SQN LDR RK Ithikkat Dissertation RMA The Changing Character

REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WARFARE
By
Squadron Leader RK Ithikkat
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the award of symbol ‘psc’ and M.Sc. (Defence & Strategic Studies)
Degree, at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, affiliated to
the University of Madras
February 2004
ii
SELF DECLARATION CERTIFICATE
I declare that the Dissertation title “Revolution in Military Affairs: The Changing Character
of Warfare” Submitted by me for the award of Degree of Master of Science ( M.Sc) in Defence
and Strategic Studies is original and that this work or part thereof has not been submitted for the
award of any degree or diploma of either this or any other university.
DSSC, Wellinton
Date : (RK Ithikkat)

Squadron Leader
COUNTER SIGNED
DSSC, Wellington
Date : (S Mehta)
Group Captain
iii
CONTENTS
Chapter No Chapter Heading Page(s)
Preface (iii)
Glossary (iv)
I Introduction 1-3
II Methodology 4-9
III Military Revolutions 10-16
IV Characteristics of an RMA 17-20
V Relationship between RMA and Breakthrough 21-29

Technology
VI Exploiting the RMA by the Indian Armed Forces 30-37
VII Conclusion 38-40
Bibliography 41-42
iv
GLOSSARY
REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WARFARE
“The term ‘revolution’ is not meant to insist that change will be rapid – indeed past revolutions
have unfolded over a period of decades – but only that the change will be profound, that the new
methods of warfare will be far more powerful than the old. Innovations in technology make a
military revolution possible, but the revolution itself takes place only when new concepts of
operations develop and, in many cases, new military organisations are created. “
Andrew W Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions”

Office of the Net Assessment memorandum, 27 July 1993
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. The term “Revolution in Military Affairs” became decidedly fashionable in military

circles in the decade gone by. It lies at the heart of debates within think-tanks over future
strategy. There is a vast amount of literature on the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA)’ in recent years. Nevertheless, few works throw light on the concept’s past or help situate
it. There is a paucity of works which describe this phenomena within a historical framework, or
offer guidance in understanding the potential magnitude and direction of future changes of
warfare. 1
2. RMAs and Military Revolutions. The term RMA is often used (erroneously) as a
synonym for what military historians call military revolutions, which are major changes in the
way states prepare and wage war. Military revolutions are much less frequent phenomena than
RMAs. It is possible for more than one RMA to occur in a century, whereas military revolutions
happen in longer cycles. Among examples of military revolution are the passage from medieval
warfare to dynastic warfare, and the passage to industrial/mass warfare that led to the total wars
witnessed in the last century. The current RMA, broadly defined, would result from the passage
of advanced societies from an industrial base to an information base. 2 The broad definition of
RMA points notably at a greater concern for all critical information infrastructures that make a
nation function smoothly, a greater reliance on capital-intensive professional armies and a
revolution in defence management, including the relations between the defence establishment
and the industrial base.
2
Relevance to Indian Armed Forces
3. The pace of technological and social change and the continuing antagonisms between
states makes it highly probable that war, military revolutions, and revolutions in military affairs
will play a central role in the century just begun. Foresight is vital to the Indian armed forces,
both in its efforts to adjust to the new world order following the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the rise of China, and in attempts to conceptualise and address pressing issues. These issues
spread across a wide canvas ranging from addressing shortcomings in organisational structures to
the procurement of weapon systems with which the forces will fight throughout the first few
decades of the twenty-first century.
4. Attempts to discern, what the past might suggest about the future, face tremendous
difficulties. As George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel said, “The owl of history is an evening bird. The
past as a whole is unknowable; only at the end of the day do (es) some of its outlines dimly
emerge. The future cannot be known at all. ….yet despite its many ambiguities, historical
experience remains the only available guide both to the present and to the range of alternatives
inherent to the future”.3
Views on the Pre-eminence of Technology
5. The Silver Bullet. Many a newly converted information warrior today advocates the
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and high tech weapons as the proverbial silver bullet.
Recent advances in technology have brought about dramatic changes in military operations: the
use of low-observable aircraft (stealth) to negate air defences, smart weapons for precision
conventional-strike operations, the employment of both ballistic missiles and antiballistic
missiles (ABMs) in conventional warfare, and so forth. These dramatic technology-driven
changes in military operations, sometimes termed a revolution in military affairs (RMA), are not
unique in the history of warfare, but merely the latest in a chain of breakthrough technologies
extending back over time. They include examples such as the machine gun in the 1890s–1910s,
the manned aircraft and the tank in the 1920s–1930s, the aircraft carrier and radar in the 1930s–
1940s, and nuclear weapons in the 1940s–1950s. Such technology-driven breakthroughs in
military operations will continue to occur, and they will continue to bestow a military advantage
on the first nation to develop and use them.
6. The Opposed View. The success of the USAF in the watershed war of Desert Storm has
been attributed by many analysts to the leadership of visionaries of the like of General W.L.
3
“Bill” Creech. 4 Savaged by a top-down management structure favoured by men like Robert
McNamara and General Walter Sweeney and ravaged by the ‘ghosts of Vietnam’, the US armed
forces underwent a metamorphosis from a faction ridden outfit battling drug abuse and
favouritism into an efficient, result oriented fighting force. 5 It is no surprise that there is the
opposed view that technology merely facilitates the change. To thinkers of this school of view,
the revolution of military affairs, if at all, is due to superior tactics, training and leadership. 6
1 Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox. These views, as well as those of Newt Gingrich, former speaker
of US House of Representatives are reproduced in the essay Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare Cambridge
University Press, 2001, p 1-3
2 Alvin and Heidi Toffler posit the third wave of economies to be in a similar way as warfare, Third Wave ,
Collins, London, 1980.
3 Knox in Brassey’s Marshon American Defence Annual. What History can tell us about the New Strategic
Environment, 1995-1996 (Washington, DC, 1996), p. 1-25.
4 Tom Clancy and General Chuck Horner (retired). Every Man a Tiger, Pan Books 2001, p. 154-165.
5 Ibid p. 117 and p. 155. General Horner uses the stronger phrase of “an endemic drug problem”. Also op cit
Murray and Knox discuss on this aspect of command in the US defence culture p. 5.
6 Tom Clancy and General Tommy Franks (retired), Into the Storm, A study in Command , Sidgwick,
London, 1989, et passim.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Statement of the Problem
1. This paper seeks to study the military revolutions and revolutions in military affairs in
order to recommend suggestions for exploiting the advantages resulting from it.
Justification of the Study
2. Technology has undoubtedly increased the vital aspects of warfare i.e. battlefield
awareness, speed, tempo of operations and devastatingly accurate fires. The heat and dust of the
raging debate within the Western world has spilt to the sub-continent too. If Operation Desert
Storm unfolded a new chapter in warfare, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom seem to be but prove the argument of technological changes ushering a bewildering
battlefield of the future.
3. There are a number of significant characteristics of RMAs and an umbilical relationship

between breakthrough technologies and RMAs. By developing models it is feasible to describe
various aspects of the breakthrough process leading to RMAs. The historical record of past
technology-driven revolutions, in both military affairs and in the business world can be used as
the point of departure. As the historical record shows, being aware of an emerging RMA is not
enough to avert military disaster; a nation must also be responsive to the implications of that
RMA. This can be a difficult challenge, particularly for a (emergent dominant?) military player
such as India.
4. This study has been impelled by an airman’s efforts to understand the effect of factors
such as technology, doctrine and organisation on the fascinating art and science of warfare.
Scope
5. India is a developing nation with miles to go. It must be accepted with all humility that it
is not a harbinger of new technologies. Indeed, far from it, the levels of technology are more than
a generation behind advanced nations. What is of essence here is that as an aspiring dominant
player in the regional context (and to some extent, an emergent dominant player), it behoves the
nation’s strategists, military thinkers and champions of the Research and Development (R&D)
5
community to be on the leading edge of breakthrough technologies that could revolutionise

military operations in the future. At the same time the Indian Armed Forces must be on the
lookout for revolutionary ways in which to employ those technologies in warfare.
6. This leads to three interrelated questions:
(a) Regarding Past Revolutions in Military Affairs. What are the lessons that can be
drawn from the historical record regarding the characteristics of RMAs and of the
breakthrough process leading to RMAs?
(b) Regarding being Prepared for Future RMAs Carried out by Others. What will it
take for India to anticipate and be prepared for future technology-driven RMAs carried
out by others?
(c) Regarding Transforming Indian Armed Forces by Carrying out Our Own RMAs.
What does it take to be successful?
7. This dissertation seeks to addresses these three questions, which are particularly relevant
today when a concerted effort is required to bring about a technology-driven transformation of
the Indian military to achieve its operational goals.
Operational Definitions
8. An RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations
which either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant player,
or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimension of warfare, or both. 7
9. There are a number of key terms in this definition which need elaboration.
(a) Paradigm. A paradigm can be usefully defined as an accepted model that

