affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of the
instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this
rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance.
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION vs
RAMOS ET.AL.
FACTS:
E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then
President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days
before the opening of Congress on July 27,
1987. ]Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same
shall take effect immediately.
Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 did not
take effect because its supposed date of
effectivity came after President Aquino had
already lost her legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution.
Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could
have only taken effect fifteen days after its
publication at which time Congress had already
convened and the Presidents power to legislate
had ceased.
ISSUE:
WON E.O. No. 279 did not come into effect.
HELD:
No, petitioners contentions have no merit.
It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O.
No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on
a date other than even before the 15-day period
after its publication. Where a law provides for its
own date of effectivity, such date prevails over
that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is
the very essence of the phrase unless it is
otherwise provided in Section 1 thereof.Section
1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a
statute does not provide for its own date of
effectivity.
 What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200,
and what due process requires, as this Court
held in Taada v. Tuvera,[217] is the publication of
the law for
without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat. It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279
does not require its publication, it is not a ground
for its invalidation since the Constitution, being
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, is deemed written in the law.
this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became
effective immediately upon its publication in the
Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
That such effectivity took place after the
convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At
the time President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279
on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising
legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution.
UMALI vs.HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO
FACTS:
The petitioner, a taxpayer filed a petition
for mandamus for himself and in behalf all
individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL the
respondents to implement RA 7167, "AN ACT
ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL AND
ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO
INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES
TO THE POVERTY THRESHOLD LEVEL” ,with
respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers
earned or received on or after 1 January 1991 or
as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.
The said act was signed and approved by the
President on 19 December 1991 and published
on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of
general circulation.
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect
upon its approval by the President on 19
December 1991, or on 30 January
1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its
publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya"
a newspaper of general circulation; and (2)
assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30
January 1992, whether or not the said law
nonetheless covers or applies to compensation
income earned or received during calendar year
1991.
HELD:
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167
took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after
fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14
January 1992 in the "Malaya."
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of
the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should
cover or extend to compensation income earned
or received during calendar year 1991.
It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167
speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as
adjustments "to the poverty threshold level."
Certainly, "the poverty threshold level" is the
poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167
was enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold
levels in futuro, at which time there may be need
of further adjustments in personal exemptions.
Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of the
fact that these personal and additional
exemptions are fixed amounts to which an
individual taxpayer is entitled, as a means to
cushion the devastating effects of high prices
and a depreciated purchasing power of the
currency. In the end, it is the lower-income and
the middle-income groups of taxpayers (not the
high-income taxpayers) who stand to benefit
most from the increase of personal and
additional exemptions provided for by Rep. Act
7167. To that extent, the act is a social
legislation intended to alleviate in part the
present economic plight of the lower income
taxpayers. It is intended to remedy the
inadequacy of the heretofore existing personal
and additional exemptions for individual
taxpayers.
And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased
personal exemptions that it provides for shall be
available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act
7167 shall have become effective. In other
words, these exemptions are available upon the
filing of personal income tax returns which is,
under the National Internal Revenue Code, done
not later than the 15th day of April after the end
of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167,
which became effective, as aforestated, on 30
January 1992, the increased exemptions are
literally available on or before 15 April
1992 (though not before 30 January 1992). But
these increased exemptions can be available on
15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation
income earned or received during the calendar
year 1991.
FORTUNE MOTORS (PHILS.) INC vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY
FACTS:
Petitioner contends that the newspaper Daily
Record where the notice of extrajudicial
foreclosure was published does not qualify as a
newspaper of general circulation. It further
contends that the population that can be
reached by the Daily Record is only .004% as its
circulation in Makati. Petitioner also claims that
the New Record is not a daily newspaper
because it is published only once a week.
Petitioner contends that, since it was the
Executive Judge who caused the publication of
the notice of the sale and not the Sheriff, the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should
be deemed annulled.
ISSUE:
WON there is sufficient compliance of
publication.
HELD:
In the case at bench, there was sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the law
regarding publication of the notice in a
newspaper of general circulation.
