FACTS
Republic v CA (GR No. 155450) August 06, 2008
 June 02, 1930 CFI of Cagayan issued Decree No.
381928[4] in favor on spouses Carag, covering parcels
of land identified as Lot No 2472, Cad. 151.
 July 1938 the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issues
OCT No. 11585[5] in the name of spouses Carag
 May 19, 1994 Petitioners filed with the Regional Office
No. 2 of the DENR requesting to annul Decree NO.
381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property
which was still classified as timber land.
 An investigation was conducted and I was found that: A.)
A portion of land issued to spouses Carag was found to
be still classified as timber land at the time of issuance.
The same was only released as alienable and
disposable on February 22, 1982. B.) Petitioners have
possessed and occupied the subject property since time
immemorial.
 An action to cancel OCT No. 11585 was recommended
to The Director of Lands. The Director of Lands
approved the recommendation.
 June 10, 1998 (68 years after the issuance of Decree
No 381928) petitioner filed with the CA a complaint for
annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles on the grounds that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate on a portion of subject property
because it was classified as timberland at the date of
issuance.
 The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
RULING
ISSUE: WON THE CFI OF CAGAYAN HAD JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE A PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,[26] which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or
mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or
disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest,
declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or
been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly
published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim
may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of
disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se
alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance
with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction
to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become
private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was
not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land
was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine
whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director
of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The Court ruled:
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands
as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a
private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874
which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an
application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these
applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the

Legarda v Saleeby (GR No. L-8936) October 2, 1915
 The plaintiffs and defendant as occupy, as owners
adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the Cirt of Manila.
 That there exists and has existed a number of years a
stone wall between said lots. Subject wall is located on
the lot of the plaintiffs.
 The plaintiffs presented a petition for the registration of
their lot. An OCT was issued by The Court of Land
Registration in favor of the plaintiffs. The registration and
certificate included the wall.
 Later, the predecessors of the defendants presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of the lot occupied by him. An OCT was
issued. The description of the lot in the petition of the
defendant included the wall.
 Months later the plaintiffs discovered that the wall was
included in the defendant’s OCT. They presented a
petition for an adjustment and correction.
 The lower court denied the petition on the theory that,
during the pendency for the registration of the
defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot including the wall.
basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and
that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of
years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural,
forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or
mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to
the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required
by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond
review.
The finality of the trial court's decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which
provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain
belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution."[29] When the Commonwealth
Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject
land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
ISSUE: WHO IS THE OWNER OF THE WALL AND LAND OCCUPIED BY IT?
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing
his land. Of course, it cannot be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the Torrens system is judicial. It
is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final there exists no fraud, there are
no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of the worlds are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
title be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to
future litigation over the same between the same parties. In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must
follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action.
This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain
other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse,
open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act
No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest
certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees
of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest
than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
Bishop v CA (GR No. 86787) May 08, 1992
 The private respondents sued the petitioners for
recovery of possession of the lots in question. The
plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered owners of the
land. In their answer, the defendants claimed that the
lots were part of the public domain and could not have
been registered under the Torrens system. All alleged
long and continuous possession of the lots and produced
tax declarations in their names. Two of them maintained
that they had acquired their respective lots by virtue of
valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on
inheritance.
 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. It held that the plaintiffs being the registered
owners in fee simple have lawful right to physical
possession of the land. (Art 428, NCC). The Court finds
and so holds that the plaintiffs being the registered
owners of the land in question are entitled to the
possession of the same, and that the defendants who
are occupying the land belonging to the plaintiffs in
violation of the right of the latter, are duty-bound to
restore possession of the same to the titled owners, the
herein plaintiffs.
 On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
National Grain Authority v IAC (GR No. 68741) January
28, 1988
 December 02, 1971 Spouses Vivas and Lizardo, as
owners, sold for P30,000.00 a parcel of land to private
respondents. This sale with right to repurchase was
recorded in the Office of Register of Deeds of Laguna on
December 06, 1971.