serves as the basic pattern for a segment of military operations. For example, opposing
infantry units arranged in orderly formations manoeuvring in the open to engage each
other at close quarters, with supporting artillery fire, was the operational paradigm for
land combat during the Napoleonic Wars. 8 Similarly, warships formed up in lines-of
battle on parallel courses and engaged opposing war vessel with gunfire. This was an
operational paradigm for naval fleet engagements during those same wars, as well as
during the First World War a hundred years later. 9
6
(b) Core competency. The fundamental ability that provides the foundation for a
set of military capabilities is a core competency. For example, the ability to detect
vehicular targets from the air and attack them with precision weapons is today a core
competency of the United States Air Force (USAF). In the period between World War I
and II, the ability to deliver accurate naval gunfire at ranges upwards of 20 miles was a
core competency of the surface combat units of the United States Navy (USN). 10 In the
13th and 14th centuries, the ability of a longbow-man to put an arrow accurately through
the chain mail armour of a knight on horseback or a man-at-arms on the ground at ranges
of 250–300 yards was a core competency of the English archers. 11
(c) Dominant Player. A military organisation that possesses a dominating set of

capabilities in an area of military operations. The Indian Army, by virtue of its sheer
experience in conducting operations in Siachen and Kargil can be considered a dominant
player in high altitude warfare. For example, today the U.S. Air Force is the dominant
player in air-to-air combat and air-to-ground attack. At the end of World War II, the
carrier force of the U.S. Navy was the dominant player in naval warfare. At the end of
World War I, the battle fleets (e.g., the battleship and battle cruiser forces) of the British
Navy and the U.S. Navy were the dominant players in naval surface warfare. Going back
further in history, during the Middle Ages the armoured cavalry (i.e., knights on
horseback) was the dominant player in land warfare in Europe. 12 Even further back, in
Roman times the Roman legion was the dominant player in land warfare throughout the
Roman Empire.
(d) Dimension of Warfare. The dimension on which warfare is conducted, the

first and most ancient of which was the land surface of the earth (land warfare). The
second and almost as ancient dimension on which warfare was conducted was the water
surface of the earth (naval warfare). In the 20th century several new dimensions were
added: the underwater portions of the oceans (undersea warfare), the air above the earth's
surface (air warfare), and the homelands of the combatants (strategic warfare and
intercontinental warfare). Another dimension much talked about since the Second World
War but in which actual combat has not yet occurred is the region outside the earth's
atmosphere (space warfare). As the information revolution continues, there is increasing
discussion of cyberspace as still another dimension of warfare (information warfare).
(e) Paradigm Shift. A profound change in the fundamental model underlying a

segment of military operations. For example, the carrier warfare paradigm, in which
7
opposing naval forces engaged each other at 100- to 200-mile distances without ever
coming within naval gunfire range, represented a profound change in the basic model
underlying naval warfare. 13 It rendered obsolete naval gunfire which was the hitherto core
competency of the hitherto dominant battleship fleets. The blitzkrieg paradigm, in which
highly mobile armoured forces broke through enemy lines and rapidly penetrated to the
rear, represented a profound change in the basic model underlying land warfare. It
rendered obsolete the core competency of the hitherto dominant infantry and artillery
forces for static defences of prepared positions. The nuclear warhead-tipped
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) created a new core competency (an
overwhelming, virtually unstoppable ability to destroy cities and other large-scale targets
in the homeland of an opponent thousands of miles away) in a new dimension of warfare
(intercontinental strategic warfare).
Methods of Data Collection
10. Material for this paper has been collected from the following sources: -
(a) Primary Sources.
(i) Research reports of RAND Corporation accessed through the Web.
(ii) Autobiography of General Chuck Horner.
(b) Secondary Sources. Books available in the Defence Services Staff College
library and college lectures on RMA and Information Warfare have provided a wealth of
information. Professional periodicals of military institutions have also been referred to. A
Bibliography is appended at the end of the text.
11. Tertiary sources included the following: -
(a) Combat Journal published by The College of Combat, Mhow.
(b) Strategic Review of United States Strategic Institute, Boston.
(c) Military Review of Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
United States.
8
Organisation of the Dissertation
12. The study commences in Chapter Three by distinguishing between the two separate
phenomena of military revolutions and revolutions in military affairs. Considerable time has been
devoted on this aspect as military history is perhaps the path to salvation. This done, the
significant characteristics of RMAs are identified and described in Chapter Four.
13. The umbilical relationship between breakthrough technologies and RMAs is discussed in
Chapter Five. The additional insights that can be gleaned from failed or incomplete RMAs are
also covered in Chapter Five.
14. As the historical record shows, being aware of an emerging RMA is not enough to avert
military disaster; a nation must also be responsive to the implications of that RMA. This
challenge is discussed in Chapter Six, where the various elements are listed from history which
bring about a successful RMA.
15. In Chapter Seven, suggestions with justification are made for the Indian Armed Forces to
bring about an RMA. An effort will be made to steer away from churning out a list of weapon
systems and new technology. This is an oft beaten track which tends to take a rather narrow view
of a revolutionary transformation of military capability. History is replete with examples that the
mere possession of weapons and cutting-edge technology cannot bring about an RMA. The buzz
words of dominant manoeuvre, precision fires, full dimensional protection and focussed logistics
are set aside for other students to tackle. Instead the focus will be on how to ensure that the
armed forces of India and in particular, the military leadership can educate themselves to
anticipate and accept an RMA. The study is concluded in Chapter Eight.
7 “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15 Sept. 2003 <
www.rand.org.publications/>
8 H A L Fisher, History of Europe, Edward Arnold and Company, London, First Edition, 1936, p. 820..
10 Ibid.
11 Fisher, op. cit. p. 315-318 and 354. Clifford J Rogers, England’s fourteenth Century RMA, , Cambridge
University Press, 2001. pp. 15-34
9
13 Mitsuo Fuchida, Midway : The Battle that Doomed Japan, Japanese Navy’s Story, Anapolis, Maryland,
1955, et passim
CHAPTER III
MILITARY REVOLUTIONS
Military Theory on Revolutionary Changes
1. Current notions of revolutions in military affairs derive from two principal sources: early
modern theorists and Soviet military theorists. The closely related concept of “military
revolution” emerged in 1955 in an inaugural lecture by the British historian Michael Roberts.14
Roberts argued that in the early seventeenth century, under the leadership of the warrior-king
Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden had embarked on a military revolution that had swept away
traditional approaches to military organisations and tactics.
2. Soviet Influence. The second major influence on the development of the notion of
revolutions in military affairs was the writings of Soviet military theorists from the 1960s
onward. 15 Marxist-Leninist indoctrination made the Red Army, from its beginnings, receptive to
notions of major revolutionary change. Soviet theorists pioneered the analysis of the effects of
World War I on military technique in the 1920s and early 1930s. However, Stalin’s uncontested
domination by massacring his military elite checked the Red Army’s development of modern
operational theories from 1937 onwards. The catastrophes of 1941 – in which the German
Blitzkrieg came close to destroying the Soviet Union – offered an unforgettable demonstration of
the possibility of revolutionary change in war. Soviet operational art belatedly recovered, and by
1945 had surpassed even the achievements of the Germans. 16 The appearance of striking new
technologies within the American armed forces – precision guided munitions (PGMs), cruise
missiles and stealth – suggested to Soviet thinkers that a further technological revolution was
taking place that had potentially decisive implications for the Soviet Union. Focussing on the
technological aspects of these advances, the Soviets termed it as an emerging “military technical
revolution.” Marshal Nikolai V Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1977 to 1984,
commented that these advances “made it possible to sharply increase the destructive potential of
conventional weapons, bringing the closer, so as to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in
terms of effectiveness.” 17
Military Revolution – “Patterns and Concepts”
3. Metaphor of Earthquakes. Military historians have begun to look beyond the

seventeenth century for examples of radical military innovation. To them a military revolution is
11
understood through a geological metaphor of earthquakes. They were as uncontrollable and

unforeseeable. A paper delivered at the spring 1991 meeting of the Society of Military History
suggested that the history of military institutions since the fourteenth century had involved
periods of violent change followed by periods of relative calm in which armies had adapted to
major changes in their environment, a pattern which evolutionary biologists have called
punctuated equilibrium. 18 Such an approach offers one – admittedly metaphorical – way of
understanding revolutionary military change in warfare.
4. Five such revolutions are recorded which recast society and the state as well as military
organisations. 19 To be examined in considerable detail, they are:-
(a) First Military Revolution. The creation in the Seventeenth Century of the
modern nation state which rested on the large scale organisation of disciplined military
power.
(b) Second Military Revolution. The French Revolution of the late Eighteenth
Century, which merged mass politics and war.
(c) Third Military Revolution. The Industrial Revolution of the late Eighteenth
Century which made it possible to arm, clothe, feed, pay and move swiftly massive
bodies of soldiers.
(d) Fourth Military Revolution. The First World War, which combined the legacies
of the French and Industrial Revolutions and set the pattern for twentieth century war.
(e) Fifth Military Revolution. The advent of nuclear weapons, which contrary to
all precedent kept the Cold War cold in the decisive European and North-Eastern Asian
theatres.
5. Military Revolutions as Upheavals. Military revolutions recast society, the state as well
as military organisations. They alter the capacity of states to create and project military power.
States that missed the early military revolutions cannot easily leap-frog to success in war by
adopting trappings of technology. For example oil brought Saddam Hussein fabulous quantities
of Soviet, French and even American military hardware. As is known, the mere possession of
hardware did not confer battlefield effectiveness on his forces conscripted from a society which
possessed neither a modern state (missed the First Revolution), nor the depth of technology
common to societies that had passed through the Industrial Revolution (missed the Second and
12
Third Revolutions). Whereas, the Vietnamese Communist movement combined the revolutionary
fervour of the French Revolution (The Second Revolution) derived from its French Colonial
masters and its Muscovite and Chinese Patrons, with a bureaucratically organized and
traditionally xenophobic culture, to defeat one Western great power and another super power. 20
CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY REVOLUTIONS
I: Creation of the Modern Nation- State
6. Indiscipline in Militaries. Since the collapse of Rome the activity of war had been in a
perpetual state of improvisation. 21Governments were personal entourages of kings and princes
and exercised only the loosest control over their armies. The soldiers received pay infrequently,
pillage being the usual method of subsistence. In 1576, the unpaid soldiers of the Spanish
Monarchy mutinied and sacked the City of Antwerp – an action that wrecked Spanish Policy in
the Netherlands. The mutiny reflected the inherent indiscipline of the soldiery and the inability of
the financially decrepit Spanish State to compensate them for their sacrifices. 22
7. Order and Organisation. Seventeenth Century Sweden fostered military discipline to