This is evidenced by the affidavit of publication
executed by the New Records publisher, which
stated that it is a newspaper edited
in Manila and Quezon City and of general
circulation in the cities of Manila, Quezon City et
al.
A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws do
not require that the newspaper which publishes
judicial notices should be a daily
newspaper. Under P.D. 1079, for a newspaper
to qualify, it is enough that it be a newspaper or
periodical which is authorized by law to publish
and which is regularly published for at least one
(1) year before the date of publication which
requirement was satisfied by New Record. Nor
is there a requirement, as stated in the said law,
that the newspaper should have the largest
circulation in the place of publication.
Petitioners contention in this regard is
bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079
clearly provides that:
The executive judge of the court of first
instance shall designate a regular
working day and a definite time each
week during which the said judicial
notices or advertisements shall
be distributed personally by him [11] for
publication to qualified newspapers or
periodicals xxx, which distribution shall
be done by raffle.
The said provision of the law is clear as to
who should personally distribute the judicial
notices or advertisements to qualified
newspapers for publication. There was a
substantial compliance with the requirements
when it was the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati who caused the publication
of the said notice by the newspaper selected by
means of raffle.
ALBINO S. CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co by which he was
convicted by the RTC. Co appealed to the Court
of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon
the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for
its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered
on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 — i.e., that a
check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at
the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior
to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery
of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee
for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement
made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. This
administrative circular was subsequently
reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984
(Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year
after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing"
check to the complainant.
ISSUE:
WON the Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August
8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will no
longer be considered as a valid defense be
retroactively applied.
HELD:
The principle of prospectivity has also been
applied to judicial decisions which, "although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the
reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system . . .'"
It would seem then, that the weight of authority
is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of
an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P.
Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective
effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons situated, who relied on the official
opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a
check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg.
22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in
which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees
no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein
above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs.
AURORA A. SALVAÑA
FACTS: Administrator of the LRTA issued
Office Order No. 119 which revoked Atty. Aurora
A. Salvaña’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department.
Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of
the President. She then applied for sick leave
but the Administrator discovered that her
medical certificate was falsified. LRTA Fact-
finding committee issued a formal charge
against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of
Official Document and imposed her the penalty
of dismissal from service.Salvana appealed with
the CSC which found that she was only guilty of
simple dishonesty and should only be meted
with a penalty of suspnsion only. LRTA filed
petition for review with the CA which was
dismissed. LRTA filed present petition and
argues that it has legal personality to file appeal
since it was the person adversely affected.
During the pendency of this decision, or on
November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service or
RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service
Commission modified the definition of a "party
adversely affected" for purposes of appeal.
PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the
respondent against whom a decision in an
administrative case has been rendered or to the
disciplining authority in an appeal from a
decision reversing or modifying the original
decision.
ISSUE:
WON the RACCS can be given retroactive
effect.
HELD:
Procedural laws have retroactive application.
In Zulueta v. Asia Brewery:
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive
effect. But there are certain recognized
exceptions, such as when they are remedial or
procedural in nature. This Court explained this
exception in the following language:
It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there
are settled exceptions to this general rule, such
as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL
in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
....
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws,
i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or
take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within
the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively
as to pending proceedings even without express
provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of
procedure can apply to cases pending at the
time of their enactment. In fact, statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be
applied on actions undetermined at the time of
their effectivity. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.85 (Emphasis supplied)
Remedial rights are those rights granted by
remedial or procedural laws. These are rights
that only operate to further the rules of
procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such,
the retroactive application of remedial rights will
not adversely affect the vested rights of any
person. Considering that the right to appeal is a
right remedial in nature, we find that Section 4,
paragraph (k), Rule I of the RACCS applies in
this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the right to
appeal the decision of the Civil Service
Commission that modified its original decision of
dismissal.
Recent decisions implied the retroactive
application of this rule. While the right of
government parties to appeal was not an issue,
this court gave due course to the appeals filed
by government agencies before the
promulgation of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Hence, the petition of LRTA was granted.
