1.Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Felipe C. Rigonan and Concepcion R.

Rigonan
G.R. No. 127540 17 October 2001
Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, including a house and warehouse on one
parcel. She allegedly sold them to Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. Petitioners Domingo, Mangabat
and Capalungan who claim to be Paulina’s closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the property by means of stealth,
force and intimidation and refused to vacate the same. Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners in
the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte, alleging their ownership of the land through the deep of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan and since
then have been in continuous possession of the properties and introduced permanent improvements thereon. According to the
petitioners, the deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious since they inherited the three lots and the permanent
improvements as nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity to Paulina. The RTC ruled in the petitioner’s favor,
declaring them the lawful owners of the contested land. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered the
petitioners to vacate the subject properties and surrender possession thereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondents sufficiently established the existence and due execution of the Deed of Absolute and
Irrevocable Sale of Real Property
(2) Whether or not Paulina Rigonan was competent to enter into said contract
Ruling:
Paulina Rigonan was in continuous possession of the property in this case, throwing an inverse implication and serious doubt on
the due execution of the deed of sale. The same parcels of land involved in the alleged sale were still included in the will
subsequently executed by Paulina and notarized by Atty. Tagatag. These circumstances, taken together, militate against
unguarded acceptance of the due execution and genuineness of the alleged deed of sale.
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile, attested by the
testimony that she played with her waste and urinated in bed. She died an octogenarian barely a year when the deed was allegedly
executed. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contractmerely because of advance years or by reason of physical
infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly,
intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights when she is undeniably incapacitated.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the decision of the Batac RTC is reinstated.

2.ABALOS VS MACATANGAY, JR.

G.R. No. 155043 September 30 2004

FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the same
to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected as soon as possession of the property shall have
been turned over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase
price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.

Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time and Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an
annotation in the title of the property. He then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the full amount of the purchase
price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract to sell the property to the extent of her conjugal
interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property to
Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon full payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the
purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in possession of the property. Macatangay informed them that he was ready
to pay the amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.

RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was
falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the transaction between
Esther and Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered the RMOA executed by Arturo valid to effect the sale of his conjugal
share in the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of property is valid.
RULING:

No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no indication that they
have adopted a different property regime, their property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their
conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law.
More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.

The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.

More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into
title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each
spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the administration of the conjugal partnership. The
new law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to
dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the
written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property
without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Inescapably, herein Arturo’s action for specific performance must fail. Even on the supposition that the parties only disposed of
their respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband
or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.

3.Rubias v. Batiller

Facts:
Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for registration of the parcel of land in question. After the war,
the petition was heard and denied. Pending appeal, Militante sold the land to petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for
forcible entry against respondent. Defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the
matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time
immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.

Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void because it was made when plaintiff was
counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute

Held:
The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright
dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof made by his
father-in- law in his favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo
land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
 Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason
of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either
directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public
officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified
by law.
Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers
and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in
litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in
a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning."
Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest
and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification
of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and
administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and
in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution
of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the
object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second
contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may
have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not
retroact to the date of the first contract."

4.PARAGAS V HEIRS OF BALACANO

GR No. 168220 August 31, 2005

Facts:

 Gregorio Balacano, married to Lorenza Sumigcay, was the registered owner of Lot 1175-E and Lot 1175-F of the Subd. Plan Psd-

38042 [located at Baluarte, Santiago City, Isabela].

 Gregorio and Lorenza had three children, namely: Domingo, Catalino and Alfredo, all surnamed Balacano.

 Lorenza died on December 11, 1991. Gregorio, on the other hand, died on July 28, 1996. Petitioners were the grandchildren of

Gregorio.

 Prior to his death, Gregorio was admitted at the Veterans General Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and

stayed there until July 19, 1996. He was transferred in the afternoon of July 19, 1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon

City where he was confined until his death.