create an effective battle worthy force. Soldiers would dig now when they were told to dig, an
uncommon notion hitherto. These new military instruments were self-reinforcing: they backed
with force the state’s collection of taxes. These taxes were used to pay the troops regularly. In
return for pay, the state demanded and received disciplined obedience in the garrison as well as
on the battlefield. The impact of this revolution of particular importance when Western societies
faced the societies of Latin America, Asia and Africa. In this era colonisation they could brutally
subjugate societies which had did not possess an organised military. 23
8. The Indian Experience. The young prince Chandragupta Maurya created a

disciplined and salaried army under the tutelage and advice of Chanakya (321 BC). An army of
6, 00,000 infantry, 30,000 horses, 9,000 elephants and 8,000 chariots, all permanently employed.
It led to the emergence of the largest-ever consolidated Indian state. 24 It ushered in over two
centuries of a stable and prosperous India including the forty years of the reign of Ashoka the
Great.
13
II: The French Revolution
9. The Merger of Mass Politics and War. The French Revolution both widened and
deepened the state’s grip upon the wealth and manpower of its citizens. The secular ideology of
equality and nationalism injected into war a ferocity which was hitherto unmatched. In 1793, the
leaders of France declared levee en masse that placed the French people and their possessions at
the state’s disposal for the duration of the war. 25 The French tripled their army in less than a year.
Their troops could accept casualties and fight on a scale that no other eighteenth-century army
could match. The Prussian philosopher of war, Carl Von Clausewitz saw the new French Armies
at first hand and wrote that
“Suddenly war again became the business of people – a people of thirty millions, all …
citizens….Nothing now inhibited the vigour with which war could be waged, and consequently
the opponents of France faced the utmost peril” 26
10. The adversaries of France brought her to heel through the same measures – the national
mobilization of resources The American Civil War and the two World Wars replicated with
greater ruthlessness and effectiveness the social and political mobilization that the French
revolution had pioneered.
III: The Industrial Revolution
11. Financial Power and Resources. Concurrently with the French Revolution, the first
stages of the Industrial Revolution were already underway in Britain. This upheaval changed
radically the economic power of British society and placed hitherto unimagined resources in the
hands of the nation’s leaders. In 1813 when the alliance of Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia
overwhelmed Napoleon’s tactical-operational genius, Britain’s financial power was the decisive
force. 27
12. Technological Innovations and Mobilization. In the Crimean War, rifled muskets,
telegraphy, and steamships facilitated Britain and France to project forces as far afield as
Southern Russia, where they defeated the numerically superior Russian armies. In the American
Civil War the opposing sides married the French and the Industrial Revolution to carry on a
bloody and costly four year conflict. The Union and the Confederacy fielded armies that dwarfed
that dwarfed all previous military formations. They supplied this vast soldiery with food,
munitions and equipment transported by railroad and steam ships. They connected units hundreds
of miles apart with webs of telegraph lines. In short, they for the first time waged a total war: a
14
war in which both sides pitted their full destructive energies against one another. It is of little
wonder that by 1865 “Southern Society” had ceased to exist. 28
13. Each time that General Ulysses Grant turned the flank of General Robert E Lee, He relied
upon the North’s ability to pay for the move of men and supplies. Although mass political
participation tapped the resources of both belligerents, it was the North alone that discovered the
ability to mobilize resources without ruinous political and economic consequences. The
asymmetry that was created by the Unionists after three years of conflict arose out of mass
democracy, private enterprise and public administration. 29
IV: The First World War
14. The Birth of Modern Warfare. The military revolution of the Great War fused industrial
warfare and ideology into a relentless whole that ultimately – in the war’s second round in 1939-
1945 – clasped fighting fronts and civilian populations within a single circle of fire and terror.
The war was perhaps the most significant conceptual development in the long history of war.
That development was the birth of “modern warfare”: the advent of three dimensional conflict
through indirect artillery fire as the foundation of planning at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels of war.
15. The Indirect Fire Revolution. The First World War changed the face of twentieth-century
warfare in many ways. It brought the tank and anti-tank duel (Cambrai-20 Nov 1917) 30, air-to-air
combat (France 1915), strategic bombing, aerial reconnaissance (Italy 1905), and air defence. 31 It
also brought the exciting prospect that aircraft may be used as “flying artillery” in support of
armoured operations; (a role which many a contemporary ground soldier views as the primary
role for air power). Logistics came to rely on the internal combustion engine. The war saw the
virtual demise of cavalry. The horrors of chemical warfare became routine. At the technological
level artillery came to dominate warfare. The bloody stalemate of trenches in 1914 was overcome
by 1917-18 using the three dimensional firepower of artillery and airpower. 32 This was
demonstrated during the battles of Cambrai, the Battle of Amiens the following August and in the
“Kaiserschlacht”. 33
15
The Revolution Continues: The Second World War
16. Case Yellow (Fall Gelb). The defeat of France within a few weeks in 1940 has
remained one of the most astonishing and seemingly revolutionary events in the twentieth-
century military history. A whole host of explanations were offered: communist treason,
unwillingness to fight, fifth columnists. Over six decades later, events and their causes appear
clearer. The French did fight in 1940: their armed forces lost 1, 23,426 dead, 5,213 missing in
action, and 2,00,000 wounded. 34
17. It is little acknowledged that the brilliant thrust from Dinant to Sedan hung on a few
fragile threads: the suicidal combativeness of the German infantry on the heights overlooking
Sedan, the then junior Major-General Erwin Rommel’s brilliant personal leadership in forcing
the crossing at Dinant, and a bridgehead across the Meuse secured by a single panzer division of
General Heinz Guderian’s XIX Corps. 35
18. Culture, Doctrine, Training and Technology. However, battle for France reflected in
greater measure the best qualities of German military culture and institutions. Developed over a
century from the Prussian reforms of 1807-14, it was a culture that demanded effectiveness and
“joy in responsibility” of every one, rifleman to general. 36 It commanded constant training and
practice, encouraged experience and innovation, inculcated honesty and truth across ranks, units
and branches. This was a culture that nurtured its leaders, and punished failure only at its second
or third occurrence. The slow steady systemic improvements of the Reichswehr and the
Wehrmacht became a revolution on the banks of the river Meuse. The German army had studied
the last war closely under its chief of staff General Hans Von Seeckt. The doctrinal changes were
reworked and crystallised by Generals Werner Von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck after analysing
British experiments on Salisbury Plain. Showing a willingness to learn from combat and realistic
experiments, the German army was able to harness armour, air power, radios and the internal
combustion engine into a revolutionary conception of war. 37
14
Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 (Belfast, 1956), reproduced in An essay “Thinking
about Revolutions in Warfare”, Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, Cambridge University Press, 2001. p. 6.
15 Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 5.
16
Joint Publications Research Service Report, Soviet Union, Military Affairs 29 June 1988, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service Translation p. 9.
16
17
Williamson, Murray. Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union N V Ogarkov, “The Defence of
Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day,” First Edition, 9 May 1984
18 Roberts, Journal of Military History, 1994, reprinted in The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050,
MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. Cambridge University Pres, 2001, p. 6
19
Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 6.
20 Roberts, Journal of Military History, 1994, reprinted in The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050,
MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. Cambridge University Pres, 2001, p. 7
21 Ibid.
22 Murray-Knox, op. cit. p. 7.