EMETERIO CUI vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
FACTS: Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law
of the defendant and finished his law studies in
the defendant university up to and including the
first semester of the fourth year. During all the
school years in which plaintiff was studying law
in defendant law college, his uncle was the dean
of the College of Law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last
semester of his law studies but failed to pay his
tuition fees because his Dean uncle having
severed his connection with defendant and
having accepted the deanship and
chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad
Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's
law college and enrolled for the last semester of
his fourth year law in the college of law of the
Abad Santos University graduating from the
college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff,
during all the time he was studying law in
defendant university was awarded scholarship
grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral
tuition fees were returned to him after the ends
of semester and when his scholarship grants
were awarded to him. After graduating in law
from Abad Santos University he applied to take
the bar examination. To secure permission to
take the bar he needed the transcripts of his
records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff
petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
transcripts. The defendant refused until after he
had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant
refunded to him as above stated. As he could
not take the bar examination without those
transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said
sum under protest. This is the sum which
plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this
case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the
scholarship grants as above stated, he was
made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to
me by the University, I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school without having
refunded to the University (defendant) the
equivalent of my scholarship cash.
ISSUE: WON the provision of the contract,
whereby the plaintiff waived his right to transfer
to another school without refunding to the
defendant the equivalent of his scholarships in
cash, is valid or not.
HELD:
Director of Private Schools correctly pointed:
In order to declare a contract void as against
public policy, a court must find that the contract
as to consideration or the thing to be done,
contravenes some established interest of
society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and
good moralsor tends clearly to undermine the
security of individual rights. The policy
enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is
sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in
recognition of merit not to keep outstanding
students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
understanding of that university scholarships
award is a business schemedesigned to
increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good
morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
definition. It is good customs; those generally
accepted principles of morality which have
received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding
scholarships to attract students and keep them
in school is not good customs nor has it received
some kind of social and practical confirmation
except in some private institutions as in Arellano
University. The University of the Philippines
which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value
of the scholarships if they transfer to other
schools. So also with the leading colleges and
universities of the United States after which our
educational practices or policies are patterned.
In these institutions scholarships are granted not
to attract and to keep brilliant students in school
for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or
help gifted students in whom society has an
established interest or a first lien.
PEOPLE vs. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO
FACTS: An information was filed with the RTC
charging respondents the crime of rebellion.
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the
Information but was denied. He then filed a
petition for bail but was opposed by the
prosecution, on the ground that since rebellion
became a capital offense under the provisions of
P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death on those who promote, maintain, or head
a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to
bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.EO187 was
issued restoring ART 135 of RPC, Thus, the
original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor.
Respondent Judge, taking into consideration
Executive Order No. 187, granted private
respondent's petition for bail. The prosecution
argued that respondent is estopped from filing
bail because he has waived his right to bail
when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus
as a sign of agreement that he will be held in
custody in consideration of the recall of the
warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners
ISSUE: WON the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is
charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and
whether such right may be waived.
HELD:
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party
would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment
or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist, with the intent that such
right shall be surrendered and such person
forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct
as warrants an inference of the relinquishment
of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it."41
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of
the constitutional rights which can be waived. It
is a right which is personal to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC vs. HON. JOSE, Y.
FELICIANO, ET AL
FACTS: On December 26, 1964, Jose Y.
Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of
the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the
President of the Philippines urging the
immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of
rice, thru a government agency which the
President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic
Council. The President submitted said letter to
his cabinet for consideration and on December
28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed
importation. On January 4, 1965, the President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as
the government agency authorized to undertake
the importation. Considering that said
importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters
Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3452
which prohibits the government from importing
rice and tat there is no law appropriating funds
to finance the same. They said that it its illegal
because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in
Section 10 provides that the importation of rice
and corn is only left to private properties
upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They
claim that RCA is prohibited from doing
so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides
that should there be an existing or imminent
shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity
as to constitute a national emergency and
certified by the NEC, the president may
authorize such importation thru
any government agency he may designate - is
repealed by RA 3452.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 2207 which allows
importation of rice by government agency during
national emergency is repealed by RA 3452
HELD:
The two laws can therefore be construed as
harmonious parts of the legislative expression of
its policy to promote a rice and corn program.