 Respondents essentially alleged – in asking for the nullification of the deed of sale – that: (1) their grandfather Gregorio could not

have appeared before the notary public on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City because he was then confined at the Veterans Memorial

Hospital in Quezon City; (2) at the time of the alleged execution of the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, in fact dying at that

time, which vitiated his consent to the disposal of the property; and (3) Catalino (uncle) manipulated the execution of the deed

and prevailed upon the dying Gregorio to sign his name on a paper the contents of which he never understood because of his

serious condition.
 Alternatively, they alleged that assuming Gregorio was of sound and disposing mind, he could only transfer a half portion of Lots

1175-E and 1175-F as the other half belongs to their grandmother Lorenza who predeceased Gregorio – they claimed that Lots

1175-E and 1175-F form part of the conjugal partnership properties of Gregorio and Lorenza.

 Finally, they alleged that the sale to the Spouses Paragas covers only a 5-hectare portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F leaving a

portion of 6,416 square meters that Catalino is threatening to dispose. They asked for the nullification of the deed of sale executed

by Gregorio and the partition of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F.

 The defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint. Additionally, they claimed that: (1) the deed of sale

was actually executed by Gregorio on July 19 (or 18), 1996 and not July 22, 1996; (2) the Notary Public personally went to the

Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on July 18, 1996 to notarize the deed of sale already subject of a previously concluded

covenant between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas; (3) at the time Gregorio signed the deed, he was strong and of sound and

disposing mind; (4) Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorio’s separate capital and the inscription of Lorenza’s name in the titles was

just a description of Gregorio’s marital status; (5) the entire area of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were sold to the Spouses Paragas.

Issues:

Whether or not Gregorio has executed a perfected Deed of Sale. NO

Ruling: Gregorio’s consent was absent in the execution of the Deed of Sale.

It is not disputed that when Gregorio signed the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, as he in fact died a week after the deed’s

signing. Gregorio died of complications caused by cirrhosis of the liver. Gregorio’s death was neither sudden nor immediate; he

fought at least a month-long battle against the disease until he succumbed to death on July 22, 1996. Given that Gregorio

purportedly executed a deed during the last stages of his battle against his disease, we seriously doubt whether Gregorio could

have read, or fully understood, the contents of the documents he signed or of the consequences of his act. We note in this regard

that Gregorio was brought to the Veteran’s Hospital at Quezon City because his condition had worsened on or about the time the

deed was allegedly signed. This transfer and fact of death not long after speak volumes about Gregorio’s condition at that time.

We likewise see no conclusive evidence that the contents of the deed were sufficiently explained to Gregorio before he affixed his

signature.
Article 24 of the Civil Code tells us that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage

on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be

vigilant for his protection.

In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale was allegedly signed by Gregorio on his death bed in the hospital. Gregorio was an octogenarian

at the time of the alleged execution of the contract and suffering from liver cirrhosis at that – circumstances which raise grave

doubts on his physical and mental capacity to freely consent to the contract.

5.Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v Mijares,

410SCRA 97 (2003)

FACTS:

Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960but had been separated de facto since1974.

In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold aproperty (lot) to spouses Mijares for P40,000on 1983.

She also found out that Vicentemisrepresented her in the MTC declaringthat she died on March 22, 1982 and thatthe heirs left
are him and the 5 minor children.

On September 1983, the court grantedguardianship over the minor children toVicente and authorized the latter to sell theestate
of Ignacia on October 1983.

On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spousesdemanding the return of her ½ share in thelot.

Failing to settle the matter amicably,Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale against respondentspouses.

In their answer, respondent spouses claimedthat they are purchasers in good faith andthat the sale was valid because it was
dulyapproved by the court.

Vicente Reyes, on the other hand,contended that what he sold to the spouseswas only his share.

On February 15, 1990, the court aquo rendered a decision declaring the saleof lot void with respect to the share ofIgnacia. It held
that the purchase price ofthe lot was P110,000.00 and orderedVicente to return ½ thereof or P55,000.00 torespondent spouses.

Ignacia filed a motion for modification ofthe decision praying that the sale bedeclared void in its entirety and that therespondents
be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they collected on theapartments built on Lot No. 4349-B-2computed from March 1,
1983.

Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondentspouses appealed the decision to the Courtof Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignaciadied
and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale is valid, void or merelyvoidable?
HELD:
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, thegoverning laws at the time the assailed sale wascontracted, provide:Art.166. Unless the
wife has been declared anoncompos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civilinterdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, thehusband
cannot alienate or encumber any realproperty of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably
togive her consent, the court may compel her togrant the same…

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage andwithin ten years from the transaction questioned,ask the courts for the annulment
of any contractof the husband entered into without her consent,when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraudher or impair her interest in the conjugalpartnership property. Should the wife fail toexercise this
right, she or her heirs after thedissolution of the marriage, may demand thevalue of property fraudulently alienated by
thehusband.In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is aconjugal property of Ignacia and Vicente.Therefore, the sale of said lot to
the Mijaresspouses, without the knowledge and consent ofIgnacia Reyes, is voidable. The action to annul

6.MEDINA V. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS:
1944: Petitioner Antonio Medina marries Antonia Rodriguez. Neither have any property of their own.

Eventually, they were able to get a logging concession.

Antonia Rodriguez (wife) then opens a lumber dealer shop. Up to 1952, Antonio Medina (husband) sold all his logs from the
concession to her. Antonia Rodriguez (wife) then sells the logs in Manila through an agent who then gives the proceeds back to the
husband.

Collector of Internal Revenue, stating that the sale between spouses is void, taxed Antonio Medina (husband) on the sales of
Antonia Rodriguez (wife)

Petitioner protested taxing, stating that he should only be taxed on his sale to his wife.

Petitioner offers testimony (no document) that they entered a regime of separation of property prior to their marriage.

ISSUE:
WoN the sale of Antonio Medina (husband) to Antonia Rodriguez (wife) is void

RULING:
YES, sale is void between the spouses. The petitioner only offered testimonial evidence to support his assertions. The factual
findings of the court finds the impossibility of the narration. Primarily, the husband and wife could have not entered into a regime
of separation of property prior to the marriage when they never had property before it.

Contracts violative of the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code are null and void. Being void transactions, the sales made by
the petitioner to his wife were correctly disregarded by the Collector in his tax assessments that considered as the taxable sales
those made by the wife through the spouses' common agent, Mariano Osorio. In upholding that stand, the Court below committed
no error.

7.CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES,

GR No. L-28771, 1971-03-31

Facts:

The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while
he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee

Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before
defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter's stand. Hence... this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character,
this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista,[2]
by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that
should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls... within the prohibition
and is "null and void as contrary to public policy."[3] Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be
reversed.

Issues:

whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

Ruling:

The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff
having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix

Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is
therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the... plaintiff, as the
surviving sister, to the other half

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned
donation is declared void, with the rights of plain-tiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the... property in question recognized.
The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Principles:

A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage.

When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix
Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They... became spouses only when they married on March
28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of
the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the... same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.

8.Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun
129 SCRA 675 (1984)

Concept: Between Spouses (Family Code Sec. 87 & Civil Code Art. 133, 1490, 1492)Sale by husband of conjugal land to his concubine
is null and void for being contraryto morals and public policy and “subversive to the stability of the family, a basicsocial institution
which public policy cherishes and protects.”Parties: Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas – petitioner / Judge Fortun of CFI Pangasinan
&Corazon Daguines – respondents

Facts:Dec 19, 1962 – Fernando & Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas got married & had 5kids. They built a conjugal home in fernando’s
inherited property.1978 – Fernando abandoned his home & lived with Corazon Daguines.April 15, 1980 – Fernando sold the house
& lot to his concubine for only P2000 statingthat house&lot were inherited by him. June 19, 1980 – Daguines claimed ownership
but was unable so she filed case againstMercedes (kapal lang ng mukha ng kabit!)Oct 27, 1981 – Fernando & Daguines convicted
of concubinageRTC of Pangasinan ruled in favor of the concubine granting lot and half of house toher. Real wife Mercedes
appealed.

Issues: 1) WON conjugal house on exclusive property of husband is ipso facto givencharacter of conjugal property2) WON sale of
the house & lot to concubine was valid in this case

Held & Ratio:

1) Yes! Lot where conjugal home was built w/ conjugal funds becomesconjugal property subject to reimbursement from conjugal
funds upon liquidation(which should happen in normal cases upon death – till death do us part, correct?)
2) Sale to the concubine is NULL & VOID! Art. 1409 & 1352 of the civil code says so!Unlawful cause. Also, constitution protects the
family.Ruling: RTC decision set aside & sale of house & lot is declared null & void. No cost.

9.SCHMID & OBERLY, INC. vs. RJL MARTINEZ FISHING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 75198 October 18, 1988Cortes, J.