23 Murray-Knox, op. cit p. 8.
24 Jackson AV William, History of India, Asia Education Services, New Delhi, Reprint 1987, p. 67.
25 Sabine Flaissier, French Revolution, Secker and Warburg, London, 1960, p.
26 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, Infantry Journal Press, Washington DC, 1943 , p. 582
27 Murray-Knox op. cit. p. 9.
28 Nathaniel Platt and Muriel Jean Drummond, Our Nation from Its Creation, Prentice Hall Inc, Englewoods
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, p. 379.
29 EB Long, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 1861-1865, Garden City New York, pp. 721-726.
30 Hart BH Lidell, History of the First World War, Casell, London, 1970, p. 435
31 Jonathan B A Bailey, “The First World War and The Birth of Modern Warfare, Strategic and Combat
Studies Institute Paper No. 22,” British Army Staff College Camberley, 1996 reproduced in The Dynamics of
Military Revolution 1300-2050, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. Cambridge University Pres, 2001
32 The annihilation at Verdun as covered by Hart BH Lidell, History of the First World War, Casell, London,
1970, p. 287
33 Ibid. As Bailey explains .. “the use of indirect fire was probably at Paltsig in July 1759, when Russian
artillery fired over the tops of trees. By 1840 the British had given the howitzer the task of firing at enemy artillery.
However, aiming remained a matter of hit and miss without calculations. Targets had to be observed and the means
to carry out long range reconnaissance were absent…..from 1915 air observation and photography facilitated precise
targeting. First used by Italy in 1915, it had developed sufficiently by 1917 to overcome image distortion.” Such
survey made it possible for guns to fix their position easily and ergo the Indirect fire revolution.
34 Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning, Lawrence, KS
1996 p. xii. Also Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian: A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd Von Runstedt 1875-
1953, Brassey’s (UK), First Edition 1991, p. 96.
35 Guderian H, Panzer Leader, p. 84.

36 Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian: A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd Von Runstedt 1875-1953,
Brassey’s (UK), First Edition 1991, p. 7.
37 Williamson Murray, May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, pp 173-174.
CHAPTER IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF AN RMA
1. It will be recalled from Chapter II that some characteristics of a RMA have been defined.
These were Paradigm Shift and Core Competency.
2. To elaborate on the afore mentioned, a development in military technology that does not
either render obsolete a core competency of a dominant player or create a new core
competency, the development cannot be termed as an RMA. Table 1 below gives a few
illustrative examples of developments in military technology that satisfy this criteria.
TABLE 1
RMAs: SOME ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
Nature of Paradigm Core Competency Dominant Player

RMA
Shift Affected Affected
Created new tactical It rendered man-to-man
level model for land combat capability of French armoured
Longbow
warfare knights on horseback cavalry
obsolete.
Created new tactical It rendered obsolete the
All armies employing
level model for land ability to manoeuvre
massed infantry forces
Machinegun warfare massed infantry forces
in the open
in the open.
Created new operational It rendered obsolete the

and tactical level model static defence of French army
Blitzkrieg
for land warfare prepared positions by
infantry and artillery.
Created new operational It rendered obsolete the
Carrier Warfare and tactical model for accurate naval gunfire of All contemporary navies
naval warfare battleship fleets.
Created new dimension It created a new core
of warfare competency of long-
ICBM (intercontinental range, accurate delivery
strategic warfare) of high yield nuclear
weapons.
38
Other Notable Characteristics of RMAs
2. Based on the historical record, other notable characteristics of RMAs are: -

(a) RMAs are rarely brought about by dominant players. For example, during the
period between the First and Second World Wars, British navy, one of the dominant
players in sea warfare, did not develop the concept of carrier warfare.
18
(b) RMAs frequently bestow an enormous and immediate military advantage on the
first nation to exploit them in combat. A few of the many examples are the use of the
longbow by the English against the French at Crecy in 1346, 39 the use of the machine gun
by the British against the Zulus in 1879,40 and, most recently, the use of stealth aircraft
and precision-guided munitions by the United States against the Iraqis in 1991.
(c) RMAs are often adopted and fully exploited first by someone other than the nation
inventing the new technology. For example, even though the key inventors of the
machine gun were all Americans (William Browning, Richard Gatling, Isaac Lewis, and
Hiram Maxim) machine guns were first used in a decisive fashion by European armies
against native forces in Africa in the 1870s–1890s. The American army did not begin
buying them in quantity and actively incorporate them into its tactical doctrine until many
years later, after they were employed by the German army in September 1914 to stop the
Allied advance at the Chemin des Dames ridge on the river Aisne. 41
(c) RMAs are not always technology-driven. For example, American combat tactics
during the Revolutionary War (i.e., engaging an opponent from behind cover rather than
in formation out in the open) brought about a revolutionary change in land combat
without any change in the weapon technologies involved.
(d) Technology-driven RMAs are usually brought about by combinations of
technologies. More precisely, technology-driven RMAs are usually brought
about by weapons or systems exploiting combinations of technologies. Examples include
the blitzkrieg, which was enabled by the combination of three technologies—the tank, the
two-way tactical radio, and the dive bomber; and the ICBM, which was enabled by the
combination of three technologies—long-range ballistic missiles, lightweight fusion
warheads, and highly accurate inertial guidance.
(e) Not all technology-driven RMAs involve weapons. For example, the coming of
the railroad to Europe and America in the 1830s–1850s led to a revolution in strategic
mobility. This was first demonstrated by the French when they moved 250,000 men at
heretofore unheard-of speed to the front in northern Italy to engage the Austrians during
the War of 1859. 42
(f) All successful technology-driven RMAs appear to have three components:
technology, doctrine, and organisation. Technology, even when developed into a
revolutionary weapon or system, is not enough to produce an RMA. It must be combined
with doctrine (i.e., an agreed-upon concept for the employment of the new weapon or
system) and organisation (i.e., a military force structure crafted to exploit the new weapon
or system). For example, the carrier aviation RMA resulted from the combination of
19
technologies enabling military aircraft to take off and land on carrier decks; the
operational concept allowed carrier aircraft to engage an opposing naval force at distances
well beyond naval gunfire range and concentrate their attack on the opposing carriers.
The force structure (the carrier task force) was built around the aircraft carrier and its
planes.
(g) RMAs often take a long time to come to fruition. There are many examples of
this. The U.S. Navy began experimenting with aircraft in 1910; it took them almost three
decades to fully develop the carrier warfare RMA. Further back in time, although all of
the major technology developments embodied in the machine gun were essentially
completed by the 1870s, it did not come to fruition as an RMA in European warfare until
September 1914, some 40 years later. So the “revolution” in revolutions in military affairs
does not mean the change will occur rapidly—sometimes it will, often it won’t—but
ultimately it will be profound.
(h) The military utility of an RMA is frequently controversial and in doubt up until
the moment it is proven in battle. The British did not begin to realize the combat value of
the machine gun until they used it with devastating force against the Zulus at Ulundi in
1879. 43 Many British and French generals continued to seriously doubt the value of
machine guns in a European war up until the Germans employed them to stop the Allied
advance in September 1914. Not only most French and British generals but many German
generals, including some in the German high command such as (then) Colonel-General v.
Runstedt, doubted the value of the blitzkrieg up until the moment Guderian broke through
at Sedan on May 13–14, 1940, and were vehement in expressing their doubts. 44 Some
French, British, and German generals continued to doubt it for days thereafter, even after
Guderian reached the English Channel on May 20. Similarly many American admirals
seriously doubted the power of carrier aviation up until the battle of Midway in June
1942. 45
Lessons from the Business World regarding Paradigm Shifts
3. Paradigm shifts are not limited to the military arena. They occur in the business world as
well, where they have become a much-studied phenomenon. A clear message from business
literature regarding product and process innovation is that product revolutions—the business
world’s version of paradigm shifts—are rarely brought about by dominant players. 46
20
4. The following list is illustrative: -

(a) Electric typewriters did not come from a major typewriter manufacturer.
(b) Ballpoint pens did not come from the pen industry.
(c) Levi’s did not come up with designer jeans for women.
(d) Semiconductors did not come from the vacuum tube industry.
(e) Radial tires did not come from a major tire maker.
(f) Personal computers did not come from a major computer manufacturer.
(g) Wine coolers came from neither the wine nor soda industries.
5. The typical impact of these “discontinuous innovations” on dominant players in the
business world is stated by Grove:
“ …when a strategic inflection point sweeps through the industry, the more successful a
participant was in the old industry structure, the more threatened it is by change and the more
reluctant it is to adapt to it.” 47
6. The historical message is clear: in neither military nor business affairs are “revolutions”
(i.e., paradigm shifts that destroy core competencies) brought about by dominant players.
39 Clifford J Rogers, The Efficacy of the English Longbow, War in History 5, 1998, pp. 233-242.
40 Ellis, 1975, pp. 82–84. “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15 Sept. 2003 <
41 Ellis, 1975, p. 74. “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15 Sept. 2003 <
42 Van Creveld, 1989, pp. 158–159. “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15
Sept. 2003 < www.rand.org.publications/>
43 Ellis, 1975, p. 98. “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15 Sept. 2003 <
44 Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian: A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd Von Runstedt 1875-1953,
Brassey’s (UK), First Edition 1991, p. 104.
45 Turnbull and Lord, 1949, p. 238. “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15
46 Samuel Gardiner, Private Communication, 1995, p. 67. “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND
Study Report. 15 Sept. 2003 < www.rand.org.publications/>
47 Grove, 1996, p. 50. “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15 Sept. 2003 <
CHAPTER V
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RMA AND BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY
1. As discussed earlier, technology-driven RMAs are brought about by weapons or systems