And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is
the duty of this Court to adopt such
interpretation that would give effect to both laws.
Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by
implication, the litter statute must be
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the
prior existing law. The old and the new laws
must be absolutely incompatible. A mere
difference in the terms and provisions of the
statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy
between them. There must be such a positive
repugnancy between the provisions of the old
and the new statutes that they cannot be made
to reconcile and stand together. The clearest
case possible must first be made before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn.
Inconsistency is never presumed.
While the two laws are geared towards the same
ultimate objective, their methods of approach
are different; one is by a total ban of rice
importation and the other by a partial ban, the
same being applicable only to the government
during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only
authorizes importation during normal times, but
when there is shortage in the local supply of
sucy gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These
two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so
implied repeal does not ensue.
TING vs. VELEZ-TING
FACTS:
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was
declared void ab initio by the RTC based on Art
36. Petitioner appealed to the CA and argued
that the RTC decision is contrary to Santos and
Molina cases. CA reversed RTC ruling stating
that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen
since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact.
Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be
applied to this case since the Molina decision
was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her
petition with the RTC. She claimed that
the Molina ruling could not be made to apply
retroactively, as it would run counter to the
principle of stare decisis. CA amended its
decision and sustained RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the CA violated the rule
on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under
the Santosand Molina cases
HELD:
Yes, the principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It
is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issues, necessary for two
simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article
8 of the Civil Code.
To be forthright, respondents argument that the
doctrinal guidelines prescribed
in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle
of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
argument was also raised but was struck down
in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v.
Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
PESCA vs PESCA
FACTS:
RTC rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to
be null and void ab initio on the basis of
psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent. Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court.Petitioner, in her plea
to this Court, would have the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the
doctrine enunciated in Santos case promulgated
on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines
set out in Molina case, promulgated on 13
February 1997, should have no retroactive
application and, on the assumption that
the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively,
the guidelines therein outlined should be taken
to be merely advisory and not mandatory in
nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application
of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant
only a remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings and not its dismissal.
HELD:
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in
Article 8 of the Civil Code,expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that
the interpretation placed upon the written law by
a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the
courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute
a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have
to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance
therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed
from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in
our statute books, and, until the relatively recent
enactment of the Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos
when, for the first time, the Court has given life
to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to
assist the courts and the parties in trying cases
for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity.Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in
her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as
to warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.
KAREN SALVACION vs CENTRAL BANK
FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested
for committing four counts of rape and serious
illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police
recovered from him several dollar checks and a
dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He
was, however, able to escape from prison. In a
civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and
attorney’s fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the
dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section
11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body whatsoever.
Salvacion therefore filed this action for
declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
HELD:
In fine, the application of the law depends on the
extent of its justice.Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court. Legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would
result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a
foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de
otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental
solutions that would respond to the vehement
urge of conscience.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are
hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case.
Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to
draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors
and, subsequently, to give the latter protection.
However, the foreign currency deposit made by
a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and
given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few
days in the country and, therefore, will maintain
his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a
transient, he is not entitled to the protection of
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON
FACTS:
December 21, 1965, National Marketing
Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil
case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor
of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against
the same defendant from 10 years ago
(December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization
Corporation vs. Tecson). Defendant Miguel
Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint
upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of that and prescription of action.
More than ten years have passed a year is a
period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot
that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that
when this present case was filed it was filed two
days too late.
The lower court, then, issued an order
of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the
civil code. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil
Code, an action upon a judgment “must be
brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues,” the issue thus confined to the
date on which ten years from December 21,
1955 had expired.
However, National Marketing Corporation insists
that the same “is erroneous because a year
means a calendar year. There is no question
that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to
December 21 of the following year is one year.
The case reached its conclusion with the
appellant’s theory that contravenes the explicit
provision of Article 13 of the civil code.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the term year as used in the
article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
RULING: Yes. The term year as used in the
article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public
interest demands a reversion to the
policy embodied in the revised administrative
code, this may be done through legislative
process and not by judicial decree.