 Private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse,
open possession of the subject property.
 On February 26, 1975, an OCT covering the subject
property was issed to and in the name of the spouses
Vivas nad Lizardo without the knowledge of private
respondent.
 On April 30, 1975 spouses Vivas nad Lizardo executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez
authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the
National Grains Authority.
 The counsel for the petitioner requested for the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the subject property for unpaid
ISSUE: WON THE LAND IN QUESTION IS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN VALIDLY
REGISTERED UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM
The petition has no merit.
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original Certificate of Title
issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the
whole world. The presumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the
finding that the land subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens
system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown that the registration court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. [3] Neither of these requirements
has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in
question was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration
for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail against a court decision declaring
the land to be registrable.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property
at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and continuous occupancy of the lots in question,
the petitioners are in effect contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary
principle that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription. [5]
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby:[6]
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the
"mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with use and has long become a settled rule of
law.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SPOUSES VIVAS AND
LIZARDO, THE SELLERS, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THE BUYERS, TO DELIVER THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
TO THE LATTER, UPON ITS ISSUANCE, CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF TRUST SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT THE TITLE
AND RIGHT ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER NGA, AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE.
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is
by provision of law "understood to be without prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the
Torrens System and has obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the
suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private
respondents.
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens System is
an action in rem not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court
may have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the
decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for
the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a to proceeding in rem which shall be binding
upon all persons, known or unknown (Moscoso vs. Court of appeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, et
al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil.
120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred by res
 indebtedness. A public auction was scheduled and the
petitioner was the highest and successful bidder. A
Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.
 Private respondents learned that a title in the name of
the Vivas spouses had been issued covering the
property in question and that the same had been
mortgaged in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent
Nina Magcamit offered to pay NGA the balance due to
the Vivas spouses but petitioner refused to accept the
payment.
 The private respondents were asked by petitioner to
vacate the subject property but the former refused.
 Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners
and Spouses Vivas praying that they be declared the
owners of the property in question and entitled to
continue in possession.
 The trial court rendered its decision in favor of NGA as
lawful owners and ordered to turn over possession to
NGA.
 CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.
 NGA filed for a motion of reconsideration.
D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction v Panes (594 SCRA 578)
2009
 A parcel of land (TCT No. 200519) was conveyed by
Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago for services
rendered. On June 24, 1992, the respondents Panes
and his sons filed a complaint for quieting of title with
damages and petition for injunction against Regalado
and DBT.
 In the complaint, Panes alleged that he is the lawful
owner of the land which he had declared for taxation
purposes in his name. Respondents alleged that per
certificate issued by the DENR the land was verified to
be correct and on file.
 Respondents also claimed the Panes and his immediate
family had been and still are in actual possession of the
subject property, and their possession preceded the 2nd
world war. To perfect his title, Panes filed with the RTC
QC.
 Respondents averred that in the process of complying
with the registration, it was found out that a portion of the
land was with the subdivision plan of Regalado which
was conveyed by Regalado to DBT.
 On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime
and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura) filed
their Answer with Counterclaim, claiming that they were
buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a
house and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C.
Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and
registered owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When
respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the
property, Spouses Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery
of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97
which rendered a decision in their favor.
judicata when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizards. It does not matter that they may
have had some right even the right of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith,
shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances
which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except
those mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if
not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner
Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209 [1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if the purchaser
is the only party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles in the property registry, no one except such purchaser
may be deemed by law to be the owner of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation
to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427
[1985]).
ISSUE: (1) DID THE RTC ERR IN UPHOLDING DBT'S DEFENSES OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES AS RAISED IN THE
LATTER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION? (2) WHICH BETWEEN DBT AND THE RESPONDENTS HAVE A BETTER
RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY?
AFFIRMATIVE. The facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily
apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. However,
the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action filed before
it was not simply for reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has rendered their right
to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of
equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice.
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code,
acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws.
Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the
respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.
Note: Action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it
must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of
title or transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the
time of registration.
 On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it
is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject
property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C.
Regalado in the former’s favor; that respondents were
not real parties-in-interests because Panes was a mere
claimant whose rights over the property had yet to be
determined by the RTC where he filed his application for
registration; that the other respondents did not allege
matters or invoke rights which would entitle them to
the relief prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint
was premature; and that the action inflicted a chilling
effect on the lot buyers of DBT.
 RTC's Ruling: The testimony of Panes that he occupied
the property since he was only 16 had not been rebutted;
Panes's occupation and cultivation of the land for more
than 30 years vested him equitable ownership.
 DBT filed a motion for reconsideration based on the
grounds of prescription and laches. While this motion
was still pending, judge Bacalla died.
 CA's Ruling: CA reversed and set aside the RTC
Orders dated November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and
reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The
CA held that the properties described and included in
TCT No. 200519 are located in San Francisco del
Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao, Quezon
City while the subject property is located in Brgy. Pasong
Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA
held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony that there is a gap
of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu
123169 was not disproved or refuted. The CA found that
Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when
he entertained issues and admitted evidence presented
by DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration which were
never raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior to
the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that
DBT's claims of laches and prescription clearly appeared
to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's
Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds
enumerated in the Rules of Procedure.
Baranda v Hon. Judge Gustilo (GR No. 811638) ISSUE: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS TO ANNOTATE OR ANNUL A NOTICE
September 26, 1988 OF LIS PENDENS IN A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE?
 A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be
original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with
the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting
Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria register of deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to
Gotera and Susan Silao). cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately
 Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
said land. However during the trial, it was found that the registration.
transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the presentor or such denial in
was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec
 In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting 117 of this decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
 declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the
same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
petitioners. Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”
 However, by reason of a separate case pending in the
Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated
in the new certificate of title.
 This prompted the petitioners to move for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates.
 Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of
Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for
reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
Balbin v Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur (GR No. L-20611) ISSUE: WON THE REFUSAL OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS TO MAKE THE ANNOTATION IS PROPER
May 8, 1969
 Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity may be affected if an encumbrance, or
Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of the an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If different copies were permitted to carry
registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of different annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be available.
donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be
annotated on the title. Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife
 The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have Nemesia Mina, “there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the
 The register of deeds denied the requested annotation denial of registration, namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than ½ his share, not
for being “legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
law.” It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil status, character of land and validity of conveyances are in
separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and parties may protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis
favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana pendens.
Gabayan, who each received their co-owner’s duplicate
CTs.
 Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had
not been presented by petitioners, the register of deeds
refused to make the requested annotation.
 Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of
Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register
of Deeds in a resolution.
Almirol v Register of Deeds of Agusan (GR No. L-22486) ISSUE: WON MANDAMUS WILL LIE TO COMPEL THE RESPONDENT TO REGISTER THE DEED OF SALE IN
March 20, 1968 QUESTION
 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel
of land covered by OCT P-1237 in the name of “Arcenio NO. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo.” to a court of competent jurisdiction.1
 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but
secure a TCT but registration was refused by the a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
Register of Deeds upon the following grounds: a.) That
the OCT was by presumption considered conjugal . . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity
property b.) That in the sale of conjugal property it is is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not
necessary that both spouses sign the document. c.) require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their
Since the wife has already died, to effect the registration invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the
of aforesaid deed of absolute sale, it is necessary that purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are
the property be first liquidated and transferred in the expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration
name of the surviving spouse and heirs of the deceased must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco,
wife. 92 Phil. 182-183).
 In view of such refusal Almirol went to the CFI of Agusan
 on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of
Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue him the
corresponding TCT, recovery of moral damages,
attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation.
 Lower court dismissed the petition hence the present
appeal by Almirol.
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal
judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground
that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the
step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the Register of Deeds is in
doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or
other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of
Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration
either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter
shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall
enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with
the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed
to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.