exploiting combinations of technologies, combined with supporting doctrine and organisation.
Technology alone, without accompanying doctrine and organisation, cannot produce an RMA.
Use of the term “breakthrough technologies,” therefore, focuses on one of the inputs to the
breakthrough process; use of the term “RMA” focuses on the output from that process. This is
the essence of the relationship between breakthrough technologies and RMAs.
The Breakthrough Process
2. Here again the historical record of technology-driven changes in military operations

provides numerous insights into the nature of the breakthrough process leading to RMAs.
3. RMAs Result from Serendipitous Conceptual Breakthroughs. One insight is that RMAs
almost always involve some sort of conceptual breakthrough that could not be anticipated in
advance. Based on this insight, Figure 5.1 presents a simple model of the breakthrough process,
in which RMAs result from serendipitous conceptual breakthroughs. In the preparatory phase,
one or more technology developments and various unmet military challenges set the stage for the
subsequent conceptual breakthrough. In the breakthrough phase, the key creative event in the
RMA process—the critical conceptual breakthrough—occurs. Such conceptual breakthroughs
usually cannot be anticipated in advance, and often occur accidentally. In the exploitation and
selling phase, the conceptual breakthrough is exploited and sold. It is developed into a military
weapon or system, combined with a suitable operational doctrine, and expressed in a force
structure adequate to realize the potentialities. In the payoff phase, the new weapon or system is
used in combat and shows its revolutionary potential; the RMA becomes a reality.
22
FIGURE 5.1
SERENDIPITOUS CONCEPTUAL BREAK THROUGH
Technological Military
PREPARATORY developments Developments
PHASE
Concept
BREAKTHROUGH Breakthrough
PHASE
EXPLOITATION Development, Testing

AND SELLING PHASE &
Evaluation
PAY-OFF PHASE
Use in Combat
4. RMAs are the Result Of Multiple Innovations. History shows that each individual
RMA is usually the result of a number of innovations in technology, doctrine, and organisation.
Accordingly, Figure 5.2 presents a second, more complex model of the breakthrough process, in
which RMAs are the result of multiple innovations.
23
TABLE 5.2
MULTIPLE INNOVATIONS IN AN RMA
NEW TECHNOLOGY
MILITARY CHALLENGES
DRIVE THE CREATIVITY AT
EACH STEP
NEW DEVICE
NEW SYSTEM
INNOVATIONS
SOMETIMES OCCUR OUT NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
NEW MILITARY REALITY

AN RMA CAN FAIL TO OCCUR DUE TO OBSTACLES AT ANY STAGE
5. The innovative stages in this model are: -

(a) A new technology (or several new technologies) that enables devices and systems
not previously contemplated.
(b) A new device, based on this new technology, which provides a new capability.
(c) A new system, based on the new device, which performs a military function
dramatically better/differently. (In some cases, it may perform a function that had never
been performed before.)
(d) A new operational concept that employs the new system in a military situation and
accomplishes some military task either dramatically better or dramatically differently.
Alternately performing a new task that did not exist previously.
(e) A new doctrine and force structure—to employ the new system and to provide the
military organisation to fully realise its potential.
(f) These various stages culminate in a new military reality, in which a paradigm shift
has occurred in some segment of the military arena.
24
FAILED OR INCOMPLETE RMAs
6. Additional insights concerning the RMA process can be gleaned from a more detailed
look at the history of some failed or incomplete RMAs and why they failed to achieve their
anticipated potential. As indicated earlier, RMAs can fail to occur in the face of obstacles at any
step in the chain portrayed in Figure 5.2.
Impractical Devices
7. Nuclear Powered Aircraft. In the 1950s, much thought was given to a nuclear-powered
aircraft. Such an aircraft would have virtually unlimited range and endurance, and would
therefore (in its proponents’ view) revolutionise aerial warfare.
8. This dream never came to fruition. Even though the necessary nuclear reactor and energy
conversion technologies existed, the contemplated device (a nuclear-powered aircraft engine)
proved much too heavy to be practical. Because of the weight of the engine, such an aircraft
would literally have never got airborne.
Non-Viable Systems
9. Electromagnetic Gun. In the 1970s and early 1980s, thought was given to an
electromagnetic (EM) gun that would shoot projectiles at much higher muzzle velocities than
conventional guns, and would therefore (in its proponents’ view) be a superior antitank,
antiaircraft, and antimissile weapon. EM accelerators, that accelerated small projectiles to
velocities of several kilometres per second—were in fact developed and tested. However, even
though EM guns worked in principle, in practice they were cumbersome, with internal barrel
components that wore out rapidly and had to be replaced often. It has, thus far at least, not been
possible to turn EM guns into viable military systems.
Lack of an Operational Concept to Employ a Viable System Concept
10. Machine Guns. Without an operational concept, the best weapon system in the
world will never revolutionise anything. The machine gun—or rather the lack of a position for
the machine gun—in most European based armies during the last quarter of the 19th century
provides a good example of this.
11. Development. By 1885, the development of a workable machine gun was relatively
complete, and several firms were actively marketing such guns. But most European armies—with
25
the exception of the British (they missed the full significance of this RMA for a different
reason)—did not have the slightest concept of how to employ these guns effectively in combat.
During the Franco-Prussian War, in the battles of Wissembourg and Spichern (1870), the French
used machine guns mounted on artillery carriages and sited them with field artillery as indirect
fire weapons. They were outranged by the Prussian artillery pieces and decimated before they
had a chance to fire. The idea that the use of machine guns as direct-fire infantry-support
weapons could decimate infantry forces attempting to cross open ground did not occur to them. 48
Wrong or Incomplete Operational Concept Is Used
12. The absence of a seemingly small missing element in an operational concept can cause
the failure of an RMA, or can cause one player to miss realizing the full potential of an RMA that
another player achieves.
13. Carrier warfare provides an example. The British conducted the first carrier air raid in
history— the attack on the Cuxhaven Zeppelin base near Wilhelmshaven by seven British
seaplanes from three improvised carriers in the Heligoland Bight. 49 At the close of World War I,
the Royal Navy had over three years of wartime carrier operations and possessed nearly a dozen
carriers of one sort or another, at a time when no other naval power had even one. In spite of this
head start, the British completely missed realizing the full potential of the carrier warfare RMA;
at the beginning of World War II, the first-line British carriers were incapable of generating the
combat striking power of American and Japanese carriers, as so convincingly demonstrated in the
carrier battles of 1942.
14. Why did the British miss this RMA? The British concept of operations did not
include the practice of stowing a major fraction of a carrier’s complement of aircraft on the flight
deck, and refuelling and rearming there as well. The British stowed, refuelled, and rearmed all of
their aircraft below, on the hangar deck. Thus, in 1939 a first-line British carrier carried only 24–
30 aircraft, whereas American and Japanese carriers carried 80–100 aircraft. As later events
demonstrated, the key determinants of the offensive striking power of a carrier force were the
number of strike aircraft that could be launched in a single attack and the repetition of successive
attacks. The American and Japanese carriers could launch larger attacks; and because they
refuelled and rearmed their aircraft on the flight deck, a faster turnaround was feasible. These
features were crucial.
26
Unacceptable New Concept to Prevailing Military Culture
15. Occasionally a viable system and an effective operational concept exist, but because the
operational concept is unacceptable to the prevailing military culture, the doctrine and force
structure necessary to exploit the new weapon are not developed.
16. Machine Guns in Combat. In contrast to the continental European armies, by the 1880s
the British knew how to employ machine guns in combat to achieve devastating effect: as direct-
fire infantry weapons. The British learned this in Africa, fighting the native tribes. Machine guns
were used against the Zulus at Ulundi in 1879, in the assault on Tel-el-Kebir in Egypt in 1882
and against the Dervish at Abu Klea in the Sudan in 1884. 50
17. “Uncivilised Concept”. But these were the British colonial forces, not the
mainstream British army; and these were native tribes, not other “civilised” European armies.
Simply put, the prevailing British military culture could not conceive of “officers and gentlemen”
employing such an uncivilised weapon against other officers and gentlemen. In the words of
Ellis: So the machine gun became associated with colonial expeditions and the slaughter of
natives, and was thus by definition regarded as being totally inappropriate to the conditions of
regular European warfare. Thus, in the years before World War I, the British army did not
develop the doctrine and force structure necessary to exploit the machine gun. 51
Radical Change in the Existing Military Organisations
18. Mechanised Warfare. As mentioned earlier, the British invented the tank and were the
first to employ it in combat, during World War I. Following that war, a number of British
individuals (most prominently J.F.C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart) wrote and spoke passionately
regarding the tank’s potential to revolutionise land warfare, laid out operational concepts to that
end, and advocated a new force structure for the British army centred on all-tank units.
19. The Salisbury Plain Manoeuvres. Further, the British army carried out an innovative
series of experiments in the late 1920s and early 1930s involving the use of armour in mobile,
mechanised warfare. The most notable of these experiments were the 1926 manoeuvres on the
Salisbury plain, in which an armoured force carried out a 25-mile penetration that wrecked the
defending forces’ position. 52 In spite of the apparent lessons of these manoeuvres and the
passionate arguments of armoured-warfare advocates such as Fuller and Liddell Hart, the leaders
of the British army rejected this new operational concept and the force structure that went along
with it. The new force structure proposed by Fuller, Liddell Hart, and their followers required too
radical a change in the then-existing organisational structure of the British army; it upset too
many apple carts and provoked too much opposition from defenders of traditional regiments.
27
Thus, in the years before World War II, the British army did not develop the doctrine (mobile,
mechanised warfare) and force structure (armoured divisions) necessary to exploit the tank, and
thereby missed out on the blitzkrieg RMA.
Incongruent Force Structure and Operational Concept
20. Offence versus Defence. The French also failed to adopt a doctrine of offensive tank
warfare during the period between the World Wars, but for a different reason: they were focused
on a grand strategy for land warfare that was primarily defensive. The enormous casualty lists of
World War I trench warfare had convinced the leaders of the French army that in the future all
offensive operations, except those that were limited and tightly controlled, would no longer be
worth the price. 53
21. Missed the Blitzkrieg. It was the fundamental unwillingness and inability of the French to
visualise the tank overcoming the power of the defence that had been demonstrated in 1914–
1918. Accordingly, in the 1920s and 1930s they adopted a land warfare doctrine that was almost
entirely defensive. Moreover, and more important, they could not conceive of any other
(successful) way to fight. Offensive tank operations had no place in the French strategy, so the
French also missed out on the blitzkrieg RMA.
Lessons from Failure
22. These historical examples of failed or incomplete RMAs highlight some additional
lessons regarding the RMA process: -
(a) Development of Vision. Military institutions must be willing to develop a
vision of how war may change in the future, or they are incapable of developing RMAs.
(b) Acceptance of New Ideas. At least some senior military leaders and at least
part of the military bureaucracy must accept a new idea for the successful development of
RMAs by existing military institutions.
28
Summary
23. In order to put things in their correct perspective, it is necessary to develop a model to
summarise the obstacles which have led to failed RMAs. This model, Fig 6, will come of
particular use when an analysis is attempted to bring about an RMA.
FIGURE 6
OBSTACLES IN THE PATH TO RMA
RADICAL CHANGE IN MILITARY

