DECISION-MAKING THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BY

JOSHUA ESTHER OJODUNWENE

COVENANT UNIVERSITY, CANAANLAND, OTA, OGUN STATE

COLLEGE OF LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses decision-making theory in international relations. An attempt is made at

defining decision-making theory; and considers the relationship between decision-making and

foreign policy, prospect and deliberative theories as essential parts of decision-making theory

and a critique of decision-making theory. It shows how reasoning, whether analogical or

rational, and limited human capabilities affect effective decision making.

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INTRODUCTION

The theory of decision-making was articulated by Joseph Snyder and his colleagues nearly fifty

years ago (Hagan, 2001: 5). Decision-making theory and foreign policy (making) are entwined.

In the 1970s, a combined study of both was widespread; enhanced by the introduction of

bureaucratic politics and other cognitive approaches to government decision making. In the

1980s however, neorealist and neoliberal views strengthened; and yet dwindled in the 1990s

due to the loopholes in the foreign policies of great powers during the Crimean war. Unlike

popular beliefs/misconceptions, decision-making can provide answers to some unresolved

issues/questions about conflicts and wars. How do we aptly explain ‘why’ and ‘when’ World

Wars I and II and the Cold War started? Surely, structural realism has not been able to explain

this. Nonetheless, that is not to say that decision-making approaches brought about the

outbreak of the wars. How do we grasp the complexity of foreign policy? Therefore,

understanding the dynamics of decision-making is imperative to responses to both domestic

and international issues, as it enhances better performance.

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DECISION-MAKING THEORY

Decision-making theory basically has as its underlying principle, people-significance. It suggests

that people matter in international affairs. (Hagan, 2001: 2). As such, I like to view it as a direct

opposite of structural-functionalism theory which stresses the importance of institutions. There

is no general definition of decision-making theory. However, in an attempt at the definition of

decision-making theory, I view it as the use of cognitive approaches based on rational or

analogical reasoning to act upon a pressing issue of concern.

Structural-realist theorists fall short in their explanation of the outbreak of World War I. Japan

in the East and Germany in Europe by the mid 1930s, were the major threat to international

stability. The major powers then – Britain, France and the United States of America did nothing

relevant to stop Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, Germany’s rearmament, Rhineland’s

remilitarization and the merging of Austria and Sudetenland. It was only at the outbreak of the

Munich crisis that the powers acted albeit nonchalantly. The United States even formulated

stricter neutrality acts (it was only after the fall of France that she loosened a bit and made

available the lend-lease aid). We still cannot fathom why Japan with obviously less military and

economic capabilities unlike the other powers had to expand the war into China in the mid

1930s and started the Pacific War against the United States.

By 1912, most of the increasingly vulnerable European governments had shifted to relatively

hard-line foreign policies. (Hagan, 2001: 8). Germany had forsaken Bismarck’s diplomacy for

militant diplomacy; the failure of micro-level balancing (crisis management) in July 1914 is quite

puzzling. It took the European government nearly a month to strike at Serbia after the

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assassination because they were jolted into concerns for Europe’s stability. Even when the war

seemed imminent, why did the diplomatic activities of the British and German foreign policies

seem ineffective in containing the war? Why could they not employ the concert diplomacy that

was applied during the Balkan crisis? Even the Triple Entete agreement was not honoured in

time.

When the international order is threatened, decision-makers respond to the ‘systematic

imperatives’. Even when a threat to war is imminent, decision-makers collectively, readily

strategise to deal with it – focusing on the national security as 9the goal and the foreign policy

authority necessary to commit the state’s resources in responding to the threat.

DECISION-MAKING MODELS

According to Joe Holtsi (2001), decision-making models are of three types – bureaucratic-

organisational model, small group politics (also referred to as groupthink) and individual

leaders. (p. 22-28).

In bureaucratic-organisation politics, traditional models called for a clear distinction between

politics and decision-making; administration, implementation and a presentation of that

distinction. The focal point of decision-making in a bureaucratic organization is the political

character of bureaucracies and certain aspects of organisational behaviour. Bureaucracies

which are often seen as complex organisations, are made up of individuals and units having

different values, interests and perceptions that are always in conflict. These differing qualities

arise from parochial self-interests and perceptions about division of labour. Values, experiences

and standard procedures of an organization either shape or distort the implementation of

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certain decisions. Hence, organizational decision-making has a political undertone – dominated

by bargaining for resources, roles and missions, and by compromise rather than analysis.

Assertion has been put forward by some analysts that, the only way to reduce some of the

nonrational aspects of bureaucratic behaviour are crises. This way, decisions reach the

hierarchy (where a higher quality of intelligence exists) faster. In the American system for

example, the president ultimately decides and selects players that will be crucial in shaping

ultimate decisions. For instance, the advice of the Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, not to

bomb or invade Cuba in 1962, was preferred by President Kennedy above all others. Allison’s

study of the Cuban Missile crisis casts doubt on the efficacy of traditional realist conceptions of

the unitary rational actor.