Facts:
RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation is engaged in deep-sea fishing. In the course of its business, it needed electricalgenerators for the
operation of its business. Schmid and Oberly sells electrical generators with the brand of “Nagata”, aJapanese product. D. Nagata
Co. Ltd. of Japan was Schmid’s supplier. Schmid advertised the 12 Nagata generators for sale and RJL purchased 12 brand new
generators. Through an irrevocable line of credit, Nagata shipped to the Schmid thegenerators and RJL paid the amount of the
purchase price. (First sale = 3 generators; Second sale = 12 generators).Later, the generators were found to be factory defective.
RJL informed the Schmid that it shall return the 12 generators. 3were returned. Schmid replaced the 3 generators subject of the
first sale with generators of a different brand. As to thesecond sale, 3 were shipped to Japan and the remaining 9 were not
replaced.RJL sued the defendant on the warranty, asking for rescission of the contract and that Schmid be ordered to accept
thegenerators and be ordered to pay back the purchase money as well as be liable for damages. Schmid opposes such
liabilityaverring that it was merely the indentor in the sale between Nagata Co., the exporter and RJL Martinez, the importer.
Asmere indentor, it avers that is not liable for the seller’s implied warranty against hidden defects, Schmid not having personally
assumed any such warranty

.Issue:
1) WON the second transaction between the parties was a sale or an indent transaction?
2) Even is Schmid is merely an indentor, may it still be liable for the warranty?

Held:
As to the first issue, the SC held it to be an indent transaction. An indentor is a middlemen in the same class ascommercial brokers
and commission merchants. A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on acommission, negotiating contracts
relative to property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own
name but in the name of those who employed him; he is strictly amiddleman and for some purpose the agent of both parties.
There are 3 parties to an indent transaction, (1) buyer, (2)indentor, and (3) supplier who is usually a non-resident manufacturer
residing in the country where the goods are to be bought. The chief feature of a commercial broker and a commercial merchant is
that in effecting a sale, they are merelyintermediaries or middle-men, and act in a certain sense as the agent of both parties to the
transaction.

RJL MARTINEZ admitted that the generators were purchased “through indent order.” RJL admitted in its demand letter previously
sent to SCHMID that 12 of 15 generators “were purchased through your company, by indent order and three(3) by direct purchase.”
The evidence also show that RJL MARTINEZ paid directly NAGATA CO, for the generators,and that the latter company itself invoiced
the sale and shipped the generators directly to the former. The only participation of Schmid was to act as an intermediary or
middleman between Nagata and RJL, by procuring an order fromRJL and forwarding the same to Nagata for which the company
received a commission from Nagata.

Even as SCHMID was merely an indentor, there was nothing to prevent it from voluntarily warranting that twelve (12)generators
subject of the second transaction are free from any hidden defects. In other words, SCHMID may be heldanswerable for some
other contractual obligation, if indeed it had so bound itself. As stated above, an indentor is to someextent an agent of both the
vendor and the vendee. As such agent, therefore, he may expressly obligate himself toundertake the obligations of his principal.

10.Philippine Trust Co. v. Roldan

Facts:

Mariano Bernardo, a minor, inherited 17 parcels of land from his deceased father. Respondent, Mariano’s step-mother, was
appointed his guardian. As guardian, she sold the 17 parcels to Dr. Ramos, her brother-in-law, for P14,700. After a week, Dr. Ramos
sold the lands to her for P15,000. Subsequently, she sold 4 out of 17 parcels to Emilio Cruz. Petitioner replaced Roldan as guardian,
and two months thereafter, this litigation sought to declare as null and void the sale to Dr. Ramos, and the sale to Emilio Cruz.
Issue:

Whether the sale of the land by the guardian is null and void for being violative of the prohibition for a guardian to purchase either
in person or through the mediation of another the property of her ward

Held:

Remembering the general doctrine that guardianship is a trust of the highest order, and the trustee cannot be allowed to have any
inducement to neglect his ward’s interest, and in line with the court’s suspicion whenever the guardian acquires ward’s property
we have no hesitation to declare that in this case, in the eyes of the law, Socorro Roldan took by purchase her ward’s parcels thru
Dr. Ramos, and that Article 1459 of the Civil Code applies.