ORGANISATION
INCONGRUENT FORCE STRUCTURE NEW CONCEPT UNACCEPTABLE TO

OR OPERATIONAL CONCEPT PREVAILING MILITARY CULTURE
IMPRACTICAL DEVICES
FAILED RMAs NON-VIABLE SYSTEMS
WRONG OR INCOMPLETE LACK OF OPERATIONAL

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT CONCEPT FOR A VIABLE SYSTEM
LACK OF VISION DENIAL OF NEW IDEAS
48 Ellis, 1975, pp. 63-64. Reproduced in “Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
29
52 Williamson Murray, May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 159.
53 Robert A Doughty, Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939, Hamden,
CT, 1985, et passim reproduced in The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, MacGregor Knox and
Williamson Murray. Cambridge University Pres, 2001, p. 164.
CHAPTER VI
EXPLOITING THE RMA BY THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES
Is the Current Military-Technical Revolution A True RMA?
1. This is an interesting question regarding RMAs. Is the current military-technical

revolution—called by some “the RMA”—a true RMA? Based on the parameters that have been
the basis of the definition, it is premature to term the current advances as a “Revolution in
Military Affairs”. For it to be a true RMA, it must render obsolete or irrelevant one or more core
competencies of a dominant player, or create one or more new core competencies in a new
dimension of warfare. This has not yet happened.
2. However, it could very well occur. For example, the use by the U.S. Air Force of air-
delivered, precision-guided, anti-armour sub-munitions in a future regional conflict might
conceivably stop the advance of a sizable (e.g., division-size or greater) enemy armoured force in
its tracks, without requiring intervention by U.S. Army mechanised forces. If this were to occur,
and if it could be confidently accomplished in a wide variety of tank-accessible terrain and in the
face of enemy air defences, it would be a true RMA, since it would render irrelevant a core
competency (tank/antitank warfare) of a dominant player (the armoured forces of the U.S.
Army).
Emerging RMA
3. There is every likelihood that in the next two decades there exists tremendous promise for
a potential RMA. While a large measure of this is due to the mind boggling advances in
technology especially micro-technology 54, the potential for exploitation will remain still born if it
is not addressed with doctrinal and organisational changes. Being adequately prepared to cope
with an emerging RMA being developed by others is a twofold challenge: -
(a) Being aware of a potential emerging RMA
(b) Being responsive to the implications of that RMA.
4. Failure to meet either one of these challenges can lead a nation to military disaster. The
Zulus were unaware of the machine gun RMA before the Battle of Ulundi, which led them to
disaster in that battle. The British and French armies were aware of the blitzkrieg RMA well
before the events of May 1940, but failed to respond; this led them to disaster in the Battle of
Flanders and the subsequent Battle of France.
31
Being Responsive to an Emerging RMA
5. Chapter Five dealt with the first of these challenges, describing the essential elements of a
worldwide RMA breakthrough. This chapter deals with the second challenge.
Overcoming the Obstacles to Responsiveness
6. Established military organisations more often than not fail to respond adequately to
emerging RMAs threatening their core competencies, even ones of which they are aware,
primarily because of inherent obstacles to the changes necessary to cope with an RMA. This can
be thought of in terms of obstacles in the path of each of the steps in the RMA process. It can
also be thought of, more generally, in terms of generic psychological obstacles to the
organisational learning and change necessary to cope with paradigm shifts, no matter what their
shape or form.
7. Psychological obstacles to change are as common for business organisations confronting

paradigm shifts as for military organisations confronting RMAs. Andrew Grove (1996, p. 124),
the co-founder and former Chief Executive Officer of Intel, lays out the typical steps in an
organisation’s response to a paradigm shift threatening one of its core competencies: -
(a) Denial.
(b) Escape or diversion.
(c) Acceptance and pertinent action.
8. How does a military establishment cope with organisational denial when confronted with
a potential RMA? How does a military establishment cope with organisational escape or
diversion in the face of a potential RMA? How does a military establishment achieve acceptance
and pertinent action in response to a potential RMA? These questions are answered using
primarily the business world as an example.
Overcoming Denial
9. Protect the Core Competency. Psychologists tell us that the first stage in an
individual’s response to the death of a loved one is almost always denial: psychological denial
that the person is gone. The same is true for military organisations threatened with the
forthcoming “death” of a cherished core competency (core competencies are a military
organisation’s “loved ones”). Recent history is full of examples of military organisations that
32
were aware of an emerging RMA but failed to respond, most often because of denial. In the
period before World War I, the leaders of the infantry and cavalry forces of most European
armies were aware of the machine gun and what it had accomplished against native armies in
Africa, but they denied the possibility that it would be used in combat between civilized armies
in Europe, as well as the possibility that it could overcome the morale of properly trained infantry
or the charge of properly motivated cavalry. In the period before World War II, the leaders of the
British and French armies were aware of the claims of the proponents of what became the
blitzkrieg RMA, but they denied its efficacy. The list goes on and on.
10. Protective Paranoia. According to Grove (1996, pp. 1–3):
“Only the paranoid survive. Sooner or later, something fundamental in your business world will
change. When it comes to business, I believe in the value of paranoia. ….I believe the prime
responsibility of a manager is to guard constantly against other people’s attacks [on his
organisation’s core competencies] ….”
11. This attitude of “productive paranoia is just as applicable to successful military

organisations as to successful business organisations. A basic sense of productive paranoia
regarding the future is a useful first step in overcoming organisational denial, particularly for a
dominant player. Military institutions not only need to make up-front intellectual investments to
develop a vision of future war, but they must continue agonising over that vision, struggling to
discern how the next war may differ from the last. The combined message from the business and
military arenas is that denial (of change) can be overcome by maintaining a basic sense of
productive paranoia regarding the future, and by developing and continually refining a vision of
how the future (i.e., future wars) may differ from the past. Two useful techniques for the
development of such visions of future wars are war-gaming 55, and the concept of asymmetric
strategies. 56
Overcoming Escape or Diversion
12. In the business world, escape or diversion is often the next step in an organisation’s
response to an oncoming paradigm shift. Turning again to Grove (1996, pp. 124–125):
“Escape, or diversion, refers to the personal actions of the senior manager. When companies are
facing major changes in their core business, they seem to plunge into what seem to be totally
33
unrelated [activities]. In my view, a lot of these activities are motivated by the need of senior
management to occupy themselves respectably with something that clearly and legitimately
requires their attention day in and day out, something that they can justify spending their time on
and make progress in instead of figuring out how to cope with an impending strategically
destructive force.”
13. Military organisations facing paradigm shifts are often subject to the same phenomena.
To overcome such organisational escape or diversion, there is a need to develop and continually
refine a vision of how future wars may differ from past wars.. The message is clear: escape or
diversion can be overcome by developing and continually refining a vision of how future wars
may differ from past wars, and by fostering an organisational climate encouraging broad and
intensive debate regarding the future of the organisation.
Achieving Acceptance and Pertinent Action
14. Overcoming denial, escape, and diversion in the face of an emerging RMA is not the end
of the story. The organisation must then unite behind an effective response to the challenge (what
Grove calls “acceptance and pertinent action”). According to Grove (1996, p. 121):
“Resolution comes through experimentation. Only stepping out of the old ruts will bring new
insights.”
15. Institutional processes for exploring, testing, and refining conceptions of future war are
literally the sine qua non of successful military innovation in peacetime. In both the business and
military arena, there must be mechanisms available within the organisation for experimentation
with new ideas, even if they threaten the organisation’s current core competencies. More is
required to achieve acceptance and pertinent action. Investigation of the politics of peacetime
innovation in 20th century military organisations shows a need for (at least some) senior officers
with traditional credentials who sponsor the new ways of doing things (within at least part of the
organisation). Innovations occurred when senior military officers were convinced that structural
changes in the security environment had created the need. These senior officers, who had
established themselves by satisfying the traditional criteria for performance, had the necessary
power to champion innovations. General von Seeckt played this role during the initial stages of
development of the blitzkrieg RMA; Admiral William S. Sims (the president of the Naval War
College during 1917–1922)8 and Rear Admiral William A. Moffett (the director of the U.S.
Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics from 1921 to 1933) played the same role during the early
34
developmental stages of the carrier aviation RMA. In addition, new promotion pathways (within
at least part of the organisation) for junior officers practicing a new way of war are also
necessary. Peacetime innovation has been possible when senior military officers with traditional
credentials, reacting to a perceived structural change in the security environment, have acted to
create a new promotion pathway for junior officers practicing a new way of war. In summary,
three things appear to be necessary to achieve acceptance and pertinent action in a military
organisation confronted with an emerging RMA: -
(a) Mechanisms within the organisation for experimentation with new ideas.
(b) Senior officers willing to sponsor new ways of doing things.
(c) New promotion pathways for junior officers practicing a new way of war.
The Desirable Characteristics of a Future-Oriented Indian Armed Forces
16. The characteristics of a future-oriented military organisation likely to respond adequately