The second model which is the small group politics aims to assess the impact of group dynamics

on decision-making, sociology and social psychology, has been employed by some analysts.

Group suggestions have more impact on the quality of decisions than separate individual

preferences. This is so because groups are made up of individuals with distinct qualities,

specialists in their fields, dispersed in an effective division of labour and high-quality debates

that will bring out the best. Irving Janis, a social psychologist in his identification of

“groupthink” (small group politics), asserts that defiance in a fraction of a group enhances

performance in decision-making. If a group is constantly cohesive in nature, performance may

be reduced in decision making. He analysed “successful” cases as the Marshall Plan and the

Cuban Missile Crisis; and “unsuccessful” cases as the Munich Conference of 1938, Pearl Harbor

and the Bay of Pigs invasion to show that decision-making anomalies can be avoided.

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The third model is individual leaders. Policy makers (political leaders) have different characters.

These anomalies as postulated by cognitive psychology range from paranoia, authoritative,

displacements of private motives on public objects, etc. limited human capabilities often inhibit

rational decision-making. These limited capabilities could be an individual’s capacity to process

and assimilate information about a situation, inability to order preferences on a single utility

scale. As such, conceptions have arisen as to the strategies of the decision-maker in dealing

with half-truths, conflicting information, and complex situation.

In terms of analyzing foreign policy with reference to the functions of the decision-maker, some

view the decision-maker as a “bounded rationalist” who seeks satisfactory rather than optimal

solutions. Herbert Simon asserts that “the capacity of the human mind for formulating and

solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose solution

is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world...” () The decision-maker is also

seen as a “cognitive miser” who always seeks avenues to simplify complex problems and

shortcuts to problem solving. It is therefore no wonder that rational reasoning has given way to

analogical reasoning. In 1991 for instance, President Bush referred to Saddam Hussein as

“another Hitler” blinded by the distinct character of either men, but focused on similarities

between Iran in 1990 and Germany in 1938. He simply replayed the script history had laid out

and responded to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Prospect and deliberative theories are essential theories to be mentioned when considering

decision-making theory. Decision-making is basically a deliberative process and usually involves

taking risks.

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Prospect Theory

Prospect theory describes the way people between alternative probabilities without

considering the final outcome of their decisions whether it could incur gains or losses. States

can fight to maintain a status quo, but will not fight to create it in the first place. A good

example of this is Nigeria’s diplomacy under General Abacha’s regime and the United States

response to terrorism under the administration of President George W. Bush.

Deliberative Theory

Deliberative theory is a political theory that states that political decisions should be a product

of fair and reasonable discussion and debates among citizens.

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CRITIQUE OF DECISION-MAKING THEORY

Drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction of policy makers as either “hedgehogs” or “foxes”,

Nigerian foreign policy makers are “hedgehogs”. They drive policy in a consistent direction and

are not open to new information or changes unlike policy makers who are classified as “foxes”.

Foreign policy decision makers tend to be loss averse, generally protective of what they have

(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 as cited in Walter, Thomas & Beth, 2014: 199). Leaders are also

likely to take greater risks to protect what they already have than to increase their gains. It is

therefore no wonder that Nigeria has ‘Africa’ as the centre-piece of her foreign policy, and

always plays the role of “big brother” neglecting her immediate duties. Gowon’s decision during

the Nigeria-Biafra war is a good example of taking greater risks to protect the existence of

Nigeria as a state.

Looking at the twentieth century great conflicts- the World Wars and the Cold war, decision-

making conditions (the consideration of national security and foreign policy authority necessary

to commit the state’s resources in responding to threat), simply do not hold up very well.

Consequently, we cannot make sense of the responses of decision-makers to threatening

situations.

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CONCLUSION

Early in the twenty-first century, neuroscience is bringing emotion back into theories of

individual choice and collective moods and transforming understanding of decision making,

with significant consequences for the analysis of foreign policy and international politics. (Stein,

2013: 195). This is essential because all other theories of international relations cannot function

effectively without some level of decision-making (theory). Through the analysis of decision-

making, central key concepts in international politics- deterrence and reassurance, nuclear

proliferation, nuclear strategy, onset of war, signaling and bargaining, peace, conflict

management and resolution, are explored by political psychologists. (Janice, 2014: 195).

It is pertinent to note that a leaders views and teachings affect his actions. Consider differences

in foreign policy of the United States under President Obama and President Bush where the

former is a Republican and the latter is a Democrat. Their responses to terrorism and terrorists

differ. I can rightly say that decision-making is principally dependent on the ‘person’ of the

policy maker.

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