CIR vs PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP
FACTS: Yap, vice chair of respondent
Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the
refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in
1997. According to Yap, because respondent
suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its
quarterly corporate income tax and remitted
creditable withholding tax from real estate sales
to the BIR in the total amount
of P26,318,398.32. Revenue officer required
respondent to submit additional documents to
support its claim which he complied but its claim
was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it
filed a petition for review in the CTA which
dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the
two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund or tax credit.
The CTA found that respondent filed its final
adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right
to claim a refund or credit commenced on that
date. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year
prescriptive period under Section 229 of the
NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was
equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000
was a leap year, respondent's petition, which
was filed 731 days[14] after respondent filed its
final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period. CA reversed and set aside
the decision of the CTA.[18] It ruled that Article 13
of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a
regular year and a leap year.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent’s
petition was filed within the two-year
reglementary period.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was
filed within the two-year reglementary period
because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that
provides that a year is composed of 365 years is
repealed by Executive Order 292 or the
Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under
Executive Order 292, a year is composed of 12
calendar months.
MICIANO VS BRIMO
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate
in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased
(Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation
in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen. The appellant's opposition is based on
the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil
Code which, among other things, provides the
following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of
the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may
be situated.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law
will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph
Brimo’s estates.
HELD:
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove
that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as
he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines.
Though the last part of the second clause of the
will expressly said that “it be made and disposed
of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Island”, this condition, described as
impossible conditions, shall be considered as
not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary
to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.
TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA,
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New
York, migrated to California, where he resided
and consequently was considered a California
citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until his death.
However, during the entire period of his
residence in this country he had always
considered himself a citizen of California. In his
will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of
sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia who was rendered to have been declared
acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for
appellant claims that California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is
referred back to the law of the domicile; that
therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable;
that finally, the share of Helen must be
increased in view of the success ional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the
other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen
contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under
Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of
the deceased must apply, our courts must
immediately apply the internal law of California
on the matter; that under California law there are
no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator
could dispose of any property possessed by him
in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything and his
will remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail
in administering the estate of Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional
rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter: the internal law
which should apply to Californians domiciled in
California; and the conflict rule which should
apply to Californians domiciled outside of
California. The California conflict rule says: “If
there is no law to the contrary in the place where
personal property is situated, is deemed to
follow the person of its owner and is governed
by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being
domiciled outside California, the law of his
domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.
Where it is referred back to California, it will form
a circular pattern referring to both country back
and forth.
Bellis vs. Bellis
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States. He had five
legitimate children with his first wife (whom he
divorced), three legitimate children with his
second wife (who survived him) and, finally,
three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed
two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his
estate and properties to his seven surviving
children. The appellants filed their oppositions
to the project of partition claiming that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they
were entitled according to the Philippine law.
Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the
Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate
wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in
the case in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to
the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in view of those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of
the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and
domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will
should be governed by his national law. Since
Texas law does not require legitimes, then his
will, which deprived his illegitimate children of
the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate
children are not entitled to the legitimes under
the texas law, which is the national law of the
deceased.
Francisco Hermosisima vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a
school teacher, later she became an insurance
underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23
years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with
each other. Since 1953, both had a refular
intimate and sexual affair with each other. In
1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then
promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954,
Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next
month, Francisco got married but with a different
woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against
Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter
with Soledad and for damages due to
Francisco’s breach of his promise to marry
Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of
Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court and even increased the
award of damages. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages
because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the
love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his
sexual desires – that being, the award of moral
damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are
recoverable under our laws for breach of
promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals
based its award of damages on Article 2219 of
the Civil Code which says in part that “Moral
damages may be recovered from… (3)
Seduction, xxx…” However, it must be noted
that the “Seduction” being contemplated in the
said Civil Code provision is the same
“Seduction” being contemplated in Article 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such
“seduction” is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that
Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal
seduction) Soledad given the circumstances of
this case. Soledad was 10 years older than
Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience
and a better job overall than Francisco who was
a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted
by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself
to Francisco and that she wanted to bind “by
having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy.”
Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and
Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be
held on September 4 of the same year. The
bride-to-be has been devoted with all the
preparations for their wedding. However, two
days before their marriage, ‘Paking’ left a note
that they must postpone the marriage for his
mother was against it. A day before their
wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding
shall push through. Worse, Paking did not show
up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be
publicly humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by
Velez prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit
against the former. Velez never filed an answer,
thus, awarding moral and exemplary damages
to Wassmer.
Velez appealed on the court and stated
that he failed to attend the wedding day because
of fortuitous events. He also insisted that he
cannot be civilly liable for there is no law that
acts upon the breach of promise to marry. He
also contested the award of moral and
exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary
damages may be awarded in a breach of
promise to marry suit.
HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. Howver, Wassmer has
already made preparations for the wedding.
Velez’s failure to appear on the wedding day is
contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the
Civil Code. Under the law, the injured party is
entitled to moral damages as well as to
exemplary damages because Velez’s acted in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner (Article
2232) in breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales,
then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh,
a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who
was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got
really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account,
she said that Gashem later offered to marry her
at the end of the semester. Marilou then
introduced Gashem to her parents where they
expressed their intention to get married.
Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started
looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem
in his apartment where they had sexual
intercourse. But in no time, their relationship
went sour as Gashem began maltreating
Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his
promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that
he is already married to someone in Bacolod
City. So Marilou went home and later sued
Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and
awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never
proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino
customs and traditions since he, being an
Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs
and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is
correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for
damages in favor of Marilou not really because
of his breach of promise to marry her but based
on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and
fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a
violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His
promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As
found by the trial court, Marilou was not a
woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before
she met Gashem. She would not have
surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not
promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant
disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and
on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy. As a
foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our
country and even taking advantage of the
opportunity to study here he is expected to
respect our traditions. Any act contrary will
render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article
21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts
and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations
such as this case where the breach complained
of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was
meant as a legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books – such as the absence of a
law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal
luminaries that if the promise to marry was made
and there was carnal knowledge because of it,
then moral damages may be recovered
(presence of moral or criminal seduction),
Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses
were made because of the promise (expenses
for the wedding), then actual damages may be
recovered.
Sergio Amonoy vs Spouses Gutierrez
In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented
Alfonso Fornilda (Formida in some records) in a
partition case. Since Fornilda had no money to
pay, he agreed to make use of whatever
property he acquires as a security for the
payment of Amonoy’s attorney’s fees which
amounts to P27k. In July 1969, Fornilda died. A
month later, the property was finally adjudicated
and Fornilda, through his heirs, got his just
share from the property in dispute. Fornilda was
however unable to pay Amonoy. Hence,
Amonoy sought to foreclose the property in
1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the spouses Jose
Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda then sued
Amonoy questioning the validity of his mortgage
agreement with Fornilda. It was their claim that
the attorney’s fees he was collecting was
unconscionable and that the same was based
on an invalid mortgage due to the existing
att0rney-client relationship between him and
Fornilda at the time the mortgage was executed.
The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in
the Court of Appeals but they appealed to the
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.No. L-72306.
Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to
foreclose the property. Amonoy was also the
highest bidder in the public sale conducted in
view of the foreclosure. He was able to buy the
property of Fornilda for P23k. But constructed on
said property was the house of the spouses
Gutierrez.
Pending the spouses’s appeal with the Supreme
Court, Amonoy was able to secure a demolition
order and so on May 30, 1986, Amonoy started
demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on
June 2, 1986, the Supreme Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the
demolition order. On June 4, 1986, Amonoy
received a copy of the TRO. Finally, on June 24,
1989, the Supreme Court promulgated a
decision on G.R.No. L-72306 where it ruled that
the mortgage between Amonoy and Fornilda is
void, hence, Amonoy has no right over the
property. But by this time, the house of the
spouses was already demolished because it
appears that despite the TRO, Amonoy
continued demolishing the house until it was
fully demolished in the middle of 1987.
The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It
is now the contention of Amonoy that he
incurred no liability because he was merely
exercising his right to demolish (pursuant to the
demolition order) hence what happened was a
case of damnum absque injuria (injury without
damage).