to an emerging RMA include: -
(a) “Productive paranoia” regarding the Future. There is a need for the armed forces
to establish small think tanks with junior and middle level officers and civilians with a
capability for lateral and creative thinking. These teams would endeavour to throw up
future scenarios of threats to Indian security without a risk of failure. The German tradition
of punishing failure at the second or third instance is reiterated here.
(b) A Continually Refined Vision of how War and Situations may/can be change (d).
The current weapon procurement programmes underway seem to point to getting, “ more
bang for the buck”. There is a need to downsize while acquiring greater capability; a dire
need to stop trying to win the last war. The Indian Army grew from a strength of 9,80, 000
(1995-96) to 1,10,000 in 2000-01. This increase was to have been supposedly for
countering the terrorist threat in Jammu and Kashmir. It must be also appreciated that a 100
per cent increase in the BSF and the CRPF did not produce units capable of fighting
terrorists. This increase of 1,20,000 men is estimated to cost Rs. 720 crore a year. This
amount would over five years have paid for an armoured division to permanently wrest the
offensive away from Pakistan. 57
(c) An Organisational Climate encouraging Vigorous Debate regarding the Future of
the Organisation. This point has been addressed at numerous occasions during the
dissertation. In the context of the Indian Armed Forces, there has been an abysmal lack of
35
joint perspective planning within the armed forces. The efforts of IDS on Long term
Perspective Planning and identification of Horizon Core Technologies are definitely a step
in the right direction. 58 While the Defence Minister has assured of the CDS being in place
in the next few months, the reorganisation of the individual service HQs and that of the
MOD is still awaited. 59
(d) Mechanisms Available within the Organisation for Experimentation With New
Ideas that Threaten the Organisation’s Core Competencies. The Indian Army recognises
its armoured formations as the combat arm of decision, and rightly so. However, tank
technology in terms of ranges and fire-power appear to have reached their theoretical peak.
The future clearly lies with mobility and accuracy. The majority of the armoured officers
are well aware of this. However, “denial” and “fear of upsetting the applecart” , prevent
experimentation with new ideas such as precision targeting from the air and lighter more
mobile tanks.
(e) Senior Officers with traditional Credentials willing to sponsor New Ways Of
Doing Things. The U.S. Navy had both of these during the period between the two World
Wars. Several Navy admirals provided essential support at crucial periods during the
development of carrier aviation, most notably including Admiral William S. Sims and Rear
Admiral William A. Moffett. Promotion of naval aviators to the rank of commander and
captain was a problem in the early years, but from the mid-1930s on, all captains
commanding carriers and naval air stations had to be qualified naval aviators; this provided
a promotion pathway to higher ranks. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, did not have high-
level support during the interwar period for changes in the way it waged war, particularly
changes involving new ways of employing tanks or aircraft. Not only did the generals
commanding the traditional branches of the Army (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) oppose
the development of innovative ways of using tanks and aircraft, they also put promotion
roadblocks in the way of any officers persisting in careers in the fledgling Armoured Corps
or Army Air Corps. In sum, the innovators in the U.S. Navy had support from the top
during the interwar period; they produced the carrier warfare RMA. The innovators in the
U.S. Army lacked such support; the Army entered World War II with both armour and
aviation doctrine and technology markedly inferior to that of the Germans. 60
(f) New Promotion Pathways for Junior Officers Practicing A New Way Of War.
All services are composed of constituencies. The Army’s constituencies are the infantry,
armour and artillery. The Navy has the aviation, submarine and the surface warfare
36
communities while the Indian Air Force has essentially only one community – the fighter
pilots. These communities take great pride in themselves and that is essentially desirable.
However, when the emerging RMA points towards a future of surveillance and
reconnaissance, an electronic, digital command and control system with an emphasis on
aerospace management and photo-interpretation with information warfare, there must be a
“demise of barons”. 61
(i) Reorganisation of Some Appointments of the Army. The Army could do well to
downgrade heads of the combat arms to two star and re-appropriate the three
vacancies for a Director General Digital Mapping Service, a Director General
Command and Control System and a Director General Aviation, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Group. These posts could be tenable by officers from the Corps of
Engineers, Corps of Signals and Army Aviation respectively. 62
(ii) Reorganisation of Some Appointments of the Navy. The gap in the C3I systems
between the Indian Navy and other navies is perhaps the largest. Although the Navy
has an Assistant Chief of Materials (Systems), an ideal post to push a C3I system,
branch structures prevent this. The sacrifice of one vacancy in a two star rank by the
Executive branch could be given to an electrical officer as the Assistant Chief of
Naval Staff (Command and Control) under the DCNS. 63
(iii) Reorganisation of Some Appointments of the Air Force. The lead service
among the three in space applications, the relative lack of importance to this job has
crippled the Indian Air Force from concentrating on aerospace. This is perhaps a
principle reason why the Prithvi missile systems have gone to the army, which should
have come its way. Another critical area is the management of airspace. The service
has a specialised branch which handles air defence and management of air space,
namely the fighter controller. However, at the end of his active life as a fighter
controller, this specialist reverts to general administration with career prospects
limited to one PSO at Air Headquarters. The higher level of air space management is
dealt with by a different branch. Surely, such a job would be better managed by a
specialist. With such a background, it becomes abundantly clear why coherent policy
on air space management in the TBA continues to elude the service. 64
37
54 James Adam, The Next World War, Computers are the Weapons and the Front Line is Everywhere, Simon
and Schuster, 1998, pp. 124 -137. He uses the term acronym MEMS, micro electro-mechanical system.
55 In their 1995 unpublished RAND work on “Understanding Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Sam Gardiner
and Daniel Fox conducted an extensive series of war-games exploring six future wars in Southwest Asia. The
challenge-response cycle in this series of future Gulf wars—first one side gains the advantage, then the other—
generated a continually evolving vision of how future wars may differ from previous wars. Reproduced in
56 The term “asymmetric strategies” denotes a certain class of military strategies (or operational concepts)
employed by an opponent of a dominant military player. These strategies are asymmetric in the sense that they do
not mimic the dominant player’s approach to warfare. Rather, they deliberately choose a different way of conducting
Combat—a way chosen to negate the dominant player’s many advantages.
57 Rear Admiral Raja Menon (retired), RMA and the Indian Armed Forces, Indian Defence Review, pp. 77-78
58 Research > Formation of Horizon Core Technology, http://ids.nic.in