ISSUE: Whether or not Amonoy is correct.
HELD: No. Amonoy initially had the right to
demolish but when he received the TRO that
right had already ceased. Hence, his continued
exercise of said right after the TRO was already
unjustified. As quoted by the Supreme Court:
“The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. ”
What Amonoy did is an abuse of right. Article
19, known to contain what is commonly referred
to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible.
Clearly then, the demolition of the spouses’s
house by Amonoy, despite his receipt of the
TRO, was not only an abuse but also an
unlawful exercise of such right.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Roberto Reyes
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive
party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden. The party was being held for a
prominent Japanese national. The person in
charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also
the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during
the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly
known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the
list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out
who invited Reyes to the party. When she
ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite
Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the
latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and
leave the party. Reyes however made a scene
and began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman
was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden for damages. In his version, he said that
he was invited by another party guest, Dr.
Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing
to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered
him in a loud voice to leave the party
immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr.
Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart
the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted
out of the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko
Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her
right and that Reyes deserved to be treated
humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the
right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she
should have done it respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of
rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the
version of Lim more credible. She has been
employed by the hotel for more than 20 years at
that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all
times. It is very unlikely for her to make a scene
in the party she was managing. That would only
make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even
Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to
leave, Lim did so very close to him – so close
that they could almost kiss. This only proves that
Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear
whatever is it that she’s going to tell Reyes and
exclude other guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known
as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as
proven by evidence on record, did not demean
Reyes. They do not know each other personally.
She has no reason to treat him wrongfully
especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived
person. together as husband and wife for 21 days. Soon,
Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever applications for a marriage license with the
damage he incurred upon himself. Under the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor,
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to Cavite. However, Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed
the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
risk of being turned away, and thus being marriage license.
embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self- Cirilo claims that she was abducted and
inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart raped. One of the cases she filed was a suit for
herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and damages based on a breach of a promise to
that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not marry. The trial court decided in her favor. This
even present any supporting evidence to was affirmed by the CA.
support any of his claims. Since he brought
injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a
can be held liable for damages. breach of a promise to marry?
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants vs.
Decision: No.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
time-honored rule that an action for breach of
FACTS: The defendant was regarded as a
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
family member so he was allowed to visit the
apart from the right to recover money or property
plaintiffs’ house and to ask Lolita to teach him to
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
pray the rosary. Defendant, a married man, had
promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of
a clandestine love affair with Lolita, the 24 year
promise to marry per se is not actionable, except
old unmarried woman. When the family learnt
where the plaintiff has actually incurred
about their secret affair, defendant was
expenses for the wedding and the necessary
forbidden to visit their house and to see Lolita.
incidents thereof.
However, their affair still continued. On April
In this case however, moral damages
1957, Lolita disappeared from her brother’s
were awarded based on art. 21 of the Civil Code
house in Quezon City. A note written by the
which states that any person who wilfully causes
defendant was seen on the aparador of Lolita.
loss or injury to another in a manner that is
The family filed an action for damages in
contrary to morals, good customs or public
pursuant with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. As such, the act of Bunag forcibly
ISSUE: Whether or not the injury caused to the
abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge
family of Lolita by the defendant is contrary to
with her against her will, and thereafter
morals, good customs or public policy.
promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on
HELD: The court held that there can be no other
such promise after cohabiting with her for
conclusion that can be drawn from this chain of
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
events that the defendant succeeded in winning
contrary to morals and good customs.
the heart of Lolita through clever strategies.
Article 21 was adopted to remedy the
Knowing that he is a married man, the wrong
countless gaps in the statutes which leave so
that he had done to her and to the family is
many victims of moral wrongs helpless even
immeasurable. Verily, he has committed and
though they have actually suffered material and
injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe
morals, good customs and public policy as
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
moral wrongs which is impossible for human
Code.
foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes. Thus, the damages awarded to Cirilo
Bunag v. CA
were proper.
Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. brought Zenaida
Cirilo to a motel where they had sexual
intercourse. Later that evening, said Bunag
brought Cirilo to the house of his grandmother in