59 Expressindia.com, Nation, Monday, 02 February 2004.
60 As but one of many examples of promotion roadblocks put in the way of junior Army officers wanting to
pursue new ways of war, both Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton were advised to transfer out of the Armored
Corps if they ever wanted to make major. (Private Communication to David Johnson (1998), accessed through
“Past Revolutions, Future Transformations” RAND Study Report. 15 Sept. 2003 < www.rand.org.publications/>
61 Admiral Owens term from Rear Admiral Raja Menon (retired), RMA and the Indian Armed Forces, Indian
Defence Review, p. 82.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. p. 84.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Military Revolutions and the RMA
1. History: The Path to the Future. The research of military history and case studies
reveals that the term Revolution in Military Affairs is being used perhaps less than maturely. As
was shown the inter se difference between a Military Revolution and a Revolution in Military
affairs is gargantuan. An RMA will challenge a core competency of a military player. It will
establish a new dimension of warfare. The use of this new competency or dimension will cause a
paradigm shift in the way wars are wages. It will be a combination of doctrine and reorganisation
of the military force. A Military revolution on the other hand is a cataclysmic change of society.
With only five such revolutions having occurred (by common acceptance), the likelihood of a
Military revolution is statistically unlikely.
2. Technology is only the Means. The current term in flavour is ‘Force
Transformation’. It is necessary to mention here that technology is a vital component of the
transformation. However, as has been seen in case studies of the machine gun and the tank,
technology by itself will not result in an RMA. It will need to be harnessed and put to military
use.
Relationship between Technology and RMA
3. Serendipitous Conceptual Breakthroughs. As was seen from Figure 5.2 (Chapter Five)
the process from preparatory to payoff needs to take place before a technology ushers in an
RMA. The key creative event in the RMA process—the critical conceptual breakthrough—
cannot be anticipated in advance, and often occur accidentally.
4. Multiple Innovations lead to the RMA. The new technology (or several new
technologies) that enables devices and systems not previously contemplated will translate into a
new military reality only after the creation of a new operational concept. This was particularly
true in the case of the Blitzkrieg. The concept lead to a force transformation which led to a
paradigm shift from the attrition based trench warfare to a manoeuvring arm capable of
delivering a ‘schwerpunkt’.
39
Exploiting the RMA
5. The challenge of being aware of a potential emerging RMA has been met by the Indian
Armed Forces. This is evident from the work being carried out by the study groups at CIDS by
focussing on Horizon Technology and the Long Term Perspective planning. The challenge of
being responsive to the implications of that RMA is perhaps quite daunting. As was elaborated in
Chapter Five and Six, there are qualities and characteristics that an organisation must possess to
anticipate and respond to an RMA.
6. Cues from the Business World. The challenges to a core competency, the problems
of denial, and the issue of protective paranoia are common to both military and business
organisations. This has been recognised in the research. The course that a successful commercial
organisation follows may be the remedy to the dilemma that we face.
The Desirable Characteristics of a Future Oriented Indian Armed Forces
7. Possessing the characteristics listed in Chapters Five and Six is not a guarantee of future
success. However, a military establishment lacking one or more of these characteristics is less
likely to respond adequately to an emerging RMA. These characteristics must come from within
the military establishment in question; they cannot be imposed from the outside.
8. For a military organization to bring about an RMA of its own or respond to an RMA
being developed by someone else, history suggests that all of the following items are probably
necessary: -
(a) A fertile set of enabling technologies to solve military problem. This must
challenge a core competency.
(b) A receptive organisational climate that fosters a continually refined vision of how
war may change and that encourages vigorous debate regarding the future of the
organisation.
(c) Support from the top senior officers with traditional credentials willing to sponsor
new techniques and approaches.
(d) New promotion pathways for junior officers practicing a new way of war.
(e) Mechanisms for experimentation to discover, learn, test, and demonstrate.

40
(f) A method to positively respond to the results of successful experiments in terms

of doctrinal changes, acquisition programs, and force structure modifications.
Effective Military Forces or Superior Weapon Platforms
9. It is common knowledge that the potential RMA points to a future with Dominant
Battlefield Knowledge, Parallel Operations, and combined arms teams. Eventually, the RMA can
be applied only in joint operations. Thus all components of doctrine, technology, tactics and
training would have to be addressed. The subject of RMA has been examined with this view.
11. One of the difficulties that the Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Andrew W
Marshall has confronted since his office brought the possibility of a revolution in military affairs
to the attention of the services in the aftermath of Operation desert Storm has been the consistent
overemphasis on technology. The Indian Armed Forces must similarly beware of substituting
technology for strategy and of falling prey to fielding superior weapon platforms rather than
effective military forces.
41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
1. O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. Washington DC,
The Brookings Institute.
2. Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. Third Wave. New York, Warner Books, 1993.
3. Alvin and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century.
New York, Warner Books, 1993.
4. James Adams. Information Warfare – Computers are the Weapons and the Frontline is
Everywhere.
5. Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu - The Art of War. Oxford University Press, 1963.
6. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. O J Matthijs Jolles and Colonel Joseph I Greene, Infantry
Journal Press Washington DC, 1950.
7. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray: The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-
2050.
8. John A. Warden. The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Air University Press.
Articles
1. Joshi, Akshay. Information Warfare in Kargil Operations. Indian Defence Review, April
– June 1999.
2. Singh, Ajai. Information Warfare: Reshaping Traditional Perceptions. Strategic Analysis,

March 1998.
3. Dibb, Paul. The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security. Survival, Winter
1997-98.
4. Banerjee, Maj Gen Dipankar. Revolution in Military Afairs. USI Journal, Vol CXXVII,
No 529, July – September 1997.
5. Lundquist, Anders. Net Defence: The Current Revolution in Military Affairs. Miltech
12/2000.
42
6. Mallick, PK. Revolution in Military Affairs – An Appraisal. Trishul, Vol XII No 2.
7. Indian Navy’s Information Warfare Bulletin, Info War Navy. March 1998.
8. Air Commodore AK Tiwary. VSM: Indian Experience in RMA, IDR/65.
9. Rear Admiral Raja Menon. The RMA and the Indian Armed Forces. IDR/65
Papers
1. Kak, AVM Kapil. Impact of Information Technology on Warfare. Paper presented at a

Seminar on Command and Staff Challenges in the 21st Century at Defence Services Staff
College Wellington, 15 April 1998.
2. Cariappa, Air Marshal KC. Doctrine and Force Structuring based on Capabilities (Y2K
and the Armed Forces). Paper presented at a Seminar on Command and Staff Challenges in the
21st Century at Defence Services Staff College Wellington, 15 April 1998.
3. Mehta, Lt Gen SS. Restructuring for Joint Planning at Theatre Level. Paper presented at a
Seminar on Command and Staff Challenges in the 21st Century at Defence Services Staff
College Wellington, 15 April 1998.
WEBLIOGRAPHY
1. The Emerging Joint Strategy for Information Superiority. Joint Staff, J-6 at
www.dtic.mil/JCS/J6.
2. Joint Vision 2020 at http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020.
3. Colonel Wang Baocun and Li Fei. Information Warfare at chinapt4.html. Article at

Liberation Army Daily, Academy of Military Science, Beijing, June 13 and June 20, 1995.
4. Marshal, Andrew. Revolution in Military Affairs: A Primer. US DoDs Office of Net

Assessment at http//:infowarrior.org.
5. RAND Research Review. Information Warfare: A Two Edged Sword. RAND Home Page
at http://www.rand.org.

SQN LDR RK Ithikkat Dissertation RMA The Changing Character

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

SQN LDR RK Ithikkat Dissertation RMA The Changing Character

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WARFARE

Squadron Leader RK Ithikkat

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

SELF DECLARATION CERTIFICATE

Date : (RK Ithikkat)

Chapter No Chapter Heading Page(s)

III Military Revolutions 10-16

IV Characteristics of an RMA 17-20

V Relationship between RMA and Breakthrough 21-29

VI Exploiting the RMA by the Indian Armed Forces 30-37

VII Conclusion 38-40

Andrew W Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions”

1. The term “Revolution in Military Affairs” became decidedly fashionable in military

Relevance to Indian Armed Forces

Views on the Pre-eminence of Technology

Statement of the Problem

Justification of the Study

3. There are a number of significant characteristics of RMAs and an umbilical relationship

community to be on the leading edge of breakthrough technologies that could revolutionise

6. This leads to three interrelated questions:

(a) Paradigm. A paradigm can be usefully defined as an accepted model that

(c) Dominant Player. A military organisation that possesses a dominating set of

(d) Dimension of Warfare. The dimension on which warfare is conducted, the

(e) Paradigm Shift. A profound change in the fundamental model underlying a

Methods of Data Collection

(a) Primary Sources.

(i) Research reports of RAND Corporation accessed through the Web.

(ii) Autobiography of General Chuck Horner.

11. Tertiary sources included the following: -

(a) Combat Journal published by The College of Combat, Mhow.

(b) Strategic Review of United States Strategic Institute, Boston.

Organisation of the Dissertation

Military Theory on Revolutionary Changes

Military Revolution – “Patterns and Concepts”

3. Metaphor of Earthquakes. Military historians have begun to look beyond the

understood through a geological metaphor of earthquakes. They were as uncontrollable and

CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY REVOLUTIONS

I: Creation of the Modern Nation- State

7. Order and Organisation. Seventeenth Century Sweden fostered military discipline to

8. The Indian Experience. The young prince Chandragupta Maurya created a

II: The French Revolution

III: The Industrial Revolution

IV: The First World War

The Revolution Continues: The Second World War

22 Murray-Knox, op. cit. p. 7.

25 Sabine Flaissier, French Revolution, Secker and Warburg, London, 1960, p.

27 Murray-Knox op. cit. p. 9.

35 Guderian H, Panzer Leader, p. 84.

Nature of Paradigm Core Competency Dominant Player

Created new operational It rendered obsolete the

Other Notable Characteristics of RMAs

2. Based on the historical record, other notable characteristics of RMAs are: -

Lessons from the Business World regarding Paradigm Shifts

4. The following list is illustrative: -

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RMA AND BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGY

1. As discussed earlier, technology-driven RMAs are brought about by weapons or systems

The Breakthrough Process

2. Here again the historical record of technology-driven changes in military operations

EXPLOITATION Development, Testing

NEW MILITARY REALITY

5. The innovative stages in this model are: -